LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

University  of  California. 

Mrs.  SARAH  P.  WALSWORTH. 

Received  October,  1894. 
Accessions  No.S'J/  2r:^  -      Class  No, 


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'  forEssoi's  orv  ^  Trmdpks  df  Morality  jbi 
C  o  llui s  Bro-tier  3c  Co.  New  York. 


ESSAYS 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALITY, 


AND    ON    THa 


PRIVATE    AND   POLITICAL 


RIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS  OF  MANKIND. 


BY  JONATHAN   DYMOND, 

AUTHOR   OF   "an    ENQUIRY    INTO    THE    ACCORDANCY   OF   WAR    WITH    TUB 
PRINCIPLES    OF    CHRISTIANITY,"    ETC. 


"As  the  Will  of  God  is  ovir  f-ile;  to  enquire  what  is  our  duty,  or  what  we  are 
obliged  to  do,  in  any  instance,  is,  in  effect,  to  enquire  what  is  the  Will  of  God  in 
that  instance  1  which  consequently  becomes  the  whole  business  of  moraJity."— 
Paley. 


FIFTH      THOUSAND. 

NEW    YORK: 
COLLINS,  BROTHER  &  CO.,  254  PEARL  STREET. 


1845. 


|T7»f.?7B 


©»• 


^r3=»  If  the   Reader   approves  of  these    Essays  will  be 
please  recommend  them  ?  American  Publisher*, 


8TERE0TYPED     BT     T.     B.     SMITH, 
216  WILLIAM   STRBKT,  NEW   YORK. 


SMALL    BUT    INCREASING    NUMBER 

WHETHER   IN    THIS   COUNTRY   OR   ELSEWHERE, 

WHO 

MAINTAIN    IN    PRINCIPLE, 

AND 

ILLUSTRATE    BY    THEIR    PRACTICE, 

THE  GREAT  DUTY 

OF  CONFORMING  TO  THE 

LAWS    OF    CHRISTIAN    MORALITY 

WITHOUT  REGARD  TO 

DANGERS    OR    PRESENT    ADVANTAGES, 

THIS    WORK 

IS  RESPECTFUIXY   DEDICATED. 


PREFACE. 


The  Author  of  this  Work  died  in  the  spring  of  1828,  leav- 
ing in  manuscript  the  three  Essays  of  which  it  consists.  We 
learn  from  himself  that  the  undertaking  originated  in  a  belief 
(in  which  he  probably  is  far  from  being  alone)  that  the  exist- 
ing treatises  on  Moral  Philosophy  did  not  exhibit  the  princi- 
ples nor  enforce  the  obligations  of  morality  in  all  their  per- 
fection and  purity  ;  that  a  work  was  yet  wanted  which  should 
present  a  true  and  authoritative  standard  of  rectitude — one  by 
an  appeal  to  which  the  moral  character  •  of  human  actions 
might  be  rightly  estimated.    This  he  here  endeavours  to  supply. 

Rejecting  what  he  considered  the  false  grounds  of  duty, 
and  erroneous  principles  of  action  which  are  proposed  in  the 
most  prominent  and  most  generally  received  of  our  extant 
theories  of  moral  obligation,  he  proceeds  to  erect  a  system  of 
morality  upon  what  he  regards  as  the  only  true  and  legitimate 
basis — the  Will  of  God.  He  makes,  therefore,  the  authority 
of  the  Deity  the  sole  ground  of  duty,  and  His  communicated 
will  the  only  ultimate  standard  of  right  and  wrong ;  and  as- 
sumes, "  that  wheresoever  this  will  is  made  known,  human 
duty  is  determined  ;  and  that  neither  the  conclusions  of  phi- 
losophers, nor  advantages,  nor  dangers,  nor  pleasures,  nor  suf- 
ferings, ought  to  have  any  opposing  influence  in  regulating 
our  conduct." 

The  attempt  to  establish  a  system  of  such  uncompromising 
morality,  must  necessarily  bring  the  writer  into  direct  collision 
with  the  advocates  of  the  utilitarian  scheme,  particularly  with 
Dr.  Paley  ;  and  accordingly  it  will  be  found  that  he  frequently 
enters  the  lists  with  this  great  champion  of  Expediency. 
With  what  success — how  well  he  exposes  the  fallacies  of  that 
specious  but  dangerous  doctrine — ^how  far  he  succeeds  in  re- 
futing the  arguments  by  which  it  is  sought  to  be  maintained, 
and  in  establishing  another  system  of  obligations  and  duties 
and  rights  upon  a  more  stable  foundation,  must  be  left  to  the 
reader  to  determine. 

In  thus  attempting  to  convert  a  system  of  Moral  Philosophy, 
dubious,  fluctuating,  and  inconsistent  with  itself,  into  a  defmite 
and  harmonious  code  of  Scripture  Ethics,  the  Author  under 

X* 


Vl  PREFACE. 

took  a  task  for  which,  by  the  original  structure  of  his  mind  and 
his  prevailing  habits  of  reflection,  he  was,  perhaps,  peculiarly 
fitted.  He  had  sought  for  himself,  and  he  endeavours  to  convey 
to  others,  clear  perceptions  of  the  true  and  the  right ;  and  in 
maintaining  what  he  regarded  as  truth  and  rectitude,  he  shows 
every  where  an  unshackled  independence  of  mind,  and  a  fear- 
less, unflinching  spirit.  The  w^ork  will  be  found,  moreover, 
if  we  mistake  not,  to  be  the  result  of  a  careful  study  of  the 
writings  of  moralists,  of  much  thought,  of  an  intimate  ac- 
quaintance with  the  genius  of  the  Christian  religion,  and  an 
extensive  observation  of  human  life  in  those  spheres  of  action 
which  are  seldom  apt  to  attract  the  notice  of  the  meditative 
philosopher. 

In  proceeding  to  illustrate  his  principles,  the  author  has  evi- 
dently sought,  as  far  as  might  be,  to  simplify  the  subject,  to 
disencumber  it  of  abstruse  and  metaphysical  appendages,  and, 
rejecting  subtleties  and  needless  distinctions,  to  exhibit  a 
standard  of  morals  that  should  be  plain,  perspicuous  and  prac 
ticable. 

Premising  thus  much,  the  work  must  be  left  to  its  own 
merits.  It  is  the  last  labour  of  a  man  laudably  desirous  of 
benefiting  his  fellow  men ;  and  it  will  fulfil  the  Author's  wish, 
if  its  effect  be  to  raise  the  general  tone  of  morals,  to  give  dis- 
tinctness to  our  perceptions  of  rectitude,  and  to  add  strength 
to  our  resolutions  to  virtue. 


The  following  Essays  are  now  published  in  a  cheap  form, 
in  order  to  disseminate  more  widely  right  views  of  the  Chris- 
tian's moral  obligation.  The  importance  of  having  sound 
views  of  our  moral,  social,  and  political  rights  and  duties  can- 
not be  too  highly  estimated ;  and  it  is  hoped,  that  the  exten- 
sive difl^ision  of  a  work,  so  ably  exposing  the  laxity  of  many 
dangerous  popular  notions  and  practices,  and  the  sophistry  by 
which  these  are  upheld — particularly  the  evil  and  impolicy 
of  War — may  at  this  period,  under  the  Divine  blessing,  prove 
of  great  utility. 

The  present  Edition  contains  the  whole  of  the  original  one, 
published  in  England  in  two  volumes  octavo,  at  twenty-one 
shillings  sterling ;  and,  for  the  more  easy  reference  to  any 
particular  subject,  a  copious  Index  has  been  added. 


CONTENTS. 

ESSAY   I. 
PART  I.— PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALITY. 

PAOB 

CHAP.  I.    MORAL  OBLIGATION, 15 

Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 
CHAP.  IL     STANDARD  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG,      .  .  .  .16 

The  Will  of  God— Notices  of  Theories— The  communication  of  the  Will 

of  God — The  supreme  authority  of  the  expressed  Will  of  God— Causes 

'  of  its  practical  rejection — The  principles  of  expediency  fluctuating  and 

inconsistent— Application  of  the  principles  of  expediency— Difficulties— 

Liabihty  to  abuse — Pagans. 

The  Will  op  God,  .........    16 

The  communication  op  the  Will  op  God,    .  .  .  .  .19 

CHAP.  HI.  SUBORDINATE  STANDARDS  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG,  .  31 
Foundation  and  limits  of  the  authority  of  subordinate  moral  rules. 

CHAP.  IV.  COLLATERAL  OBSERVATIONS, 32 

Identical  authority  op  Moral  and  Religious  Obligations,    .  .    32 

Identical  authority  of  moral  and  reUgious  obligations— The  Divine  attributes 
— Of  deducing  rules  of  human  duty  from  a  consideration  of  the  attributes 
of  God— Virtue :  "  Virtue  is  conformity  with  the  standard  of  rectitude  " — 
Motives  of  action. 

The  Divine  Attributes,  ....  .  .    33 

Virtue,  .......  .  .    35 

CHAP.  V.    SCRIPTURE,  . 37 

The  morality  of  the  Patriarchal,  Mosaic,  and  Christian  dispensations— Their 
moral  requisitions  not  always  coincident— Supremacy  of  the  Christian 
morality— Of  variations  in  the  Moral  Law— Mode  of  applying  the  precepts 
of  Scripture  to  questions  of  duty — No  formal  moral  system  in  Scripture 
— Criticism  of  Biblical  morality — Of  particular  precepts  and  general  rules 
Matt.  vii.  12. — 1  Cor.  x.  31. — Rom.  iii.  8. — Benevolence,  as  it  is  proposed 
in  the  Christian  Scriptures. 

The  Morality  op  the  Patriarchal,  Mosaic,  and  Christian  DispeN' 
SATIONS,       .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  .37 

Mode  op  Applying  the  Precepts  of  Scripture  to  Questions  of  Dutt,    42 

Benevolence,  as  it  is  Proposed  in  the  Christian  Scriptures,        .    51 

CHAP.  VI.  THE  IMMEDIATE  COMMUNICATION  OF  THE  WILL  OF  GOD,    5« 

Conscience— Its  nature— Its  authority— Review  of  opinions  respecting  a 
moral  sense— Bishop  Butler— Lord  Bacon— Lord  Shaftesbury— Watts — 
Voltaire  —  Locke  —  Sout hey  —  Adam  Smith— Paley— Rousseau— Milton- 
Judge  Hale — Marcus  Antoninus — Epictetus — Seneca — Paul — That  every 
human  being  possesses  a  moral  law — Pagans — Gradations  of  light — Pro- 
phecy—The immediate  communication  of  the  Divine  Will  perpetual— 
Of  national  vices :  Infanticide  :  Duelling— Of  savage  Ufe. 

Section  i.    Conscience,  its  Nature  and  Authority,      .  .  .55 

Review  op  Opinions  Respecting  a  Moral  Sense,  .  .  .61 

The  Immediate  Communication  of  the  Will  of  God,     .  .  70 


VIU  CONTENTS. 


ESSAY    I. 

PART  II.— SUBORDINATE  MEANS  OF  DISCOVERING 
THE  DIVINE  WILL. 

PACK 

CHAP.  I.  THE  LAW  OF  THE  LAND, 80 

Its  authority — Limits  to  its  aiUliority — Morality  sometimes  prohibits  what 
the  law  permits. 

CHAP.  n.  THE  LAW  OF  NATURE, 86 

Its  authority — Limits  to  its  authority — Obligations  resulting  from  the  Rights 
of  Nature— Incorrect  ideas  attached  to  the  word  Nature. 

CHAP.  HI.     UTILITY,  .  .  .  ,  .  .  .  .91 

Obligations  resulting  from  Expediency — Limits  to  these  obligations. 
CHAP.  IV.     THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS.— THE  LAW  OF  HONOUR,  .  .    95 

Section  I.    The  Law  of  Nations,       .  .  .  .  •  .95 

Obligations  and  authority  of  the  Law  of  Nations — Its  abuses,  and  the  limits 
of  its  authority— Treaties. 

Section  IL    The  Law  of  Honour,       .  .  .  .  .  .99 

Authority  of  the  Law  of  Honour — Its  character. 


ESSAY    II. 
PRIVATE  RIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS. 

CHAP  I.     RELIGIOUS  OBLIGATIONS, 103 

Factitious  semblances  of  devotion— Religious  conversation :  Sabbatical  in- 
stitutions— Non-sanctity  of  days — Of  temporal  employments:  Travelling: 
Stage-coaches :  "  Sunday  papers :"  Amusements — Ilolydays — Ceremonial 
institutions  and  devotional  formularies  -Utility  of  forms — Forms  of  Prayer 
Extempore  prayer— Scepticism — Motives  to  Scepticism. 

Sabbatical  Institutions,  .  .  .  .  .  .  .107 

Ceremonial  Institutions  and  Devotional  Formularies,  .  .  112 

CHAP.  n.     PROPERTY, 119 

Foundation  of  the  Right  to  Property— Insolvency  :  Perpetual  obligation  to 
pay  debts  :  Reform  of  public  opinion  :  Examples  of  Integrity — Wills,  Le- 
gatees, Heirs  :  Informal  Wills  :  Intestates— Charitable  Bequests— Minor's 
Debts- A  Wife's  Debts— Bills  of  Exchange— Shipments— Distraints— Un- 
just Defendants — Extortion — Slaves — Privateers— Confiscations — Public 
Money — Insurance— Improvements  on  Estates — Settlements — Houses  of 
infamy — Literary  property — Rewards. 

CHAP.  in.  INEQUALITY  OF  PROPERTY,         .     .     .     .144 

Accumulation  of  Wealth :  its  proper  limits— Provision  for  Children  :  "Keep- 
ing up  tJie  Family." 

CHAP.  IV.     LITIGATION— ARBITRATION, 150 

Practice  of  early  Christians — Evils  of  Litigation — Efficiency  of  Arbitration. 

CHAP.  V.     THE  MORALITY  OF  LEGAL  PRACTICE,  .  .  .154 

Cormilexity  of  Law — Professional  Untruths — Defences  of  Lesal  Practice — 
Effect  s  of  Legal  Practice  :  Seduction :  Theft :  Peculation— Pleading— The 
Duties  of  the  Profession — Bfifects  of  Legal  Practice  on  the  profession, 
and  on  the  public. 


-CONTENTS.  IJ 

PAOE 
CLVP.  VI.     PROMISES.— LIES, 169 

Promises. — Definition  of  a  Pi'omise — Parole — Extorted  Promises — John 

Fletclier. 
Lies. — Milton's  Definition — Lies  in  War:  to  Robbei-s:  to  Lunatics  :  to  tlie 

Sick— Hyperbole— Irony— Complimentary  Untrutiis— "  Not  at  Home"— 

Legal  Documents. 

CHAP.  VU.     OATHS, W9 

Their  Moral  Ciiaracteu— Their  Efficacy  as  Securities  of  Vera- 
cixy- Their  Effects,    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .179 

A  Curse— Immorality  of  oaths— Oaths  of  the  ancient  Jews— Milton— Paley 
— The  High  Priest's  adjuration — Early  Cliristians— laefficacy  of  oaths — 
Motives  to  veracity — Religious  sanctions  :  Public  opinion  : — Legal  penal- 
ties—oaths in  Evidence  :  Parliamentary  Evidence  :  Courts  Martial— The 
United  States — Effects  of  Oaths :  Falsehood — General  obligations. 

CHAP.  VIII.  THE  MORAL  CHARACTER,  OBLIGATIONS,  AND  EFFECTS 
OF  PARTICULAR  OATHS, 193 

Subscription  to  Articles  op  Religion,        .....  195 

Oath  of  Allegiance — Oath  in  Evidence — Perjury — Military  oath — Oath  against 
Bribery  at  Elections— Oath  against  simony — University  oaths — Subscrip- 
tion to  articles  of  religion— Meaning  of  the  39  articles'literal— Refusal  to 
subscribe. 

CHAP.  IX.    IMMORAL  AGENCY 206 

Publication  and  circulation  of  books— Seneca— Circulating  Libraries— Pub- 
lic-houses— Prosecutions — Political  affairs. 

CHAP.  X.  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  INDIVIDUALS  UPON  PUBLIC  NOTIONS 
OF  MORALITY, 213 

Public  notions  of  morality — Errors  of  public  opinion  :  their  effects — Duel- 
ling—Scottish Bencli—Glor}'— Military  virtues— Military  talent— Bravery 
—Courage— Patriotism  not  the  soldier's  motive— Military  fame— Public 
opinion  of  unchastity  :  In  women  :  In  men— Power  of  character — Char- 
acter— Character  in  Legal  men — Fame— ^Faults  of  Great  men — The  Press 
— Newspapers — History  :  Its  defects  :  Its  power. 

CHAP.  XI.    INTELLECTUAL  EDUCATION, 239 

Ancient  Classics — London  University — The  Classics  in  Boarding-schools — 
English  Grammar — Science  and  Literature — Improved  sy.stem  of  Educa- 
tion—Orthography :  Writing :  Reading  :  Geography  :  Natural  History : 
Biography  :  Natural  Philosophy  :  Political  Science — Indications  of  a  revo- 
lution in  tlie  system  of  Education — Female  Education — The  Society  of 
Friends. 

CHAP.  Xn.    MORAL  EDUCATION, 254 

Union  of  Moral  principle  with  the  affections— Society— Morality  of  the  An- 
cient Classics— The  supply  of  motives  to  virtue — Conscience — Subjugation 
of  the  Will — Knowledge  of  our  own  Minds — Offices  of  public  worship. 

CHAP.  Xm.     EDUCATION  OF  IHE  PEOPLE, 266 

Advantages  of  extended  Education — Infant  Schools — Habits  of  enquiry. 

CHAP.  XIV.    AMUSEMENTS, 269 

Tlie  Stage— Religious  Amusements— Masquerades— Field  Sports— The  Turf 

—  Boxing  —  Wrestling  —  Opinions  of   Posterity  —  Popular  amusements 

needless. 

CHAP.  XV.     DUELLING, 273 

Pitt  and  Tierney— Duelling  the  offspring  of  intellectual  meanness,  fear,  and 
servility — "  A  fighting  man" — Hindoo  immolations — Wilberforce — Seneca. 

CHAP.  XVI.    SUICIDE, 280 

Unmanliness  of  Suicide — Forbidden  in  the  New  Testament— Its  folly— Le- 
gislation respecting  suicide — Vertlict  of  Felo  de  se. 

CHAP.  XVn.    RIGHTS  OF  SELF-DEFENCE, 235 

These  rights  not  absolute— Their  limits— Personal  attack — Preservation  of 
property— Much  resistance  lawful— Effects  of  forbearance— Sharpe— Bar- 
daj—Ellwood. 


*  CONTENTS. 

ESSAY    III. 

POLITICAL  RIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS 

rxam 
CHAP,  I.    PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  TRUTH,   AND  OF  POLITICAL 
RECTITUDE, .  .  .294 

I.  "  Political  Power  is  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  is  possessed  by  con- 
Bent  of  the  community  "—Governors  officers  of  the  Public— Tiunsfer  of 
their  rights  by  a  whole  people— The  people  hold  the  sovereign  power- 
Right  of  Governors — A  conciliating  system. 

II.  "  Political  Power  is  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  subserves  the  wel- 
fare of  the  community"— Interference  with  other  nations— Present  expe- 
dients for  present  occasions— Proper  business  of  Governments. 

III.  "  Political  Power  ia  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  subserves  the  wel- 
fare of  the  community  by  means  which  the  Moral  Law  permits  ''—The 
Moral  Law  alike  binding  on  nations  and  individuals— Deviation  from  rec- 
titude impolitic— " The  Holy  Alliance"— Durable  fame. 

I.  "Political  Power  is  rightly  possessed  only  when  it  is  pos- 
sessed BY  Consent  op  the  community,"  .  .  .  .  .295 

n.  "Political  Power  is  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  subserves 
the  Welfare  op  the  community,"  .  .  .  .  .  .301 

III.  "  Political  Power  is  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  subserves 
the  Welfare  of  the  community  by  means  which  the  Moral  Law 
PERMITS,"    ..........  305 

CHAP.  II.     CIVIL  LIBERTY, 310 

Loss  of  Liberty— War— Useless  laws. 
CHAP.  m.     POLITICAL  LIBERTY, 312 

Political  Liberty  the  right  of  a  community— Public  satisfaction. 
CHAP.  IV.    RELIGIOUS  LIBERTY, .314 

Civil  disabilities— Interference  of  the  Magistrate— Pennsylvania— Toleration 
—America— Creeds— Religious  Tests—"  The  Catholic  Question." 

CHAP.  V.     CIVIL  OBEDIENCE, 322 

Expediency  of  Obedience— Obligations  to  Obedience— Extent  of  the  Duty 
—Resistance  to  the  Civil  Power— Obedience  may  be  withdrawn— King 
James— America— Non-compliance  — Interference  of  the  Magistrate- 
Oaths  of  Allegiance. 

CHAP.  VL  FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT, 333 

Some  general  principles— Monarchy— Balance  of  interests  and  passions 
— Changes  in  a  constitution — Popular  government — The  world  in  a  state 
of  improvement— Character  of  legislators. 

CHAP.  VII.    POLITICAL  INFLUENCE— PARTY— MINISTERIAL  UNION,  342 

Influence  of  the  Crown — Effects  of  influence — Incongruity  of  public  notions — 
Patronage — American  States — Dependency  on  the  mother  country — Party 
—Ministerial  Union—"  A  party  man  " — The  council  board  and  the  senate 
— Resignation  of  offices. 

CHiP.  Vm.    BRITISH  CONSTITUTION 353 

Influence  of  the  Crown— House  of  Lords— Candidates  for  a  peerage— Sud- 
den creation  of  peers— The  bench  of  Bishops— Proxies— House  of  Com- 
mons—The wishes  of  the  people— Extension  of  the  elective  franchise — 
Universal  suffrage — Frequent  elections — Modes  of  election — Annual  par- 
liaments— Qualification  of  voters  and  representatives — Of  choosing  the 
clergy— Duties  t)f  a  representative— Systematic  opposition— Placemen 
and  pensioners — Posthumous  fame. 

CHAP   IX.  MORAL  LEGISLATION, 375 

Duties  of  a  Ruler— The  two  objects  of  moral  legislation— Education  of  the 
People— Bible  Society— Lotteries— Public-houses— Abrogation  of  bad  lawa 
—Primogeniture— Accumulation  of  property. 


CONTENTS.  11 

PAOB 
CHAP.  X.    AD>nNISTRATION  OF  JUSTICE, 384 

Substitution  of  justice  for  law— Court  of  Chancei-y— Of  fixed  laws— Their 
inadequacy — They  increase  litigation — Delays — Expenses — Infornnalities 
— Precedents — Verdicts — Legal  proof— Courts  of  Arbitration — An  extend- 
ed svstem  of  arbitration — Arbitration  in  criminal  trials — Constitution  of 
courts  of  arbitration— Their  effects— Some  alterations  suggested— Techni- 
calities— Useless  laws. 

CHAP.  XI.   OF  THE  PROPER  SUBJECTS  OF  PENAL  ANIMADVERSION,  403 

Crimes  regarded  by  the  Civil  and  the  Moral  Law— Created  offences— Seduc- 
tion—Duelling—Insolvents— Criminal  debtors— Gradations  of  guilt  in  In- 
solvency—Libels :  mode  of  punishing— Effects  of  the  laws  respecting 
Libels— Effects  of  public  censure— Libels  on  the  Government— Advanta- 
ges of  a  free  statement  of  the  truth — Freedom  of  the  Press. 

CHAP.  Xn.     OF  THE  PROPER  ENDS  OF  PUNISHMENT,     .  .  .  4SSI 

The  three  Objects  of  Punishment :— Reformation  of  the  Offender: — Exam- 
ple :— Restitution — Punishment  may  be  increased  as  well  as  diminished. 

CHAP.  XIH.     PUNISHMENT  OF  DEATH, 428 

Of  the  three  objects  of  punishment,  the  punishment  of  death  regards  but 
one — Reformation  of  minor  offenders :  Greater  criminals  neglected — 
Capital  punishments  not  efficient  as  examples — Public  executions — Paul 
— Grotius— Murder— The  punishment  of  death  irrevocable — Rousseau- 
Recapitulation. 

CHAP.  XIV.     RELIGIOUS  ESTABLISHMENTS, 438 

The  primitive  church— The  established  church  of  Ireland— America— Ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  of  established  churches — Alliance  of  a  church 
with  the  state— An  established  church  perpetuates  its  own  evils— Persecu- 
tion generally  the  growth  of  religious  establishments — State  religions  in 
jurious  to  the  civil  welfare  of  a  people — Legal  provision  for  Christian 
teachers — Voluntary  payment — ^Advancement  in  the  church — The  appoint- 
ment of  religious  teachers. 

CHAP.  XV.     THE  RELIGIOUS  ESTABLISHMENTS  OF  ENGLAND  AND 
IRELAND, 463 

The  English  Church  the  offspring  of  the  Reformation,  the  Church  establish- 
ment, of  Papacy— Alliance  of  Church  and  State—"  The  Priesthood  averse 
from  Reformation" — Noble  Ecclesiastics  —  Purchase  of  advowsons — 
Non-residence — Pluralities— Parliamentary  Returns — The  Clergy  fear  to 
preach  the  truth— Moral  Preaching— Recoil  from  Works  of  Philanthropy 
—Tithes— "The  Church  is  in  Danger"— The  Church  establishment  is  in 
danger— Monitory  Suggestion. 

CHAP.  XVI     OF  LEGAL   PROVISION   FOR   CHRISTIAN  TEACHERS.— 
OF  VOLUNTARY  PAYMENT,  AND  OF  UNPAID  MINISTRY,        .  .  486 

Compulsory  payment— America— Legal  provision  for  one  church  unjust— 
—Payment  of  Tithes  by  dissenters— Tithes  a  "property  of  the  church" — 
Voluntary  payment — The  system  of  remuneration — Quahfications  of  a 
minister  of  the  gospel— Unpaid  ministry— Days  of  greater  purity. 

CHAP.  XVn.     PATRIOTISM, 502 

Patriotism  as  it  is  viewed  by  Christianity— A  Patriotism  which  is  opposed 
to  general  benignity — Patriotism  not  the  soldier's  motive. 

CHAP.  XVIII.     SLAVERY, 50$ 

Requisitions  of  Christianity  professedly  disregarded— Persian  Law— The 
slave  system  a  costly  iniquity. 

CHAP.  XIX.     WAR, 511 

Causes  of  War,     .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .513 

Want  of  enquiry  :  Indifference  to  human  misery  :  National  irritability  :  In- 
terest :  Secret  motives  of  Cabinets :  Ideas  of  glory — Foundation  of  mili- 
tary glory. 

Consequences  of  War,  .......  521 

Destruction  of  human  life :  Taxation  ;  Moral  depraTity :  Familiarity  with 
plunder :  Implicit  submission  to  superiors :  Resignation  of  moral  agency : 
Bondage  and  degradation — Loan  of  armies— Effects  on  the  community. 


Xii  CONTENTS. 

FAOB 

Lawfulness  op  War,  .  .  .  .  .  .  .631 

Influence  of  habit — Of  appealing  to  antiquity — Tlie  Christian  Scriptures — 
Subjects  of  Christ's  benediction— Matt,  xxvii.  52.— The  Apostles  and 
Evangelists — The  Centurion — Cornelius — Silence  not  a  proof  of  approba- 
tion— Luke  xxii.  36. — John  the  Baptist- Negative  evidence — Prophecies 
of  the  Old  Testament — The  requisitions  of  Christianity  of  present  obli- 
gation— Primitive  Christians — Example  and  testimony  of  early  Christians 
— Christian  soldiers — Wars  of  the  Jews — Duties  of  individuals  and  nations 
Oflfensive  and  defensive  war  —  Wars-  always  aggressive  — Paley — War 
wholly  forbidden. 

Of  the  probable  and  practical  Effects  of  adherintj  to  the  Moral 
Law  in  respect  to  War,        .......  558 

Quakers  in  America  and  Ireland — Colonization  of  Pennsylvania— Uncondi- 
tional reliance  on  Providence— Recapitulation— General  Observations. 

CONCLUSION, 566 


INTRODUCTORY    NOTICES. 


Of  the  two  causes  of  our  deviations  from  Rectitude — want  of 
Knowledge  and  want  of  Virtue — the  latter  is  undoubtedly  the 
more  operative.  Want  of  knowledge  is,  however,  sometimes  a 
cause ;  nor  can  this  be  any  subject  of  wonder  when  it  is  recol- 
lected in  what  manner  many  of  our  notions  of  right  and  wrong 
are  acquired.  From  infancy,  every  one  is  placed  in  a  sort  of 
mora,  school,  in  which  those  with  whom  he  associates,  or  of  whom 
he  hears,  are  the  teachers.  That  the  learner  in  such  a  school 
will  often  be  taught  amiss,  is  plain. — So  that  we  w^ant  information 
respecting  our  duties.  To  supply  this  information  is  an  object  of 
Moral  Philosophy,  and  is  attempted  in  the  present  work. 

When  it  is  considered  by  what  excellences  the  existing  trea- 
tises on  Moral  Philosophy  are  recommended,  there  can  remain 
but  one  reasonable  motive  for  adding  yet  another — the  belief  that 
these  treatises  have  not  exhibited  the  Principles  and  enforced  the 
Obligations  of  Morality  in  all  their  perfection  and  purity.  Per- 
haps the  frank  expression  of  this  belief  is  not  inconsistent  with 
that  deference  which  it  becomes  every  man  to  feel  when  he  ad- 
dresses the  pubhc ;  because,  not  to  have  entertained  such  a  be- 
lief, were  to  have  possessed  no  reason  for  writing.  The  desire 
of  supplying  the  deficiency,  if  deficiency  there  be ;  of  exhibiting 
a  true  and  authoritative  Standard  of  Rectitude,  and  of  estimating 
the  moral  character  of  human  actions  by  an  appeal  to  that  Stand- 
ard, is  the  motive  which  has  induced  the  composition  of  these 
Essays. 

In  the  First  Essay  the  writer  has  attempted  to  investigate  the 
Principles  of  Morality.  In  which  term  is  here  included,  first  the 
Ultimate  Standard  of  Right  and  Wrong ;  and,  secondly,  those 
Subordinate  Rules  to  which  we  are  authorized  to  apply  for  the 
direction  of  our  conduct  in  life.  In  these  investigations  he  has 
been  solicitous  to  avoid  any  approach  to  curious  or  metaphysical 
enquiry.  He  has  endeavoured  to  act  upon  the  advice  given  by 
Tindal,  the  Reformer,  to  his  friend  John  Frith  :  "  Pronounce  not 
or  define  of  hid  secrets,  or  things  that  neither  help  nor  hinder 
whether  it  be  so  or  no ;  but  stick  you  stiffly  and  stubbornly  in 
earnest  and  necessary  things." 

In  the  Second  Essay  these  Principles  of  Morality  are  applied 
in  the  determination  of  various  questions  of  personal  and  relative 
duty.    In  making  this  application,  it  has  been  far  from  the  writer's 

2 


XIT  INTRODUCTORY    NOTICES. 

desire  to  deliver  a  system  of  Morality.  Of  the  unnumbered  par- 
ticulars to  which  this  Essay  might  have  been  extended,  he  haa 
therefore  made  a  selection ;  and  in  making  it.  has  chosen  those 
subjects  which  appeared  peculiarly  to  need  the  enquiry,  either 
because  the  popular  or  philosophical  opinions  respecting  them  ap 
peared  to  be  unsound,  or  because  they  were  commonly  little  ad- 
verted to  in  the  practice  of  life.  Form  has  been  sacrificed  to 
utility.  Many  great  duties  have  been  passed  over,  since  no  one 
questions  their  obligation  ;  nor  has  the  author  so  little  consulted 
the  pleasure  of  the  reader  as  to  expatiate  upon  duties  simply  be- 
cause they  are  great.  The  reader  will  also  regard  the  subjects 
that  have  been  chosen  as  selected,  not  only  for  the  purpose  of 
elucidating  the  subjects  themselves,  but  as  furnishing  illustration 
of  the  General  Principles — as  the  compiler  of  a  book  of  mathe- 
matics proposes  a  variety  of  examples,  not  merely  to  discover  the 
solution  of  the  particular  problem,  but  to  familiarize  the  applica- 
tion of  his  general  rule. 

Of  the  Third  Essay,  in  which  some  of  the  great  questions  of 
Political  rectitude  have  been  examined,  the  subjects  are  in  them- 
selves sufficiently  important.  The  application  of  sound  and  pure 
Moral  Principles  to  questions  of  Government,  of  Legislation,  of 
the  Administration  of  .Justice,  or  of  Religious  Establishments,  is 
manifestly  of  great  interest ;  and  the  interest  is  so  much  the 
greater,  because  these  subjects  have  usually  been  examined,  as 
the  writer  conceives,  by  other  and  very  different  standards. 

The  reader  will  probably  find,  in  each  of  these  Essays,  some 
principles  or  some  conclusions  respecting  human  duties  to  which 
he  has  not  been  accustomed — some  opinions  called  in  question 
which  he  has  habitually  regarded  as  being  indisputably  true,  and 
some  actions  exhibited  as  forbidden  by  morality  which  he  has 
supposed  to  be  lawful  and  right.  In  such  cases  I  must  hope  for 
his  candid  investigation  of  the  truth,  and  that  he  will  not  reject 
conclusions  but  by  the  detection  of  inaccuracy  in  the  reasonings 
from  which  they  are  deduced.  I  hope  he  will  not  find  himself 
invited  to  alter  his  opinions  or  his  conduct  without  being  shown 
why  ;  and  if  he  is  conclusively  shown  this,  that  he  will  not  reject 
truth  because  it  is  new  or  unwelcome. 

With  respect  to  the  present  influence  of  the  Principles  which 
these  Essays  illustrate,  the  author  will  feel  no  disappointment  if 
it  is  not  great.  It  is  not  upon  the  expectation  of  such  influence 
that  his  motive  is  founded  or  his  hope  rests.  His  motive  is,  to 
advocate  truth  without  reference  to  its  popularity  ;  and  his  hope 
is,  to  promote  by  these  feeble  exertions,  an  approximation  to  that 
state  of  purity,  which  he  believes  it  is  the  design  of  God  shall 
eventually  beautify  and  dignify  the  condition  of  mankind. 


ESSAY   I. 

PART  I. 

PRINCIPLES    OF    MORALITY 


CHAPTER  I. 

MORAL  OBLIGATION. 

Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 


There  is  little  hope  of  proposing  a  definition  of  Moral 
Obligation  which  shall  be  satisfactory  to  ever)^  reader ;  partly 
because  the  phrase  is  the  representative  of  different  notions 
in  individual  minds.  No  single  definition  can,  it  is  evident, 
represent  various  notions  ;  and  there  are  probably  no  means 
by  which  the  notions  of  individuals  respecting  Moral  Obliga- 
tion can  be  adjusted  to  one  standard.  Accordingly,  whilst 
attempts  to  define  it  have  been  very  numerous,  all  probably 
have  been  unsatisfactory  to  the  majority  of  mankind. 

Happily  this  question,  like  many  others  upon  which  the 
world  is  unable  to  agree,  is  of  little  practical  importance. 
Many  who  dispute  about  the  definition,  coincide  in  their  judg- 
ments of  Avhat  we  are  obliged  to  do  and  to  forbear  ;  and  so 
long  as  the  individual  knows  that  he  is  actually  the  subject 
of  Moral  Obligation,  and  actually  responsible  to  a  superior 
power,  it  is  not  of  much  consequence  whether  he  can  criti- 
cally explain  in  what  Moral  Obligation  consists. 

The  writer  of  these  pages,  therefore,  makes  no  attempts  at 
strictness  of  definition.  It  is  sufficient  for  his  purpose  that 
man  is  under  an  obligation  to  obey  his  Creator  ;  and  if  any 
one  curiously  asks  "  Why  ?" — he  answers,  that  one  reason  at 
least  is,  that  the  Deity  possesses  the  power,  and  evinces  the 
intention,  to  call  the  human  species  to  account  for  their  ac- 
tions, and  to  punish  or  reward  them. 

There  may  be,  and  I  believe  there  are,  higher  grounds 
upoa  which  a  sense  of  Moral  Obligation  may  be  founded ; 


16  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  [eSSAY  I. 

such  as  the  love  of  goodness  for  its  own  sake,  or  love  and 
gratitude  to  God  for  his  beneficence  :  nor  is  it  unreasonable 
to  suppose  that  such  grounds  of  obligation  are  especially  ap- 
Tiroved  bv  the  universal  Parent  of  mankind. 


CHAPTER  II. 


STANDARD  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG. 

The  Will  of  God — Notices  of  Theories — The  communication  of  the  Will 
of  God — The  supreme  authority  of  the  expressed  Will  of  God — Causes 
of  its  practical  rejection — The  principles  of  expediency  fluctuating 
and  inconsistent — Application  of  the  principles  of  expediency — Difii- 
culties — Liabihty  to  abuse — Pagans. 

-^  It  is  obvious  that  to  him  who  seeks  the  knowledge  of  his 
duty,  the  first  enquiry  is,  What  is  the  Rule  of  Duty  ?  What 
is  the  Standard  of  Right  and  Wrong  ?  Most  men,  or  most  of 
those  with  whom  we  are  concerned,  agree  that  this  Standard 
consists  in  the  Will  of  God.  But  here  the  coincidence  of 
opinion  stops  Various  and  very  dissimilar  answers  are  given 
to  the  question.  How  is  the  Will  of  God  to  be  discovered  ? 
These  differences  lead  to  diflering  conclusions  respecting  hu- 
man duty.  All  the  proposed  modes  of  discovering  his  Will 
cannot  be  the  best  nor  the  right ;  and  those  which  are  not 
right  are  likely  to  lead  to  erroneous  conclusions  respecting 
what  his  Will  is. 

It  becomes  therefore  a  question  of  very  great  interest — 
How  is  the  Will  of  God  to  be  discovered  ?  and  if  there  should 
appear  to  be  more  sources  than  one  from  which  it  may  be  de- 
duced— What  is  that  source  which,  in  our  investigations,  we 
are  to  regard  as  paramount  to  every  other  ? 

THE  WILL  OF  GOD. 

When  we  say  that  most  men  agree  in  referring  to  the  Will 
of  God  as  the  Standard  of  Rectitude,  we  do  not  mean  that  all 
those  who  have  framed  systems  of  moral  philosophy  have  set 
out  with  this  proposition  as  their  fundamental  rule  ;  but  we 
mean  that  the  majority  of  mankind  do  really  believe  (with 
whatever  indistinctness)  that  they  ought  to  obey  the  Will  of 
God  i  and  that,  as  it  respects  the  systems  of  philosophical 


GHAP.  II.]  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  17 

men,  they  will  commonly  be  found  to  involve,  directly  or  in- 
directly, the  same  belief.  He  w^ho  says  that  the  "  Under- 
standing"* is  to  be  our'  moral  guide,  is  not  far  from  saying 
that  we  are  to  be  guided  by  the  Divine  Will ;  because  the 
understanding,  however  we  define  it,  is  the  offspring  of  the 
Divine  counsels  and  power.  When  Adam  Smith  resolves 
moral  obligation  into  propriety  arising  from  feelings  of  "  Sym- 
pathy,"! the  conclusion  is  not  very  different ;  for  these  feelings 
are  manifestly  the  result  of  that  constitution  which  God  gave 
to  man.  W^hen  Bishop  Butler  says  that  we  ought  to  live  ac- 
cording to  nature,  and  make  conscience  the  judge  whether  we 
do  so  live  or  not,  a  kindred  observation  arises  ;  for  the  exist- 
ence and  nature  of  conscience  must  be  referred  ultimately  to 
the  Divine  Will.  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke's  philosophy  is,  that 
moral  obligation  is  to  be  referred  to  the  eternal  and  necessary 
differences  of  things.  This  might  appear  less  obviously  to 
have  respect  to  the  Divine  W^ill,  yet  Dr.  Clarke  himself  sub- 
sequently says,  that  the  duties  which  these  eternal  differences 
of  things  impose,  "  are  also  the  express  and  unalterable  will, 
command,  and  law  of  God  to  his  creatures,  whfph  he  cannot 
but  expect  should  be  observed  by  them  in  obedience  to  his 
supreme  authority."!  Very  similar  is  the  practical  doctrine 
of  Wollaston.  His  theory  is,  that  moral  good  and  evil  con- 
sist in  a  conformity  or  disagreement  with  truth — "  in  treating 
every  thing  as  being  ivhat  it  is.'^  But  then  he  says,  that  to 
act  by  this  rule  "  must  be  agreeable  to  the  Will  of  God,  and 
if  so,  the  contrary  must  be  disagreeable  to  it,  and,  since  there 
must  be  perfect  rectitude  in  his  will^  certainly  icrong^^  It  is 
the  same  with  Dr.  Paley  in  his  far-famed  doctrine  of  Expe- 
diency. "  It  is  the  utility  of  any  action  alone  which  consti- 
tutes the  obligation  of  it ;"  but  this  very  obligation  is  deduced 
from  the  Divine  Benevolence  ;  from  which  it  is  attempted  to 
show,  that  a  regard  to  utility  is  enforced  by  the  Will  of  God. 
Nay,  he  says  expressly,  "  Every  duty  is  a  duty  towards  God, 
since  it  is  his  vnll  which  makes  it  a  duty."|| 

Now  there  is  much  value  in  these  testimonies,  direct  or  in- 
direct, to  the  truth — that  the  Will  of  God  is  the  Standard  of 
Right  and  Wrong.  *The  indirect  testimonies  are  perhaps  the 
more  valuable  of  the  two.  He  who  gives  undesigned  evi- 
dence in  favour  of  a  proposition,  is  less  liable  to  suspicion  in 
his  motives. 

*  Dr.  Price:  Review  of  Principal  Questions  in  Morals, 
t  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments. 
\  Evidence  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion^ 

§  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated.         ||  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy. 
2* 


18  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WROXG.  [eSSAY  I. 

But,  whilst  we  regard  these  testimonies,  and  such  as  these, 
as  containing  satisfactory  evidence  that  the  Will  of  God  is 
our  Moral  Law,  the  intelligent  enquirer  will  perceive  that 
many  of  the  proposed  Theories  are  likely  to  lead  to  uncertain 
and  unsatisfactory  conclusions  respecting  what  that  Will  re- 
quires. They  prove  that  His  Will  is  the  Standard,  but  they 
do  not  clearly  inform  us  how  we  shall  bring  our  actions  into 
juxtaposition  with  it. 

One  proposes  the  Understanding  as  the  means  ;  but  every 
observer  perceives  that  the  understandings  of  men  are  often 
contradictory  in  their  decisions.  Indeed  many  of  tliose  who 
now  think  their  understandings  dictate  the  rectitude  of  a  given 
action,  will  find  that  the  understandings  of  the  intelligent 
pagans  of  antiquity  came  to  very  different  conclusions. 

A  second  proposes  Sympathy,  regulated  indeed  and  re- 
strained, but  still  Sympathy.  However  ingenious  a  philoso- 
phical system  may  be,  I  believe  that  good  men  find,  in  the 
practice  of  life,  that  these  emotions  are  frequently  unsafe,  and 
sometimes  erroneous  guides  of  their  conduct.  Besides,  the 
emotions  are, to  be  regulated  and  restrained  ;  which  of  itself 
intimates  the  necessity  of  a  regulating  and  restraining,  that 
is,  of  a  superior  power. 

To  say  we  should  act  according  to  the  "  eternal  and  neces- 
sary differences  of  things,"  is  to  advance  a  proposition  which 
nine  persons  out  of  ten  do  not  understand,  and  of  course  can- 
not adopt  in  practice  ;  and  of  those  who  do  understand  it,  per- 
haps an  equal  majority  cannot  apply  it,  with  even  tolerable 
facility,  to  the  concerns  of* life.  Why  indeed  should  a  writer 
propose  these  eternal  differences,  if  he  acknowledges  that  the 
rules  of  conduct  which  result  from  them  are  "  the  express  will 
and  command  of  God  ?" 

To  the  system  of  a  fourth,  which  says  that  virtue  consists 
in  a  "  conformity  of  our  actions  with  truth,"  the  objection  pre- 
sents itself — what  is  truth  ?  or  how,  in  the  complicated  affairs 
of  life,  and  in  the  moment  perhaps  of  sudden  temptation,  shall 
the  individual  discover  what  truth  is  ? 

Similar  difficulties  arise  in  applying  the  doctrine  of  Utility 
in  "  adjusting  our  actions  so  as  to  promote,  in  the  greatest  de- 
gree, the  happiness  of  mankind."  It  is  obviously  difficult  to 
apply' this  doctrine  in  practice.  The  welfare  of  mankind  de- 
pends upon  circumstances  which,  if  it  were  possible,  it  is  not 
easy  to  foresee.  Indeed  in  many  of  those  conjunctures  in 
which  important  decisions  must  instantly  be  made,  the  com- 
putation of  tendencies  to  general  happiness  is  wholly  im* 
practi '-able.  • 


CHAP.  II.]         STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  19 

Besides  these  objections  which  apply  to  the  systems  sepa- 
rately, there  is  one  which  applies  to  them  all — That  they  do 
not  refer  us  directly  to  the  Will  of  God.  They  interpose  a 
medium ;  and  it  is  the  inevitable  tendency  of  all  such  me- 
diums to  render  the  truth  uncertain.  They  depend  not  in- 
deed upon  hearsay  evidence,  but  upon  something  of  which 
the  tendency  is  the  same.  They  seek  the  Will  of  God  not 
from  positive  evidence  but  by  implication  ;  and  we  repeat  the 
truth,  that  every  medium  that  is  interposed  between  the  Di- 
vine Will  and  our  estimates  of  it,  diminishes  the  probability 
that  we  shall  estimate  it  rightly. 

These  are  considerations  which,  antecedently  to  all  others, 
would  prompt  us  to  seek  the  Will  of  God  directly  and  imme- 
diately ;  and  it  is  evident  that  this  direct  and  immediate 
knowledge  of  the  Divine.  Will,  can  in  no  other  manner  be 
possessed  than  by  his  own  Communication  of  it. 

THE  COMMUNICATION  OF  THE  WILL  OF  GOD. 

That  a  direct  communication  of  the  Will  of  the  Deity  re- 
specting the  conduct  which  mankind  shall  pursue,  must  be 
very  useful  to  them,  can  need  little  proof.  It  is  sufficiently 
obvious  that  they  who  have  had  no  access  to  the  written  re- 
velations, have  commonly  entertained  very  imperfect  views 
of  right  ^nd  wrong.  What  Dr.  Johnson  says  of  the  ancient 
epic  poets,  will  apply  generally  to  pagan  philosophers  :  They 
"  were  very  unskilful  teachers  of  virtue,"  because  "  they  wanted 
the  light  of  revelation."  Yet  these  men  were  inquisitive  and 
acute,  and  it  may  be  supposed  they  would  have  discovered 
moral  truth  if  sagacity  and  inquisitiveness  had  been  sufficient 
for  the  task.  But  it  is  unquestionable,  that  there  are  many 
ploughmen  in  this  country,  who  possess  more  accurate  know- 
ledge of  morality  than  all  the  sages  of  antiquity.  We  do  not 
indeed  sufficiently  consider  for  how  much  knowledge  respect- 
ing the  Divine  Will  we  are  indebted  to  his  own  Communica- 
tion of  it.  "  Many  arguments,  many  truths,  both  moral  and 
religious,  which  appear  to  us  the  products  of  our  understand- 
ings and  the  fruits  of  ratiocination,  are  in  reality  nothing  more 
than  emanations  from  Scripture ;  rays  of  the  Gospel  imper- 
ceptibly transmitted,  and  as  it  were  conveyed  to  our  minds  in 
a  side  hght."*  Of  Lord  Herbert's  book.  Be  Veritate,  which 
was  designed  to  disprove  the  validity  of  Revelation,  it  is  ob- 
served by  the  editor  of  his  "  Life,"  that  it  is  "  a  book  so 
strongly  embued  with  the  light  of  revelation  relative  to  the 

*  Balguy .  Tracts  Moral  and  Theological : — Second  Letter  to  a  Deist. 


20  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  [eSSAT  I. 

moral  virtues  and  a  future  life,  that  no  man  ignorant  of  the 
Scriptures  or  of  the  knowledge  derived  from  them,  could  have 
written  it."*  A  modern  system  of  moral  philosophy  is  founded 
upon  the  duty  of  doing  good  to  man,  because  it  appears,  from 
the  benevolence  of  God  himself,  that  such  is  his  Will.  Did 
those  philosophers  then,  who  had  no  access  to  the  written 
expression  of  his  will,  discover  with  any  distinctness  this 
seemingly  obvious  benevolence  of  God  1  No.  "  The  heathens 
failed  of  drawing  that  deduction  relating  to  morality,  to  which, 
as  we  should  now  judge,  the  most  obvious  parts  of  natural 
knowledge,  and  such  as  certainly  obtained  among  them,  were 
sufficient  to  lead  them,  namely,  the  goodness  of  Gocl.^j — We  . 
are,  I  say,  much  more  indebted  to  revelation  for  moral  light, 
than  we  commonly  acknowledge  or  indeed  commonly  perceive. 

But  if  in  fact  we  obtain  from  the  communication  of  the  Will 
of  God,  knowledge  of  wider  extent  and  of  a  higher  order  than 
was  otherwise  attainable,  is  it  not  an  argument  that  that  com- 
municated Will  should  be  our  supreme  law,  and  that,  if  any 
of  the  inferior  means  of  acquiring  moral  knowledge  lead  to 
conclusions  in  opposition  to  that  Will,  they  ought  to  give  way 
to  its  higher  authority  ? 

Indeed  the  single  circumstance  that  an  Omniscient  Being, 
and  who  also  is  the  Judge  of  mankind,  has  expressed  his 
Will  respecting  their  conduct,  appears  a  sufficient  evidence 
that  they  should  regard  that  expression  as  their  paramount 
rule.  They  cannot  elsewhere  refer  to  so  high  an  authority. 
If  the  expression  of  his  Will  is  not  the  ultimate  standard  of 
right  and  wrong,  it  can  only  be  on  the  supposition  that  his 
Will  itself  is  not  the  ultimate  standard  ;  for  no  other  means 
of  ascertaining  that  Will  can  be  equally  perfect  and  authori- 
tative. 

Another  consideration  is  this,  that  if  we  examine  those  sa- 
cred volumes  in  which  the  Avritten  expression  of  the  Divine 
Will  is  contained,  we  find  that  they  habitually  proceed  upon 
the  supposition  that  the  Will  of  God  being  expressed,  is  for 
that  reason  our  final  law.  They  do  not  set  about  formal  proofs 
that  we  ought  to  sacrifice  inferior  rules  to  it,  but  conclude,  as 
of  course,  that  if  the  Will  of  God  is  made  known,  human  duty 
is  ascertained.  "  It  is  not  to  be  imagined  that  the  Scriptures 
would  refer  to  any  other  foundation  of  virtue  than  the  true 
one,  and  certain  it  is  that  the  foundation  to  which  they  con- 
stantly do  refer  is  the  Will  of  God:'X  Nor  is  this  all :  they 
refer  to  the  expression  of  the  Will  of  God.     We  hear  nothing 

*  4th  Ed.,  p.  336.       t  Pearson :  Remarks  on  the  Theory  of  Morals. 
1  Pearson:  Theorv  of  Mor.  c.  1. 


CHAP.  II.]  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  21 

of  any  other  ultimate  authority — nothing  of  "  Sympathy" — 
nothing  of  the  "  eternal  fitness  of  things" — nothing  of  the  "  pro- 
duction of  the  greatest  sum  of  enjoyment ;" — but  we  hear,  re- 
peatedly, constantly,  of  the  Will  of  God ;  of  the  voice  of  God ; 
of  the  commands  of  God.  To  be  obedient  unto  his  voice^''*  is 
the  condition  of  favour.  To  hear  the  "  sayings  of  Christ  and 
do  them,"t  is  the  means  of  obtaining  his  approbation.  To 
"  fear  God  and  keep  his  commandments^  is  the  whole  duty  of 
man. "J  Even  superior  intelligences  are  described  as  "  do- 
ing his  commandments,  hearkening  unto  the  voice  of  his  word."^ 
In  short,  the  whole  system  of  moral  legislation,  as  it  is  exhi- 
bited in  Scripture,  is  a  system  founded  upon  authority.  The 
propriety,  the  utility  of  the  requisitions  are  not  made  of  im- 
portance. That  which  is  made  of  importance  is,  the  authority 
of  the  Being  who  legislates.  "  Thus  saith  the  Lord,"  is  re- 
garded as  constituting  a  sufficient  and  a  final  law.  So  also  it 
is  with  the  moral  instructions  of  Christ.  "  He  put  the  truth 
of  what  he  taught  upon  authority .''^'^  In  the  sermon  on  the 
mount,  /  say  unto  you,  is  proposed  as  the  sole,  and  sufficient, 
and  ultimate  ground  of  obligation.  He  does  not  say,  My 
precepts  will  promote  human  happiness,  therefore  you  are  to 
obey  them :  but  he  says.  They  are  my  precepts,  therefore 
you  are  to  obey  them.  So  habitually  is  this  principle  borne 
in  mind,  if  we  may  so  speak,  by  those  who  were  commis- 
sioned to  communicate  the  Divine  WiU,  that  the  reason  of  a 
precept  is  not  often  assigned.  The  assumption  evidently  was, 
that  the  Divine  Will  was  all  that  it  was  necessary  for  us  tc 
know.  This  is  not  the  mode  of  enforcing  duties  which  one 
man  usually  adopts  in  addressing  another.  He  discusses  the 
reasonableness  of  his  advices  and  the  advantages  of  following 
them,  as  well  as,  perhaps,  the  authority  from  which  he  de 
rives  them.  The  difference  that  exists  between  such  a  mode 
and  that  which  is  actually  adopted  in  Scripture,  is  analogous 
to  that  which  exists  between  the  mode  in  which  a  parent 
communicates  liis  instructions  to  a  young  child,  and  that  which 
is  employed  by  a  tutor  to  an  intelligent  youth.  The  tutor  re- 
commends his  instructions  by  their  reasonableness  and  pro- 
priety :  the  father  founds  his  upon  his  own  authority.  Not 
that  the  father's  instructions  are  not  also  founded  in  propriety, 
but  that  this,  in  respect  of  young  children,  is  not  the  ground 
upon  which  he  expects  their  obedience.  It  is  not  the  ground 
upon  which  God  expects  the  obedience  of  man.  We  can, 
undoubtedly,  in  general  perceive  the  wisdom  of  his  laws,  and 

*  Deut.  iv.  30.  t  Matt.  vii.  24.  X  Eccl.  xii.  13. 

§  Ps.  ciii.  20.  li  Paley:  Evid.  of  Chris,  p.  2,  c.  2. 


22  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  [eSSA^  I. 

it  is  doubtless  right  to  seek  out  that  wisdom  ;  but  whether  we 
discover  it  or  not,  does  not  lessen  their  authority  nor  alter  our 
duties. 

In  deference  to  these  reasonings,  then,  we  conclude,  that 
the  communicated  Will  of  God  is  the  Final  Standard  of  Right 
and  Wrong — that  wheresoever  this  will  is  made  known,  hu- 
man duty  is  determined — and  that  neither  the  conclusions  of 
philosophers,  nor  advantages,  nor  dangers,  nor  pleasures,  nor 
sufferings,  ought  to  have  any  o])posing  influence  in  regulating 
our  conduct.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  in  morals  there  can 
be  no  equilibrium  of  authority.  If  the  expressed  will  of  the 
Deity  is  not  our  supreme  rule,  some  other  is  superior.  This 
fatal  consequence  is  inseparable  from  the  adoption  of  any 
other  ultimate  rule  of  conduct.  The  Divine  law  becomes  the 
decision  of  a  certain  tribunal — the  adopted  rule,  the  decision 
of  a  superior  tribunal — for  that  must  needs  be  the  superior' 
which  can  reverse  the  decisions  of  the  other.  It  is  a  consi- 
deration, too,  which  may  reasonably  alarm  the  enquirer,  that 
if  once  we  assume  this  power  of  dispensing  with  the  divine 
law,  there  is  no  limit  to  its  exercise.  If  we  may  supersede 
one  precept  of  the  Deity  upon  one  occasion,  we  may  super- 
sede' every  precept  upon  all  occasions.  Man  becomes  the 
greater  authority,  and  God  the  less. 

If  a  proposition  is  proved  to  be  true,  no  contrary  reasonings 
can  show  it  to  be  false ;  and  yet  it  is  necessary  to  refer  to 
such  reasonings,  not  indeed  for  the  sake  of  the  truth,  but  for 
the  sake  of  those  whose  conduct  it  should  regulate.  Their 
confidence  in  truth  maybe  increased  if  they  discover  that  the 
reasonings  which  assail  it  are  fallacious.  To  a  considerate 
man  it  will  be  no  subject  of  wonder  that  the  supremacy  of 
the  expressed  Will  of  God  is  often  not  recognized  in  the 
writings  of  moralists  or  in  the  practice  of  life.  The  specula- 
tive enquirer  finds,  that  of  some  of  the  questions  which  come 
before  him.  Scripture  furnishes  no  solution,  and  he  seeks  for 
some  principle  by  which  all  may  be  solved.  This  indeed  is 
the  ordinary  course  of  those  who  erect  systems,  whether  in 
morals  or  in  physics.  The  moralist  acknowledges,  perhaps, 
the  authority  of  revelation  ;  but  in  his  investigations  he  passes 
away  from  the  precepts  of  revelation  to  .some  of  those  subor- 
dinate means  by  which  human  duties  may  be  discovered — 
means  which,  however  authorized  by  the  'Deity  as  subser- 
vient to  his  great  purpose  of  human  instruction,  are  wholly 
unauthorized  as  ultimate  standards  of  right  and  wrong.  Hav- 
ing fixed  his  attention  upon  these  subsidiary  means,  he  prac- 
tically loses  sight  of  the  Divine  law  which  he  acknowledges ; 


CHAP.   II.]         STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND     WRONG.  23 

and  thus  without  any  formal,  perhaps  without  any  conscious, 
rejection  of  the  expressed  Will  of  God,  he  really  makes  it 
subordinate  to  inferior  rules.  Another  influential  motive  to 
pass  by  the  Divine  precepts,  operates  both  upon  writers  and 
upon  the  public  : — the  rein  which  they  hold  upon  the  desires 
and  passions  of  mankind,  is  more  tight  than  they  are  willing 
to  bear.  Respecting  some  of  these  precepts  we  feel  as  the 
rich  man  of  old  felt :  we  hear  the^injunction  and  go  away,,  if 
not  with  sorrow  yet  without  obedience.  Here  again  is  an 
obvious  motive  to  the  writer  to  endeavour  to  substitute  som6 
less  rigid  rule  of  conduct,  and  an  obvious  motive  to  the  reader 
to  acquiesce  in  it  as  true  without  a  very  rigid  scrutiny  into  its 
foundation.  To  adhere  with  fidelity  to  the  expressed  Will 
of  Heaven,  requires  greater  confidence  in  God  than  most  men 
are  willing  to  repose,  or  than  most  moralists  are  willing  to 
recommend. 

But  whatever  have  been  the  causes,  the  fact  is  indisputa- 
Jble,  that  few  or  none  of  the  systems  of  morality  which  have 
been  offered  to  the  world,  have  uniformly  and  consistently 
applied  the  communicated  Will  of  God  in  determination  of 
those  questions  to  which  it  is  applicable.  Some  insist  upon 
its  supreme  authority  in  general  terms ;  others  apply  it  in  de- 
termining some  questions  of  rectitude  :  but  where  is  the  work 
that  applies  it  always  ?  Where  is  the  moralist  who  holds 
every  thing,  Ease,  Interest,  Reputation,  Expediency,  "  Ho- 
nour,"— ^personal  and  national, — in  subordination  to  this  Moral 
Law  ? 

One  source  of  ambiguity  and  of  error  in  moral  philosophy, 
has  consisted  in  the  indeterminate  use  of  the  term,  5'  the  Will 
of  God."  It  is  used  without  reference  to  the  mode  by  which 
that  will  is  to  be  discovered — and  it  is  in  this  mode  that  the 
essence  of  the  controversy  lies.  We  are  agreed  that  the  Will 
of  God  is  to  be  our  rule  :  the  question  at  issue  is.  What  mode 
of  discovering  it  should  be  primarily  adopted?  Now  the 
term,  "the  "Will  of  God,"  has  been  applied,  interchangeably, 
to  the  precepts  of  Scriptiire,  and  to  the  deductions  which  have 
been  made  from  other  principles.  The  consequence  has  been 
that  the  imposing  sanction,  '''  the  Will  of  God,"  has  been  ap- 
plied to  propositions  of  very  different  authority. 

To  inquire  into  the  validity  of  all  those  principles  which 
have  been  proposed  as  the  standard  of  rectitude,  would  be 
foreign  to  the  purpose  of  this  essay.  That  principle  which 
appears  to  be  most  recommended  by  its  own  excellence  and 
beauty,  and  which  obtains  the  greatest  share  of  approbation 
in  the  world,  is  the  principle  of  directing  "  every  action  so  as 


24  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  [esSAY  I. 

lo  produce  the  greatest  happiness  and  the  least  misery  in  our 
power."  The  particular  forms  of  defining  the  doctrine  are 
various,  but  they  may  be  conveniently  included  in  the  one  ge- 
neral term — Expediency. 

We  say  that  the  apparent  beauty  and  excellence  of  this  rule 
of  action  are  so  captivating,  its  actual  acceptance  in  the  world 
is  so  great,  and  the  reasonings  by  which  it  is  supported  are 
so  acute,  that  if  it  can  be  shown  that  this  rule  is  not  the  ulti- 
mate standard  of  right  and  wrong,  we  may  safely  conclude 
that  none  other  which  philosophy  has  proposed  can  make  pre- 
tensions to  such  authority.  The  truth  indeed  is,  that  the  ob- 
jections to  the  doctrine  of  expediency  will  generally  be  found 
to  apply  to  every  doctrine  which  lays  claim  to  moral  supremacy 
— which  application  the  reader  is  requested  to  make  for  him- 
self as  he  passes  along. 

Respecting  the  principle  of  Expediency — ^the  doctrine  that 
we  should,  in  every  action,  endeavour  to  produce  the  greatest 
sum  of  human  happiness — let  it  always  be  remembered  that 
the  only  question  is,  whether  it  ought  to  be  the  parameunt 
rule  of  human  conduct.  No  one  doubts  whether  it  ought  to 
influence  us,  or  whether  it  is  of  great  importance  in  estima- 
ting the  duties  of  morality.  The  sole  question  is  this  : — 
/When  an  expression  of  the  Will  of  God,  and  our  calculations 
respecting  human  happiness,  lead  to  different  conclusions  re- 
specting the  rectitude  of  an  action — ^whether  of  the  two  shall 
we  prefer  and  obey  ? 

We  are  concerned  only  with  Christian  writers.  '  Now, 
when  we  come  to  analyze  the  principles  of  the  Christian 'ad- 
vocates, of  Expediency,  we  find  precisely  the  result  which 
we  should  expect/-a  perpetual  vacillation  between  two  irre- 
concilable doctrines.  As  Christians,  they  necessarily  acknow- 
ledge the.  authority,  and,  in  words  at  least,  the  supreme  autho- 
.rity  of  the  Divine  Law :  as  advocates  of  the  universal  appli- 
cation of  the  law  of  Expediency,  they  necessarily  sometimes 
set  aside  the  Divine  Law,  because  they  sometimes  cannot  de- 
duce, from  both  laws,  the  same  rule  of  action.  Thus  there  is 
■induced  a, continual  fluctuation  and  uncertainty  both  in  prin- 
ciples and  in  practical  rules  :  a  continual  endeavour  to  "  serve 
two  masters." 

Of  these  fluctuations  an  example  is  given  in  the  article, 
"  Moral  Philosophy,"  in  Rees's  Encyclopsedia — an  article  in 
which  the  principles  of  Hartley  are  in  a  considerable  degree 
adopted.  "  The  Scripture  precepts,"  says  the  writer,  "  are 
in  themselves  the  rule  of  life." — "  The  supposed  tendency  of 
actions  can  never  be  put  against  the  law  of  God  as  delivered 


CHAP.  II.]        STANDARD    OF    RIGHT   AND    WRONO.  25 

to  US  by  revelation,  and  should  not  therefore  be  made  our 
chief  guide."  This  is  very  explicit.  Yet  the  same  article 
says,  that  the  first  great  rule  is,  that  "  we  should  aim  to  direct 
every  action  so  as  to  produce  the  greatest  happiness  and  the 
least  misery  in  our  power."  This  rule,  however,  is  some- 
what difficult  of  application,  and  therefore  "  instead  of  this 
most  general  rule  we  must  substitute  others,  less  general,  and 
subordinate  to  it :"  of  which  subordinate  rules,  to  "  obey  the 
Scripture  precepts''^  is  one  ! — I  do  not  venture  to  presume  that 
these  writers  do  really  mean  what  their  words  appear  to  mean 
— ^that  the  law  of  God  is  supreme  and  yet  that  it  is  subordi- 
nate ;  but  one  thing  is  perfectly  clear,  that  either  they  make 
the  vain  attempt  "  to  serve  two  masters,"  or  that  they  employ 
language  very  laxly  and  very  dangerously. 

The  high  language  of  Dr.  Paley  respecting  Expediency  as 
a  paramount  law,  is  well  known : — "  Whatever  is  expedient 
is  right."* — "  The  obligation  of  every  law  depends  upon  its ' 
ultimate  utility."! — "  It  is  the  utility  of  any  moral  rule  alone 
which  constitutes  the  obligation  of  it."J  Perjury,  Robbery, 
and  Murder,  "  are  not  useful,  and  for  that  reason,  and  that 
reason  only,  are  not  right."^  It  is  obvious  that  this  language 
affirms  that  utility  is  a  higher  authority  than  the  expressed 
Will  of  God.  If  the  utility  of  a  moral  rule  alone  constitutes 
the  obligation  of  it,  then  is  its  obligation  not  constituted  by 
the  divine  command.  If  murder  is  wrong  only  because  it  is 
not  useful,  it  is  not  wrong  because  God  has  said,  "  Thou  shalt 
noikill." 

But  P^ley  was  a  Christian,  and  therefore  could  neither 
formally  displace  the  Scripture  precepts  from  their  station  of 
supremacy,  nor  SiYoid  formally  acknowledging  that  the/ were 
supreme.  Accordingly  he  says,  "  There  are  two  methods  of 
coming  at  the  Will  of  God  on  any  point :  First — By  his  ex- 
press declarations,  when  they  are  to  be  had,  and  which  must 
be  sought  for  in  Scripture. "||  Secondly — ^by  Expediency .  And 
again.  When  Scripture  precepts  "  are  clear  and  positive,  there 
is  an  end  to  all  further  deliberation. "T[  This  makes  the  ex- 
pressed Will  of  God  the  final  standard  of  right  and  wrong. 
And  here  is  the  vacillation,  the  attempt  to  serve  two  masters 
of  which  we  speak :  for  this  elevation  of  the  express  decla- 
rations of  God  to  the  supremacy,  is  also  absolutely  incompati- 
ble with  the  doctrines  that  are  quoted  in  the  preceding 
paragraph. 

These  incongiiiities  of  principle  are  sometimes  brought  into 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  B.  2,  c.  6.         t  B.  6,  c.  12.         t  B.  2,  c.  6. 
§  B.  2,  c.  6.  II  B.  2,  c.  4.  IT  B.  2,  c  4 :  Note 


36  STANDARD   OT   RIGHT  AND   WRONG.         [eSSAT  I. 

operation  in  framing  practical  rules.  In  the  chapter  on  Sui- 
cide it  is  shown  that  Scripture  disallows  the  act.  Here  then 
we  might  conclude  that  there  was  "  an  end  to  all  further  de- 
liberation ;."  and  yet,  in  the  same  chapter^  we  are  told  that 
suicide  would  nevertheless  be  justifiable  if  it  were  expedient. 
Respecting  Civil  Obedience  he  says,  the  Scriptures  "  incul- 
cate the  duty"  and  "  enforce  the  obligation  ;"  but  notwithstand- 
ing this,  he  pronounces  that  the  "  anly  ground  of  the  subjects' 
obligation"  consists  in  Expediency*  If  it  consists  only  in 
expediency,  the  divine  law  upon  the  subject  is  a  dead  letter. 
In  one  chapter  he  says  that  murder  would  be  right  if  it  was 
useful  ;t  in  another,  that  "  one  word"  of  prohibition  "  from 
Christ  is  final ^X  The  words  of  Christ  cannot  be  final,  if  we 
are  afterwards  to  enquire  whether  murder  is  "  useful"  or  not. 
One  other  illustration  will  suffice.  In  laying  down  the  rights 
of  the  magistrate,  as  to  making  laws  respecting  religion,  he 
makes  Utility  the  ultimate  standard ;  so  that  whatever  the 
magistrate  tlnnks  it  useful  to  ordain,  that  he  has  a  right  to 
ordain.  But  in  stating  the  subjects'  duties  as  to  obeying  laws 
respecting  religion,  he  makes  the  commands  of  God  the  ulti- 
mate standard.*^  The  consequence  is  inevitable,  that  it  is 
right  for  the  magistrate  to  command  an  act,  and  right  for  the 
subject  to  refuse  to  obey  it.  In  a  sound  system  of  morality 
such  contradictions  would  be  impossible.  There  is  a  contra- 
diction even  in  terms.  In  one  place  he  says,  "  Wherever 
there  is  a  right  in  one  person  there  is  a  corresponding  obliga- 
tion upon  others."l|  In  another  place,  "  The  right  of  the  ma- 
gistrate to  ordain  and  the  obligation  of  the  subject  to  obey,  in 
matters  of  religion,  may  be  very  different"*^ 

Perhaps  the  reader  will  say  that  these  inconsistencies,  how- 
ever they  may  impeach  the  skilfidness  of  the  writer,  do  not 
prove  that  his  system  is  unsound,  or  that  Utility  is  not  still 
the  ultimate  standard  of  rectitude.  We  answer,  that  to  a 
Christian  writer  such  inconsistencies  are  unavoidable.  He 
is  obliged,  in  conformity  with  the  principles  of  his  religion,  to 
acknowledge  the  divine,  and  therefore  the  supreme  authority 
of  Scripture  ;  and  if,  in  addition  to  this,  he  assumes  that  any 
other  is  supreme,  inconsistency  must  ensue.  For  the  same 
consequence  follows  the  adoption  of  any  other  ultimate  stan- 
dard— ^whether  sympathy,  or  right  reason,  or  eternal  fitness, 
or  nature.  If  the  writer  is  a  Christian  he  cannot,  without 
falling  into  inconsistencies,  assert  the  supremacy  of  any  of 
these  principles  :  that  is  to  say,  when  the  precepts  of  Scrip- 

«  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  B.  6,  c.  3.         t  B.  2,  c.  6.         t  B.  3,  p.  3.  c.  2. 
§  B.  6,  p.  3.  c.  10.  II  B.  2,  c.  9.  V  B.  6,  p.  3,  c.  10 


CHA.P.  II.]         STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  27 

ture  dictate  one  action,  and  a  reasoning  from  his  principle 
dictates  another,  he  must  make  his  election :  If  he  prefers 
his  principle,  Christianity  is  abandoned :  if  he  prefers  Scrip- 
ture, his  principle  is  subordinate :  if  h^  alternately  prefers 
the  one  and  the  other,  he  falls  into  the  vacillation  and  incon- 
sistency of  which  we  speak. 

Bearing  still  in  mind  that  the  rule  "  to  endeavour  to  pro- 
duce the  greatest  happiness  in  our  power,"  is  objectionable 
only  when  it  is  made  an  ultimate  rule,  the  reader  is  invited 
to  attend  to  these  short  considerations. 

I.  In  computing  human  happiness,  the  advocate  of  Expe- 
diency does  not  sufficiently  take  into  the  account  our  happi- 
ness in  futurity.  Nor  indeed  does  he  always  take  it  into 
account  at  all.  One  definition  says,  "  The  test  of  the  morality 
of  an  act  is  its  tendency  to  promote  the  temporal  advantage 
of  the  greatest  number  in  the  society  to  which  we  belong." 
Now  many  things  may  be  very  expedient  if  death  were  anni- 
hilation, which  may  be  very  inexpedient  now  :  and  therefore 
it  is  not  unreasonable  to  expect,  nor  an  unreasonable  exercise 
of  humility  to  a,ct  upon  the  expectation,  that  the  divine  laws 
may  sometimes  impose  obligations  of  which  we  do  not  per- 
ceive the  expediency  or  the  use.  "  It  may  so  fall  out,"  says 
Hooker,  "  that  the  reason  why  some  laws  of  God  were  given, 
is  neither  opened  nor  possible  to  be  gathered  by  the  wit  of 
man."*  And  Pearson  says,  "  There  are  many  parts  of  mo- 
rality, as  taught  by  revelation,  which  are  entirely  independent 
of  an  accurate  knowledge  of  nature."!  And  Gisborne,  "  Our 
experience  of  God's  dispensations  by  no  means  permits  us  to 
affirm,  that  he  always  thinks  fit  to  act  in  such  a  manner  as  is 
productive  of  particular  expediency ;  much  less  to  conclude 
that  he  wills  us  always  to  act  in  such  a  manner  as  we  suppose 
would  be  productive  of  it. "J  All  tliis  sufficiently  indicates 
that  Expediency  is  wholly  inadmissible  as  an  ultimate  rule. 

II.  The  doctrine  is  altogether  unconnected  with  the  Chris- 
tian revelation,  or  with  any  revelation  from  heaven.  It  was  just 
as  true,  and  the  deductions  from  it  just  as  obligatory,  two  or 
five  thousand  years  ago  as  now.  The  alleged  supreme  law 
of  morality — "  Whatever  is  expedient  is  right" — might  have 
been  taught  by  Epictetus  as  well  as  by  a  modern  Christian. 
But  are  we  then  to  be  told  that  the  revelations  from  the  Deity 
have  conveyed  no  moral  knowledge  to  man  1  that  they  make 
no  act  obligatory  which  was  not  obligatory  before  ?  that  ho 
who  had  the  fortune  to  discover  that  "  whatever  is  expedient 

*  Eccles.  Polity,  B.  3,  s.  10.  t  Theory  of  Morals :  c.  3. 

X  Principles  of  Mor.  PhiL 


26  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    "WRONG.  [eSSAY  I 

is  right,"  possess^ed  a  moral  law  just  as  perfect  as  that  which 
God  has  ushered  into  the  world,  and  much  more  comprehen- 
sive ? 

III.  If  some  subordinate  rule  of  conduct  were  proposed — 
some  principle  which  served  as  an  auxiliary  moral  guide — I 
should  not  think  it  a  valid  objection  to  its  truth,  to  be  told  that 
no  sanction  of  the  principle  was  to  be  found  in  the  written 
revelation  :  but  if  some  rule  of  conduct  were  proposed  as  being 
of  universal  obligation,  some  moral  principle  which  was  para- 
mount to  every  other — and  I  discovered  that  this  principle 
was  unsactioned  by  the  written  revelation,  I  should  think  this 
want  of  sanction  was  conclusive  evidence  against  it :  because 
it  is  not  credible  that  a  revelation  from  God,  of  which  one 
great  object  was  to  teach  mankind  the  moral  law  of  God, 
would  have  been  silent  respecting  a  rule  of  conduct  which 
was  to  be  an  universal  guide  to  man.  We  apply  these  con- 
siderations to  the  doctrine  of  Expediency :  Scripture  contains 
not  a  word  upon  the  subject. 

IV.  The  principles  of  Expediency  necessarily  proceed 
upon  the  supposition  that  we  are  to  investigate  the  future,  and 
this  investigation  is,  as  every  one  knows,  peculiarly  without 
the  limits  of  human  sagacity  :  an  objection  which  derives  ad- 
ditional force  from  the  circumstance  that  an  action,  in  order 
to  be  expedient,  "  must  be  expedient  on  the  whole,  at  the  long 
run,  in  ail  its  effects,  collateral  and  remote."*  I  do  not  know 
whether,  if  a  man  should  sit  down  expressly  to  devise  a  moral 
principle  Avhich  should  be  uncertain  and  difficult  in  its  appli- 
cation, he  could  devise  one  that  would  be  more  difficult  and 
uncertain  than  this.  So  that,  as  Dr.  Paley  himself  acknow- 
ledges, "  It  is  impossible  to  ascertain  every  duty  by  an  imme- 
diate reference  to  public  utility."!  The  reader  may  therefore 
conclude  with  Dr.  Johnson,  that  "  by  presuming  to  determine 
what  is  fit  and  what  is  beneficial,  they  presuppose  more  know- 
ledge of  the  universal  system  than  man  has  attained,  and  there- 
fore depend  upon  principles  too  complicated  and  extensive 
for  our  comprehension :  and  there  can  he  no  security  in  the 
consequence  when  the  premises  are  not  understood. ^'1^ 

Y.  But  whatever  may  be  the  propriety  of  investigating  all 
consequences  "  collateral  and  remote,"  it  is  certain  that  such 
an  investigation  is  possible  only  in  that  class  of  moral  ques- 
tions which  allows  a  man  time  to  sit  down  and  deliberately 
to  think  and  compute.  As  it  respects  that  large  class  of  cases 
in  which  a  person  must  decide  and  act  in  a  moment,  it  is 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  B.  2,  c.  8.  t  B.  6.  c.  12 

I  Western  Isles. 


CHAP.  II.]        STANDARD    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  29 

"wholly  useless,  ifiere  are  thousands  of  conjunctures  in  life 
in  which  a  man  can  no  more  stop  to  calculate  effects  collate- 
ral and  remote,  than  he  can  stop  to  cross  the  Atlantic  :  and 
it  is  difficult  to  conceive  that  any  rule  of  morality  can  be  ab- 
solute and  universal,  which  is  totally  inapplicable  to  so,  large 
a  portion  of  human  affairs. 

VI.  Lastly,  the  rule  of  Expediency  is  deficient  in  one 
of  the  first  requisites  of  a  moral  law — obviousness  and  palpa- 
bility of  sanction.  What  is  the  process  by  which  the  sanc- 
tion is  applied  ?  Its  advocates  say,  the  Deity  is  a  Benevolent 
Being :  as  he  is  benevolent  himself,  it  is  reasonable  to  con- 
clude he  wills  that  his  creatures  should  be  benevolent  to  one 
another:  this  benevolence  is  to  be  exercised  by  adapting 
every  action  to  the  promotion  of  the  "  universal  interest"  of 
man:  "Whatever  is  expedient  is  right:"  or,  God  wills  that 
we  should  consult  Expediency. — Now  we  say  that  there  are 
so  many  considerations  placed  between  the  rule  and  the  act, 
that  the  practical  authority  of  the  rule  is  greatly  diminished. 
It  is  easy  to  perceive  that  the  authority  of  a  rule  will  not  come 
home  to  that  man's  mind,  who  is  told,  respecting  a  given  ac- 
tion, that  its  effects  upon  the  universal  interest  is  the  only 
thing  that  makes  it  right  or  wrong.  All  the  doubts  that  arise 
as  to  this  effect  are  so  many  diminutions  of  the  sanction.  It 
is  like  putting  half  a  dozen  new  contingencies  between  the 
act  of  thieving  and  the  conviction  of  a  jury ;  and  every  one 
knows  that  the  want  of  certainty  of  penalty  is  a  great  encou- 
ragement to  offences.  The  principle  too  is  liable  to  the  most 
extravagant  abuse — or  rather  extravagant  abuse  is,  in  the  pre- 
sent condition  of  mankind,  inseparable  from  its  general  adop- 
tion. "  Whatever  is  expedient  is  right,"  soliloquizes  the 
moonlight  adventurer  into  the  poultry-yard  :  "  It  will  tend  more 
to  the  sum  of  human-  happiness  that  my  wife  and  I  should 
dine  on  a  capon,  than  that  the  farmer  should  feel  the  satisfac- 
tion of  possessing  it ;" — and  so  he  mounts  the  hen-roost.  I 
do  not  say  that  this  hungTy  moralist  would  reason  soundly, 
but  I  say  that  he  would  not  listen  to  the  philosophy  which 
replied,  "  Oh,  your  reasoning  is  incomplete :  you  must  take 
into  account  all  consequences  collateral  and  remote  ;  and  then 
you  will  find  that  it  is  more  expedient,  upon  the  whole  and  at 
the  long  run,  that  you  and  your  wife  should  be  hungry,  than 
that  hen-roosts  should  be  insecure." 

It  is  happy,  however,  that  this  principle  never  can  be  gene- 
rally applied  to  the  private  duties  of  man.  Its  abuses  would 
be  so  enormous  that  the  laws  would  take,  as  they  do  in  fact 
take,  better  measures  for  regulating  men's  conduct  than  this 


80  STANDARD    OF    RIGHT   AND    WRONG.         [eSSAY  I. 

doctrine  supplies.     And  happily  too,  the  Universal  Lawgiver 
has  not  left  mankind  without  more  distinct  and  more  influen- 
j   tial  perceptions  of  his  will  and  his  authority,  than  they  could 
^  ,J  ever  derive  from  the  principles  of  Expediency. 

*f  

But  an  objection  has  probably  presented  itself  to  the  reader, 
that  the  greater  part  of  mankind  have  no  access  to  the  written 
expression  of  the  Will  of  God :  and  how,  it  may  be  asked, 
can  that  be  the  final  standard  of  right  and  wrong  for  the  hu- 
man race,  of  which  the  majority  of  the  race  have  never  heard  ? 
The  question  is  reasonable  and  fair. 

We  answer  then,  first,  that  supposing  most  men  to  be  desti- 
tute of  a  communication  of  the  Divine  Will,  it  does  not  affect 
the  obligations  of  those  who  do  possess  it.  That  communi- 
cation is  the  final  law  to  me,  whether  my  African  brother  en- 
joys it  or  not.  Every  reason  by  which  the  supreme  author- 
ity of  the  law  is  proved,  is  just  as  applicable  to  those  who 
do  enjoy  the  communication  of  it,  whether  that  communica- 
tion is  enjoyed  by  many  or  by  few;  and  this,  so  far  as  the 
argument  is  concerned,  appears  to  be  a  sufficient  answer.  If 
any  man  has  no  direct  access  to  his  Creator's  will,  let  him 
have  recourse  to  "  eternal  fitnesses,"  or  to  "  expediency  ;"  but 
his  condition  does  not  affect  that  of  another  man  who  does 
possess  this  access. 

'^  But  our  real  reply  to  the  objection  is,  that  they  who  are 
destitute  of  Scripture,  are  not  destitute  of  a  direct  communi- 

-  cation  of  the  Will  of  God.  The  proof  of  this  position  must 
be  deferred  to  a  subsequent  chapter ;  and  the  reader  is  soli- 
cited for  the  present,  to  allow  us  to  assume  its  truth.  This 
,direct  communication  may  be  limited,  it  may  be  incomplete, 

*but  some  communication  exists  ;  enough  to  assure  them  that 
sqme  things  are  acceptable  to  the  Supreme  Power,  and  that 
some  are  not ;  enough  to  indicate  a  distinction  between  right 
and  wrong ;  enough  to  make  them  moral  agents,  and  reason- 
ably accountable  to  our  Common  Judge.  If  these  principles 
are  true,  and  especially  if  the  amount  of  the  communication  is 
in  many  cases  considerable,  it  is  obvious  that  it  will  be  of 
great  value  in  the  direction  of  individual  conduct.  We  say 
of  individual  conduct,  because  it  is  easy  to  perceive  that  it 
would  not  often  subserve  the  purposes  of  him  who  frames 
public  rules  of  morality.  A  person  may  possess  a  satisfac- 
toiy  assurance  in  his  own  mind,  that  a  given  action  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  Divine  Will,  but  that  assurance  is  not  con- 
veyed to  another,  unless  he  participates  in  the  evidence  upon 
which  it  is  founded.     That  which  is  wanted  in  order  to  sup- 


C«AP>  III.]  tStJBORDINATE    STANDARDS,    ETC  31 

|4y  paMic  rules  for  human  conduct,  is  a  publicly  aTOucI"  cd 
autliority ;  so  that  a  writer,  in  deducing  those  rules,  has  to 
apply,  ultimately,  to  that  Standard  which  God  has  publicly 
sanctioned. 


CHAPTER  IIL 

SUBORDINATE  STANDARDS  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG. 

Foundation  said  limits  «f  the  authority  ef  siAordinate  moral  rules. 

The  ^vritten  expression  of  the  Divine  Will  does  not  con- 
tain, and  no  writings  can  contain,  directions  for  our  conduct 
in  ev€ry  circumstance  of  life.  If  the  precepts  of  Scripture 
were  mnltiplied  a  hundred  or  a  thousand  fold,  there  would  still 
arise  a  multiplicity  of  questions  to  which  none  of  them  wonld 
specifically  apply.  Accordingly,  there  are  some  subordinate 
authorities,  to  which,  as  can  be  satisfactorily  shown,  it  is  the 
Will  of  God  that  we  should  refer.  He  who  does  refer  to 
them,  and  regidate  his  conduct  by  them,  conforms  to  the  will 
of  God.  -       ^ 

To  a  son  who  is  obliged  to  regulate  all  his  actions  by  his 
father's  will,  th«re  are  two  ways  in  which  he  may  practise 
'obedience — one,  by  receiving,  upon  each  subject,  his  father's 
direct  instructions ;  and  the  other  by  receiving  instructions 
from  those  whom  his  father  commissions  to  teach  him.  The 
parent  may  appoint  a  governor,  and  enjoin,  that  upon  all  ques- 
tions of  a  certain  kind  the  son  shall  conform  to  his  instrucr 
tions ;  and  if  the  son  does  this,  he  as  truly  and  really  per- 
forms his  father's  will,  and  as  strictly  makes  that  will  the 
guide  of  his  conduct,  as  if  he  received  the  instructions  im- 
mediately from  his  parent.  •  But  if  the  father  have  laid  down 
certain  general  rules  for  his  son's  observance,  as  that  he 
shall  devote  ten  hours  a-day  to  study,  and  not  less — although 
the  governor  should  recommend  or  even  command  him  to  de- 
vote fewer  hours,  he  may  not  comply ;  for  if  he  does,  the 
governor,  and  not  his  father,  is  his  supreme  guide.  The  sub- 
ordination is  destroyed. 

This  case  illustrates,  perhaps,  with  sufficient  precision,  the 
situation  of  mankind  with  respect  to  moral  rules.  Our  Crea- 
tor has  given  direct  laws,  some  general  and  some  specific. 
These  are  of  final  authority.     But  he  has  also  sanctioned,  or 


32  IDENTICAL    AUTHORIl  i    OF  [eSSAT  I 

permitted  an  application  to,  other  rules  ;  and  in  conforming  to 
these,  so  long  as  we  hold  them  in  subordination  to  his  lavv^ 
we  perform  his  will. 

Of  these  subordinate  rules  it  were  possible  to  enumerkte 
many.  Perhaps,  indeed,  few  principles  have  been  proposed 
as  "  The  fundamental  Rule*  of  Virtue,"  which  may  not  rightly 
be  brought  into  use  by  the  Christian  in  regulating  his  conduct 
in  life  :  for  the  objection  to  many  of  these  principles  is,  not 
so  much  that  they  are  useless,  as  that  they  are  unwarranted 
as  paramount  laws.  "  Sympathy"  may  be  of  use,  and  "  Na- 
ture" may  be  of  use,  and  "  Self-love,"  and  "  Benevolence  ;" 
and  to  those  who  know  what  it  means,  "  Eternal  fitnesses  too." 

Some  of  the  subordinate  rules  of  conduct  it  will  be  proper 
hereafter  to  notice,  in  order  to  discover,  if  we  can,  how  far 
their  authority  extends,  and  where  it  ceases.  The  observa- 
tions that  we  shall  have  to  offer  upon  them  may  conveniently 
"  bo  made  under  these  heads  :  The  Law  of  the  Land,  The  Law 
of  Nature,  The  Promotion  of  Human  Happiness  or  Expe- 
diency, The  Law  of  Nations,  The  Law  of  Honour. 

These  observations  will,  however,  necessarily  be  preceded 
by  an  enquiry  into  the  great  principles  of  human  duty  as  they 
are  delivered  in  Scripture,  and  into  the  reality  of  that  com- 
munication of  the  Divine  Will  to  the  mind,  which  the  reader 
has  been  requested  to  allow  us  to  assume. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

COLLATERAL  OBSERVATIONS. 

The  reader  is  requested  to  regard  the  present  chapter  as  parenthetical. 
The  parenthesis  is  inserted  here,  because  the  writer  does  not  know  where 
more  appropriately  to  place  it. 


IDENTICAL  AUTHORITY  OF  MORAL  AND  RELIGIOUS 
OBLIGATIONS. 

Identical  authority  of  moral  and  religious  obligations — The  Divine  attri- 
butes— Of  deducing  rules  of  human  duty  from  a  consideration  of  the 
attributes  of  God — Virtue  :  "  Virtue  is  conformity  with  the  standard  of 
rectitude" — Motives  of  action. 

This  identity  is  a  truth  to  which  we  do  not  sufficiently  ad- 
\ert  either  in  our  habitual  sentiments  or  in  our  practice. 


CHAP.  IV.]     MORAL    AND    RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  33 

There  are  many  persons  who  speak  of  religious  duties,  as  if 
there  was  something  sacred  or  imperative  in  their  obligation 
that  does  not  belong  to  duties  of  morality — many,  who  would 
perhaps  offer  up  their  lives  rather  than  profess  a  belief  in  a 
false  religious  dogma,  but  who  would  scarcely  sacrifice  an 
hour's  gratification  rather  than  violate  the  moral  law  of  love. 
It  is  therefore  of  importance  to  remembojiv  that  the  authority 
which  imposes  moral  obligations  and  religious  obligations  is  one 
and  the  same — the  Will  of  God.  Fidelity  to  God  is  just  as 
truly  violated  by  a  neglect  of  his  moral  laws,  as  by  a  compro- 
mise of  religious  principles.  Religion  and  Morality  are  ab- 
stract terms,  employed  to  indicate  different  cfasses  of  those 
duties  which  the  Deity  has  imposed  upon  mankind  ;  but  they 
are  all  imposed  by  Him,  and  all  are  eijjorced  by  equal  author- 
ity. Not  indeed  that  the  violation  of  every  particular  portion 
of  the  Divine  Will  involves  equal  guilt,  but  that  each  viola- 
tion is  equally  a  disregard  of  the  Divine  Authority.  Whe- 
ther, therefore,  fidelity  be  required  to  a  point  of  doctrine  or 
of  practice,  to  theology  or  to  morals,  the  obligation  is  the 
same.  It  is  the  Divine  requisition  whicJi  constitutes  this  ob- 
ligation, and  not  the  nature  of  the  duty  required ;  so  that, 
whilst  I  think  a  Protestant  does  no  more  than  his  duty  when 
he  prefers  death  to  a  profession  of  the  j^oman  Catholic  faith, 
I  think  also  that  every  Christian  who  believes  that  Christ  has 
prohibited  swearing,  does  no  more  than  his  duty  when  he 
prefers  death  to  taking  an  oath. 

I  would  especially  solicit  the  reader  to  bear  in  mind  this 
principle  of  the  identity  of  the  authority  of  moral  and  religious 
obligations,  because  he  may  otherwise  imagine  that,  in  some 
of  the  subsequent  pages,  the  obligation  of  a  moral  law  is  too 
strenuously  insisted  on,  and  that  fidelity  to  it  is  to  be  purchased 
at  "  too  great  a  sacrifice"  of  ease  and  enjoyment. 

THE  DIVINE  ATTRIBUTES. 

The  purpose  for  which  a  reference  is  here  made  to  these 
sacred  subjects,  is  to  remark  upon  the  unfitness  of  attempting 
to  deduce  human  duties  from  the  attributes  of  God.  It  is  not 
indeed  to  be  afiirmed  that  no  illustration  of  those  duties  can 
be  derived  from  them,  but  that  they  are  too  imperfectly  cog- 
nizable by  our  perceptions  to  enable  us  to  refer  to  them  for 
specific  moral  rules.  The  truth  indeed  is,  that  we  do  not  ac- 
curately and  distinctly  know  what  the  Divine  Attributes  are. 
We  say  that  God  is  merciful ;  but  if  we  attempt  to  define, 
with  strictness,  what  the  term  merciful  means,  we  shall  find 


34  IDENTICAL   AUTHORITY    CF  [ESSAY  1. 

it  a  difficult,  perhaps  an  impracticable  task ;  and  especially 
we  shall  have  a  difficult  task  if,  after  the  definition,  we  at- 
tempt to  reconcile  every  appearance  which  presents  itself  in 
the  world,  with  our  notions  of  the  attribute  of  mercy.  I  would 
speak  with  reverence  when  I  say  that  we  cannot  always  per- 
ceive  the  mercifulness  of  the  Deity  in  his  administrations, 
either  towards  his  rational  or  his  irrational  creation.  So, 
again,  in  respect  of  the  attribute  of  Justice,  who  can  deter- 
minately  define  in  what  this  attribute  consists  ?  Who,  espe- 
cially, can  prove  that  the  Almighty  designs  that  we  should 
always  be  able  to  trace  his  justice  in  his  government  ?  We 
believe  that  he  is  unchangeable ;  but  what  is  the  sense  in 
which  we  understand  the  term  ?  Do  we  mean  that  the  attri- 
bute involves  the  necessity  of  an  unchanging  system  of  moral 
government,  or  that  the  Deity  cannot  make  alterations  in,  or 
additions  to,  his  laws  for  mankind  ?  We  cannot  mean  this, 
for  the  evidence  of  revelation  disproves  it. 

Now,  if  it  be  true  that  the  Divine  Attributes,  and  the  uni- 
form accordancy  of  the  divine  dispensations  with  our  notions 
of  those  attributes,  are  not  sufficiently  within  our  powers  of 
investigation  to  enable  us  to  frame  accurate  premises  for  our 
reasoning,  it  is  plain  that  we  cannot  always  trust  with  safety 
to  our  conclusions.  We  cannot  deduce  rules  for  our  conduct 
from  the  Divine  Attributes  without  being  very  liable  to  error ; 
and  the  liability  will  increase  in  proportion  as  the  deduction 
attempts  critical  accuracy. 

Yet  this  is  a  rock  upon  which  the  judgments  of  many  have 
suffered  wreck,  a  quicksand  where  many  have  been  involved 
in  inextricable  difficulties.  One,  because  he  cannot  recon- 
cile the  commands  to  exterminate  a  people  with  his  notions 
of  the  attribute  of  mercy,  questions  the  truth  of  the  Mosaic 
writings.  One,  because  he  finds  wars  permitted  by  the  Al- 
mighty of  old,  concludes  that,  as  he  is  unchangeable,  they 
cannot  be  incompatible  with  his  present  or  his  future  Will. 
One,  on  the  supposition  of  this  unchangeableness,  perplexes 
himself  because  the  dispensations  of  God  and  his  laws  have 
been  changed ;  and  vainly  labours,  by  classifying  these  laws 
into  those  which  result  from  his  attributes,  and  those  which 
do  not,  to  vindicate  the  immutability  of  God.  We  have  no 
business  with  these  things,  and  I  will  venture  to  affirm  that 
he  who  will  take  nothing  upon  trust — who  will  exercise  no 
faith — who  will  believe  in  the  divine  authority  of  no  rule,  and 
in  the  truth  of  no  record,  which  he  is  unable  to  reconcile  with 
the  Divine  Attributes — ^must  be  consigned  to  hopeless  Pyr 
rhonism. 


CHAP.  IV.]      MORAL    AJJD    RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  35 

The  lesson  which  such  considerations  teach  is  a  simple 
but  an  important  one  :  That  our  exclusive  business  is  to  dis- 
cover the  actual  present  Will  of  God,  without  enquiring  why 
his  will  is  such  as  it  is,  or  why  it  has  ever  been  different ; 
and  without  seeking  to  deduce,  from  our  notions  of  the  Di- 
vine Attributes,  rules  of  conduct  which  are  more  safely  and 
more  certainly  discovered  by  other  means, 

VIRTUE. 

The  definitions  which  have  been  proposed  of  Virtue  have 
necessarily  been  both  numerous  and  various,  because  many 
and  discordant  standards  of  rectitude  have  been  advanced; 
and  virtue  must,  in  every  man's  system,  essentially  consist  in 
conforming  the  conduct  to  the  standard  which  he  thinks  is 
the  true  one.  This  must  be  true  of  those  systems,  at  least, 
which  make  Virtue  consist  in  doing  right. — Adam  Smith  in- 
deed says,  that  "  Virtue  is  excellence ;  something  uncom- 
monly great  and  beautiful,  which  rises  far  above  what  is  vul- 
gar and  ordinary."*  By  which  it  would  appear  that  Virtue 
is  a  relative  quality,  depending  not  upon  some  perfect  or  per- 
manent standard,  but  upon  the  existing  practice  of  mankind. 
Thus  the  action  which  possessed  no  Virtue  amongst  a  good 
•community,  might  possess  much  in  a  bad  one.  The  practice 
which  "  rose  far  above"  the  ordinary  practice  of  one  nation, 
might  be  quite  common  in  another :  and  if  mankind  should 
become  much  worse  than  they  are  now,  that  conduct  would 
be  eminently  virtuous  amongst  them  which  now  is  not  vir- 
tuous at  all.  That  such  a  definition  of  Virtue  is  likely  to  lead 
to  very  imperfect  practice  is  plain  ;  for  what  is  the  probability 
that  a  man  will  attain  to  that  standard  which  Ood  proposes, 
if  his  utmost  estimate  of  Virtue  rises  no  higher  than  to  an  in  ■ 
determinate  superiority  over  other  men  ? 

Our  definition  o^^Virtue  necessarily  accords  with  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Morality  which  have  been  ad^'anced  in  the  preced- 
ing chapter :  Virtue  is  conformity  with  the  Standard  of  Recti- 
tude ;  which  standard  consists,  primarily,  in  the  expressed 
Will  of  God. 

Virtue,  as  it  respects  the  meritoriousness  of  the  agent,  is 
another  consideration.  The  quality  of  an  action  is  one  thing, 
the  desert  of  the  agent  is  another.  The  business  of  him  who 
illustrates  moral  rules,  is  not  with  the  agent,  but  with  the  act. 
He  must  state  what  the  moral  law  pronounces  to  be  right  and 
wrong :  but  it  is  very  possible  that  an  individual  may  do  what 

♦  Theo.  Mor.  Sent. 


36  IDENTICAL   AUTHORITY    OF,    ETC.  [eSSAY  I. 

is  right  without  any  Virtue,  because  there  may  be  no  rectitude 
in  his  motives  and  intentions.  He  does  a  virtuous  act,  but  he 
is  not  a  virtuous  agent. 

Although  the  concern  of  a  work  like  the  present  is  evi- 
dently with  the  moral  character  of  actions,  without  reference 
to  the  motives  of  the  agent ;  yet  the  remark  may  be  allowed, 
that  there  is  frequently  a  sort  of  inaccuracy  and  unreasonable- 
ness in  the  judgments  which  we  form  of  the  deserts  of  other 
men.  We  regard  the  act  too  much,  and  the  intention  too 
little.  The  footpad  who  discharges  a  pistol  at  a  traveller  and 
fails  in  his  aim,  is  just  as  wicked  as  if  he  had  killed  him ; 
yet  we  do  not  feel  the  same  degree  of  indignation  at  his 
crime.  So,  too,  of  a  person  who  does  good.  A  man  who 
plunges  into  a  river  and  saves  a  child  from  drowning,  im- 
presses the  parents  with  a  stronger  sense  of  his  deserts  than 
if,  with  the  same  exertions,  he  had  failed. — We  should  en- 
deavour to  correct  this  inequality  of  judgment,  and  in  forming 
our  estimates  of  human  conduct,  should  refer,  much  more  than 
we  commonly  do,  to  what  the  agent  intends.  It  should  habi- 
tually be  borne  in  mind,  and  especially  with  reference  to  our 
own  conduct,  that  to  have  been  unable  to  execute  an  ill  inten- 
tion deducts  nothing  from  our  guilt ;  and  that  at  that  tribunal 
where  intention  and  action  will  be  both  regarded,  it  will  avail 
little  if  we  can  only  say  that  we  have  done  no  evil.  Nor  let  it  be 
less  remembered,  with  respect  to  those  who  desire  to  do  good 
but  have  not  the  power,  that  their  Virtue  is  not  diminished  by 
their  want  of  ability.  I  ought,  perhaps,  to  be  as  gTateful  to 
the  man  who  feelingly  commiserates  my  sufferings  but  cannot 
relieve  them,  as  to  him  who  sends  me  money  or  a  physician. 
The  mite  of  the  widow  of  old  was  estimated  even  more  highly 
than  the  greater  offerings  of  the  rich. 


CHAP,  v.]  PATRIARCHAL,    MOSAIC,    ETC.  37 


CHAPTER  V 


SCRIPTURE. 

The  morality  of  the  Patriarchal,  Mosaic,  and  Christian  dispensations — 
Their  moral  requisitions  not  always  coincident — Supremacy  of  the 
Christian  morality — Of  variations  in  the  Moral  Law — Mode  of  apply- 
ing the  precepts  of  Scripture  to  the  questions  of  duty — No  formal  mo- 
ral system  in  Scripture — Criticism  of  Biblical  morality — Of  particular 
precepts  and  general  rules — Matt.  vii.  12. — 1  Cor.  x.  31. — Rom.  iii.  8. — 
Benevolence,  as  it  is  proposed  in  the  Christian  Scriptures. 

THE  MORALITY  OF  THE  PATRIARCHAL,  MOSAIC,  AND 
CHRISTIAN  DISPENSATIONS. 

One  of  the  very  interesting  considerations  wMch  are  pre- 
sented to  an  enquirer  in  perusing  the  volume  of  Scripture, 
consists  in  the  variations  in  its  morality.  There  are  three 
distinctly  defined  periods,  in  which  the  moral  government 
and  laws  of  the  Deity  assume,  in  some  respects,  a  different 
character.  In  the  first,  without  any  system  of  external  in- 
struction, he  communicated  his  Will  to  some  of  our  race, 
either  immediately  or  through  a  superhuman  messenger.  In 
the  second,  he  promulgated,  through  Moses,  a  distinct  and 
extended  code  of  laws,  addressed  peculiarly  to  a  selected 
people.  In  the  third,  Jesus  Christ  and  his  commissioned 
ministers,  delivered  precepts,  of  which  the  general  character 
was  that  of  greater  purity  or  perfection,  and  of  which  the  ob- 
ligation was  universal  upon  mankind. 

That  the  records  of  all  these  dispensations  contain  declara- 
tions of  the  Will  of  God,  is  certain :  that  their  moral  requisi- 
tions are  not  always  coincident,  is  also  certain ;  and  hence 
the  conclusion  becomes  inevitable,  that  to  us,  one  is  of  primary 
authority ; — that  when  all  do  not  coincide,  one  is  paramount 
to  the  others.  That  a  coincidence  does  not  always  exist, 
may  easily  be  shown.  It  is  manifest,  not  only  by  a  compari- 
son of  precepts  and  of  the  general  tenor  of  the  respective  re- 
cords, but  from  the  express  declarations  of  Christianity  itself. 

One  example,  referring  to  the  Christian  and  Jewish  dis- 
pensations, may  be  found  in  the  extension  of  the  law  of  Love. 
Christianity,  in  extending  the  application  of  this  law,  requires 
us  to  abstain  from  that  which  the  law  of  Moses  permitted  us 
to  do.  Thus  it  is  in  the  instance  of  duties  to  our  "  neigh- 
bour," as  they  are  illustrated  in  the  parable  of  the  Samaritan.* 

*  Luke,  X.  30. 
4 


38  PATRIAttCHAL,    MOSAIC,    AND  [eSSAY  I. 

Thus,  too,  in  the  sermon  on  the  mount :  "  It  hath  been  said 
hy  them  of  old  time,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  and  hate 
thine  enemy  :  but  /  say  unto  you,  Love  your  enemies."*  It  is 
indeed  sometimes  urged  that  the  words  "  hate  thine  enemy," 
were  only  a  gloss  of  the  expounders  of  the  law :  but  Grotius 
writes  thus — "  What  is  there  repeated  as  said  to  those  of  old, 
are  not  the  words  of  the  teachers  of  the  law,  but  of  Moses  ; 
either  literally  or  in  their  meaning.  They  are  cited  by  our 
Saviour  as  his  express  words,  not  as  interpretations  of  them."t 
If  the  authority  of  Grotius  should  not  satisfy  the  reader,  let 
him  consider  such  passages  as  this :  "  An  Ammonite  or  a 
Moabite  shall  not  enter  into  the  congregation  of  the  Lord. 
Because  they  met  you  not  with  bread  and  with  water  in  the 
way,  when  ye  came  forth  out  of  Egypt.  Thou  shall  not  seek 
their  peace  nor  their  prosperity  all  thy  days  for  ever,"|  This 
is  not  coincident  with,  "  Love  your  enemies  ;"  or  with,  "  Do 
^ood  to  them  that  hate  you ;"  or  with  that  temper  which  is 
recommended  by  the  words,  "to  him  that  smiteth  thee  on 
one  cheek,  turn  the  other  also."^ 

"  Pour  out  thy  fury  upon  the  heathen  that  know  thee  not," 
and  upon  the  families  that  call  not  on  thy  name,"|| — is  not 
coincident  with  the  reproof  of  Christ  to  those  who,  upon  simi- 
lar grounds,  would  have  called  down  fire  from  heaven. 1" 
*  The  Lord  look  upon  it  and  require  it,"** — is  not  coincident 
with,  "  Lord,  lay  not  this  sin  to  their  charge."tt  "  Let  me 
see  thy  vengeance  on  them," J j: — "Bring  upon  them  the  day 
of  evil,  and  destroy  them  with  double  destruction,"^ § — is  not 
coincident  with  "  Forgive  them,  for  they  know  not  what  they 
do."|||L 

Similar  observations  applying  to  Swearing,  to  Polygamy, 
to  Retaliation,  to  the  motives  of  murder  and  adultery. 

And  as  to  the  express  assertion  of  the  want  of  coincidence  : 
— "  The  law  made  nothing  perfect,  but  the  bringing  in  of  a 
better  hope  did."T[^  "  There  is  verily  a  disannulling  of  the 
commandment  going  before, /or  the  weakness  and  unprofitable- 
ness thereof."***  If  the  commandment  now  existing  is  not 
weak  and  unprofitable,  it  must  be  because  it  is  superior  to  that 
which  existed  before. 

But  although  this  appears  to  be  thus  clear  with  respect  to 
the   Jewish  dispensation,  there   are    some  who  regard  the 

*  Matt.  V.  43.  t  Rights  of  War  and  Peace. 

X  Deut.  xxiii.  3,  4,  6.  §  Matt.  v.  39.                  |I  Jer.  x.  25. 

IT  Luke,  ix.  54.  **  2  Chron.  xxiv.  22.      +t  Acts,  vii.  60. 

XX  Jer.  XX.  12.  §§  Jer.  xvii.  18.               t|||  Luke,  xxiii.  34. 

TV  Heb.  viL  19.  «**  Heb.  viL  18. 


CHAP,  v.]  CHRISTIAN    DISPENSATIONS.  39 

moral  precepts  which  were  delivered  before  the  period  of 
that  dispensation,  as  imposing  permanent  obligations :  they 
were  delivered,  it  is  said,  not  to  one  peculiar  people,  but  to 
individuals  of  many ;  and,  in  the  persons  of  the  immediate 
survivors  of  the  deluge,  to  the  whole  human  race.  This  argu- 
ment assumes  a  ground  paramount  to  all  questions  of  subse- 
quent abrogation.  Now  it  would  appear  a  sufficient  answer 
to  say — If  the  precepts  of  the  Patriarchal  and  Christian  dis- 
pensations are  coincident,  no  question  needs  to  be  discussed  ; 
if  they  are  not,  we  must  make  an  election ;  and  surely  the 
Christian  cannot  doubt  what  election  he  should  make.  Could 
a  Jew  have  justified  himself  for  violating  the  Mosaic  law,  by 
urging  the  precepts  delivered  to  the  patriarchs  ?  No.  Neither 
then  can  we  justify  ourselves  for  violating  the  Christian  law, 
by  urging  the  precepts  delivered  to  Moses. 

We  indeed  have,  if  it  be  possible,  still  stronger  motives. 
The  moral  law  of  Christianity  binds  us,  not  merely  because 
it  is  the  present  expression  of  the  Will  of  God,  but  because  it 
is  a  portion  of  his  last  dispensation  to  man — of  that  which  is 
avowedly  not  only  the  last,  but  the  highest  and  the  best.  We 
do  not  find  in  the  records  of  Christianity  that  which  we  find 
in  the  other  Scriptures,  a  reference  to  a  greater  and  purer  dis- 
pensation yet  to  come.  It  is  as  true  of  the  Patriarchal  as  of 
the  Mosaic  institution,  that  "  it  made  nothing  perfect,"  and 
that  it  referred  us  from  the  first,  to  "  the  bringing  in  of  that 
better  hope  which  did."  If  then  the  question  of  supremacy 
is  between  a  perfect  and  an  imperfect  system,  who  will  hesi- 
tate in  his  decision  1 

There  are  motives  of  gratitude,  too,  and  of  aflfection,  as  well 
as  of  reason.  The  clearer  exhibition  which  Christianity 
gives  of  the  attributes  of  God ;  its  distirlct  disclosure  of  our 
immortal  destinies ;  and  above  all,  its  wonderful  discovery  of 
the  love  of  our  Universal  Father,  may  well  give  to  the  moral 
law  with  which  they  are  connected,  an  authority  which  may 
supersede  every  other. 

These  considerations  are  of  practical  importance ;  for  it 
may  be  observed  of  those  who  do  not  advert  to  them,  that  they 
sometimes  refer  indiscriminately  to  the  Old  Testament  or  the 
New,  without  any  other  guide  than  the  apparent  greater  ap- 
plicability of  a  precept  in  the  one  or  the  other,  to  their  pre- 
sent need  :  and  thus  it  happens  that  a  rule  is  sometimes  acted 
upon,  less  perfect  than  that  by  which  it  is  the  good  pleasure 
of  God  we  should  now  regulate  our  conduct. — It  is  a  fact 
which  the  reader  should  especially  notice,  that  an  appeal  to 
the  Hebrew  Scriptures  is  frequently  made  when  the  precepts  of 


40        .  PATRIARCHAL,    MOSAIC,    AND  [eSSAY  I. 

Christianity  would  he  too  rigid  for  our  purpose.  He  who  in- 
sists upon  a  pure  morality,  applies  to  the  New  Testament  : 
he  who  desires  a  little  more  indulgence,  defends  himself  by 
arguments  from  the  Old. 

Of  this  indiscriminate  reference  to  all  the  dispensations, 
there  is  an  extraordinary  example  in  the  newly  discovered 
work  of  Milton.  He  appeals,  Tbelieve,  almost  uniformly  to 
the  precepts  of  all,  as  of  equal  present  obligation.  The  con- 
sequence is  what  might  be  expected — ^his  moral  system  is  not 
consistent.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten,  that  in  defending  what 
may  be  regarded  as  less  pure  doctrines,  he  refers  mostly,  or 
exclusively,  to  the  Hebrew  Scriptures.  In  all  his  disquisi- 
tions to  prove  the  lawfulness  of  untruths,  he  does  not  once 
refer  to  the  New  Testament.*  Those  who  have  observed 
the  prodigious  multiplicity  of  texts  which  he  cites  in  this 
work,  will  peculiarly  appreciate  the  importance  of  the  fact. — • 
Again :  "  Hatred,"  he  says,  "  is  in  some  cases  a  religious 
duty."t  A  proposition  at  which  the  Christian  may  reasonably 
wonder.  And  how  does  Milton  prove  its  truth  ?  He  cites 
from  Scripture  ten  passages  ;  of  which  eight  are  from  the  Old 
Testament  and  two  from  the  New.  The  reader  will  be  curi- 
ous to  know  what  these  two  are  : — "  If  any  man  come  to  me 
and  hate  not  his  father  and  mother — he  cannot  be  my  dis- 
ciple."J  And  the  rebuke  to  Peter ;  "  Get  thee  behind  me, 
Satan."§  The  citation  of  such  passages  shows  that  no  pas- 
sages to  the  purpose  could  be  found. 

It  may  be  regarded  therefore  as  a  general  rule,  that  none 
of  the  injunctions  or  permissions  which  formed  a  part  of  the 
former  dispensations,  can  be  referred  to  as  of  authority  to  us, 
except  so  far  as  they  are  coincident  with  the  Christian  law. 
To  our  own  Master  we  stand  or  fall ;  and  our  Master  is 
Christ.- — And  in  estimating  this  coincidence,  it  is  not  requi- 
site to  show  that  a  given  rule  or  permission  of  the  former  dis- 
pensations is  specifically  superseded  in  the  New  Testament. 
It  is  sufficient  if  it  is  not  accordant  with  the  general  spirit ; 
and  this  consideration  assumes  greater  weight  when  it  is  con- 
nected with  another  which  is  hereafter  to  be  noticed — ^that  it 
is  by  the  general  spirit  of  the  Christian  morality  that  many 
of  the  duties  of  man  are  to  be  discovered. 

Yet  it  is  always  to  be  remembered,  that  the  laws  which 
are  thus  superseded  were,  nevertheless,  the  laws  of  God. 
Let  not  the  reader  suppose  that  we  would  speak  or  feel  re- 
specting them  otherwise  than  with  that  reverence  which  their 

*  Christian  Doctrine,  p.  660.  t  P.  641. 

t  Luke  xiv.  26.  §  Mark  viii.  33. 


CHAP,  v.]  CHRISTIAN    DISPENSATIONS,  41 

origin  demands — or  that  we  would  take  any  tiling  from  their 
present  obligation  but  that  which  is  taken  by  the  Lawgiver 
nimself.  It  may  indeed  he  observed,  that  in  all  his  dispen- 
sations there  is  a  harmony,  a  one  pervading  piinciple,  which, 
without  other  evidence,  indicates  that  they  proceeded  from 
the  same  authority.  The  variations  are  circumstantial  rather 
than  fundamental ;  and,  after  all,  the  great  principles  in  which 
they  accord,  far  outweigh  the  particular  applications  in  wliich 
they  differ.  The  Mosaic  Dispensation  was  "  a  schoolmaster" 
to  bring  us,  not  merely  through  the  medium  of  types  and  pro- 
phecies, but  through  its  moral  law,  to  Christ.  Both  the  one 
and  the  other  were  designed  as  preparatives  ;  and  it  was  pro^ 
bably  as  true  of  these  moral  laws  as  of  the  prophecies,  that 
the  Jews  did  not  perceive  their  relationship  to  Christianity  as 
it  was  actually  introduced  into  the  world. 


Respecting  the  variations  of  the  moral  law,  some  persons 
greatly  and  very  needlessly  perplex  themselves  by  indulging 
in  such  questions  as  these. — "  If,"  say  they,  "  God  be  perfect, 
and  if  all  the  dispensations  are  communications  of  his  will, 
how  happens  it  that  they  are  not  uniform  in  their  requisitions  ? 
How  happens  it  that  that  which  was  required  by  Infinite 
Knowledge  at  one  time,  was  not  required  by  Infinite  Know- 
ledge at  another?"  I  answer — I  cannot  tell.  And  what 
then?  Does  the  enquirer  think  this  a  sufficient  reason  for 
rejecting  the  authority  of  the  Christian  law  ?  If  inability  to 
discover  the  reasons  of  the  moral  government  of  God  be  a 
good  motive  to  doubt  its  authority,  we  may  involve  ourselves 
in  doubts  without  end. — Why  does  a  Being  who  is  infinitely 
pure  permit  moral  evil  in  the  world  ?  Why  does  he  who  is 
perfectly  benevolent  permit  physical  suffering  ?  Why  did  he 
suffer  our  first  parents  to  fall  ?  Why,  after  they  had  fallen, 
did  he  not  immediately  repair  the  loss  ?  Why  was  the  Mes- 
siah's appearance  deferred  for  four  thousand  years  1  Why  is 
not  the  religion  of  the  Messiah  universally  known  and  univer- 
sally operative  at  the  present  day  ?  To  all  these  questions  and 
to  many  others,  no  answer  can  be  given  ;  and  the  difficulty  ari- 
sing from  them  is  as  great,  if  we  choose  to  make  difficulties  for 
ourselves,  as  that  which  arises  from  variations  in  his  moral 
laws.  Even  in  infidelity  we  shall  find  no  rest ;  the  objections 
lead  us  onward  to  atheism.  He  who  will  not  believe  in  a  Deity 
unless  he  can  reconcile  all  the  facts  before  his  eyes  with  his 
notions  of  the  divine  attributes,  must  deny  that  a  Deity  exists. 
I  talked  of  rest : — Alas  !  there  is  no  rest  in  infidelity  or  in 
atheism.    To  disbelieve  in  revelation  or  in  God,  is  not  to  escape 

4* 


42  PATRIARCHAL,    MOSAIC,    AND  [eSSAY  I 

from  a  belief  in  things  which  you  do  noi  comprehend,  but  to 
transfer  your  belief  to  a  new  class  of  such  things.  Unbelief 
is  credulity.  The  infidel  is  more  credulous  than  the  Chris- 
tian, and  the  atheist  is  the  most  credulous  of  mankind :  that 
is,  he  believes  important  propositions  upon  less  evidence  than 
any  other  man,  and  in  opposition  to  greater. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  the  anxiety  of  some  writers  to  re- 
concile some  of  the  facts  before  us  with  the  "  moral  perfec- 
tions" of  the  Deity  ;  and  it  is  instructive  to  observe  into  what 
doctrines  they  are  led.  They  tell  us  that  all  the  evil  and  all 
the  pain  in  the  world,  are  parts  of  a  great  system  of  Benevo- 
lence. "  The  moral  and  physical  evil  observable  in  the  sys- 
tem, according  to  men's  limited  views  of  it,  are  necessary 
parts  of  the  great  plan ;  all  tending  ultimately  to  produce  the 
greatest  sum  of  happiness  upon  the  whole,  not  only  with  re- 
spect to  the  system  in  general,  but  to  each  individual,  accord- 
ing to  the  station  he  occupies  in  it."*  They  affirm  that  God 
is  an  "  allwise  Being,  who  directs  all  the  movements  of  na- 
ture, and  who  is  determined,  by  his  o\vn  unalterable  perfec- 
tions, to  maintain  in  it  at  all  times,  the  greatest  possible  quantity 
of  happiness."!  The  Creator  found,  therefore,  that  to  inflict 
the  misery  which  now  exists,  was  the  best  means  of  promot- 
ing this  happiness — that  to  have  abated  the  evil,  the  suffer- 
ing, or  the  misery,  would  be  to  have  diminished  the  sum  of 
felicity — and  that  men  could  not  have  been  better  or  more  at 
ease  than  they  are,  without  making  them  on  the  whole  more 
vicious  or  unhappy ! — These  things  are  beacons  which  should 
warn  us.  These  speculations  show  that  not  only  religion,  but 
reason,  dictates  the  propriety  of  acquiescing  in  that  degree  of 
ignorance  in  which  it  has  pleased  God  to  leave  us  ;  because 
they  show,  that  attempts  to  acquire  knoAvledge  may  conduct 
us  to  folly.  These  are  subjects  upon  which  he  acts  most  ra- 
tionally, who  says  to  his  reason — ^be  still. 


MODE  OF  APPLYING^THE  PRECEPTS  OF  SCRIPTURE  TO 
aUESTlONS  OF  DUTY. 

It  is  remarkable  that  many  of  these  precepts,  and  especially 
those  of  the  Christian  Scriptures,  are  delivered,  not  systemati- 
cally but  occasionully .  They  are  distributed  through  occa- 
sional discourses  and  occasional  letters.     Except  in  the  in- 

*  This  is  given  as  the  belief  of  Dr.  Priestly.     See  Memoirs :  Ap.  No.  5. 

t  Adum  Smith :  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments.  See  also  T.  Southwood 
Smith's  Illustrations  of  the  Divine  Government,  in  which  unbridled  li- 
cense of  speculation  has  led  the  writer  into  some  instructive  absurdities. 


CHAP,  v.]  CHRISTIAPr   DISPENSATIONS.  43 

stance  of  the  law  of  Moses,  the  speaker  or  writer  rarely  set 
about  a  formal  exposition  of  moral  truth.  The  precepts  were 
delivered  as  circumstances  called  them  forth  or  made  them 
needful.  There  is  nothing  like  a  system  of  morality ;  nor, 
consequently,  does  there  exist  that  completeness,  that  distinct- 
ness in  defining  and  accuracy  ih  limiting,  which,  in  a  system 
of  morality,  we  expect  to  find.  Many  rules  are  advanced  in 
short  absolute  prohibitions  or  injunctions,  without  assigning 
any  of  those  exceptions  to  their  practical  application,  which 
the  majority  of  such  rules  require. — The  enquiry,  in  passing, 
may  be  permitted — Why  are  these  things  so  1  When  it  is 
considered  what  the  Christian  dispensation  is,  and  what  it  is 
designed  to  effect  upon  the  conduct  of  man,  it  cannot  be  sup- 
posed that  the  incompleteness  of  its  moral  precepts  happened 
by  inadvertence.  The  precepts  of  the  former  dispensation 
are  much  more  precise ;  and  it  is  scarcely  to  be  supposed 
that  the  more  perfect  dispensation  would  have  had  a  less  pre- 
cise law,  unless  the  deficiency  were  to  be  compensated  from 
some  other  authoritative  source  : — which  remark  is  offered  as 
a  reason,  a  priori,  for  expecting  that,  in  the  present  dispensa- 
tion, God  would  extend  the  operation  of  his  law  written  in  the 
heart. 

But  whatever  may  be  thought  of  this,  it  is  manifest  that 
considerable  care  is  requisite  in  the  application  of  precepts, 
so  delivered,  to  the  conduct  of  life.  To  apply  them  in  all 
cases  literally,  were  to  act  neither  reasonably  nor  consistently 
with  the  designs  of  the  Lawgiver  :  to  regard  them  in  all  cases 
as  mere  general  directions,  and  to  subject  them  to  the  unau- 
thorized revision  of  man,  were  to  deprive  them  of  their  pro- 
per character  and  authority  as  divine  laws.  In  proposing 
some  grounds  for  estimating  the  practical  obligation  of  these 
precepts,  I  would  be  first  allowed  to  express  the  conviction, 
that  the  simple  fact  that  such  a  disquisition  is  needed,  and 
that  the  moral  duties  are  to  be  gathered  rather  by  implication 
or  general  tenor  than  from  specific  and  formal  rules,  is  one 
indication  amongst  the  many,  that  the  dispensation  of  which 
these  precepts  fonn  a  part,  stands  not  in  words  but  in  power : 
and  I  hope  to  be  forgiven,  even  in  a  book  of  morality,  if  I 
express  the  conviction  that  none  can  fulfil  their  requisitions — < 
that  none  indeed  can  appreciate  them — without  some  partici-" 
pation  in  this  "  power."  I  say  he  cannot  appreciate  them. 
Neither  the  morals  nor  the  religion  of  Christianity  can  be 
adequately  estimated  by  the  man  who  sits  down  to  the  New 
Testament,  with  no  other  preparation  than  that  which  is  ne- 
cessary in  sitting  down  to  Euclid  or  Newton.     There  must 


44  PATRIARCHAL,   MOSAIC,   AND  [eSSAT  I. 

be  some  preparation  of  heart  as  well  as  integrity  of  under- 
standing— or,  as  the  appropriate  language  of  the  volume  itself 
would  express  it,  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  become,  in 
some  degree,  the  "  sheep"  of  Christ  before  we  can  accurately 
"  know  his  voice." 

There  is  one  clear  and  distinct  ground  upon  which  we  may 
limit  the  application  of  a  precept  that  is  couched  in  absolute 
language — the  unlawfulness,  in  any  given  conjuncture,  of  obey- 
ing it.  "  Submit  yourselves  to  every  ordinance  of  man."* 
This,  literally,  is  an  unconditional  command.  But  if  we  were 
to  obey  it  unconditionally,  we  should  sometimes  comply  with 
human,  in  opposition  to  divine  laws.  In  such  cases  then, 
the  obligation  is  clearly  suspended ;  and  this  distinction,  the 
first  teachers  of  Christianity  recognized  in  their  own  practice. 
When  an  "  ordinance  of  man"  required  them  to  forbear  the 
promulgation  of  the  new  religion,  they  refused  obedience; 
and  urged  the  befitting  expostulation — "  Whether  it  be  right 
in  the  sight  of  God  to  hearken  unto  you  more  than  unto  God, 
judge  ye."t  So,  too,  with  the  filial  relationship  :  "  Children 
obey  your  parents  in  all  things. "J  But  a  parent  may  require 
his  child  to  lie  or  steal ;  and  therefore  when  a  parent  requires 
obedience  in  such  things  his  authority  ceases,  and  the  obliga- 
tion to  obedience  is  taken  away  by  the  moral  law  itself.  The 
precept,  so  far  as  the  present  ground  of  exception  applies,  is 
virtually  this  :  Obey  your  parents  in  all  things,  unless  disobe- 
dience is  required  by  the  will  of  God.  Or  the  subject  might 
be  illustrated  thus :  The  Author  of  Christianity  reprobates 
those  v/ho  love  father  or  mother  more  than  himself.  The  pa- 
ramount love  to  God  is  to  be  manifested  by  obedience. §  So, 
then,  we  are  to  obey  the  commands  of  God  in  preference  to 
hose  of  our  parents.  "  All  human  authority  ceases  at  the 
point  where  obedience  becomes  criminal."  || 

Of  some  precepts,  it  is  evident  that  they  were  designed  to 
be  understood  conditionally.  "  When  thou  prayest,  enter  into 
thy  closet,  and  when  thou  hast  shut  thy  door,  pray  to  thy 
Father  which  is  in  secret."^  This  precept  is  conditional.  I 
doubt  not  that  it  is  consistent  with  his  will  .that  the  greater 
number  of  the  supplications  which  man  offers  at  his  throne 
shall  be  offered  in  secret ;  yet,  that  the  precept  does  not  ex- 
clude the  exercise  of  public  prayer,  is  evident  from  this  con- 
sideration, if  from  no  other,  that  Christ  and  his  apostles  them- 
selves practised  it. 

»  1  Pet.  ii.  13.  t  Acts  iv.  19.  t  Col.  iii.  20. 

§  If  ye  love  me,  ye  will  keep  my  commandments. — ^John  xiv  15. 
II  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  IT  Matt.  vi.  6. 


CHAP,  v.]  CHRISTIAN    DTSPENSATTONS.  45 

Some  precepts  are  figurative,  and  describe  the  spirit  and 
temper  that  should  govern  us,  rather  than  the  particular  ac- 
tions that  we  should  perform.  Of  this  there  is  an  example 
in,  "  Whosoever  shall  compel  thee  to  go  a  mile,  go  with  him 
twain."*  In  promulgating  some  precepts,  a  principal  object 
appears  to  have  been,  to  supply  sanctions.  Thus  in  the  case 
of  Civil  Obedience :  we  are  to  obey  because  the  Deity  autho- 
rizes the  institution  of  Civil  Government — because  the  magis- 
trate is  the  minister  of  God  for  good ;  and,  accordingly,  we 
are  to  obey  not  from  considerations  of  necessity  only,  but  of 
duty ;  "  not  only  for  wrath,  but  for  conscience  sake."t  One  pre- 
cept, if  we  accept  it  literally,  would  enjoin  us  to  "  hate"  our 
parents  ;  and  this  acceptation,  Milton  appears  actually  to  have 
adopted.  One  would  enjoin  us  to  accumulate  no  property : 
"  Lay  not  up  for  yourselves  treasures  upon  earth. "J  Such 
rules  are  seldom  mistaken  in  practice  ;  and,  it  may  be  observed, 
that  this  is  an  indication  of  their  practical  wisdom,  and  their 
practical  adaptation  to  the  needs  of  man.  It  is  not  an  easy 
thing  to  pronounce,  as  occasions  arise,  a  large  number  of  mo- 
ral precepts  in  unconditional  language,  and  yet  to  secure  them 
from  the  probability  of  even  great  misconstructions.  Let  the 
reader  make  the  experiment. — Occasionally,  but  it  is  only 
occasionally,  a  sincere  Christian,  in  his  anxiety  to  conform  to 
the  moral  law,  accepts  such  precepts  in  a  more  literal  sense 
than  that  in  which  they  appear  to  have  been  designed  to  be 
applied.  I  once  saw  a  book  that  endeavoured  to  prove  the 
unlawfulness  of  accumulating  any  property ;  upon  the  autho- 
rity, primarily,  of  this  last  quoted  precept.  The  principle 
upon  which  the  writer  proceeded  was  just  and  right — ^that  it 
is  necessary  to  conform,  unconditionally,  to  the  expressed  Will 
of  God.  The  defect  was  in  the  criticism ;  that  is  to  say,  in 
ascertaining  what  that  Will  did  actually  require. 

Another  obviously  legitimate  ground  of  limiting  the  appli- 
cation of  absolute  precepts,  is  afforded  us  in  just  biblical  criti- 
cism. Not  that  critical  disquisitions  are  often  necessary. to 
the  upright  man  who  seeks  for  the  knowledge  of  his  duties. 
God  has  not  left  the  knowledge  of  his  moral  law  so  remote 
from  the  sincere  seekers  of  his  will.  But  in  deducing  public 
rules  as  authoritative  upon  mankind,  it  is  needful  to  take  into 
account  those  considerations  which  criticism  supplies.  The 
construction  of  the  original  languages  and  their  peculiar 
phraseology,  the  habits,  manners,  and  prevailing  opinions  of 
the  times,  and  the  circumstances  under  which  a  precept  was 

•  Matt.  V.  41.  t  Rom.  xiii.  5.  \  Matt.  vi.  19. 


46  PATRIARCHAL,    MOSAIC,   AND  [eSSAT  I. 

delivered,  are  evidently  amongst  these  considerations.  And 
literary  criticism  is  so  much  the  more  needed,  because  the 
great  majority  of  mankind  have  access  to  Scripture  only 
through  the  medium  of  translations. 

But  in  applying  all  these  limitations  to  the  absolute  precepts 
of  Scripture,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  we  are  not  subjecting 
their  authority  to  inferior  principles.  We  are  not  violating  the 
principle  upon  which  these  essays  proceed,  that  the  expres- 
sion of  the  Divine  Will  is  our  ultimate  law.  We  are  only 
ascertaining  what  that  expression  is.  If,  after  just  and  author- 
ized examination,  any  precept  should  still  appear  to  stand 
imperative  in  its  absolute  form,  we  accept  it  as  obligatory  in 
that  form.  Many  such  precepts  there  are  ;  and  being  such, 
we  allow  no  considerations  of  convenience,  nor  of  expediency, 
nor  considerations  of  any  other  kind,  to  dispense  with  their 
authority. 

One  great  use  of  such  inquiries  as  these,  is  to  vindicate  to 
the  apprehensions  of  men  the  authority  of  the  precepts  them- 
selves. It  is  very  likely  to  happen,  and  to  some  negligent 
enquirers  it  does  happen,  that  seeing  a  precept  couched  in 
unconditional  language,  which  yet  cannot  be  unconditionally 
obeyed,  they  call  in  question  its  general  obligation.  Their 
minds  fix  upon  the  idea  of  some  consequences  which  would 
result  from  a  literal  obedience,  and  feeling  assured  that  those 
consequences  ought  not  to  be  undertaken,  they  set  aside  the 
precept  itself.  They  are  at  little  pains  to  enquire  what  the 
proper  requisitions  of  the  precept  are — glad,  perhaps,  of  a 
specious  excuse  for  not  regarding  it  at  all.  The  careless 
reader,  perceiving  that  a  literal  compliance  with  the  precept 
CO  give  the  cloak  to  him  who  takes  a  coat,  would  be  neither 
proper  nor  right,  rejects  the  whole  precept  of  which  it  form? 
an  illustration ;  and  in  doing  this,  rejects  one  of  the  mos* 
beautiful,  and  important,  and  sacred  requisitions  of  the  Chri? 
tiau  law.*  

There  are  two  modes  in  which  moral  obligations  are  ii** 
posed  in  Scripture — by  particular  precepts,  and  by  gener?».' 
rules.  The  one  prescribes  a  duty  upon  one  subject,  the  othe^ 
upon  very  many.  The  applicability  of  general  rules  is  nearly 
similar  to  that  of  what  is  usually  called  the  spirit  of  the  gos 
pel,  the  spirit  of  the  moral  law  :  which  spirit  is  of  very  wido 
embrace  in  its  application  to  the  purposes  of  life.  "  In  esti 
mating  the  value  of  a  moral  rule,  we  are  to  have  regard  not 

•  Matt  V.  3a 


CHAP,  v.]  CHRISTIAN    DISPENSATIONS.'  ^  47 

only  to  the  particular  duty,  but  the  general  spirit ;  not  only  to 
what  it  directs  us  to  do,  but  to  the  character  which  a  com- 
pliance with  its  direction  is  likely  to  form  in  us."*  In  this 
manner,  some  particular  precepts  become,  in  fact,  general 
rules ;  and  the  duty  that  results  from  these  rules,  from  this 
spirit,  is  as  obligatory  as  that  which  is  imposed  by  a  specific  in- 
junction. Christianity  requires  us  to  maintain  universal  benev- 
olence towards  mankind  ;  and  he  who,  in  his  conduct  towards 
another,  disregards  this  benevolence,  is  as  truly  and  some- 
times as  flagrantly  a  violator  of  the  moral  law,  as  if  he  had 
transgressed  the  command,  "  Thou  shalt  not  steal."  This 
doctrine  is  indeed  recommended  by  a  degree  of  utility  that 
makes  its  adoption  almost  a  necessity;  because  no  number 
of  specific  precepts  would  be  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of 
moral  instruction  :  so  that,  if  we  were  destitute  of  this  species 
of  general  rules,  we  should  frequently  be  destitute,  so  far  as 
external  precepts  are  concerned,  of  any.  It  appears  by  a  note 
to  the  work  which  has  just  been  cited,  that  in  the  Mussulman 
code,  which  proceeds  upon  the  system  of  a  precise  rule  for  a 
precise  question,  there  have  been  promulgated  seventy-five 
thousand  precepts.  I  regard  the  wide  practical  applicability 
of  some  of  the  Christian  precepts  as  an  argument  of  great 
wisdom.  They  impose  many  duties  in  few  words  ;  or  rather, 
they  convey  a  great  mass  of  moral  instruction  within  a  sen- 
tence that  all  may  remember  and  that  few  can  mistake.  "  All 
things  whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to  you,  do  ye 
even  so  to  them,"t  is  of  greater  utility  in  the  practice  of  life, 
and  is  applicable  to  more  circumstances,  than  a  hundred  rules 
which  presented  the  exact  degree  of  kindness  or  assistance 
that  should  be  afforded  in  prescribed  cases.  The  Mosaic  law, 
rightly  regarded,  conveyed  many  clear  expositions  of  human 
duty ;  yet  the  quibbling  and  captious  scribes  of  old  found,  in 
the  literalities  of  that  law,  more  plausible  grounds  for  evading 
its  duties,  than  can  be  found  in  the  precepts  of  the  Christian 
Scriptures.  

There  are  a  few  precepts  of  which  the  application  is  so  ex- 
tensive in  human  affairs,  that  I  would,  in  conformity  with 
some  of  the  preceding  remarks,  briefly  enquire  into  their  prac- 
tical obligation.  Of  these,  that  which  has  just  been  quoted 
for  another  purpose,  "  All  things  whatsoever  ye  would  that 
men  should  do  to  you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them,"J  is  perhaps 
cited  and  recommended  more  frequently  than  any  other.     The 

*  Evidences  of  Christianity :  p.  2,  c.  2.       t  Matt.  vii.  12.        }  Ibid. 


48  PATRIARCHAL,    MOSAIC,   AND  [eSSAT  I. 

difficulty  of  applying  this  precept  has  induced  some  to  reject 
it  as  containing  a  moral  maxim  which  is  not  sound :  but  per- 
haps it  will  be  found,  that  the  deficiency  is  not  in  the  rule  but 
in  the  non-applicability  of  the  cases  to  which  it  has  often  been 
applied.  It  is  not  applicable  when  the  act  which  another 
would  that  ice  should  do  to  him,  is  in  itself  unlawful  or  adverse 
to  some  other  portion  of  the  Moral  Law.  If  I  seize  a  thief 
in  the  act  of  picking  a  pocket,  he  undoubtedly  "  would"  that  I 
should  let  him  go;  and  I,  if  our  situations  were  exchanged, 
should  wish  it  too.  But  I  am  not  therefore  to  release  him ; 
because,  since  it  is  a  Christian  obligation  upon  the  magistrate 
to  punish  offenders,  the  obligation  descends  to  me  to  secure 
them  for  punishment.  Besides,  in  every  such  case  I  must  do 
as  I  would  be  done  unto  with  respect  to  all  parties  concerned — ■ 
the  public  as  well  as  the  thief.  The  precept,  again,  is  not 
applicable  when  the  desire  of  the  second  party  is  such  as  a 
Christian  cannot  lawfully  indulge.  An  idle  and  profligate 
man  asks  me  to  give  him  money.  It  would  be  wrong  to  in- 
dulge such  a  man's  desire,  and  therefore  the  precept  does  not 
apply.  _  ,    .      .  ^ 

The  reader  will  perhaps  say  ;  that  a  person's  duties  in  such 
cases  are  sufficiently  obvious  without  the  gravity  of  illustra- 
don.  Well — but  are  the  principles  upon  which  the  duties  are 
ascertained  thus  obvious  ?  This  is  the  important  point.  In 
he  affiiirs  of  life,  many  cases  arise  in  which  a  person  has  to 
refer  to  such  principles  as  these,  and  in  which,  if  he  does  not 
apply  the  right  principles,  he  will  transgress  the  Christian 
law.  The  law  appears  to  be  in  effect  this.  Do  as  you  would 
be  done  unto,  except  in  those  instances  in  which  to  act  other- 
wise is  permitted  bi/  Christianity.  Inferior  grounds  of  limi- 
tation are  often  applied  ;  and  they  are  always  wrong ;  because 
they  always  subject  the  Moral  Law  to  suspension  by  inferior 
authorities.  To  do  this,  is  to  reject  the  authority  of  the  Di- 
vine Will,  and  to  place  this  beautiful  expression  of  that  Will 
at  the  mercy  of  every  man's  inclination. 

"  Whether  ye  eat  or  drink,  or  whatsoever  ye  do,  do  all  to 
the  glory  of  God."*  I  have  heard  of  the  members  of  some 
dinner  club  who  had  been  recommended  to  consider  this  pre- 
cept, and  who,  in  their  discussions  over  the  bottle,  thought 
perhaps  that  they  were  arguing  soundly  when  they  held  lan- 
guage like  this  :  "  Am  I,  in  lifting  this  glass  to  my  mouth,  to 
do  it  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  glory  to  God  ?  I^4hat  to  be 
my  motive  in  buying  a  horse  or  shooting  a  pheasant  ?"    From 

«  1  Cor.  X.  31. 


CHAP.  V,]  CHRISTIAN    DISPEL   ATIONS.  49 

such  moralists  much  sagacity  of  discrimination  was  not  to  be 
expected ;  and  these  questions  delighted  and  probably  con- 
vinced the  club.  The  mistake  of  these  persons,  and  perhaps 
of  some  others,  is,  that  they  misunderstand  the  rule.  The 
promotion  of  the  Divine  glory  is  not  to  be  the  motive  and  pur- 
pose of  all  our  actions,  but,  having  actions  to  perform,  we  are 
so  to  perform  them  that  this  glory  shall  be  advanced.  The 
pi  ecept  is  in  effect,  Let  your  actions  and  the  motives  of  them 
ho  such,  that  others  shall  have  reason  to  nonour  God  :* — and 
a  precept  like  this  is  a  very  sensitive  test  of  the  purity  of  our 
conduct.  I  know  not  whether  there  is  a  single  rule  of  Chris- 
tianity of  which  the  use  is  so  constant  and  the  application  so 
universal.  To  do  as  we  would  be  done  by,  refers  to  relative 
duties  ;  Not  to  do  evil  that  good  may  come,  refers  to  particular 
circumstances :  but.  To  do  all  things  so  that  the  Deity  may  be 
honoured,  refers  to  almost  every  action  of  a  man's  life .  Happily 
the  Divine  glory  is  thus  promoted  by  some  men  even  in  trifling 
aflfairs — almost  whether  they  eat  or  drink,  or  whatsoever  thing 
they  do.  There  is,  in  truth,  scarcely  a  more  efficacious  means 
of  honouring  the  Deity,  than  by  observing  a  constant  Chris- 
tian manner  of  conducting  our  intercourse  with  men.  He  who 
habitually  maintains  his  allegiance  to  religion  and  to  purity, 
who  is  moderate  and  chastised  in  all  his  pursuits,  and  who 
always  makes  the  prospects  of  the  future  predominate  over 
the  temptations  of  the  present,  is  one  of  the  most  efficacious 
recommenders  of  goodness — one  of  the  most  impressive 
preachers  of  righteousness," — and  by  consequence,  one  of  the 
most  efficient  promoters  of  the  glory  of  God.  ^ 

By  a  part  of  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  it  appears  that 
he  and  his  coadjutors  had  been  reported  to  hold  the  doctrine, 
that  it  is  lawful  "to  do  evil  that  good  may  come."t  This  re- 
port he  declares  is  slanderous ;  and  expresses  his  reprobation 
of  those  who  act  upon  the  doctrine,  by  the  short  and  emphatic 
declaration — their  condemnation  is  just.  This  is  not  critically 
a  prohibition,  but  it  is  a  prohibition  in  eflect ;  and  the  manner 
in  which  the  doctrine  is  reprobated,  induces  the  belief  that  it 
was  so  flagitious  that  it  needed  very  little  enquiry  or  thought : 
in  the  writer's  mind  the  transition  is  immediate,  from  the  idea 
of  the  doctrine  to  the  punishment  of  those  who  adopt  it. 

Now  the  "  evil"  which  is  thus  prohibited,  is,  any  thing  and 
all  things  discordant  with  the  divine  will ;  so  that  the  unso- 
phisticated meaning  of  the  rule  is,  that  nothing  which  is  con- 

*  "  Let  your  light  so  shine  before  men  that  they  may  see  youi  good 
^orks,  and  glorify  your  father  which  is  in  heaven." — Matt,  v  16. 
t  Rom.  iii.  8. 


60  PATRIARCHAL,    MOSAIC,    ANI>  [eSSAT  J. 

trary  to  the  Christian  law  may  be  done  for  the  sake  of  attaining 
a  beneficial  end.  Perhaps  the  breach  of  no  moral  rule  is  pro- 
ductive of  more  mischief  than  of  this .  Tliat  ' ''  the  end  justifies 
the  means,"  is  a  maxim  which  many,  who  condemn  it  as  a 
maxim,  adopt  in  their  practice  :  and  in  political  affairs  it  is 
not  only  habitually  adopted,  but  is  indiretutly,  if  not  openly, 
defended  as  right.  If  a  senator  were  to  object  to  some  mea- 
sure of  apparent  public  expediency,  that  it  was  not  consistent 
with  the  moral  law,  he  would  probably  be  laughed  at  as  a 
fanatic  or  a  fool :  yet  perhaps  some  who  are  flippant  with  this 
charge  of  fanaticism  and  folly  may  be  in  perplexity  for  a  proof. 
If  the  expressed  will  of  God  is  our  paramount  law,  no  proof 
can  be  brought ;  and  in  truth  it  is  not  often  that  it  is  candidly 
attempted.  I  have  not  beeoi  amongst  the  least  diligent  enqui- 
rers into  the  moral  reasonings  of  men,  but  honest  and  manly 
reasoning  against  this  portion  of  Scripture  I  have  never  found. 
Of  the  rule,  "  not  to  do  evil  that  good  may  came,"  Dr.  Paley 
says,  that  it  "  is,  for  the  most  part,  a  salutary  caution."  A 
person  might  as  v/ell  say  that  the  rule  "  not  to  commit  mur- 
der" is  a  salutary  caution.  There  is  no  caution  in  the  matter, 
but  an  imperative  law.  But  he  proceeds  : — "  Strictly  speak- 
ing, that  cannot  be  evil  from  which  good  comes."*  Now  let 
the  reader  consider : — Paul  says,  You  may  not  do  evil  that 
good  may  come :  Ay,  hut,  says  the  philosopher,  if  good  does 
come,  the  acts  that  bring  it  about  are  not  evil.  What  the 
apostle  would  have  said  of  such  a  reasoner,  I  vdll  not  trust 
my  pen  to  suppose,  "^rhe  reader  will  perceive  the  foundation 
of  this  reasoning.  It  assumes  that  good  and  evil  are  not  to 
be  estimated  by  the  expressions  of  the  Will  of  God,  but  by 
the  effects  of  actions.  The  question  is  clearly  fundamental. 
If  expediency  be  the  ultimate  test  of  rectitude,  Dr.  Paley  is 
right ;  if  the  expressions  of  the  Di\'ine  Will  are  the  ultimate 
test,  he  is  wrong.  You  must  sacrifice  the  one  authority  or 
the  other.  If  this  Will  is  the  greater,  consequences  are  not : 
if  consequences  are  the  greater,  this  Will  is  not.  But  this 
question  is  not  now  to  be  discussed  :  it  may  however  be  ob- 
served that  the  interpretation  which  the  rule  has  been  thus 
made  to  bear,  appears  to  be  contradicted  by  the  terms  of  the 
rule  itself.  The  rule  of  Christianity  is,  evil  may  not  be  com- 
mitted for  the  purpose  of  good  :  the  rule  of  the  philosophy  is, 
.Evil  may  not  be  committed,  except  for  the  purpose  of  good. 
Are  these  precepts  identical  ?  Is  there  not  a  fundamental 
variance,  an  absolute  contrariety  between  them  ?     Christianity 

»  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  2,  c.  a 


CHAP,  v.]  CHRISTIAN    DISPENSATIONS.  61 

does  not  speak  of  evil  and  good  as  contingent,  but  as  fixed 
qualities.  You  cannot  convert  the  one  into  the  other  by  dis- 
quisitions about  expediency.  In  morals,  there  is  no  philoso- 
pher's stone  that  can  convert  evil  into  good  with  a  touch. 
Our  labours,  so  long  as  the  authority  of  the  moral  law  is 
acknowledged,  will  end  like  those  of  the  physical  alchymist : 
after  all  our  efforts  at  transmutation,  lead  will  not  become  gold 
— evil  will  not  become  good.  However,  there  is  one  subject 
of  satisfaction  in  considering  such  reasonings  as  these.  They 
prove,  negatively,  the  truth  which  they  assail ;  for  that  against 
which  nothing  but  sophistry  can  be  urged,  is  undoubtedly 
true.  The  simple  truth  is,  that  if  evil  may  be  done  for  the 
sake  of  good,  all  the  precepts  of  Scripture  which  define  or 
prohibit  evil  are  laws  no  longer  ;  for  that  cannot  in  any  rational 
use  of  language  be  called  a  law  in  respect  of  those  to  whom 
it  is  directed,  if  they  are  at  liberty  to  neglect  it  when  they 
think  fit.  These  precepts  may  be  advices,  recommendations, 
"  salutary  cautions"  but  they  are  not  laws.  They  may  suggest 
hints,  but  they  do  not  impose  duties. 

With  respect  to  the  legitimate  grounds  of  exceptions  or 
limitation  in  the  application  of  this  rule,  there  appear  to  be 
few  or  none.  The  only  question  is.  What  actions  are  evil  ? 
Which  question  is  to  be  determined,  ultimately,  by  the  Will 
of  God. 

BENEVOLENCE  AS  IT  IS  PROPOSED  IN  THE  CHRISTIAN 
SCRi:^RES. 

In  enquiring  into  the  great  principles  of  that  moral  system 
which  the  Christian  revelation  institutes,  we  discover  one 
remarkable  characteristic,  one  pervading  peculiarity  by  which 
it  is  distinguished  from  every  other — the  paramount  emphasis 
v/hich  it  lays  upon  the  exercise  of  pure  Benevolence.  It  will 
be  found  that  this  preference  of  "  Love"  is  wise  as  it  is  un- 
exampled, and  that  no  other  general  principle  would  effect, 
with  any  approach  to  the  same  completeness,  the  best  and 
highest  purposes  of  morality.  How  easy  soever  it  be  for  us, 
to  whom  the  character  and  obligations  of  this  benevolence 
are  comparatively  familiar,  to  perceive  the  wisdom  of  placing 
it  at  the  foundation  of  the  Moral  Law,  we  are  indebted  for  the 
capacity  not  to  our  own  sagaciousness,  but  to  light  which  has 
been  communicated  from  heaven.  That  schoolmaster  the  law 
of  Moses  never  taught,  and  the  speculations  of  philosophy 
never  discovered,  that  Love  was  the  fulfilment  of  the  Moral 
Law.  Eighteen  hundred  years  ago  this  doctrine  was  a  new 
commandment. 


52r  PATRIARCHAL,    MOSAIC,   AND  [eSSAY  I. 

Love  is  made  the  test  of  the  validity  of  our  claims  to  the 
Christian  character — "  By  this  shall  all  men  know  that  ye 
are  my  disciples."*  Again,  " — Love  one  another.  He  that 
loveth  another  hath  fulfilled  the  law.  For  this,  Thou  shalt 
not  commit  adultery.  Thou  shalt  not  kill.  Thou  shalt  not  bear 
false  witness.  Thou  shalt  not  covet ;  and  if  there  be  any  other 
commandment,  it  is  briefly  comprehended  in  this  saying, 
namely.  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself.  Love 
worketh  no  ill  to  his  neighbour  ;  therefore  Love  is  the  fulfilling 
of  the  law."t  It  is  not  therefore  surprising  that  after  an  enu- 
meration, in  another  place,  of  various  duties,  the  same  digni- 
fied apostle  says,  "  Above  all  these  things  put  on  charity, 
which  is  the  bond  of  perfectness.^X  The  inculcation  of  this 
Benevolence  is  as  frequent  in  the  Christian  Scriptures  as  its 
practical  utility  is  great.  He  who  would  look  through  the 
volume  will  find  that  no  topic  is  so  frequently  introduced,  no 
obligations  so  emphatically  enforced,  no  virtue  to  which  the 
approbation  of  God  is  so  specially  promised.  It  is  the  theme 
of  all  the  "  apostolic  exhortations,  that  with  which  their  mo- 
rality begins  and  ends,  from  which  all  their  details  and  enu- 
merations set  out  and  into  which  they  return,"^  "  He  that 
dwelleth  in  love  dwelleth  in  God,  and  God  in  him."l|  More 
emphatical  language  cannot  be  employed.  It  exalts  to  the 
utmost  the  character  of  the  virtue,  and,  in  effect,  promises  its 
possessor  the  utmost  favour  and  felicity.  If  then,  of  Faith, 
Hope,  and  Love,  Love  be  the  greatest ;  if  it  be  by  the  test 
of  love  that  our  pretensions  to  Christianity  are  to  be  tried  ; 
if  all  the  relative  duties  of  morality  are  embraced  in  one  word, 
and  that  word  is  Love  ;  it  is  obviously  needful  that,  in  a  book 
like  this,  the  requisitions  of  Benevolence  should  be  habitually 
regarded  in  the  prosecution  of  its  enquiries.  And  accordingly 
the  reader  will  sometimes  be  invited  to  sacrifice  inferior  con- 
siderations to  these  requisitions,  and  to  give  to  the  law  of 
Love  that  paramount  station  in  which  it  has  been  placed  by 
the  authority  of  God. 

It  is  certain  that  almost  every  offence  against  the  relative 
duties,  has  its  origin,  if  not  in  the  malevolent  propensities,  at 
least  in  those  propensities  which  are  incongruous  with  love. 
I  know  not  whether  it  is  possible  to  disregard  any  one  obli- 
gation that  respects  the  intercourse  of  man  with  man,  without 
violating  this  great  Christian  law.  This  universal  applica- 
bility may  easily  be  illustrated  by  referring  to  the  obligations 
of  Justice,  obligations  which,  in  civilized  communities,  are 

*  J«hn  xiii.  35.  t  Rom.  xiii.  9.  t  Col.  iii.  14. 

6  Evid.  Christianitv.  d.  2.  c.  2.  ||  1  John  iv.  IG. 


CHAP,  v.]  CHRISTIAN    DISPENSATIONS.  53 

called  into  operation  more  frequently  than  almost  any  other 
He  who  estimates  the  obligations  of  justice  by  a  reference  to 
that  Benevolence  which  Christianity  prescribes,  will  form  to 
himself  a  much  more  pure  and  perfect  standard  than  he  who 
refers  to  the  law  of  the  land,  to  the  apprehension  of  exposure, 
or  to  the  desire  of  reputation.  There  are  many  ways  in  which 
a  man  can  be  unjust  without  censure  from  the  public,  and 
without  violating  the  laws  ;  but  there  is  no  way  in  which  he 
can  be  unjust  without  disregarding  Christian  benevolence. 
It  is  an  universal  and  very  sensitive  test.  He  who  does  re- 
gard it,  who  uniformly  considers  whether  his  conduct  towards 
another  is  consonant  with  pure  good  will,  cannot  be  volun- 
tarily unjust ;  nor  can  he  who  commits  injustice  do  it  without 
the  consciousness,  if  he  will  reflect,  that  he  is  violating  the 
law  of  Love.  That  integrity  which  is  founded  upon  Love, 
when  compared  with  that  which  has  any  other  basis,  is  recom- 
mended by  its  honour  and  dignity  as  well  as  by  its  rectitude. 
It  is  more  worthy  the  man  as  well  as  the  Christian,  more 
beautiful  in  the  eye  of  infidelity  as  well  as  of  religion. 

It  were  easy,  if  it  were  necessary,  to  show  in  what  manner 
the  law  of  Benevolence  applies  to  other  relative  duties,  and 
in  what  manner,  when  applied,  it  purifies  and  exalts  the  ful- 
filment of  them.  But  our  present  business  is  with  principles 
rather  than  with  their  specific  application. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  obligations  of  this  Benevolence  are 
not  merely  prohibitory — directing  us  to  avoid  "  working  ill" 
to  another,  but  mandatory — requiring  us  to  do  him  good.  That 
benevolence  which  is  manifested  only  by  doing  no  evil,  is  in- 
deed of  a  very  questionable  kind.  To  abstain  from  injustice, 
to  abstain  from  violence,  to  abstain  from  slander,  is  compatible 
with  an  extreme  deficiency  of  love.  There  are  many  who  are 
neither  slanderous,  nor  ferocious,  nor  unjust,  who  have  yet 
very  little  regard  for  the  benevolence  of  the  gospel.  In  the 
illustrations  therefore  of  the  obligations  of  morality,  whether  ' 
private  or  political,  it  will  sometimes  become  our  business  to^ 
state,  what  this  Benevolence  requires  as  well  as  what  it  for- 
bids. The  legislator  whose  laws  are  contrived  only  for  the 
detection  and  punishment  of  offenders,  fulfils  but  half  his  duty : 
if  he  would  conform  to  the  Christian  standard,  he  must  pro- 
vide also  for  their  reformation. 

5* 


54  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION  [eSSAY  I 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  IMMEDIATE  COMMUNICATION  OF  THE  WILL  OF  GOD 

Conscience — Its  nature — Its  authority — Review  of  opinions  respecting  a 
moral  sense — Bishop  Butler— Lord  Bacon — Lord  Shaftesbury — Watts- 
Voltaire — Locke — Southey — Adam  Smith — Paley — Rousseau — Milton 
— ^Judge  Hale — Marcus  Antoninus — Epictetus — Seneca — Paul — That 
every  human  being  possesses  a  moral  law — Pagans — Gradations  of 
light — Prophecy — The  immediate  communication  of  the  Divine  Will 
perpetual — Of  national  vices  :  Infanticide :  Duelling — Of  savage  life. 

The  reader  is  solicited  to  approach  this  subject  with  that 
mental  seriousness  which  its  nature  requires.  Whatever  be 
his  opinions  upon  the  subject,  whether  he  believes  in  the 
reality  of  such  communication  or  not,  he  ought  not  even  to 
think  respecting  it  but  with  feelings  of  seriousness. 

In  endeavouring  to  investigate  this  reality,  it  becomes  espe- 
cially needful  to  distinguish  the  communication  of  the  Will 
of  God  from  those  mental  phenomena  with  which  it  has  very 
commonly  been  intermingled  and  confounded.  The  want  of 
this  distinction  has  occasioned  a  confusion  which  has  been 
greatly  injurious  to  the  cause  of  truth.  It  has  occasioned 
great  obscurity  of  opinion  respecting  divine  instruction ;  and 
by  associating  error  with  truth,  has  frequently  induced  scep- 
ticism respecting  the  truth  itself. — When  an  intelligent  person 
perceives  that  infallible  truth  or  divine  authority  is  described 
as  belonging  to  the  dictates  of  "  Conscience,"  and  when  he 
perceives,  as  he  must  perceive,  that  these  dictates  are  various 
and  sometimes  contradictory ;  he  is  in  danger  of  concluding 
that  no  unerring  and  no  divine  guidance  is  accorded  to  man. 

Upon  this  serious  subject  it  is  therefore  peculiarly  neces- 
sary to  endeavour  to  attain  distinct  ideas,  and  to  employ  those 
words  only  which  convey  distinct  ideas  to  other  men.  The 
first  section  of  the  present  chapter  will  accordingly  be  devoted 
to  some  brief  observations  respecting  the  Conscience,  its  na- 
ture, and  its  authority;  by  which  it  is  hoped  the  reader  will 
see  sufficient  reason  to  distinguish  its  dictates  from  that  higher- 
guidance,  respecting  which  it  is  the  object  of  the  present 
chapter  to  enquire. 

Fot  a  kindred'  purpose,  it  appears  requisite  to  offer  a  short 
review  of  popular  and  philosophical  opinions  respecting  a 
Moral  Sense.  These  opinions  will  be  found  to  have  been 
frequently  expressed  in  great  indistinctness  and  ambiguity  of 
language.     The  purpose  of  the  writer  in  referring  to  these 


CH\P.  VI.]  or    THE    WILL    OF    tJOD,       '  55 

opinions,  is  to  enquire  whether  they  do  not  generally  involve 
a  recognition-:— obscurely  perhaps,  but  still  a  recognition — of 
the  principle,  that  God  communicates  his  will  to  the  mind. 
If  they  do  this,  and  if  they  do  it  without  design  or  conscious- 
ness, no  trifling  testimony  is  afforded  to  the  truth  of  the  prin- 
ciple :  for  how  should  this  principle  thus  secretly  recommend 
itself  to  the  minds  pf  men,  except  by  the  influence  of  its  own 
evidence  ? 


SECTION  I. 
CONSCIENCE,  ITS  NATURE  AND  AUTHORITY. 

In  the  attempt  to  attack  distinct  notions  to  the  term  "  Con- 
science," we  have  to  request  the  reader  not  to  estimate  the 
accuracy  of  our  observations  by  the  notions  which  he  may 
have  habitually  connected  with  the  word.  Our  disquisition 
is  not  about  terms  but  truths.  If  the  observations  are  in  them- 
selves just,  our  principal  object  is  attained.  The  secondary 
object,  that  of  connecting  truth  v/ith  appropriate  terms,  is  only 
«o  far  attainable  by  a  writer,  as  shall  be  attained  by  an  uni- 
form employment  of  words  in  determinate  senses  in  his  own 
practice. 

Men  possess  notions  of  right  and  wrong ;  they  possess  a 
belief  that,  under  given  circumstances,  they  ought  to  do  one 
thing  or  to  forbear  another.  This  belief  I  would  call  a  con- 
scientious belief.  And  when  such  a  belief  exists  in  a  man's 
mind  in  reference  to  a  number  of  actions,  I  would  call  the 
sum  or  aggregate  of  his  notions  respecting  what  is  right  and 
wrong,  his  Conscience, 

To  possess  notions  of  right  and  wrong  in  human  conduct — 
to  be  convinced  that  we  ougkj.  to  do  or  to  forbear  an  action — 
implies  and  supposes  a  sense  of  obligation  existent  in  the 
mind,  A  man  who  feels  that  it  is  wrong  for  him  to  do  a 
thing,  possesses  a  sense  of  obligation  to  refrain.,  Into  the 
origin  of  this  sense  of  obligation,  or  how  it  is  induced  into  the 
mind,  we  do  not  enquire :  it  is  sufficient  for  our  purposfe  that 
it  exists ;  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  its  existence  is 
consequent  of  the  will  of  God. 

In  most  men — perhaps  in  all — this  sense  of  obligation  re- 
fers, with  greater  or  less  distinctness,  to  the  will  of  a  supe- 
rior being.     The  impression,  however  obscure,  is,  in  gene 


56  THE    IMMEDIATi.     COMMUNICATION  [eSSAT  I. 

ral,  fundamei»rfally  this:  I  must  do  so  or  so,  because  God 
requires  it. 

It  is  found  that  this  sense  of  obhgation  is  sometimes  con- 
nected, in  the  minds  of  separate  individuals,  with  different 
actions.  One  man  thinks  he  ought  to  do  a  thing  from  which 
another  thinks  he  ought  »cr  forbear.  Upon  the  great  questions 
of  morality  there  is  indeed,  in  general,  a  congruity  of  human 
judgment ;  yet  subjects  do  aiise  respecting  which  one  man's 
conscience  dictates  an  act  different  from  that  which  is  dic- 
tated by  another's.  It  is  not  therefore  essential  to  a  con- 
scientious judgment  of  right  and  wrong,  that  that  judgment 
should  be  in  strict  accordance  with  the  Moral  Law.  Some 
men's  consciences  dictate  that  which  the  Moral  Law  does 
not  enjoin ;  and  this  law  enjoins  some  points  which  are  not 
enforced  by  every  man's  conscience.  This  is  precisely  the 
result  which,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  it  is  reasonable  to 
expect.  Of  these  judgments  respecting  what  is  right,  with 
which  the  sense  of  obligation  becomes  from  time  to  time  con- 
nected, some  are  induced  by  the  instructions  or  example  of 
others  ;  some  by  our  own  reflection  or  enquiry ;  some  per- 
haps from  the  written  law  of  revelation ;  and  some,  as  we 
have  cause  to  conclude^  from  the  direct  intimations  of  the  Di- 
vine Will. 

It  is  manifest  that  if  the  sense  of  obligation  is  sometimes 
connected  with  subjects  that  are  proposeid  to  us  merely  by 
the  instruction  of  others,  or  if  the  connexion  results  from  the 
power  of  association  and  habit,  or  from  the  fallible  investiga- 
tions of  our  own  minds — ^that  sense  of  obligation  will  be  con- 
nected, in  different  individuals,  with  different  subjects.  So 
that  it  may  sometimes  happen  that  a  nian  can  say,  I  con- 
scientiously think  I  ought  to  do  a  certain  action,  and  yet 
that  his  neighbour  can  say,  I  conscientiously  think  the  con- 
trary. "  With  respect  to  particular  actions,  opinion  deter- 
mines whether  they  are  good  or  ill ;  and  Conscience  approves, 
or  disapproves,  in  consequence  of  this  determination,  whether 
it  be  in  favour  of  truth  or  falsehood."* 

Such  considerations  enable  us  to  account  for  the  diversity 
of  the  dictates  of  the  conscience  in  individuals  respectively. 
A  person  is  brought  up  amongst  Catholics,  and  is  taught  from 
his  childhood  that  flesh  ought  not  to  be  eaten  in  Lent.  The 
arguments  of  those  around  him,  or  perhaps  their  authority, 
satisfy  him  that  what  he  is  taught  is  truth.  The  sense  of  obli- 
gation  thus  becomes  connected  with  a  refusal  to  eat  flesh  in 

>*  Adventurer;  No.  91 


CHAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OF    GOD.  57 

Lent ;  and  thenceforth  he  says  that  the  abstinence  is  dictated 
by  his  conscience.  A  Protestant  youth  is  taught  the  con- 
trary. Argument  or  authority  satisfies  him  that  flesh  may 
lawfully  be  eaten  every  day  in  the  year.  His  sense  of  obli- 
gation therefore  is  not  connected  with  the  abstinence ;  and 
thenceforth  he  says  that  eating  flesh  in  Lent  does  not  violate 
his  conscience.     And  so  of  a  multitude  of  other  questions. 

When  therefore  a  person  says,  my  conscience  dictates  to 
me  that  I  ought  to  perform  such  an  action,  he  means — or  in 
the  use  of  such  language  he  ought  to  mean — that  the  sense 
of  obligation  which  subsists  in  his  mind  is  connected  with 
that  action ;  that,  so  far  as  his  judgment  is  enlightened,  it  is 
a  requisition  of  the  law  of  God. 

But  not  all  our  opinions  respecting  morality  and  religion 
are  derived  from  education  or  reasoning.  He  who.  finds  in 
Scripture  the  precept,  "  Thou  ^halt  love  thy  neighbour  as  thy- 
self," derives  an  opinion  respecting  the  duty  of  loving  others 
from  the  discovery  of  this  expression  of  the  Will  of  God. 
His  sense-  of  obligation  is  connected  with  benevolence  to- 
wards others  in  consequence  of  this  discovery;  or,  in  other 
words,  his  understanding  has  been  informed  by  the  Moral 
Law,  and  a  new  duty  is  added  to  those  which  are  dictated  by 
his  conscience.  Thus  it  is  that  Scripture,  by  informing  the 
judgment,  extends  the  jurisdiction  of  conscience ;  and  it  is 
hence,  in  part,  that  in  those  who  seriously  study  the  Scrip- 
tures, the  conscience  appears  so  much  more  vigilant  and 
operative  than  in  inany  who  do  not  possess,  or  do  not  regard 
them.  Many  of  the  mistakes  which  education  introduces, 
many  of  the  fallacies  to  which  our  own  speculations  lead  us, 
are  corrected  by  this  law.  In  the  case  of  our  Catholic,  if  a 
reference  to  Scripture  should  convince  him  that  the  judgment 
he  has  formed  respecting  abstinence  from  flesh  is  not  founded 
on  the  Law  of  God,  the  sense  of  obligation  becomes  detached 
from  its  subject;  and  thenceforth  his  conscience  ceases  to 
dictate  that  he  should  abstain  from  flesh  in  Lent.  Yet  Scrip- 
ture does  not  decide  every  question  respecting  human  duty, 
and  in  some  instances  individuals  judge  differently  of  the  de- 
cisions which  Scripture  gives.  This,  again,  occasions  some 
diversity  in  the  dictates  of  the  Conscience ;  it  occasions  the 
sense  of  obligation  to  become  connected  with  dissimilar,  and 
possibly  incompatible,  actions. 

But  another  portion  of  men's  judgments  respecting  moral 
affairs  is  derived  from  immediate  intimations  of  the  Divine 
Will.  '(This  we  must  be  allowed  for  the  present  to  assume.) 
These  intimations  inform  sometimes  the  judgment ;  correct 


58  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION  [eSSAY  I. 

its  mistakes  ;  and  increase  and  give  distinctness  to  our  know- 
ledge— thus  operating,  as  the  Scriptures  operate,  to  connect 
the  sense  of  obligation  more  accurately  with  those  actions 
which  are  conformable  with  the  Will  of  God.  It  does  not, 
however,  follow,  by  any  sort  of  necessity,  that  this  higher  in- 
struction must  correct  all  the  mistakes  of  the  judgment ;  that 
because  it  imparts  some  light,  that  light  must  be  perfect  day ; 
that  because  it  communicates  some  moral  or  religious  truth, 
it  must  communicate  all  the  truths  of  religion  and  morality. 
Nor,  again,  does  it  follow  that  individuals  must  each  receive 
the  same  access  of  knowledge.  It  is  evidently  as  possible 
that  it  should  be  communicated  in  different  degrees  to  dif- 
ferent individuals,  as  that  it  should  be  communicated  at  all. 
For  which  plain  reasons  we  are  still  to  expect,  what  in  fact 
we  find,  that  although  the  judgment  receives  light  from  a 
superhuman  intelligence,  the  degree  of  that  light  varies  in  in- 
dividuals ;  and  that  the  sense  of  obligation  is  connected  with 
fewer  subjects,  and  attended  with  less  accuracy,  in  the  minds 
of  some  men  than  of  others. 

With  respect  to  the  authority  which  properly  belongs  to 
Conscience  as  a  director  of  individual  conduct,  it  appears 
manifest,  ahke  from  reason  and  from  Scripture,  that  it  is  great. 
When  a  man  believes,  upon  due  deliberation,  that  a  certain 
action  is  right,  that  action  is  right  to  him.  And  this  is  true, 
\whether  the  action  be  or  be  not  required  of  mankind  by  the 
Moral  Law.*  The  fact  that  in  his  mind  the  sense  of  obligation 
attaches  to  the  act,  and  that  he  has  duly  deliberated  upon  the 
accuracy  of  his  judgment,  makes  the  dictate  of  his  Conscience 
.upon  that  subject  an  authoritativa  dictate.  The  individual  is 
to  be  held  guilty  if  he  violates  his  Conscience — if  he  does 
one  thing,  whilst  his  sense  of  obligation  is  directed  to  its- con- 
trary. Nor,  if  his  judgment  should  not  be  accurately  informed, 
if  his  sense  of  obligation  should  not  be  connected  with  a  proper 
subject,  is  the  guilt  of  violating  his  Conscience  taken  away. 
Were  it  otherwise,  a  person  might  be  held  virtuous  for  acting 
in  opposition  to  his  apprehensions  of  duty ;  or  guilty,  for 
doing  what  he  believed  to  be  right.  "  It  is  happy  for  us  that 
our  title  to  the  character  of  virtuous  beings,  depends  not  upon 
the  justness  of  our  opinions  or  the  constant  objective  rectitude 
of  all  we  do,  but  upon  the  conformity  of  our  actions  to  the  sin- 
cere convictions  of  our  minds. "f  Dr.  Fumeaux  says,  "  To 
secure  the  favour  of  God  and  the  rewards  of  true  religion,  we 

*  "  By  Conscience  all  men  are  restrained  from  intentional  ill — it  infal- 
libly directs  us  to  avoid  guilt,  but  is  not  intended  to  secure  us  from  error." 
—Advent.  No.  91.  t  Dr.  Price. 


CHAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OF    GOD.  59 

must  follow  our  own  consciences  and  judgments  according  to 
the  best  light  we  can  attain."*  And  I  am  especially  disposed 
to  add  the  testimony  of  Sir  William  Temple,  because  he  re- 
cognizes the  doctrine  which  has  just  been  advanced,  that  our 
judgments  are  enlightened  by  superhuman  agency.  "  The 
way  to  our  future  happiness  must  bo  left,  at  last,  to  the  ifn- 
pressions  made  upon  every  marCs  belief  and  conscience  either 
by  natural  or  supernatural  arguments  and  means."! — Accord- 
ingly there  appears  no  reason  to  doubt  that  some  will  stand 
convicted  in  the  sight  of  the  Omniscient  Judge,  for  actions 
which  his  Moral  Law  has  not  forbidden ;  and  that  some  may 
be  uncondemned  for  actions  which  that  law  does  not  allow.. 
The  distinction  here  is  the  same  as  that  to  which  we  have 
before  had  occasion  to  allude,  between  the  desert  of  the  agent 
and  the  quality  of  the  act.  Of  this  distinction  an  illustration 
is  contained  in  Isaiah  x.  It  was  the  divine  will  that  a  cer- 
tain specific  course  of  action  should  be  pursued  in  punishing^ 
the  Israelites,  For  the  performance  of  this,  the  king  of  As- 
syria was  employed : — "  I  will  give  him  a  charge  to  take  the 
spoil,  and  to  take  the  prey,  and  to  tread  them  downi  like  the 
mire  of  the  streets."  This  charge  the  Assyrian  monarch  ful- 
filled ;  he  did  the  will  of  God ;  but  then  his  intention  was  , 
criminal ;  he  "  meant  not  so  :"  and  therefore,  when  the  "  whofe 
work"  is  performed,  "  I  will  punish,"  says  the  Almighty,  "  the 
fruit  of  the  stout  heart  of  the  king  of  Assyria,  and  the  glory 
of  his  high  looks." 

But  it  was  said  that  these  principles  respecting  the  author- 
ity of  Conscience  were  recognized  in  Scripture.  "  One  be- 
lieveth  that  he  may  eat  all  things  :  another  who  is  weak  eateth 
herbs.  One  man  esteemeth  one  day  above  another :  another 
esteemeth  every  day  alike."  Here,  then,  are  differences, 
nay,  contrarieties  of  conscientious  judgments.  And  what  are 
the  parties  directed  severally  to  do  ? — "  Let  every  man  be 
fully  persuaded  in  his  own  mind  ;"  that  is,  let  the  full  persua- 
sion of  his  own  mind  be  every  man's  rule  of  action.  The 
situation  of  these  parties  was,  that  one  perceived  the  truth 
upon  the  subject,  and  the  other  did  not ;  that  in  one  the  sense 
of  obligation  was  connected  with  an  accmrate,  in  the  other 
with  an  inaccurate,  opinion.  Thus,  again : — "  /  know,  and 
am  persuaded  by  the  Lord  Jesus,  that  there  is  nothing  un- 
clean of  itself ;"  therefore,  absolutely  speaking,  it  is  lawful  to 
eat  all  things  ;  "  but  to  him  that  esteemeth  any  thing  to  be  un- 
clean, to  him  it  is  unclean."     The  question  is  not,  whether 

•  Essay  on  .Toleration,  p.  8.  t  Works :  v.  1.  p.  55.  f.  1740. 


GO  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION  [eSSAY  I 

his  judgment  was  correct,  but  what  that  judgment  actually 
was.  To  the  doubter,  the  uncleanness,  that  is,  the  sin  of  eat- 
ing, was  certain,  though  the  act  was  right.  Again :  "All  things 
indeed  are  pure ;  but  it  is  evil  for  that  man  who  eateth  with 
offence."  And,  again,  as  a  general  rule  :  "  He  that  doubteth 
is  condemned  if  he  eat,  because  he  eateth  not  of  faith ;  for 
whatsoever  is  not  of  faith  is  sin,"* 

And  here  we  possess  a  sufficient  answer  to  those  who 
affect  to  make  light  of  the  authority  of  Conscience,  and  ex- 
claim, "  Every  man  pleads  his  conscientious  opinions,  and 
that  he  is  bound  in  conscience  to  do  this  or  that ;  and  yet  his 
neighbour  makes  the  same  plea  and  urges  the  same  obligation 
to  do  just  the  contrary.  But  what  then?  These  persons' 
judgments  differed  :  that  we  might  expect,  for  they  are  falli- 
ble ;  but  their  sense  of  obligation  was,  in  each  case,  really 
attached  to  its  subject,  and  was  in  each  case  authoritative. 

One  observation  remains ;  that  although  a  man  ought  to 
make  his  conduct  conform  to  his  conscience,  yet  he  may 
sometimes  justly  be  held  crirninal  for  the  errors  of  his  opinion. 
Men  often  judge  amis>  respecting  their  duties  in  consequence 
of  their  own  faults :  some  take  little  pains  to  ascertain  the 
truth ;  some  voluntarily  exclude  knowledge  ;  and  most  men 
would  possess  more  accurate  perceptions  of  the  Moral  Law 
if^  they  sufficiently  endeavoured  to  obtain  them.  And,  there- 
fore, although  a  man  may  not  be  punished  for  a  given  act 
which  he  ignorantly  supposes  to  be  lawful,  he  may  be  pun- 
ished -for  that  ignorance  in  which  his  supposition  originates. 
Which  consideration  may  perhaps  account  for  the  expression, 
that  he  who  ignorantly  failed  to  do  his  master's  will  "  shall 
be  beaten  with  few  stripes."  There  is  a  degree  of  wicked- 
ness, to  the  agents  of  which  God  at  length  "  sends  strong  de- 
lusion" that  they  may  "  believe  a  lie."  In  this  state  of  strong 
delusion  they  perhaps  may,  without  violating  any  sense  of 
obligation,  do  many  wicked  actions.  The  principles  which 
have  been  here  delivered  would  lead  us  to  suppose  that  the 
punishment  which  awaits  such  men  will  have  respect  rathei 
to  that  intensity  of  wickedness  of  which  delusion  was  the 
consequence,  than  to  those  particular  acts  which  they  might 
ignorantly  commit  under  the  influence  of  the  delusion  itself. 
This  observation  is  offered  to  the  reader  because  some  writers 
have  obscured  the  present  subject  by  speculating  upon  the 
moral  deserts  of  those  desperately  bad  men,  who  occasionally 
have  committed  atrocious  acts  under  the  notion  that  they  were 
doing  right. 

*  Rom.  xiv. 


CHAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OF    GOD.  61 

Let  us  then,  when  we  direct  our  serious  enquiry  to  the 
Immediate  Communication  of  the  Divine  Will,  carefully  dis- 
tinguish that  Communication  from  the  dictates  of  the  con- 
science. They  are  separate  and  distinct  considerations.  It 
is  obvious  that  those  positions  which  some  persons  advance'; 
— "  Conscience  is  our  infallible  guide," — "  Conscience  is  the 
voice  of  the  Deity,"  &lc.,  are  wholly  improper  and  inadmissi- 
ble. The  term  may  indeed  have  been  employed  synonymously 
for  the  voice  of  God  :  but  this  ought  never  to  be  done.  It  is 
to  induce  confusion  of  language  respecting  a  subject  which 
ought  always  to  be  distinctly  exhibited;  and  the  necessity 
for  avoiding  ambiguity  is  so  much  the  greater,  as  the  conse- 
quences of  that  ambiguity  are  more  serious :  it  is  obvious 
that,  on  these  subjects,  inaccuracy  of  language  gives  rise  to 
serious  error  of  opinion.  , 

REVIEW  OF  OPINIONS  RESPECTING  A  MORAL  SfeNSE. 

The  purpose  for  which  this  brief  review  is  offered  to  the 
reader,  is  explained  in  very  few  words.  It  is  to  enquire,  by 
a  reference  to  the  written  opinions  of  rdany  persons,  whether 
they  do  not  agree  in  asserting  that  our  Cre£(,tor  communicated 
some  portions  of  his  Moral  Law  immediately  to  the  humaii 
mind.  These  opinions  are  frequently  delivered,  as  the  reader 
will  presently  discover,  in  great  ambiguity  of  language ;  fbul 
in  the  midst  of  this  ambiguity  there  appears  to  exist  one  per- 
vading truth — a  truth  in  testimony  to  which  these  opinions 
are  not  the  less  satisfactory  because,  in  some  instances,  the 
testimony  is  undesigned.  The  reader  is  requested  to  observe, 
as  he  passes  on,  whether  many  of  the  difficulties  which  en- 
quirers have  found  or  made,  are  not  solved  by  the  supposition 
of  a  divine  communication,  and  whether  they  can  be  solved 
by  any  other. 

"  The  Author  of  nature  has  much  better  furnished  us  for  a 
virtuous  conduct  than  our  moralists  seem  to  imagine,  by  al- 
most as  quick  and  powerful  instructions  as  we  have  for  the 
preservation  of  our  bodies."* 

"  It  is  manifest,  great  part  of  common  language  and  of 
common  behaviour  over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  the  sup- 
position of  a  moral  faculty,  whether  called  conscience,  moral 
reason,  moral  sense,  or  divine  reason ;  whether  considered 
as  a  sentiment  of  the  understanding,  or  as  a  perception  of  the 
heart,  or,  which  seems  the  truth,  as  including  both."t     Is  it 

*  Dr.  Hutcheion :  Enquiry  concerning  Moral  Good  and  Evil, 
t  Bishop  Butler :  Enquiry  on  Virtue. 
6 


62  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION  [eSSAY  1. 

not  remarkable  that  for  a  "  faculty"  so  well  known  "  over  the 
world,"  even  a  name  has  not  been  found,  and  that  a  Christian 
bishop  accumulates  a  multiplicity  of  ambiguous  epithets  to 
explain  his  meaning  ?  Bishop  Butler  says  again  of  Conscience, 
"  To  preside  and  govern,  from  the  very  economy  and  consti- 
tution of  man,  belongs  to  it.  This  faculty  was  placed  within 
to  be  our  proper  governor,  to  direct  and  regulate  all  undue 
principles,  passions,  and  motives  of  action. — It  carries  its 
own  authority  with  it,  that  it  is  our  natural  guide,  the  guide 
assigned  us  by  the  Author  of  our  nature."  Would  it  have 
been  unreasonable  to  conclude,  that  there  was  at  least  some 
connexion  between  this  reprover  of  "  all  undue  principles, 
passions,  and  motives,"  and  that  law  of  which  the  New  Tes- 
tament speaks,  "  All  things  that  are  reproved  are  made  mani- 
fest by  the  light  ?"* 

Blair  says,  "  Conscience  is  felt  to  act  as  the  delegate  of  an 
invisible  Ruler ;" — "  Conscience  is  the  guide,  or  the  enlight- 
ening or  directing  principle  of  our  conduct."!  In  this  in- 
stance, as  in  many  others,  Conscience  appears  to  be  used  in 
an  indeterminate  sense.  Conscience  is  not  an  enlightening 
principle,  but  a  principle  which  is  enlightened.  It  is  not  a 
legislator,  but  a  repository  of  statutes.  Yet  the  reader  will 
perceive  the  fundamental  truth,  that  man  is  in  fact  illuminated, 
and  illuminated  by  an  invisible  Ruler.  In  the  thirteenth  ser- 
mon there  is  an  expression  more  distinct :  "  God  has  invested 
Conscience  with  authority  to  promulgate  his  laws."  It  is 
obvious  that  the  Divine  Being  must  have  communicated  his 
laws,  before  they  could  have  been  promulgated  by  Conscience. 
In  accordance  with  which  the  author  says  in  another  place, 
*'  Under  the  tuition  of  God  let  us  put  ourselves." — "  A  Hea- 
venly Conductor  vouchsafes  his  aid." — "  Divine  light  de- 
scends to  guide  our  steps. "J  It  were  to  be  wished  that  such 
sentiments  were  not  obscured  by  propositions  like  these  :  "  A 
sense  of  right  and  wrong  in  conduct,  or  of  moral  good  and 
evil,  belongs  to  human  nature^ — "  Such  sentiments  are  coeval 
ivith  human  nature ;  for  they  are  the  remains  of  a  law  which 
was  originally  written  in  our  heart. "^ 

I  do  not  know  whether  the  reader  will  be  able  to  perceive 
with  distinctness  the  ideas  of  Lord  Bacon  and  of  Dr.  Rush 
in  the  following  quotations,  but  I  think  he  will  perceive  that 
they  involve  a  recognition — obscure  and  indeterminate,  but 
still  a  recognition— of  the  doctrine,  that  the  Deity  communi- 
cates his  laws  to  the  minds  of  men.     Dr.  Rush  says,  "  It 

•  Eph.  V.  13.  t  Sermon*.  X  Sermon  7.  §  Sermon  13. 


CHAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OF    GOD.  63 

would  seem  as  if  the  Supreme  Being  had  preserved  the  Moral 
Faculty  in  man  from  the  ruins  of  his  fall,  on  purpose  to  guide 
him  back  again  to  paradise ;  and  at  the  same  time  had  consti- 
tuted the  Conscience,  both  in  man  and  fallen  spirits,  a  kind  of 
royalty  in  his  moral  empire,  on  purpose  to  show  his  property 
in  all  intelligent  creatures,  and  their  original  resemblance  to 
himself."  And  Lord  Bacon  says,  "  The  light  of  nature  not 
only  shines  upon  the  human  mind  through  the  medium  of  a  ra- 
tional faculty,  but  by  an  internal  instinct  according  to  the  law 
of  conscience,  which  is  a  sparkle  of  the  purity  of  man's  first 
estate." 

"  The  faculties  of  our  minds  are  so  formed  by  nature,  that 
as  soon  as  we  begin  to  reason,  we  may  also  begin,  in  some 
measure  to  distinguish  good  from  evil." — "  We  prefer  virtue 
to  vice  on  account  of  the  seeds  planted  in  us."* 

The  following  is  not  the  less  worthy  notice  because  it  is 
from  the  pen  of  Lord  Shaftesbury :  "  Sense  of  right  and 
wrong,  being  as  natural  to  us  as  natural  affection  itself,  and 
being  a  first  principle  in  our  constitution  and  make,  there  is 
no  speculation,  opinion,  persuasion,  or  belief,  which  is  capa- 
ble, immediately  or  directly,  to  exclude  or  destroy  it."t  Sen- 
timents such  as  these  are  very  commonly  expressed ;  and 
what  do  they  imply  ?  If  sense  of  right  and  wrong  is  natural 
to  us,  it  is  because  He  who  created  us  has  placed  it  in  our 
minds.  The  conclusion  too  is  inevitable,  that  this  sense 
must  indicate  the  Divine  Law  by  which  right  and  wrong  are 
discriminated.  Now  we  do  not  say  that  these  sentiments 
are  absolutely  just,  or  that  a  sense  of  right  and  wrong  is 
strictly  "natural"  to  man,  but  we  say  that  the  sentiments 
involve  the  supposition  of  some  mode  of  Divine  Guidance — 
some  mode  in  which  the  Moral  Law  of  God,  or  a  part  of  it, 
is  communicated  by  him  to  mankind.  And  if  this  be  indeed 
true,  it  may  surely,  with  all  reason,  be  asked,  why  we  should 
not  assent  to  the  reality  of  that  mode  of  communication,  of 
which,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  Christianity  asserts  the 
existence  ? 

"  The  first  principles  of  morals  are  the  immediate  dictates 
of  the  moral  faculty." — "  By  the  moral  faculty,  or  conscience, 
solely,  we  have  the  original  conception  of  right  and  wrong." 
^— "  It  is  evident  that  this  principle  has,  from  its  nature,  au- 
thority to  direct  and  determine  with  regard  to  our  conduct ; 
to  judge,  to  acquit  or  condemn,  and  even  to  punish ;  an  author- 
ity which  belongs  to  no  other  principle  of  the  human  mind." 

•  John  Le  Clerc.  t  Characteristics. 


64  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION  [eSSAY  t. 

— "  The  Supreme  Being  has  given  us  this  light  within  to 
direct  our  moral  conduct." — "  It  is  the  candle  of  the  Ivord, 
set  up  within  us  to  guide  our  steps."*  This  is  almost  the 
language  of  Christianity,  "  That  was  the  true  Light,  which 
lighteth  every  man  that  cometh  into  the  world."!  I  do  not 
mean  to  affirm  that  the  author  of  the  essays  speaks  exclusively 
of  the  same  Divine  Guidance  as  the  apostle ;  but  surely,  if 
Conscience  operates  as  such  a  "  light  within,"  as  "  the  candle 
of  the  Lord,"  it  can  require  no  reasoning  to  convince  us  that 
it  is  illuminated  from  heaven.  The  indistinctness  of  notions 
_  which  such  language  exhibits,  appears  to  arise  from  inaccu- 
rate views  of  the  nature  of  Conscience.  The  writer  does 
not  distinguish  between  the  recipient  and  the  source  ;  between 
the  enlightened  principle  and  the  enlightening  beam.  The 
apostle  speaks  only  of  the  last ;  the  uninspired  enquirer 
speaks,  without  discrimination,  of  both ; — and  hence  the  am- 
biguity. 

Dr.  Beattie  appears  to  maintain  the  same  general  principle, 
the  same  essential  truth,  under  other  phraseology.  Common 
sense,  he  says,  is  "  that  power  of  the  mind  which  perceives 
truth  or  commands  belief  by  an  instantaneous,  instinctive,  and 
irresistible  impulse,  neither  derived  from  education  nor  from 
habit,  but  from  nature.''^ — "  Every  man  may  find  the  evidence 
of  moral  science  in  his  own  breast."  An  "  instinctive"  per- 
ception of  truth  derived  from  nature,  must  necessarily  be  tan- 
^tamount  to  a  power  of  perception  imparted  by  the  Deity. 
I  "  Whatsoever  nature  does,  God  does,"  says  Seneca :  and  Dr 
I  Beattie  himself  explains  his  own  meaning — "  The  dictates 
l^of  nature,  that  is,  the  voice  of  God."J  We  have  no  concern 
with  the  justness  of  Beattie's  philosophy,  intellectual  or  moral, 
but  the  reader  will  perceive  the  recognition  of  the  truth,  or 
of  something  like  the  truth,  to  which  we  have  so  often  referred. 
"  What  is  the  power  within  us  that  perceives  the  distinc- 
tions of  right  and  wrong  1  My  answer  is.  The  Understanding." 
— "  Of  every  thought,  sentiment,  and  subject,  the  Understand- 
ing is  the  natural  and  ultimate  judge."  This  is  the  language 
of  Dr.  Price,  but  he  does  not  seem  wholly  satisfied  with  his 
own  definition.  He  says,  "  The  truth  seems  to  be,  that  in 
contemplating  the  actions  of  moral  agents,  we  have  both  a 
perception  of  the  understanding,  and  a  feeling  of  the  heart." 
And  again,  "  It  is  to  intuition  that  we  owe  our  moral  ideas." 
He  speaks  too  of  "the  virtuous  principle," — "the  inward 
spring  of  virtue ;  and  says,  "  Goodness  is  the  power  of  re- 

*  Dr.  Reid :  Essays  on  the  Powers  of  the  Human  Mind,  Essay  3.  c.  8.  &,c. 
t  John  L  9.  X  Essay  on  Truth. 


CHAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OF    GOD.  65 

fleclion,  raised  to  its  due  seat  of  direction  and  sovereignty  m 
the  mind."  These  various  expressions  do  not  appear  to  re- 
present very  distinct  notions,  but  after  the  "  Understanding" 
has  been  stated  to  be  the  ultimate  judge,  we  are  presented 
with  the  idea  of  Conscience,  and  then  we  perceive  in  Dr. 
Price's  language,  that  which  we  find  in  the  language  of  so 
many  others,  "  Whatever  our  Consciences  dictate  to  us,  that 
//e,  (the  Deity,)  commands  more  evidently  and  undeniably, 
than  if  by  a  voice  from  heaven  we  had  been  called  upon  to  do  it.''''* 

Dr.  Watts  says  that  the  mind  "  contains  in  it  the  plain  and 
general  principles  of  morality,  not  explicitly  as  propositions, 
but  only  as  native  principles,  by  which  it  judges,  and  cannot 
but  judge,  virtue  to  be  fit  and  vice  unfit."! 

And  Dr.  Cudworth :  "  The  anticipations  of  morality  do  not 
spring  merely  from  notional  ideas,  or  from  certain  rules  or 
propositions  arbitrarily  printed  upon  the  soul  as  upon  a  book, 
but  from  some  other  more  inward  and  vital  principle  in  intel- 
lectual beings  as  such,  whereby  they  have  a  natural  determi- 
nation in  them  to  do  some  things  and  to  avoid  others. "J 

Voltaire  in  his  Commentary  on  Beccaria§  says,  "  I  call 
natural  laws  those  which  nature  dictates,  in  all  ages,  to  all 
m£n,  for  the  maintenance  of  that  Justice  which  she,  (say  what 
they  will  of  her,)  hath  implanted  in  our  hearts." 

"  And  this  law  is  that  innate  sense  of  right  and  wrong,  of 
virtue  and  vice,  which  every  man  carries  in  his  own  bosom." 
— "  These  impressions,  operating  on  the  mind  of  man,  be- 
speak a  law  written  on  his  hearth"" — "  This  secret  sense  of 
right  and  wrong,  for  wise  purposes  so  deeply  implanted  by 
our  Creator  on  the  human  mind,  has  the  nature,  force,  and 
effect  of  a  law."|i 

Locke  :  "  The  Divine  law,  that  law  which  God  has  set  to 
the  actions  of  men,  whether  promulgated  to  them  by  the  light 
of  nature  or  the  voice  of  revelation,  is  the  measure  of  sin  and 
duty.  That  God  has  given  a  rule  whereby  men  should  gov- 
ern themselves,  I  think  there  is  nobody  so  brutish  as  to 
deny."T[  The  reader  should  remark,  that  revelation  and  "  the 
light  of  nature"  are  here  represented  as  being  jointly  and 
equally  the  law  of  God. 

"  Actions,  then,  instead  of  being  tried  by  the  eternal  stand- 
ard of  right  and  wrong,  on  which  the  unsophisticated  heart 
unerringly  pronounces,  were  judged  by  the  rules  of  a  perni- 

*  Review  of  Principal  Questions  in  Morals.         t  Philosophical  Essays. 
X  Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality. 
ij  Crimes  and  Punishments,  Com.  c.  14. 

II  Dr.  Shepherd's  Discourse  on  Future  Existence.      H  Essay,  b.  2,  c.  28. 
6* 


66  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION  [eSSAY  I. 

cious  casuistry."*  This  may  not  be  absolutely  true ;  but 
there  must  be  some  truth  which  it  is  like,  or  such  a  proposi- 
tion would  not  be  advanced.  Who  ever  thought  of  attribu- 
ting to  the  unsophisticated  heart  the  power  of  unerringly 
pronouncing  on  questions  o{ prudence  ?  Yet  questions  of  right 
and  wrong  are  not,  in  their  own  nature,  more  easily  solved 
than  those  of  prudence. 

"  Boys  do  not  listen  to  sermons.  They  need  not  be  told 
what  is  right ;  like  men,  they  all  know  their  duty  sujjiciently ; 
the  grand  difficulty  is  to  practise  it."t  Neither  may  this  be 
true  ;  and  it  is  not  true.  But  upon  what  species  of  knowledge 
would  any  writer  think  of  affirming  that  boys  need  not  be  in- 
structed, except  upon  the  single  species,  the  knowledge  of 
duty  ?  And  hov/  should  they  know  this  without  instruction, 
unless  their  Creator  has  taught  them  ? 

Dr.  Rush  exhibits  the  same  views  in  a  more  determinate 
form :  "  Happily  for  the  human  race,  the  intimations  of  duty 
and  the  road  to  happiness  are  not  left  to  the  slow  operations 
or  doubtful  inductions  of  reason.  It  is  worthy  of  notice,  that 
while  second  thoughts  are  best  in  matters  of  judgment,  first 
thoughts  are  always  to  be  preferred  in  matters  that  relate  to 
morality  .''''X 

Adam  Smith :  "  It  is  altogether  absurd  and  unintelligible, 
to  suppose  that  the  first  perceptions  of  right  and  wrong  can  be 
derived  from  reason.  These  first  perceptions  cannot  be  the 
object  of  reason,  but  of  immediate  sense  and  deling." — 
"  Though  man  has  been  rendered  the  immediate  judge  of  man- 
kind, an  appeal  lies  from  his  senteiice  to  a  much  higher  tri- 
bunal, to  the  tribunal  of  their  own  Consciences,  to  that  of  the 
man  within  the  breast,  the  great  judge  and  arbiter  of  their 
conduct."  In  some  cases  in  which  censure  is  violently  poured 
upon  us,  the  judgments  of  the  man  within,  are,  however,  much 
shaken  in  the  steadiness  and  firmness  of  their  decision.  "  In 
such  cases,  this  demigod  within  the  breast  appears,  like  the 
demigods  of  the  poets,  though  partly  of  immortal,  yet,  partly, 
too,  of  mortal  extraction."  Our  moral  faculties  "  were  set  up 
within  us  to  be  the  supreme  arbiters  of  all  our  actions."  "  The 
rules  which  they  prescribe  are  to  be  regarded  as  the  com- 
mands and  laws  of  the  Deity,  promulgated  by  those'  vice- 
gerents which  he  has  thus  set  up  within  us."  "  Some  ques- 
tions must  be  left  altogether  to  the  decision  of  the  man  within 
the  breast."  And  let  the  reader  mark  w^hat  follows  :  "  If  we 
"  listen  with  diligent  and  reverential  attention  to  what  he  sug- 

*  Dr.  Southey  :  Book  of  the  Church,  xi.  10.  t  West.  Rev.  No.  1. 

t  Influence  of  Physical  Causes  on  the  Moral  Faculty. 


CHAP  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OF    GOD,  67 

gests  to  US,  his  voice  will  never  deceive  us.  We  shall  stand 
in  no  need  of  casuistic  rules  to  direct  our  conduct."  How 
wonderful  that  such  a  man,  who  uses  almost  the  language  of 
Scripture,  appears  not  even  to  have  thought  of  the  truth — • 
"  the  Anointing  which  ye  have  received  of  him  abideth  in 
you,  and  ye  need  not  that  any  man  teach  you!"  for  he  does 
not  appear  to  have  thought  of  it.  He  intimates  that  this  vice- 
gerent of  God,  this  undeceiving  teacher  to  whom  we  are  to 
listen  with  reverential  attention,  is  some  "  contrivance  or 
mechanism  within ;"  and  says  that  to  examine  what  contriv- 
ance or  mechanism  it  is,  "  is  a  mere  matter  of  philosophical 
curiosity."* 

A  matter  of  philosophical  curiosity,  Dr.  Paley  seems  to  have 
thought  a  kindred  enquiry  to  be.  He  discusses  the  question, 
whether  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  Moral  Sense  or  not ;  and 
thus  sums  up  the  argument :  "  Upon  the  whole  it  seems  to 
me,  either  that  there  exist  no  such  instincts  as  compose  what 
is  called  the  moral  sense,  or  that  they  are  not  now  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  prejudices  and  habits." — "  This  celebrated 
question  therefore  becomes,  in  our  system,  a  question  of  pure 
curiosity ;  and  as  such,  we  dismiss  it  to  the  determination  of 
those  who  are  more  inquisitive  than  we  are  concerned  to  be, 
about  the  natural  history  and  constitution  of  the  human  spe- 
cies."! But  in  another  work,  a  work  in  which  he  did  not 
bind  himself  to  the  support  of  a  philosophical  system,  he  holds 
other  language  :  "  Conscience,  our  own  Conscience,  is  to  be 
our  guide  in  all  things."  "  It  is  through  the  whisperings  of 
Conscience  that  the  Spirit  speaks.  If  men  are  wilfully  deaf 
to  their  Consciences  they  cannot  hear  the  Spirit.  If,  hearing, 
if  being  compelled  to  hear  the  remonstrances  of  Conscience, 
they  nevertheless  decide  and  resolve  and  determine  to  go 
against  them,  then  they  grieve,  then  they  defy,  then  they  do 
despite  to,  the  Spirit  of  God."  "  Is  it  superstition  1  Is  it  not 
on  the  contrary  a  just  and  reasonable  piety  to  implore  of  God 
the  guidance  of  his  Holy  Spirit,  when  we  have  any  thing  of 
great  importance  to  decide  upon  or  undertake  ?" — "  It  being 
confessed  that  we  cannot  ordinarily  distinguish,  at  the  time, 
the  suggestions  of  the  Spirit  from  the  operations  of  our  minds, 
it  may  be  asked,  How  are  we  to  listen  to  them  1  The  answer 
is,  by  attending,  universally,  to  the  admonitions  within  us. "J 
The  tendency  of  these  quotations  to  enforce  our  general  ar- 
gument, is  plain  and  powerful.  But  the  reader  should  notice 
here  another  and  a  very  interesting  consideration.     Paley 

*  Theory  of  Mor.  Sent.      t  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  1,  c.  5.      t  Sermons. 


68  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION.  [-ESSAY  I. 

says,  "  Our  own  Conscience  is  to  be  our  guide  in  all  things.''^ 
— We  are  to  attend  universally/  to  the  admonitions  within  us. 
Now  he  writes  a  book  of  moral  philosophy,  that  is,  a  book  that 
shall  "  teach  men  their  duty  and  the  reasons  of  it,"  and  from 
this  book  he  absolutely  excludes  this  law  which  men  should 
universally  obey,  this  law  which  should  be  their  "  guide  in  all 
things." 

"  Conscience,  Conscience,"  exclaims  Rousseau  in  his  Pen- 
sees,  "  Divine  Instinct,  Immortal  and  Heavenly  Voice,  sure 
Guide  of  a  being  ignorant  and  limited  but  intelligent  and  free, 
infallible  Judge  of  good  and  evil,  by  which  man  is  made  like 
unto  God!"  Here  are  attributes  which,  if  they  be  justly 
assigned,  certainly  cannot  belong  to  humanity ;  or  if  they  do 
belong  to  humanity,  an  apostle  certainly  could  not  be  accurate 
when  he  said  that  in  us,  that  is  in  our  flesh,  "  dwelleth  no  good 
thingP  Another  observation  of  Rousseau's  is  worth  transcrib- 
ing :  "  Our  own  conscience  is  the  most  enlightened  philo- 
sopher. There  is  no  need  to  be  acquainted  with  Tully's 
Offices  to  make  a  man  of  probity ;  and  perhaps  the  most  vir- 
tuous woman  in  the  world  is  the  least  acquainted  with  the  de 
finition  of  virtue." 

"And  I  will  place  within  them  as  a  guide, 
My  Umpire,  Conscience  ;  whom  if  they  will  near 
Light  after  light,  well  used,  they  shall  attain."* 

This  is  the  language  of  Milton ;  and  we  have  thus  his  tes- 
timony added  to  the  many,  that  God  has  placed  within  us  an 
Umpire  which  shall  pronounce.  His  own  laws  in  our  hearts. 
Thus  in  his  "  Christian  Doctrine"  more  clearly  :  "  They  can 
lay  claim  to  nothing  more  than  human  powers,  assisted  by 
that  spiritual  illumination  which  is  common  to  ally] 

Judge  Hale  :  "  Any  man  that  sincerely  and  truly  fears  Al- 
mighty God,  and  calls  and  relies  upon  him  for  his  direction, 
has  it  as  really  as  a  son  has  the  counsel  and  direction  of  his 
father ;  and  though  the  voice  be  not  audible  nor  discernible 
by  sense,  yet  it  is  equally  as  real  as  if  a  man  heard  a  voice 
saying,  "  This  is  the  way,  walk  in  it." 

The  sentiments  of  the  ancient  philosophers,  &c.,  should 
not  be  forgotten,  and  the  rather  because  their  language  is  fre- 
quently much  more  distinct  and  satisfactory  than  that  of  the 
refined  enquirers  of  the  present  day. 

Marcus  Antoninus :  "  He  who  is  well  disposed  will  do 
every  thing  dictated  by  the  divinity — a  particle  or  portion  of 
Himself,  which  God  has  given  to  each  as  a  guide  and  a  leader. "\ 

*  Par.  Lost,  iii.  194.  t  P.  81.  \  Lib.  5,  Sect.  27. 


CHAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OF    GOD.  '  69 

Aristotle :  "  The  mind  of  man  hath  a  near  affinity  to  God : 
there  is  a  divine  ruler  in  him" — Phitarch :  "  The  light  of 
truth  is  a  law,  not  written  in  tables  or  books  but  dwelling  in 
the  mind,  always  as  a  living  rule  which  never  permits  the 
soul  to  be  destitute  of  an  interior  guide." — Hieron  says  that 
the  universal  light,  shining  in  the  Conscience,  is  "  a  domestic 
God,  a  God  within  the  hearts  and  souls  of  men." — Epictetus  : 
1"  God  has  assigned  to  each  man  a  director,  his  own  good  ge- 
nius, a  guardian  whose  vigilance  no  slumbers  interrupt,  and 
whom  no  false  reasonings  can  deceive.  So  that  when  you 
have  shut  your  door,  say  not  that  you  are  alone,  for  your  God 
is  within. — What  need  have  you  of  outward  light  to  discover 
what  is  done,  or  to  light  to  good  actions,  who  have  God  or  that 
genius  or  divine  principle  for  your  light  ?"*  Such  citations 
might  be  greatly  multiplied  ;  but  one  more  must  suffice.  Sen- 
eca says,  "  We  find  felicity — in  a  pure  and  untainted  mind, 
which  if  it  were  not  holy  were  not  fit  to  entertain  the  Deity.'''' 
How  like  the  words  of  an  apostle  ! — "  If  any  man  defile  the 
temple  of  God,  him  shall  God  destroy ;  for  the  temple  of  God 
is  holy,  which  temple  ye  are."t  The  philosopher  again : 
•'  There  is  a  holy  spirit  in  us  ;"J  and  again  the  apostle  :  "  Know 
ye  not  that"  the  "  Spirit  of  God  dwelleth  in  you  ?"§ 

Now  respecting  the  various  opinions  which  have  been  laid 
before  the  reader,  there  is  one  observation  that  will  generally 
apply — that  they  unite  in  assigning  certain  important  attributes 
or  operations  to  some  principle  or  power  existent  in  the  hu- 
man mind.  They  affirm  that  this  principle  or  power  possesses 
wisdom  to  direct  us  aright— that  its  directions  are  given  in- 
stantaneously as  the  individual  needs  them — ^that  it  is  insepa- 
rably attended  with  unquestionable  authority  to  command. 
That  such  a  principle  or  power  does,  therefore,  actually  exist, 
can  need  little  further  proof;  for  a  concurrent  judgment  upon 
a  question  of  personal  experience  cannot  surely  be  incorrect. 
To  say  that  individuals  express  their  notions  of  this  principle 
or  power  by  various  phraseology,  that  they  attribute  to  it  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  superhuman  intelligence,  or  that  they  refer 
for  its  origin  to  contradictory  causes,  does  not  affect  the  gen- 
eral argument.  The  great  point  for  our  attention  is,  not  the 
designation  or  the  supposed  origin  of  this  guide,  but  its  attri- 
butes ;  and  these  attributes  appear  to  be  divine. 

*  Lib.  1,  c.  14.  t  1  Cor.  iii.  17.  - 

t  De  Benef.  c.  17,  &c.  §  1  Cor.  iii.  16. 


70  THB    IMMEDIATE    COMMUXICATION  [eSSAT  I. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  COMMUNICATION  OF  THE  WILL  OP  GOD. 

I.  That  every  reasonable  human  being  is  a  moral  agent^ — 
that  is,  that  every  such  human  being  is  responsible  to- God,  no 
one  perhaps  denies.  There  can  be  no  responsibility  where 
there  is  no  knowledge  :  "  Where  there  is  no  law  there  is  no 
transgression."  So  then  every  human  being  possesses,  or  is 
furnished  with,  moral  knowledge  and  a  moral  law.  "  If  we 
admit  that  mankind,  without  an  outward  revelation,  are  never- 
theless sinners,  we  must  also  admit  that  mankind,  without 
siich  a  revelation,  are  nevertheless  in  possession  of  the  law 
of  God."* 

Whence  then  do  they  obtain  it  ? — a  question  to  which  but 
one  answer  can  be  given  ;  from  the  Creator  himself.  It  ap- 
pears therefore  to  be  almost  demonstratively  shown,  that  God 
does  communicate  his  will  immediately  to  the  minds  of  those 
who  have  no  access  to  the  external  expression  of  it.  It  is 
always  to  be  remembered  that,  as  the  majority  of  mankind  do 
not  possess  the  written  communication  of  the  will  of  God,  the 
question,  as  it  respects  them,  is  between  an  Immediate  Com- 
munication and  none ;  between  such  a  communication,  and 
the  denial  of  their  responsibility  in  a  future  state ;  between 
such  a  communication,  and  the  reducing  them  to  the  condition 
of  the  beasts  that  perish. 

II.  No  one  perhaps  will  imagine  that  this  argument  is  con- 
fined to  countries  which  the  external  light  oLChristianity  has 
not  reached.  "  Whoever  expects  to  find  in  the  Scriptures 
a  specific  direction  for  every  moral  doubt  that  arises,  looks 
for  more  than  he  will  meet  with  ;"t  so  that  even  in  Christian 
countries  there  exists  some  portion  of  that  necessity  for  other 
guidance,  which  has  been  seen  to  exist  in  respect  to  pagans. 
Thus  Adam  Smith  says  that  there  are  some  questions  which 
it  "  is  perhaps  altogether  impossible  to  determine  by  any  pre- 
cise rules,"  and  that  they  "  must  be  left  altogether  to  the  de- 
cision of  the  man  within  the  breast." — But,  indeed,  when  we 
spaak  of  living  in  Christian  countries,  and  of  having  access 
to  the  external  revelation,  we  are  likely  to  mislead  ourselves 
with  respect  to  the  actual  condition  of  "  Christian"  people. 
Persons  talk  of  possessing  the  Bible,  as  if  every  one  who 
lived  in  a  protestant  country  had  a  Bible  in  his  pocket  and 
could  read  it.  But  there  are  thousands,  perhaps  millions,  in 
Christian  and  in  protestant  countries,  who  know  very  little  of 

*  Gurney:  Essays  on  Christianity,  p.  516. 
t  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  1,  c.  4. 


CHAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OF    GOD.  71 

what  Christianity  enjoins.  They  probably  do  not  possess  the 
Scriptures,  or  if  they  do,  probably  cannot  read  them.  What 
they  do  know  they  learn  from  others — from  others  who  may 
be  little  solicitous  to  teach  them,  or  to  teach  them  aright. 
Such  persons  therefore  are,  to  a  considerable  extent,  practi- 
cally in  the  same  situation  as  those  who  have  not  heard  of 
Christianity,  and  there  is  therefore  to  them  a  corresponding 
need  of  a  direct  communication  of  knowledge  from  heaven. 
But  if  we  see  the  need  of  such  knowledge  extending  itself 
thus  far,  who  will  call  in  question  the  doctrine,  that  it  is  im- 
parted to  the  whole  human  race  ? 

These  are  offered  as  considerations  involving  an  antecedent 
probability  of  the  truth  of  our  argument.  The  reader  is  not 
required  to  give  his  assent  to  it  as  to  a  dogma  of  which  he 
can  discover  neither  the  reason  nor  the  object.  Here  is  pro- 
bability very  strong  ;  here  is  usefulness  very  manifest,  and  very 
great ; — so  that  the  mind  may  reasonably  be  open  to  the  recep- 
tion of  evidence,  whatever  Truth  that  evidence  shall  establish. 

If  the  written  revelation  were  silent  respecting  the  imme- 
diate communication  of  the  Divine  Will,  that  silence  might 
perhaps  rightly  be  regarded  as  conclusive  evidence  that  it  is 
not  conveyed ;  because  it  is  so  intimately  connected  with  the 
purposes  to  which  that  revelation  is  directed,  that  scarcely 
any  other  explanation  could  be  given  of  its  silence  than  that  " 
the  communication  did  not  exist.  That  the  Scriptures  declare 
that  God  has  communicated  light  and  knowledge  to  some 
men  by  the  immediate  exertion  of  his  own  agency,  admits 
not  of  dispute :  but  this  it  is  obvious  is  not  sufficient  for  our 
purpose ;  and  it  is  in  the  belief  that  they  declare  that  God 
imparts  some  knowledge  to  all  men,  that  we  thus  appeal  to 
their  testimony.  .., 

Now  here  the  reader  should  especially  observe,  that  where 
the  Christian  Scriptures  speak  of  the  existence  and  influence 
of  the  Divine  Spirit  on  the  mind,  they  commonly  speak  of  its 
higher  operations ;  not  of  its  office  as  a  moral  guide,  but  as  a 
purifier,  and  sanctifier,  and  comforter  of  the  soul.  They 
speak  of  it  in  reference  to  its  sacred  and  awful  operations  in 
connexion  with  human  salvation  :  and  thus  it  happens  that 
very  many  citations  which,  if  we  were  writing  an  essay  on 
religion,  would  be  perfectly  appropriate,  do  not  possess  that 
distinct  and  palpable  application  to  an  argument,  which  goes 
no  further  than  to  affirm  that  it  is  a  moral  guide.  And  yet  it 
may  most  reasonably  be  remarked,  that  if  it  has  pleased  the 
Universal  Parent  thus,  and  for  these  awful  purposes,  to  visit 
the  minds  of  those  who  are  obedie  v.   t     his  power — he  will 


72  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION  [esSAY  I. 

not  suffer  them  to  be  destitute  of  a  moral  guidance.  The  less 
must  be  supposed  to  be  involved  in  the  greater. 

Our  argument  does  not  respect  the  degrees  of  illumination 
which  may  be  possessed,  respectively,  by  individuals,*  or  in 
different  ages  of  the  world.  There  were  motives,  easily  con- 
ceived, for  imparting  a  greater  degree  of  light  and  of  power 
at  the  introduction  of  Christianity  than  in  the  present  day ; 
accordingly  there  are  many  expressions  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment which  speak  of  high  degrees  of  light  and  power,  and 
which,  however  they  may  affirm  the  general  existence  of  a 
Divine  Guidance,  are  not  descriptive  of  the  general  nor  of  the 
present  condition  of  mankind.  Nevertheless,  if  the  records 
of  Christianity,  in  describing  these  greater  "  gifts,"  inform  us 
that  a  gift,  similar  in  its  nature  but  without  specification  of 
its  amount,  is  imparted  to  all  men,  it  is  sufficient.  Although 
it  is  one  thing  for  the  Creator  to  impart  a  general  capacity  to 
distinguish  right  from  wrong,  and  another  to  impart  miraculous 
power  ;  one  thing  to  inform  his  accountable  creature  that  lying 
is  evil,  and  another  to  enable  him  to  cure  a  leprosy ;  yet  this 
affords  no  reason  to  deny  that  the  nature  of  the  gift  is  not  the 
same,  or  that  both  are  not  divine.  "  The  degree  of  light  may 
vary  according  as  one  man  has  a  greater  measure  than  ano- 
ther. But  the  light  of  an  apostle  is  not  one  thing  and  the 
light  of  the  heathen  another  thing,  distinct  in  principle. 
They  differ  only  in  degree  of  power,  distinctness,  and  splen- 
dour of  manifestation."! 

So  early  as  Gen.  vi.  there  is  a  distinct  declaration  of  the 
moral  operation  of  the  Deity  on  the  human  mind ;  not  upon 
the  pious  and  the  good,  but  upon  those  who  were  desperately 
wicked,  so  that  even  "  every  imagination  of  the  thoughts  of 
their  heart  was  only  evil  continually." — "  My  spirit  shall  not 
always  strive  with  man."  Upon  this  passage  a  good  and  in- 
telligent man  writes  thus  ;  "  Surely,  if  His  spirit  had  striven 
with  them  until  that  time,  until  they  were  so  desperately 
wicked,  and  wholly  corrupted,  that  not  only  some,  but  every 
imagination  of  their  hearts  was  evil,  yes,  only  evil,  and  that 

*  I  am  disposed  to  offer  a  simple  testimony  to  what  I  believe  to  be  a 
truth  ;  that  even  in  the  present  day,  the  divine  illumination  and  power  is 
Bometimes  imparted  to  individuals  in  a  degree  much  greater  than  is  neces- 
sary for  the  purposes  of  mere  moral  direction  ;  that  on  subjects  connected 
with  their  own  personal  condition  or  that  of  others,  light  is  sometimes 
imparted  in  greater  brightness  and  splendour  than  is  ordinarily  enjoyed  by 
mankind,  or  than  is  necessary  for  our  ordinary  direction  in  life. 

t  Hancock :  Essay  on  Instinct,  &c.,  p.  2,  c.  7,  s.  1.  I  take  this  oppor- 
timity  of  acknowledging  the  obligations  I  am  under  to  this  work,  for 
many  of  the  "  Opinions"  which  are  cited  in  the  last  section. 


CRAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OP    GOD.  73 

continually,  we  may  well  believe  the  express  Scripture  asser- 
tion, that  *  a  manifestation  of  the  Spirit  is  given  to  every  man 
to  profit  withal.'  "* 

Respecting  some  of  the  prophetical  passages  in  the  He- 
brew Scriptures,  it  may  be  observed  that  there  appears  a 
want  of  complete  adaptation  to  the  immediate  purpose  of  our 
argument,  because  they  speak  of  that,  prospectively,  which 
our  argument  assumes  to  be  true  retrospectively  also.  "  After 
those  days,  saith  the  Lord,  I  will  put  my  law  in  their  inward 
parts  and  write  it  in  their  hearts  ;"t  from  which  the  reader 
may  possibly  conclude  that  before  those  days  no  such  inter- 
nal law  was  imparted.  Yet  the  preceding  paragraph  might 
assure  him  of  the  contrary,  and  that  the  prophet  indicated  an 
increase  rather  than  a  commencement  of  internal  guidance. 
Under  any  supposition  it  does  not  affect  the  argument  as  it 
respects  the  present  condition  of  the  human  race  ;  for  the  pro- 
phecy is  twice  quoted  in  the  Christian  Scriptures,  and  is  ex- 
pressly stated  to  be  fulfilled.  Once  the  prophecy  is  quoted 
almost  at  length,  and  in  the  other  instance  the  important  clause 
is  retained,  "  I  will  put  my  laws  into  their  hearts,  and  in  their 
minds  will  I  write  them."J 

"  And  all  thy  children,"  says  Isaiah,  "  shall  be  taught  of 
the  Lord."  Christ  himself  quotes  this  passage  in  illustrating 
the  nature  of  his  own  religion :  "  It  is  written  in  the  prophets, 
And  they  shall  be  all  taught  of  God."§ 

"  Thine  eyes  shall  see  thy  teachers  :  and  thine  ears  shall 
hear  a  word  behind  thee,  saying.  This  is  the  way,  walk  ye 
in  it ;  when  ye  turn  to  the  right  hand,  and  when  ye  turn  to 
theleft."|| 

The  Christian  Scriptures,  if  they  be  not  more  explicit,  are 
more  abundant  in  their  testimony.  Paul  addresses  the  ^^  foolish 
Galatians"  The  reader  should  observe  their  character ;  for 
some  Christians  who  acknowledge  the  Divine  influence  on 
the  minds  of  eminently  good  men,  are  disposed  to  question  it 
in  reference  to  others.  These  foolish  Galatians  had  turned 
again  to  "  weak  and  beggarly  elements,"  and  their  dignified 
instructor  was  afraid  of  them,  lest  he  had  bestowed  upon 
them  labour  in  vain.  Nevertheless,  to  them  he  makes  the 
solemn  declaration,  "  God  hath  sent  forth  the  Spirit  of  his 
Son  into  your  hearts. "TT 

John  writes  a  General  Epistle,  an  epistle  which  was  ad- 
dressed, of  course,  to  a  great  variety  of  characters,  of  whom 
some,  it  is  probable,  possessed  little  more  of  the  new  religion 

•  Job  Spoil's  Journal,  c.  1.     t  Jer.  xxxi.33,     X  Heb.  viii.  10  ;  and  x.  16. 
i)  John  vi.  45.  II  Isa.  xxx.  20,  21.  IT  Gal.  iy.  p. 

7 


74  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION  [eSSAT  I. 

than  the  name.  The  apostle  writes — "  Hereby  we  know 
that  he  abideth  in  us  by  the  Spirit  which  he  hath  given  us."* 

The  solemn  declarations  which  follow  are  addressed  to 
large  numbers  of  recent  converts^  of  converts  whom  the  writer 
had  been  severely  reproving  for  improprieties  of  conduct,  for 
unchristian  contentions,  and  even  for  the  greater  faults  :  "  Ye 
are  the^  temple  of  the  living  God,  as  God  hath  said,  I  will 
dwell  in  them  and  walk  in  them." — "  What,  know  ye  not  that 
your  body  is  the  temple  of  the  Holy  Ghost  which  is  in  you  t";t 
"  Know  ye  not  that  ye  are  the  temple  of  God,  and  that  the 
Spirit  of  God  dwelleth  in  you  ?  If  any  man  defile  the  temple 
of  God,  him  shall  God  destroy ;  for  the  temple  of  God  is 
holy,  which  temple  ye  are. "J 

And  with  respect  to  the  moral  operations  of  this  sacred 
power : — "  As  touching  brotherly  love,  ye  need  not  that  I 
write  Unto  you :  for  ye  yourselves  are  taught  of  God  to  love 
one  another  ;"<^  that  is,  taught  a  duty  of  morality . 

Thus  also  :— "  The  Grace  of  God  that  bringeth  salvation 
hath  appeared  to  all  men,  teaching  us  that,  denying  ungodli- 
ness and  worldly  lusts,  we  should  live  soberly,  righteously, 
and  godly,  in  this  present  world  ;^'[1  or  in  other  words,  teach- 
ing all  men  moral  laws — -laws  both  mandatory  and  prohibitory, 
teaching  both  what  to  do  and  what  to  avoid. 

And  very  distinctly : — "The  manifestation  of  the  Spirit  is 
given  to  every  man  to  profit  withal."T[  "  A  Light  to  lighten 
the  Gentiles."**  "  I  am  the  Light  of  the  world."tt  "  The 
true  light  which  lighteth  every  man  that  cometh  into  the 
world."tt 

"  When  the  Gentiles,  which  have  not  the  law,  do  by  nature 
the  things  contained  in  the  law,  these  having  not  the  law  are 
a  law  unto  themselves,  which  show  the  work  of  the  law  writ- 
ten in  their  hearts. "'^^ — written,  it  may  be  asked  by  whom  but 
by  that  Being  who  said,  "  I  will  put  my  law  in  their  inward 
parts,  and  write  it  in  their  hearts  ?"i||| 

To  such  evidence  from  the  written  revelation,  I  know  of 
no  other  objection  which  can  be  urged  than  the  supposition 
that  this  Divine  instruction,  though  existing  eighteen  hundred 
years  ago,  does  not  exist  now.  To  which  it  appears  sufii- 
cient  to  reply,  that  it  existed  not  only  eighteen  hundred  years 
ago,  but  before  the  period  of  tlie  Deluge  ;  and  that  the  terms 
in  which  the  Scriptures  speak  of  it  are  incompatible  with  the 

*  1  John  iii.  24.  t  1  Cor.  vi.  19.                   M  Cor.  iii.  16. 

§  1  Thess.  iv.  9.  II  Tit.  ii.  11,  12.  IT  1  Cor.  xii.  7. 

**  Luke  ii.  32.  +t  John  viii.  12.  X\  John  i.  9. 

§§  Rom.  ii.  14.  ||||  Jer.  xxxi.  33. 


CHAP.  VI.]  THE    WILL    OF   GOD.  75 

supposition  of  a  temporary  duration :  "  all  taught  of  God :" 
"  in  you  all :"  "  hath  appeared  unto  all  men  :"  "  given  to  every 
man :"  "  every  man  that  cometh  into  the  world."  Besides, 
there  is  not  the  most  remote  indication  in  the  Christian  Scrip- 
tures that  this  instruction  would  not  be  perpetual ;  and  their 
silence  on  such  a  subject,  a  subject  involving  the  most  sacred 
privileges  of  our  race,  must  surely  be  regarded  as  positive 
evidence  that  this  instruction  would  be  accorded  to  us  for  ever. 


How  clear  soever  appears  to  be  the  evidence  of  reason, 
that  man,  being  universally  a  moral  and  accountable  agent, 
must  be  possessed,  universally,  of  a  moral  law  ;  and  how  dis- 
tinct soever  the  testimony  of  revelation,  that  he  does  univer- 
sally possess  it — objections  are  still  urged  against  its  existence. 

Of  these,  perhaps  the  most  popular  are  those  which  are 
founded  upon  the  varying  dictates  of  the  "  Conscience."  If 
the  view  which  we  have  taken  of  the  nature  and  operations 
of  the  conscience  be  just,  these  objections  will  have  little 
weight.  That  the  ilictates  of  the  conscience  should  vary  in 
individuals  respectively,  is  precisely  what,  from  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  is  to  be  expected  ;  but  this  variation  does 
not  impeach  the  existence  of  that  purer  ray  which,  whether 
in  less  or  greater  brightness,  irradiates  the  heart  of  man. 

I  am,  however,  disposed  here  to  notice  the  objections*  that 
may  be  founded  upon  national  derelictions  of  portions  of  the 
Moral  Law.  "  There  is,"  says  Locke,  "  scarce  that  principle 
of  morality  to  be  named,  or  rule  of  virtue  to  be  thought  on, 
which  is  not  somewhere  or  other  slighted  and  condemned  by 
the  general  fashion  of  whole  societies  of  men,  governed  by 
practical  opinions  and  rules  of  living  quite  opposite  to 
others." — And  Paley :  "  There  is  scarcely  a  single  vice 
which,  in  some  age  or  country  of  the  world,  has  not  been 
countenanced  by  public  opinion  :  in  one  country  it  is  esteemed 
an  office  of  piety  in  children  to  sustain  their  aged  parents,  in 
another  to  dispatch  them  out  of  the  way :  suicide  in  one  age 
of  the  world  has  been  heroism,  in  another  felony  ;  theft  which 
is  punished  by  most  laws,  by  the  laws  of  Sparta  was  not  un- 
frequently  rewarded :  you  shall  hear  duelling  alternately  re- 
probated and  applauded  according  to  the  sex,  age,  or  station 
of  the  person  you  converse  with :  the  forgiveness  of  injuries 
and  insults  is  accounted  by  one  sort  of  people  magnanimity, 
hy  another,  meanness."! 

*  Not  urged  specifically,  perhaps,  agaiust  the  Divine  Guidance ;  but 
ihey  will  equally  afford  an  illustration  of  the  truth, 
t  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  1.  c.  5. 


76  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATIOPT  [esSAT  I. 

•  ^  Upon  all  which  1  observe,  that  to  whatever  purpose  thes© 
reasoninsrs  are  directed,  they  are  defective  in  an  essential 
point.  They  show  us  indeed  what  the  external  actions  of 
men  have  been,  but  give  no  proof  that  these  actions  were  con- 
formable with  the  secret  internal  judgment :  and  this  last  is 
the  only  important  point.  That  a  rule  of  virtue  is  "  slighted 
and  condemned  by  the  general  fashion^^  is  no  sort  of  evidence 
that  those  who  joined  in  this  general  fashion  did  not  still 
know  that  it  was  a  rule  of  virtue.  There  are  many  duties 
which,  in  the  present  day,  are  slighted  by  the  general  fashion, 
and  yet  no  man  will  stand  up  and  say  that  they  are  not  duties. 
"  There  is  scarcely  a  single  vice  which  has  not  been  coun- 

I '  tenanced  by  public  opinion ;"  but  where  is  the  proof  that  il 
has  been  approved  by  private  and  secret  judgment  ?  There 
is  a  great  deal  of  difference  between  those  sentiments  which 
men  seem  to  entertain  respecting  their  duties  when  they  give 
expression  to  "public  opinion,"  and  when  they  rest  their 
heads  on  their  pillows  in  calm  reflection.  "  Suicide  in  one 
age  of  the  world  has  been  heroism,  in  another  felony  ;"  but  it 
is  not  every  action  which  a  man  says  is  heroic,  that  he  be- 
lieves is  right.  "  Forgiveness  of  injuries  and  insults  is  ac-" 
counted  by  one  sort  of  people  magnanimity,  by  another,  mean- 
ness ;"  and  yet  they  who  thus  vulgarly  employ  the  word 
meanness,  do  not  imagine  that  forbearance  and  placability  are 
really  wrong. 

I  have  met  with  an  example  which  serves  to  confirm  me 
in  the  judgment,  that  public  notions  or  rather  public  actions 
are  a  very  equivocal  evidence  of  the  real  sentiments  of  man- 
kind. "  Can  there  be  greater  barbarity  than  to  hurt  an  in- 
fant? Its  helplessness,  its  innocence,  its  amiableness,  call 
forth  the  compassion  even  of  an  enemy. — What  then  should 
we  imagine  must  be  the  heart  of  a  parent  who  would  injure 
that  weakness  which  a  furious  enemy  is  afraid  to  violate  ? 
Yet  the  exposition,  that  is,  the  murder  of  new-bom  infants, 
was  a  practice  allowed  of  in  almost  all  the  States  of  Greece, 
even  among  the  polite  and  civilized  Athenians."  This  seems 
a  strong  case  against  us.  But  what  were  the  grounds  upon 
which  this  atrocity  was  defended  ? — "  Philosophers,  instead 
of  censuring,  supported  the  horrible  abuse,  by  far-fetched 
considerations  of  public  utility."* 

By  far-fetched  considerations  of  public  utility  !  Why  had 
they  recourse  to  such  arguments  as  these  ?  Because  they 
found  that  the  custom  could  not  be  reconciled  with  direct  and 

*  Theory  Mor.  Sent  p.  5,  c.  2. 


CHAP.  VI.]  OF    THE    WILL    OP    GOD.  77 

acknowledged  rules  of  virtue :  because  they  felt  and  knew 
that  it  was  wrong.  The  very  circumstance  that- they  had 
recourse  to  "far-fetched  arguments,"  is  evidence  that  they 
were  conscious  that  clearer  and  more  immediate  arguments 
were  against  them.  They  knew  that  infanticide  was  an  im- 
moral act. 

I  attach  some  importance  to  the  indications  which  this 
class  of  reasoning  affords  of  the  comparative  uniformity  of 
human  opinion,  even  when  it  is  nominally  discordant.  One 
other  illustration  maybe  oifered  from  more  private  life.  Bos- 
well  in  his  Life  of  Johnson,  says  that  he  proposed  the  ques- 
tion to  the  moralist,  "  Whether  duelling  was  contrary  to  the 
laws  of  Christianity  V  Let  the  reader  notice  the  essence  of 
the  reply :  "  Sir,  as  men  become  in  a  high  degree  refined, 
various  causes  of  offence  arise  which  are  considered  to  be  of 
such  importance  that  life  must  be  staked  to  atone  for  them, 
though  in  reality  they  are  not  so.  In  a  state  of  highly  pol- 
ished society,  an  affront  is  held  to  be  a  serious  injury.  It 
must  therefore  be  resented,  or  rather  a  duel  must  be  fought 
upon  it,  as  men  have  agreed  to  banish  from  their  society  one 
who  puts  up  with  an  affront  without  fighting  a  duel.  Now, 
Sir,  it  is  never  unlawful  to  fight  in  self-defence.  He  then 
who  fights  a  duel,  does  not  fight  from  passion  against  his  an- 
tagonist, but  out  of  self-defence,  to  avert  the  stigma  of  the 
world,  and  to  prevent  himself  from  being  driven  from  society. 
— While  such  notions  prevail,  no  doubt  a  man  may  lawfully 
fight  a  duel."  The  question  was,  the  consistency  of  duelling 
with  the  laws  of  Christianity ;  and  there  is  not  a  word  about 
Christianity  in  the  reply.  Why  ?  Because  its  laws  can  never 
be  shown  to  allow  duelling;  and  Johnson  doubtless  knew 
this.  Accordingly,  like  the  philosophers  who  tried  to  justify 
the  kindred  crime  of  infanticide,  he  had  recourse  to  "far- 
fetched considerations," — to  the  high  polish  of  society— -to 
the  stigma  of  the  world — to  the  notions  that  prevail.  Now, 
whilst  the  readers  of  Boswell  commonly  think  they  have 
Johnson's  authority  in  favour  of  duelling,  I  think  they  have 
his  authority  against  it.  I  think  that  the  mode  in  which  he 
justified  duelling,  evinced  his  consciousness  that  it  was  not 
compatible  with  the  Moral  Law. 

And  thus  it  is,  that  with  respect  to  Public  Opinions,  and 
general  fashions,  and  thence  descending  to  private  life,  we 
shall  find  that  men  very  usually  know  the  requisitions  of  the 
Moral  Law  better  than  they  seem  to  know  them ;  and  that 
^e  who  estimates  the  moral  knowledge  of  societies  or  indi- 


78  THE    IMMEDIATE    COMMUNICATION    '         [eSSAT  I. 

viduals  by  their  common  language,  refers  to  an  uncertain  and 
fallacious  standard. 

After  all,  the  uniformity  of  human  opinion  respecting  the 
great  laws  of  morality  is  very  remarkable.  Sir  James  Mack- 
intosh speaks  of  Grotius,  who  had  cited  poets,  orators,  his- 
torians, &c.,  and  says,  ^"  He  quotes  them  as  witnesses,  whose 
conspiring  testimony,  mightily  strengthened  and  confirmed  by 
their  discordance  on  almost  every  other  subject,  is  a  conclu- 
sive proof  of  the  unanimity  of  the  whole  human  race,  on  the 
great  rules  of  duty  and  fundamental  principles  of  morals."* 

From  poets  and  orators  we  may  turn  to  sav2(!ge  life.  In 
1683,  that  is,  soon  after  the  colonization  of  Pennsylvania,  the 
founder  of  the  colony  held  a  "  council  and  consultation"  with 
some  of  the  Indians.  In  the  course  of  the  interview  it  ap- 
peared that  these  savages  believed  in  a  state  of  future  retribu- 
tion ;  and  they  described  their  simple  ideas  of  the  respective 
states  of  the  good  and  bad.  The  vices  that  they  enumerated 
as  those  which  would  consign  them  to  punishment,  are  remark- 
able, inasmuch  as  they  so  nearly  correspond  to  similar  enu- 
merations in  the  Christian  Scriptures.  They  were  "  theft, 
swearing,  lying,  whoring,  murder,  and  the  like  ;"t  and  the 
New  Testament  affirms  that  those  who  are  guilty  of  adultery, 
fornication,  lying,  theft,  murder,  &c.,  shall  not  inherit  the 
kingdom  of  God.  The  same  writer  having  on  his  travels 
met  with  some  Indians,  stopped  and  gave  them  some  good 
and  serious  advices.  "  They  wept,"  says  he,  "  and  tears  ran 
down  their  naked  bodies.  They  smote  their  hands  upon  their 
breasts  and  said,  '  The  Good  Man  here  told  them  what  I  said 
was  all  good.'  "J  . 

But  reasonings  such  as  these  are  in  reality  not  necessary 
to  the  support  of  the  truth  of  the  Immediate  Communication 
of  the  Will  of  God ;  because  if  the  variations  in  men's  no- 
tions of  right  and  wrong  were  greater  than  they  are,  they 
would  not  impeach  the  existence  of  that  communication.  In 
the  first  place,  we  never  affirm  that  the  Deity  communicates 
all  his  law  to  every  man :  and  in  the  second  place,  it  is  suffi- 
ciently certain  that  multitudes  know  his  laws,  and  yet  neglect 
to  fulfil  them. 

If,  in  conclusion,  it  should  be  asked,  what  assistance  can 
be  yielded,  in  the  investigation  of  publicly  authorized  rules 
of  virtue,  by  the  discussions  of  the  present  chapter  ?  we  an- 
swer, Very  little.     But  when  it  is  asked,  Of  what  impor- 

*  Disc,  on  Study  of  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations. 

t  John  Richardson's  Life.  I  Ibid. 


CHAP.  VT.]  OF    THE    LAW    OF    GOD.  -  79 

tance  are  they  as  iilustratmg  the  Principles  of  Morality  ?  we 
answer,  Very  much.  If  there  be  two  sources  from  which  it 
has  pleased  God  to  enable  mankind  to  know  his  Will — a  law 
\vTitten  externally,  and  a  law  communicated  to  the  heart — it 
is  evident  that  both  must  "be  regarded  as  Principles  of  Mo- 
rality, and  that,  in  a  work  like  the  present,  both  should  be 
illustrated  as  such.  It  is  incidental  to  the  latter  mode  of> 
moral  guidance,  that  it  is  little  adapted  to  the  formation  of  ex- 
ternal rules  ;  but  it  is  of  high  and  solemn  impartance  to  our 
species  for  the  secret  direction  of  the  individual  man. 


ESSAY   I. 

PART  II. 

SUBORDINATE   MEANS   OF   DISCOVERING 
THE  DIVINE  WILL. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  LAW  OF  THE  LAND. 


Its  authority — Limits  to  its  authority — Morality  sometimes  prohibits 
what  the  law  permits. 

The  authority  of  civil  government  as  a  director  of  indi 
vidual  conduct,  is  explicitly  asserted  in  the  Christian  Scrip- 
tures : — ^"  Be  subject  to  principalities  and  powers, — Obey  ma- 
gistrates,'"*— "  Submit  yourselves  to  every  ordinance  of  man 
for  the  Lord's  sake  :  whether  it  be  to  the  king,  as  supreme  ; 
or  unto  governors,  as  unto  them  that  are  sent  by  him  for  the 
punishment  of  evil  doers,  and  for  the  praise  of  them  that  do 
well."t 

By  this  general  sanction  of  civil  government,  a  multitude 
of  questions  respecting  human  duty  are  at  once  decided.  In 
ordinary  cases,  he  upon  whom  the  magistrate  imposes  a  law, 
needs  not  to  seek  for  knowledge  of  his  duty  upon  the  subject 
from  a  higher  source.  The  divine  will  is  sufficiently  indi- 
cated by  the  fact  that  the  magistrate  commands.  Obedience 
to  the  Law  is  obedience  to  the  expressed  will  of  God.  He 
who,  in  the  payment  of  a  tax  to  support  the  just  exercise  of 
government,  conforms  to  the  Law  of  the  Land,  as  truly  obeys 
the  divine  will,  as  if  the  Deity  had  regulated  questions  of 
taxation,  by  express  rules. 

In  thus  founding  the  authority  of  civil  government  upon  the 
precepts  of  revelation,  we  refer  to  the  ultimate,  and  for  that 
reason  to  the  most  proper  sanction.  Not,  indeed,  that  if  reve- 
lation had  been  silent,  the  obligation  of  obedience  might  not 
laave  been  deduced  from  other  considerations.     The  utility  of 

*  Tit.  lii.  1.  1 1  Pet.  ii.  13. 


CHAP.  I.]  THE    LAW    OF    THE    LAND.  81 

government — its  tendency  to  promote  the  order  and  happiness 
of  society — powerfully  recommend  its  authority ;  so  power- 
fully, indeed,  that  it  is  probable  that  the  worst  government 
which  ev^er  existed,  was  incomparably  better  than  none ;  and 
we  shall  hereafter  have  occasion  to  see  that  considerations  of 
Utility  involve  actual  moral  obligation. 

The  purity  and  practical  excellence  of  the  motives  to  civil 
obedience  which  are  proposed  in  the  Christian  Scriptures,  are 
especially  worthy  of  regard.  "  Submit ybr  the  Lord's  sake." 
"  Be  subject,  not  only  for  wrath,  but  for  conscience'  sake." 
Submission  for  wrath's  sake,  that  is,  from  fear  of  penalty,  im- 
plies a  very  inferior  motive  to  submission  upon  grounds  of 
principle  and  duty ;  and  as  to  practical  excellence,  who  can- 
not perceive  that  he  who  regulates  his  obedience  by  the  mo- 
tives of  Christianity,  acts  more  worthily,  and  honourably,  and 
consistently,  than  he  who  is  influenced  only  by  fear  of  pen- 
alties ?  The  man  who  obeys  the  laws  for  conscience'  sake, 
will  obey  always  ;  alike  when  disobedience  would  be  unpun- 
ished and  unknown,  as  when  it  would  be  detected  the  next 
hour.  The  magistrate  has  a  security  for  such  a  man's  fidel- 
ity, which  no  other  motive  can  supply.  A  smuggler  will  im- 
port his  kegs  if  there  is  no  danger  of  a  seizure — a  Christian 
will  not  buy  the  brandy  though  no  one  knows  it  but  himself. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  obligation  of  civil  obedience 
is  enforced,  whether  the  particular  command  of  the  law  is  iu 
itself  sanctioned  by  morality  or  not.  Antecedently  to  the 
existence  of  the  law  of  the  magistrate  respecting  the  impor- 
tation of  brandy,  it  was  of  no  consequence  in  the  view  of 
morality  whether  brandy  was  imported  or  not ;  but  the  prohi- 
bition of  the  magistrate  involves  a  moral  obligation  to  refrain. 
Other  doctrine  has  been  held ;  and  it  has  been  asserted,  that 
unless  the  particular  law  is  enforced  by  morality,  it  does  not 
become  obligatory  by  the  command  of  the  state.*  But  if  this 
were  true — if  no  law  was  obligatory  that  was  not  previously 
enjoined  by  morality,  no  moral  obligation  would  result  from 
the  law  of  the  land.  Such  a  question  is  surely  set  at  rest  by, 
"  Submit  yourselves  to  every  ordinance  of  manP 

But  the  authority  of  civil  government  is  a  subordinate  au- 
thority. If,  from  any  cause,  the  magistrate  enjoins  that  which 
is  prohibited  by  the  Moral  Law,  the  duty  of  obedience  is 
withdrawn.  "  AH  human  authority  ceases  at  the  point  where 
obedience  becomes  criminal."  The  reason  is  simple ;  that 
when  the  magistrate  enjoins  what  is  criminal,  he  has  ex- 

*  See  Godwin's  Political  Justice. 


82  THE    LAW    OF    THE    LAND.  [eSSAY  I. 

ceeded  his  power :  "  the  minister  of  God  "  has  gone  beyond 
his  commission.  There  is,  in  our  day,  no  such  thing  as  a 
moral  plenipotentiary. 

Upon  these  principles,  the  first  teachers  of  Christianity 
acted  when  the  rulers  "  called  them,  and  commanded  them  not 
to  speak  at  all  nor  teach  in  the  name  of  Jesus. — "  Whether," 
they  replied,  "  it  be  right  in  the  sight  of  God,  to  hearken  unto 
you  more  than  unto  God,  jij^dge  ye."*  They  accordingly  "  en- 
tered into  the  temple  early  in  the  morning  and  taught :"  and 
when,  subsequently,  they  were  again  brought  before  the  coun 
oil  and  interrogated,  they  replied,  "  We  ought  to  obey  God 
rather  than  men ;"  and  notwithstanding  the  renewed  command 
of  the  council,  "  daily  in  the  temple  and  in  every  house,  they 
ceased  not  to  teach  and  preach  Jesus  Christ. "f — Nor  let  any 
one  suppose  that  there  is  any  thing  religious  in  the  motives 
of  the  apostles,  which  involved  a  peculiar  obligation  upon 
them  to  refuse  obedience  :  we  have  already  seen  that  the  ob- 
ligation to  conform  to  religious  duty  and  to  moral  duty,  is  one. 

To  disobey  the  civil  magistrate  is  however  not  a  light  thing. 
When  the  Christian  conceives  that  the  requisitions  of  gov- 
ernment and  of  a  higher  law  are  conflicting,  it  is  needful  that 
he  exercise  a  strict  scrutiny  into  the  principles  of  his  con- 
duct. But  if,  upon  such  scrutiny,  the  contrariety  of  requisi- 
tions appears  real,  no  room  is  left  for  doubt  respecting  his 
tluty,  or  for  hesitation  in  performing  it.  With  the  considera- 
tion of  consequences  he  has  then  no  concern  :  whatever  they 
may  be,  his  path  is  plain  before  him. 

-  It  is  sufficiently  evident  that  these  doctrines  respect  non- 
compliance only.  It  is  one  thing  not  to  comply  with  laws, 
and  another  to  resist  those  who  make  or  enforce  them.  He 
who  thinks  the  payment  of  tithes  unchristian,  ought  to  decline 
to  pay  them;  but  he  would  act  upon  strange  principles  of 
morality,  if,  when  an  oflicer  came  to  distrain  upon  his  pro- 
perty, he  forcibly  resisted  his  authority .;{ 

If  there  are  cases  in  which  the  positive  injunctions  of  the 
law  may  be  disobeyed,  it  is  manifest  that  the  mere  permission 
;of  the  law^tb  do  a  given  action,  conveys  no  sufficient  au- 
thority to  perform  it.  There  are,  perhaps,  no  disquisitions, 
connected  with  the  present  subject,  which  are  of  greater  prac- 
tical utility  than  those  which  show,  that  not  every  thing  whicli 
is  legally  right  is  morally  right;  that  a  man  may  be  entitled 

*  Acts  iv.  18.  t  Acts  V.  29,  42. 

X  Wa^  speak  here  of  private  obligations  only.  Respecting  the  political 
obligatrons  which  result  from  the  authority  of  civil  government,  some  ob- 
servations will  be  found  in  the  chapter  on  Civil  Obedience.     Ess.  iii.  c.  v< 


CHAP.  I.]  THE    LAW    OF    THE    LAND  83 

by  law  to  privileges  which  morality  forbids  him  .o  exercise, 
or  to  possessions  which  morality  forbids  him  to  enjoy. 

As  to  the  possession,  for  example,  of  property :  the  gen- 
eral foundation  of  the  right  to  property  is  the  Law  of  the 
Land.  But  as  the  Law  of  the  Land  is  itself  subordinate,  it 
is  manifest  that  the  right  to  property  must  be  subordinate  also, 
and.  must  be  held  in  subjection  to  the  Moral  Law.  A  man 
who  has  a  wife  and  two  sons,  and  who  is  worth  fifteen  hun- 
dred pounds,  dies  without  a  will.  The  widow  possesses  no 
separate  property,  but  the  sons  have  received  from  another 
quarter  ten  thousand  pounds  a-piece.  Now,  of  the  fifteen 
hundred  pounds  which  the  intestate  left,  the  law  assigns  five 
hundred  to  the  mother,  and  five  hundred  to  each  son.  Are 
these  sons  morally  permitted  to  take  each  his  five  hundred 
pounds,  and  to  leave  their  parent  with  only  five  hundred  for 
her  support  ?  Every  man  I  hope  will  answer,  No  :  and  the 
reason  is  this  ;  that  the  Moral  Law,  which  is  superior  to  the 
Law  of  the  Land,  forbids  them  to  avail  themselves  of  their 
legal  rights.  The  Moral  Law  requires  justice  and  benevo- 
lence, and  a  due  consideration  for  the  wants  and  necessities 
of  others  ;  and  if  justice  and  benevolence  would  be  violated 
by  availing  ourselves  of  legal  permissions,  those  permissions 
are  not  sufficient  authorities  to  direct  our  conduct. 

It  has  been  laid  down,  that  "  so  long  as  we  keep  within  the 
design  and  intention  of  a  law,  that  law  will  justify  us,  inforcr 
conscienti(B  as  in  foro  hurnano,  whatever  be  the  equity  or  ex-, 
pediency  of  the  law  itself."*  From  the  example  which  has 
been  ofiered,  I  think  it  sufficiently  appears  that  this  maxim  is 
utterly  unsound  :  at  any  rate,  its  unsoundness  will  appear  from 
a  brief  historical  fact.  During  the  Revolutionaiy  war  in  Amer- 
ica, the  Virginian  Legislature  passed  a  law,  by  which  "  it 
was  enacted,  that  all  merchants  and  pfanters^in  Virginia  who 
owed  money  to  British  merchants,  should  be  exonerated  from 
their  debts,  if  they  paid  the  money  due  into  the  public  trea- 
sury instead  of  sending  it  to  Great  Britain ;  and.all  such  as 
stood  indebted,  were  invited  to  come  forward  and  give  4heir 
money,  in  this  manner,  towards  the  support  of  the  contest  in 
which  America  was  then  engaged."  Now,  according  to  the ' 
principles  of  Paley,  these  Virginian  planters  would  have  been 
justified,  in  foro  conscientim,  in  defrauding  the  British  mer- 
chants of  the  money  which  was  their  due.  It  is  quite  clear 
that  the  "  design  and  intention  of  the  law"  was  to  allow  the 
fraud — ^the  planters  were  even  invited  to  commit  it ;  and  yet 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  PhiL  b.  iii.  p.  1,  c.  4. 


84  THE    LAW    OF    THE    LAND.  [eSSA       /. 

the  heart  of  every  reader  will  tell  him,  that  to  have  availed 
themselves  of  the  legal  permission,  would  have  been  an  act 
of  flagitious  dishonesty.  The  conclusion  is  therefore  distinct 
— ^that  legal  decisions  respecting  property,  are  not  always  a 
sufficient  warrant  for  individual  conduct.  To  the  extreme 
disgrace  of  these  planters  it  should  be  told,  that  although  at 
first,  when  they  would  have  gained  little  by  the  fraud,  few  of 
them  paid  their  debts  into  the  treasury,  yet  afterwards  many 
large  sums  were  paid.  The  Legislature  offered  to  take  the 
American  paper  money  :  and  as  this  paper  money,  in  conse- 
quence of  its  depreciation,  was  not  worth  a  hundredth  part 
of  its  value  in  specie,  the  planters,  in  thus  paying  their  debts 
to  their  own  government,  paid  but  one  pound  instead  of  a  hun- 
dred, and  kept  the  remaining  ninety-nine  in  their  own  pock- 
ets !  Profligate  as  these  planters  and  as  this  Legislature 
were,  it  is  pleasant  for  the  sake  of  America  to  add,  that  in 
1796,  after  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  had  been 
erected,  the  British  merchants  brought  the  affair  before  it ; 
and  the  judges  directed  that  every  one  of  these  debts  should 
again  be  paid  to  the  rightful  creditors. 

It  might  be  almost  imagined  that  the  moral  philosopher 
designed  to  justify  such  conduct  as  that  of  the  planters.  He 
says,  when  a  man  "  refuses  to  pay  a  debt  of  the  reality  of 
which  he  is  conscious,  he  cannot  plead  the  intention  of  the 
statute,  unless  he  could  show  that  the  law  intended  to  inter- 
pose its  supreme  authority  to  acquit  men  of  debts  of  tlie  ex- 
istence and  justice  of  which  they  were  themselves  sensible."* 
Now  the  planters  could  show  that  this  was  the  intention  of 
the  law,  and  yet  they  were  not  justified  in  availing  themselvea 
of  it.  The  error  of  the  moralist  is  founded  in  the  assumption, 
that  there  is  "  supreme  authority"  in  the  law.  Make  that  au- 
thority, as  it  really  is,  subordinate ^  smd  the  error  and  the  falla- 
cious rule  which  is  founded  upon  it,  will  be  alike  corrected. 

In  applying  to  the  Law  of  the  Land  as  a  moral  guide,  it  is 
of  importance  to  distinguish  its  intention  from  its  letter.  The 
intention  is  not,  indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  a  final  considera- 
tion, but  the  design  of  a  legislature  is  evidently  of  greater 
^  import,  and  consequent  obligation,  than  the  literal  interpreta- 
tion of  the  words  in  which  that  design  is  proposed  to  be  ex- 
pressed. The  want  of  a  sufficient  attention  to  this  simple 
rule,  occasions  many  snares  to  private  virtue,  and  the  com- 
mission of  much  practical  injustice.  In  consequence,  partly 
of  the  inadequacy  of  all  language,  and  partly  of  the  inability 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  3,  p.  1,  c.  4. 


CHAP.  II.]  THE  LAW  OF  NATURB.  85 

of  those  who  frame  laws,  accurately  to  provide  for  cases 
which  subsequently  arise,  it  happens  that  the  literal  applica- 
tion of  a  law,  sometimes  frustrates  the  intention  of  the  legis- 
lator, and  violates  the  obligations  of  justice.  Whatever  be  the 
cause,  it  is  found  in  practice,  that  courts  of  law  usually  re- 
gard the  letter  of  a  statute  rather  than  its  general  intention ; 
and  hence  it  happens  that  many  duties  devolve  upon  individ- 
uals in  the  application  of  the  laws  in  their  own  affairs.  If 
legal  courts  usually  decide  by  the  letter,  and  if  decision  by 
the  letter  often  defeats  the  objects  of  the  legislator  and  the 
claims  of  justice,  how  shall  these  claims  be  satisfied  except 
by  the  conscientious  and  forbearing  integrity  of  private  men  ? 
Of  the  cases  in  which  this  integrity  should  be  brought  into 
exercise,  several  examples  will  be  offered  in  the  early  part 
of  the  next  Essay. 


CHAPTER  11. 

THE  LAW  OF  NATURE. 


Its  authority — Limits  to  its  authority — Obligations  resulting  from  the 
Rights  of  Nature — Incorrect  ideas  attached  to  the  word  Nature. 

We  here  use  the  term,  the  Law  of  Nature,  as  a  convenient 
title  under  which  to  advert  to  the  authority,  in  moral  affairs, 
of  what  are  called  Natural  Instincts  and  Natural  rights. 

"  They  who  rank  Pity  among  the  original  impulses  of  our 
nature,  rightly  contend  that  when  this  principle  prompts  us 
to  the  relief  of  human  misery,  it  indicates  the  divine  intention 
and  our  duty.  Indeed,  the  same  conclusion  is  deducibie 
from  the  existence  of  the  passion,  whatever  account  be  given 
of  its  origin.  Whether  it  be  an  instinct  or  a  habit,  it  is  in 
fact  a  property  of  our  nature  which  God  appointed."* 

I  should  reason  similarly  respecting  Natural  Rights — the 
right  to  life — to  personal  liberty — to  a  share  of  the  productions 
of  the  earth.  The  fact  that  life  is  given  us  by  our  Creator — • 
that  our  personal  powers  and  mental  dispositions  are  adapted 
by  Him  to  personal  liberty — and  that  He  has  constituted  our 
bodies  so  as  to  need  the  productions  of  the  earth,  are  satis- 
factory indications  of  the  Divine  Will,  and  of  human  duty. 

So  that  we  conclude  the  general  proposition  is  true — that 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  3,  p.  Sfc.  5. 

8 


S6  THE    LAW    OF    NATURE.  [eSSAY  I. 

a  regard  to  the  Law  of  Nature,  in  estimating  human  duty,  is 
accordant  with  the  Will  of  God.  There  is  little  necessity 
for  formally  insisting  on  the  authority  of  the  Law  of  Nature, 
because  few  are  disposed  to  dispute  that  authority,  at  least 
when  their  own  interests  are  served  by  appealing  to  it.  If 
this  authority  were  questioned,  perhaps  it  might  be  said  that 
the  expression  of  the  Divine  Will  tacitly  sanctions  it,  because 
that  expression  is  addressed  to  us  under  the  supposition  that 
our  constitution  is  such  as  it  is;  and  because  some  of  the 
Divine  precepts  appear  to  specify  a  point  at  which  the  autho- 
rity of  the  Law  of  Nature  stops.  To  say  that  a  rule  is  only 
in  some  cases  wrong,  is  to  say,  that  in  many  it  is  right:  to 
which  may  be  added  the  consideration,  that  the  tendency  of 
the  Law  of  Nature  is  manifestly  beneficial.  No  man  ques- 
tions that  the  "  original  impulses  of  our  nature"  tend  power- 
fully to  the  well-being  of  the  species. 

In  speaking  of  the  Instincts  of  Nature,  we  enter  into  no 
'  curious  definitions  of  what  constitutes  an  instinct.  Whether 
ani/  of  our  passions  or  emotions  be  properly  instinctive,  or  the 
efiect  of  association,  is  of  little  consequence  to  the  purpose, 
so  long  as  they  actually  subsist  in  the  human  economy,  and 
so  long  as  we  have  reason  to  believe  that  their  subsistence 
there  is  in  accordance  with  the  Divine  Will. 

.But  the  authority  of  the  Law  of  Nature,  like  every  other 
authority,  i.s  subordinate  to  that  of  the  Moral  Law.     This 
i    indeed  is   sufficiently  indicated  by  those  reasonings  which 
'Ishow  the  universal  supremacy  of  that  law.     Ye>^t  maybe  of 
advantage  to  remember  such  expressions  as  these  :    "  Be  not 
afraid  of  them  that  kill  the  body,  and  after  that  have  no  more 
that  they  can  do.     But  fear  him  which,  after  he  hath  killed, 
hath  power  to  cast  into  hell."*     This  appears  distinctly  to 
place  an  instinct  of  nature  in  subordination  to  the  Moral  Law. 
The  "fear  of  them  that  kill  the  body,"  results  from  the  in- 
stinct of  self-preservation ;  and  by  this  instinct  we  are  not  to 
be  guided  when  the  Divine  Will  requires  us  to  repress  its 
'  voice. 

ParentaL  affection  has  been  classed  amongst  the  instincts.f 
The  declaration,  "  He  that  loveth  son  or  daughter  more  than 
Me,  is  not  worthy  of  me,"|  clearly  subjects  this  instinct  to 
the  higher  authority  of  the  Divine  Will ;  for  the  "  love"  of 
God  is  to  be  manifested  by  obedience  to  his  law.  Another 
declaration  to  the  same  import  subjects  also  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation :  "  If  a  man  hate  not  (that  is  by  comparison) 

*  Luke  xii.  4.  +  Dr.  Price.  J  Matt.  x.  37. 


CHAP.  II.]         THE  LAW  OF  NATURE.  87 

his  own  life  also,  he  cannot  be  my  disciple."*  And  here  it 
is  remarkable,  that  these  affection^  or  instincts  are  adduced 
for  the  purpose  of  inculcating  their  subordination  to  the  Moral 
Law. 

Upon  one  of  the  most  powerful  instincts  of  nature,  the  re- 
straints of  revelation  are  emphatically  laid.  Its  operation  is 
restricted,  not  to  a  few  of  its  possible  objects,  but  exclusively 
to  one ;  and  to  that  one  upon  an  express  and  specified  condi- 
tion.f 

The  propriety  of  holding  the  natural  impulses  in  subjection 
to  a  higher  law,  appears  to  be  asserted  in  this  language  of 
Dugald  Stewart :  "  The  dictates  of  reason  and  conscience 
inform  us,  in  language  which  it  is  impossible  to  mistake,  that 
it  is  sometimes  a  duty  to  check  the  most  amiable  and  pleasing 
emotions  of  the  heart ;  to  withdraw,  for  example,  from  the 
sight  of  those  distresses  which  stronger  claims  forbid  us  to 
relieve,  and  to  deny  ourselves  that  exquisite  luxury  which 
arises  from  the  exercise  of  humanity."  Even  that  morality 
which  is  not  founded  upon  religion,  recommends  the  same 
truth.  Godwin  says,  that  if  Fenelon  were  in  his  palace,  and  ; 
it  took  fire,  and  it  so  happened  that  the  life  either  of  himself 
or  of  his  chambermaid  must  be  sacrificed,  it  would  be  the 
duty  of  the  woman  to  repress  the  instinct  of  self-preservation, 
and' sacrifice  hers — because  Fenelon  would  do  more  good  in 
the  world. J  If  the  morality  of  scepticism  inculcates  this 
subjugation  of  our  instincts  to  indeterminate  views  of  advan- 
tage, much  more  does  the  morality  of  the  New  Testament 
teach  us  to  subject  them  to  the  determinate  Will  of  God. 

It  is  upon  these  principles  that  some  of  the  most  noble 
examples  of  human  excellence  have  been  exhibited — those 
of  men  who  have  died  for  the  testimony  of  a  good  conscience. 
If  the  strongest  of  our  instincts — if  that  instinct,  excited  to 
its  utmost  vigour  by  the  apprehension  of  a  dreadful  death, 
might  be  of  weight  to  suspend  the  obligation  of  the  Moral 
Law,  it  surely  might  have  been  suspended  in  the  case  of 
those  who  thus  proved  their  fidelity. 

Yet,  obvious  as  is  the  propriety  and  the  duty  of  thus  pre- 
ferring the  Divine  Law  before  all,  the  dictates  or  the  rights 
of  nature  are  continually  urged  as  of  paramount  obligation. 
Many  persons  appear  to  th^nk  that  if  a  given  action  is  dicta- 
ted by  the  law  of  nature,  it  is  quite  sufficient.  Respecting 
the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  especially,  they  appear  to 
conclude  that  to  whatever  that  instinct  prompts,  it  is  lawful 

«  Luke  xiv.  26.    t  See  Matt.  iv.  9.    1  Cor.  vi.  9.  vii.  1 , 2.   Gal.  v.  19,  dtc. 
}  Political  Justice. 


88  THE    LAW    OF    NATURE.  [eSSAY  I. 

to  conform  to  its  voice.  They  do  not  surely  reflect  upon  the 
monstrousness  of  their  opinions  :  they  do  not  surely  consider 
that  they  are  absolutely  superseding  the  Moral  Law  of  God, 
and  superseding  it  upon  considerations  resulting  merely  from 
the  animal  part  of  our  constitution.  The  Divine  Laws  re- 
spect the  whole  human  economy — our  prospects  in  another 
world  as  well  as  our  existence  in  the  present. 

Some  men,  again,  speak  of  our  rights  in  a  state  of  nature, 
as  if  to  be  in  a  state  of  nature  was  to  be  without  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Moral  Law.  But  if  man  be  a  moral  and  responsi- 
ble agent,  that  law  applies  every  where  ;  to  a  state  of  nature 
as  truly  as  to  every  other  state.  If  some  other  human  being 
had  been  left  with  Selkirk  or  Juan  Fernandez,  and  if  that  other 
seized  an  animal  which  Selkirk  had  ensnared,  would  Selkirk 
have  been  justified  in  asserting  his  natural  right  to  the  animal 
by  whatever  means  ?  It  is  very  possible  that  no  means  would 
have  availed  to  procure  the  restoration  of  the  rabbit  or  the 
bird  short  of  killing  the  oflTender.  Might  Selkirk  kill  the  man 
in  assertion  of  his  natural  rights  ?  Every  one  answers,  No — 
because  the  unsophisticated  dictates  in  every  man's  mind 
assure  us  that  the  rights  of  natur^  are  subordinate  to  higher 
laws.  ' 

Situations  similar  to  those  of  a  state  of  nature  sometimes 
arise  in  society  ;*  as  where  money  is  demanded,  or  violence 
is  committed  by  one  person  on  another,  where  no  third  per- 
son can  be  called  in  to  assistance.  The  injured  party,  in 
such  a  case,  cannot  go  to  every  length  in  his  own  cause  by 
virtue  of  the  law  of  nature :  he  can  go  only  so  far  as  the 
Moral  Law  allows.  These  considerations  will  be  found  pe- 
culiarly applicable  to  the  rights  of  self-defence ;  and  it  is 
pleasant  to  find  these  doctrines  supported  by  that  sceptical 
morality  to  which  we  just  now  referred.  The  author  of  Po- 
litical Justice  maintains  that  man  possesses  7io  rights ;  that  is, 
no  absolute  rights — none,  of  which  the  just  exercise  is  not 
conditional  upon  the  permission  of  a  higher  rule.  That  rule, 
.  with  him,  is  "  Justice" — with  us  it  is  the  law  of  God ;  but  the 
rea,soning  is  the  same  in  kind.  / 

Nevertheless,  the  natural  rights  of  man  ought  to  possess 
extensive  application  both  in  private  and  political  affairs.  If 
it  were  sufficiently  remembered,  that  these  rights  are  abstract- 
edly possessed  in  equality  by  all  men,  we  shbuld  find  many 
imperative  claims  upon  us  with  which  we  do  not  now  com- 
ply.    The  artificial  distinctions  of  society  induce  forgetful- 

*  See  Locke  on  Gov.  b.  ii.  c.  7. 


CHAP  II.]  THE    LAW    OF    NATURE.  89 

ness  of  the  circumstance  that  we  are  all  brethren :  not  that  I 
would  countenance  the  speculations  of  those  who  think  that 
all  men  should  be  now  practically  equal ;  but  that  these  dis- 
tinctions are  such,  that  the  general  rights  of  nature  are  inva- 
ded in  a  degree  which  nothing  can  justify.  There  are  natu- 
ral claims  of  the  poor  upon  the  rich,  of  dependents  upon  their 
superiors,  which  are  very  commonly  forgotten :  there  are  end- 
less acts  of  superciliousness,  and  unkindness,  and  oppression, 
in  private  life,  which  the  Law  of  Nature  emphatically  con- 
demns. When,  sometimes,  I  see  a  man  of  fortune  speaking 
in  terms  of  supercilious  command  to  his  servant,  I  feel  that 
he  needs  to  go  and  learn  some  lessons  of  the  Law  of  Nature. 
I  feel  that  he  has  forgotten  what  he  is,  and  what  he  is  not, 
and  what  his  brother  is :  he  has  forgotten  that  by  nature  he 
and  his  servant  are  in  strictness  equal ;  and  that  although,  by 
the  permission  of  Providence,  a  various  allotment  is  assigned 
to  them  now,  he  should  regard  every  one  with  that  considera- 
tion and  respect  which  is  due  to  a  man  and  a  brother.  And 
when  to  these  considerations  are  added  those  which  result 
from  the  contemplation  of  our  relationship  to  God — ^that  we 
are  the  common  objects  of  his  bounty  and  his  goodness,  and 
that  we  are  heirs  to  a  common  salvation,  we  are  presented 
with  such  motives  to  pay  attention  to  the  rights  of  nature,  as 
constitute  an  imperative  obligation. 

The  political  duties  which  result  from  the  Law  of  Nature, 
it  is  not  our  present  business  to  investigate  ;  but  it  may  be 
observed  here,  that  a  very  limited  appeal  to  facts -is  sufficient 
to  evince,  that  by  many  political  institutions  the  Rights  of 
Nature  have  been  grievously  sacrificed ;  and  that  if  those 
Rights  had  been  sufficiently  regarded,  many  of  these  vicious 
institutions  would  never  have  been  exhibited  in  the  world. 


It  appears  worth  while  at  the  conclusion  of  this  chapter  to 
remark,  that  a  person,  when  he  speaks  of  "  Nature,"  should 
know  distinctly  what  he  means.  The  word  carries  with  it  a 
sort  of  indeterminate  authority ;  and  he  who  uses  it  amiss, 
may  connect  that  authority  with  rules  or  actions  which  are 
little  entitled  to  it.  There  are  few  senses  in  which  the  word 
is  used,  that  do  not  refer,  however  obscurely,  to  God ;  and  it 
is  for  that  reason  that  the  notion  of  authority  is  connected 
with  the  word.  "  The  very  name  of  nature  implies,  that  it 
must  owe  its  birth  to  some  prior  agent,  or,  to  speak  properly, 
signifies  in  itself  nothing."*     Yet,  unmeaning  as  the  term  is, 

*  Milton :  Christian  Doct.  p.  14. 
8* 


90  THE    LAW    OF    NATURE.  [eSSAY   I. 

it  is  one  of  wliich  many  persons  are  very  fond ; — whether  it 
be  that  their  notions  are  really  indistinct,  or  that  some  pur- 
poses are  answered  by  referring  to  the  obscurity  of  nature 
rather  than  to  God.  "  Nature  has  decorated  the  earth  with 
beauty  and  magnificence," — "  Nature  has  furnished  us  with 
joints  and  limbs," — are  phrases  sufficiently  unmeaning  ;  and 
yet  I  know  not  that  they  are  likely  to  do  any  other  harm  than 
to  give  currency  to  the  common  fiction.  But  when  it  is  said, 
that  "  Nature  teaches  us  to  adhere  to  truth," — "  Nature  con- 
demns us  for  dishonesty  or  deceit," — "  Men  are  taught  by 
nature  that  they  are  responsible  beings," — there  is  consider- 
able danger  that  we  have  both  fallacious  and  injurious  notions 
of  the  authority  which  thus  teaches  or  condemns  us.  Upon 
this  subject  it  were  well  to  take  the  advice  of  Boyle :  "Na- 
ture," he  says,  "  is  sometimes,  indeed  commonly,  taken  for  a 
kind  of  semi-deity.  In  this  sense  it  is  bgst  not  to  use  it  at 
all."*  It  is  dangerous  to  induce  confusion  into  our  ideas 
respecting  our  relationship  with  God. 

A  law  of  nature  is  a  very  imposing  phrase  ;  and  it  might 
be  supposed,  from  the  language  of  some  persons,  that  nature 
was  an  independent  legislatress,  who  had  sat  and  framed 
laws  for  the  government  of  mankind.  Nature  is  nothing;  yet 
it  would  seem  that  men  do  sometimes  practically  imagine, 
that  a  "  law  of  nature"  possesses  proper  and  independent 
authority ;  and  it  may  be  suspected  that  with  some  the  notion 
is  so  palpable  and  strong,  that  they  set  up  the  authority  of 
"  the  law  of  nature"  without  reference  to  the  will  of  God,  or 
perhaps  in  opposition  to  it.  Even  if  notions  like  these  float  in 
the  mind  only  with  vapoury  indistinctness,  a  correspondent 
indistinctness  of  moral  notions  is  likely  to  ensue.  Everyman 
should  make  to  himself  the  rule,  never  to  employ  the  word 
Nature  when  he  speaks  of  ultimate  moral  authority.  A  law 
possesses  no  authority ;  the  authority  rests  only  in  the  legis- 
lator :  and  as  nature  makes  no  laws,  a  law  of  nature  involves 
no  obligation  but  that  which  is  imposed  by  the  Divine  Will. 

*  Free  Inquir}'  into  the  vulgarly  received  Notions  of  Nature. 


CHAP.  III.]  UTILITY.  91 

CHAPTER  III. 

UTILITY. 

Obligations  resulting  from  Expediency  ^Limits  to  these  obligations. 

That  in  estimating  our  duties  in  life  we  ought  to  pay  re- 
gard to  what  is  useful  and  beneficial — ^to  what  is  likely  to 
promote  the  welfare  of  ourselves  and  of  others — can  need  little 
argument  to  prove.  Yet,  if  it  v/ere  required,  it  may  be  easily 
shown  that  this  regard  to  Utility  is  recommended  or  enforced 
in  the  expression  of  the  Divine  Will.  That  Will  requires 
the  exercise  of  pure  and  universal  benevolence  ; — which 
benevolence  is  exercised  in  consulting  the  interests,  the  wel- 
fare, and  the  happiness  of  mankind.  The  dictates  of  Utility, 
therefore,  are  frequently  no  other  than  the  dictates  of  benevo- 
lence. 

Or,  if  we  derive  the  obligations  of  Utility  from  considera- 
tions connected  with  our  reason,  they  do  not  appear  much 
less  distinct.  To  say  that  to  consult  Utility  is  right,  is  almost 
the  same  as  to  say,  it  is  right  to  exercise  our  understandings. 
The  daily  and  hourly  use  of  reason  is  to  discover  what  is  fit 
to  be  done  ;  that  is,  what  is  useful  and  expedient :  and  since 
it  is  manifest  that  the  Creator,  in  endowing  us  with  the  faculty, 
designed  that  we  should  exercise  it,  it  is  obvious  that  in  this 
view  also  a  reference  to  expediency  is  consistent  with  the 
Divine  Will. 

When  (higher  laws  being  silent)  a  man  judges  that  of  two 
alternatives  one  is  dictated  by  greater  utility,  that  dictate  con- 
stitutes an  obligation  upon  him  to  prefer  it.  I  should  not  hold 
a  landowner  innocent,  who  knowingly  persisted  in  adopting  a 
bad  mode  of  raising  corn ;  nor  should  I  hold  the  person  inno- 
cent who  opposed  an  improvement  in  shipbuilding,  or  who 
obstructed  the  formation  of  a  turnpike  road  that  would  benefit 
the  public.  These  are  questions,  not  of  prudence  merely,  but 
of  morals  also. 

Obligations  resulting  from  Utility  possess  great  extent  of 
application  to  political  affairs.  There  are,  indeed,  some  public 
concerns  in  which  the  Moral  Law,  antecedently,  decides  no- 
thing. Whether  a  duty  shall  be  imposed,  or  a  charter  granted, 
or  a  treaty  signed,  are  questions  which  are  perhaps  to  be  de- 
tei-mined  by  expediency  alone  :  but  when  a  public  man  is  of 
the  judgment  that  any  given  measure  will  tend  to  the  general 
good,  he  is  immoral  if  he  opposes  that  measure.     The  imrao- 


^  V  ^ 


92  UTILITY.  [essay   I. 

rality  may  indeed  oe  made  out  by  a  somewhat  different  pro- 
cess : — such  a  man  violates  those  duties  of  benevolence  which 
religion  imposes  :  he  probably  disregards,  too,  his  sense  of 
obligation  ;  for  if  he  be  of  the  judgment  that  a  given  measure 
will  tend  to  the  general  good,  conscience  will  scarcely  be  si- 
lent in  whispering  that  he  ought  not  to  oppose  it. 

It  is  sufficiently  evident,  upon  the .  principles  which  have 
hitherto  been  advanced,  that  considerations  of  utility  are  only 
so  far  obligatory  as  they  are  in  accordance  with  the  Moral 
Law.  Pursuing,  however,  the  method  which  has  been 
adopted  in  the  two  last  chapters,  it  may  be  observed,  that  this 
subserviency  of  Utility  to  the  Divine  Will,  appears  to  be  re- 
quired by  the  written  revelation.  That  habitual  preference 
of  futurity  to  the  present  time,  which  Scripture  exhibits,  in- 
dicates that  our  interests  here  should  be  held  in  subordination 
to  our  interests  hereafter :  and  as  these  higher  interests  are 
to  be  consulted  hy  the  means  which  revelation  prescribes,  it  is 
manifest  that  those  means  are  to  be  pursued,  whatever  we 
may  suppose  to  be  their  effects  upon  the  present  welfare  of 
ourselves  or  of  other  men.  "  If  in  this  life  only  we  have  hope 
in  God,  then  are  we  of  all  men  most  miserable."  It  certainly 
is  not,  in  the  usual  sense  of  the  word,  expedient  to  be  most 
miserable.  And  why  did  they  thus  sacrifice  expediency? 
Because  the  communicated  Will  of  God  required  that  course 
of  life  by  which  human  interests  were  apparently  sacrificed. 
It  will  be  perceived  that  these  considerations  result  from  the 
truth,  (too  little  regarded  in  talking  of  "  Expediency"  and 
*'  General  Benevolence")  that  Utility,  as  it  respects  mankind, 
cannot  be  properly  consulted  without  taking  into  account  our 
interests  in  futurity.  "  Let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow 
we  die,"  is  a  maxim  of  which  all  would  approve  if  we  had  no 
concerns  with  another  life.  That  which  might  be  very  expe- 
dient if  death  were  annihilation,  may  be  very  inexpedient  now. 

"  If  ye  say.  We  will  not  dwell  in  this  land,  neither  obey 
the  voice  of  the  Lord  your  God,  saying,  No ;  but  we  will  go 
into  the  land  of  Egypt,  where  we  shall  see  no  war  ;''^  ^^  nor 
have  hunger  of  bread ;  and  there  will  we  dwell ;  it  shall  come 
to  pass,  that  the  sword,  which  ye  feared,  shall  overtake  you 
there  in  the  land  of  Egypt ;  and  the  famine,  whereof  ye  were 
afraid,  shall  follow  close  after  you  in  Egypt ;  and  there  ye 
shall  die."* — "  We  will  burn  incense  unto  the  queen  of  heaven, 
and  pour  out  drink-offerings  unto  her ;  for  then  had  we  plenty 
of  victuals,  and  were  well,  and  saw  no  evil.     But  since  we  left 

*  Jer.  xliL 


CHAP.  III.]  UTTLITT.  93 

off,  we  have  wanted  all  things,  and  have  been  consumed  by 
the  sword,  and  by  the  famine." — Therefore,  "  I  will  watch 
over  them  for  evil,  and  not  for  good."*  These  reasoners  ar- 
gued upon  the  principle  of  making  expediency  the  paramount 
law  ;  and  it  may  be  greatly  doubted  whether  those  who  argue 
upon  that  principle  now,  have  better  foundation  for  their  rea- 
soning than  those  of  old.  Here  was  the  prospect  of  advan- 
tage founded,  as  they  thought,  upon  experience.  One  course 
of  action  had  led  (so  they  reasoned)  to  war  and  famine,  and 
another  to  plenty,  and  health,  and  general  well-being:  yet 
still  our  Universal  Lawgiver  required  them  to  disregard  all 
these  conclusions  of  expediency,  and  simply  to  conform  to 
His  will. 

After  all,  the  general  experience  is,  that  what  is  most  ex- 
pedient with  respect  to  another  world,  is  most  expedient  with 
respect  to  the  present.  There  may  be  cases,  and  there  have 
been,  in  which  the  Divine  Will  may  require  an  absolute  re- 
nunciation of  our  present  interests  ;  as  the  martyr  who  main- 
tains his  fidelity,  sacrifices  all  possibility  of  advantage  now. 
But  these  are  unusual  cases  ;  and  the  experience  of  the  con- 
trary is  so  general,  that  the  truth  has  been  reduced  to  a  pro- 
verb. Perhaps  in  nineteen  cases  out  of  twenty,  he  best  con- 
sults his  present  welfare,  who  endeavours  to  secure  it  in 
another  world.  "  By  the  wise  contrivance  of  the  Author  of 
nature,  virtue  is  upon  all  ordinary  occasions,  even  with  regard 
to  this  life,  real  wisdom,  and  the  surest  and  readiest  means 
of  obtaining  both  safety  and  advantage."!  Were  it  however 
otherwise,  the  truth  of  our  principles  would  not  be  shaken. 
Men's  happiness,  and  especially  the  happiness  of  good  men, 
does  not  consist  merely  in  external  things.  The  promise  of 
a  hundred  fold  in  this  present  life  may  still  be  fulfilled  in 
mental  felicity;  and  if  it  could  not  be,  who  is  the  man  that 
would  exclude  from  his  computations  the  prospect,  in  the 
world  to  come,  of  life  everlasting  ? 

In  the  endeavour  to  produce  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness, 
or  which  is  the  same  thing,  in  applying  the  dictates  of  Utility 
to  our  conduct  in  life,  there  is  one  species  of  utility  that  is 
deplorably  disregarded  both  in  private  and  public  affairs — that 
which  respects  the  religious  and  moral  welfare  of  mankind. 
If  you  hear  a  politician  expatiating  upon  the  good  tendency 
of  a  measure,  he  tells  you  how  greatly  it  will  promote  the  in- 
terests of  commerce,  or  how  it  will  enrich  a  colony,  or  how 
it  will  propitiate  a  powerful  party,  or  how  it  will  injure  a  na- 

•  Jer.  xliv.  t  Dr.  Smith:  Theor.  Mor.  Sent 


94  UTILITY.  [essay  I. 

tion  whom  he  dreads ;  but  you  hear  probably  not  one  word 
of  enquiry  whether  it  will  corrupt  the  character  of  those  who 
execute  the  measure,  or  whether  it  will  introduce  vices  into 
the  colony,  or  whether  it  will  present  new  temptations  to  the 
virtue  of  the  public.  And  yet  these  considerations  are  per- 
haps by  far  the  most  important  in  the  view  even  of  enlight- 
ened expediency ;  for  it  is  a  desperate  game  to  endeavour  to 
benefit  a  people  by  means  which  may  diminish  their  virtue. 
Even  such  a  politician  would  probably  assent  to  the  unapplied 
proposition,  "the  virtue  of  a  people  is  the  best  security  for 
their  welfare."  It  is  the  same  in  private  life.  You  hear  a 
parent  who  proposes  to  change  his  place  of  residence,  or  to 
engage  in  a  new  profession  or  pursuit,  discussing  the  compara- 
tive conveniences  of  the  proposed  situation,  the  prospect  of 
profit  in  the  new  profession,  the  pleasures  which  will  result 
from  the  new  pursuit ;  but  you  hear  probably  not  one  word  of 
enquiry  whether  the  change  of  residence  will  deprive  his 
family  of  virtuous  and  beneficial  society  which  will  not  be 
replaced — whether  the  contemplated  profession  will  not  tempt 
his  own  virtue  or  diminish  his  usefulness — or  whether  his 
children  will  not  be  exposed  to  circumstances  that  v/ill  proba- 
bly taint  the  purity  of  their  minds.  And  yet  this  parent  will 
acknowledge,  in  general  terms,  that  "  nothing  can  compensate 
for  the  loss  of  religious  and  moral  character."  Such  persons 
surely  make  very  inaccurate  computations  of  Expediency. 

As  to  the  actual  conduct  of  political  aflairs,  men  frequently 
legislate  as  if  there  was  no  such  thing  as  religion  or  morality 
in  the  world  ;  or  as  if,  at  any  rate,  religion  and  morality  had 
no  concern  with  aflfairs  of  state.  I  believe  that  a  sort  of 
shame  (a  false  and  vulgar  shame  no  doubt)  would  be  felt  by 
many  members  of  senates,  in  directly  opposing  religious  or 
moral  considerations  to  prospects  of  advantage.  In  our  own 
country,  those  who  are  most  willing  to  do  this  receive,  from 
vulgar  persons,  a  name  of  contempt  for  their  absurdity  !  How 
inveterate  must  be  the  impurity  of  a  system,  which  teaches 
m6n  to  regard  as  ridiculous  that  system  which  only  is  sound ! 


CHAP.  IV.]         THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS.  95 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS— THE  LAW  OF  HONOUR. 

Although  the  subjects  of  this  chapter  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  con- 
stituting rules  of  life,  yet  we  are  induced  briefly  to  notice  them  in  the 
present  Essay,  partly,  on  account  of  the  importance  of  the  affairs  which 
they  regulate,  and  partly,  because  they  will  afford  satisfactory  illustra- 
tion of  the  principles  of  Morality. 


SECTION  L 
THE  LAW  OP  NATIONS. 


Obligations  and  authority  of  the  Law  of  Nations — Its  abuses,  and 
the  limits  of  its  authority — Treaties. 

The  Law  of  Nations,  so  far  as  it  is  founded  upon  the  prin- 
ciples of  morality,  partakes  of  that  authority  which  those  prin- 
ciples possess  ;  so  far  as  it  is  founded  merely  upon  the  mutual 
conventions  of  states,  it  possesses  that  authority  over  the 
contracting  parties  which  results  from  the  rule,  that  men  ought 
to  abide  by  their  engagements.  The  principal  considerations 
which  present  themselves  upon  the  subject,  appear  to  be  these  : 

1 — That  the  Law  of  Nations  is  binding  upon  those  states 
who  knowingly  allow  themselves  to  be  regarded  as  parties  to  it: 

2 — That  it  is  wholly  nugatory  with  respect  to  those  states 
which  are  not  parties  to  it : 

3 — That  it  is  of  no  force  in  opposition  to  the  Moral  Law : 

I.  The  obligation  of  the  Law  of  Nations  upon  those  who 
join  in  the  convention,  is  plain — ^that  is,  it  rests,  generally, 
upon  all  civilized  communities  which  have  intercourse  with 
one  another.  A  tacit  engagement  only  is,  from  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  to  be  expected ;  and  if  any  state  did  not 
choose  to  conform  to  the  Law  of  Nations,  it  should  publicly 
express  its  dissent.  The  Law  of  Nations  is  not  wont  to 
tighten  the  bonds  of  morality ;  so  that  probably  most  of  its 
positive  requisitions  are  enforced  by  the  Moral  Law:  and 
this  consideration  should  operate  as  an  inducement  to  a  con- 
scientious fulfilment  of  these  requisitions.  In  time  of  war, 
the  Law  of  Nations  prohibits  poisoning  and  assassination,  and 
it  is  manifestly  imperative  upon  every  state  to  forbear  them ; 


96  THE    LAW    OF    NATIONS.  [eSSAT  I. 

biit  whilst  morality  thus  enforces  many  of  the  requisitions  of 
the  Law  of  Nations,  that  law  frequently  stops  short,  instead 
of  following  on  to  whither  morality  would  conduct  it.  This 
distinction  between  assassination  and  some  other  modes  of 
destruction  that  are  practised  in  war,  is  not  perhaps  very 
accurately  founded  in  considerations  of  morality :  neverthe- 
less, since  the  distinction  is  made,  let  it  be  made,  and  let  it 
by  all  means  be  regarded.  Men  need  not  add  arsenic  and 
the  private  dagger  to  those  modes  of  human  destruction  which 
war  allows.  The  obligation  to  avoid  private  murder  is  clear, 
even  though  it  were  shown  that  the  obligation  extends  much 
further.  Whatever  be  the  reasonableness  of  the  distinction, 
and  of  the  rule  that  is  founded  upon  it,  it  is  perfidious  to  vio- 
late that  rule. 

So  it  is  with  those  maxims  of  the  Law  of  Nations  which 
require  that  prisoners  should  not  be  enslaved,  and  that  the 
persons  of  ambassadors  should  be  respected.  Not  that  I 
think  the  man  who  sat  down,  with  only  the  principles  of 
morality  before  him,  would  easily  be  able  to  show,  from  those 
principles,  that  the  slavery  was  wrong  whilst  other  things 
which  the  Law  of  Nations  allows  are  right — ^but  that,  as 
these  principles  actually  enforce  the  maxims,  as  the  observ- 
ance of  them  is  agreed  on  by  civilized  states,  and  as  they 
tend  to  diminish  the  evils  of  war,  it  is  imperative  on  states  to 
observe  them.  Incoherent  and  inconsistent  as  the  Law  of 
Nations  is,  when  it  is  examined  by  the  Moral  Law,  it  is  plea- 
sant to  contemplate  the  good  tendency  of  some  of  its  requisi- 
tions. In  1702,  previous  to  the  declaration  of  war  by  this 
country,  a  number  of  the  anticipated  "  enemy's"  ships  had 
been  seized  and  detained.  When  the  declaration  was  made, 
these  vessels  were  released,  "  in  pursuance,"  as  the  procla- 
mation stated,  "of  the  Law  of  Nations."  Some  of  these 
vessels  were  perhaps  shortly  after  captured,  and  irrecoverably 
lost  to  their  owners  :  yet  though  it  might  perplex  the  Chris- 
tian moralist  to  show  that  the  release  was  right  and  that  the 
capture  was  right  too,  still  he  may  rejoice  that  men  conform, 
even  in  part,  to  the  purity  of  virtue. 

Attempts  to  deduce  the  maxims  of  international  law  as  they 
now  obtain,  from  principles  of  morality,  will  always  be  vain. 
Grotius  seems  as  if  he  would  countenance  the  attempt  when 
he  says,  "  Some  writers  have  advanced  a  doctrine  which  can 
never  be  admitted,  maintaining  that  the  Law  of  Nations  au- 
thorizes one  power  to  commence  hostilities  against  another, 
whose  increasing  greatness  awakens  her  alarms.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  expediency,"  says  Grotius,  "  such  a  measure  may  be 


CHAP.  IV.]  THE    LAW    OF    NATIONS.  97 

adopted ;  but  the  principles  of  justice  can  never  be  advanced 
in  its  favour."*  Alas !  if  principles  of  justice  are  to  decide 
what  the  Law  of  Nations  shall  authorize,  it  will  be  needful  to 
establish  a  new  code  to-morrow,  A  great  part  of  the  code 
arises  out  of  the  conduct  of  war ;  and  the  usual  practices  of 
war  are  so  foreign  to  principles  of  justice  and  morality,  that 
it  is  to  no  purpose  to  attempt  to  found  the  code  upon  them. 
Nevertheless,  let  those  who  refer  to  the  Law  of  Nations, 
introduce  morality  by  all  possible  means ;  and  if  they  think 
they  cannot  appeal  to  it  always,  let  them  appeal  to  it  where 
they  can.  If  they  cannot  persuade  themselves  to  avoid  hos- 
tilities when  some  injury  is  committed  by  another  nation,  let 
them  avoid  them  when  "  another  nation's  greatness  merely 
awakens  their  alarms." 

IL  That  the  Law  of  Nations  is  wholly  nugatory  with 
respect  to  those  states  which  are  not  parties  to  it,  is  a  tru,th 
which,  however  sound,  has  been  too  little  regarded  in  the 
conduct  of  civilized  nations.  The  state  whose  subjects  dis- 
cover and  take  possession  of  an  uninhabited  island,  is  entitled 
by  the  Law  of  Nations  quietly  to  possess  it.  And  it  ought 
auietly  to  possess  it :  not  that  in  the  view  of  reason  or  of  mo- 
lality,  the  circumstance  of  an  Englishman's  first  visiting  the 
shores  of  a  country,  gives  any  very  intelligible  right  to  the 
King  of  England  to  possess  it  rather  than  any  other  prince, 
but  that,  such  a  rule  having  been  agreed  upon  it,  it  ought  to 
be  observed  ;  but  by  whom  ?  By  those  who  are  parties  to  the 
agreement.  For  which  reason,  the  discoverer  possesses  no 
sufficient  claim  to  oppose  his  right  to  that  of  a  people  who 
were  not  parties  to  it.  So  that  he  who,  upon  pretence  of 
discovery,  should  forcibly  exclude  from  a  large  extent  of  ter- 
ritory a  people  who  knew  nothing  of  European  politics,  and 
who  in  the  view  of  reason  possessed  an  equal  or  a  greater 
right,  undoubtedly  violates  the  obligations  of  morality.  It 
may  serve  to  dispel  the  obscurity  in  which  habit  and  self-in- 
terest wrap  our  perceptions,  to  consider,  that  amongst  the 
states  which  were  nearest  to  the  newly-discovered  land,  a 
law  of  nations  might  exist  which  required  that  such  land 
should  be  equally  divided  amongst  them.  Whose  law  of  na- 
tions ought  to  prevail  ?  That  of  European  states,  or  that  of 
states  in  the  Pacific  or  South  Sea  ?  How  happens  it  that  the  En- 
glishman possesses  a  sounder  right  to  exclude  all  other  nations, 
than  surrounding  nations  possess  to  partition  it  amongst  them  ? 

Unhappily,  our  law  of  nations  goes  n^iuch  further ;  and  by 

*  Riffhts  of  War  and  Peace. 

y 


98  THE    LAW    OF    NATIOXS.  [eSSAT  1. 

a  monstrous  abuse  of  power^  has  acted  upon  the  same  doc- 
trine with  respect  to  inhabited  countries;  for  when  these 
have  been  discovered,  the  law  of  nations  has  talked,  with 
perfect  c(X>lness,  of  setting  up  a  standard,  and  thenceforth 
assigning  the  territory  to  the  nation  whose  subjects  set  it  up ; 
as  if  the  previous  inhabitants  possessed  no  other  claim  or 
right  than  the  bears  and  wolves.  It  has  been  asked  (and 
asked  with  great  reason,)  what  we  should  say  to  a  canoe-full 
of  Indians  who  should  discover  England,  and  take  possession 
of  it  in  the  name  of  their  chief? 

Civilized  states  appear  to  have  acted  upon  the  maxim, 
that  no  people  possess  political  rights  but  those  who  are  par- 
ties to  the  law  of  nations;  and  accordingly  the  history  of 
European  settlements  has  been,  so  far  as-  the  aborigines  were 
concerned,  too  much  a  history  of  outrage,  and  treachery,  and 
blood.  Penn  acted  upon  sounder  principles :  he  perfectly 
well  knew  that  neither  an  established  practice,  nor  the  Law 
of  Nations,  could  impart  a  right  to  a  country  which  was  justly 
possessed  by  fonner  inhabitants;  and  therefore,  although 
Charles  II.  "granted"  him  Pennsylvania,  he  did  not  imagine 
that  the  gift  of  a  man  in  London,  could  justify  him  in  taking 
possession  of  a  distant  country  without  the  occupiers'  consent. 
What  was  "  granted"  therefore  by  his  sovereign,  he  purchased 
of  the  owners  ;  and  the  sellers  were  satisfied  with  their  bar- 
gain and  with  him.  The  experience  of  Pennsylvania  has 
shown  that  integrity  is  politic  as  well  as  right.  When  nations 
shall  possess  gi-eater  expansion  of  knowledge,  and  exercise 
greater  purity  of  virtue,  it  will  be  found  that  many  of  the 
principles  which  regulate  international  intercourse,  are  fool- 
ish as  well  as  vicious  ;  that  whilst  they  disregard  the  interests 
'  of  morality  they  sacrifice  their  own. 

III.  Respecting  the  third  consideration,  that  the  Law  of 
Nations  is  of  no  force  in  opposition  to  the  Moral  Law,  little 
needs  to  be  said  here.  It  is  evident  that,  upon  whatever 
foundation  the  Law  of  Nations  rests,  its  authority  is  subordi- 
nate to  that  of  the  Will  of  God.  When,  therefore,  we  say 
that  amongst  civilized  states,  when  an  island  is  discovered  by 
one  state,  other  states  are  bound  to  refrain,  it  is  not  identical 
with  saying  that  the  discoverer  is  at  liberty  to  keep  posses- 
sion by  whatever  means.  The  mode  of  asserting  all  rights  is 
to  be  regulated  in  subordination  to  the  Moral  Law.  Dupli- 
city, and  fraud,  and  violence,  and  bloodshed,  may  perhaps 
sometimes  be  the  only  means  of  availing  ourselves  of  the 
rights  which  the  Law  of  Nations  grants :  but  it  were  a  con- 


CHAP.  IV.]         THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS.  99 

fused  species  of  morality  which  should  allow  the  commission 
of  all  this,  because  it  is  consistent  with  the  Law  of  Nations. 

A  kindred  remark  applies  to  the  obligation  of  treaties. 
Treaties  do  not  oblige  us  to  do  what  is  morally  wrong.  A 
treaty  is  a  string  of  engagements  ;  but  those  engagements  are 
no  more  exempt  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Moral  Law,  than 
the  promise  of  a  man  to  assassinate  another.  Does  such  a 
promise  morally  bind  the  ruffian  ?  No :  and  for  this  reason, 
and  for  no  other,  that  the  performance  is  unlawful.  And  so  it 
is  with  treaties.  Two  nations  enter  into  a  treaty  of  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance.  Subsequently  one  of  them  engages 
in  an  unjust  and  profligate  war.  Does  the  treaty  morally 
bind  the  other  nation  to  abet  the  profligacy  and  injustice  ? 
No :  if  it  did,  any  man  might  make  any  action  lawful  to  him- 
self by  previously  engaging  to  do  it.  No  doubt  such  a  nation 
and  such  a  ruffian  have  done  wrong ;  but  their  offence  con- 
sisted in  making  the  engagement,  not  in  breaking  it.  Even 
if  ordinary  wars  were  defensible,  treaties  of  offensive  alliance 
that  are  unconditional  with  respect  to  time  or  objects,  can 
never  be  justified.  The  state,  however,  which,  in  the  pursuit 
of  a  temporary  policy,  has  been  weak  enough,  or  vicious 
enough  to  make  them,  should  not  hesitate  to  refuse  fulfilment, 
when  the  act  of  fulfilment  is  incompatible  with  the  Moral 
Law.  Such  a  state  should  decline  to  perform  the  treaty,  and 
retire  with  shame — with  shame,  not  that  it  has  violated  its 
engagements,  but  that  it  was  ever  so  vicious  as  to  make  them. 


SECTION  II  ^ 

THE  LAW  OF  HONOUR. 

Authority  of  the  Law  of  Honour — Its  character. 

The  Law  of  Honour  consists  of  a  set  of  maxims,  written 
or  understood,  by  which  persons  of  a  certain  class  agree  to 
regulate,  or  are  expected  to  regulate,  their  conduct.  It  is 
evident  that  the  obligation  of  the  Law  of  Honour,  as  such, 
results  exclusively  from  the  agreement,  tacit  or  expressed,  of 
the  parties  concerned.  It  binds  them  because  they  have  agreed 
to  be  bound,  and  for  no  other  reason.  He  who  does  not 
choose  to  be  ranked  amongst  the  subjects  of  the  Law  of  Hon- 
our, is  under  no  obligation  to  obey  its  rules.     These  rules 


100  THE    LAW    OF    HONOUR.  [eSSAY  I. 

are  precisely  upon  the  same  footing  as  the  laws  of  free-ma- 
sonry, or  the  regulations  of  a  reading-room.  He  who  does 
not  choose  to  subscribe  to  the  room,  or  to  promise  conformity 
to  masonic  laws,  is  under  no  obligation  to  regard  the  rules  of 
either. 

For  which  reason,  it  is  very  remarkable  that  at  the  com- 
mencement of  his  Moral  Philosophy,  Dr.  Paley  says,  The 
rules  of  life  "  are,  the  Law  of  Honour,  the  Law  of  the  Land, 
and  the  Scriptures."  It  were  strange  indeed,  if  that  were  a 
rule  of  life  which  every  man  is  at  liberty  to  disregard  if  he 
pleases  ;  and  which,  in  point  of  fact,  nine  persons  out  of  ten 
do  disregard  without  blame.  Who  would  think  of  taxing  the 
writer  of  these  pages  with  violating  a  "  rule  of  life,"  because 
he  pays  no  attention  to  the  Law  of  Honour  ?  *'  The  Scrip- 
tures" communicate  the  Will  of  God  ;  "  the  Law  of  the  Land" 
is  enforced  by  that  Will ;  but  where  is  the  sanction  of  the 
Law  of  Honour  ? — It  is  so  much  the  more  remarkable  that 
this  law  should  have  been  thus  formally  proposed  as  a  rule 
of  life,  because,  in  the  same  work,  it  is  described  as  "  unau- 
thorized." How  can  a  set  of  unauthorized  maxims  compose 
a  rule  of  life  ?  But  further :  the  author  says  that  the  Law  of 
Honour  is  a  "  capricious  rule,  which  abhors  deceit,  yet  ap- 
plauds the  address  of  a  successful  intrigue" — And  further 
still :  "  it  allows  of  fornication,  adultery,  drunkenness,  prodi- 
gality, duelling,  and  of  revenge  in  the  extreme."  Surely 
then  it  cannot,  with  any  propriety  of  language,  be  called  a 
rule  of  life. 

Placing,  then,  the  obligation  of  the  Law  of  Honour,  as 
such,  upon  that  which  appears  to  be  its  proper  basis — ^the 
duty  to  perform  our  lawful  engagements — it  may  be  concluded, 
that  when  a  man  goes  to  a  gaming-house  or  a  race-course, 
and  loses  his  money  by  betting  or  playing,  he  is  morally 
bound  to  pay :  not  because  morality  adjusts  the  rules  of  the 
billiard  room  or  the  turf,  not  because  the  Law  of  the  Land 
sanctions  the  stake,  but  because  the  party  previously  promised 
to  pay  it.  Nor  would  it  affect  this  obligation,  to  allege  that 
the  stake  was  itself  both  illegal  and  immoral.  So  it  was ; 
but  the  payment  is  not.  The  payment  of  such  a  debt  involves 
no  breach  of  the  Moral  Law.  The  guilt  consists  not  in  pay- 
ing the  money,  but  in  staking  it.  Nevertheless,  there  may 
be  prior  claims  upon  a  man's  property  which  he  ought  first  to 
pay.  Such  are  those  of  lawful  creditors.  The  practice  of* 
paying  debts  of  honour  with  promptitude,  and  of  delaying  the 
payment  of  other  debts,  argues  confusion  or  depravity  of  prin- 
ciple.    It  is  not  honour,  in  any  virtuous  and  rational  sense 


iAP.  IV.]  THE    LAW    OF    HONOUR.  101 

tft  the  word,  which  induces  men  to  pay  debts  of  honour  in- 
stantly. Real  honour  would  induce  them  to  pay  their  lawfu 
debts  first :  and  indeed  it  may  be  suspected  that  the  motive 
to  the  prompt  payment  of  gaming  debts,  is  usually  no  other 
than  the  desire  to  preserve  a  fair  name  with  the  world.  In- 
tegTity  of  principle  has  often  so  little  to  do  with  it,  that  this 
principle  is  sacrificed  in  order  to  pay  them. 

With  respect  to  those  maxims  of  the  Law  of  Honour  which 
require  conduct  that  the  Moral  Law  forbids,  it  is  quite  mani- 
fest that  they  are  utterly  indefensible.  "  If  unauthorized  laws 
of  honour  be  allowed  to  create  exceptions  to  divine  prohibi- 
tions, there  is  an  end  of  all  morality  as  founded  in  the  Will 
of  the  Deity,  and  the  obligation  of  every  duty  may  at  one 
time  or  other  be  discharged."*  These  observations  apply  to 
those  foolish  maxims  of  honour  which  relate  to  duelling. 
These  maxims  can  never  justify  the  individual  in  disregarding 
the  obligations  of  morality.  He  who  acts  upon  them  acts 
ty2cA:e£?/y;  unless  indeed  he  be  so  little  informed  of  the  requisi- 
tions of  morality,  that  he  does  not,  upon  this  subject,  perceive 
the  distinction  between  right  and  wrong.  The  man  of  honour 
therefore  should  pay  a  gambling  debt,  but  he  should  not  send 
a  challenge  or  accept  it.  The  one  is  permitted  by  the  Moral 
Law,  the  other  is  forbidden. 

Whatever  advantages  may  result  from  the  Law  of  Honour, 
it  is,  as  a  system,  both  contemptible  and  bad.  Even  its  ad- 
vantages are  of  an  ambiguous  kind  ;  for  although  it  may  prompt 
to  rectitude  of  conduct,  that  conduct  is  not  founded  upon 
rectitude  of  principle.  The  motive  is  not  so  good  as  the  act. 
And  as  to  many  of  its  particular  rules,  both  positive  and  ne- 
gative, they  are  the  proper  subject  of  reprobation  and  abhor- 
rence. We  ought  to  reprobate  and  abhor  a  system  which 
enjoins  the  ferocious  practice  of  challenges  and  duels,  and 
which  allows  many  of  the  most  flagitious  and  degrading  vices 
that  infest  the  world. 

The  practical  effects  of  the  Law  of  Honour  are  probably 
greater  and  worse  than  we  are  accustomed  to  suppose.  Men 
learn  by  the  power  of  association,  to  imagine  that  that  is  law- 
ful which  their  maxims  of  conduct  do  not  condemn.  A  set 
of  rules  which  inculcates  some  actions  that  are  right,  and  per- 
mits others  that  are  wrong,  practically  acts  as  a  sanction 
to  the  wrong.  The  code  which  attaches  disgrace  to 
falsehood,  but  none  to  drunkenness  or  adultery,  operates 
as  a  sanction  to  drunkenness  and  adultery.     Does  not  ex- 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  iii.  c.  9. 
9* 


10!S  THE    LAW    OF    HONOUR.  [eSSAY  I. 

perience  verify  these  conclusions  of  reason  ?  Is  it  not  true 
that  men  and  women  of  honour  indulge,  with  the  less  hesita- 
tion, in  some  vices,  in  consequence  of  the  tacit  permission  of 
the  Law  of  Honour  ?  What  then  is  to  be  done  but  to  repro- 
bate the  system  as  a  whole  ?  In  this  reprobation  the  man  of 
sense  may  unite  with  the  man  of  virtue ;  for  assuredly  the 
system  is  contemptible  in  the  view  of  intellect,  as  well  as 
hateful  in  the  view  of  purity. 


ESSAY  II 


PRIVATE  EIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS. 

The  dhrfewn  whicli  has  tsommonly  "been  made  of  the  private  obligations 
"of  man,  into  those  which  respect  himself,  his  neighbour,  and  his  Creator, 
does  not  appear  to  be  attended  with  any  considerable  advantages.  These 
several  obligations  are  indeed  so  involved  the  one  with  the  other,  that 
there  are  few  personal  duties  which  are  not  also  in  some  degree  relative, 
and  there  are  no  duties,  either  relative  or  personal,  which  may  not  be  re- 
garded as  duties  to  God.  The  suicide's  or  the  drunkard's  vice  injures  his 
family  or  his  friends :  for  every  offence  against  morality  is  an  injury  to 
ourselves,  and  a  violation  of  the  duties  which  we  owe  to  Him  whose  law 
is  the  foundaticm  of  morality.  Neglecting,  therefore,  these  miauter  dis- 
tinctions, we  observe  those  only  which  separate  the  Private  firGm  the  Po- 
litical Ob%ati«as  «f  Mankind. 


CHAPTER  L 


RELIGIOUS   OBLIGATIONS, 

Factitious  semblances  of  devotion — Religious  cwtversation — Sabbatical 
institutions — Non-sanctity  of  days — ^^Of  temporal  employments :  Trav- 
€llmg:  Stage-coaches:  **  Sunday  papers :"  Amusements — Holydays — 
Ceremonial  institutions  and  devotional  formularies — Utility  of  forms — 
Forms  of  prayer — Extempore  prayer — Scepticism — Motives  to  Scepti- 


Of  the  two  classes  of  Religious  Obligations — ^that  which 
respects  the  exercise  of  piety  towards  God,  and  that  which 
respects  visible  testimonials  of  our  reverence  and  devotion, 
the  business  of  a  work  like  this  is  principally  with  the  latter. 
Yet  at  the  risk  of  being  charged  with  deviating  from  this 
proper  business,  I  would  adventure  a  few  paragraphs  respect- 
ing devotion  of  mind. 

That  the  worship  of  our  Father  who  is  in  heaven  consists, 
not  in  assembling  with  others  at  an  appointed  place  and  hour  ; 
not  in  joining  in  the  rituals  of  a  Christian  church,  or  in  per- 
forming ceremonies,  or  in  participating  of  sacraments,*  all 
men  will  agree ;  because  all  men  know  that  these  things  may 

*  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  this  word,  of  wbich  the  origin  is  so  excep- 
tionable, should  be  used  to  designate  what  are  regarded  as  solemn  acts 
of  religioo. 


104  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  [eSSAT  U. 

be  done  whilst  the  mind  is  wholly  intent  upon  other  affairs, 
and  even  without  any  belief  in  the  existence  of  God.  "  Two 
attendances  upon  public  worship  is  a  form  complied  with  by 
thousands  who  never  kept  a  Sabbath  in  their  lives."*  Devo- 
tion, it  is  evident,  is  an  operation  of  the  mind ;  the  sincere 
aspiration  of  a  dependent  and  grateful  being  to  Him  who  has 
all  power  both  in  heaven  and  in  earth  :  and  as  the  exercise  of 
devotion  is  not  necessarily  dependent  upon  external  circum- 
stances, it  may  be  maintained  in  solitude  or  in  society,  in  the 
place  appropriated  to  Avorship  or  in  the  field,  in  the  hour  of 
business  or  of  quietude  and  rest.  Even  under  a  less  spirit- 
ual dispensation  of  old,  a  good  man  "  worshipped,  leaning 
upon  the  top  of  his  staff." 

Now  it  is  to  be  feared  that  some  persons,  who  acknowledge 
that  devotion  is  a  mental  exercise,  impose  upon  themselves 
some  feelings  as  devotional  which  are  wholly  foreign  to  the 
worship  of  God.  There  is  a  sort  of  spurious  devotion — feel- 
ings, having  the  resemblance  of  worship,  but  not  possessing 
its  nature,  and  not  producing  its  effects.  "  Devotion,"  says 
Blair,  "is  a  powerful  principle,  which  penetrates  the  soul, 
which  purifies  the  affections  from  debasing  attachments,  and 
by  a  fixed  and  steady  regard  to  God,  subdues  every  sinful 
passion,  and  forms  the  inclinations  to  piety  and  virtue. 'f  To 
purify  the  affections  and  subdue  the  passions,  is  a  serious 
operation  :  it  implies  a  sacrifice  of  inclination ;  a  subjugation 
of  the  will.  This  mental  operation  many  persons  are  not 
willing  to  undergo :  and  it  is  not  therefore  wonderful  that 
some  persons  are  willing  to  satisfy  themselves  with  the  ex- 
ercise of  a  species  of  devotion  that  shall  be  attained  at  less 
cost. 

A  person  goes  to  an  oratorio  of  sacred  music.  The  ma- 
jestic flow  of  harmony,  the  exalted  subjects  of  the  hymns  or 
anthems,  the  full  and  rapt  assembly,  excite,  and  warm,  and 
agitate  his  mind  ;  sympathy  becomes  powerful ;  he  feels  the 
stirring  of  unwonted  emotions ;  weeps,  perhaps,  or  exults ; 
and  when  he  leaves  the  assembly,  persuades  himself  that  he 
has  Deen  worshipping  and  glorifying  God. 

There  are  some  preachers  with  whom  it  appears  to  be  an 
object  of  much  solicitude,  to  excite  the  hearer  to  a  warm  and 
impassioned  state  of  feeling.  By  ardent  declamation  or  pas- 
sionate displays  of  the  hopes  and  terrors  of  religion,  they 
arouse  and  alarm  his  imagination.  The  hearer,  who  desires 
perhaps  to  experience  the  ardours  of  religion,  cultivates  the 

*  Cowper's  Letters.  t  Sermons,  No.  10. 


CHAP.  I.}  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  105 

glowing  sensations,  abandons  his  mind  to  the  impulse  of  feel- 
ing, and  at  length  goes  home  in  complacency  with  his  reli- 
gious sensibility,  and  glads  himself  with  having  felt  the  fer- 
vours of  devotion. 

Kindred  illusion  may  be  the  result  of  calmer  causes.  The 
lofty  and  silent  aisle  of  an  ancient  cathedral,  the  venerable 
ruins  of  some  once  honoured  abbey,  the  boundless  expanse 
of  the  heaven  of  stars,  the  calm  immensity  of  the  still  ocean, 
or  the  majesty  and  terror  of  a  tempest,  sometimes  suffuses 
the  mind  with  a  sort  of  reverence  and  awe  ;  a  sort  of  "philo- 
sophic transport-,"  which  a  person  would  willingly  hope  is 
devotion  of  the  heart. 

It  might  be  sufficient  to  assure  us  of  the  spuriousness  of 
these  semblances  of  religious  feeling,  to  consider  that  emo- 
tions very  similar  in  their  nature  are  often  excited  by  subjects 
which  have  no  connection  with  religion.  I  know  not  whe- 
ther the  affecting  scenes  of  the  drama  and  of  fictitious  story, 
want  much  but  association  with  ideas  of  religion  to  make  them 
as  devotional  as  those  which  have  been  noticed  :  and  if,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  feelings  of  him  who  attends  an  oratorio 
were  excited  by  a  military  band,  he  would  think  not  of  the 
Deity  or  of  heaven,  but  of  armies  and  conquests.  Nor 
should  it  be  forgotten,  that  persons  who  have  habitually  little 
pretension  to  religion,  are  perhaps  as  capable  of  this  fac- 
titious devotion  as  those  in  whom  religion  is  constantly  influ- 
ential ;  and  surely  it  is  not  to  be  imagined,  that  those  who 
rarely  direct  reverend  thoughts  to  their  Creator,  can  suddenly 
adore  Him  for  an  hour  and  then  forget  him  again,  until  some 
new  excitement  again  arouses  their  raptures,  to  be  again  for- 
gotten. 

To  religious  feelings  as  to  other  things,  the  truth  applies — ■ 
"  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them."  If  these  feelings  do 
not  tend  to  "purify  the  affections  from  debasing  attach- 
ments ;"  if  they  do  not  tend  to  "  form  the  inclinations  to  piety 
and  virtue,"  they  certainly  are  not  devotional.  Upon  him 
whose  mind  is  really  prostrated  in  the  presence  of  his  God, 
the  legitimate  effect  is,  that  he  should  be  impressed  with  a 
more  sensible  consciousness  of  the  Divine  presence  ;  that  he 
should  deviate  with  less  facility  from  the  path  of  duty ;  that 
his  desires  and  thoughts  should  be  reduced  to  Christian  sub- 
jugation ;  that  he  should  feel  an  influential  addition  to  his 
dispositions  to  goodness  ;  and  that  his  affections  should  be 
expanded  towards  his  fellow  men.  He  who  rises  from  the 
sensibilities  of  seeming  devotion,  and  finds,  that  effects  such 
as  these  are  not  produced  in  his  mind,  may  rest  assured  that, 


106  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  [eSSAY  II. 

in  whatever  he  has  been  employed,  it  has  not  been  in  the 
pure  worship  of  that  God  who  is  a  spirit.  To  the  real  pros- 
tration of  the  soul  in  the  Divine  presence,  it  is  necessary  that 
the  mind  should  be  still : — "  Be  still  and  know  that  I  am 
God."  Such  devotion  is  sufficient  for  the  whole  mind;  it 
needs  not — perhaps  in  its  purest  state  it  admits  not— the  in- 
trusion of  external  things.  And  when  the  soul  is  thus  per* 
mitted  to  enter  as  it  were  into  the  sanctuary  of  God ;  when 
it  is  humble  in  his  presence  ;  when  all  its  desires  are  involved 
in  the  one  desire  of  devotedness  to  him  ;  then  is  the  hour  of 
acceptable  worship — then  the  petition  of  the  soul  is  prayer — 
then  is  its  gratitude  thanksgiving — then  is  its  oblation  praise. 
That  such  devotion,  when  such  is  attainable,  will  have  a 
powerful  tendency  to  produce  obedience  to  the  Moral  Law, 
may  justly  be  expected  :  and  here  indeed  is  the  true  connex- 
ion of  the  subject  of  these  remarks  with  the  general  object 
of  the  present  essays.  Without  real  and  efficient  piety  of 
mind,  we  are  not  to  expect  a  consistent  observance  of  the 
Moral  Law.  That  law  requires,  sometimes,  sacrifices  of  in- 
clination and  of  interest,  and  a  general  subjugation  of  the 
passions,  which  religion,  and  religion  only,  can  capacitate  and 
induce  us  to  make.  I  recommend  not  enthusiasm  or  fanaticism, 
but  that  sincere  and  reverent  application  of  the  soul  to  its 
Creator,  which  alone  is  likely  to  give  either  distinctness  to 
our  perceptions  of  his  will,  or  efficiency  to  our  motives  to 
fulfil  it.  

A  few  sentences  will  be  indulged  to  me  here  respecting 
Religious  Conversation.  I  believe  both  that  the  proposition 
is  true,  and  that  it  is  expedient  to  set  it  down — that  religious 
conversation  is  one  of  the  banes  of  the  religious  world. 
There  are  many  who  are  really  attached  to  religion,  and  who 
sometimes  feel  its  power,  but  who  allow  their  better  feelings 
to  evaporate  in  an  ebullition  of  words.  They  forget  how 
much  religion  is  an  affiiir  of  the  mind  and  how  little  of  the 
tongue :  they  forget  how  possible  it  is  to  live  under  its  power 
without  talking  of  it  to  their  friends ;  and  some,  it  is  to  be 
feared,  may  forget  how  possible  it  is  to  talk  without  feeling 
its  influence.  Not  that  the  good  man's  piety  is  to  live  in  his 
breast  like  an  anchorite  in  his  cell.  The  evil  does  not  con- 
sist in  speaking  of  religion,  but  in  speaking  too  much  ;  not 
in  manifesting  our  allegiance  to  God  ;  not  in  encouraging  by 
exhortation,  and  amending  by  our  advice  ;  not  in  placing  the 
light  upon  a  candlestick — but  in  making  religion  a  common 
topic  of  discourse.     Of  all  species  of  well  intended  religious 


CHAP.  I.]  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  107 

cDnversalion,  that  perhaps  is  the  most  exceptionable  which 
consists  in  narrating  our  own  religious  feelings.  Many  thus  in- 
trude upon  that  religious  quietude  which  is  peculiarly  favour- 
able to  the  Christian  character.  The  habit  of  communicating 
"  experiences"  I  believe  to  be  very  prejudicial  to  the  mind.  It 
may  sometimes  be  right  to  do  this :  in  the  great  majority  of 
instances  I  believe  it  is  not  beneficial,  and  not  right.  Men 
thus  dissipate  religious  impressions,  and  therefore  diminish 
their  effects.  Such  observation  as  I  have  been  enabled  to 
make,  has  sufficed  to  convince  me  that,  where  the  religious 
character  is  solid,  there  is  but  little  religious  talk  ;  and 
that,  where  there  is  much  talk,  the  religious  character  is 
superficial,  and,  like  other  superficial  things,  is  easily  de- 
stroyed. And  if  these  be  the  attendants,  and  in  part  the 
consequences  of  general  religious  conversation,  how  pecu- 
liarly dangerous  must  that  conversation  be,  which  exposes 
those  impressions  that  perhaps  were  designed  exclusively  for 
ourselves,  and  the  use  of  which  maybe  frustrated  by  communi- 
cating them  to  others.  Our  solicitude  should  be  directed  to 
the  invigoration  of  the  religious  character  in  our  own  minds  ; 
and  we  should  be  anxious  that  the  plant  of  piety,  if  it  had 
fewer  branches  might  have  a  deeper  root. 

SABBATICAL  INSTITUTIONS. 

"  Not  forsaking  the  assembling  of  ourselves  together,  as 
the  manner  of  some  is."*  The  divinely  authorized  institu- 
tion of  Moses  respecting  a  weekly  Sabbath,  and  the  practice 
of  the  first  teachers  of  Christianity,  constitute  a  sufficient  re- 
commendation to  set  apart  certain  times  for  the  exercise  of 
public  worship,  even  were  there  no  injunctions  such  as  that 
which  is  placed  at  the  head  of  this  paragraph.  It  is,  besides, 
manifestly  proper,  that  beings  who  are  dependent  upon  God 
for  all  things,  and  especially  for  their  hopes  of  immortality, 
should  devote  a  portion  of  their  time  to  the  expression  of 
their  gi'atitude,  and  submission,  and  reverence.  Community 
of  dependence  and  of  hope  dictates  the  propriety  of  united 
worship ;  and  worship  to  be  united,  must  be  performed  at 
times  previously  fixed. 

From  the  duty  of  observing  the  Hebrew  Sabbath,  we  are  suf- 
ficiently exempted  by  the  fact,  that  it  was  actually  not  observed 
by  the  apostles  of  Christ.  The  early  Christians  met,  not  on 
the  last  day  of  the  week,  but  on  the  first.  Whatever  reason 
may  be  assigned  as  a  motive  for  this  rejection  of  the  ancient 

*  Heb.  X.  5. 


108  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  [ESSAT  II, 

Sabbath,  I  think  it  will  tend  to  discountenance  the  observance 
of  any  day,  as  such :  for  if  that  day  did  not  possess  perpetual 
sanctity,  what  day  does  possess  it  1 

And  with  respect  to  the  general  tenor  of  the  Christian 
Scriptures  as  to  the  sanctity  of  particular  days,  it  is  I  think 
manifestly  adverse  to  the  opinion  that  one  day  is  obligatory, 
rather  than  another.  "  Let  no  man  therefore  judge  you  in 
meat,  or  in  drink,  or  in  respect  of  an  holyday,  or  of  the  new- 
moon  or  of  the  Sabbath-days  ;  which  are  a  shadow  of  things 
to  come  ;  but  the  body  is  of  Christ."*  Although  this  "  Sab- 
bath-day" was  that  of  the  Jews,  yet  the  passage  indicates  the 
writer's  sentiments,  generally,  respecting  the  sanctity  of  spe- 
cific days :  he  classes  them  with  matters  which  all  agree  to 
be  unimportant ; — with  meats,  and  drinks,  and  new-moons  ; 
and  pronounces  them  to  be  alike  ^^  shadows ^  That  strong 
passage  addressed  to  the  Christians  of  Galatia  is  of  the  same 
import :  "  How  turn  ye  again  to  the  weak  and  beggarly  ele- 
ments whereunto  ye  desire  again  to  be  in  bondage  ?  Ye  ob- 
serve days,  and  months,  and  times,  and  years.  I  am  afraid 
of  you,  lest  I  have  bestowed  upon  you  labour  in  vain."t  That 
which,  in  writing  to  the  Christians  of  Colosse,  the  apostle 
called  "  shadows,"  he  now,  in  writing  to  those  of  Galatia,  calls 
"  beggarly  elements."  The  obvious  tendency  is  to  discredit 
the  observance  of  particular  times  ;  and  if  he  designed  to  ex^ 
cept  the  first  day  of  the  week,  it  is  not  probable  that  he  would 
have  failed  to  except  it. 

Nevertheless,  the  question  whether  we  are  obliged  to  ob- 
serve the  first  day  of  the  week  because  it  is  the  first,  is  one 
point — whether  we  ought  to  devote  it  to  religious  exercises, 
seeing  that  it  is  actually  set  apart  for  the  purpose,  is  another. 
The  early  Christians  met  on  that  day,  and  their  example  has 
been  followed  in  succeeding  times ;  but  if  for  any  si^cient 
reason,  (and  such  reasons,  however  unlikely  to  arise,  are  yet 
conceivable,)  the  Christian  world  should  fix  upon  another 
day  of  the  week  instead  of  the  first,  I  perceive  no  grounds 
upon  which  the  arrangement  could  be  objected  to.  As  there 
is  no  sanctity  in  any  day,  and  no  obligation  to  appropriate 
one  day  rather  than  another,  that  which  is  actually  fixed  upon 
is  the  best  and  the  right  one.  Bearing  in  mind,  then,  that  it 
is  right  to  devote  some  portion  of  our  time  to  religious  exer- 
cises, and  that  no  objection  exists  to  the  day  which  is  actually 
appropriated,  the  duty  seems  very  obvious — so  to  employ  it. 

Cessation  from  labour  on  the  first  day  of  the  week,  is  no- 

*  Col.  ii.  16,  17.     In  Rom.  xiv.  5,  6,  there  is  a  parallel  passage, 
t  Gal  iv.  10,  11. 


CHAP.  I.]  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  109 

■where  enjoined  in  the  Christian  Scriptures.  Upon  this  sub- 
ject, the  principles  on  which  a  person  should  regulate  his 
conduct  appear  to  be  these  :  He  should  reflect  that  the  whole 
of  the  day  is  not  too  large  a  portion  of  our  time  to  devote  to 
public  worship,  to  religious  recollectedness,  and  sedateness 
of  mind ;  and  therefore  that  occupations  which  would  inter- 
fere with  this  sedateness  and  recollectedness,  or  with  public 
worship,  ought  to  be  forebome.  Even  if  he  supposed  that 
the  devoting  of  the  whole  of  the  day  was  not  necessary  for 
himself,  he  should  reflect,  that  since  a  considerable  part  of 
mankind  are  obliged,  from  various  causes,  to  attend  to  matters 
unconnected  with  religion  during  a  part  of  the  day,  and  that 
one  set  attends  to  them  during  one  part  and  another  during 
another — the  whole  of  the  day  is  necessary  for  the  commu- 
nity, even  though  it  were  not  for  each  individual :  and  if 
eveiy  individual  should  attend  to  his  ordinary  affairs  during 
that  portion  of  the  day  which  he  deemed  superabundant,  the 
consequence  might  soon  be  that  the  day  would  not  be  devoted 
to  religion  at  all. 

These  views  will  enable  the  reader  to  judge  in  what  man- 
ner we  should  decide  questions  respecting  attention  to  tem- 
poral affairs  on  particular  occasions.  The  day  is  not  sacred, 
therefore  business  is  not  necessarily  sinful ;  the  day  ought  to 
be  devoted  to  religion,  therefore  other  concerns  which  are  not 
necessary  are  generally,  wrong.  The  remonstrance,  "  Which 
of  you  shall  have  an  ass  or  an  ox  fallen  into  a  pit,  and  will 
not  straightway  pull  him  out  on  the  Sabbath-day  ?"  sufficiently 
indicates  that,  when  reasonable  calls  are  made  upon  us,  we 
are  at  liberty  to  attend  to  them.  Of  the  reasonableness  of 
these  calls  every  maij  must  endeavour  to  judge  for  himself. 
A  tradesman  ought,  as  a  general  rule,  to  refuse  to  buy  or  sell 
goods.  If  I  sold  clothing,  I  would  furnish  a  surtout  to  a  man 
who  was  suddenly  summoned  on  a  journey,  but  not  to  a  man 
who  could  call  the  next  morning.  Were  I  a  builder,  I  would 
prop  a  falling  w^all,  but  not  proceed  in  the  erection  of  a  house. 
Were  I  a  lawyer,  I  would  deliver  an  opinion  to  an  applicant 
to  whom  the  delay  of  a  day  would  be  a  serious  injury,  but 
not  to  save  him  the  expense  of  an  extra  night's  lodging  by 
waiting.  I  once  saw  with  pleasure  on  the  sign-board  of  a 
public-house  a  notice,  that  "  none  but  travellers  could  be  fur- 
nished with  liquor  on  a  Sunday."  The  medical  profession, 
and  those  who  sell  medicine,  are  differently  situated ;  yet  it 
is  not  to  be  doubted  that  both,  and  especially  the  latter,  might 
devote  a  smaller  portion  of  the  day  to  their  secular  employ- 
ments, if  earnestness  in  religious  concerns  were  as  great  as 

10 


110  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  [fiSSAY  11. 

the  opportunities  to  attend  to  them.  Some  physicians  in  ex- 
tensive practice,  attend  almost  as  regularly  on  public  worship 
as  any  of  their  neighbours.  Excursions  of  pleasure  on  this 
day  are  rarely  defensible  :  they  do  not  comport  with  the  pur- 
poses to  which  the  day  is  appropriated.  To  attempt  specific 
rules  upon  such  a  subject  were,  however,  vain.  Not  every 
thing  which  partakes  of  relaxation  is  unallowable.  A  walk 
in  the  country  may  be  proper  and  right,  when  a  party  to  a 
watering  place  would  be  improper  and  wrong.*  There  will 
be  little  difficulty  in  determining  what  it  is  allowable  to  do 
and  what  it  is  not,  if  the  enquiry  be  not,  how  much  secularity 
does  religion  allow?  but,  how  much  can  I,  without  a  neglect 
of  duty,  avoid  ? 

The  habit  which  obtains  with  many  persons  of  travelling 
on  this  day,  is  peculiarly  indefensible  ;  because  it  not  only 
keeps  the  traveller  from  his  church  or  meeting,  but  keeps 
away  his  servants,  or  the  postmen  on  the  road,  and  ostlers, 
and  cooks,  and  waiters.  All  these  may  be  detained,  from 
public  worship  by  one  man's  journey  of  fifty  miles.  Such  a 
man  incurs  some  responsibility.  The  plea  of  "  saving  time" 
is  not  remote  from  irreverence  ;  for  if  it  has  any  meaning  it 
is  this,  that  our  time  is  of  more  value  when  employed  in  busi- 
ness, than  when  employed  in  the  worship  of  God.  It  is  dis- 
creditable to  this  country  that  the  number  of  carriages  which 
traverse  it  on  this  day  is  so  great.  The  evil  may  rightly  and 
perhaps  easily  be  regulated  by  the  Legislature.  You  talk  of 
difficulties  : — ^you  would  have  talked  of  many  more,  if  it  were 
now,  for  the  first  time,  proposed  to  shut  up  the  General  Post- 
Office  one  day  in  seven.  We  should  have  heard  of  parents 
dying  before  their  children  could  hear  of  their  danger:  of 
bills  dishonoured  and  merchants  discredited  for  want  of  a 
post ;  and  of  a  multitude  of  other  inconveniences  which  busy 
anticipation  would  have  discovered.  Yet  the  General  Post- 
Office  is  shut ;  and  where  is  the  evil  ?  The  journeys  of  stage 
coaches  may  be  greatly  diminished  in  number ;  and  though 
twenty  difficulties  may  be  predicted,  none  would  happen  but 
such  as  were  easily  borne.  An  increase  of  the  duty  per  mile 
on  those  coaches  which  travelled  every  day,  might  perhaps 

*  The  scrupulousness  of  the  "  Puritans"  in  the  reign  of  Charles  I.,  and 
the  laxity  of  Laud,  whose  ordinances  enjoined  sports  after  the  hours  of 
public  worship,  were  both  really,  though  perhaps  not  equally,  improper. 
The  Puritans  attached  sanctity  to  the  day ;  and  Laud  did  not  consider, 
or  did  not  regard  the  consideration,  that  his  sports  would  not  only  discredit 
the  notion  of  sanctity,  but  preclude  that  recoUectedness  of  mind  which 
ought  to  be  maintained  throughout  the  whole  day. 


CHAP.  I.]  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  HI 

effect  the  object.  Probably  not  less  than  forty  persons  are 
employed  on  temporal  affairs,  in  consequence  of  an  ordinary 
stage  coach  journey  of  a  hundred  miles.* 

A  similar  regulation  would  be  desirable  with  respect  to 
"  Sunday  Papers."  The  ordinary  contents  of  a  newspaper 
are  little  accordant  with  religious  sobriety  and  abstraction  from 
the  world.  News  of  armies,  and  of  funds  and  markets,  of 
political  contests  and  party  animosities,  of  robberies  and  trials, 
of  sporting,  and  boxing,  and  the  stage ;  with  merriment,  and 
scandal,  and  advertisements— are  sufficiently  ill  adapted  to 
the  cultivation  of  religiousness  of  mind.  An  additional  two- 
pence on  the  stamp-duty  would  perhaps  remedy  the  evil. 

Private,  and  especially  public  amusements  on  this  day,  are 
clearly  wrong.  It  is  remarkable  that  they  appear  least  will- 
ing to  dispense  with  their  amusements  on  this  day,  who  pur- 
sue them  on  every  other :  and  the  observation  affords  one 
illustration  amongst  the  many  of  the  pitiable  effects  of  what 
is  called — though  it  is  only  called — a  life  of  pleasure. 

Upon  every  kind  and  mode  of  negligence  respecting  these 
religious  obligations,  the  question  is  not  simply,  whether  the 
individual  himself  sustains  moral  injury,  but  also  whether  he 
occasions  injury  to  those  around  him.  The  example  is  mis- 
chievous 1  Even  supposing  that  a  man  may  feel  devotion  in 
his  counting  house,  or  at  the  tavern,  or  over  a  pack  of  cards, 
his  neighbours  who  know  where  he  is,  or  his  family  who  see 
what  he  is  doing,  are  encouraged  to  follow  his  example,  with- 
out any  idea  of  carrying  their  religion  with  them.  "My 
neighbour  amuses  himself — ^my  father  attends  to  his  ledgers 
— and  why  may  not  I  ?" — So  that,  if  such  things  were  not 
intrinsically  unlawful,  they  would  be  wrong  because  they  are 
inexpedient.  Some  things  might  be  done  without  blame  by 
the  lone  tenant  of  a  wild^  which  involve  positive  guilt  in  a 
man  in  society. 

Holydays,  such  as  those  which  are  distinguished  by  the 
names  of  Christmas-day  and  Good-Friday,  possess  no  sanction 
from  Scripture :  they  are  of  human  institution.  If  any  re- 
ligious community  thinks  it  is  desirable  to  devote  more  than 
fifty-two  days  in  the  year  to  the  purposes  of  religion,  it  is  un- 
questionably right  that  they  should  devote  them ;  and  it  is 
amongst  the  good  institutions  of  several  Christian  communi- 
ties, that  they  do  weekly  appropriate  some  additional  hours 

*  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  to  the  numerous  class  of  coachmen, 
waiters,  &c.,  the  alteration  would  be  most  acceptable.  I  have  been  told 
\>y  an  intelUgent  coachman,  that  they  would  gladly  unite  in  a  request  to 
their  employers  if  it  were  likely  to  avail. 


113  RELIGIOUS   OBLIGATIONS.  [ESSAY  II. 

to  these  purposes.  The  observance  of  the  days  in  question 
is  however  of  another  kind :  here,  the  observance  refers  to 
the  day  as  such;  and  I  know  not  how  the  censure  can  be 
avoided  which  was  directed  to  those  Galatians  who  "  observed 
days,  and  months,  and  times,  and  years."  Whatever  may  be 
the  sentiments  of  enhghtened  men,  those  who  are  not  enUght- 
ened  are  Ukely  to  regard  such  days  as  sacred  in  themselves. 
This  is  turning  to  beggarly  elements  :  this  partakes  of  the 
character  of  superstition ;  and  superstition  of  every  kind  and 
in  every  degree,  is  incongruous  with  that  "  glorious  liberty" 
which  Christianity  describes,  and  to  which  it  would  conduct  us. 


CEREMONIAL  INSTITUTIONS  AND  DEVOTIONAL 
FORMULARIES. 

If  God  have  made  known  his  will  that  any  given  ceremony 
shall  be  performed  in  his  church,  that  expression  is  sufficient ; 
we  do  not  then  enquire  into  the  reasonableness  of  the  cere- 
mony, nor  into  its  utility.  There  is  nothing  in  the  act  of 
sprinkling  water  in  an  infant's  face,  or  of  immersing  the  person 
of  an  adult,  which  recommends  it  to  the  view  of  reason,  any 
more  than  twenty  other  acts  which  might  be  performed  :  yet,  if 
it  be  clear  that  such  an  act  is  required  by  the  Divine  Will,  all 
further  controversy  is  at  an  end.  It  is  not  the  business,  any 
more  than  it  is  the  desire,  of  the  writer  here  to  enquire 
whether  the  Deity  has  thus  expressed  his  will  respecting  any 
of  the  rites  which  are  adopted  in  some  Christian  churches ; 
yet  the  reader  should  carefully  bear  in  mind  what  it  is  that 
constitutes  the  obligation  of  a  rite  or  ceremony,  and  what 
does  not.  Setting  utility  aside,  the  obligation  must  be  con- 
stituted by  an  expression  of  the  Divine  Will ;  and  he  who  en- 
quires into  the  obligation  of  these  things,  should  reflect  that 
they  acquire  a  sort  of  adventitious  sanctity  from  the  power  of 
association.  Being  connected  from  early  life  with  his  ideas  of 
religion,  he  learns  to  attach  to  them  the  authority  which  he  at- 
taches to  religion  itself;  and  thus  perhaps  he  scarcely  knows,  be- 
cause he  does  not  enquire,  whether  a  given  institution  is  found- 
ed upon  the  law  of  God,  or  introduced  by  the  authority  of  men. 

Of  some  ceremonies  or  rites,  and  of  almost  all  formularies 
and  other  appendages  of  public  worship,  it  is  acknowledged 
that  they  possess  no  proper  sanction  from  the  Will  of  God. 
Supposing  the  written  expression  of  that  will  to  contain  no- 
thing by  which  we  can  judge  either  of  their  propriety  or  im- 
propriety, the  standard  to  which  they  are  to  be  referred  is 
that  of  fjtility  alone. 


CHAP.  I.]  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  113 

Now,  it  is  highly  probable  that  benefits  result  from  these 
adjuncts  of  religion,  because,  in  the  present  state  of  mankind, 
it  may  be  expected  that  some  persons  are  impressed  with 
useful  sentiments  respecting  religion  through  the  intervention 
of  these  adjuncts,  who  might  otherwise  scarcely  regard  religion 
at  all :  it  is  probable  that  many  are  induced  to  attend  upon 
public  worship  by  the  attraction  of  its  appendages,  who  would 
otherwise  stay  away.  Simply  to  be  present  at  the  font  or  the 
communion  table,  may  be  a  means  of  inducing  many  religious 
considerations  into  the  mind.  And  as  to  those  who  are  at- 
tracted to  public  worship  by  its  accompaniments,  they  may  at 
least  be  in  the  way  of  religious  benefit.  One  goes  to  hear  the 
singing,  and  one  the  organ,  and  one  to  see  the  paintings  or 
the  architecture  ;  a  still  larger  number  go  because  they  are 
sure  to  find  some  occupation  for  their  thoughts  ;  some  prayers 
or  other  offices  of  devotion,  something  to  hear,  and  see,  and 
do.  "  The  transitions  from  one  office  of  devotion  to  another, 
from  confession  to  prayer,  from  prayer  to  thanksgiving,  froiri 
thanksgiving  to  'hearing  of  the  word,'  are  contrived,  like 
scenes  in  the  drama,  to  supply  the  mind  with  a  succession 
of  diversified  engagements."*  These  diversified  engagements, 
I  say,  attract  some  who  would  not  otherwise  attend ;  and  it 
is  better  that  they  should  go  from  imperfect  motives  than  that 
they  should  not  go  at  all.  It  must,  however,  be  confessed, 
that  the  groundwork  of  this  species  of  utility  is  similar  to  that 
which  has  been  urged  in  favour  of  the  use  of  images  by  the 
Romish  Church.  "  Idols,"  say  they,  "  are  laymen's  books  ; 
and  a  great  means  to  stir  up  pious  thoughts  and  devotion  in  the 
learnedest."t  Indeed,  if  it  is  once  admitted  that  the  prospect 
of  advantage  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  introducing  objects  ad- 
dressed to  the  senses  into  the  public  offices  of  worship,  it  is 
not  easy  to  define  where  we  shall  stop.  If  we  may  have 
magnificent  architecture,  and  music,  and  chanting,  and  paint- 
ings ;  why  may  we  not  have  the  yet  more  imposing  pomp  of 
the  Catholic  worship  1  I  do  not  say  that  this  pomp  is  useful 
and  right,  but  that  the  principle  on  which  such  things  are  in- 
troduced into  the  worship  of  God  furnishes  no  satisfactory 
means  of  deciding  what  amount  of  external  observances  should 
be  introduced,  and  what  should  not.  If  figures  on  canvass 
are  lawful  because  they  are  useful,  why  is  not  a  figure  in  mar- 
ble or  in  wood  ?  Why  may  we  not  have  images  by  way  of 
lavmen's  books,  and  of  stirring  up  pious  thoughts  and  devotion  ? 

But  it  is  to  be  apprehended  of  such  things,  or  of  "  contri- 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  5,  c.  5. 
t  Miltou's  Prose  Works,  v.  4.  p.  266. 
10* 


il4  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  [eSSAY  II. 

vances  like  scenes  in  a  drama,"  that  they  have  much  less  ten- 
dency to  promote  devotion  than  some  men  may  suppose.  No 
doubt  they  may  possess  an  imposing  effect,  they  may  power- 
fully interest  and  affect  the  imagination ;  but  does  not  tliis 
partake  too  much  of  that  factitious  devotion  of  which  we 
speak  ?  Is  it  certain  that  such  things  have  much  tendency  to 
purify  the  mind,  and  raise  up  within  it  a  power  that  shall 
efficiently  resist  temptation  ? 

Even  if  some  benefits  do  result  from  the  employment  of 
these  appendages  of  w^orship,  they  are  not  without  their  dan- 
gers and  their  evils.  With  respect  to  those  which  are  ad- 
dressed to  the  senses,  whether  to  the  eye  or  ear,  there  is  ob- 
viously a  danger  that  like  other  sensible  objects  they  will 
withdraw  the  mind  from  its  proper  business — ^the  cultivation 
of  pure  religious  affections  towards  God.  And  respecting  the 
formularies  of  devotion,  it  has  been  said  by  a  writer,  whom 
none  will  suspect  of  overstating  their  evils,  "  The  arrogant 
man,  as  if  like  the  dervise  in  the  Persian  fable,  he  had  shot 
his  soul  into  the  character  he  assumes,  repeats,  with  complete 
self-application.  Lord,  I  am  not  high-minded :  the  trifler  says, 
/  hate  vain  thoughts :  the  irreligious.  Lord,  how  I  love  thy  law : 
he  who  seldom  prays  at  all,  confidently  repeats,  All  the  day 
long  I  am  occupied  in  thy  statutes*  These  are  not  light  con- 
siderations :  here  is  insincerity  and  untruths  ;  and  insincerity 
and  untruths,  it  should  be  remembered,  in  the  place  and  at 
the  time  when  we  profess  to  be  humbled  in  the  presence 
of  God.  The  evils  too  are  inseparable  from  the  system. 
Wherever  preconcerted  formularies  are  introduced,  there  will 
always  be  some  persons  who  join  in  the  use  of  them  without 
propriety,  or  sincerity  or  decorum.  Nor  are  the  evils  much 
extenuated  by  the  hope  which  has  been  suggested,  that  "  the 
holy  vehicle  of  their  hypocrisy  may  be  made  that  of  their 
conversion."  It  is  very  Christian-like  to  indulge  this  hope, 
though  I  fear  it  is  not  very  reasonable.  Hypocrisy  is  itself 
an  offence  against  God ;  and  it  can  scarcely  be  expected  that 
any  thing  so  immediately  connected  with  the  offence  will 
often  effect  such  an  end. 

It  is  not,  however,  in  the  case  of  those  who  use  these 
forms  in  a  manner  positively  hypocritical,  that  the  greatest 
evil  and  danger  consists :  "  There  is  a  kind  of  mechanical 
memory  in  the  tongue,  which  runs  over  the  form  without  any 
aid  of  the  understanding,  without  any  concurrence  of  the  will, 
without  any  consent  of  the  affections ;  for  do  we  not  some- 

*  More's  Moral  Sketches,  3d  Ed.  p.  429. 


CHAP.  I.]  RELIGIOirS    OBLIGATIONS.  115 

times  implore  God  to  hear  a  prayer  to  which  we  are  ourselves 
not  attending  ?"*  We  have  sufficient  reason  for  knowing  that 
to  draw  nigh  to  God  with  our  lips  whilst  our  hearts  are  far 
from  him,  is  a  serious  offence  in  his  sight ;  and  when  it  is 
considered  how  powerful  is  the  tendency  of  oft-repeated  words 
to  lose  their  practical  connexion  with  feelings  and  ideas,  it  is 
to  be  feared  that  tliis  class  of  evils,  resulting  from  the  use  of 
forms,  is  of  very  wide  extent.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten,  that 
as  even  religious  persons  sometimes  employ  "  the  form  with- 
out any  aid  of  the  understanding,"  so  others  are  in  danger  of 
substituting  the  form  for  the  reality,  and  of  imagining  that,  if 
they  are  exemplary  in  the  observance  of  the  externals  of  de- 
votion, the  work  of  religion  is  done. 

Such  circumstances  may  reasonably  make  us  hesitate  in 
deciding  the  question  of  the  propriety  of  these  external  things, 
as  a  question  of  expediency.  They  may  reasonably  make  us 
do  more  than  this ;  for  does  Christianity  allow  us  to  invent  a 
system,  of  which  some  of  the  consequences  are  so  bad,  for 
the  sake  of  a  beneficial  end  1 

Forms  of  prayer  have  been  supposed  to  rest  on  an  authority 
somewhat  more  definite  than  that  of  other  religious  forms. 
"  The  Lord's  Prayer  is  a  precedent,  as  well  as  a  pattern,  for 
forms  of  prayer.  Our  Lord  appears,  if  not  to  have  prescribed, 
at  least  to  have  authorized  the  use  of  fixed  forms,  when  he 
complied  with  the  request  of  the  disciple  who  said  unto  him, 
Lord,  teach  us  to  pray,  as  John  also  taught  his  disciples. "t 
If  we  turn  to  Matt,  vi.,  where  the  fullest  account  is  given  of 
the  subject,  we  are,  I  think,  presented  with  a  different  view. 
Our  Saviour,  who  had  been  instituting  his  more  perfect  laws 
in  place  of  the  doctrines  which  had  been  taught  of  old  time, 
proceeded  to  the  prevalent  mode  of  giving  alms,  of  prayings 
of  fasting,  and  of  laying  up  wealth.  He  first  describes  these 
modes,  and  then  directs  in  what  manner  Christians  ought  to 
give  alms,  and  pray  and  fast.  Now,  if  it  be  contended  that 
he  requires  us  to  employ  that  particular  form  of  prayer  which 
he  then  dictated,  it  must  also  be  contended  that  he  requires 
us  to  adopt  that  particular  mode  of  giving  money  which  he 
described,  and  those  particular  actions,  when  fasting,  which 
he  mentions.  If  we  are  obliged  to  use  the  form  of  prayer, 
we  are  obliged  to  give  money  in  secret ;  and  when  we  fast,  to 
put  oil  upon  our  heads.  If  these  particular  modes  were  not 
enjoined,  neither  is  the  form  of  prayer ;  and  the  Scriptures 
contain  no  indication  that  this  form  was  ever  used  at  all,  either 

*  More's  Moral  Sketches,  3d  Ed.  p.  327. 
t  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  p.  3.  b.  5.  c.  5. 


116  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  [eSSAY  II. 

by  the  apostles  or  their  converts.  But  if  the  argument  only 
asserts  that  fixed  forms  are  "  authorized"  by  the  language  of 
Christ,  the  question  becomes  a  question  merely  of  expediency. 
Supposing  that  they  are  authorized,  they  are  to  be  employed 
only  if  they  are  useful.  Even  in  this  view,  it  may  be  re- 
marked that  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose,  from  the  Christian 
Scriptures,  that  either  Christ  himself  or  his  apostles  ever 
used  a  fixed  form.  If  he  had  designed  to  authorize,  and 
therefore  to  recommend  their  adoption,  is  it  not  probable  that 
some  indications  of  their  having  been  employed  would  be 
presented?  But  instead  of  this,  we  find  that  every  prayer 
which  is  recorded  in  the  volume  was  delivered  extempore, 
upon  the  then  occasion,  and  arising  out  of  the  then  existing 
circumstances. 

Yet  after  all,  the  important  question  is  not  between  precon- 
certed and  extempore  prayer  as  such,  but  whether  any  prayer 
is  proper  and  right  but  that  which  is  elicited  by  the  influence 
of  the  Divine  power.  The  enquiry  into  this  solemn  subject 
would  lead  us  too  wide  from  our  general  business.  The 
truth,  however,  that  "  we  know  not  what  to  pray  for  as  we 
ought,"  is  as  truly  applicable  to  extempore  as  to  formal  prayer. 
Words  merely  do  not  constitute  prayer,  whether  they  be  pre- 
pared beforehand,  or  conceived  at  the  moment  they  are  ad- 
dressed. There  is  reason  to  believe  that  he  only  offers  per- 
fectly acceptable  supplications,  who  offers  them  "  according 
to  the  will  of  God,"  and  "  of  the  ability  which  God  giveth :" — 
and  if  such  be  indeed  the  truth,  it  is  scarcely  compatible 
either  with  a  prescribed  form  of  words,  or  with  extempore 
prayer  at  prescribed  times. — Yet  if  any  Christian,  in  the  piety 
of  his  heart,  believes  it  to  be  most  conducive  to  his  religious 
interests  to  pray  at  stated  times  or  in  fixed  forms,  far  be  it 
from  me-  to  censure  this  the  mode  of  his  devotion,  or  to  as- 
sume that  his  petition  will  not  obtain  access  to  the  Universal 
Lord. 

Finally,  respecting  uncommanded  ceremonials  and  rituals 
of  all  kinds,  and  respecting  all  the  appendages  of  public  wor- 
ship which  have  been  adopted  as  helps  to  devotion,  there  is 
one  truth  to  which  perhaps  every  good  man  will  assent — 
that  if  religion  possessed  its  sufficient  and  rightful  influence, 
if  devotion  of  the  heart  were  duly  maintained  without  these 
things,  they  would  no  longer  be  needed.  He  who  enjoys  the 
vigorous  exercise  of  his  limbs,  is  encumbered  by  the  employ- 
ment of  a  crutch.  Whether  the  Christian  world  is  yet  pre- 
pared for  the  relinquishment  of  these  appendages  and  "  helps'* 
— whether  an  equal  degree  of  efficacious  religion  would  be 


CHAP.  I.]  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  117 

maintained  without  them — are  questions  which  I  presume 
not  to  determine  :  but  it  may  nevertheless  be  decided,  that 
this  is  the  state  of  the  Christian  church  to  which  we  should 
direct  our  hopes  and  our  endeavours — and  that  Christianity 
will  never  possess  its  proper  influence,  and  will  not  effect  its 
destined  objects,  until  the  internal  dedication  of  the  heart  is 
universally  attained.  

To  those  who  may  sometimes  be  brought  into  contact  with 
persons  who  profess  scepticism  respecting  Christianity,  and 
especially  to  those  who  are  conscious  of  any  tendency  in 
their  own  minds  to  listen  to  the  objections  of  these  persons, 
it  may  be  useful  to  observe,  that  the  grounds  upon  which 
sceptics  build  their  disbelief  of  Christianity,  are  commonly 
very  slight.  The  number  is  comparatively  few  whose  opin- 
ions are  the  result  of  any  tolerable  degree  of  investigation. 
They  embraced  sceptical  notions  through  the  means  which 
they  now  take  of  diffusing  them  amongst  others — not  by  ar- 
guments but  jests  ;  not  by  objections  to  the  historical  evidence 
of  Christianity,  but  by  conceits  and  witticisms  ;  not  by  exam- 
ining the  nature  of  religion  as  it  was  delivered  by  its  Founder, 
but  by  exposing  the  conduct  of  those  who  profess  it.  Per- 
haps the  seeming  paradox  is  true,  that  no  men  are  so  credu- 
lous, that  no  men  accept  important  propositions  upon  such 
slender  evidence,  as  the  majority  of  those  #ho  reject  Chris- 
tianity. To  believe  that  the  religious  opinions  of  almost  all 
the  civilized  world  are  founded  upon  imposture,  is  to  believe 
an  important  proposition ;  a  proposition  which  no  man,  who 
properly  employs  his  faculties,  would  believe  without  consid- 
erable weight  of  evidence.  But  what  is  the  evidence  upon 
which  the  "  unfledged  witlings  who  essay  their  wanton  efforts" 
against  religion,  usually  found  their  notions  ?  Alas  !  they  are 
so  far  from  having  rejected  Christianity  upon  the  examination 
of  its  evidences  that  they  do  not  know  what  Christianity  is. 
To  disbelieve  the  religion  of  Christianity  upon  grounds  which 
shall  be  creditable  to  the  understanding,  involves  no  light 
task.  A  man  must  investigate  and  scrutinize ;  he  must  ex- 
amine the  credibility  of  testimony ;  he  must  weigh  and  com- 
pare evidence  ;  he  must  enquire  into  the  reality  of  historical 
facts.  If,  after  rationally  doing  all  this,  he  disbelieves  in 
Christianity — be  it  so.  I  think  him,  doubtless,  mistaken,  but 
I  do  not  think  him  puerile  and  credulous.  But  he  who  pro- 
fesses scepticism  without  any  of  this  species  of  enquiry,  is 
credulous  and  puerile  indeed  ;  and  such  most  sceptics  actually 
are.     "  Concerning  unbelievers  and  doubters  of  every  class, 


118  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  [ESSAY  II 

one  observation  may  almost  universally  be  made  with  truth, 
that  they  are  little  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  the  Christian 
religion,  and  still  less  with  the  evidence  by  which  it  is  sup- 
ported."* In  France,  scepticism  has  extended  itself  as  widely 
perhaps  as  in  any  country  in  the  world,  and  its  philosophers, 
forty  or  fifty  years  ago,  were  ranked  amongst  the  most  intelli- 
gent and  sagacious  of  mankind.  And  upon  what  grounds 
did  these  men  reject  Christianity  ?  Dr.  Priestley  went  with 
Lord  Shelburne  to  France,  and  he  says,  "  I  had  an  opportu- 
nity of  seeing  and  conversing  with  every  person  of  eminence 
wherever  we  came  :"  I  found  "  all  the  philosophical  persons 
to  whom  I  was  introduced  at  Paris,  unbelievers  in  Christian- 
ity, and  even  professed  atheists.  As  I  chose  on  all  occa- 
sions to  appear  as  a  Christian,  I  was  told  by  some  of  them 
that  I  was  the  only  person  they  had  ever  met  with,  of  whose 
understanding  they  had  any  opinion,  who  professed  to  believe 
in  Christianity.  But  on  interrogating  them  on  the  subject,  I 
soon  found  that  they  had  given  no  proper  attention  to  it,  and 
did  not  really  know  what  Christianity  was.  This  was  also 
the  case  with  a  great  part  of  the  company  that  I  saw  at  Lord 
Shelburne's."!  If  these  philosophical  men  rejected  Christi- 
anity in  such  contemptible  and  shameful  ignorance  of  its  na- 
ture and  evidences,  upon  what  grounds  are  we  to  suppose  the 
ordinary  striplings  of  infidelity  reject  it  1 

How  then  does  it  happen  that  those  who  affect  scepticism 
are  so  ambitious  to  make  their  scepticism  known  ?  Because 
it  is  a  short  and  easy  road  to  distinction ;  because  it  affords 
a  cheap  means  of  gratifying  vanity.  To  "  rise  above  vulgar 
prejudices  and  superstitions" — "to  entertain  enlarged  and 
liberal  opinions,"  a.re  phrases  of  great  attraction,  especially  to 
young  men ;  and  how  shall  they  show  that  they  rise  above 
vulgar  prejudices,  how  shall  they  so  easily  manifest  the  en- 
largement of  their  views,  as  by  rejecting  a  system  which  all 
their  neighbours  agree  to  be  true  ?  They  feel  important  to 
themselves,  and  that  they  are  objects  of  curiosity  to  others : 
and  they  are  objects  of  curiosity,  not  on  account  of  their  own 
qualities,  but  on  account  of  the  greatness  of  that  which  they 
contemn.  The  peasant  who  reviles  a  peasant,  may  revile 
him  without  an  auditor,  but  a  province  will  listen  to  him  who 
vilifies  a  king.  I  know  not  that  an  intelligent  person  should 
be  advised  to  reason  with  these  puny  assailants  :  their  notions 
and  their  conduct  are  not  the  result  of  reasoning.  What 
they  need  is  the  humiliation  of  vanity  and  the  exposure  of 

*  Gisborne's  Duties  of  Men.  t  Memoirs  of  Dr.  Priestley. 


CRAP.   II-I  RELIGIOUS    OBLIGATIONS.  119 

folly.  A  few  simple  interrogations  would  expose  their  folly ; 
and  for  the  purposes  of  humiliation,  simply  pass  them  by. 
The  sun  that  shines  upon  them,  makes  them  look  bright  and 
large.  Let  reason  and  truth  withdraw  their  rays,  and  these 
seeming  stars  will  quickly  set  in  silence  and  in  darkness. 

More  contemptible  motives  to  the  profession  of  infidelity 
cannot  perhaps  exist,  but  there  are  some  which  are  more  de- 
testable. Hartley  says  that  "  the  strictness  and  purity  of  the 
Christian  religion  in  respect  to  sexual  licentiousness,  is  pro- 
bably the  chief  thing  which  makes  vicious  men  first  fear  and 
hate,  and  then  vilify  and  oppose  it."* 

Whether  therefore  we  regard  the  motives  which  lead  to 
scepticism,  or  the  reasonableness  of  the  grounds  upon  which 
it  is  commonly  founded,  there  is  surely  much  reason  for  an 
ingenuous  young  person  to  hold  in  contempt  the  jests,  and 
pleasantries,  and  sophistries  respecting  revelation  with  which 
he  may  be  assailed. 


CHAPTER  n. 

PROPERTY. 


Foundation  of  the  Right  to  Property — Insolvency :  Perpetual  obligation 
to  pay  debts:  Reform  of  public  opinion  :  Examples  of  integrity — Wills, 
Legatees,  Heirs:  Informal  Wills:  Intestates — Charitable  Bequests — 
Minor's  debts — A  Wife's  debts — Bills  of  Exchange — Shipment — Dis- 
traints— Unjust  defendants — Extortion — Slaves — Privateers — Confisca- 
tions— Public  money — Insurance — Improvements  on  estates — Settle- 
ments— Houses  of  infamy — Literary  property — Rewards. 

Disquisitions  respecting  the  Origin  of  Property  appear  to 
be  of  little  use  ;  partly  because  the  origin  can  scarcely  be  de- 
termined, and  partly  because,  if  it  could  be  determined,  the 
discoveiy  would  be  little  applicable  to  the  present  condition 
of  human  affairs.  In  whatever  manner  an  estate  was  acquired 
two  thousand  years  ago,  it  is  of  no  consequence  in  enquiring 
who  ought  to  possess  it  now. 

The  foundation  of  the  Right  to  Property  is  a  more  impor- 
tant point.  Ordinarily,  the  foundation  is  the  law  of  the  land. 
Of  Civil  Government— which  institution  is  sanctioned  by  the 
divine  will — one  of  the  great  offices  is,  to  regulate  the  distri- 
bution of  property ;  to  give  it,  if  it  has  the  power  of  giving  ; 

*  Observations  on  Man. 


120  PROPERTY.  [essay  II, 

or  to  decide  between  opposing  claimants,  to  whom  it  shall  be 
assigned. 

The  proposition  therefore,  as  a  general  rule,  is  sound ; — 
He  possesses  a  right  to  property  to  whom  the  law  of  the  land  as- 
signs it.  This  however  is  only  a  general  rule.  It  has  been 
sufficiently  seen  that  some  legal  possessions  are  not  permitted 
by  the  Moral  Law.  The  occasional  opposition  between  the 
moral  and  the  legal  right  to  property,  is  inseparable  from  the 
principle  on  which  law  is  founded — ^that  of  acting  upon  gen- 
eral rules.  It  is  impossible  to  frame  any  rule,  the  application 
of  which  shall,  in  every  variety  of  circumstances,  effect  the 
requisitions  of  Christian  morality.  A  rule  which  in  nine 
cases  proves  equitable,  may  prove  utterly  unjust  in  the  tenth, 
A  rule  which  in  nine  cases  promotes  the  welfare  of  the  citi- 
zen, may  in  the  tenth  outrage  reason  and  humanity. 

It  is  evident  that  in  the  present  state  of  legal  institutions, 
the  evils  which  result  from  laws  respecting  property  must  be 
prevented,  if  they  are  prevented  at  all,  by  the  exercise  of 
virtue  in  individuals.  If  the  law  assigns  a  hundred  pounds 
tome,  which  every  upright  man  perceives  ought  in  equity  to 
have  been  assigned  to  another,  that  other  has  no  means  of  en- 
forcing his  claim.  Either  therefore  the  claim  of  equity  must 
be  disregarded,  or  I  must  voluntarily  satisfy  it. 

There  are  many  cases  connected  with  the  acquisition  or 
retention  of  property,  with  which  the  decisions  of  law  are 
not  immediately  connected,  but  respecting  which  it  is  needr 
ful  to  exercise  a  careful  discrimination,  in  order  to  con- 
form to  the  requisitions  of  Christian  rectitude.  The  whole 
subject  is  of  great  interest,  and  of  extensive  practical  appli- 
cation in  the  intercourse  of  life.  The  reader  will  therefore  be 
presented  with  several  miscellaneous  examples,  in  which  the 
Moral  Law  appears  to  require  greater  purity  of  rectitude 
than  is  required  by  statutes,  or  than  is  ordinarily  practised  by 
mankind. 

Insolvency. — Why  is  a  man  obliged  to  pay  his  debts  1  It 
is  to  be  hoped  that  the  morality  of  few  persons  is  lax  enough 
to  reply — Because  the  law  compels  him.  But  why,  then,  is 
he  obliged  to  pay  them  1  Because  the  Moral  Law  requires 
it.  That  this  is  the  primary  ground  of  the  obligation  is  evi- 
dent;  otherwise  the  payment  of  any  debt  which  a  vi- 
cious or  corrupt  legislature  resolved  to  cancel,  would  cease  to 
be  obligatory  upon  the  debtor.  The  Virginian  statute,  which 
we  noticed  in  the  last  Essay,  would  have  been  a  sufficient 
justification  to  the  planters  to  defraud  their  creditors. 

A  man  becomes  insolvent  and  is  made  a  bankrupt :  he  pays 


CHAP  11.]  PROPERTY.  121 

his  creditors  ten  sliillings  instead  of  twenty,  and  obtains  his 
certificate.  The  law,  therefore,  discharges  him  from  the  ob- 
ligation to  pay  more.  The  bankrupt  receives  a  large  legacy, 
or  he  engages  in  business  and  acquires  property.  Being  then 
able  to  pay  the  remainder  of  his  debts,  does  the  legal  dis- 
charge exempt  him  from  the  obligation  to  pay  them  ?  No  : 
and  for  this  reason  that  the  legal  discharge  is  not  a  moral 
discharge  ;  that  as  the  duty  to  pay  at  all  was  not  founded 
primarily  on  the  law,  the  law  cannot  warrant  him  in  with- 
holding a  part. 

It  is  however  said,  that  the  creditors  have  reHnquished 
their  right  to  the  remainder  by  signing  the  certificate.  But 
why  did  they  accept  half  their  demands  instead  of  the  whole  1 
Because  they  were  obliged  to  do  it ;  they  could  get  no  more. 
As  to  granting  the  certificate,  they  do  it  because  to  withhold 
it  would  be  only  an  act  of  gratuitous  unkindness.  It  would 
be  preposterous  to  say  that  creditors  relinquish  their  claims 
voluntarily ;  for  no  one  would  give  up  his  claim  to  twenty 
shillings  on  the  receipt  of  ten  if  he  could  get  the  other 
ten  by  refusing.  It  might  as  reasonably  be  said  that  a 
man  parts  with  a  limb  voluntarily,  because,  having  in- 
curably lacerated  it,  he  submits  to  an  amputation.  It  is 
to  be  remembered,  too,  that  the  necessary  relinquishment 
of  half  the  demand  is  occasioned  by  the  debtor  himself: 
and  it  seems  very  manifest  that  when  a  man,  by  his 
own  act,  deprives  another  of  his  property,  he  cannot  allege 
the  consequences  of  that  act  as  a  justification  of  withholding 
it  after  restoration  is  in  his  power. 

The  mode  in  which  an  insolvent  man  obtains  a  discharge, 
does  not  appear  to  afiect  his  subsequent  duties.  Composi- 
tions, and  bankruptcies,  and  discharges  by  an  insolvent  act 
are  in  this  respect  alike.  The  acceptance  of  a  part  instead  of 
the  whole  is  not  voluntary  in  either  case ;  and  neithfer  case 
exempts  the  debtor  from  the  obligation  to  pay  in  full  if  he  can. 

If  it  should  be  urged  that  when  a  person  intrusts  property  to 
another,  he  knowingly  undertakes  the  risk  of  that  other's  insol- 
vency, and  that,  if  the  contingent  loss  happens,  he  has  no 
claims  to  justice  on  the  other,  the  answer  is  this  ;  that  what- 
ever may  be  thought  of  these  claims,  they  are  not  the  grounds 
upon  which  the  debtor  is  obliged  to  pay.  The  debtor  always 
engages  to  pay,  and  the  engagement  is  enforced  by  morality  ; 
the  engagement  therefore  is  binding,  whatever  risk  another 
man  may  incur  by  relying  upon  it.  The  causes  which  have 
occasioned  a  person's  insolvency,  although  they  greatly  affect 
his  character,  do  not  affect  his  obligations :  the  duty  to  repay 

11 


123  PROPERTY.  [esSAV  II. 

when  he  has  the  power,  is  the  same  whether  the  insolvency- 
were  occasioned  by  his  fault  or  his  misfortune.  Jn  all  cases, 
the  reasoning  that  applies  to  the  debt,  applies  also  to  the  in- 
terest that  accrues  upon  it ;  although  with  respect  to  the  ac- 
ceptance of  both,  and  especially  of  interest,  a  creditor  should 
exercise  a  considerate  discretion. — A  man  who  has  failed  of 
paying  his  debts  ought  always  to  live  with  frugality,  and 
carefully  to  economize  such  money  as  he  gains.  He  should 
reflect  that  he  is  a  trustee  for  his  creditors,  and  that  all  the 
needless  money  which  he  expends  is  not  his  but  theirs. 

The  amount  of  property  which  the  trading  part  of  a  com- 
mercial nation  loses  by  insolvency,  is  great  enough  to  consti- 
tute a  considerable  national  evil.  The  fraud,  too,  that  is  prac- 
tised under  cover  of  insolvency,  is  doubtless  the  most  exten- 
sive of  all  species  of  private  robbery.  The  profligacy  of 
some  of  these  cases  is  well  known  to  be  extreme.  He  who 
is  a  bankrupt  to-day,  riots  in  the  luxuries  of  affluence  to-mor- 
row ;  bows  to  the  creditors  whose  money  he  is  spending,  and 
exults  in  the  success  and  the  impunity  of  his  wickedness. 
Of  such  conduct  we  should  not  speak  or  think  but  with  de- 
testation. We  should  no  more  sit  at  the  table,  or  take  the 
hand  of  such  a  man,  than  if  we  knew  he  had  got  his  money 
last  night  on  the  highway.  There  is  a  wickedness  in  some 
bankruptcies  to  which  the  guilt  of  ordinary  robbers  approaches 
but  at  a  distance.  Happy,  if  such  wickedness  could  not  be 
practised  with  legal  impunity  !*  Happy,  if  Public  Opinion 
supplied  the  deficiency  of  the  law  and  held  the  iniquity  in 
rightful  abhorrence  If 

Perhaps  nothing  would  tend  so  efficaciously  to  diminish  the 
general  evils  of  insolvency,  as  a  sound  state  of  public  opinion 
respecting  the  obligation  to  pay  our  debts.  The  insolvent 
who,  with  the  means  of  paying,  retains  the  money  in  his  own 
pocket,  is,  and  he  should  be  regarded  as  being,  a  dishonest 
man.  If  Public  Opinion  held  such  conduct  to  be  of  the  same 
character  as  theft,  probably  a  more  powerful  motive  to  avoid 
insolvency  would  be  established  than  any  which  now  exists. 
Who  would  not  anxiously  (and  therefore,  in  almost  all  cases, 
successfully)  struggle  against  insolvency,  when  he  knew  that 
it  would  be  followed,  if  not  by  permanent  poverty,  by  per- 
manent disgrace  ?  If  it  should  be  said  that  to  act  upon  such 
a  system  would  overwhelm  an  insolvent's  energies,  keep  him 
m  perpetual  inactivity,  and  deprive  his  family  of  the  benefit 
of  his  exertions — I  answer,  that  the  evil,  supposing  it  to  im- 

*  See  the   3d    Essay.  t  Id. 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  123 

pend,  would  be  much  less  extensive  than  may  be  imagined. 
The  calamity  being  foreseen,  would  prevent  men  from  becom- 
ing insolvent ;  and  it  is  certain  that  the  majority  might  have 
avoided  insolvency  by  sufficient  care.  Besides,  if  a  man's 
principles  are  such  that  he  would  rather  sink  into  inactivity 
than  exert  himself  in  order  to  be  just,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
mould  public  opinion  to  his  character.  The  question  too  is, 
not  whether  some  men  would  not  prefer  indolence  to  the  calls 
of  justice,  but  whether  the  public  should  judge  accurately  res- 
pecting what  those  calls  are.  The  state,  and  especially  a  fa- 
mily, might  lose  occasionally  by  this  reform  of  opinion — and 
so  they  do  by  sending  a  man  to  New  South  Wales  ;  but  who 
would  think  this  a  good  reason  for  setting  criminals  at  large  ? 
And  after  all,  much  more  would  be  gained  by  preventing  in- 
solvency, than  lost  by  the  ill  consequences  upon  the  few  who 
failed  to  pay  their  debts. 

It  is  cause  of  satisfaction  that,  respecting  this  rectified  state 
of  opinion,  and  respecting  integrity  of  private  virtue,  some  ex- 
amples are  offered.  There  is  one  community  of  Christians 
which  holds  its  members  obliged  to  pay  their  debts  whenever 
they  possess  the  ability,  without  regard  to  the  legal  discharge.* 
By  this  means,  there  is  thrown  over  the  character  of  every 
bankrupt  who  possesses  property,  a  shade  which  nothing  but 
payment  can  dispel.  The  effect  (in  conjunction  we  may  hope 
with  private  integrity  of  principle)  is  good — good,  both  in  in- 
stituting a  new  motive  to  avoid  insolvency,  and  in  inducing 
some  of  those  who  do  become  insolvent,  subsequently  to  pay 
all  their  debts. 

Of  this  latter  effect  many  honourable  instances  might  be 
given :  two  of  which  having  fallen  under  my  observation,  I 
would  briefly  mention. — A  man  had  become  insolvent,  I  be- 
lieve in  early  life  ;  his  creditors  divided  his  property  amongst 
them,  and  gave  him  a  legal  discharge.  He  appears  to  have 
formed  the  resolution  to  pay  the  remainder,  if  his  own  exer- 

*  "  Where  any  have  injured  others  in  their  property,  the  greatest  fru- 
gality should  be  observed  by  themselves  and  their  families  ;  and  although 
they  may  have  a  legal  discharge  from  their  creditors,  both  equity  and  our 
Christian  profession  demand,  that  none,  when  they  have  it  in  their  power, 
should  rest  satisfied  until  a  just  restitution  be  made  to  those  who  have  suf- 
fered by  them." 

"  And  it  is  the  judgment  of  this  meeting,  that  monthly  and  other  meet- 
ings ought  not  to  receive  collections  or  bequests  for  the  use  of  the  poor, 
or  any  other  services  of  the  Society,  of  persons  who  have  fallen  short  in 
the  payment  of  their  just  debts,  though  legally  discharged  by  their  credi- 
tors :  for  until  such  persons  have  paid  the  deficiency,  their  possessions  can- 
not in  equity  be  considered  as  their  own." 

Official  Documents  of  the  Yearly  Meeting  of  the  Society  of  Friends. 


124  "  PROPERTY.  [essay  II. 

tions  should  enable  him  to  do  it.  He  procured  employment, 
by  which  however  he  never  gained  more  than  twenty  shillings 
a-week ;  and  worked  industriously  and  lived  frugally  for  eigh- 
teen years.  At  the  expiration  of  this  time,  he  found  he  had 
accumulated  enough  to  pay  the  remainder,  and  he  sent  the 
money  to  his  creditors.  Such  a  man,  I  think,  might  hope  to 
derive,  during  the  remainder  of  his  life,  greater  satisfaction 
from  the  consciousness  of  integrity,  than  he  would  have  de- 
rived from  expending  the  money  on  himself.  It  should  be 
told  that  many  of  his  creditors,  when  they  heard  the  circum- 
stances, declined  to  receive  the  money,  or  voluntarily  pre- 
sented it  to  him  again.  One  of  these  was  my  neighbour ; 
he  had  been  little  accustomed  to  exemplary  virtue,  and  the 
proffered  money  astonished  him :  he  talked  in  loud  commen- 
dation of  what  to  him  was  unheard-of  integrity  ;  signed  a  re- 
ceipt for  the  amount,  and  sent  it  back  as  a  present  to  the 
debtor.  The  other  instance  may  furnish  hints  of  a  useful 
kind.  It  was  the  case  of  a  female  who  had  endeavoured  to 
support  herself  by  the  profits  of  a  shop.  She  however  be- 
came insolvent,  paid  some  dividend,  and  received  a  discharge. 
She  again  entered  into  business,  and  in  the  course  of  years 
had  accumulated  enough  to  pay  the  remainder  of  her  debts. 
But  the  infirmities  of  age  were  now  coming  on,  and  the  an- 
nual income  from  her  savings  was  just  sufficient  for  the  wants 
of  declining  years.  Being  thus  at  present  unable  to  discharge 
her  obligations  without  subjecting  herself  to  the  necessity  of 
obtaining  relief  from  others  ;  she  executed  a  will,  directing 
that  at  her  death  the  creditors  should  be  paid  the  remainder 
of  their  demands  :  and  when  she  died  they  were  paid  accord- 
ingly. 

Wills,  Legatees,  and  Heirs. — The  right  of  a  person  to 
order  the  distribution  of  his  property  after  death,  is  recom- 
mended by  its  Utility ;  and  were  this  less  manifest  than  it  is, 
it  would  be  sufficient  for  us  that  the  right  is  established  by 
civil  government. 

It  however  happens  in  practice,  that  persons  sometimes  dis- 
tribute their  property  in  a  manner  that  is  both  unreasonable 
and  unjust.  This  evil  the  law  cannot  easily  remedy  ;  and  con- 
sequently the  duty  of  remedying  it,  devolves  upon  those  to 
whom  the  property  is  bequeathed.  If  they  do  not  prevent  the 
injustice,  it  cannot  be  prevented.  This  indicates  the  proprie- 
ty, on  the  part  of  a  legatee  or  an  heir,  of  considering,  when 
property  devolves  to  him  in  a  manner  or  in  a  proportion  that 
appears  improper,  how  he  may  exercise  upright  integrity,  lest 
he  should  be  the  practical  agent  of  injustice  or  oppression. 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTT.  125 

Another  cause  for  the  exercise  of  this  integrity  consists  in 
this  circumstance  : — When  the  right  of  a  person  to  bequeath 
his  property  is  admitted,  it  is  evident  that  his  intention  ought 
in  general  to  be  the  standard  of  his  successor's  conduct :  and 
accordingly  the  law,  in  making  enactments  upon  the  subject, 
directs  much  of  its  solicitude  to  the  means  of  ascertaining 
and  of  fulfilling  the  testator's  intentions.  These  intentions 
must,  according  to  the  existing  systems  of  Jurisprudence,  be 
ascertained  by  some  general  rules — by  a  written  declaration 
perhaps,  or  a  declaration  of  a  specified  kind,  or  made  in  a  pre- 
scribed form,  or  attested  in  a  particular  manner.  But  in  con- 
sequence of  this  it  happens,  that  as  through  accident  or  inad- 
vertency a  testator  does  not  always  coitiply  with  these  forms, 
the  law,  which  adheres  to  its  rules,  frustrates  his  intentions, 
and  therefore,  in  effect,  defeats  its  own  object  in  prescribing 
the  forms.  Here  again  the  intentions  of  the  deceased  and 
the  demands  of  equity  cannot  be  fulfilled,  except  by  the  vir- 
tuous integrity  of  heirs  and  legatees. 

I.  If  my  father,  who  had  one  son  besides  myself,  left  nine- 
tenths  of  his  property  to  me,  and  only  the  remaining  tenth  to 
my  brother,  I  should  not  think  the  will,  however  authentic, 
justified  me  in  taking  so  large  a  proportion,  unless  I  could  dis- 
cover some  reasonable  motive  which  influenced  my  father's 
mind.  If  my  brother  already  possessed  a  fortune  and  I  had 
none  ;  if  I  were  married  and  had  a  numerous  family ;  and  he 
were  single  and  unlikely  to  marry ;  if  he  was  incurably  ex- 
travagant, and  would  probably  in  a  few  weeks  or  months 
squander  his  patrimony ;  in  these,  or  in  such  circumstances,  I 
should  think  myself  at  liberty  to  appropriate  my  father's  be- 
quest :  otherwise  I  should  not.  Thus,  if  the  disproportionate 
'division  was  the  effect  of  some  unreasonable  prejudice  against 
my  brother,  or  fondness  for  me  ;  or  if  it  was  made  at  the  un- 
fair instigation  of  another  person,  or  in  a  temporary  fit  of  pas- 
sion or  disgust;  I  could  not,  virtuously,  enforce  the  will. 
The  reason  is  plain.  The  will  being  unjust  or  extremely  un- 
reasonable, I  should  be  guilty  of  injustice  or  extreme  unrea- 
sonableness in  enforcing  it. 

By  the  English  law,  the  real  estates  of  deceased  persons 
are  not  available  for  the  payment  of  debts  of  simple  contract, 
unless  they  are  made  so  by  the  will.  The  rule  is,  to  be  sure, 
sufficiently  barbarous  ;  and  he  who  intentionally  forbears  to 
make  the  estates  available,  dies,  as  has  been  properly  observed 
with  a  deliberate  fraud  in  his  heart.  But  this  fraud  cannot 
be  completed  without  the  concurrence  of  a  second  person,  the 
heir.     He  therefore  is  under  a  moral  obligation  lo  pay  such 

11* 


126  PROPERTY.  [essay  II. 

debts  out  of  the  real  estate,  notwithstanding  the  deficiency 
of  the  will :  for  if  the  father  was  fraudulent  in  making  such  a 
will,  the  son  is  fraudulent  in  taking  advantage  of  his  parent's 
wickedness.     He  may  act  with  strict  legality  in  keeping  the  ■ 
property,  but  he  is  condemned  as  dishonest  by  the  Moral  Law. 

II.  A  person  bequeaths  five  hundred  pounds  to  some 
charity — for  example,  to  the  Foundling — and  directs  that  the 
money  shall  be  laid  out  in  land.  His  intention  is  indisputably 
plain :  but  the  law,  with  certain  motives,  says,  that  the  direc- 
tion to  lay  out  the  money  in  land  makes  the  bequest  void ; 
and  it  will  not  enforce  the  bequest.  But,  because  the  testator 
forgot  this,  can  the  residuary  legatee  honestly  put  the  five 
hundred  pounds  into  his  own  pocket  ?  Assuredly  he  cannot. 
The  money  is  as  truly  the  property  of  the  Foundling  as  if  the 
will  had  been  accurately  framed.  The  circumstance  that  the 
law  will  not  compel  him  to  give  it  up,  although  it  may  exempt 
him  from  an  action,  cannot  exempt  him  from  guilt. 

The  law,  either  with  reason  or  without  it,  prefers  that  an 
estate  should  descend  to  a  brother's  son  rather  than  a  sister's. 
Still  it  permits  a  man  to  leave  it  to  his  sister's  son  if  he 
pleases ;  and  only  requires  that,  when  he  wishes  to  do  this, 
he  shall  have  three  witnesses  to  his  will  instead  of  two.  The 
reader  will  remark  that  the  object  of  this  legal  provision  is, 
that  the  intention  of  the  party  shall  be  indisputably  known. 
The  legislature  does  not  wish  to  control  him  in  th^  disposi- 
tion of  his  property,  but  only  to  ascertain  distinctly  what  his 
intention  is.  A  will  then  is  made,  leaving  an  estate  to  a  sis- 
ter's son,  and  is  attested  by  two  witnesses  only.  The  omis- 
sion of  the  third  is  a  matter  of  mere  inadvertence  :  no  doubt 
exists  as  to  the  person's  intention  or  its  reasonableness.  Is 
it  then  consistent  with  integrity  for  the  brother's  son  to  take- 
advantage  of  the  omission,  and  to  withhold  the  estate  from  his 
cousin  1  I  think  the  conscience  of  every  man  will  answer, 
no  :  and  if  this  be  the  fact,  we  need  enquire  no  further.  Upon 
such  a  subject,  the  concurrent  dictates  in  the  minds  of  men  can 
scarcely  be  otherwise  than  true  and  just.  But  even  critically,  the 
same  conclusion  appears  to  follow.  The  law  required  three 
witnesses  in  order  that  the  person's  intention  should  be  known. 
Now  it  is  known  :  and  therefore  the  very  object  of  the  law  is 
attained.  To  take  advantage  of  the  omission  is,  in  reality,  to 
misapply  the  law.  It  is  insisting  upon  its  letter  in  opposition 
to  its  motives  and  design.  Dr.  Paley  has  decided  this  ques- 
tion otherwise,  by  a  process  of  reasoning  of  which  the  basis 
does  not  appear  very  sound.  He  says  that  such  a  person  has 
no  "  right"  to  dispose  of  the  property,  because  the  law  con- 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  l2t 

ferred  the  right  upon  condition  that  he  should  have  three  wit- 
nesses, with  which  condition  he  has  not  complied.  But  sure- 
ly the  "right"-  of  disposing  property  is  recognized  generalli/ 
by  the  law ;  the  requisition  of  three  witnesses  is  not  designed 
to  confer  a  right,  but  to  adjust  the  mode  of  exercising  it.  In- 
deed, Paley  himself  virtually  gives  up  his  own  doctrine  ;  for 
he  says  he  should  hesitate  in  applying  it,  if  "  considerations 
of  pity  to  distress,  of  duty  to  a  parent,  or  of  gratitude  to  a  ben- 
efactor,"* would  be  disregarded  by  the  application.  Why 
should  these  considerations  suspend  the  applicability  of  his 
doctrine  ?  Because  Christianity  requires  us  to  attend  to  them 
— which  is  the  very  truth  we  are  urging  :  we  say,  the  per- 
mission of  the  law  is  not  a  sufficient  warrant  to  disregard  the 
obligations  of  Christianity. 

A  man  who  possesses  five  thousand  pounds,  has  two  sons, 
of  whom  John  is  well  provided  for,  and  Thomas  is  not.  With 
the  privity  of  his  sons  he  makes  a  will,  leaving  four  thousand 
pounds  to  Thomas  and  one  to  John,  explaining  to  both  the  rea- 
son of  this  division.  A  fire  happens  in  the  house  and  the 
will  is  burnt ;  and  the  father,  before  he  has  the  opportunity  of 
making  another,  is  carried  off  by  a  fever.  Now  the  English 
law  would  assign  a  half  of  the  money  to  each  brother.  If 
John  demands  his  half,  is  he  a  just  man  ?  Every  one  I  think 
will  perceive  that  he  is  not,  and  that,  if  he  demanded  it,  he 
would  violate  the  duties  of  benevolence.  The  law  is  not  his 
sufficient  rule. 

A  person  whose  near  relations  do  not  stand  in  need  of  his 
money,  adopts  the  children  of  distant  relatives,  with  the  de- 
clared intention  or  manifest  design  of  providing  for  them  at 
his  death.  If,  under  such  circumstances,  he  dies  without  a 
will,  the  heir  at  law  could  not  morally  avail  himself  of  his  le- 
gal privilege,  to  the  injury  of  these  expectant  parties.  They 
need  the  money,  and  he  does  not ;  which  is  one  good  reason 
for  not  seizing  it ;  but  the  intention  of  the  deceased  invested 
them  with  a  right ;  and  so  that  the  intention  is  known,  it  mat- 
ters little  to  the  moral  obligation,  whether  it  is  expressed  on 
paper  or  not. 

Possibly  some  reader  may  say,  that  if  an  heir  or  legatee 
must  always  institute  enquiries  into  the  uncertain  claims  of 
others  before  he  accepts  the  property  of  the  deceased,  and  if 
he  is  obliged  to  give  up  his  own  claims  whenever  their's  seem 
to  preponderate,  he  will  be  involved  in  endless  doubts  and 
scruples,  and  testators  will  never  know  whether  their  wills 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  3,  p.  1,  c  23. 


12S  pnovtnfr.  [essat  tj. 

I 

■will  be  executed  or  not :  the  answer  is,  that  no  such  scrupti- 
lousness  is  demanded.  Hardheartedness,  and  extreme  unrea- 
sonableness, and  injustice,  are  one  class  of  considerations ; 
critical  scruples,  and  uncertain  claims,  are  another. 

It  may  be  worth  a  paragraph  to  remark,  that  it  is  to  be  feared 
some  persons  think  too  complacently  of  their  charitable  be- 
quests, or,  what  is  worse,  hope  that  it  is  a  species  of  good 
works  which  will  counterbalance  the  offence  of  some  present 
irregularities  of  conduct.  Such  bequests  ought  not  to  be  dis- 
couraged ;  and  yet  it  should  be  remembered,  that  he  who 
gives  money  after  his  death,  parts  with  nothing  of  his  own. 
He  gives  it  only  when  he  cannot  retain  it.  The  man  who 
leaves  his  money  for  the  single  purpose  of  doing  good,  does 
right :  but  he  who  hopes  that  it  is  a  work  of  merit,  should  re- 
member that  the  money  is  given,  that  the  privation  is  endured, 
not  by  himself  but  by  his  heirs.  A  man  who  has  more  than  he 
needs,  should  dispense  it  whilst  it  is  his  own. 

Minors'  Debts. — A  young  man  under  twenty-one  years 
of  age  purchases  articles  of  a  tradesman,  of  which  some  are 
necessary  and  some  are  not.  Payment  for  unnecessary  articles 
cannot  be  enforced  by  the  English  law — ^the  reason  with  the 
Legislature  being  this,  that  thoughtless  youths  might  be  prac- 
tised upon  by  designing  persons,  and  induced  to  make  need- 
less and  extravagant  purchases.  But  is  the  youth  who  pur- 
chases unnecessary  articles  with  the  promise  to  pay  when  he 
becomes  of  age,  exempted  from  the  obligation  ?  Now  it  is  to 
be  remembered,  generally,  that  this  obligation  is  not  founded 
upon  the  Law  of  the  Land,  and  therefore  that  the  law  cannot 
dispense  with  it.  But  if  the  tradesman  has  actually  taken  ad- 
vantage of  the  inexperience  of  a  youth,  to  cajole  him  into 
debts  of  which  he  was  not  conscious  of  the  amount  or  the  im- 
propriety, it  does  not  appear  that  he  is  obliged  to  pay  them  ; 
and  for  this  reason,  that  he  did  not,  in  any  proper  sense  of  the 
term,  come  under  an  obligation  to  pay  them.  In  other  cases, 
the  obligation  remains.  The  circumstance  that  the  law  will 
not  assist  the  creditor  to  recover  the  money,  does  not  dispense 
with  it.  It  is  fit,  no  doubt,  that  these  dishonourable  trades- 
men should  be  punished,  though  the  mode  of  punishing  them 
is  exceptionable  indeed.  It  operates  as  a  powerful  tempta- 
tion to  fraud  in  young  men,  and  it  is  a  bad  system  to  discourage 
dishonesty  in  one  person  by  tempting  the  probity  of  another, 
The  youth,  too,  is  of  all  persons  the  last  who  should  profit  by 
the  punishment  of  the  trader.  He  is  reprehensible  himself: 
young  men  who  contract  such  debts  are  seldom  so  young  or 
so  ignorant  as  not  to  know  that  they  are  doing  wrong. 


OHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  129 

A  man's  wife  "runs  him  into  debt"  by  extravagant  pur- 
chases which  he  is  alike  unable  to  prevent  or  to  afford.  Many- 
persons  sell  goods  to  such  a  woman,  who  are  conscious  of 
her  habits  and  of  the  husband's  situation,  yet  continue  to  sup- 
ply her  extravagance,  because  they  know  the  law  will  enable 
them  to  enforce  payment  from  the  husband.  These  persons  act 
legally,  but  they  are  legally  wicked.  Do  they  act  as  they  would 
desire  others  to  act  towards  them  ?  Would  one  of  these  men 
wish  another  tradesman  so  to  supply  his  own  wife  if  she  was 
notoriously  a  spendthrift  ?  If  not,  morality  condemns  his  con- 
duct :  and  the  laws,  in  effect,  condemn  it  too ;  for  the  Legislature 
would  not  have  made  husbands  responsible  for  their  wives'  debts 
anymore  than  for  their  children's,  but  for  the  presumption  that 
the  wife  generally  buys  what  the  husband  approves.  Debts  of 
unprincipled  extravagance,  are  not  debts  which  the  law  in- 
tended to  provide  that  the  husband  should  pay.  If  all  women 
contracted  such  debts,  the  Legislature  would  instantly  alter 
the  law.  If  the  Legislature  could  have  made  the  distinction, 
perhaps  it  would  have  made  it ;  since  it  did  not  or  could  not, 
the  deficiency  must  be  supplied  by  private  integrity. 

Bills  of  Exchange. — The  law  of  England  provides,  that 
if  the  possessor  of  a  Bill  of  Exchange  fails  to  demand  pay- 
ment on  the  day  on  which  it  becomes  due,  he  takes  the  re- 
sponsibility, in  case  of  its  eventual  non-payment,  from  the  pre- 
vious endorsers,  and  incurs  it  himself.  This  as  a  general 
rule  may  be  just.  A  party  may  be  able  to  pay  to-day  and  un- 
able a  week  hence  ;  and  if  in  such  a  case  a  loss  arises  by  one 
man's  negligence,  it  were  manifestly  unreasonable  that  it 
should  be  sustained  by  others.  But  if  the  acceptor  becomes 
unable  to  pay  a  week  or  a  month  before  the  bill  is  due,  the 
previous  endorsers  cannot  in  justice  throw  the  loss  upon  the 
last  possessor,  even  though  he  fails  to  present  it  on  the  ap- 
pointed day.  For  wAy  did  the  law  make  its  provision  ?  In  or- 
der to  secure  persons  from  the  loss  of  their  property  by  the 
negligence  of  others  over  whom  they  had  no  control.  But, 
in  the  supposed  case,  the  loss  is  not  occasioned  by  any  such 
cause,  and  therefore  the  spirit  of  the  law  does  not  apply  to  it. 
You  are  insisting  upon  its  literal,  in  opposition  to  its  just,  in- 
terpretation. Whether  the  Bill  was  presented  on  the  right 
day  or  the  wrong,  makes  no  difference  to  the  previous  en- 
dorsers, and  for  such  a  case  the  law  was  not  made. 

A  similar  rule  of  virtue  applies  to  the  case  of  giving  notice 
of  refusal  to  accept  or  to  pay.  If,  in  consequence  of  the  want 
of  this  notice,  the  party  is  subjected  to  loss,  he  may  avail 
himself  of  the  legal  exemption  from  the  last  possessor's  claim. 


130  PROPERTY.  [essay  II. 

If  the  want  of  notice  made  no  difference  in  his  situation,  he 
may  not. 

Shipments. — The  same  principles  apply  to  a  circumstance 
which  not  unfrequently  occurs  amongst  men  of  business,  and 
in  which  integrity  is,  I  think,  very  commonly  sacrificed  to  in- 
terest. A  tradesman  in  Falmouth  is  in  the  habit  of  purchas- 
ing goods  of  merchants  in  London,  by  whom  the  goods  are 
forwarded  in  vessels  to  Falmouth.  Now  it  is  a  rule  of  law 
founded  upon  established  custom,  that  goods  when  shipped 
are  at  the  risk  of  the  buyer.  The  law,  however,  requires 
that  an  account  of  the  shipment  shall  be  sent  to  the  buyer  by 
post,  in  order  that,  if  he  thinks  proper,  he  may  insure  his 
goods :  and  in  order  to  effect  this  object,  the  law  directs,  that 
if  the  account  be  not  sent,  and  the  vessel  is  wrecked,  it  will 
not  enforce  payment  from  the  buyer.  All  this  as  a  general 
rule  is  just.  But  in  the  actual  transactions  of  business,  goods 
are  very  frequently  sent  by  sea  by  an  expressed  or  tacit  agree- 
ment between  the  parties  without  notice  by  the  post.  The 
Falmouth  tradesman  then  is  in  the  habit  of  thus  conducting 
the  matter  for  a  series  of  years.  He  habitually  orders  his 
goods  to  be  sent  by  ship,  and  the  merchant,  as  habitually, 
with  the  buyer's  knowledge,  sends  the  invoice  with  them. 
Of  course  the  buyer  is  not  in  the  habit  of  insuring.  At  length 
a  vessel  is  wrecked  and  a  package  is  lost.  When  the  mer- 
chant applies  for  payment,  the  tradesman  says — "  No ;  you 
sent  no  invoice  by  post :  I  shall  not  pay  you,  and  I  know  you 
cannot  compel  me  by  law."  Now  this  conduct  I  think  is  con- 
demned by  morality.  The  man  in  Falmouth  does  not  suffer 
any  loss  in  consequence  of  the  want  of  notice.  He  would  not 
have  insured  if  he  had  received  it ;  and  therefore  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Legislature  in  withholding  its  assistance  from  the 
merchant,  was  not  to  provide  for  such  a  case.  Thus  to  take 
advantage  of  the  law  without  regard  to  its  intention  is  unjust. 
Besides,  the  custom  of  sending  .the  invoice  with  the  goods  ra- 
ther than  by  post,  is  for  the  advantage  of  the  buyer  only : — it 
saves  him  a  shilling  in  postage.  The  understanding  amongst 
men  of  business  that  the  risk  of  loss  at  sea  impends  on  buyers 
is  so  complete,  that  they  habitually  take  that  risk  into  ac- 
count in  the  profits  which  they  demand  on  their  goods  :  sellers 
do  not ;  and  this  again  indicates  the  injustice  of  throwing  the 
loss  upon  the  seller  when  an  accident  happens  at  sea. — Yet 
tradesmen,  I  believe,  rarely  practise  any  other  justice  than 
that  which  the  law  will  enforce  ;  as  if  not  to  be  compelled  by 
law  were  to  be  exempt  from  all  moral  obligation.  It  is  hard- 
ly necessary  to  observe,  that  if  the  man  in  Falmouth  was  ac- 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  131 

tually  prevented  from  insuring  by  the  want  of  an  invoice  by 
post,  he  has  a  claim  of  justice  as  well  as  of  law  upon  the  mer- 
chant in  London. 

DiSTRAixVTs. — It  is  well  known  that  in  distraints  for  rent, 
the  law  allows  the  landlord  to  seize  whatever  goods  he  finds 
upon  the  premises,  without  enquiring  to  whom  they  belong. 
And  this  rule,  like  many  others,  is  as  good  as  a  general  rule 
can  be  ;  since  an  unprincipled  tenant  might  easily  contrive 
to  make  it  appear  that  none  of  the  property  was  his  own,  and 
thus  the  landlord  might  be  irremediably  defrauded.  Yet  the 
landlord  cannot  always  virtuously  act  upon  the  rule  of  law. 
A  tenant  who  expects  a  distraint  to-morrow,  and  of  whose 
profligacy  a  lodger  in  the  house  has  no  suspicion,  secretly 
removes  his  own  goods  in  the  night,  and  leaves  the  lodger's 
to  be  seized  by  the  bailiff.  The  landlord  ought  not,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course,  to  take  these  goods,  and  to  leave  a  family  per- 
haps without  a  table  or  a  bed.  The  law  indeed  allows  it ; 
but  benevolence,  but  probity,  does  not. 

A  man  came  to  a  friend  of  mine  and  proposed  to  take  a 
number  of  his  sheep  to  graze.  My  friend  agreed  with  him, 
and  sent  the  sheep.  The  next  day  these  sheep  were  seized 
by  the  man's  landlord  for  rent.  It  was  an  artifice  precon- 
certed between  the  landlord  and  the  tenant  in  order  that  the 
rent  might  be  paid  out  of  my  friend's  pocket !  Did  this  land- 
lord act  justly?  The  reader  says,  "No,  he  deserved  a 
prison."  And  yet  the  seizure  was  permitted  by  the  law;  and 
if  morality  did  not  possess  an  authority  superior  to  law,  the 
seizure  would  have  been  just.  Now,  in  less  flagitious  in- 
stances, the  same  regard  to  the  dictates  of  morality  is  to  be 
maintained  notwithstanding  the  permissions  of  law. — The  con- 
trivers of  this  abandoned  iniquity  possessed  the  effrontery  to 
come  afterwards  to  the  gentleman  whom  they  had  defrauded, 
to  offer  to  compound  the  matter ;  to  send  back  the  sheep 
which  were  of  the  value  perhaps  of  fifty  pounds,  if  he  would 
give  them  thirty  pounds  in  money.  He  refused  to  counte- 
nance such  wickedness  by  the  remotest  implication,  and  sent 
them  away  to  enjoy  all  their  plunder. 

Theoretically^  perhaps  no  seizures  are  unjust  when  no  fraud 
is  practised  by  the  landlord,  because  persons  who  entrust 
their  property  on  the  premises  of  another,  are  supposed  to 
know  the  risk,  and  voluntarily  to  undertake  it.  But,  in  prac- 
tice, this  risk  is  often  not  thought  of  and  not  known.  Besides, 
mere  justice  is  not  the  only  thing  which  a  landlord  has  to 
take  into  account.  The  authority  which  requires  us  to  be 
just,  requires  us  to  be  compassionate  and  kind.     And  here,  a$ 


132  PROPERTY.  [essay  II. 

in  many  other  cases,  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  object  of 
the  law  in  allowing  landlords  to  seize  whatever  they  find, 
was  to  protect  them  from  fraud,  and  not  to  facilitate  the  op- 
pression of  under-tenants  and  others.  If  the  first  tenant  has 
practised  no  fraud,  it  seems  a  violation  of  the  intention  of  the 
law,  to  enforce  it  against  those  who  happen  to  have  entrusted 
their  property  in  his  hands. 

Unjust  Defendants. — It  does  not  present  a  very  favour- 
able view  of  the  state  of  private  principle,  that  there  are  so 
many  who  refuse  justice  to  plaintiffs  unless  they  are  com- 
pelled to  be  just  by  the  law.  It  is  indisputable,  that  a  multi- 
tude of  suits  are  undertaken  in  order  to  obtain  property  or 
rights  which  the  defendant  knows  he  ought  voluntarily  to  give 
up.  Such  a  person  is  certainly  a  dishonest  man.  When  the 
verdict  is  given  against  him,  I  regard  him  in  the  light  of  a. 
convicted  robber — differing  from  other  robbers  in  the  circum- 
stance that  he  is  tried  at  Nisi  prius  instead  of  the  Crown  bar. 
For  what  is  the  difference  between  him  who  takes  what  is 
another's  and  him  who  withholds  it  ?  This  severity  of  cen- 
sure applies  to  some  who  are  sued  for  damages.  A  man  who, 
whether  by  design  or  inadvertency,  has  injured  another,  and 
will  not  compensate  him  unless  he  is  legally  compelled  to  do 
it,  is  surely  unjust.  Yet  many  of  these  persons  seem  to  think 
that  injury  to  property,  or  person,  or  character,  entails  no 
duty  to  make  reparation  except  it  be  enforced.  Why,  the 
law-  does  not  create  this  duty,  it  only  compels  us  to  fulfil  it. 
If  the  minds  of  such  persons  were  under  the  influence  of  in- 
tegrity, they  would  pay  such  debts  without  compulsion. — This 
subject  is  one  amongst  the  many  upon  which  Public  Opinion 
needs  to  be  aroused  and  to  be  rectified.  When  our  estimates 
of  moral  character  are  adjusted  to  individual  probity  of  prin- 
ciple, some  of  those  who  now  pass  in  society  as  creditable 
persons,  will  be  placed  at  the  same  point  on  the  scale  of  mo- 
rality, as  many  of  those  who  are  consigned  to  a  jail. 

Extortion. — It  is  a  very  common  thing  for  a  creditor  who 
cannot  obtain  payment  from  the  person  who  owes  him  money, 
to  practise  a  species  of  extortion  upon  his  relations  or  friends. 
The  man  perhaps  is  insolvent  and  unable  to  pay,  and  the 
creditor  threatens  to  imprison  him  in  order  to  induce  his 
friends  to  pay  the  money  rather  than  allow  him  to  be  immured 
in  a  jail.  This  is  not  honest.  Why  should  a  person  be  de- 
prived of  his  property  because  he  has  a  regard  for  the  repu- 
tation and  comfort  of  another  man  ?  It  will  be  said  that  the 
debtor's  friends  pay  voluntarily ;  but  it  is  only  with  that  sort 
of  willingness  with  which  a  traveller  gives  his  purse  to  ? 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  133 

footpad,  rather  than  be  violently  assaulted  or  perhaps  killed. 
Both  the  footpad  and  the  creditor  are  extortioners — one  ob- 
tains money  by  threatening  mischief  to  the  person,  and  the 
other  by  threatening  pain  to  the  mind.  We  do  not  say  that 
their  actions  are  equal  in  flagitiousness,  but  we  say  that  both 
are  criminal. — -It  is  said  that,  after  the  death  of  Sheridan,  and 
when  a  number  of  men  of  rank  were  assembled  to  attend  his 
funeral,  a  person  elegantly  dressed  and  stating  himself  to  be 
a  relation  of  the  deceased,  entered  the  chamber  of  death.  He 
urgently  entreated  to  be  allowed  to  view  the  face  of  his  de- 
parted friend,  and  the  coffin  lid  was  unscrewed.  The  stranger 
pulled  a  warrant  out  of  his  pocket  and  arrested  the  body.  It 
was  probably  a  concerted  scheme  to  obtain  a  sum  (which  it 
is  supposed  was  five  hundred  pounds)  that  had  been  owing 
by  the  deceased.  The  creditor  doubtless  expected  that  a 
number  of  men  of  fortune  would  be  present,  who  would  pre- 
fer losing  five  hundred  pounds  to  suffering  the  remains  of  their 
friend  to  be  consigned  to  the  police.  The  extortioner  was 
successful :  it  is  said  that  Lord  Sidmouth  and  another  gentle- 
man paid  the  money.  Was  this  creditor  an  honest  man  ?  If 
courts  of  Equity  had  existed  adapted  to  such  cases,  and  the 
man  were  prosecuted,  the  consciences  of  a  jury  would  surely 
have  impelled  them  to  send  him  to  Newgate. 

Slaves. — If  a  person  left  me  an  estate  in  Virginia  or  the 
West  Indies,  with  a  hundred  slaves,  the  law  of  the  land  allows 
me  to  keep  possession  of  both  ;  the  Moral  Law  does  not.  I 
should  therefore  hold  myself  imperatively  obliged  to  give 
these  persons  their  liberty.  I  do  not  say  that  I  would  manu- 
mit them  all  the  next  day ;  but  if  I  deferred  their  liberation, 
it  ought  to  be  for  their  sakes,  not  my  own :  just  as  if  I  had  a 
thousand  pounds  for  a  minor,  my  motive  in  withholding  it 
from  him  would  be  exclusively  his  own  advantage.  Some 
persons  who  perceive  the  flagitiousness  of  slavery,  retain 
slaves.  Much  ^forbearance  of  thought  and  language  should 
be  observed  towards  the  man,  in  whose  mind  perhaps  there 
is  a  strong  conflict  between  conscience  and  the  difficulty  or 
loss  which  might  attend  a  regard  to  its  dictates.  I  have  met 
with  a  feeling  and  benevolent  person  who  owned  several  hun- 
dred slaves,  and  who,  I  believe,  secretly  lamented  his  own 
situation.  I  would  be  slow  in  censuring  such  a  man,  and 
yet  it  ought  not  to  be  concealed,  that  if  he  complied  with  the 
requisitions  of  the  Moral  Law,  he  would  at  least  hasten  to 
prepare  them  for  emancipation.  To  endeavour  to  extricate 
oneself  from  the  difficulty  by  selling  the  slaves,  were  self-im- 
position.    A  man  may  as  well  keep  them  in  bondage  himself 

12 


134  PROPERTY.  [essay  II. 

as  sell  them  to  another  who  would  keep  them  in  it.  A  nar- 
rative has  appeared  in  print  of  the  conduct  of  a  gentleman  to 
whom  a  number  of  slaves  had  been  bequeathed,  and  who 
acted  towards  them  upon  the  principles  which  rectitude  re- 
quires. He  conveyed  them  to  some  other  country,  educated 
some,  procured  employment  for  others,  and  acted  as  a  Chris- 
tian towards  all. 

Upon  similar  grounds,  an  upright  man  should  not  accept  a 
present  of  a  hundred  pounds  from  a  person  who  had  not  paid 
his  debts,  nor  become  his  legatee.  If  the  money  were  not 
rightfully  his,  he  cannot  give  it ;  if  it  be  rightfully  his  credit- 
ors' it  cannot  be  mine. 

Privateers.-— Although  familiarity  with  war  occasions 
many  obliquities  in  the  moral  notions  of  a  people,  yet  the 
silent  verdict  of  public  opinion  is,  I  think,  against  the  recti- 
tude of  privateering.  It  is  not  regarded  as  creditable  and 
virtuous  ;  and  this  public  disapprobation  appears  to  be  on  the 
increase.  Considerable  exertion  at  least  has  been  made,  on 
the  part  of  the  American  government,  to  abolish  it. — To  this 
private  plunderer  himself  I  do  not  talk  of  the  obligations  of 
morality;  he  has  many  lessons  of  virtue  to  learn  before  he 
will  be  likely  to  listen  to  such  virtue  as  it  is  the  object  of 
these  pages  to  recommend:  but  to  him  who  perceives  the 
flagitiousness  of  the  practice,  I  would  urge  the  consideration 
that  he  ought  not  to  receive  the  plunder  of  a  privateer  even 
at  second  hand.  If  a  man  ought  not  to  be  the  legatee  of  a 
bankrupt,  he  ought  not  to  be  the  legatee  of  him  who  gained 
his  money  by  privateering.  Yet  it  is  to  be  feared  that  many 
who  would  not  fit  out  a  privateer,  would  accept  the  money 
which  the  owners  had  stolen.  If  it  be  stolen,  it  is  not  theirs 
to  give ;  and  what  one  has  no  right  to  give,  another  has  no 
right  to  accept. 

During  one  of  our  wars  with  France,  a  gentleman  who  en- 
tertained such  views  of  integrity  as  these  was  partner  in  a 
merchant  vessel,  and,  in  spite  of  his  representations,  the  other 
owners  resolved  to  fit  her  out  as  a  privateer.  They  did  so, 
and  she  happened  to  capture  several  vessels.  This  gentle- 
man received  from  time  to  time  his  share  of  the  prizes,  and 
laid  it  by ;  till,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  it  amounted  to  a 
considerable  sum.  What  was  to  be  done  with  the  money '? 
He  felt  that,  as  an  upright  man,  he  could  not  retain  the  money ; 
and  he  accordingly  went  to  France,  advertised  for  the  owners 
of  the  captured  vessels,  and  returned  to  them  the  amount. 
Such  conduct,  instead  of  being  a  matter  for  good  men  to  ad- 
mire, and  for  men  of  loose  morality  to  regard  as  needless 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  135 

scrupulosity,  ought,  when  such  circumstances  arise,  to  be  an 
ordinary  occurrence.  I  do  not  relate  the  fact  because  I  think 
it  entitles  the  party  to  any  extraordinary  praise.  He  was 
honest ;  and  honesty  was  his  duty.  The  praise,  if  praise  be 
due,  consists  in  this — that  he  was  upright  where  most  men 
would  have  been  unjust.  Similar  integrity  upon  parallel  sub- 
jects may  often  be  exhibited  again — ^upon  privateering  it  can- 
not often  be  repeated ;  for  when  the  virtue  of  the  public  is 
great  enough  to  make  such  integrity  frequent,  it  will  be  great 
enough  to  frown  privateering  from  the  world. 

At  the  time  of  war  with  the  Dutch,  about  forty  years  ago, 
an  English  merchant  vessel  captured  a  Dutch  Indiaman.  It 
happened  that  one  of  the  owners  of  the  merchantman  was  one 
of  the  Society  of  Friends  or  Quakers.  This  society,  as  it 
objects  to  war,  does  not  permit  its  members  to  share  in  such 
a  manner  in  the  profits  of  war.  However,  this  person,  when 
he  heard  of  the  capture,  insured  his  share  of  the  prize.  The 
vessel  could  not  be  brought  into  port,  and  he  received  of  the 
underwriters  eighteen  hundred  pounds.  To  have  retained 
this  money  would  have  been  equivalent  to  quitting  the  society, 
so  he  gave  it  to  his  friends  to  dispose  of  it  as  justice  might 
appear  to  prescribe.  The  state  of  public  affairs  on  the  Con- 
tinent did  not  allow  the  trustees  immediately  to  take  any  ac- 
tive measures  to  discover  the  owners  of  the  captured  vessel. 
The  money,  therefore,  was  allowed  to  accumulate.  At  the 
termination  of  the  war  with  France,  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  were  repeatedly  published  in  the  Dutch  journals,  and 
the  full  amount  of  every  claim  that  has  been  clearly  made  out 
has  been  paid  by  the  trustees. 

Confiscations. — I  do  not  know  whether  the  history  of 
confiscations  aflTords  any  examples  of  persons  who  refused  to 
accept  the  confiscated  property.  Yet,  when  it  is  considered 
under  what  circumstances  these  seizures  are  frequently  made 
■ — of  revolution  and  civil  war,  and  the  like,  when  the  vindic- 
tive passions  overpower  the  claims  of  justice  and  humanity — ■ 
it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  acceptance  of  confiscated  pro- 
perty has  sometimes  been  an  act  irreconcilable  with  integrity. 
Look,  for  example,  at  the  confiscations  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution. The  Government  which  at  the  moment  held  the  reins, 
doubtless  sanctioned  the  appropriation  of  the  property  which 
they  seized ;  and  in  so  far  the  acceptance  was  legal.  But 
that  surely  is  not  sufficient.  Let  an  upright  man  suppose 
himself  to  be  the  neighbour  of  another,  who,  with  his  family, 
enjoys  the  comforts  of  a  paternal  estate.  In  the  distractions 
of  political  turbulence  this  neighbour  is  carried  oflf  and  ban- 


136  PROPERTY.  [essay  tl. 

ished,  and  the  estate  is  seized  by  order  of  the  government. 
Would  such  a  man  accept  this  estate  when  the  government 
offered  it,  without  enquiry  and  consideration  ?  Would  he  sit 
down  in  the  warm  comforts  of  plenty,  whilst  his  neighbour 
was  wandering,  destitute  perhaps,  in  another  land,  and  whilst 
his  family  were  in  sorrow  and  in  want  ?  Would  he  not  con- 
sider whether  the  confiscation  was  consistent  with  justice 
and  rectitude — and  whether,  if  it  were  right  with  respect  to 
the  man,  it  was  right  with  respect  to  his  children  and  his 
wife,  who  perhaps  did  not  participate  in  his  offences  ?  It 
may  serve  to  give  clearness  to  our  perception  to  consider, 
that  if  Louis  XVII .  had  been  restored  to  the  throne  soon  after 
his  father's  death,  it  is  probable  that  many  of  the  emigrants 
would  have  been  reinstated  in  their  possessions.  Louis's 
restoration  might  have  been  the  result  of  some  intrigue,  or  of 
a  battle.  Do,  then,  the  obligations  of  mankind  as  to  enjoying 
the  property  of  another,  depend  on  such  circumstances  as  bat- 
tles and  intrigues  ?  If  the  returning  emigrant  would  have 
rightfully  repossessed  his  estate  if  the  battle  was  successful, 
can  the  present  occupier  rightfully  possess  it  if  the  battle  is 
not  successful  ?  Is  the  result  of  a  political  manoeuvre  a  pro- 
per rule  to  guide  a  man's  conscience  in  retaining  or  giving 
up  the  houses  and  lands  of  his  neighbours  1  Politicians,  and 
those  who  profit  by  confiscations,  may  be  little  influenced  by 
considerations  like  these ;  but  there  are  other  men,  who,  I 
think,  will  perceive  that  they  are  important,  and  who,  though 
confiscated  property  may  never  be  offered  to  them,  will  be  able 
to  apply  the  principles  which  these  considerations  illustrate, 
to  their  own  conduct  in  other  affairs. 

It  is  worthy  of  observation  that  in  our  own  countrj',  "  of  all 
the  persons  who  were  enriched  by  the  spoils  of  the  religious 
houses,  there  was  not  one  who  suffered  for  his  opinions  dur<- 
ing  the  persecution."*  How  can  this  be  accounted  for,  ex- 
cept upon  the  presumption  that  those  who  were  so  willing  to 
accept  these  spoils,  were  not  remarkable  for  their  fidelity  to 
religion  ? 

Public  Money. — Some  writers  on  political  affairs  declaim 
much  against  sinecures  and  "  places  ;"  not  always  remember- 
ing that  these  things  may  be  only  modes  of  paying,  and  of 
justly  paying,  the  servants  of  the -public.  It  would,  no  doubt, 
be  preferable  that  he  who  is  rewarded  for  serving  the  public 
should  be  rewarded  avowedly  as  such,  and  not  by  the  salary 
of  a  nominal  office,  which  is  always  filled  whether  the  re- 

«  Southey's  Book  of  the  Church,  vol.  2. 


CHAP.  11.]  PROPERTY.  137 

ceiver  deserves  the  money  or  not.  Sucli  a  mode  of  remuner- 
ation would  be  more  reasonable  in  itself,  and  more  satisfac- 
tory to  the  people.  However,  if  public  men  deserve  the  money 
they  receive,  the  name  by  which  the  salary  is  designated  is 
not  of  much  concern.  The  great  point  is  the  desert.  That 
this  ought  to  be  a  great  point  with  a  government  there  can  be 
no  doubt ;  and  it  is  indeed  upon  governments  that  writers  are 
wont  to  urge  the  obligation. 

But  our  business  is  with  the  receivers.  May  a  person, 
morally,  appropriate  to  his  own  use  any  amount  of  money 
which  a  government  chooses  to  give  him  ?  No.  Then,  when 
the  public  money  is  offered  to  any  man,  he  is  bound  in  con- 
science to  consider  whether  he  is  in  equity  entitled  to  it  or 
not.  If,  not  being  entitled,  he  accepts  it,  he  is  not  an  upright 
man.  For  who  gives  it  to  him  ?  The  government ;  that  is, 
the  trustee  for  the  public.  A  government  is  in  a  situation  not 
dissimilar  to  that  of  a  trustee  for  a  minor.  It  has  no  right  to 
dispose  of  the  public  property  according  to  its  own  will. 
Whatever  it  expends,  except  with  a  view  to  the  public  advan- 
tage, is  to  be  regarded  as  so  much  fraud ;  and  it  is  quite  mani- 
fest that  if  the  government  has  no  right  to  give,  the  private 
person  can  have  no  right  to  receive.  I  know  of  no  exception 
to  the  application  of  these  remarks,  except  where  the  public 
have  expressly  delivered  up  a  certain  amount  of  revenue  to 
be  applied  according  to  the  inclination  of  the  governing  power. 

Now,  the  equity  of  an  individual's  claims  upon  the  public 
property  must  be  jfounded  upon  his  services  to  the  public :  not 
upon  his  services  to  a  minister,  not  upon  the  partiality  of  a 
prince ;  but  upon  services  actually  performed  or  performing 
for  the  public*  The  degree  in  which  familiarity  with  an  ill 
custom  diminishes  our  estimate  of  its  viciousness  is  wonder- 
ful. If  you  propose  to  a  man  to  come  to  some  understanding 
with  a  guardian,  by  which  he  shall  get  a  hundred  pounds  out 
of  a  ward's  estate,  he  starts  from  you  with  abhorrence.  Yet 
that  same  man,  if  a  minister  should  offer  him  ten  times  as 
much  of  the  public  property,  puts  it  complacently  and  thank- 
fully into  his  pocket.    Is  this  consistency  ?   Is  it  uprightness  ? 

In  estimating  the  recompense  to  which  public  men  are 
entitled,  let  the  principles  by  all  means  be  liberal.  Let  them 
be  well  paid :  but  let  the  money  be  paid,  not  given  ;  let  it  be 
the  discharge  of  a  debt,  not  the  making  of  a  present.  And 
were  I  a  servant  of  the  public,  I  should  not  assume  as  of 

*  It  is  not  necessary  that  these  services  should  have  been  personal. 
The  widow  or  son  of  a  man  who  had  been  inadequately  remunerated  du- 
ring his  Ufe,  may  very  properly  accept  a  competent  pension  from  the  State. 

12* 


138  PROPERTY.  [essay  II. 

course,  that  whatever  remuneration  the  government  was  dis- 
posed to  give,  it  would  be  right  for  me  to  receive.  I  should 
think  myself  obliged  to  consider  for  myself:  and  without 
affecting  a  trifling  scrupulousness,  I  could  not  with  integrity 
receive  two  thousand  a  year,  if  I  knew  that  I  was  handsomely 
remunerated  by  one.  These  principles  of  conduct  do  not 
appear  to  lose  their  application  in  respect  of  fixed  salaries  or 
perquisites  that  are  attached  to  offices.  If  a  man  cannot  up- 
rightly take  two  thousand  pounds  when  he  knows  he  is  enti- 
tled to  but  one,  it  cannot  be  made  right  by  the  circumstance 
that  others  have  taken  it  before  him,  or  that  all  take  it  who  ac- 
cept the  office.  The  income  may  be  exorbitantly  dispropor- 
tioned,  not  merely  to  the  labour  of  the  office,  but  to  the  total 
services  of  the  individual.  Nor,  I  think,  do  these  principles 
lose  their  application,  even  when,  as  in  this  country,  a  sum  is 
voted  by  the  Legislature  for  the  Civil  List,  and  when  it  is  out 
of  this  voted  sum  that  the  salaries  are  paid.  You  say — ^the 
representatives  of  the  people  give  the  individual  the  money. 
Very  well — ^yet  even  this  may  be  true  in  theory  rather  than 
in  fact.  But  who  pretends  that,  when  the  votes  for  the  Civil 
List  are  made  in  the  House  of  Commons,  its  members  ac- 
tually consider  whether  the  individuals  to  whom  the  money 
will  be  distributed  are  in  equity  entitled  to  it  or  not  ? — The 
question  is  very  simple  at  last — whether  a  person  may  vir- 
tuously accept  the  money  of  the  public,  without  having  ren- 
dered proportionate  services  to  the  public  ?  There  have  been 
examples  of  persons  who  have  voluntarily  declined  to  receive 
the  whole  of  the  sums  allotted  to  them  by  the  government ;  and 
when  these  sums  were  manifestly  disproportionate  to  the 
claims  of  the  parties,  or  unreasonable  when  compared  with 
the  privations  of  the  people,  such  sacrifices  approve  them- 
selves to  the  feelings  and  consciences  of  the  public.  We 
feel  that  they  are  just  and  right ;  and  this  feeling  outweighs 
in  authority  a  hundred  argimients  by  which  men  may  attempt 
to  defend  themselves  in  the  contrary  practice. 

Those  large  salaries  which  are  given  by  way  of  "  support- 
ing the  dignity  of  public  functionaries,"  are  not  I  think  recon- 
cilable with  propriety  nor  dictated  by  necessity.  At  any 
rate,  there  must  be  some  sorrowful  want  of  purity  in  political 
affairs,  if  an  ambassador  or  a  prime  minister  is  indebted  for 
any  part  of  his  efficiency  to  these  dignities  and  splendours. 
If  the  necessity  for  them  is  not  imaginary,  it  ought  to  be  ;  and 
it  may  be  doubted  whether,  even  now,  a  minister  of  integrity 
who  could  not  afford  the  customary  splendours  of  his  office, 
would  not  possess  as  much  weight  in  his  own  country  and 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  139 

amongst  other  nations,  as  if  he  were  surrounded  with  magni- 
ficence. Who  feels  disrespect  towards  the  great  officers  of 
the  American  government  ?  And  yet  their  salaries  are  incom- 
parably smaller  than  those  of  some  of  the  inferior  ministers 
in  Europe. 

Insurance. — It  is  very  possible  for  a  man  to  act  dishon- 
estly every  day  and  yet  never  to  defraud  another  of  a  shilling. 
A  merchant  who  conducts  his  business  partly  or  wholly  with 
borrowed  capital,  is  not  honest  if  he  endangers  the  loss  of  an 
amount  of  property  which,  if  lost,  would  disable  him  from 
paying  his  debts.  He  who  possesses  a  thousand  pounds  of 
his  own  and  borrows  a  thousand  of  some  one  else,  cannot 
virtuously  speculate  so  extensively  as  that,  if  his  prospects 
should  be  disappointed,  he  would  lose  twelve  hundred.  The 
speculation  is  dishonest  whether  it  succeeds  or  not :  it  is  risk- 
ing other  men's  property  without  their  consent.  Under  simi- 
lar circumstances  it  is  unjust  not  to  insure.  Perhaps  the 
majority  of  uninsured  traders,  if  their  houses  and  goods  were 
burnt,  would  be  unable  to  pay  their  creditors.  The  injustice 
consists  not  in  the  actual  loss  which  may  be  inflicted,  (for 
whether  a  fire  happens  or  not,  the  injustice  is  the  same,)  but 
in  endangering  the  infliction  of  the  loss.  There  are  but  two 
ways  in  which,  under  such  circumstances,  the  claims  of  rec- 
titude can  be  satisfied — one  is  by  not  endangering  the  property, 
and  the  other  by  telling  its  actual  owner  that  it  will  be  en- 
dangered, and  leaving  him  to  incur  the  risk  or  not  as  he 
pleases. 

"  Those  who  hold  the  property  of  others  are  not  warranted, 
on  the  principles  of  justice,  in  neglecting  to  inform  themselves 
from  time  to  time,  of  the  real  situation  of  their  affairs."*  This 
enforces  the  doctrines  which  we  have  delivered.  It  asserts 
that  injustice  attaches  to  not  investigating ;  and  this  injustice 
is  often  real  whether  creditors  are  injured  or  not. 

During  the  seventeenth  century,  when  religious  persecu- 
tion was  very  active,  some  beautiful  examples  of  integrity 
were  offered  by  its  victims.  It  was  common  for  officers  to 
seize  the  property  of  conscientious  and  good  men,  and  some- 
times to  plunder  them  with  such  relentless  barbarity  as  scarcely 
to  leave  them  the  common  utensils  of  a  kitchen.  These  per 
sons  sometimes  had  the  property  of  others  on  their  premises  , 
and  when  they  heard  that  the  officers  were  likely  to  make  a 
seizure,  industriously  removed  from  their  premises  all  pro- 
perty but  their  own.     At  one  period,  a  number  of  traders  in 

*  Official  Documents  of  the  Yearly  Meeting  of  the  Society  of  Friends : 


140  PROPERTY.  [essay  II. 

the  country  who  had  made  purchases  in  the  London  markets, 
found  that  their  plunderers  were  likely  to  disable  them  from 
paying  for  their  purchases,  and  they  requested  the  merchants 
to  take  back,  and  the  merchants  did  take  back,  their  goods. 

In  passing,  I  would  remark,  that  the  readers  of  mere  gen- 
eral history  only,  are  very  imperfectly  acquainted  with  the  ex- 
tent to  which  persecution  on  account  of  religion  has  been 
practised  in  these  kingdoms,  ages  since  protestantism  became 
the  religion  of  the  state.  A  competent  acquaintance  with 
this  species  of  history,  is  of  incomparable  greater  value  than 
much  of  the  matter  with  which  historians  are  wont  to  fill  their 
pages. 

Improvements  on  Estates. — There  are  some  circum- 
stances in  which  the  occupier  of  lands  or  houses,  who  has 
increased  their  value  by  erections  or  other  improvements, 
cannot  in  justice  be  compelled  to  pay  for  the  increased  value 
if  he  purchases  the  property.  A  man  purchases  the  lease  of 
an  estate,  and  has  reason  to  expect  from  the  youth  and  health 
of  the  "  lives,"  that  he  may  retain  possession  of  it  for  thirty 
or  forty  years.  In  consequence  of  this  expectation,  he  makes 
many  additions  to  the  buildings  ;  and  by  other  modes  of  im- 
provement considerably  increases  the  value  of  the  estate.  It 
however  happens  that  in  the  course  of  two  or  three  years  all 
the  lives  drop.  The  landowner  when  the  person  applies  to 
him  for  a  new  lease,  demands  payment  for  all  the  improve- 
ments. This  I  say  is  not  just.  It  will  be  replied,  that  all 
parties  knew  and  voluntarily  undertook  the  risk  :  so  they  did, 
and  if  the  event  had  approached  to  the  ordinary  average  of 
such  risks,  the  owner  would  act  rightly  in  demanding  the 
increased  value.  But  it  does  not ;  and  this  is  the  circum- 
stance which  would  make  an  upright  man  decline  to  avail 
himself  of  his  advantages.  Yet,  if  any  one  critically  disputes 
the  "justice"  of  the  demand,  I  give  up  the  word,  and  say  that 
it  is  not  considerate,  and  kind,  and  benevolent ;  in  a  word,  it 
is  not  Christian.  It  is  no  light  calamity  upon  such  a  tenant 
to  be  obliged  so  unexpectedly  to  repurchase  a  lease  ;  and  to 
add  to  this  calamity  a  demand  which  the  common  feelings  of 
mankind  would  condemn,  cannot  be  the  act  of  a  good  man. 
Who  doubts  whether,  within  the  last  fourteen  years,  it  has 
not  been  the  duty  of  many  landowners  to  return  a  portion  of 
their  rents  1  The  duty  is  the  same  in  one  case  as  in  the  other  ; 
and  it  is  founded  on  the  same  principles  in  both.  To  say 
that  other  persons  would  be  willing  to  pay  the  present  value 
of  the  property,  would  not  affect  the  question  of  morality ; 
because,  to  sell  it  to  another  for  that  value  when  the  former 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  141 

tenant  was  desirous  of  repurchasing,  would  not  diminish  the 
unkindness  to  him. 

Settlements. — It  is  not  an  unfrequent  occurrence,  when 
a  merchant  or  other  person  becomes  insolvent,  that  the  credit- 
ors unexpectedly  find  the  estate  is  chargeable  with  a  large 
settlement  on  the  wife.  There  is  a  consideration  connected 
with  this  which  in  a  greater  degree  involves  integrity  of  char- 
acter than  perhaps  is  often  supposed.  Men  in  business 
obtain  credit  from  others  in  consequence  of  the  opinions 
which  others  form  of  their  character  and  property.  The 
latter,  if  it  be  not  the  greater  foundation  of  credit,  is  a  great 
one.  A  person  lives  then  at  the  rate  of  a  thousand  a  year ; 
he  maintains  a  respectable  establishment,  and  diffuses  over 
all  its  parts  indications  of  property.  These  appearances  are 
relied  upon  by  other  men  :  they  think  they  may  safely  entrust 
him,  and  they  do  entrust  him,  with  goods  or  money ;  until, 
when  his  insolvency  is  suddenly  announced,  they  are  sur- 
prised and  alarmed  to  find  that  five  hundred  a  year  is  settled 
on  his  wife.  Now  this  person  has  induced  others  to  confide 
their  property  to  him  by  holding  out  fallacious  appearances. 
He  has  in  reality  deceived  them  ;  and  the  deception  is  as  real, 
'though  it  may  not  be  as  palpable,  as  if  he  had  deluded  them 
with  verbal  falsehoods.  He  has  been  acting  a  continued  un- 
truth. Perhaps  such  a  man  will  say  that  he  never  denied 
that  the  greater  part  of  his  apparent  property  was  settled  on 
his  wife.  This  may  be  true  ;  but,  when  his  neighbour  came 
to  him  to  lodge  five  or  six  hundred  pounds  in  his  hands ; 
when  he  was  conscious  that  this  neighbour's  confidence  was 
founded  upon  the  belief  that  his  apparent  property  was  really 
his  own ;  when  there  was  reason  to  apprehend,  that  if  his 
neighbour  had  known  his  actual  circumstances  he  would  have 
hesitated  in  entrusting  him  with  the  money,  then  he  does 
really  and  practically  deceive  his  neighbour,  and  it  is  not  a 
sufficient  justification  to  say  that  he  has  uttered  no  untruth. 
The  reader  will  observe  that  the  case  is  very  different  from 
that  of  a  person  who  conducts  his  business  with  borrowed 
money.  This  person  must  annually  pay  the  income  of  the 
money  to  the  lender.  He  does  not  expend  it  on  his  own 
establishment,  and  consequently  does  not  hold  out  the  same 
fallacious  appearances.  Some  profligate  spendthrifts  take  a 
house,  buy  elegant  furniture,  and  keep  a  handsome  equipage, 
in  order  by  these  appearances  to  deceive  and  defraud  traders. 
No  man  doubts  whether  these  persons  act  criminally.  How 
then  can  he  be  innocent  who  knowingly  practises  a  deception 
similar  in  kind  though  varying  in  degree  ? 


142  PROPERTY.  [essay  11. 

Houses  of  Infamy. — If  it  were  not  that  a  want  of  virtue 
is  so  common  amongst  men,  we  should  wonder  at  the  cool- 
ness with  which  some  persons  of  decent  reputation  are  con- 
tent to  let  their  houses  to  persons  of  abandoned  character, 
and  to  put  periodically  into  their  pockets,  the  profits  of  in- 
famy. Sophisms  may  easily  be  invented  to  palliate  the  con- 
duct ;  but  nothing  can  make  it  right.  Such  a  landlord  knows 
perfectly  to  what  purposes  his  house  will  be  devoted,  and 
knows  that  he  shall  receive  the  wages,  not  perhaps  of  his 
own  iniquity,  but  still  the  wages  of  iniquity.  He  is  almost  a 
partaker  with  them  in  their  sins.  If  I  were  to  sell  a  man 
arsenic  or  a  pistol,  knowing  that  the  buyer  wanted  it  to  com- 
mit murder,  should  I  not  be  a  bad  man  ?  If  I  let  a  man  a 
house,  knowing  that  the  renter  wants  it  for  purposes  of  wick- 
edness, am  I  an  innocent  man  ?  Not  that  it  is  to  be  affirmed 
that  no  one  may  receive  ill-gotten  money.  A  grocer  may 
sell  a  pound  of  sugar  to  a  woman  though  he  knows  she  is 
upon  the  town.  But,  if  we  cannot  specify  the  point  at  which 
a  lawful  degree  of  participation  terminates,  we  can  determine, 
respecting  some  degrees  of  participation,  that  they  are  unlaw- 
ful. To  the  majority  of  such  offenders  against  the  Moral 
Law,  these  arguments  may  be  urged  in  vain ;  there  are  some 
of  whom  we  may  indulge  greater  hope.  Respectable  public 
brewers  are  in  the  habit  of  purchasing  beer  houses  in  order 
that  they  may  supply  the  publicans  with  their  porter.  Some 
of  these  houses  are  notoriously  the  resort  of  the  most  aban- 
doned of  mankind  ;  the  daily  scenes  of  riot,  and  drunkenness, 
and  of  the  most  filthy  debauchery.  Yet  these  houses  are 
purchased  by  brewers — ^perhaps  there  is  a  competition  amongst 
them  for  the  premises  ;  they  put  in  a  tenant  of  their  own, 
supply  him  with  beer,  and  regularly  receive  the  profits  of 
this  excess  of  wickedness.  Is  there  no  such  obligation  as 
that  of  abstaining  even  from  the  appearance  of  evil  ?  Is  there 
no  such  thing  as  guilt  without  a  personal  participation  in  it  ? 
All  pleas  such  as  that,  if  one  man  did  not  supply  such  a  house 
another  would,  are  vain  subterfuges.  Upon  such  reasoning, 
you  might  rob  a  traveller  on  the  road,  if  you  knew  that  at  the 
next  turning  a  footpad  was  waiting  to  plunder  him  if  you  did 
not.  Selling  such  houses  to  be  occupied  as  before,  would  be 
like  selling  slaves  because  you  thought  it  criminal  to  keep 
them  in  bondage.  The  obligation  to  discountenance  wicked- 
ness rests  upon  him  who  possesses  the  power.  "  To  him 
who  knoweth  to  do  good  and  doeth  it  not,  to  him  it  is  sin." 
To  retain  our  virtue  may  in  such  cases  cost  us  something; 


CHAP.  II.]  PROPERTY.  143 

but  he  who  values  virtue  at  its  worth  will  not  think  that  he 
retains  it  at  a  dear  rate. 

Literary  Property. — Upon  similar  grounds  there  are 
some  of  the  profits  of  the  press  which  a  good  man  cannot  ac- 
cept. There  are  some  periodical  works  and  some  newspa- 
pers, from  which,  if  he  were  offered  an  annual  income,  he 
would  feel  himself  bound  to  reject  it.  Suppose  there  is  a 
newspaper  which  is  lucrative  because  it  gratifies  a  vicious 
taste  for  slander  or  indecency — or  suppose  there  is  a  maga- 
zine of  which  the  profits  result  from  the  attraction  of  irre- 
ligious or  licentious  articles,  I  would  not  put  into  my  pocket, 
every  quarter  of  a  year,  the  money  which  was  gained  by 
vitiating  mankind.  In  all  such  cases,  there  is  one  sort  of  ob- 
ligation which  applies  with  great  force,  the  obligation  not  to 
discourage  rectitude  by  our  example.  Upon  this  ground,  a 
man  of  virtue  would  hesitate  even  to  contribute  an  article  to 
such  a  publication,  lest  they  who  knew  he  was  a  contributor, 
should  think  they  had  his  example  to  justify  improprieties  of 
their  own. 

Rewards. — A  person  loses  his  pocket-book  containing 
fifty  pounds,  and  offers  ten  pounds  to  the  finder  if  he  will 
restore  it.  The  finder  ought  not  to  demand  the  reward.  It 
implies  surely  some  imputation  upon  a  man's  integrity,  when 
he  accepts  payment  for  being  honest.  For,  for  what  else  is 
he  paid  ?  If  he  retains  the  property  he  is  manifestly  fraudu- 
lent. To  be  paid  for  giving  it  up,  is  to  be  paid  for  not  com- 
mitting fraud.  The  loser  offers  the  reward  in  order  to  over- 
power the  temptation  to  dishonesty.  To  accept  the  reward 
is  therefore  tacitly  to  acknowledge  that  you  would  have  been 
dishonest  if  it  had  not  been  offered.  This  certainly  is  not 
maintaining  an  integrity  that  is  "  above  suspicion."  It  will 
be  said  that  the  reward  is  offered  voluntarily.  This,  in  proper 
language,  is  not  true.  Two  evils  are  presented  to  the  loser, 
of  which  he  is  compelled  to  choose  one.  If  men  were  honest, 
he  would  not  offer  the  reward :  he  would  make  it  known  that 
he  had  lost  his  pocket-book,  and  the  finder,  if  a  finder  there 
were,  would  restore  it.  The  offered  ten  pounds  is  a  tax  which 
is  imposed  upon  him  by  the  want  of  uprightness  in  mankind, 
and  he  who  demands  the  money  actively  promotes  the  impo- 
sition. The  very  word  reward  carries  with  it  its  own  repro- 
bation. As  a  reward,  the  man  of  integrity  would  receive  no- 
thing. If  the  loser  requested  it,  he  might  if  he  needed  it, 
accept  a  donation  ;  but  he  would  let  it  be  understood  that  he 
accepted  a  present  not  that  he  received  a  debt. 


144  PROPERTY.  [essay  II. 

Perhaps  examples  enough  or  more  than  enough,  have  been 
accumulated  to  illustrate  this  class  of  obligations.  Many  ap- 
peared needful,  because  it  is  a  class  which  is  deplorably  neg- 
lected in  practice.  So  strong  is  the  temptation  to  think  that  we 
may  rightfully  possess  whatever  the  law  assigns  to  us — so  in- 
sinuating is  the  notion,  upon  subjects  of  property,  that  whatever 
the  law  does  not  punish  we  may  rightfully  do,  that  there  is 
little  danger  of  supplying  too  many  motives  to  habitual  dis- 
crimination of  our  duties  and  to  habitual  purity  of  conduct. 
Let  the  reader  especially  remember,  that  the  examples  which 
are  offered  are  not  all  of  them  selected  on  account  of  their 
individual  importance,  but  rather  as  illustrations  of  the  gen- 
eral principle.  A  man  may  meet  with  a  hundred  circumstances 
in  life  to  which  none  of  these  examples  are  relevant,  but  I 
think  he  will  not  have  much  difficulty  in  estimating  the  prin- 
ciples which  they  illustrate.  And  this  induces  the  observa- 
tion, that  although  several  of  these  examples  are  taken  from 
British  law  or  British  customs,  they  do  not,  on  that  account, 
lose  their  applicability  where  these  laws  and  customs  do  not 
obtain.  If  this  book  should  ever  be  read  in  a  foreign  land,  or 
if  it  should  be  read  in  this  land  when  public  institutions  or 
the  tenor  of  men's  conduct  shall  be  changed,  the  principles 
of  its  morality  will,  nevertheless,  be  applicable  to  the  affairs 
of  life. 


CHAPTER  III. 

INEQUALITY    OF   PROPERTY. 

Accumulation  of  Wealth:  its  proper  limits — Provision  for  children: 
"  Keeping  up  the  family." 

That  many  and  great  evils  result  from  that  inequality  of 
property  which  exists  in  civilized  countries,  is  indicated  by 
the  many  propositions  which  have  been  made  to  diminish  or 
destroy  it.  We  want  not  indeed  such  evidence  ;  for  it  is  suf- 
ficiently manifest  to  every  man  who  will  look  round  upon  his 
neighbours.  We  join  not  with  those  who  declaim  against  all 
inequality  of  property :  the  real  evil  is  not  that  it  is  unequal, 
but  that  it  is  greatly  unequal ;  not  that  one  man  is  richer  than 
another,  but  that  one  man  is  so  rich  as  to  be  luxurious,  or 
imperious,  or  profligate,  and  that  another  is  so  poor  as  to  be 


CHAP  III.]  INEQUALITY    OF    PROPERTY.  145 

abject  and  depraved,  as  well  as  to  be  destitute  of  the  proper 
comforts  of  life. 

There  are  two  means  by  which  the  pernicious  inequality 
of  property  may  be  diminished  ;  by  political  institutions,  and 
by  the  exertions  of  private  men.  Our  present  business  is  with 
the  latter. 

To  a  person  who  possesses  and  expends  more  than  he 
needs,  there  are  two  reasonable  inducements  to  diminish  its 
amount — first,  to  benefit  others,  and  next  to  benefit  his  family 
and  himself.  The  claims  of  benevolence  towards  others  are 
often  and  earnestly  urged  upon  the  public,  and  for  that  reason 
they  will  not  be  repeated  here.  Not  that  there  is  no  occasion 
to  repeat  the  lesson,  for  it  is  very  inadequately  learnt ;  but 
that  it  is  of  more  consequence  to  exhibit  obligations  which 
are  less  frequently  enforced.  To  insist  upon  diminishing  the 
amount  of  a  man's  property  ybr  the  sake  of  his  family  and  him- 
self may  present  to  some  men  new  ideas,  and  to  some  men 
the  doctrine  may  be  paradoxical. 

Large  possessions  are  in  a  great  majority  of  instances  in- 
jurious to  the  possessor — that  is  to  say,  those  who  hold  them 
are  generally  less  excellent,  both  as  citizens  and  as  men,  than 
those  who  do  not.  The  truth  appears  to  be  established  by 
the  concurrent  judgment  of  mankind.  Lord  Bacon  says — 
"  Certainly  great  riches  have  sold  more  men  than  they  have 
bought  out.  As  baggage  is  to  an  army,  so  are  riches  to  vir- 
tue.— It  hindereth  the  march,  yea  and  the  care  of  it  some- 
times loseth  or  disturbeth  the  victory." — "  It  is  to  be  feared 
that  the  general  tendency  of  rank,  and  especially  of  riches,  is 
to  withdraw  the  heart  from  spiritual  exercises."*  "  A  much 
looser  system  of  morals  commonly  prevails  in  the  higher  than 
in  the  middling  and  lower  orders  of  society."!  "  The  middle 
rank  contains  most  virtue  and  abilities. "J 

"  Wealth  heap'd  on  wealth,  nor  truth  nor  safety  buys, 
The  dangers  gather  as  the  treasures  rise."§ 

"  There  is  no  greater  calamity  than  that  of  leaving  children 
an  affluent  independence. — The  worst  examples  in  the  Society 
of  Friends  are  generally  amongst  the  children  of  the  rich."|( 

It  was  an  observation  of  Voltaire's  that  the  English  people 
were,  like  their  butts  of  beer,  froth  at  top,  dregs  at  bottom — • 
in  the  middle  excellent.  The  most  rational,  the  Wisest,  the 
best  portion  of  mankind,  belong  to  that  class  who  "  possess 

*  More's  Moral  Sketches,  3rd  Edit.  p.  446.     t  Wilberforce :  Pract.  View. 
X  Wollestoncroft :  Rights  of  Women,  c.  4. 

§  Johnson :  Vanity  of  Human  Wishes.  ||  Clarkson :  Portraiture. 

13 


146  INEQUALITY    OF    PROPERTY.  fESSAY  11. 

neither  poverty  nor  riches."  Let  the  reader  look  around  him, 
Let  him  observe  who  are  the  persons  that  contribute  most  to 
the  moral  and  physical  amelioration  of  mankind ;  who  they 
are  that  practically  and  personally  support  our  unnumbered 
institutions  of  benevolence ;  who  they  are  that  exhibit  the 
worthiest  examples  of  intellectual  exertion ;  who  they  are  to 
whom  he  would  himself  apply  if  he  needed  to  avail  himself 
of  a  manly  and  discriminating  judgment.  That  they  are  the 
poor  is  not  to  be  expected :  we  appeal  to  himself  whether 
they  are  the  rich.  Who  then  would  make  his  son  a  rich 
man?  Who  would  remove  his  child  out  of  that  station  in 
society  which  is  thus  peculiarly  favourable  to  intellectual  and 
iporal  excellence  ? 

If  a  man  knows  that  wealth  will  in  all  probability  be  inju- 
rious to  himself  and  to  his  children,  injurious  too  in  the  most 
important  points,  the  religious  and  moral  character,  it  is  mani- 
festly a  point  of  the  soundest  wisdom  and  the  truest  kindness 
to  decline  to  accumulate  it.  Upon  this  subject,  it  is  admira- 
ble to  observe  with  what  exactness  the  precepts  of  Christian- 
ity are  adapted  to  that  conduct  which  the  experience  of  life 
recommends.  "  The  care  of  this  world  and  the  deceitfulness 
of  riches  choke  the  word  :" — "  choked  with  cares,  and  riches, 
and  pleasures  of  this  life,  and  bring  no  fruit  to  perfection :" — ■ 
"  How  hardly  shall  they  that  have  riches  enter  into  the  king- 
dom of  God  !"  "  They  that  will  be  rich  fall  into  temptation 
and  a  snare,  and  into  many  foolish  and  hurtful  lusts  which 
drown  men  in  destruction  and  perdition."  Not  that  riches 
necessarily  lead  to  these  consequences,  but  that  such  is  their 
tendency  ;  a  tendency  so  uniform  and  powerful  that  it  is  to  be 
feared  these  are  their  very  frequent  results.  Now  this  lan- 
guage of  the  Christian  Scriptures  does  not  contain  merely 
statements  of  fact — it  imposes  duties  ;  and  whatever  may  be 
the  precise  mode  of  regarding  those  duties,  one  point  is  per- 
fectly clear  ; — ^that  he  who  sets  no  other  limit  to  his  posses- 
sions or  accumulations  than  inability  or  indisposition  to  obtain 
more,  does  not  conform  to  the  will  of  God.  Assuredly,  if 
any  specified  thing  is  declared  by  Christianity  to  be  highly 
likely  to  obstruct  our  advancement  in  goodness,  and  to  en 
danger  our  final  felicity,  against  that  thing,  whatever  it  be,  i 
is  imperative  upon  us  to  guard  with  wakeful  solicitude. 

And  therefore,  without  affirming  that  no  circumstance  can 
justify  a  great  accumulation  of  property,  it  may  safely  be  con- 
cluded that  far  the  greater  number  of  those  who  do  accumu- 
late it,  do  wrong :  nor  do  I  see  any  reason  to  be  deterred 
from  ranking  the  distribution  of  a  portion  of  great  wealth,  or  a 


CHAP.  III.]  INEQUALITY    OF    PROPERTY.  147 

refusal  to  accumulate  it,  amongst  the  imperative  duties  which 
are  imposed  by  the  Moral  Law.  In  truth,  a  man  may  almost 
discover  whether  such  conduct  is  obligatory,  by  referring  to 
the  motives  which  induce  him  to  acquire  great  property  or  to 
retain  it.  The  motives  are  generally  impure ;  the  desire  of 
splendour,  or  the  ambition  of  eminence,  or  the  love  of  per- 
sonal indulgence.  Are  these  motives  fit  to  be  brought  into 
competition  with  the  probable  welfare,  the  virtue,  the  useful- 
ness, and  the  happiness  of  his  family  and  himself?  Yet  such 
is  the  competition,  and  to  such  unworthy  objects,  duty,  and 
reason,  and  affection  are  sacrificed. 

It  will  be  said,  a  man  should  provide  for  his  family ;  and 
make  them,  if  he  can,  independent.  That  he  should  provide 
for  his  family  is  true  ;  that  he  should  make  them  independent, 
at  any  rate  that  he  should  give  them  an  affluent  independence, 
forms  no  part  of  his  duty,  and  is  frequently  a  violation  of  it. 
As  it  respects  almost  all  men,  he  will  best  approve  himself  a 
wise  and  kind  parent,  who  leaves  to  his  sons  so  much  only 
as  may  enable  them,  by  moderate  engagements,  to  enjoy  the 
conveniences  and  comforts  of  life ;  and  to  his  daughters  a 
sufficiency  to  possess  similar  comforts,  but  not  a  sufficiency 
to  shine  amongst  the  great,  or  to  mingle  with  the  votaries  of 
expensive  dissipation.  If  any  father  prefers  other  objects  to 
the  welfare  and  happiness  of  his  children — if  wisdom  and 
kindness  towards  them  are  with  him  subordinate  considera- 
tions, it  is  not  probable  that  he  will  listen  to  reasonings  like 
these.  But  where  is  the  parent  who  dares  to  acknowledge 
this  preference  to  his  own  mind  ? 

It  were  idle  to  affect  to  specify  any  amount  of  property 
which  a  person  ought  not  to  exceed.  The  circumstances  of 
one  man  may  make  it  reasonable  that  he  should  acquire  or 
retain  much  more  than  another  who  has  fewer  claims.  Yet 
somewhat  of  a  general  rule  may  be  suggested.  He  who  is 
accumulating  should  consider  why  he  desires  more.  If  it 
really  is,  that  he  believes  an  addition  will  increase  the  welfare 
and  usefulness  and  virtue  of  his  family,  it  is  probable  that 
further  accumulation  may  be  right.  If  no  such  belief  is  sin- 
cerely entertained,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  it  is  wrong. 
He  who  already  possesses  affluence  should  consider  its  actual 
existing  effects. — If  he  employs  a  competent  portion  of  it  in 
increasing  the  happiness  of  others,  if  it  does  not  produce  any 
injurious  effect  upon  his  own  mind,  if  it  does  not  diminish  or 
impair  the  virtues  of  his  children,  if  they  are  grateful  for  their 
privileges  rather  than  vain  of  their  superiority,  if  they  second 
his  own  endeavours  to  diffuse  happiness  around  them,  he  may 


148  INEQUALITY    OF    PROPERTY.  [eSSAY  II. 

remain  as  he  is.  If  such  effects  are  not  produced,  but  in- 
stead of  them  others  of  an  opposite  tendency,  he  certainly 
has  too  much. — Upon  this  serious  subject  let  the  Christian 
parent  be  serious.  If,  as  is  proved  by  the  experience  of 
every  day,  great  property  usually  inflicts  great  injuries  upon 
those  who  possess  it,  what  motive  can  induce  a  good  man  to 
lay  it  up  for  his  children  ?  What  motive  will  be  his  justifi- 
cation, if  it  tempts  them  from  virtue  ? 

When  children  are  similarly  situated  with  respect  to  their 
probable  wants,  there  seems  no  reason  for  preferring  the  el- 
der to  the  younger,  or  sons  to  daughters.  Since  the  proper 
object  of  a  parent  in  making  a  division  of  his  property,  is  the 
comfort  and  welfare  of  his  children — if  this  object  is  likely 
to  be  better  secured  by  an  equal  than  by  any  other  division, 
an  equal  division  ought  to  be  made.  It  is  a  common,  though 
not  a  very  reasonable  opinion,  that  a  son  needs  a  larger  por- 
tion than  a  daughter.  To  be  sure,  if  he  is  to  live  in  greater 
affluence  than  she,  he  does.  But  why  should  he  ?  There 
appears  no  motive  in  reason,  and  certainly  there  is  none  in 
affection,  for  diminishing  one  child's  comforts  to  increase 
another's.  A  son  too  has  greater  opportunities  of  gain.  A 
woman  almost  never  grows  rich  except  by  legacies  or  mar- 
riage ;  so  that,  if  her  father  do  not  provide  for  her,  it  is  prob- 
able that  she  will  not  be  provided  for  at  all.  As  to  marriage, 
the  opportunity  is  frequently  not  offered  to  a  woman ;  and  a 
father  if  he  can,  should  so  provide  for  his  daughter  as  to 
enable  her,  in  single  life,  to  live  in  a  state  of  comfort  not 
greatly  inferior  to  her  brother's.  The  remark  that  the  custom 
of  preferring  sons  is  general,  and  therefore  that  when  a  couple 
marry  the  inequality  is  adjusted,  applies  only  to  the  case  of 
those  who  do  marry.  The  number  of  women  who  do  not  is 
great ;  and  a  parent  cannot  foresee  his  daughter's  lot.  Be- 
sides, since  marriage  is  (and  is  reasonably)  a  great  object  to 
a  woman,  and  is  desirable  both  for  women  and  for  men,  there 
appears  a  propriety  in  increasing  the  probability  of  marriage 
by  giving  to  women  such  property  as  shall  constitute  an  ad- 
ditional inducement  to  marriage  in  the  men.  I  shall  hardly 
be  suspected  of  recommending  persons  to  "  marry  for  money." 
My  meaning  is  this :  A  young  man  possesses  five  hundred 
a-year,  and  lives  on  a  corresponding  scale.  He  is  attached  to 
a  woman  who  has  but  one  hundred  a  year.  This  young  man 
sees  that  if  he  marries,  he  must  reduce  his  scale  of  living ; 
and  the  consideration  operates  (I  do  not  say  that  it  ought  to 
operate)  to  deter  him  from  marriage.  But  if  the  young  man 
possessed  three  hundred  a-year  and  lived  accordingly,  and  if 


CHAP.  III.]  INEQUALITY    OF    PROPERTY.  149 

the  object  of  his  attachment  possessed  three  hundred  a-year 
also,  he  would  not  be  prevented  from  marrying  her  by  the 
fear  of  being  obliged  to  diminish  his  system  of  expenditure. 
Just  complaints  are  made  of  those  half-concealed  blandish- 
ments by  which  some  women  who  need  "  a  settlement"  en- 
deavour to  procure  it  by  marriage.  Those  blandishments 
would  become  more  tempered  with  propriety,  if  oile  great  mo- 
tive was  taken  away  by  the  possession  of  a  competence  of  their 
own. 

An  equal  division  of  a  father's  property  will  be  said  to  be 
incompatible  with  the  system  of  primogeniture,  and  almost  in- 
compatible with  hereditary  rank.  These  are  not  subjects  for 
the  present  Essay.  Whatever  the  reader  may  think  of  the 
practical  value  of  these  institutions,  it  is  manifest  that  far  the 
greater  number  of  those  who  have  property  to  bequeath,  need 
not  concern  themselves  with  either :  they  may,  in  their  own 
practice,  contribute  to  diminish  the  general  and  the  particular 
evils  of  unequal  property.  With  respect  to  their  own  fami- 
lies, the  result  can  hardly  fail  to  be  good.  It  is  probable  that 
as  men  advance  in  intellectual,  and  especially  in  moral  excel- 
lence, the  desire  of  "  keeping  up  the  family"  will  become  less 
and  less  an  object  of  solicitude.  That  desire  is  not,  in  its  or- 
dinary character,  recommended  by  any  considerations  which 
are  obviously  reducible  from  virtue  or  from  reason.  It  is  an 
affair  of  vanity ;  and  vanity,  like  other  weaknesses  and  evils 
may  be  expected  to  diminish  as  sound  habits  of  judgment 
prevail  in  the  world. 

Perhaps  it  is  remarkable,  that  the  obligation  not  to  accumu- 
late great  property  for  ourselves  or  our  children,  is  so  little 
enforced  by  the  writers  on  morality.  None  will  dispute  that 
such  accumulation  is  both  unwise  and  unkind.  Every  one 
acknowledges  too  that  the  general  evils  of  the  existing  in- 
equality of  property  are  enormously  great ;  yet  how  few  in- 
sist upon  those  means  by  which,  more  than  by  any  other  pri- 
vate means,  these  evils  may  be  diminished !  If  all  men  de- 
clined to  retain,  or  refrained  from  acquiring,  more  than  is 
likely  to  be  beneficial  to  their  families  and  themselves,  the 
pernicious  inequality  of  property  would  quickly  be  diminished 
or  destroyed.  There  is  a  motive  upon  the  individual  to  do 
this,  which  some  public  reformations  do  not  offer.  He  who 
contributes  almost  nothing  to  diminish  the  general  mischiefs 
of  extreme  poverty  and  extreme  wealth,  may  yet  do  so  much 
benefit  to  his  own  connexions  as  shall  greatly  overpay  him 
for  the  sacrifice  of  vanity  or  inclination.  Perhaps  it  may  be 
said  that  there  is  a  claim  too  of  justice.     The  wealth  of  a 

13* 


150  LITIGATION ARBITRATION.  [eSSAY  II. 

nation  is  a  sort  of  common  stock,  of  which  the  accumulations 
of  one  man  are  usually  made  at  the  expense  of  others.  A 
man  who  has  acquired  a  reasonable  sufficiency,  and  who 
nevertheless  retains  his  business  to  acquire  more  than  a  suffi- 
ciency, practises  a  sort  of  injustice  towards  another  who 
needs  his  means  of  gain.  There  are  always  many  who  can- 
not enjoy  the  comforts  of  life,  because  others  are  improperly 
occupying  the  means  by  which  those  comforts  are  to  be  ob- 
tained. Is  it  the  part  of  a  Christian  to  do  this  ? — even  aba- 
ting the  consideration  that  he  is  injuring  himself  by  withhold- 
ing comforts  from  another. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

LITIGATION— ARBITRATION. 

Practice  of  early  ChristianG — Evils  of  Litigation — Efficiency  of 
Arbitration. 

In  the  third  Essay,*  some  enquiry  will  be  attempted,  as  to 
whether  Justice  may  not  often  be  administered  between  con- 
tending parties,  or  to  public  offenders,  by  some  species  of  ar- 
bitration rather  than  by  law  ; — ^whether  a  gradual  substitution 
of  Equity  for  fixed  rules  of  decision,  is  not  congruous  alike 
with  philosophy  and  morals.^ — The  present  chapter,  however, 
and  that  which  succeeds  it,  proceed  upon  the  supposition  that 
the  administration  of  Justice  continues  in  its  present  state. 

The  question  for  an  individual,  when  he  has  some  cause 
of  dispute  with  another  respecting  property  or  rights  is.  By 
what  means  ought  I  to  endeavour  to  adjust  it  ?  Three  modes 
of  adjustment  may  be  supposed  to  be  offered :  Private  ar- 
rangement with  the  other  party — Reference  to  impartial  men 
— and  Law.  Private  adjustment  is  the  best  mode ;  arbitra- 
tion is  good ;  law  is  good  only  when  it  is  the  sole  alterna- 
tive. 

The  litigiousness  of  some  of  the  early  Christians  at  Cor- 
inth gave  occasion  to  the  energetic  expostulation,  "  Dare  any 
of  you,  having  a  matter  against  another,  go  to  law  before  the 
unjust  and  not  before  the  saints  ?  Do  ye  not  know  that  the 
saints  shall  judge  the  world  ?  And  if  the  world  shall  be 
*  Chap.  X. 


CHAP.  IV.]  LITIGATION ARBITRATION.  151 

judged  by  you,  are  ye  unworthy  to  judge  the  smallest  matters  1 
Know  ye  not  that  we  shall  judge  angels  ?  How  much  more 
things  that  pertain  to  this  life  ?  If  then,  ye  have  judgments 
of  things  pertaining  to  this  life,  set  them  to  judge  who  are 
least  esteemed  in  the  church.  I  speak  to  your  shame.  Is  it 
so  that  there  is  not  a  wise  man  among  you  ?  No,  not  one 
that  shall  be  able  to  judge  between  his  brethren  1  But  brother 
goeth  to  law  with  brother,  and  that  before  the  unbelievers. 
Now  therefore  there  is  utterly  a  fault  among  you,  because  ye 
go  to  law  one  with  another.  Why  do  ye  not  rather  take 
wrong  ?  Why  do  ye  not  rather  suffer  yourselves  to  be  de- 
frauded ?"*  Upon  this,  one  observation  is  especially  to  be  re- 
membered :  that  a  great  part  of  its  pointedness  of  reprehen- 
sion is  directed,  not  so  much  to  litigation,  as  to  litigation  be- 
fore  Pagans.  "  Brother  goeth  to  law  with  brother,  and  that 
before  the  unbelievers."  The  impropriety  of  exposing  the 
disagreements  of  Christians  in  Pagan  courts,  was  manifest 
and  great.  They  who  had  rejected  the  dominant  religion,  for 
a  religion  of  which  one  peculiar  characteristic  was  good  will 
and  unanimity,  were  especially  called  upon  to  exhibit  in  their 
conduct  an  illustration  of  its  purer  principles.  Few  things, 
not  grossly  vicious,  would  bring  upon  Christians  and  upon 
Christianity  itself  so  much  reproach  as  a  litigiousness  which 
could  not  or  would  not  find  arbitration  amongst  themselves. 
The  advice  of  the  apostle  appears  to  have  been  acted  upon : 
"  The  primitive  church,  which  was  always  zealous  to  recon- 
cile the  brethren  and  to  procure  pardon  for  the  offender  from 
the  person  oftended,  did  ordain,  according  to  the  epistle  of 
St.  Paul  to  the  Corinthians,  that  the  saints  or  Christians 
should  not  maintain  a  process  of  law  one  against  the  other  at 
the  bar  or  tribunals  of  infidels. "f  The  Christian  of  the  pre- 
sent day  is  differently  circumstanced,  because,  though  he  ap- 
peals to  the  law,  he  does  not  appeal  to  Pagan  judges  ;  and 
therefore  so  much  of  the  apostle's  censure  as  was  occasioned 
by  the  Paganism  of  the  courts,  does  not  apply  to  us. 

To  this  indeed  there  is  an  exception  founded  upon  analogy. 
If  at  the  commencement  of  the  Reformation,  two  of  the  re- 
formers had  carried  a  dispute  respecting  property  before  Ro- 
mish courts,  they  would  have  come  under  some  portion  of  that 
reprobation  which  was  addressed  to  the  Corinthians.  Cer- 
tainly, when  persons  profess  such  a  love  for  religious  purity 
and  excellence  that  they  publicly  withdraw  from  the  general 
religion  of  a  people,  there  ought  to  be  so  much  purity  and  ex-. 

*  1  Cor.  vi.  t  Ryeauf 8 Lives  of  the  Popes,  fol.  2d,  »'  ^ ""'^  ^ 

trod.  p.  2. 


t6i  LITIGATION ARBITRATION.  [ESSAT  II. 

cellence  amongst  them,  that  it  would  be  needless  to  have  re- 
course to  those  from  whom  they  had  separated,  to  adjust  their 
disputes.  The  catholic  of  those  days  might  reasonably 
have  turned  upon  such  reformers  and  said,  "  Is  it  so  that 
there  is  not  a  wise  man  among  you,  no  not  one  that  shall  be 
able  to  judge  between  his  brethren  ?"  And  if  indeed,  no  such 
wise  man  was  to  be  found,  it  might  safely  be  concluded  that 
their  reformation  was  an  empty  name. — For  the  same  reasons, 
those  who,  in  the  present  times,  think  it  right  to  withdraw 
from  other  protestant  churches  in  order  to  maintain  sounder 
doctrines  or  purer  practice,  cast  reproach  upon  their  own  com- 
munity if  they  cannot  settle  their  disputes  amongst  them- 
selves. Pretensions  to  soundness  and  purity  are  of  little 
avail  if  they  do  not  enable  those  who  make  them  to  repose  in 
one  another  such  confidence  as  this.  Were  I  a  Wesleyan  or 
a  Baptist,  I  should  think  it  discreditable  to  go  to  law  with  one 
of  my  own  brotherhood. 

But,  though  the  apostle's  prohibition  of  going  to  law  ap- 
pears to  have  been  founded  upon  the  paganism  of  the  courts, 
his  language  evidently  conveys  disapprobation,  generally,  of 
appeals  to  the  law.  He  insists  upon  the  propriety  of  adjust- 
ing disputes  by  arbitration.  Christians,  he  says,  ought  not  to 
be  unworthy  to  judge  the  smallest  matters  ;  and  so  emphati- 
cally does  he  insist  upon  the  truth,  that  their  religion  ought  to 
capacitate  them  to  act  as  arbitrators,  that  he  intimates  that 
even  a  small  advance  in  Christian  excellence  is  sufficient  for 
such  a  purpose  as  this  : — "  Set  them  to  judge  who  are  least 
esteemed  in  the  church."  It  will  perhaps  be  acknowledged 
that  when  Christianity  shall  possess  its  proper  influence  over 
us,  there  will  be  little  reason  to  recur,  for  adjustment  of  our 
disagreements,  to  fixed  rules  of  law.  And  though  this  influ- 
ence is  so  far  short  of  universal  prevalence,  who  cannot  find 
amongst  those  to  whom  he  may  have  access,  some  who  are 
capable  of  deciding  rightly  and  justly?  The  state  of  that 
christian  country  must  indeed  be  bad,  if  it  contains  not,  even 
in  every  little  district,  one  that  is  able  to  judge  between  his 
brethren. 

Nevertheless,  there  are  cases  in  which  the  christian  may 
properly  appeal  to  the  law.  He  may  have  an  antagonist  who 
can  in  no  other  manner  be  induced  to  be  just,  or  to  act  aright 
Under  some  such  circumstances  Paul  himself  pursued  a  simi- 
lar course  :  "  I  appeal  unto  Caesar." — "  Is  it  lawful  for  you 
to  scourge  a  man  that  is  a  Roman,  and  uncondemned  ?"  And 
when  he  had  been  illegally  taken  into  custody  he  availed  him- 
self of  his  legal  privileges,  and  made  the  magistrates  "  come 


CHAP.  IV.]  LITIGATION ARBITRATION.  153 

themselves  and  fetch  him  out."  There  are,  besides,  in  the 
present  condition  of  jurisprudence,  some  cases  in  which  the 
rule  of  justice  depends  upon  the  rule  of  law — so  that  a  thing 
is  just  or  not  just  according  as  the  law  determines.  In  such 
cases,  neither  party,  however  well  disposed,  may  be  able  dis- 
tinctly to  tell  what  justice  requires  until  the  law  informs 
them.  Even  then,  however,  there  are  better  means  of  pro- 
cedure than  by  prosecuting  suits.  The  parties  may  obtain 
"  Opinions." 

Besides  these  considerations  there  are  others  which  power- 
fully recormnend  arbitration  in  preference  to  law.  The  evils 
of  litigation,  from  which  arbitration  is  in  a  great  degree  exempt, 
are  great. 

Expense  is  an  important  item.  A  reasonable  man  desires 
of  course  to  obtain  justice  as  inexpensively  as  he  can ;  and 
the  great  cost  of  obtaining  it  in  courts  of  law,  is  a  powerful 
reason  for  preferring  arbitration. 

Legal  Injustice. — He  who  desires  that  justice  should  be 
dispensed  between  him  and  another,  should  sufficiently  bear 
in  mind  how  much  injustice  is  inflicted  by  the  law.  We  have 
seen  in  some  of  the  preceding  chapters  that  law  is  often  very 
wide  of  equity ;  and  he  who  desires  to  secure  himself  from 
an  inequitable  decision,  possesses  a  powerful  motive  to  prefer 
arbitration.  The  technicalities  of  the  law  and  the  artifices  of 
lawyers  are  almost  innumerable.  Sometimes,  when  a  party 
thinks  he  is  on  the  eve  of  obtaining  a  just  verdict,  he  is  sud- 
denly disappointed  and  his  cause  is  lost  by  some  technical 
defect — ^the  omission  of  a  word  or  the  mis-spelling  of  a  name  ; 
matters  which  in  no  degree  affect  the  validity  of  his  claims. 
If  the  only  advantage  which  arbitration  offers  to  disagreeing 
parties,  was  exemption  from  these  deplorable  evils,  it  would 
be  a  substantial  and  sufficient  argument  in  its  favour.  There 
is  no  reason  to  doubt,  that  justice  would  generally  be  adminis- 
tered by  a  reference  to  two  or  three  upright  and  disinterested 
men.  When  facts  are  laid  before  such  persons,  they  are  sel- 
dom at  a  loss  to  decide  what  justice  requires.  Its  principles 
are  not  so  critical  or  remote  as  usually  to  require  much  labour 
of  research  to  discover  what  they  dictate.  It  might  be  con- 
cluded, therefore,  even  if  experience  did  not  confirm  it,  that 
an  arbitration,  if  it  did  not  decide  absolutely  aright,  would  at 
least  come  to  as  just  a  decision  as  can  be  attained  by  human 
means.  But  experience  does  confirm  the  conclusion.  It  is 
known  that  the  Society  of  Friends  never  permits  its  members 
to  carry  disagreements  with  one  another  before  courts  of  law. 
All,  if  they  continue  in  the  society,  must  submit  to  arbitration. 


154  THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.      [esSAT  II. 

And  what  is  the  consequence  ?  They  find,  practically,  that 
arbitration  is  the  best  mode  ;  that  justice  is  in  fact  adminis- 
tered by  it,  administered  more  satisfactorily  and  with  fewer 
exceptions  than  in  legal  courts.  No  one  pretends  to  dispute 
this.  Indeed  if  it  were  disputable,  it  may  be  presumed  that 
this  community  would  abandon  the  practice.  'Hiey  adhere  to 
it  because  it  is  the  most  Christian  practice  and  the  best. 

Inquietude. — The  expense,  the  injustice,  the  delays  and 
vexations  which  are  attendant  upon  lawsuits,  bring  altogether 
a  degree  of  inquietude  upon  the  mind  which  greatly  deducts 
from  the  enjoyment  of  life,  and  from  the  capacity  to  attend 
with  composure  to  other  and  perhaps  more  important  concerns. 
If  to  this  we  add  the  heart-burnings  and  ill-will  which  suits 
frequently  occasion,  a  considerable  sum  of  evil  is  in  this  re- 
spect presented  to  us  :  a  sum  of  evil,  be  it  remembered,  from 
which  arbitration  is  in  a  great  degree  exempt. 

Upon  the  whole,  arbitration  is  recommended  by  such  va- 
rious and  powerful  arguments,  that  when  it  is  proposed  by  one 
of  two  contending  parties  and  objected  to  by  the  other,  there 
is  reason  to  presume  that,  with  that  other,  justice  is  not  the 
paramount  object  of  desire. 


CHAPTER  Y. 

THE  MORALITY  OF  LEGAL  PRACTICE. 

Complexity  of  law — Professional  untruths — Defences  of  legal  practice — 
Effects  of  legal  practice  :  Seduction  :  Theft :  Peculation — Pleading — 
The  duties  of  the  profession — Effects  of  legal  practice  on  the  profes- 
sion, and  on  the  public. 

If  it  should  be  asked  why,  in  a  book  of  general  morality, 
the  writer  selects  for  observation  the  practice  of  a  particular 
profession,  the  answer  is  simply  this,  that  the  practice  of  this 
particular  profession  peculiarly  needs  it.  It  peculiarly  needs 
to  be  brought  into  juxtaposition  with  sound  principles  of  mo- 
rality. Besides  this,  an  honest  comparison  of  the  practice 
with  the  principles  will  afford  useful  illustration  of  the  requisi- 
tions of  virtue. 

That  public  opinion  pronounces  that  there  is,  in  the  ordi- 
nary character  of  legal  practice,  much  that  is  not  reconcilable 


CHAP,  v.]       THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.  155 

with  rectitude,  can  need  no  proof.  The  public  opinion  could 
scarcely  become  general  unless  it  were  founded  upon  truth, 
and  that  it  is  general  is  evinced  by  the  language  of  all  ranks 
of  men  ;  from  that  of  him  who  writes  a  treatise  of  morality,  to 
that  of  him  who  familiarly  uses  a  censorious  proverb.  It  may 
reasonably  be  concluded  that  when  the  professional  conduct 
of  a  particular  set  of  men  is  characterized  peculiarly  with 
sacrifices  of  rectitude,  there  must  be  some  general  and  pecu- 
liar cause.  There  appears  nothing  in  the  profession,  as  such, 
to  produce  this  effect — nothing  in  taking  a  part  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  which  necessarily  leads  men  away  from  the 
regard  to  justice.  How  then  are  we  to  account  for  the  fact 
as  it  exists,  or  where  shall  we  primarily  lay  the  censure  ?  Is 
it  the  fault  of  the  men,  or  of  the  institutions  ;  of  the  lawyers 
or  of  the  law  1     Doubtless  the  original  fault  is  in  the  law. 

This  fault,  as  it  respects  our  own  country,  and  I  suppose 
every  other,  is  of  two  kinds  ;  one  is  necessary,  and  one  acci- 
dental. First :  Wherever  fixed  rules  of  deciding  controver- 
sies between  man  and  man,  or  fixed  rules  of  administering 
punishment  to  public  offenders  are  established — there  it  is  in- 
evitable that  equity  will  sometimes  be  sacrificed  to  rules. 
These  rules  are  laws,  that  is,  they  must  be  uniformly,  and  for 
the  most  part  literally  applied ;  and  this  literal  application  (as 
we  have  already  had  manifold  occasion  to  show,)  is  sometimes 
productive  of  practical  injustice.  Since,  then,  the  legal  pro- 
fession employ  themselves  in  enforcing  this  literal  application 
— since  they  habitually  exert  themselves  to  do  this  with  little 
regard  to  the  equity  of  the  result,  they  cannot  fail  to  deserve 
and  to  obtain  the  character  of  a  profession  that  sacrifices  rec- 
titude. I  know  not  that  this  is  evitable  so  long  as  numerous 
and  Jixed  rules  are  adopted  in  the  administration  of  justice. 

The  second  cause  of  the  evil,  as  it  results  from  the  law  it- 
self, is  in  its  extreme  complication — in  the  needless  multipli- 
city of  its  forms,  in  the  inextricable  intricacy  of  its  whole 
structure.  This,  which  is  probably  by  far  the  most  efficient 
cause  of  the  want  of  morality  in  legal  practice,  I  call  gratui- 
tous. It  is  not  necessary  to  law  that  it  should  be  so  extremely 
complicated.  This,  the  public  are  beginning  more  and  more 
to  see  and  to  assert.  Simplification  has  indeed  been  in  some 
small  degree  effected  by  recent  acts  of  the  legislature ;  and  this 
is  a  sufficient  evidence  that  it  was  needed.  But  whether  needed 
or  not,  the  temptation  which  it  casts  in  the  way  of  profes- 
sional virtue  is  excessively  gTeat.  A  man  takes  a  cause — a 
morally  bad  cause  we  will  suppose — to  a  barrister.  The  bar- 
rister searches  his  memory  or  his  books  for  some  one  or  more 


156  THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.      [eSSAY  II 

amongst  the  multiplicity  of  legal  technicalities  by  which  suc- 
cess may  be  obtained  for  his  client.  He  finds  them,  urges 
them  in  court,  shows  that  the  opposing  client  cannot  legally 
substantiate  his  claim,  and  thus  inflicts  upon  him  practical  in- 
justice. This  is  primarily  the  fault  of  the  law.  Take  away 
or  diminish  this  encumbering  load  of  technicalities,  and  you 
take  away,  in  the  same  proportion,  the  opportunity  for  the 
profession  to  sacrifice  equity  to  forms,  and  by  consequence 
diminish  the  immorality  of  its  practice.  There  can  be  no 
efficient  reform  amongst  lawyers  without  a  reform  of  the  law. 
But  whilst  thus  the  original  cause  of  the  sacrifice  of  virtue 
amongst  legal  men  is  to  be  sought  in  legal  institutions,  it  can- 
not be  doubted  that  they  are  themselves  chargeable  with 
greatly  adding  to  the  evils  which  these  institutions  occasion. 
This  is  just  what,  in  the  present  state  of  human  virtue,  we 
might  expect.  Lawyers  familiarize  to  their  minds  the  notion, 
that  whatever  is  legally  right  is  right ;  and  when  they  have 
once  habituated  themselves  to  sacrifice  the  manifest  dictates 
of  equity  to  law,  where  shall  they  stop  ?  If  a  material  inform- 
ality in  an  instrument  is  to  them  a  sufficient  justification  of 
a  sacrifice  of  these  dictates,  they  will  soon  sacrifice  them  be- 
cause a  word  has  been  mis-spelt  by  an  attorney's  clerk. 
When  they  have  gone  thus  far,  they  Avill  go  further.  The 
practice  of  disregarding  rectitude  in  courts  of  justice  will  be- 
come habitual.  They  will  go  onward,  from  insisting  upon 
legal  technicalities  to  an  endeavour  to  pervert  the  law,  then 
to  the  giving  a  false  colouring  to  facts,  and  then  onward  and 
still  onward  until  witnesses  are  abashed  and  confounded,  until 
juries  are  misled  by  impassioned  appeals  to  their  feelings,  un- 
til deliberate  untruths  are  solemnly  averred,  until,  in  a  word, 
all  the  pitiable  and  degrading  spectacles  are  exhibited  which 
are  now  exhibited  in  legal  practice. 

But  when  we  say  that  the  original  cause  of  this  unhappy 
system  is  to  be  found  in  the  law  itself,  is  it  tantamount  to  a 
justification  of  the  system  ?  No  :  if  it  were,  it  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  justify  any  departure  from  rectitude — it  would  be 
sufficient  to  justify  any  crime,  to  be  able  to  show  that  the  per- 
petrator possessed  strong  temptation.  Strong  temptation  is 
undoubtedly  placed  before  the  legal  practitioner.  This  should 
abate  our  censure,  but  it  should  not  cause  us  to  be  silent. 

We  affirm  that  a  lawyer  cannot  morally  enforce  the  appli- 
cation of  legal  rules,  without  regard  to  the  claims  of  equity  in 
the  particular  case. 

If  it  has  been  seen,  in  the  preceding  chapters,  that  morality 
is  paramoxmt  to  law  ;  if  it  has  been  seen  that  there  are  manr 


CHAP,  v.]       THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.  157 

instances  in  which  private  persons  are  morally  obliged  to 
forego  their  legal  pretensions,  then  it  is  equally  clear  that  a 
lawyer  is  obliged  to  hold  morality  as  paramount  to  law  in  his 
own  practice.  If  one  man  may  not  urge  an  unjust  legal  pre- 
tension, another  may  not  assist  him  in  urging  it.  No  man  it 
may  be  hoped  will  say  it  is  the  lawyer's  only  business  to  apply 
the  law.  Men  cannot  so  cheaply  exempt  themselves  from 
the  obligations  of  morality.  Yet  here  the  question  is  really 
suspended  ;  for  if  the  business  of  the  profession  does  not  jus- 
tify a  disregard  of  morality,  it  is  not  capable  of  justification. 
Suspended  !  It  is  lamentable  that  such  a  question  can  exist. 
For  to  what  does  the  alternative  lead  us  ?  Is  a  man,  when  he  un- 
dertakes a  client's  business,  at  liberty  to  advance  his  interest  by 
every  method,  good  or  bad,  which  the  law  will  not  punish  1  If 
he  is,  there  is  an  end  of  morality.  If  he  is  not,  something  must 
limit  and  restrict  him ;  and  that  something  is  the  Moral  Law. 

Of  every  custom,  however  indefensible,  some  advocates 
offer  themselves ;  and  some  accordingly  have  attempted  to 
justify  the  practice  of  the  bar.*  Of  that  particular  item  in 
the  practice,  which  consists  in  uttering  untruths  in  order  to 
serve  a  client.  Dr.  Paley  has  been  the  defender.  "  There  are 
falsehoods,"  says  he,  "  which  are  not  criminal ;  as  where  no 
one  is  deceived,  which  is  the  case  with  an  advocate  in  asserting 
the  justice,  or  his  belief  of  the  justice,  of  his  client's  cause." 
It  is  plain  that  in  support  of  this  position  one  argument,  and 
only  one  can  be  urged,  and  that  one  has  been  selected.  "  No 
confidence  is  destroyed,  because  none  was  reposed  ;  no  prom- 
ise to  speak  the  truth  is  violated,  because  none  was  given 
or  understood  to  be  given."!  The  defence  is  not  very  credit- 
able even  if  it  were  valid  :  it  defends  men  from  the  imputation 
of  falsehood  because  their  falsehoods  are  so  habitual  that  no 
one  gives  them  credit ! 

But  the  defence  is  not  valid.  Of  this  the  reader  may  satisfy 
himself  by  considering  why,  if  no  one  ever  believes  what  ad- 
vocates say,  they  continue  to  speak.  They  would  not,  year 
after  year,  persist  in  uttering  untruths  in  our  courts,  without 
attaining  an  object,  and  knowing  that  they  would  not  attain  it. 
If  no  one  ever  in  fact  believed  them,  they  would  cease  to  assev- 
erate. They  do  not  love  falsehood  for  its  own  sake,  and' 
utter  it  gratuitously  and  for  nothing.  The  custom  itself,  there- 
fore, disproves  the   argument  that  is  brought  to  defend  it. 

*  I  speak  of  the  bar,  because  that  branch  of  the  profession  offers  the 
most  convenient  illustration  of  the  subject.  The  reasonings  will  gener- 
ally apply  to  other  branches. 

t  Mor.  and  Pol.  PhU.  b.  3.  p.  1.  c.  15. 

14 


15S  THE    MORALITY    OP   LEGAL   PRACTICE.     [eSSAY  II. 

Whenever  that  defence  becomes  valid — ^whenever  it  is  really 
true  that  "  no  confidence  is  reposed"  in  advocates,  they  will 
cease  to  use  falsehood,  for  it  will  have  lost  its  motive.  But 
the  real  practice  is  to  mingle  falsehood  and  truth  together, 
and  so  to  involve  the  one  with  the  other  that  the  jury  cannot 
easily  separate  them.  The  jury  know  that  some  of  the 
pleader's  statements  are  true,  and  these  they  believe.  Now 
he  makes  other  statements  with  the  same  deliberate  empha- 
sis ;  and  how  shall  the  jury  know  whether  these  are  false  or 
true  1  How  shall  they  discover  the  point  at  which  they  shall 
begin  to  "  repose  no  confidence  ?"  Knowing  that  a  part  is 
true,  they  cannot  always  know  that  another  part  is  not  true. 
That  it  is  the  pleader's  design  to  persuade  them  of  the  truth 
of  all  he  affirms,  is  manifest.  Suppose  an  advocate  when  he 
rose  should  say,  "  Gentlemen,  I  am  now  going  to  speak  the 
truth ;"  and  after  narrating  the  facts  of  the  case  should  say, 
"  Gentlemen,  I  am  now  going  to  address  you  with  fictions." 
Why  would  not  an  advocate  do  this  ?  Because  then  no  con- 
fidence would  be  reposed,  which  is  the  same  thing  as  to  say 
that  he  pursues  his  present  plan  because  some  confidence  is 
reposed  ;  and  this  decides  the  question.  The  decision  should 
not  be  concealed — that  the  advocate  who  employs  untruths 
in  his  pleadings,  does  really  and  most  strictly,  lie. 

And  even  if  no  one  ever  did  believe  an  advocate,  his  false 
declarations  would  still  be  lies,  because  he  always  professes 
to  speak  the  truth.  This  indeed  is  true  upon  the  Archdea- 
con's own  showing ;  for  he  says,  "  Whoever  seriously  ad- 
dresses his  discourse  to  another,  tacitly  promises  to  speak  the 
truth."  The  case  is  very  different  from  others  which  he  pro- 
poses as  parallel — "  parables,  fables,  jests."  In  these,  the 
speaker  does  noi  profess  to  state  facts.  But  the  pleader  does 
profess  to  state  facts.  He  intends  and  endeavours  to  mislead. 
His  untruths  therefore  are  lies  to  him  whether  they  are  be- 
lieved or  not ;  just  as,  in  vulgar  life,  a  man  whose  falsehoods 
are  so  notorious  that  no  one  gives  him  credit,  is  not  the  less 
a  liar  than  if  he  were  believed. 

From  one  sort  of  legal  falsehoods  results  one  peculiar  mis- 
chief, a  mischief  arising  primarily  out  of  an  unhappy  rule  of 
law,  but  which  is  not  on  that  account  morally  justifiable. 
"  Decision  is  commanded  by  pleadings  as  by  evidence,  and 
that  also  to  a  vast  extent  and  with  a  degree  of  certainty  refu- 
sed to  evidence.  Decision  is  produced  by  pleadings  as  if 
they  were  true,  when  they  are  known  and  acknowledged  to 
be  false  ;  because  they  act  as  evidence  and  as  true  evidence 
in  all  cases  where  the  opposed  party  cannot  follow  them  by 


CHAP,  v.]   THE  MORALITY  OF  LEGAL  PRACTICE.        159 

counter  declarations — a  consequence  which  may  and  does 
resuh  from  poverty  and  other  causes."*  This  is  deplorable 
indeed.  To  employ  false  pleadings  is  sufficiently  unjustifi- 
able ;  but  to  employ  them  in  order  that  a  poor  man  or  that 
any  man  may  be  debarred  of  his  rights,  is  abominable.  But 
why  do  we  say  that  this  peculiarly  is  abominable  ?  For  to 
what  purpose  is  any  falsehood  urged  at  the  bar  but  to  impede 
or  prevent  the  administration  of  justice  between  man  and 
man  1  I  make  no  pretensions  to  legal  knowledge.  Some  false 
pleadings  are  legally  "  necessary"  in  order  to  give  formality 
to  a  proceeding.  In  these  cases  the  evil  is  attributable  in  a 
great  degree  to  the  law  itself,  though  I  presume  the  law  is 
founded  upon  custom,  which  custom  was  introduced  by  law- 
yers. The  evil  therefore  and  the  guilt  lies  at  the  door  of 
the  system  of  legal  practice,  although  it  may  not  all  lie  at  the 
doors  of  existing  practitioners. t 

Gisborne  is  another  defender  of  legal  practice,  and  assumes 
a  wider  ground  of  justification.  "  The  standard,"  says  he, 
"  to  which  the  advocate  refers  the  cause  of  his  client,  is  not 
the  law  of  reason  nor  the  law  of  God,  but  the  law  of  the  land. 
His  peculiar  and  proper  object  is  not  to  prove  the  side  of  the 
question  which  he  maintains  morally  right,  but  legally  right. 
The  law  offers  its  protection  only  on  certain  preliminary 
conditions ;  it  refuses  to  take  cognizance  of  injuries  or  to  en- 
force redress,  unless  the  one  be  proved  in  the  specific  manner 
and  the  other  claimed  in  the  precise  form,  which  it  prescribes ; 
and  consequently,  whatever  be  the  pleader's  opinion  of  his 
cause,  he  is  guilty  of  no  breach  of  truth  and  justice  in  defeat- 
ing the  pretensions  of  the  persons  whom  he  opposes,  by  evin- 
cing that  they  have  not  made  good  the  terms  on  which  alone 
they  could  be  legally  entitled,  on  which  alone  they  could 
suppose  themselves  entitled,  to  success. "J  There  is  some- 
thing specious  in  this  reasoning,  but  what  is  its  amount? — 
that  if  the  laws  of  a  country  proceed  upon  such  and  such 
maxims,  they  exempt  us  from  the  authority  of  the  laws  of 

*  West.  Rev.  No.  9. 

t  Some  of  these  legal  falsehoods  are  ridiculous  to  the  last  degree.  A 
horse  is  sent  to  a  farrier  to  be  shod.  Unhappily,  and  to  the  great  regret 
of  the  farrier,  his  man  accidentally  lames  the  horse.  What  then  says  the 
legal  form  ?  That  the  farrier  faithfully  promised  to  shoe  the  horse  pro- 
perly :  but  that  "  he,  not  regarding  his  said  promise  and  undertaking,  but 
contriving  and  fraudulently  intending,  craftily,  and  subtilely  to  deceive 
and  defraud  the  said  plaintiff,  did  not  nor  would  shoe  the  said  horse,  in  a 
skilful,  careful,  and  proper  manner,  &c. !" — See  the  form,  2  Chitty  on 
Pleading,  p.  154. 

X  Duties  of  Men.     The  Legal  Profession 


160  THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.      [eSSAY  II. 

God.  We  arrive  at  this  often  refuted  doctrine  at  last.  Either 
the  acts  of  a  legislature  may  suspend  the  obligations  of  mo- 
rality or  they  may  not.  If  they  may,  there  is  an  end  of  that 
morality  which  is  founded  upon  the  divine  will :  if  they  may 
not,  the  argument  of  Gisborne  is  a  fallacy.  But  in  truth  he 
himself  shows  its  fallaciousness  :  he  says,  "  If  a  cause  should 
present  itself  of  an  aspect  so  dark  as  to  leave  the  advocate  no 
reasonable  doubt  of  its  being  founded  in  iniquity  or  baseness, 
or  to  justify  extremely  strong  suspicions  of  its  evil  nature  and 
tendency,  he  is  bound  in  the  sight  of  God  to  refuse  all  con- 
nexion with  the  business."  Why  is  he  thus  bound  to  refuse  ? 
Because  he  will  otherwise  violate  the  Moral  Law :  and  this  is 
the  very  reason  why  he  is  bound  in  other  cases.  Observe 
too  the  inconsistency :  first  we  are  told  that  whatever  be  the 
pleader's  opinion  of  a  cause,  "  he  is  guilty  of  no  breach  of 
truth  and  justice"  in  advocating  it ;  and  afterwards,  that  if  the 
cause  is  of  an  "  evil  nature  and  tendency"  he  may  not  advo- 
cate it !  That  such  reasoning  does  not  prove  what  it  is  de- 
signed to  prove  is  evident ;  but  it  proves  something  else — 
that  the  practice  cannot  be  defended.  Such  reasoning  would 
not  be  advanced  if  better  could  be  found.  Let  us  not,  how- 
ever seem  to  avail  ourselves  of  a  writer's  words  without  re- 
ference to  his  meaning.  The  meaning  in  the  present  instance 
is  clearly  this — that  a  pleader,  generally,  may  undertake  a 
vicious  cause  ;  but  that  if  it  be  very  vicious,  he  must  refrain. 
You  may  abet  an  act  of  a  certain  shade  of  iniquity,  but  not  if 
it  be  of  a  certain  shade  deeper :  you  may  violate  the  Moral 
Law  to  a  certain  extent,  but  not  to  every  extent.  To  him 
who  would  recommend  rectitude  in  its  purity,  few  reasonings 
are  more  satisfactory  than  such  as  these.  They  prove  the 
truth  which  they  assail  by  evincing  that  it  cannot  be  disproved. 
Dr.  Johnson  tried  a  shorter  course  :  "  You  do  not  know  a 
cause  to  be  good  or  bad  till  the  judge  determines  it.  An  ar- 
gument that  does  not  convince  you  may  convince  the  judge 
to  whom  you  urge  it,  and  if  it  does  convince  him,  why  then 
he  is  right  and  you  are  wrong."  This  is  satisfactory.  It 
is  always  satisfactory  to  perceive  that  a  powerful  intellect 
can  find  nothing  but  idle  sophistry  to  urge  against  the  obliga- 
tions of  virtue.  One  other  argument  is  this":  Eminent  barris- 
ters, it  is  said,  should  not  be  too  scrupulous,  because  clients 
might  fear  their  causes  would  be  rejected  by  virtuous  plead- 
ers, and  might  therefore  go  to  "  needy  and  unprincipled  chi- 
caners." Why,  if  their  causes  were  good,  virtuous  pleaders 
would  undertake  them ;  and  if  they  were  bad,  it  matters  not 
how  soon  they  were  discountenanced.     In  a  right  state  of 


CHA?.  v.]      THE   MORALITY   6f   tE6AL   PftAOTlCfi.  161 

things,  the  very  circumstance  that  only  an  "unprincipled 
chicaner"  would  undertake  a  particular  cause,  would  go  far 
towards  procuring  a  verdict  against  it.  Besides,  it  is  a  very 
loose  morality  that  recommends  good  men  to  do  improper 
things  lest  they  should  be  done  by  the  bad. 

Seeing  therefore  that  no  tolerable  defence  can  be  adduced 
of  the  ordinary  legal  practice,  let  us  consider  for  a  moment 
what  are  its  practical  results. 

A  civil  action  is  brought  into  court,  and  evidence  has  been 
heard  which  satisfies  every  man  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
in  justice  to  a  verdict.  It  is,  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  a 
clear  case  of  dishonesty.  Suddenly,  the  pleader  discovers 
that  there  is  some  verbal  flaw  in  a  document,  some  technical 
irregularity  in  the  proceedings — and  the  plaintiff  loses  his 
cause.  The  public  are  disappointed  in  their  expectations  of 
justice  ;  the  jury  and  the  court  are  grieved  ;  and  the  unhappy 
sufferer  retires,  injured  and  wronged — without  redress  or 
hope  of  redress.  Can  this  be  right  ?  Can  it  be  sufficient  to 
justify  a  man  in  this  conduct,  to  urge  that  such  things  are 
his  business — the  means  by  which  he  obtains  his  living? 
The  same  excuse  would  justify  a  corsair,  or  a  troop  of  Ara- 
bian banditti  which  plunders  the  caravan.  Yet  indefensible, 
immoral,  as  this  conduct  is,  it  is  the  every  day  practice  of  the 
profession  ;  and  the  amount  of  injustice  which  is  inflicted  by 
this  practice  is  enormous.  The  plea  that  such  are  the  rules 
of  the  law  is  not  admissible.  Whatever  utility  we  may  be 
disposed  to  allow  to  the  uniform  application  of  the  law,  it  will 
not  justify  such  conduct  as  this.  The  integrity  of  the  law 
would  not  have  been  violated,  though  the  pleader  had  not 
pointed  out  the  mis-spelling,  for  example,  of  a  word.  For  a 
judge  to  refuse  to  allow  the  law  to  take  its  course  after  the 
mistake  has  been  urged,  is  one  thing ;  for  a  pleader  to  detect 
and  to  urge  it,  is  another.  The  judge  may  not  be  able  to 
regard  the  equity  of  the  case  without  sacrificing  the  uniform 
operation  of  the  law.  But  if  the  inadvertency  is  not  pointed 
out,  that  uniform  operation  is  perfect  though  equity  be  awarded. 
There  is  no  excuse  for  thus  inflicting  injustice.  It  is  an  act 
of  pure  gratuitous  mischief:  an  act  not  required  by  law,  an 
act  condenaned  by  morality,  an  act  possessing  no  apology  but 
that  the  agent  is  tempted  by  the  gains  of  his  profession. 

An  unhappy  father  seeks,  in  a  court  of  justice,  some  re- 
dress for  the  misery  which  a  seducer  has  inflicted  upon  his 
family ;  a  redress  which,  if  he  were  successful,  is  deplorably 
inadequate,  both  as  a  recompense  to  the  sufferers  and  as  a 
punishment  to  the  criminal.     Th€  2ase  is  established,  and  it 

14* 


163  THE   MORALITY   OP  IfiOAL   PRACTtCE.     [essAY  II, 

is  manifest  that  equity  and  the  public  good  require  exemplary 
damages.  What  then  does  the  pleader  do  ?  He  stands  up 
and  employs  every  contrivance  to  prevent  the  jury  from 
awarding  these  damages.  He  eloquently  endeavours  to  per- 
suade them  that  the  act  involved  little  guilt ;  casts  undeserved 
imputations  upon  the  immediate  sufferer  and  upon  her  family  ; 
jests,  and  banters,  and  sneers,  about  all  the  evidence  of  the 
case :  imputes  bad  motives  (without  truth  or  with  it)  to  the 
prosecutor ;  expatiates  upon  the  little  property  (whether  it  be 
little  or  much)  which  the  seducer  possesses;  by  these  and 
by  such  means  he  labours  to  prevent  this  injured  father  from 
obtaining  any  redress,  to  secure  the  criminal  from  all  punish- 
ment, and  to  encourage  in  other  men  the  crime  itself.  Com- 
passion, justice,  morality,  the  public  good,  every  thing  is 
sacrificed — to  what  ?  To  that  which,  upon  such  a  subject,  it 
were  a  shame  to  mention, 

In  the  criminal  courts,  the  same  conduct  is  practised,  and 
with  the  same  indefensibility.  Can  it  be  necessary,  or  ought 
it  to  be  necessary,  to  insist  upon  the  proposition — "  If  it  be 
right  that  offenders  should  be  punished,  it  is  not  right  to  make 
them  pass  with  impunity.'*  If  a  police  officer  has  seized  a 
thief  and  carried  him  to  prison,  every  one  knows  that  it  would 
be  vicious  in  me  to  effect  his  escape.  Yet  this  is  the  every 
day  practice  of  the  profession.  It  is  their  regular  and  con- 
stant endeavour  to  prevent  justice  from  being  administered 
to  offenders.  Is  it  a  sufficient  justification  of  preventing  the 
execution  of  justice,  of  preventing  that  which  every  good 
citizen  is  desirous  of  promoting — to  say  that  a  man  is  an 
advocate  by  profession  ?  Is  the  circumstance  of  belonging  to 
the  legal  profession  a  good  reason  for  disregarding  those  du- 
ties which  are  obligatory  upon  every  other  man  ?  He  who 
-wards  off  punishment  from  swindlers  and  robbers,  and  sends 
them  amongst  the  public  upon  the  work  of  fraud  and  plunder 
again,  surely  deserves  worse  of  his  country  than  many  a 
hungry  fllfti  who  filches  a  loaf  or  a  trinket  from  a  stall.  As 
to  employing  legal  artifices  or  the  tactics  of  declamation  in 
order  to  obtain  the  conviction  of  a  prisoner  whom  there  is 
reason  to  believe  to  be  innocent;  or  aa  to  endeavouring  to 
inflict  upon  him  a  punishment  greater  than  his  deserts,  the 
wickedness  is  so  palpable  that  it  is  wonderful  that  even  the 
power  of  custom  protects  it  from  the  reprobation  of  the  world. 

In  Scotland,  where  the  criminal  process  is  in  some  re- 
spects superior  to  ours,  the  proportion  of  those  prisoners  who 
escape  punishment  on  account  of  "  technical  niceties,"  is  very 
great.     Of  the  persons  acquitted  in  our  courts,  at  least  one 


CHAP,  v.]       THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.  163 

half  escape  from  teclmical  niceties,  or  rules  of  evidence  which 
give  advantage  to  the  prisoner,  with  which,  in  the  other  part 
of  the  island,  they  are  wholly  unacquainted."*  Is  not  this  a 
great  public  evil  ?  And  if  we  charge  that  evil  originally  upon 
the  law,  is  it  warrantable,  is  it  morale  in  the  advocate  actively 
to  increase  and  extend  it. 

The  plea  that  it  is  of  consequence  that  law  should  be  uni- 
formly  administered,  does  not  suffice  to  justify  the  pleader  in 
criminal  any  more  than  in  civil  courts.  "  A  thief  was  caught 
coming  out  of  a  house  in  Highbury  Terrace,  with  a  watch  he 
had  stolen  therein  upon  him.  He  was  found  guilty  by  the 
jury  upon  the  clearest  evidence  of  the  theft ;  but  his  counsel 
having  discovered  that  he  was  charged  in  the  indictment  with 
having  stolen  a  watch,  the  property  of  the  owner  of  the  house, 
whereas  the  watch  really  belonged  to  his  daughter,  the  pris- 
oner got  clear  off."t  The  pretext  of  the  value  of  an  uniform 
operation  of  the  law  will  not  avail  here.  Suppose  the  coun- 
sel, though  he  did  discover  the  watch  was  the  daughter's,  had 
not  insisted  upon  the  inaccuracy,  no  evil  would  have  ensued. 
The  integrity  of  the  law  would  not  have  been  violated.  The 
act  of  a  counsel  therefore  in  such  a  case  is  simply  and  only 
a  defeat  of  pubUc  justice,  an  injury  to  the  State,  an  encourage- 
ment to  thieves  ;  and  surely  there  is  no  reason,  either  in  mo- 
rals or  in  common  sense,  why  any  particular  class  of  men 
should  be  privileged  thus  to  injure  the  community. 

The  wife  of  a  respectable  tradesman  in  the  town  in  which 
I  Uve  was  left  a  widow  with  eight  or  ten  children.  She  em- 
ployed a  confidential  person  to  assist  in  conducting  the  busi- 
ness. The  business  was  flourishing ;  and  yet  at  the  end  of 
every  year  she  was  surprised  and  afflicted  to  find  that  her 
profits  were  unaccountably  small.  At  length  this  confidential 
person  was  suspected  of  peculation.  Money  was  marked 
and  placed  as  usual  under  his  care.  It  was  soon  missed  and 
found  upon  his  person ;  and  when  the  police  searched  his 
house,  they  found  in  his  possession,  methodically  stowed 
away,  five  or  six  thousand  pounds,  the  accumulated  plunder 
of  years  !  This  cruel  and  atrocious  robber  found  no  difficulty 
in  obtaining  advocates,  who  employed  every  artifice  of  de- 
fence, who  had  recourse  to  every  technicality  of  law,  to  screen 
him  from  punishment  and  to  secure  for  him  the  quiet  posses- 
sion of  his  plunder.  They  found  in  the  indictment  some 
word,  of  which  the  ordinary  and  the  legal  acceptation  were 
different ;  and  the  indictment  was  quashed !    Happily,  another 

*  Remarks  on  the  Administration  of  Criminal  Justice  in  Scotland,  &c. 
t  West.  Rev.  No.  8,  Art.  4, 


164  THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.     [eSSAT  IT. 

was  proof  against  the  casuistry,  and  the  criminal  was  found 
guilty. 

Will  it  be  said  that  pleaders  are  not  supposed  to  know,  till 
the  verdict  is  pronounced,  whether  a  prisoner  is  guilty  or  not  ? 
If  this  were  true,  it  would  not  avail  as  a  justification  ;  but,  in 
reality,  it  is  only  a  subterfuge.  In  this  very  case,  after  the 
verdict  had  been  pronounced,  after  the  prisoner's  guilt  had 
been  ascertained,  a  new  trial  was  obtained;  not  on  account 
of  any  doubt  in  the  evidence — that  was  unequivocal — ^but  on 
account  of  some  irregularity  in  passing  sentence.  And  now 
the  same  conduct  was  repeated.  Knowing  that  the  prisoner 
was  guilty,  advocates  still  exerted  their  talents  and  eloquence 
to  procure  impunity  for  him,  nay  to  reward  him  at  the  expense 
of  public  duty  and  of  private  justice.  They  did  not  succeed  : 
the  plunderer  was  transported  ;  but  their  want  of  success  does 
not  diminish  the  impropriety,  the  immorality,  of  their  endeav- 
ours. If,  by  the  trickery  of  law,  this  man  had  obtained  an 
acquittal,  what  would  have  been  the  consequence  1  Not  merely 
that  he  would  have  possessed,  undisturbed,  his  plundered 
thousands ;  not  merely  that  he  might  have  laughed  at  the 
family  whose  money  he  was  spending ;  but  that  a  hundred 
or  a  thousand  other  shopmen,  taking  confidence  from  his  suc- 
cess and  his  impunity,  might  enter  upon  a  similar  course  of 
treachery  and  fraud.  They  might  think  that  if  the  hour  of 
detection  should  arrive,  nothing  was  wanting  but  a  sagacious 
advocate  to  protect  them  from  punishment,  and  to  secure  their 
spoil.  Will  any  man  then  say,  as  an  excuse  for  the  legal 
practice,  that  it  is  "  usual,"  "  customary,"  the  "  business  of  the 
profession?"    It  is  preposterous.* 

It  really  is  a  dreadful  consideration,  that  a  body  of  men,  res- 
pectable in  the  various  relationships  of  life,  should  make,  in 
consequence  of  the  vicious  maxims  of  a  profession,  these  de- 
plorable sacrifices  of  rectitude.  To  a  writer  upon  such  a  sub- 
ject, it  is  difficult  to  speak  with  that  plainness  which  morality 
requires  without  seeming  to  speak  illiberally  of  men.  But  it 
is  not  a  question  of  liberality  but  of  morals.     When  a  barris- 

*  Some  obstacles  in  the  way  of  this  mode  of  defeating  the  ends  of 
justice  have  been  happily  interposed  by  the  admirable  exertions  of  the 
late  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department.  Still  such  cases  are 
applicable  as  illustrations  of  what  the  duties  of  the  profession  are  ;  and, 
unfortunately,  opportunities  in  abundance  remain  for  sacrificing  the  du- 
ties of  the  profession  to  its  "  business,"  Here,  without  any  advertance  to 
political  opinion,  it  may  be  remarked,  that  one  such  statesman  as  Robert 
Peel  is  of  more  value  to  his  country  than  a  multitude  of  those  who  take 
office  and  leave  it  without  any  endeavour  to  ameliorate  the  national  in- 
Btitutioiis. 


CHAP,  v.]   THE  MORALITY  OF  LEGAL  PRACTICE.        165 

ter  arrives  at  an  assize  town  on  the  circuit,  and  tacitly  pub- 
lishes that  (abating  a  few,  and  only  a  few,  cases)  he  is  will- 
ing to  take  the  brief  of  any  client ;  that  he  is  ready  to  employ 
his  abilities,  his  ingenuity,  in  proving  that  any  given  cause 
is  good  or  that  it  is  bad ;  and  when,  having  gone  before  a  jury, 
he  urges  the  side  on  which  he  happens  to  have  been  em- 
ployed, with  all  the  earnestness  of  seeming  integrity  and 
truth,  and  bends  all  the  faculties  which  God  has  given  him  in 
promotion  of  its  success  ;  when  we  see  all  this,  and  remem- 
ber that  it  was  the  toss  of  a  die  whether  he  should  have  done 
exactly  the  contrary,  I  think  that  no  expression  characterizes 
the  procedure  but  that  of  intellectual  and  moral  prostitution. 
[n  any  other  place  than  a  court  of  justice,  every  one  would 
say  that  it  was  prostitution  :  a  court  of  justice  cannot  make  it 
less. 

Perhaps  the  reader  has  heard  of  the  pleader  who,  by  some 
accident,  mistook  the  side  on  which  he  was  to  argue,  and  ear- 
nestly contended  for  the  opponent's  cause.  His  distressed 
client  at  length  conveyed  an  intimation  of  his  mistake,  and  he, 
with  forensic  dexterity  told  the  jury  that  hitherto  he  had  only 
been  anticipating  the  arguments  of  the  opposing  counsel,  and 
that  now  he  would  proceed  to  show  they  were  fallacious.  If 
the  reader  should  imagine  there  is  peculiar  indecency  in  this, 
his  sentiment  would  be  founded  upon  habit  rather  than  upon 
reason.  There  is,  really,  very  little  difference  between  con- 
tending for  both  sides  of  the  same  cause,  and  contending 
for  either  side,  as  the  earliest  retainer  may  decide.  I  lately 
read  the  report  of  a  trial  in  which  retainers  from  both  parties 
had  been  sent  to  a  counsel,  and  when  the  cause  was  brought 
into  court  it  was  still  undecided  for  whom  he  should  appear. 
The  scale  was  turned  by  the  judgment  of  another  counsel,  and 
the  pleader  instantly  appeared  on  behalf  of  the  client  to  whom 
his  brother  had  allotted  him.  From  the  mistake  which  is 
mentioned  at  the  head  of  this  paragraph,  let  clients  take  a  ben- 
eficial hint.  I  suggest  to  them,  if  their  opponent  has  engaged 
the  ablest  counsel,  to  engage  him  also  themselves.  The 
arrangement  might  easily  be  managed,  and  would  be  attended 
with  manifest  advantages  ;  clients  would  be  sure  of  arraying 
against  each  other  equal  abilities  ;  justice  would  be  promoted 
by  preventing  the  triumph  of  the  more  skilful  pleader  over  the 
less  ;  and  the  minds  of  juries  might  more  quietly  weigh  the 
conflicting  arguments,  when  they  were  all  proved  and  all  re- 
futed by  one  man. 

Probably  it  will  be  asked.  What  is  a  legal  man  to  do? 
How  shall  he  discriminate  his  duties,  or  know,  in  the  present 


166  THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.     [esSAY  11. 

State  of  legal  institutions,  what  extent  of  advocation  morality 
allows  ?  These  are  fair  questions,  and  he  who  asks  them  is 
entitled  to  an  answer.  I  confess  that  an  answer  is  dilEficult : 
and  why  is  it  difficult  ?  Because  the  whole  system  is  un- 
sound. He  who  would  rectify  the  ordinary  legal  practice,  is 
in  the  situation  of  a  physician  who  can  scarcely  prescribe 
with  effect  for  a  particular  symptom  in  a  patient's  case,  un- 
less he  will  submit  to  an  entirely  new  regimen  and  mode  of 
life.  The  conscientious  lawyer  is  surrounded  with  tempta- 
tions and  with  difficulties  resulting  from  the  general  system 
of  the  law ;  difficulties  and  temptations  so  great  that  it  may 
almost  appear  to  be  the  part  of  a  wise  man  to  fly  rather  than 
to  encounter  them.  There  is  however  nothing  necessarily  in- 
cidental to  the  legal  profession  which  makes  it  incompatible 
with  morality.  He  who  has  the  firmness  to  maintain  his  al- 
legiance to  virtue  may  doubtless  maintain  it.  Such  a  man 
would  consider,  that  law  being  in  general  the  practical  stand- 
ard of  equity,  the  pleader  may  properly  illustrate  and  enforce 
it.  He  may  assiduously  examine  statutes  and  precedents, 
and  honourably  adduce  them  on  behalf  of  his  client.  He  may 
distinctly  and  luminously  exhibit  his  client's  claims.  In  ex- 
amining his  witnesses  he  may  educe  the  whole  truth :  in  ex- 
amining the  other  party's,  he  may  endeavour  to  detect  collu- 
sion, and  to  elicit  facts  which  they  may  attempt  to  conceal ; 
in  a  word,  he  may  lay  before  the  court  a  just  and  lucid  view 
of  the  whole  question.  But  he  may  not  quote  statutes  and 
adjudged  cases  which  he  really  does  not  think  apply  to  the 
subject,  or  if  they  do  appear  to  apply,  he  may  not  urge  them 
as  possessing  greater  force  or  applicability  than  he  really 
thinks  they  possess.  He  may  not  endeavour  to  mislead  the 
jury  by  appealing  to  their  feelings,  by  employing  ridicule,  and 
especially  by  unfounded  insinuations  or  misrepresentation  of 
facts.  He  may  not  endeavour  to  make  his  own  witnesses  af- 
firm more  than  he  thinks  they  know,  or  induce  them,  by  artful 
questions,  to  give  a  colouring  to  facts  different  from  the  co- 
louring of  truth.  He  may  not  endeavour  to  conceal  or  discredit 
the  truth  by  attempting  to  confuse  the  other  witnesses,  or 
by  entrapping  them  into  contradictions.  Such  as  these  ap- 
pear to  be  the  rules  which  rectitude  imposes  in  ordinary  cases. 
There  are  some  cases  which  a  professional  man  ought  not  to 
undertake  at  all.  This  is  indeed  acknowledged  by  numbers 
of  the  profession.  The  obligation  to  reject  them  is  of  course 
founded  upon  their  contrariety  to  virtue.  How  then  shall  a 
legal  man  know  whether  he  ought  to  undertake  a  cause  at  all, 
but  by  some  previous  consideration  of  its  merits  1     This  must 


CHAP,  v.]      THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.  167 

really  be  done  if  he  would  conform  to  the  requisitions  of  mora- 
lity. There  is  not  an  alternative  :  and  "  absurd  "  or  "  imprac- 
ticable "  as  it  may  be  pronounced  to  be,  we  do  not  shrink  from 
explicitly  maintaining  the  truth.  Impracticable  !  it  is  at  any 
rate  not  impracticable  to  withdraw  from  the  profession  or  to 
decline  to  enter  it.  A  man  is  not  compelled  to  be  a  lawyer : 
and  if  there  are  so  many  difficulties  in  the  practice  of  profes- 
sional virtue,  what  is  to  be  said  ?  Are  we  to  say,  Virtue  must 
be  sacrificed  to  a  profession — or,  The  profession  must  be  sac- 
rificed to  Virtue  ?  The  pleader  will  perhaps  say  that  he  can- 
not tell  what  the  merits  of  a  case  are  until  they  are  elicited 
in  court :  but  this  surely  would  not  avail  to  justify  a  disregard 
of  morality  in  any  other  case.  To  defend  one's  self  for  an 
habitual  disregard  of  the  claims  of  rectitude,  because  we  can- 
not tell,  when  we  begin  a  course  of  action,  whether  it  will  in- 
volve a  sacrifice  of  rectitude  or  not,  is  an  ill  defence  indeed. 
At  any  rate,  if  he  connects  himself  with  a  cause  of  questiona- 
ble rectitude,  he  needs  not  and  he  ought  not  to  advocate  it, 
whilst  ignorant  of  its  merits,  as  if  he  knew  that  it  was  good. 
He  ought  not  to  advocate  it  further  than  he  thinks  it  is  good. 
But  if  any  apologist  for  legal  practice  should  say,  that  a  plead- 
er knows  nothing  or  almost  nothing  of  a  brief  till  he  is  in- 
structed in  court  by  a  junior  counsel,  or  that  he  has  too  many 
briefs  to  be  capable  of  any  previous  enquiry  about  them,  the 
answer  is  at  hand — Refuse  them.  It  would  only  add  one  ex- 
ample to  the  many — that  Virtue  cannot  always  be  maintained 
without  cost.  It  is  necessary  that  a  man  should  adhere  to 
virtue ;  it  is  not  necessary  that  he  should  be  overwhelmed  with 
briefs. 

There  is  one  consideration  under  which  a  pleader  may  as- 
sist a  client  even  with  a  bad  cause,  which  is,  that  it  is  pro- 
per to  prevent  the  client  from  suffering  too  far.  I  would  ac- 
knowledge, generally,  the  justice  of  the  opposite  party's  claims, 
or,  if  it  were  a  criminal  case,  I  would  acquiesce  in  the  evi- 
dence which  carried  conviction  to  my  mind ;  but  still,  in  both, 
something  may  remain  for  the  pleader  to  do.  The  plaintiflT 
may  demand  a  thousand  pounds  when  only  eight  hundred  are 
due,  and  a  pleader,  though  he  could  not  with  integrity  resist 
the  whole  demand,  could  resist  the  excess  of  the  demand 
above  the  just  amount.  Or  if  the  prosecutor  urges  the  guilt 
of  a  prisoner  and  attempts  to  procure  the  infliction  of  an  undue 
punishment,  a  pleader,  though  he  knows  the  prisoner's  guilt, 
may  rightly  prevent  a  sentence  too  severe.  Murray  the 
grammarian  had  been  a  barrister  in  America  :  "  I  do  not  re- 
collect," says  he,  "  that  I  ever  encouraged  a  client  to  proceed 


168  THE    MORALITY    OF    LEGAL    PRACTICE.      [eSSAY  II. 

at  law  when  I  thought  his  cause  was  unjust  or  indefensible  ; 
but  in  such  cases,  I  believe  it  was  my  invariable  practice  to 
discourage  litigation  and  to  recommend  a  peaceable  settlement 
of  differences.  In  the  retrospect  of  this  mode  of  practice,  I 
have  always  had  great  satisfaction,  and  I  am  persuaded  that 
a  different  procedure  would  have  been  the  source  of  many 
painful  recollections."  * 

One  serious  consideration  remains — the  effect  of  the  im- 
morality of  Legal  Practice  upon  the  personal  character  of  the 
profession.  "  The  lawyer  who  is  frequently  engaged  in  re- 
sisting what  he  strongly  suspects  to  be  just,  in  maintaining 
what  he  deems  to  be  in  strictness  untenable,  in  advancing  in- 
conclusive reasoning,  and  seeking  after  flaws  in  the  sound  re- 
plies of  his  antagonists,  can  be  preserved  by  nothing  short  of 
serious  and  invariable  solicitude,  from  the  risk  of  having  the 
distinction  between  moral  right  and  wrong  almost  erased  from 
his  mind."  f  Is  it  indeed  so  ?  Tremendous  is  the  risk.  Is 
it  indeed  so  ?  Then  the  custom  which  entails  this  fearful 
risk  must  infallibly  be  bad.  Assuredly  no  virtuous  conduct 
tends  to  erase  the  distinctions  between  right  and  wrong  from 
the  mind. 

It  is  by  no  means  certain,  that  if  a  lawyer  were  to  enter 
upon  life  with  a  steady  determination  to  act  upon  the  princi- 
ples of  strict  integrity,  his  experience  would  occasion  any  ex- 
ception to  the  general  rule,  that  the  path  of  virtue  is  the  path 
of  interest.  The  client  who  was  conscious  of  the  goodness 
of  his  cause,  would  prefer  the  advocate  whose  known  maxims 
of  conduct  gave  weight  to  every  cause  that  he  undertook. 
When  such  a  man  appeared  before  a  jury,  they  would  attend 
to  his  statements  and  his  reasonings  with  that  confidence 
which  integrity  only  can  inspire.  They  would  not  make,  as 
they  now  do,  perpetual  deductions  from  his  averred  facts  ;  they 
would  not  be  upon  the  watch,  as  they  now  are,  to  protect 
themselves  from  illusion,  and  casuistry,  and  misrepresentation. 
Such  a  man,  I  say,  would  have  a  weight  of  advocacy  which 
no  other  qualification  can  supply ;  and  upright  clients,  know- 
ing this,  would  find  it  their  interest  to  employ  him.  The  ma- 
jority of  clients,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  are  upright.  Professional 
success,  therefore,  would  probably  follow.  And  if  a  few  such 
pleaders,  nay  if  one  such  pleader  was  established,  the  conse- 
quence might  be  beneficial  and  extensive  to  a  degree  which 
it  is  not  easy  to  compute.  It  might  soon  become  necessary 
for  other  pleaders  to  act  upon  the  same  principles,  because 
^  *  Mcnaoirs  of  Lindley  Murray,  p.  43.  t  Gisborne. 


CHAP.  VI.]  PROMISES. LIES.  169 

clients  would  not  entrust  their  interests  to  any  but  those  whose 
characters  would  give  weight  to  their  advocacy.  Thus  even 
the  profligate  part  of  the  profession  might  be  reformed  by  mo- 
tives of  interest  if  not  from  choice.  Want  of  credit  might  be 
want  of  practice ;  for  it  might  eventually  be  almost  equivalent 
to  the  loss  of  a  cause  to  entrust  it  to  a  bad  man.  The  effects 
would  extend  to  the  public.  If  none  but  upright  men  could 
be  efficient  advocates,  and  if  upright  men  would  not  advocate 
vicious  causes,  vicious  causes  would  not  be  prosecuted.  But 
if  such  be  the  probable  or  even  the  possible  results  of  sterling 
integrity,  if  it  might  be  the  means  of  reforming  the  practice  of 
a  large  and  influential  profession,  and  of  almost  exterminating 
wicked  litigation  from  a  people — the  obligation  to  practise 
this  integrity  is  proportionately  great :  the  amount  of  depend- 
ing good  involves  a  corresponding  amount  of  responsibility 
upon  him  who  contributes  to  perpetuate  the  evil. 


CHAPTER  YI. 

PROMISES.— LIES. 


Promises, — Definition  of  a  promise — Parole — Extorted  promises — John 
Fletcher. 

Lies. — Milton's  definition — ^Lies  in  war :  to  robbers :  to  lunatics :  to  the 
sick — Hyperbole — Irony — Complimentary  untruths — "  Not  at  home" 
Legal  documents. 

A  Promise  is  a  contract,  differing  from  such  contracts  as 
a  lawyer  would  draw  up,  in  the  circumstance  that  ordinarily 
it  is  not  written.  The  motive  for  signing  a  contract  is  to  give 
assurance  or  security  to  the  receiver  that  its  terms  will  be  ful- 
filled. The  same  motive  is  the  inducement  to  a  promise. 
The  general  obligation  of  promises  needs  little  illustration, 
because  it  is  not  disputed.  Men  are  not  left  without  the  con- 
sciousness that  what  they  promise,  they  ought  to  perform  ;  and 
thus  thousands,  who  can  give  no  philosophical  account  of  the 
matter,  know,  with  certain  assurance,  that  if  they  violate  their 
engagements  they  violate  the  law  of  God. 

Some  philosophers  deduce  the  obligation  of  promises  from 
the  expediency  of  fulfilling  them.  Doubtless  fulfilment  is  ex- 
pedient ;  but  there  is  a  shorter  and  a  safer  road  to  truth.     To 

15 


170  PROMISES. LIES.  [eSSAY  II. 

promise  and  not  to  perform,  is  to  deceive  ;  and  deceit  is  pe- 
culiarly and  especially  condemned  by  Christianity.  A  lie 
has  been  defined  to  be  "  a  breach  of  promise  ;"  and,  since  the 
Scriptm-es  condemn  lying,  they  condemn  breaches  of  promise. 

Persons  sometimes  deceive  others  by  making  a  promise 
in  a  sense  different  from  that  in  which  they  know  it  will  be 
understood.  They  hope  this  species  of  deceit  is  less  crimi- 
nal than  breaking  their  word,  and  wish  to  gain  the  advantage 
of  deceiving  without  its  guilt.  They  dislike  the  shame  but 
perform  the  act.  A  son  has  abandoned  his  father's  house, 
and  the  father  promises  that  if  he  returns,  he  shall  be  received 
with  open  arms.  The  son  returns,  the  father  "  opens  his  arms" 
to  receive  him,  and  then  proceeds  to  treat  him  with  rigour. 
This  father  falsifies  his  promise  as  truly  as  if  he  had  specifi- 
cally engaged  to  treat  him  with  kindness.  The  sense  in  which 
a  promise  binds  a  person,  is  the  sense  in  which  he  knows  it  is 
accepted  hy  the  other  party. 

It  is  very  possible  to  promise  without  speaking.  Those 
who  purchase  at  auctions  frequently  advance  on  the  price  by 
a  sign  or  a  nod.  An  auctioneer,  in  selling  an  estate  says, 
"  Nine  hundred  and  ninety  pounds  are  offered."  He  who 
makes  the  customary  sign  to  indicate  an  advance  of  ten  pounds, 
promises  to  give  a  thousand. — A  person  who  brings  up  his 
children  or  others  in  the  known  and  encouraged  expectation 
that  he  will  provide  for  them,  promises  to  provide  for  them. 
A  shipmaster  promises  to  deliver  a  pipe  of  wine  at  the  ac- 
customed port,  although  he  may  have  made  no  written  and  no 
verbal  engagement  respecting  it. 

Parole,  such  as  is  taken  of  military  men,  is  of  imperative 
obligation.  The  prisoner  who  escapes  by  breach  of  parole, 
ought  to  be  regarded  as  the  perpetrator  of  an  aggravated  crime  : 
aggravated,  since  his  word  was  accepted,  as  he  knows,  be- 
cause peculiar  reliance  was  placed  upon  it,  and  since  he  adds 
to  the  ordinary  guilt  of  breach  of  promise,  that  of  casting  sus- 
picion and  entailing  suffering  upon  other  men.  If  breach 
of  parole  were  general,  parole  would  not  be  taken.  It  is  one 
of  the  anomalies  which  are  presented  by  the  adherents  to  the 
law  of  honour,  that  they  do  not  reject  from  their  society  the 
man  who  impeaches  their  respectability  and  his  own,  Avhilst 
they  reject  the  man  who  really  impeaches  neither  the  one  nor 
the  other. — To  say  I  am  a  man  of  honour  and  therefore  you 
may  rely  upon  my  word ;  and  then,  as  soon  as  it  is  accepted, 
to  violate  that  word  is  no  ordinary  deceit.  An  upright  man 
never  broke  parole. 

Promises  are  not  binding  if  performance  is  unlawful.    Some- 


CHAP.  VI.]  PROMISES. LIES.  171 

times  men  promise  to  commit  a  wicked  act — even  to  assassina- 
tion ;  but  a  man  is  not  required  to  commit  murder  because  he 
has  promised  to  commit  it.  Thus,  in  the  Christian  Scriptures, 
the  son  who  had  said,  "  I  will  not"  work  in  the  vineyard,  and 
"  afterwards  repented  and  went,"  is  spoken  of  with  approba- 
tion :  his  promise  was  not  binding,  because  fulfilment  would 
have  been  wrong.  Cranmer,  whose  religious  firmness  was 
overcome  in  the  prospect  of  the  stake,  recanted ;  that  is,  he 
promised  to  abandon  the  protestant  faith.  Neither  was  his 
promise  binding.  To  have  regarded  it  would  have  been  a 
crime.  The  offence  both  of  Cranmer  and  of  the  son  in  the 
parable,  consisted  not  in  violating  their  promises,  but  in  making 
them. 

Some  scrupulous  persons  appear  to  attach  a  needless  obli- 
gation to  expressions  which  they  employ  in  the  form  of  pro^ 
mises.  You  ask  a  lady  if  she  will  join  a  party  in  a  walk; 
she  declines,  but  presently  recollecting  some  inducement  to 
go,  she  is  in  doubt  whether  her  refusal  does  not  oblige  her  to 
stay  at  home.  Such  a  person  should  recollect,  that  her  refu- 
sal does  not  partake  of  the  character  of  a  promise  :  there  is 
no  other  party  to  it ;  she  comes  under  no  engagement  to  an- 
other. She  only  expresses  her  present  intention,  which  in- 
tention she  is  at  liberty  to  alter. 

Many  promises  are  conditional  though  the  conditions  are 
not  expressed.  A  man  says  to  some  friends,  I  will  dine  with 
you  at  two  o'clock ;  but  as  he  is  preparing  to  go,  his  child 
meets  with  an  accident  which  requires  his  attention.  This 
man  does  not  violate  a  promise  by  absenting  himself,  because 
such  promises  are  in  fact  made  and  excepted  with  the  tacit  un- 
derstanding that  they  are  subject  to  such  conditions.  No  one 
would  expect,  when  his  friend  engaged  to  dine  with  him,  that 
he  intended  to  bind  himself  to  come,  though  he  left  a  child 
unassisted  with  a  fractured  arm.  Accordingly,  when  a  per- 
son means  to  exclude  such  conditions  he  says,  "  I  will  cer- 
tainly do  so  and  so  if  I  am  living  and  able." 

Yet  even  to  seem  to  disregard  an  engagement  is  an  evil. 
To  an  ingenuous  and  Christian  mind  there  is  always  some- 
thing painful  in  not  performing  it.  Of  this  evil  the  principal 
source  is  gratuitously  brought  upon  us  by  the  habit  of  using 
unconditional  terms  for  conditional  engagements.  That  which 
is  only  intention  should  be  expressed  as  intention.  It  is  bet- 
ter, and  more  becoming  the  condition  of  humanity,  to  say,  I 
intend  to  do  a  thing,  than,  I  will  do  a  thing.  The  recollection 
of  our  dependency  upon  uncontrollable  circumstances  should 
be  present  with  us  even  in  littlp  affairs — "  Go  to  now,  ye  that 


1?2  PROMISES. LIES.  [ESSAy  H. 

say,  To-day  or  to-morrow  we  will  go  into  such  a  city  and  buy 
and  sell  and  get  gain  :  whereas  ye  know  not  what  shall  be  on 
the  morrow. — Ye  ought  to  say,  If  the  Lord  will,  we  shall 
live,  and  do  this  or  that."  Not  indeed  that  the  sacred  name 
of  God  is  to  be  introduced  to  express  the  conditions  of  our 
little  engagements  ;  but  the  principle  should  never  be  forgotten 
— ^that  we  know  not  what  shall  be  on  the  morrow. 

Respecting  the  often  discussed  question,  whether  extorted 
promises  are  binding,  there  has  been,  I  suspect,  a  general 
want  of  advertence  to  one  important  point.  What  is  an  ex- 
torted promise  ?  If  by  an  extorted  promise,  is  meant  a  pro- 
mise that  is  made  involuntarily,  without  the  concurrence  of 
the  will ;  if  it  is  the  effect  of  any  ungovernable  impulse,  and 
made  without  the  consciousness  of  the  party — then  it  is  not  a 
promise.  This  may  happen.  Fear  or  agitation  may  be  so 
great  that  a  person  really  does  .not  know  what  he  says  or 
does  ;  and  in  such  a  case  a  man's  promises  do  not  bind  him 
any  more  than  the  promises  of  a  man  in  a  fit  of  insanity. 
-But  if  by  an  "extorted"  promise  it  is  only  meant  that  very 
powerful  inducements  were  held  out  to  making  it,  inducements 
however  which  did  not  take  away  the  power  of  choice — then 
•these  promises  are  in  strictness  voluntary,  and  like  all  other 
voluntary  engagements,  they  ought  to  be  fulfilled.  But  perhaps 
fulfilment  itself  is  unlawful.  Then  you  may  not  fulfil  it.  The 
offence  consists  in  making  such  engagements.  It  will  be  said, 
a  robber  threatened  to  take  my  life  unless  I  would  promise  to 
reveal  the  place  where  my  neighbour's  money  was  deposited. 
Ought  I  not  to  make  the  promise  in  order  to  save  my  life  1 
No.  Here,  in  reality,  is  the  origin  of  the  difliculties  and  the 
doubts.  To  rob  your  neighbour  is  criminal;  to  enable  an- 
other man  to  rob  him  is  criminal  too.  Instead  therefore  of 
discussing  the  obligation  of  "  extorted"  promises,  we  should 
consider  whsther  such  promises  may  lawfully  be  made.  The 
prospect  of  saving  life  is  one  of  the  utmost  inducements  to 
make  them,  and  yet,  amongst  those  things  which  we  are  to 
hold  subservient  to  our  Christian  fidelity,  is  our  "  own  life 
-also."  If,  however,  giving  way  to  the  weakness  of  nature,  a 
person  makes  the  promise,  he  should  regulate  his  perform- 
ance by  the  ordinary  principles.  Fulfil  the  promise  unless 
fulfilment  be  wrong :  and  if,  in  estimating  the  propriety  of 
-fulfilling  it,  any  difficulty  arises,  it  must  be  charged  not  to  the 
imperfection  of  moral  principles,  but  to  the  entanglement  in 
which  we  involve  ourselves  by  having  begun  to  deviate  from 
rectitude.  If  we  had  not  unlawfully  made  the  promise  we 
should  have  had  no  difficulty  in  ascertaining  our  subsequent 


CHAP,  n.]  PROMISES. LIES.  173 

duty.  The  traveller  who  does  not  'desert  the  proper  road, 
easily  finds  his  way  ;  he  who  once  loses  sight  of  it,  has  many 
difRculties  in  returning. 

The  history  of  that  good  man  John  Fletcher  (La  Flechere) 
affords  an  example  to  our  purpose.  Fletcher  had  a  brother, 
De  Gons,  and  a  nephew,  a  profligate  youth.  This  youth 
came  one  day  to  his  uncle  De  Gons,  and  holding  up  a  pistol, 
declared  he  would  instantly  shoot  him  if  he  did  not  give  him 
an  order  for  five  hundred  crowns.  De  Gons  in  terror  gave  it ; 
and  the  nephew  then,  under  the  same  threat,  required  him 
solemnly  to  promise  that  he  would  not  prosecute  him  ;  and 
De  Gons  made  the  promise  accordingly.  That  is  what  is 
called  an  extorted  promise,  and  an  extorted  gift.  How,  in 
similar  circumstances,  did  Fletcher  act  ?  This  youth  after- 
wards went  to  him,  told  him  of  the  "  present"  which  De  Gons 
had  made,  and  showed  him  the  order.  Fletcher  suspected 
some  fraud,  and  thinking  it  right  to  prevent  its  success,  he 
put  the  order  in  his  pocket.  It  was  at  the  risk  of  his  life. 
The  young  man  instantly  presented  his  pistol,  declaring  that 
he  would  fire  if  he  did  not  deliver  it  up.  Fletcher  did  not 
submit  to  the  extortion  :  he  told  him  that  his  life  was  secure 
under  the  protection  of  God,  refused  to  deliver  up  the  order, 
and  severely  remonstrated  with  his  nephew  on  his  profligacy. 
The  young  man  was  restrained  and  softened  ;  and  before  he 
left  his  uncle,  gave  him  many  assurances  that  he  would  amend 
his  life. — De  Gons  might  have  been  perplexed  with  doubts  as 
to  the  obligation  of  his  "  extorted"  promise  : — Fletcher  could 
have  no  doubts  to  solve. 

LIES. 

The  guilt  of  lying,  like  that  of  many  other  offences,  has 
been  needlessly  founded  upon  its  ill  effects.  These  effects 
constitute  a  good  reason  for  adhering  to  truth,  but  they  are 
not  the  greatest  nor  the  best.  "  Putting  away  lying,  speak 
every  man  truth  with  his  neighbour."*  "  Ye  shall  not  steal, 
neither  deal  falsely,  neither  lie  one  to  another."!  "  The  law 
is  made  for  unholy  and  profane,  for  murderers — for  liars. "J 
It  may  afford  the  reader  some  instruction,  to  observe  with  what 
crimes  lying  is  associated  in  Scripture — with  perjury,  and 
murder,  and  parricide.  Not  that  it  is  necessary  to  suppose 
that  the  measure  of  guilt  of  these  crimes  is  equal,  but  that 
the  guilt  of  all  is  great.  With  respect  to  lying,  there  is  no 
trace  in  these  passages  that  its  guilt  is  conditional  upon  its  ef- 

*  Eph.  iv.  25.  t  Lev.  xix.  11.  X  I  Tim.  i.  9,  10 

15* 


174  PROMISES. LIES.  [eSSAY  II. 

fects,  or  that  it  is  not  always,  and  for  whatever  purpose,  pro- 
hibited by  the  Divine  Will. 

A  lie  is,  uttering  what  is  not  true  when  the  speaker  pro- 
fesses to  utter  truth,  or  when  he  knows  it  is  expected  by  the 
hearer.  I  do  not  perceive  that  any  looser  definition  is  al- 
lowable, because  every  looser  definition  would  permit  deceit. 

Milton's  definition,  considering  the  general  tenor  of  his 
character,  was  very  lax.  He  says,  "  Falsehood  is  incurred 
when  any  one,  from  a  dishonest  motive,  either  perverts  the 
truth  or  utters  what  is  false  to  one  to  whom  it  is  his  duty  to 
speak  the  truth P*  To  whom  is  it  not  our  duty  to  speak  the 
truth  ?  What  constitutes  duty  but  the  will  of  God  ?  and  where 
is  it  found  that  it  is  his  will  that  we  should  sometimes  lie  ? 
— But  another  condition  is  proposed  :  In  order  to  constitute  a 
lie,  the  motive  to  it  must  be  dishonest.  Is  not  all  deceit  dis- 
honesty ;  and  can  any  one  utter  a  lie  without  deceit  ?  A  man 
who  travels  in  the  Arctic  regions  comes  home  and  writes  a 
narrative  professedly  faithful,  of  his  adventures,  and  decorates 
it  with  marvellous  incidents  which  never  happened,  and  sto- 
ries of  wonders  which  he  never  saw.  You  tell  this  man  he 
has  been  passing  lies  upon  the  public.  Oh  no,  he  says,  I  had  not 
"  a  dishonest  motive."  I  only  meant  to  make  readers  wonder. 
— Milton's  mode  of  substantiating  his  doctrine,  is  worthy  of 
remark.  He  makes  many  references  for  authority  to  the 
Hebrew  Scriptures,  but  not  one  to  the  Christian.  The  reason 
is  plain  though  perhaps  he  was  not  aware  of  it,  that  the  purer 
moral  system  which  the  Christian  Lawgiver  introduced,  did 
not  countenance  the  doctrine.  Another  argument  is  so  feeble 
that  it  may  well  be  concluded  no  valid  argument  can  be  found. 
If  it  had  been  discoverable  would  not  Milton  have  found  it  ? 
He  says,  "It  is  universally  admitted  that  feints  and  stratagems 
in  war,  when  unaccompanied  by  perjury  or  breach  of  faith, 
do  not  fall  under  the  description  of  falsehood. — It  is  scarcely 
possible  to  execute  any  of  the  artifices  of  war,  without  openly 
uttering  the  greatest  untruths  with  the  indisputable  intention 
of  deceiving."!  And  so,  because  the  "  greatest  untruths"  are 
uttered  in  conducting  one  of  the  most  flagitious  departments 
of  the  most  unchristian  system  in  the  world,  we  are  told,  in  a 
system  of  Christian  Doctrine,  that  untruths  are  lawful ! 

Paley's  philosophy  is  yet  more  lax :  he  says  that  we  may 
tell  a  falsehood  to  a  person  who  "has  no  right  to  know  the 
truth."}:  What  constitutes  a  right  to  know  the  truth  it  were 
not  easy  to  determine.     But  if  a  man  has  no  right  to  know 

*  Christian  Doctrine,  p.  658.  t  Id.  659.  \  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil, 
b.  3.  p.  1.  c.  15. 


CHAP.  VI.]  PROMISES. LIES.  175 

the  truth — ^withhold  it ;  but  do  not  utter  a  lie.  A  man  has  no 
right  to  know  how  much  property  I  possess.  If,  however, 
he  impertinently  chooses  to  ask,  what  am  I  to  do  ?  Refuse  t& 
tell  him,  says  Christian  morality.  What  am  I  to  do  ?  Tell 
him  it  is  ten  times  as  great  as  it  is,  says  the  morality  of  Paley. 

To  say  that  when  a  man  is  tempted  to  employ  a  falsehood, 
he  is  to  consider  the  degree  of  "  inconveniency  which  results 
from  the  want  of  confidence  in  such  cases,"*  and  to  employ 
the  falsehood  or  not  as  this  degree  shall  prescribe,  is  surely 
to  trifle  with  morality.  What  is  the  .hope  that  a  man  will 
decide  aright,  who  sets  about  such  a  calculation  at  such 
a  time  ?  Another  kind  of  falsehood  which  it  is  said  is  law- 
ful, is  that  "  to  a  robber,  to  conceal  your  property ."  A  man 
gets  into  my  house,  and  desires  to  know  where  he  shall  find 
my  plate.  I  tell  him  it  is  in  a  chest  in  such  a  room,  knowing 
that  it  is  in  a  closet  in  another.  By  such  a  falsehood  I  might 
save  my  property  or  possibly  my  life  ;  but  if  the  prospect  of 
doing  this  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  violating  the  Moral  Law, 
there  is  no  action  which  we  may  not  lawfully  commit.  May 
a  person,  in  order  so  to  save  his  property  or  life,  commit  par- 
ricide 1  Every  reader  says.  No.  But  where  is  the  ground 
of  the  distinction  ?  If  you  may  lie  for  the  sake  of  such  ad- 
vantages, why  may  you  not  kill?  What  makes  murder  un- 
lawful but  that  which  makes  lying  unlawful  too  ?  No  man 
surely  will  say  that  we  must  make  distinctions  in  the  atrocity 
of  such  actions,  and  that  though  it  is  not  lawful  for  the  sake 
of  advantage  to  commit  an  act  of  a  certain  intensity  of  guilt, 
yet  is  lawful  to  commit  one  of  a  certain  gradation  less.  Such 
doctrine  would  be  purely  gratuitous  and  unfounded :  it  would 
be  equivalent  to  saying  that  we  are  at  liberty  to  disobey  the 
Divine  Laws  when  we  think  fit.  The  case  is  very  simple  : 
If  I  may  tell  a  falsehood  to  a  robber  in  order  to  save  my  pro- 
perty, I  may  commit  parricide  for  the  same  purpose  ;  for  ly- 
ing and  parricide  are  placed  together  and  jointly  condemnedf 
in  the  revelation  from  God. 

Then  we  are  told  that  we  may  "  tell  a  falsehood  to  a  mad- 
man for  his  own  advantage,"  and  this  because  it  is  beneficial. 
Dr.  Carter  may  furnish  an  answer :  he  speaks  of  the  Female 
Lunatic  Asylum,  Saltpetriere  in  Paris,  and  says,  "  The  great 
object  to  which  the  views  of  the  officers  of  La  Saltpetriere 
are  directed,  is  to  gain  the  confidence  of  the  patients ;  and 
this  object  is  generally  attained  by  gentleness,  by  appearing 
to  take  an  interest  in  their  affairs,  by  a  decision  of  character 
equally  remote  from  the  extremes  of  indulgence  and  severity, 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  3.  p.  1.  c.  15.  t  1  Tim.  i.  9,  10. 


17(J  PROMISES. LIES.  [eSSAY  II. 

and  by  the  most  scrupulous  observance  of  good  faith.  Upon 
this  latter,  particular  stress  seems  to  be  laid  by  M.  Pinel,  who 
remarks  'that  insane  persons,  like  children,  lose  all  confi- 
dence and  all  respect  if  you  fail  in  your  word  towards  them ; 
and  they  immediately  set  their  ingenuity  to  work  to  deceive 
and  circumvent  you.'  "*  What  then  becomes  of  the  doctrine 
of  "  telling  falsehoods  to  madmen  for  their  own  advantage  .?" 
It  is  pleasant  thus  to  find  the  evidence  of  experience  enforcing 
the  dictates  of  principle,  and  that  what  morality  declares  to 
be  right,  facts  declare  to  be  expedient. 

Persons  frequently  employ  falsehoods  to  a  sick  man  who 
cannot  recover,  lest  it  should  discompose  his  mind.  This  is 
called  kindness,  although  an  earnest  preparation  for  death 
may  be  at  stake  upon  their  speaking  the  truth.  There  is  a 
peculiar  inconsistency  sometimes  exhibited  on  such  occa- 
sions :  the  persons  who  will  not  discompose  a  sick  man  for 
the  sake  of  his  interests  in  futurity,  will  discompose  him 
without  scruple  if  he  has  not  made  his  will.  Is  a  bequest  of 
more  consequence  to  the  survivor,  than  a  hope  full  of  immor- 
tality to  the  dying  man  1 

It  is  curious  to  remark  how  zealously  persons  reprobate 
"  pious  frauds ;"  that  is,  lies  for  the  religious  benefit  of  the 
deceived  party.  Surely  if  any  reason  for  employing  false- 
hood be  a  good  one,  it  is  the  prospect  of  effecting  religious 
benefit.  How  is  it  then  that  we  so  freely  condemn  these 
falsehoods,  whilst  we  contend  for  others  which  are  used  fot 
less  important  purposes  1 

Still,  not  every  expression  that  is  at  variance  with  facts  is 
a  lie,  because  there  are  some  expressions  in  which  the  speaker 
does  not  pretend,  and  the  hearer  does  not  expect,  literal  truth. 
Of  this  class  are  hyperboles  and  jests,  fables  and  tales  of  pro- 
fessed fiction:  of  this  class  too,  are  parables,  such  as  are 
employed  in  the  New  Testament.  In  such  cases  affirmative 
language  is  used  in  the  same  terms  as  if  the  allegations  were 
true,  yet  as  it  is  known  that  it  does  not  profess  to  narrate  facts, 
no  lie  is  uttered.  It  is  the  same  with  some  kinds  of  irony : 
*'  Cry  aloud,"  said  Elijah  to  the  priests  of  the  idol,  "/or  he  is 
a  god,  peradventure  he  sleepeth."  And  yet,  because  a  given 
untruth  is  not  a  lie,  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that  it  is 
innocent :  for  it  is  very  possible  to  employ  such  expressions 
without  any  sufficient  justification.  A  man  who  thinks  he 
can  best  inculcate  virtue  through  a  fable,  may  write  one  :  he 
who  desires  to  discountenance  an  absurdity,  may  employ 
irony.  Yet  every  one  should  use  as  little  of  such  language 
*  Account  of  the  Principal  Hospitals  in  France,  &c. 


CHAP.  VI.]  PROMISES. LIES.  177 

as  he  can,  because  it  is  frequently  dangerous  language.  The 
man  who  familiarizes  himself  to  a  departure  from  literal  truth, 
is  in  danger  of  departing  from  it  without  reason  and  without 
excuse.  Some  of  these  departures  are  like  lies ;  so  much 
like  them  that  both  speaker  and  hearer  may  reasonably  ques- 
tion whether  they  are  lies  or  not.  The  lapse  from  untruths 
which  can  deceive  no  one,  to  those  which  are  intended  to 
deceive,  proceeds  by  almost  imperceptible  gradations  on  the 
scale  of  evil :  and  it  is  not  the  part  of  wisdom  to  approach 
the  verge  of  guilt.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten,  that  language, 
professedly  fictitious,  is  not  always  understood  to  be  such  by 
those  who  hear  it.  This  applies  especially  to  the  case  of 
children — that  is,  of  mankind  during  that  period  of  life  in 
which  they  are  acquiring  some  of  their  first  notions  of  morale 
ity.  The  boy  who  hears  his  father  using  hyperboles  and 
irony  with  a  grave  countenance,  probably  thinks  he  has  his 
father's  example  for  telling  lies  among  his  schoolfellows. 

Amongst  the  indefensible  untruths  which  often  are  not  lies, 
are  those  which  factitious  politeness  enjoins.  Such  are  com 
pliments  and  complimentary  subscriptions,  and  many  other 
untruths  of  expression  and  of  action  which  pass  currently  in 
the  world.  These  are,  no  doubt,  often  estimated  at  their 
value :  the  receiver  knows  that  they  are  base  coin  though 
they  shine  like  the  good.  Now,  although  it  is  not  to  be  pre- 
tended that  such  expressions,  so  estimated,  are  lies,  yet  I  will 
venture  to  affirm  that  the  reader  cannot  set  up  for  them  any 
tolerable  defence ;  and  if  he  cannot  show  that  they  are  right 
he  may  be  quite  sure  that  they  are  wrong.  A  defence  has 
however  been  attempted :  "  How  much  is  happiness  increased 
by  the  general  adoption  of  a  system  of  concerted  and  limited 
deceit !  He  from  whose  doctrine  it  flows  that  we  are  to  be 
in  no  case  hypocrites,  would,  in  mere  manners,  reduce  us  to 
a  degree  of  barbarism  beyond  that  of  the  rudest  savage."  We 
do  not  enter  here  into  such  questions  as  whether  a  man  may 
smile  when  his  friend  calls  upon  him,  though  he  would  rather 
just  then  that  he  had  staid  away.  Whatever  the  reader  may 
think  of  these  questions,  the  "  system  of  deceit"  which  passes 
in  the  world  cannot  be  justified  by  the  decision.  There  is 
no  fear  that  "  a  degree  of  barbarism  beyond  that  of  the  rudest 
savage"  would  ensue,  if  this  system  were  amended.  The 
first  teachers  of  Christianity,  who  will  not  be  charged  with 
being  in  "  any  case  hypocrites,"  both  recommended  and  prac- 
tised gentleness  and  courtesy.*  And  as  to  the  increase  of 
happiness  which  is  assumed  to  result  from  this  system  of, 
*  1  Peter,  ii.  1.     Tit.  iii.  2.     1  Peter,  iii.  8 


178  PROMISES. LIES.  [eSSAY  II. 

deceit,  the  fact  is  of  a  very  questionable  kind.  No  society  I 
believe  sufficiently  discourages  it ;  but  that  society  which 
discourages  it  probably  as  much  as  any  other,  certainly  en- 
joys its  full  average  of  happiness.  But  the  apology  proceeds, 
and  more  seriously  errs  :  "  The  employment  of  falsehood  for 
the  production  of  good,  cannot  be  more  unworthy  of  the  Di- 
vine Being  than  the  acknowledged  employment  of  rapine  and 
murder  for  the  same  purpose."*  Is  it  then  not  perceived  that 
to  employ  the  wickedness  of  man  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  holding  its  agents  innocent  ?  Some  of  those  whose  wick- 
edness has  been  thus  employed,  have  been  punished  for  that 
wickedness.  Even  to  show  that  the  Deity  has  employed 
falsehood  for  the  production  of  good,  would  in  no  degree 
establish  the  doctrine  that  falsehood  is  right. 

The  childish  and  senseless  practice  of  requiring  servants 
to  "  deny"  their  masters,  has  had  many  apologists — I  suppose 
because  many  perceive  that  it  is  wrong.  It  is  not  always 
true  that  such  a  servant  does  not  in  strictness  lie ;  for,  how 
well  soever  the  folly  may  be  understood  by  the  gay  world, 
some  who  knock  at  their  doors  have  no  other  idea  than  that 
they  may  depend  upon  the  servant's  word.  Of  this  the  ser- 
vant is  sometimes  conscious,  and  to  these  persons  therefore 
he  who  denies  his  master,  lies.  An  uninitiated  servant  suffers 
a  shock  to  his  moral  principles  when  he  is  first  required  to 
tell  these  falsehoods.  It  diminishes  his  previous  abhorrence 
of  lying,  and  otherwise  deteriorates  his  moral  character. 
Even  if  no  such  ill  consequences  resulted  from  this  foolish 
custom,  there  is  objection  to  it  which  is  short,  but  sufficient — ■ 
nothing  can  be  said  in  its  defence. 

Amongst  the  prodigious  multiplicity  of  falsehoods  which 
are  practised  in  legal  processes,  the  system  of  pleading  not 
guilty  is  one  that  appears  perfectly  useless.  By  the  rule, 
that  all  who  refuse  to  plead  were  presumed  to  be  guilty,  pris- 
oners were  in  some  sort  compelled  to  utter  this  falsehood 
before  they  could  have  the  privilege  of  a  trial.  The  law  is 
lately  relaxed ;  so  that  a  prisoner,  if  he  chooses,  may  refuse 
to  plead  at  all.  Still,  only  a  part  of  the  evil  is  removed,  for 
even  now,  to  keep  silent  may  be  construed  into  a  tacit  ac- 
knowledgment of  guilt,  so  that  the  temptation  to  falsehood  is 
still  exhibited.  There  is  no  other  use  in  the  custom  of  plead- 
ing guilty  or  not  guilty,  but  that,  if  a  man  desires  to  acknow- 
ledge his  guilt,  he  may  have  the  opportunity ;  and  this  he 
may  have  wiiiiout  any  custom  of  the  sort. — It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  the  multitude  of  falsehoods  which  obtain  in  legal 
*  Edin.  Rev.  vol,  1,  Art.  Belsham's  Philosophy  of  the  Mind. 


CHAP.  VII.]  QATHS.  1?9 

documents  during  the  progress  of  a  suit  at  law,  have  a  power- 
ful tendency  to  propagate  habits  of  mendacity.  A  man  sells 
goods  to  the  value  of  twenty  pounds  to  another,  and  is  obliged 
to  enforce  payment  by  law.  The  lawyer  draws  up,  for  the 
creditor,  a  Declaration  in  Assumpsit,  stating  that  the  debtor 
owes  him  forty  pounds  for  goods  sold,  forty  pounds  for 
work  done,  forty  pounds  for  money  lent,  forty  pounds  for 
money  expended  on  his  account,  forty  pounds  for  money  re- 
ceived by  the  debtor  for  the  creditor,  and  so  on — and  that, 
two  or  three  hundred  pounds  being  thus  due  to  the  creditor, 
he  has  a  just  demand  of  twenty  pounds  upon  the  debtor! 
These  falsehoods  are  not  one  half  of  what  an  every  day  De- 
claration in  Assumpsit  contains.  If  a  person  refuses  to  give 
up  a  hundred  head  of  cattle  which  a  farmer  has  placed  in  his 
custody,  the  farmer  declares  that  he  "  casually  lost"  them, 
and  that  the  other  party  "  casually  found"  them :  and  then, 
instead  of  saying  he  casually  lost  a  hundred  head  of  cattle, 
he  declares  that  it  was  a  thousand  bulls,  a  thousand  cows,  a 
thousand  oxen,  and  a  thousand  heifers  !*  I  do  not  think  that 
the  habits  of  mendacity  which  such  falsehoods  are  likely 
to  encourage  are  the  worst  consequences  of  this  unhappy 
system,  but  they  are  seriously  bad.  No  man  who  considers 
the  influence  of  habit  upon  the  mind,  can  doubt  that  an  ingen- 
uous abhorrence  of  lying  is  likely  to  be  diminished  by  famil- 
iarity with  these  extravagant  falsehoods. 


CHAPTER  YII. 


OATHS. 

THEIR    MORAL   CHARACTER— THEIR   EFFICACY   AS 
SECURITIES  OF  VERACITY— THEIR  EFFECBTS. 

A  curse — Immorality  of  oaths — Oaths  of  the  ancient  Jews — Milton — 
Paley — The  High  Priest's  adjuration — Early  Christians — InefEcacy  of 
oaths — Motives  to  veracity — Religious  sanctions :  Public  opinion  ;  Le- 
gal penalties — Oaths  in  Evidence:  Parliamentary  Evidence:  Courts 
Martial— The  United  States— Effects  of  oaths :  Falsehood— General 
obligations. 

"  An  oath  is  that  whereby  we  call  God  to  witness  the  truth 
of  what  we  say,  with  a  curse  upon  ourselves,  either  implied 
or  expressed,  should  it  prove  false. "t 

*  See  the  Form,  2,  Chitty  on  Pleading,  p.  370.  t  MUlon :  Chris- 

tian  Doctrine,  p.  579. 


180  OATHS.  [essay  II. 

A  Curse. ^ — ^Now  supposing  the  Christian  Scriptures  to 
contain  no  information  respecting  the  moral  character  of  oaths, 
how  far  is  it  reasonable,  or  prudent,  or  reverent,  for  a  man  to 
stake  his  salvation  upon  the  truth  of  what  he  says  ?  To  bring 
forward  so  tremendous  an  event  as  "  everlasting  destruction 
from  the  presence  of  the  Lord,"  in  attestation  of  the  offence 
perhaps  of  a  poacher  or  of  the  claim  to  a  field,  is  surely  to 
make  unwarrantably  light  of  the  most  awful  things.  This 
consideration  applies,  even  if  a  man  is  sure  that  he  speaks 
the  truth ;  but  who  is,  beforehand,  sure  of  this  ?  Oaths  in 
evidence,  for  example,  are  taken  before  the  testimony  is  given. 
A  person  swears  that  he  will  speak  the  truth.  Who,  I  ask, 
is  sure  that  he  will  do  this  1  Who  is  sure  that  the  embarrass- 
ment of  a  public  examination,  that  the  ensnaring  questions  of 
counsel,  that  the  secret  influence  of  inclination  or  interest, 
will  not  occasion  him  to  utter  one  inaccurate  expression? 
Who,  at  any  rate,  is  so  sure  of  this  that  it  is  rational,  or  justi- 
fiable, specifically  to  stake  his  salvation  upon  his  accuracy  ? 
Thousands  of  honest  men  have  been  mistaken ;  their  allega- 
tions have  been  sincere,  but  untrue.  And  if  this  should  be 
thought  not  a  legitimate  objection,  let  it  be  remembered,  that 
few  men's  minds  are  so  sternly  upright,  that  they  can  answer 
a  variety  of  questions  upon  subjects  on  which  their  feelings, 
and  wishes,  and  interest  are  involved,  without  some  little 
deduction  from  the  truth,  in  speaking  of  matters  that  are 
against  their  cause,  or  some  little  overcolouring  of  facts  in 
their  own  favour.  It  is  a  circumstance  of  constant  occurrence, 
that  even  a  well-intentioned  witness  adds  to  or  deducts  a 
little  from  the  truth.  Who  then,  amidst  such  temptation, 
would  make,  who  ought  to  make,  his  hope  of  heaven  dependent 
on  his  strict  adherence  to  accurate  veracity  ?  And  if  such 
considerations  indicate  the  impropriety  of  swearing  upon 
subjects  which  afiect  the  lives,  and  liberties,  and  property  of 
others,  how  shall  we  estimate  the  impropriety  of  using  these 
dreadful  imprecations  to  attest  the  delivery  of  a  summons  for 
a  debt  of  half-a-crown ! 

These  are  moral  objections  to  the  use  of  oaths  indepen- 
dently of  any  reference  to  the  direct  Moral  Law.  Another 
objection  of  the  same  kind  is  this :  To  take  an  oath  is  to 
assume  that  the  Deity  will  become  a  party  in  the  case — that 
we  can  call  upon  Him,  when  we  please,  to  follow  up  by  the 
exercise  of  his  Almighty  power,  the  contracts  (often  the  veiy 
insignificant  contracts)  which  men  make  with  men.  Is  it  not 
irreverent,  and  for  that  reason  inunoral,  to  call  upon  him  to 
exercise  this  power  in  reference  to  subjects  which  are  so  151 


CHAP,  VII.]  OATHS.  1^1 

significant  that  other  men  will  scarcely  listen  with  patience 
to  their  details  ?  The  objection  goes  even  further.  A  robber 
exacts  an  oath  of  the  man  whom  he  has  plundered,  that  he 
will  not  attempt  to  pursue  or  prosecute  him.  Pursuit  and 
prosecution  are  duties ;  so  then  the  oath  assumes  that  the 
Deity  will  punish  the  swearer  in  futurity  if  he  fulfils  a  duty. 
Confederates  in  a  dangerous  and  wicked  enterprise  bind  one 
another  to  secrecy  and  to  mutual  assistance,  by  oaths — assu- 
ming that  God  will  become  a  party  to  their  wickedness,  and  if 
they  do  not  perpetrate  it  will  punish  them  for  their  virtue. 

Upon  every  subject  of  questionable  rectitude  that  is  sanc- 
tioned by  habit  and  the  usages  of  society,  a  person  should 
place  himself  in  the  independent  situation  of  an  enquirer. 
He  should  not  seek  for  arguments  to  defend  an  existing  prac- 
tice, but  should  simply  enquire  what  our  practice  ought  to  be; 
One  of  the  most  powerful  causes  of  the  slow  amendment  of 
public  institutions,  consists  in  this  circumstance,  that  most 
men  endeavour  rather  to  justify  what  exists  than  to  consider 
whether  it  ought  to  exist  or  not.  This  cause  operates  upon 
the  question  of  oaths.  We  therefore  invite  the  reader,  in  con- 
sidering the  citation  which  follows,  to  suppose  himself  to  be 
one  of  the  listeners  at  the  Mount — to  know  nothing  of  the  cus- 
toms of  the  present  day,  and  to  have  no  desire  to  justify  them. 

"  Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath  been  said  by  them  of  old  time, 
Thou  shalt  not  forswear  thyself  but  shalt  perform  unto  the 
Lord  thine  oaths.  But  I  say  unto  you,  Swear  not  at  all :  nei- 
ther by  heaven  for  it  is  God's  throne,  nor  by  the  earth  for  it  is 
his  footstool,  neither  by  Jerusalem,  for  it  is  the  city  of  the 
Great  King.  Neither  shalt  thou  swear  by  thy  head,  because 
thou  canst  not  make  one  hair  white  or  black.  But  let  your 
communication  be  yea  yea,  nay  nay ;  for  whatsoever  is  more 
than  these,  cometh  of  evil."* 

If  a  person  should  take  a  New  Testament,  and  read  these 
words  to  ten  intelligent  Asiatics  who  had  never  heard  of  them 
before,  does  any  man  believe  that  a  single  individual  of  them 
would  think  that  the  words  did  prohibit  all  oaths  ?  I  lay 
stress  upon  this  consideration  :  if  ten  unbiassed  persons 
would,  at  the  first  hearing,  say  the  prohibition  was  universal, 
we  have  no  contemptible  argument  that  that  is  the  real  mean- 
ing of  the  words.  For  to  whom  were  the  words  addressed  ? 
Not  to  schoolmen,  of  whom  it  was  known  that  they  would 
make  nice  distinctions  and  curious  investigations  ;  not  to  men 
of  learning,  who  were  in  the  habit  of  cautiously  weighing  the 
import  of  words — ^but  to  a  multitude — a  mixed  and  mischooled 
*  Matt.  V.  33—37. 
16 


182  OATHS.  [essay  II. 

multitude.  It  was  to  such  persons  that  the  prohibition  was 
addressed ;  it  was  to  such  apprehensions  that  its  form  was 
adapted. 

"It.  hath  been  said  of  old  time,  Thou  shalt  not  forswear 
thyself."  Why  refer  to  what  was  said  of  old  time  ?  For 
this  reason  assuredly ;  to  point  out  that  the  present  requisi- 
tions were  different  from  the  former  ;  that  what  was  prohibited 
now  was  different  from  what  was  prohibited  before.  And 
what  was  prohibited  before  ?  Swearing  falsely — Swearing 
and  not  performing.  What  then  could  be  prohibited  now  1 
Swearing  ^rwZy— Swearing,  even,  and  performing:  that  is, 
swearing  at  all ;  for  it  is  manifest  that  if  truth  may  not  be  at- 
tested by  an  oath,  no  oath  may  be  taken.  Of  old  time  it  was 
said,  "  Ye  shall  not  swear  by  my  name  falsely y*  "  If  a  man 
swear  an  oath  to  bind  his  soul  with  a  bond,  he  shall  not  break 
his  word."t  There  could  be  no  intelligible  purpose  in  con- 
tradistinguishing the  new  precept  from  these,  but  to  point  out 
a  characteristic  difference ;  and  there  is  no  intelligible  char- 
acteristic difference  but  that  which  denounces  all  oaths. 
Such  were  the  views  of  the  early  Christians.  "  The  old 
law,"  says  one  of  them,  "  is  satisfied  with  the  honest  keeping 
of  the  oath,  but  Christ  cuts  off  the  opportunity  of  perjury. "| 
In  acknowledging  that  this  prefatory  reference  to  the  former 
law,  is  in  my  view  absolutely  conclusive  of  our  Christian 
duty,  I  would  remark  as  an  extraordinary  circumstance,  that 
Dr.  Paley,  in  citing  the  passage,  omits  this  introduction  and 
takes  no  notice  of  it  in  his  argument. 

"  I  say  unto  you,  Swear  not  at  ally  The  words  are  abso- 
lute and  exclusive. 

"  Neither  by  heaven,  nor  by  the  earth,  nor  by  Jerusalem, 
nor  by  thy  own  head."  Respecting  this  enumeration  it  is  said 
that  it  prohibits  swearing  by  certain  objects,  but  not  by  all 
objects.  To  which  a  sufficient  answer  is  found  in  the  parallel 
passage  in  James  :  "  Swear  not,"  he  says  ;  "  neither  by  heav- 
en, neither  by  the  earth,  neither  by  any  other  oath."§  Tliis 
mode  of  prohibition,  by  which  an  absolute  and  universal  rule 
is  first  proposed  and  then  followed  by  certain  examples  of  the 
prohibited  things,  is  elsewhere  employed  in  Scripture.  "  Thou 
shalt  have  no  other  gods  before  me.  Thou  shalt  not  make 
unto  thee  any  graven  image,  or  any  likeness  of  any  thing  that 
is  in  heaven  above,  or  that  is  in  the  earth  beneath,  or  that  is 
in  the  water  under  the  earth. "||  No  man  supposes  that  this 
after-enumeration  was  designed  to  restrict  the  obligation  of 

*  Lev.  xix.  12.  t  Numb.  xxx.  2.  %  Basil. 

i)  James  v.  12.  ||  Exod.  xx.  3.     See  also  xx.  4. 


CHAP.  VII.]  OATHS.  183 

the  law — Thou  shalt  have  no  other  gods  before  me.  Yet  it 
were  as  reasonable  to  say  that  it  was  lawful  to  make  idols  in 
the  form  of  imaginary  monsters  because  they  were  not  men- 
tioned in  the  enumeration,  as  that  it  is  lawful  to  swear  any 
given  kind  of  oath  because  it  is  not  mentioned  in  the  enumer- 
ation. Upon  this  part  of  the  prohibition  it  is  curious  that 
two  contradictory  opinions  are  advanced  by  the  defenders  of 
oaths.  The  first  class  of  reasoners  says,  The  prohibition 
allows  us  to  swear  by  the  Deity,  but  disallows  swearing  by 
inferior  things.  The  second  class  says.  The  prohibition 
allows  swearing  by  inferior  things,  but  disallows  swearing  by 
the  Deity.  Of  the  first  class  is  Milton.  The  injunction,  he 
says,  "does  not  prohibit  us  from  swearing  by  the  name  of 
God — We  are  only  commanded  not  to  swear  by  heaven^  &c."* 
But  here  again  the  Scripture  itself  furnishes  a  conclusive 
answer.  It  asserts  that  to  swear  by  heaven  is  to  swear  hy 
the  Deity :  "  He  that  shall  swear  by  heaven,  sweareth  by  the 
throne  of  God,  and  by  Him  that  sitteth  thereon."!  To  pro- 
hibit swearing  by  heaven,  is  therefore  to  prohibit  swearing  by 
God. — Amongst  the  second  class  is  Dr.  Paley.  He  says, 
"  On  account  of  the  relation  which  these  things,  [the  heavens, 
the  earth,  &c.]  bore  to  the  Supreme  Being,  to  swear  by  any 
of  them  was  in  effect  and  substance  to  swear  by  Him ;  for 
which  reason  our  Saviour  says,  Swear  not  at  all ;  that  is,  neither 
directly  by  God  nor  indirectly  by  anything  related  to  him."| 
But  if  we  are  thus  prohibited  from  swearing  by  any-thing  related 
to  Him,  how  happens  it  that  Paley  proceeds  to  justify  judicial 
oaths  ?  Does  not  the  judicial  deponent  swear  by  something 
related  to  God  ?  Does  he  not  swear  by  something  much  more 
nearly  related  than  the  earth  or  our  own  heads  ?  I^s  not  our 
hope  of  salvation  more  nearly  related  than  a  member  of  our 
bodies  ? — But  after  he  has  thus  taken  pains  to  show  that 
swearing  by  the  Almighty  was  especially  forbidden,  he  enfor- 
ces his  general  argument  by  saying  that  Christ  did  swear  by 
the  Almighty !  He  says  that  the  high  priest  examined  our 
Saviour  upon  oath,  "  by  the  living  God  ;"  which  oath  he  took. 
This  is  wonderful ;  and  the  more  wonderful  because  of  these 
two  arguments  the  one  immediately  follows  the  other.  It  is 
contended,  within  half  a  dozen  lines,  first  that  Christ  forbade 
swearing  by  God,  and  next  that  he  violated  his  own  command. 
"  But  let  your  communication  be  yea  yea,  nay  nay."  This 
is  remarkable  :  it  is  positive  superadded  to  negative  com- 
mands.    We  are  told  not  only  what  we  ought  nt)t,  but  what 

*  Christ.  Doc.  p.  582.  t  Matt,  xxiii.  22.         t  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil. 

b.  3,  p.  1,  c.  16. 


184  OATHSi  [essay  ir 

we  ought  to  do.  It  has  indeed  been  said  that  the  expression 
"  your  communication,"  fixes  the  meaning  to  apply  to  the  or- 
dinary intercourse  of  life.  But  to  this  there  is  a  fatal  objec- 
tion :  the  whole  prohibition  sets  out  with  a  reference  not  to 
conversational  language  but  to  solemn  declarations  on  solemn 
occasions.  "  Oaths,  Oaths  to  the  Lord,"  are  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  passage  ;  and  it  is  too  manifest  to  be  insisted  upon  that 
solemn  declarations,  and  not  every-day  talk,  were  the  subject 
of  the  prohibition. 

"  Whatsoever  is  more  than  these,  cometh  of  evil."  This 
is  indeed  most  accurately  true.  Evil  is  the  foundation  of 
oaths  :  it  is  because  men  are  bad  that  it  is  supposed  oaths  are 
needed  :  take  away  the  wickedness  of  mankind,  and  we  shall 
still  have  occasion  for  No  and  Yes,  but  we  shall  need  nothing 
"  more  than  these."  And  this  consideration  furnishes  a  dis- 
tinct motive  to  a  good  man  to  decline  to  swear.  To  take  an 
oath  is  tacitly  to  acknowledge  that  this  "  evil"  exists  in  his 
own  mind — that  with  him  Christianity  has  not  effected  its  des- 
tined objects. 

From  this  investigation  of  the  passage,  it  appears  manifest 
that  all  swearing  upon  all  occasions  is  prohibited.  Yet  the 
ordinary  opinion,  or  rather  perhaps  the  ordinary  defence  is, 
that  the  passage  has  no  reference  to  judicial  oaths.  "  We 
explain  our  Saviour's  words  to  relate  not  to  judicial  oaths  but 
to  the  practice  of  vain,  wanton,  and  unauthorized  swearing  in 
common  discourse."  To  this  we  have  just  seen  that  there  is 
one  conclusive  answer  :  our  Saviour  distinctly  and  specifically 
mentions,  as  the  subject  of  his  instructions,  solemn  oaths. 
But  there  is  another  conclusive  answer  even  upon  our  oppo- 
nents' own  showing.  They  say  first,  that  Christ  described 
particular  forms  of  oaths  which  might  be  employed,  and  next, 
that  his  precepts  referred  to  wanton  swearing ;  that  is  to  say, 
that  Christ  described  what  particular  forms  of  wanton  swearing 
he  allowed  and  what  he  disallowed !  You  cannot  avoid  this 
monstrous  conclusion.  If  Christ  spoke  only  of  vain  and 
wanton  swearing,  and  if  he  described  the  modes  that  were 
lawful,  he  sanctioned  wanton  swearing  provided  we  swear  in 
the  prescribed  form. 

With  such  distinctness  of  evidence  as  to  the  universality  of 
the  prohibition  of  oaths  by  Jesus  Christ,  it  is  not  in  strictness 
necessary  to  refer  to  those  passages  in  the  Christian  Scriptures 
which  some  persons  adduce  in  favor  of  their  employment.  If 
Christ  have  prohibited  them,  nothing  else  can  prove  them  to 
be  right.  Our  reference  to  these  passages  will  accordingly 
be  short. 


CHAP.  VII. J  OATHS.  185 

"  I  adjure  thee  by  the  living  God  that  thou  tell  us  whether 
thou  be  the  Christ,  the  son  of  God."  To  those  who  allege 
that  Christ,  in  answering  to  this  "Thou  hast  said,"  took  aii 
oath,  a  sufficient  answer  has  already  been  intimated.  If 
Christ  then  took  an  oath,  he  swore  by  the  Deity,  and  this  is 
precisely  the  very  kind  of  oath  which  it  is  acknowledged  he 
himself  forbade.  But  what  imaginable  reason  could  there  be 
for  examining  him  upon  oath?  Who  ever  heard  of  calling 
upon  a  prisoner  to  swear  that  he  was  guilty  1  Nothing  was 
wanted  but  a  simple  declaration  that  he  was  the  Son  of  God. 
With  this  view  the  proceeding  was  extremely  natural.  Find- 
ing that  to  the  less  urgent  solicitation  he  made  no  reply,  the 
high  priest  proceeded  to  the  more  urgent.  Schleusner  ex- 
pressly remarks  upon  the  passage  that  the  words,  I  adjure,  do 
not  here  mean,  "  I  make  to  swear  or  put  upon  oath,"  but  "  I 
solemnly  and  in  the  name  of  God  exhort  and  enjoin."  This 
is  evidently  the  natural  and  the  only  natural  meaning  ;  just  as 
it  was  the  natural  meaning  when  the  evil  spirit  said,  "  I  adjure 
thee  by  the  living  God  that  thou  torment  me  not."  The  evil 
spirit  surely  did  not  administer  an  oath. 

"  God  is  my  witness  that  without  ceasing  I  make  mention 
of  you  always  in  my  prayers."*  That  the  Almighty  was  wit- 
ness to  the  subject  of  his  prayers  is  most  true ;  but  to  state 
this  truth  is  not  to  swear.  Neither  this  language  nor  that 
which  is  indicated  below,  contains  the  characteristics  of  an 
oath  according  to  the  definitions  even  of  those  who  urge  the 
expressions.  None  of  them  contain  according  to  Milton's 
definition,  "  a  curse  upon  ourselves  ;"  nor  according  to  Paley's 
"  an  invocation  of  God!s  vengeance."  Similar  language,  but 
in  a  more  emphatic  form  is  employed  in  writing  to  the  Co- 
rinthian converts.  It  appears  from  2  Cor.  ii.  that  Paul  had 
resolved  not  again  to  go  to  Corinth  in  heaviness,  lest  he 
should  make  thern  sorry.  And  to  assure  them  why  he  had 
made  this  resolution  he  says,  "  I  call  God  for  a  record  upon 
my  soul  that  to  spare  you  I  came  not  as  yet  unto  Corinth." 
In  order  to  show  this  to  be  an  oath,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
show  that  the  apostle  imprecated  the  vengeance  of  God  if  he 
did  not  speak  the  truth.  Who  can  show  this  ? — The  expression 
appears  to  me  to  be  only  an  emphatical  mode  of  saying,  God 
is  witness ;  or  as  the  expression  is  sometimes  employed  in 
the  present  day,  God  knows  that  such  was  my  endeavour  or 
desire. 

The  next  and  the  last  argument  is  of  a  very  exceptionable 
class ;  it  is  founded  upon  silence.     "  For  men  verily  swear 
*  Bom.  i.  9.     See  also  1  Thess.  ii.  5.  and  Gal.  i.  20. 
16* 


186  OATHS.  [essay  ii, 

by  the  greater,  and  an  oath  for  confirmation  is  to  them  an  end 
of  all  strife."*  Respecting  this  it  is  said  that  it  "  speaks  of 
the  custom  of  swearing  judicially  without  any  mark  of  cen- 
sure or  disapprobation."  Will  it  then  be  contended  that  what- 
ever an  apostle  mentions  without  reprobating,  he  approves  ? 
The  same  apostle  speaks  just  in  the  same  manner  of  the  pa- 
gan games  ;  of  running  a  race  for  prizes  and  of  "  striving  for 
the  mastery."  Yet  who  would  admit  the  argument,  that  because 
Paul  did  not  then  censure  the  games,  he  thought  them  right ! 
The  existing  customs  both  of  swearing  and  of  the  games,  are 
adduced  merely  by  way  of  illustratio7i  of  the  writer's  subject. 
Respecting  the  lawfulness  of  oaths,  then,  as  determined  by 
the  Christian  Scriptures,  how  does  the  balance  of  evidence 
stand  ?  On  the  one  side,  we  have  plain  emphatical  prohibi- 
tions— prohibitions,  of  which  the  distinctness  is  more  fully 
proved  the  more  they  are  investigated ;  on  the  other  we  have 
-^counter  precepts  ?  No  ;  it  is  not  even  pretended  ;  but  we 
have  examples  of  the  use  of  language,  of  which  it  is  saying 
much  to  say,  that  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  are  oaths  or  not. 
How,  then,  would  the  man  of  reason  and  of  philosophy  de- 
cide ? — "  Many  of  the  Christian  fathers,"  says  Grotius, "  con- 
demned all  oaths  without  exception."!  Grotius  was  himself 
an  advocate  of  oaths.  "  I  say  nothing  of  perjury,"  says  Ter- 
tullian,  "  since  swearing  itself  is  unlawful  to  Christians. "| 
Chrysostom  says,  "  Do  not  say  to  me,  I  swear  for  a  just  pur- 
pose ;  it  is  no  longer  lawful  for  thee  to  swear  either  justly  or 
unjustly. "§  "He  who,"  says  Gregory  of  Nysse,  "has  pre- 
cluded murder  by  taking  away  anger,  and  who  has  taken  away 
the  pollution  of  adultery  by  subduing  desire,  has  expelled 
from  our  life  the  curse  of  perjury  by  forbidding  us  to  swear ; 
for  where  there  is  no  oath,  there  can  be  no  infringement  of 
it."|j  Such  is  the  conviction  which  the  language  of  Christ 
conveyed  to  the  early  converts  to  his  pure  religion  ;  and  such 
is  the  conviction  which  I  think  it  would  convey  to  us  if  cus- 
tom had  not  familiarized  us  with  the  evil,  and  if  we  did  not 
read  the  New  Testament  rather  to .  find  justifications  of  our 
practice  than  to  discover  the  truth  and  to  apply  it  to  our  con- 
duct. 

EFFICACY  OF  OATHS  AS  SECURITIES  FOR  VERACITY. 

Men  naturally  speak  the  truth  unless  they  have  some  in- 
ducements to  falsehood.     When  they  have  such  inducements, 

*  Heb.  vi.  16.         t  Rights  of  War  and  Peace.         \  De  Idol.  cap.  11. 
§  In  Gen.  ii.  Horn,  xv.  II  In  Cant.  Horn.  13. 


CHAP.  VII.]  OAtHS.  187 

what  is  it  that  overcomes  them  and  still  prompts  them  to  speak 
the  truth  ? 

Considerations  of  duty,  founded  upon  religion  : 

The  apprehension  of  the  ill  opinion  of  other  men  : 

The  fear  of  legal  penalties. 

I.  It  is  obvious  that  the  intervention  of  an  oath  is  designed 
to  strengthen  only  the  first  of  these  motives — that  is,  the  re- 
ligious sanction.  I  say  to  strengthen  the  religious  sanction. 
No  one  supposes  it  creates  that  sanction ;  because  people 
know  that  the  sanction  is  felt  to  apply  to  falsehood  as  well  as 
to  perjury.  The  advantage  of  an  oath,  then,  if  advantage 
there  be,  is  in  the  increased  power  which  it  gives  to  sentiments 
of  duty  founded  upon  religion.  Now,  it  will  be  our  endeavour 
to  show  that  this  increased  power  is  small ;  that,  in  fact,  the 
oath,  as  such,  adds  very  little  to  the  motives  to  veracity. 
What  class  of  men  will  the  reader  select  in  order  to  illustrate 
its  greatest  power  ? 

Good  men  ?  They  will  speak  the  truth  whether  without 
an  oath  or  with  it.  They  know  that  God  has  appended  to 
falsehood  as  to  perjury  the  threat  of  his  displeasure  and  of 
punishment  in  futurity.  Upon  them  religion  possesses  its 
rightful  influence  without  the  intervention  of  an  oath. 

Bad  men  ?  Men  who  care  nothing  for  religion  ?  They  will 
care  nothing  for  it  though  they  take  an  oath. 

Men  of  ambiguous  character?  Men  on  whom  the  sanc- 
tions of  religion  are  sometimes  operative  and  sometimes  not  ? 
Perhaps  it  will  be  said  that  to  these  the  solemnity  of  an  oath 
is  necessary  to  rouse  their  latent  apprehensions,  and  to  bind 
them  to  veracity.  But  these  persons  do  not  go  before  a  legal 
officer  or  into  a  court  of  justice  as  they  go  into  a  parlour  or 
meet  an  acquaintance  in  the  street.  Recollection  of  mind  is 
forced  upon  them  by  the  circumstances  of  their  situation. 
The  court,  and  the  forms  of  law,  and  the  audience,  and  the 
after  publicity  of  the  evidence,  fix  the  attention  even  of  the 
careless.  The  man  of  only  occasional  seriousness  is  serious 
then  ;  and  if  in  their  hours  of  seriousness,  such  persons  re- 
gard the  sanctions  of  religion,  they  will  regard  them  in  a 
court  of  justice  though  without  an  oath. 

Yet  it  may  be  supposed  by  the  reader  that  the  solemnity 
of  a  specific  imprecation  of  the  Divine  vengeance  would,  never- 
theless, frequently  add  stronger  motives  to  adhere  to  truth. 
But  what  is  the  evidence  of  experience  1  After  testimony 
has  been  given  on  affirmation,  the  parties  are  sometimes  exa- 
mined on  the  same  subject  upon  oath.  Now  Pothier  says, 
"  In  forty  years  of  practice  I  have  only  met  two  instances 


IS8  9ATBS.  [essay  II. 

where  the  parties,  in  the  case  of  an  oath  offered  after  evidence, 
have  been  prevented  by  a  sense  of  religion  from  persisting  in 
their  testimonies."  Two  instances  in  forty  years ;  and  even 
with  respect  to  these  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  one  great 
reason  why  simple  affirmations  do  not  bind  men  is,  that  their 
obligation  is  artificially  diminished  (as  we  shall  presently  see) 
by  the  employment  of  oaths.  To  the  evidence  resulting  from 
these  truths  I  know  of  but  one  limitary  consideration  ;  and  to 
this  the  reader  must  attach  such  weight  as  he  thinks  it  de- 
serves— that  a  man  on  whom  an  oath  had  been  originally 
imposed  might  then  have  been  bound  to  veracity,  who  would 
not  incur  the  shame  of  having  lied  by  refusing  afterwards  to 
confirm  his  falsehoods  with  an  oath. 

II.  The  next  inducement  to  adhere  to  truth  is  the  apprehen- 
sion of  the  ill  opinion  of  others.  And  this  inducement,  either 
in  its  direct  or  indirect  operation,  will  be  found  to  be  incom- 
parably more  powerful  than  that  religious  inducement  which 
is  applied  by  an  oath  as  such.  Not  so  much  because  religious 
sanctions  are  less  operative  than  public  opinion,  as  because 
public  opinion  applies  or  detaches  the  religious  sanction. 
Upon  this  subject  a  serious  mistake  has  been  made  ;  for  it 
has  been  contended  that  the  influence  of  religious  motives 
is  comparatively  nothing — that  unless  men  are  impelled  to 
speak  the  truth  by  fear  of  disgrace  or  of  legal  penalties,  they 
care  very  little  for  the  sanctions  of  religion.  But  the  truth 
is,  that  the  sanctions  of  religion  are,  in  a  great  degree,  either 
brought  into  operation,  or  prevented  from  operating,  by  these 
secondary  motives.  Religious  sanctions  necessarily  follow 
the  judgments  of  the  mind ;  if  a  man  by  any  means  becomes 
convinced  that  a  given  action  is  wrong,  the  religious  obliga- 
tion to  refrain  from  it  follows.  Now,  the  judgments  of  men 
respecting  right  and  wrong  are  very  powerfully  affected  by 
public  opinion.  It  commonly  happens  that  that  which  a  man 
has  been  habitually  taught  to  think  wrong,  he  does  think  wrong. 
Men  are  thus  taught  by  public  opinion.  So  that  if  the  public 
attach  disgrace  to  any  species  of  mendacity  or  perjury,  the 
religious  sanction  will  commonly  apply  to  that  species.  If 
there  are  instances  of  mendacity  or  perjury  to  which  public 
disapprobation  does  not  attach — to  those  instances  the  re- 
ligious sanction  will  commonly  not  apply,  or  apply  but  weakly. 
The  power  of  public  opinion  in  binding  to  veracity  is  there- 
fore twofold.  It  has  its  direct  influence  arising  from  the  fear 
which  all  men  feel  of  the  disapprobation  of  others,  and  the 
indirect  influence  arising  from  the  fact  that  public  opinion 
applies  the  sanctions  of  religion. 


CHAP.  VII.]  OATHS.  189 

III.  Of  the  influence  of  legal  penalties  in  binding  to  vera- 
city, little  needs  to  be  said.  It  is  obvious  that  if  they  induce 
men  to  refrain  from  theft  and  violence,  they  will  induce  men 
to  refrain  from  perjury.  But  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the 
legal  penalty  tends  to  give  vigour  and  efficiency  to  public 
opinion.  He  whom  the  law  punishes  as  a  criminal,  is  gen- 
erally regarded  as  a  criminal  by  the  world. 

Now  that  which  we  affirm  is  this — ^that  unless  public 
opinion  or  legal  penalties  enforce  veracity,  very  little  will  be 
added  by  an  oath  to  the  motives  to  veracity  more  than  would 
subsist  in  the  case  of  simple  affirmation.  The  observance  of 
the  Oxford  statutes*  is  promised  by  the  members  on  oath — 
yet  no  one  observes  them,  They  swear  to  observe  them, 
they  imprecate  the  Divine  vengeance  if  they  do  not  observe 
them,  and  yet  they  disregard  them  every  day.  The  oath  then 
is  of  no  avail.  An  oath,  as  such,  does  not  here  bind  men's 
consciences.  And  why?  Because  those  sanctions  by  which 
men's  consciences  are  bound,  are  not  applied.  The  law  ap- 
plies none :  public  opinion  applies  none :  and  therefore  the 
religious  sanction  is  weak  ;  too  weak  with  most  men  to  avail. 
Not  that  no  motives  founded  upon  religion  present  themselves 
to  the  mind ;  for  I  doubt  not  there  are  good  men  who  would 
refuse  to  take  these  oaths  simply  in  consequence  of  religious 
motives :  but  constant  experience  shows  that  these  men  are 
comparatively  few  ;  and  if  any  one  should  say  that  upon  them 
an  oath  is  influential,  we  answer,  that  they  are  precisely  the 
very  persons  who  would  be  bound  by  their  simple  promises 
without  an  oath. 

The  oaths  of  Jurymen  afford  another  instance.  Jurymen 
swear  that  they  will  give  a  verdict  according  to  the  evidence, 
and  yet  it  is  perfectly  well  known  that  they  often  assent  to  a 
verdict  which  they  believe  to  be  contrary  to  that  evidence. 
They  do  not  all  coincide  in  the  verdict  which  the  foreman 
pronounces,  it  is  indeed  often  impossible  that  they  should  coin- 
cide. This  perjury  is  committed  by  multitudes  ;  yet  what 
juryman  cares  for  it,  or  refuses,  in  consequence  of  his  oath, 
to  deliver  a  verdict  which  he  believes  to  be  improper  ?  The 
reason  that  they  do  not  care  is,  that  the  oath,  as  such,  does  not 
bind  their  consciences.  It  stands  alone.  The  public  do  not 
often  reprobate  the  violation  of  such  oaths ;  the  law  does  not 
punish  it ;  jurymen  learn  to  think  that  it  is  no  harm  to  violate 
them ;  and  the  resulting  conclusion  is,  that  the  form  of  an 
oath  cannot  and  does  not  supply  the  deficiency ; — It  cannot 
and  does  not  apply  the  religious  sanction. 
*  See  p.  201. 


1^0  OATHS.  [essay  II 

•  Step  a  few  yards  from  the  jury  box  to  the  witness-box,  and 
you  see  the  difference.  There  public  opinion  interposes  its 
power — there  the  punishment  of  perjury  impends — ^there  the 
reUgious  sanction  is  applied — and  there,  consequently,  men 
regard  the  truth.  If  the  simple  intervention  of  an  oath  was 
that  which  bound  men  to  veracity,  they  would  be  bound  in 
the  jury-box  as  much  as  at  ten  feet  off;  but  it  is  not. 

A  custom-house  oath  is  nugatory  even  to  a  proverb.  Yet 
it  is  an  oath :  yet  the  swearer  does  stake  his  salvation  upon 
his  veracity  ;  and  still  his  veracity  is  not  secured.  Why  1 
Because  an  oath,  as  such,  applies  to  the  minds  of  most  men 
little  or  no  motive  to  veracity.  They  do  not  in  fact  think 
that  their  salvation  is  staked,  necessarily,  by  oaths.  They 
think  it  is  either  staked  or  not,  according  to  certain  other  cir- 
cumstances quite  independent  of  the  oath  itself.  These  cir- 
cumstances are  not  associated  with  custom-house  oaths,  and 
therefore  they  do  not  avail.  Churchwardens'  oaths  are  of  the 
same  kind.  Upon  these,  Gisborne  remarks — "  In  the  succes- 
sive execution  of  the  office  of  churchwarden,  almost  every 
man  above  the  rank  of  a  day  labourer,  in  every  parish  in  the 
kingdom,  learns  to  consider  the  strongest  sanction  of  truth  as  a 
nugatory  form."  This  is  not  quite  accurate.  They  do  not  learn 
to  consider  the  strongest  sanction  of  truth  as  a  nugatory  form, 
but  they  learn  to  consider  oaths  as  a  nugatory  form.  The  real- 
ity is,  that  the  sanctions  of  truth  are  not  brought  into  operation, 
and  that  oaths,  as  such,  do  not  bring  them  into  operation. 

We  return  then  to  our  proposition — Unless  public  opinion 
or  legal  penalties  enforce  veracity,  very  little  is  added  by  an 
oath  to  the  motives  to  veracity,  more  than  would  subsist  in  the 
case  of  simple  affirmation. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  legislature  might,  if  it  pleased,  attach 
the  same  penalties  to  falsehood  as  it  now  attaches  to  perjury ; 
and  therefore  all  the  motives  to  veracity  which  are  furnished 
by  the  law  in  the  case  of  oaths,  might  be  equally  furnished  in 
the  case  of  affirmation.  This  is  in  fact  done  by  the  legisla- 
ture in  the  case  of  the  Society  of  Friends. 

It  is  also  obvious  that  public  opinion  might  be  applied  to  af- 
firmation much  more  powerfully  than  it  is  now.  The  simple 
circumstance  of  disusing  oaths  would  effect  this.  Even  now, 
when  the  public  disapprobation  is  excited  against  a  man  who 
has  given  false  evidence  in  a  court  of  justice,  by  what  is  it 
excited  ?  by  his  having  broken  his  oath,  or  by  his  having 
given  false  testimony  ?  It  is  the  falsehood  which  excites  the 
disapprobation,  much  more  than  the  circumstance  that  the  false- 
hood was  in  spite  of  an  oath.     This  public  disapprobation  is 


CHAP.  VII.]  OATHS.  191 

founded  upon  the  general  perception  of  the  guilt  of  false  testi- 
mony and  of  its  perniciousneas.  Now  if  affirmation  only  wa9 
employed,  this  public  disapprobation  would  follow  the  lying 
witness,  as  it  now  follows,  or  nearly  as  it  now  follows,  the 
perjured  witness.  Every  thing  but  the  mere  oath  would  be 
the  same — the  fear  of  penalties,  the  fear  of  disgrace,  the  mo- 
tives of  religion  would  remain  ;  and  we  have  just  shown  how 
little  a  mere  oath  avails.  But  we  have  artificially  diminished 
the  public  reprobation  of  lying  by  establishing  oaths.  The 
tendency  of  instituting  oaths  is  manifestly  to  diffuse  the  sen- 
timent that  there  is  a  difference  in  the  degree  of  obligation  not 
to  lie,  and  not  to  swear  falsely.  This  difference  is  made,  not 
so  much  by  adding  stronger  motives  to  veracity  by  an  oath, 
as  by  deducting  from  the  motives  to  veracity  in  simple  affirm- 
ations. Let  the  public  opinion  take  its  own  healthful  and  un- 
obstructed course,  and  falsehood  in  evidence  will  quickly  be 
regarded  as  a  flagrant  offence.  Take  away  oaths,  and  the 
public  reprobation  of  falsehood  will  immediately  increase  in 
power,  and  will  bring  with  its  increase  an  increasing  efficiency 
in  the  religious  sanction.  The  present  relative  estimate  of 
lying  and  perjury  is  a  very  inaccurate  standard  by  which  to 
judge  of  the  efficiency  of  oaths.  We  have  artificially  reduced 
the  abhorrence  of  lying,  and  then  say  that  that  abhorrence  is 
not  great  enough  to  bind  men  to  the  truth. 

Our  reasoning  then  proceeds  by  these  steps.  Oaths  are 
designed  to  apply  a  strong  religious  sanction  :  they  however 
do  not  apply  it  unless  they  are  seconded  by  the  apprehension 
of  penalties  or  disgrace.  The  apprehension  of  penalties  and 
disgi'ace  may  be  attached  to  falsehood,  and  with  this  appre- 
hension the  religious  sanction  will  also  be  attached  to  it. 
Therefore,  all  those  motives  which  bind  men  to  veracity  may 
be  applied  to  falsehood  as  well  as  to  oaths. — In  other  words, 
oaths  are  needless. 

But  in  reality  we  have  evidence  of  this  needlessness  from 
every  day  experience.  In  some  of  the  most  important  of 
temporal  affairs,  an  oath  is  never  used.  The  Houses  of  Par- 
liament in  their  examinations  of  witnesses  employ  no  oaths. 
They  are  convinced  (and  therefore  they  have  proved)  that  the 
truth  can  be  discovered  without  them.  But  if  affirmation  is 
thus  a  sufficient  security  for  veracity  in  the  great  questions 
of  a  legislature,  how  can  it  be  insufficient  in  the  little  ques- 
tions of  private  life  1  There  is  a  strange  inconsistency  here. 
That  same  Parliament  which  declares,  by  its  every-day  prac- 
tice, that  oaths  are  needless,  continues,  by  its  every-day  prac- 
tice, to   impose  them '     Even  more :    those  very  m^  who 


192  OATHS.  [essay  II. 

themselves  take  oaths  as  a  necessary  qualification  for  their 
duties  as  legislators,  proceed  to  the  exercise  of  these  duties 
upon  the  mere  testimony  of  other  men ! — Peers  are  never  re- 
quired to  take  oaths  in  delivering  their  testimony,  yet  no  one 
thinks  that  a  peer's  evidence  in  a  court  of  justice  may  not  be 
as  much  depended  upon  as  that  of  him  v^rho  swears.  Why 
are  peers  in  fact  bound  to  veracity  though  without  an  oath  ? 
Will  you  say  that  the  religious  sanction  is  more  powerful  upon 
lords  than  upon  other  men  ?  The  supposition  were  ridiculous. 
How  then  does  it  happen  ?  You  reply.  Their  honour  binds 
them :  Very  well ;  that  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  public 
opinion  binds  them.  But  then,  he  who  says  that  honour,  or 
any  thing  else  besides  pure  religious  sanctions,  binds  men  to 
veracity,  impugns  the  very  grounds  upon  which  oaths  are 
defended. 

Oath  evidence  again  is  not  required  by  courts-martial. 
But  can  any  man  assign  a  reason  why  a  person  who  would 
speak  the  truth  on  affirmation  before  military  officers,  would 
not  speak  it  on  affirmation  before  a  judge  1  Arbitrations  too 
proceed  often,  perhaps  generally,  upon  evidence  of  parole. 
Yet  do  not  arbitrators  discover  the  truth  as  well  as  courts  of 
justice  ?  and  if  they  did  not,  it  would  be  little  in  favour  of 
oaths,  because  a  part  of  the  sanction  of  veracity  is,  in  the  case 
of  arbitrations,  withdrawn. 

But  we  have  even  tried  the  experiment  of  affirmations  in 
our  own  courts  of  justice,  and  tried  it  for  some  ages  past. 
The  Society  of  Friends  uniformly  give  their  evidence  in  courts 
of  law  on  their  words  alone.  No  man  imagines  that  their 
words  do  not  bind  them.  No  legal  court  would  listen  with 
more  suspicion  to  a  witness  because  he  was  a  Quaker.  Here 
all  the  motives  to  veracity  are  applied :  there  is  the  religious 
motive,  which  in  such  cases  all  but  desperately  bad  men  feel : 
there  is  the  motive  of  public  opinion  :  and  there  is  the  motive 
arising  from  the  penalties  of  the  law.  If  the  same  motives 
were  applied  to  other  men,  why  should  they  not  be  as  effectual 
in  securing  veracity  as  they  are  upon  the  Quakers  ? 

We  have  an  example  even  yet  more  extensive.  In  all  the 
courts  of  the  United  States  of  America,  no  one  is  obliged  to 
take  an  oath.  What  are  we  to  conclude  ?  Are  the  Ameri- 
cans so  foolish  a  people  that  they  persist  in  accepting  affirm- 
ations knowing  that  they  do  not  bind  witnesses  to  truth  ? 
Or,  do  the  Americans  really  find  that  affirmations  are  suffi- 
cient ?  But  one  answer  can  be  given  : — They  find  that  affirm- 
ations are  sufficient :  they  prove  undeniably  that  oaths  are 
needless.     No  one  will  imagine  that  virtue  on  the  other  side 


CHAP.  VII.]  OATHS.  193 

the  Atlantic  is  so  much  greater  than  on  this,  that  while  an  af- 
firmation is  sufficient  for  an  American  an  oath  is  necessary 
here. 

So  that  whether  we  enquire  into  the  moral  lawfulness  of 
oaths,  they  are  not  lawful ;  or  into  their  practical  utility,  they 
are  of  little  use  or  of  none. 


EFFECTS  OF  OATHS. 

There  is  a  power  and  efficacy  in  our  religion  which  ele- 
vates those  who  heartily  accept  it  above  that  low  moral  state 
in  which  alone  an  oath  can  even  be  supposed  to  be  of  ad- 
vantage. The  man  who  takes  an  oath,  virtually  declares  that 
his  word  would  not  bind  him  ;  and  this  is  an  admission  which 
no  good  man  should  make — for  the  sake  both  of  his  own  mo- 
ral character  and  of  the  credit  of  religion  itself.  It  is  the 
testimony  even  of  infidelity,  that  "  wherever  men  of  uncom- 
mon energy  and  dignity  of  mind  have  existed,  they  have  felt 
the  degradation  of  binding  their  assertions  with  an  oath."* 
This  degradation,  this  descent  from  the  proper  ground  on 
which  a  man  of  integrity  should  stand,  illustrates  the  propo- 
sition that  whatever  exceeds  affinnation  "  cometh  of  evil." 
The  evil  origin  is  so  palpable  that  you  cannot  comply  with 
the  custom  without  feeling  that  you  sacrifice  the  dignity  of 
virtue.  It  is  related  of  Solon  that  he  said,  "  A  good  man 
ought  to  be  in  that  estimation  that  he  needs  not  an  oath  ;  be- 
cause it  is  to  be  reputed  a  lessening  of  his  honour  if  he  be 
forced  to  swear."!  If  to  take  an  oath  lessened  a  pagan's 
honour,  what  must  be  its  effect  upon  a  Christian's  purity. 

Oaths,  at  least  the  system  of  oaths  which  obtains  in  this 
country,  tends  powerfully  to  deprave  the  moral  character. 
We  have  seen  that  they  are  continually  violated — that  men 
are  continually  referring  to  the  most  tremendous  sanctions  of 
religion  with  the  habitual  belief  that  those  sanctions  impose 
no  practical  obligation.  Can  this  have  any  other  tendency 
than  to  diminish  the  influence  of  religious  sanctions  upon 
other  things  ?  If  a  man  sets  light  by  the  divine  vengeance 
in  the  jury  box  to-day,  is  he  likely  to  give  full  weight  to  that 
vengeance  before  a  magistrate  to-morrow  ?  We  cannot  pre- 
vent the  efi'ects  of  habit.  Such  things  will  infallibly  dete- 
riorate the  moral  character,  because  they  infallibly  diminish 
the  power  of  those  principles  upon  which  the  moral  charac- 
ter is  founded. 

*  Godwin :  Political  Justice,  vol.  2.  p.  633.         t  Stoboeua :  Serm.  3. 
17 


194  OATH5.  [eSSAT  Tt, 

Oaths  encourage  falsehood.  We  have  already  seeT>  that 
the  effect  of  instituting  oaths  is  to  diminish  the  practical 
obligation  of  simple  affirm-ation.  The  law  says,  You  must 
speak  the  truth  when  you  are  iFpon  your  oasth  ;  which  is  the 
same  thing  as  to  say  that  it  is  less  harm  to  violate  truth  when 
you  are  not  on  your  oath.  The  court  sometimes  reminds  3 
witness  that  he  is  upon  oath,  which  is:  equivalent  to  say- 
ing, If  you  were  not,  we  should  think  less  of  your  mendacity. 
The  same  lesson  is  inculcated  by  the  assignation  of  penalties 
to  perjury  and  not  to  falsehood.  What  is  a  maix  to  conchide, 
but  that  the  law  thinks  light  of  the  crime  which  it  does  nol 
punish  ;  and  that  since  he  may  lie  with  impunity,  it  is  not  much 
harm  to  lie  ?  Common  language  bears  testimony  to  the  effect. 
The  vulgar  phrase,  I  will  take  my  oath  to  it,  clearly  evinces 
the  prevalent  notion  that  a  man  may  lie  with  less  guilt  when 
he  does  not  take  his  oath.  No  answer  can  be  made  to  this 
remark,  unless  any  one  can  show  that  the  extra  sanction  of 
an  oath  is  so  much  added  to  the  obligation  which  would  other- 
wise attach  to  simple  affirmation.  And  who  can  show  this  1 
Experience  proves  the  contrary :  "  Experience  bears  ample 
testimony  to  the  fact,  that  the  prevalence  of  oaths  among  men 
(Christians  not  excepted)  has  produced  a  very  material  and 
a  very  general  effect  in  reducing  their  estimate  of  the  obliga- 
tion of  plain  truth,  in  its  natural  and  simple  forms."* — "  There 
is  no  cause  of  insincerity,  prevarication,  and  falsehood,  more 
powerful  than  the  practice  of  administering  oaths  in  a  court 
of  justice."t 

Upon  this  subject  the  legislator  plays  a  desperate  game 
against  the  morality  of  a  people.  He  wishes  to  make  them 
speak  the  truth  when  they  undertake  an  office  or  deliver  evi- 
dence. Even  supposing  him  to  succeed,  what  is  the  cost  ? 
That  of  diminishing  the  motives  to  veracity  in  all  the  affairs 
of  life.  A  man  may  not  be  called  upon  to  take  an  oath  above 
two  or  three  times  in  his  life,  but  he  is  called  upon  to  speak 
the  truth  every  day. 

A  few,  but  a  few  serious,  words  remain.  The  investiga- 
tions of  this  chapter  are  not  matters  to  employ  speculation  but 
to  influence  our  practice.  If  it  be  indeed  true  that  Jesus 
Christ  has  imperatively  forbidden  us  to  employ  an  oath,  a 
duty,  an  imperative  duty  is  imposed  upon  us.  It  is  worse 
than  merely  vain  to  hear  his  laws  unless  we  obey  them. 
Of  him  therefore  who  is  assured  of  the  prohibition,  it 
is  indispensably  required  that  he  should  refuse  an  oath. 
There  is  no  other  means  of  maintaining  our  allegiance  to 
*  Gurney  :  Observations,  &e.  «.  X.  t  Godwin :  r.  9.  p.  634. 


CHAP.  VII.]  OATHS.  195 

God.  Our  pretensions  to  Christianity  are  at  stake  :  for  he 
who,  knowing  the  Christian  law,  will  not  conform  to  it,  is  cer- 
tainly not  a  Christian.  How  then  does  it  happen,  that  al- 
though persons  frequently  acknowledge  they  think  oaths  are 
forbidden,  so  few,  when  they  are  called  upon  to  swear,  de- 
cline to  do  it  ?  Alas,  this  offers  one  evidence  amongst  the 
many,  of  the  want  of  uncompromising  moral  principles  in  the 
world — of  such  principles  as  it  has  been  the  endeavour  of 
these  pages  to  enforce — of  such  principles  as  would  prompt 
us  and  enable  us  to  sacrifice  every  thing  to  Christian  fidelity. 
By  what  means  do  the  persons  of  whom  we  speak  suppose 
that  the  will  of  God  respecting  oaths  is  to  be  effected  ?  To 
whose  practice  do  they  look  for  an  exemplification  of  the 
Christian  standard  ?  Do  they  await  some  miracle  by  which 
the  whole  world  shall  be  convinced,  and  oaths  shall  be  abol- 
ished without  the  agency  of  man  ?  Such  are  not  the  means 
by  which  it  is  the  pleasure  of  the  Universal  Lord  to  act.  He 
effects  his  moral  purposes  by  the  instrumentality  of  faithful 
men.  Where  are  these  faithful  men  ? — But  let  it  be  :  if  those 
who  are  called  to  this  fidelity  refuse,  theirs  will  be  the  dis- 
honour and  the  offence.  But  the  work  will  eventually  be 
done.  Other  and  better  men  will  assuredly  arise  to  acquire 
the  Christian  honour  and  to  receive  the  Christian  reward. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


THE  MORAL  CHARACTER,  OBLIGATIONS,  AND  EFFECTS 
OF  PARTICULAR  OATHS. 


SUBSCRIPTION  TO  ARTICLES  OF  RELIGION. 

Oath  of  Allegiance — Oath  in  Evidence — Perjury — Military  oath — Oath 
against  Bribery  at  Elections — Oath  against  simony — University  oaths 
— Subscription  to  articles  of  religion — Meaning  of  the  39  articles  literal 
— Refusal  to  subscribe. 

In  reading  the  paragraphs  which  follow  respecting  several 
of  the  specific  oaths  which  are  imposed  in  this  country,  the 
reader  should  remember,  that  the  evils  with  which  they  are 
attended  would  almost  equally  attend  aflfiirmations  in  similar 
circumstances.  Our  object  therefore  is  less  to  illustrate  their 
nature  as  oaths,  than  as  improper  and  vicious  engagements. 


196  MORAL  CHARACTER,  OBLIGATIONS,  AND      [eSSAY  II. 

With  respect  to  the  interpretation  of  a  particular  oath,  it  is 
obviously  to  be  determined  by  the  same  rule  as  that  of  pro- 
mises. A  man  must  fulfil  his  oath  in  that  sense  in  which  he 
knows  the  imposer  desigiis  and  expects  him  to  fulfil  it.  And 
he  must  endeavour  to  ascertain  what  the  imposer's  expectation 
is.  To  take  an  oath  in  voluntary  ignorance  of  the  obligations 
which  it  is  intended  to  impose,  and  to  excuse  ourselves  for 
disregarding  them  because  we  *lo  not  know  what  they  are, 
cannot  surely  be  right.  Yet  it  is  often  difficult,  sometimes 
impossible,  to  discover  what  an  oath  requires.  The  absence 
of  precision  in  the  meaning  of  terms,  the  alteration  of  gen- 
eral usages  whilst  the  forms  of  oaths  remain  the  same,  and  the 
original  want  of  explicitness  of  the  forms  themselves,  throw 
sometimes  insuperable  obstacles  in  the  M^ay  of  discovering, 
when  a  man  takes  an  oath,  what  it  is  that  he  binds  himself  to 
do.  This  is  manifestly  a  great  evil :  and  it  is  chargeable 
primarily  upon  the  custom  of  exacting  oaths  at  all.  It  is  in 
general  a  very  difficult  thing  to  frame  an  unobjectionable  oath 
— an  oaUi  which  shall  neither  be  so  lax  as  to  become  nugatory 
by  easiness  of  evasion  and  uncertainty  of  meaning,  nor  so 
rigid  as  to  demand  in  words  more  than  the  imposer  wishes  to 
exact,  and  thus  to  ensnare  the  consciences  of  those  who  take 
it.  The  same  objections  would  apply  to  forms  of  affirma- 
tion. .  The  only  eifectual  remedy  is  to  diminish,  or,  if  it  were 
possible,  to  abolish  the  custom  of  requiring  men  to  promise 
beforehand  to  pursue  a  certain  course  of  action.  How  is  non- 
fulfilment  of  these  engagements  punished  ?  By  fine  or  imprison- 
ment, or  some  other  mode  of  penalty  ?  Let  the  penalty,  let 
the  sanction  remain,  without  the  promise  or  the  oath.  A  man 
swears  allegiance  to  a  prince  :  if  he  becomes  a  traitor  he  is 
punished,  not  for  the  breach  of  his  oath  but  for  his  treason. 
Can  you  not  punish  his  treason  without  the  oath  ?  A  man 
swears  he  has  not  received  a  bribe  at  an  election.  If  he 
does  receive  one  you  send  him  to  prison.  You  could  as 
easily  send  him  thither  if  he  had  not  sworn.  You  reply — ■ 
But,  by  imposing  the  oath  we  bind  the  swearer's  conscience. 
Alas  !  we  have  seen  and  we  shall  presently  again  see,  that 
this  plan  of  binding  men  is  of  little  effect.  There  is  one 
kind  of  affirmation  that  appears  to  involve  absurdity.  I  mean 
that  by  which  a  man  affirms  that  he  will  speak  the  truth.  Of 
what  use  is  the  affirmation  ?  The  affirmant  is  not  bound  to  ve- 
racity more  than  he  was  before  he  made  it.  It  is  no  greater 
lie  to  speak  falsely  after  an  affirmation  than  before. 

Oath    of    Allegiance. — "I    do    sincerely   promise    and 
swear  that  I  will  be  faithful,  and  bear  true  allegiance,  to  his 


CHAP.  VIII.]       EFFECTS    OF    PARTICULAR    OATHS.  197 

Majesty  king  George." — On  the  propriety  of  exacting  these 
poUtical  oaths,  we  shall  offer  some  observations  in  the  next 
Essay.*  At  present  we  ask,  What  does  the  oath  of  alle- 
giance mean  ?  Set  a  hundred  men  each  to  write  an  exact  ac- 
count of  what  the  party  here  promises  to  do,  and  I  will  un- 
dertake to  affirm  that  not  one  in  the  hundred  will  agree  with 
any  other  individual.  "  I  will  be  faithful  ?"  What  is  meant 
by  being  faithful  ?  What  is  the  extent  of  the  obligation,  and 
what  are  its  limits  ?  "I  will  bear  true  allegiance  :"  What 
does  allegiance  mean  ?  Is  it  synonymous  with  fidelity  ?  Or 
does  it  embrace  a  wider  extent  of  obligation,  or  a  narrower  ? 
And  if  either,  how  is  the  extent  ascertained  ? — The  oath  w-as, 
1  believe,  made  purposely  indefinite  :  the  old  oath  of  allegiance 
was  more  discriminative.  But  no  form  can  discriminate  the 
duty  of  a  citizen  to  his  rulers — unless  you  make  it  consist  of 
a  political  treatise  ;  and  no  man  can  write  a  treatise  with  de- 
finitions to  which  all  would  subscribe.  The  truth  is,  that  no 
one  knows  what  the  oath  of  allegiance  requires.  Paley  at- 
tempts, in  six  separate  articles,  to  define  its  meaning :  one  of 
which  definitions  is,  that  "  the  oath  excludes  all  design,  at 
the  time,  of  attempting  to  depose  the  reigning  prince."!  At 
the  time  !  Why  the  oath  is  couched  in  the  future  tense.  Its 
express  purpose  is  to  obtain  a  security  for  future  conduct. 
The  swearer  declares,  not  what  he  then  designs,  but  what,  in 
time  to  come,  he  will  do. — Another  definition  is,  "  it  permits 
resistance  to  the  king  when  his  ill  behaviour  or  imbecility  is 
such  as  to  make  resistance  beneficial  to  the  community."! 
But  how  or  in  what  manner,  "  fidelity  and  true  allegiance" 
means  "  resistance,"  casuistry  only  can  tell.  We  may  rest 
assured,  that  after  all  attempts  at  explanation,  the  meaning  of 
the  oath  will  be,  at  the  least,  as  doubtful  as  before.  Nor  is 
there  any  remedy.  The  fault  is  not  in  the  form,  for  no 
form  can  be  good :  but  in  the  imposition  of  any  oath  of  alle- 
giance. The  only  means  of  avoiding  the  evil  is  by  abolish- 
ing the  oath.  Besides,  what  do  oaths  of  allegiance  avail  in 
those  periods  of  disturbance  in  which  princes  are  commonly 
displaced  ?  What  revolution  has  been  prevented  by  oaths  of 
allegiance  ? 

Yet  if  the  oath  does  no  good,  it  does  harm.  It  is  always 
doing  harm  to  exact  promises  from  men,  who  cannot  know- 
beforehand  whether  they  will  fulfil  them.  And  as  to  the  am- 
biguity, it  is  always  doing  harm  to  require  men  to  stake  their 
salvation  upon  doing — they  know  not  what. 

Oath  in  Evideince. — "The  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and 
»  Essay  III.,  ch  5         t  Mor.  and  Pol.  Piiil.  b.  3,  p.  1,  c.  18.         t  Ibid 

17* 


198  MORAL  CHARACTER,  OBLIGATIONS,  AND      [eSSAY   If. 

nothing  but  the  truth,  touching  the  matter  in  question."  Is 
the  witness  to  understand  by  this  that  if  he  truly  answers  all 
questions  that  are  put  to  him,  he  conforms  to  the  requisitions 
of  the  oath  ?  If  he  is,  the  terms  of  the  oath  are  very  excep- 
tionable ;  for  many  a  witness  may  give  true  answers  to  a 
counsel  and  yet  not  tell  "  the  whole  truth."  Or  does  the  oath 
bind  him  to  give  an  exact  narrative  of  every  particular  con- 
nected with  the  matter  in  question  whether  asked  or  not  ?  If 
it  does,  multitudes  commit  perjury.  How  then  shall  a  wit- 
ness act  ?  Shall  he  commit  perjury  by  withholding  all  inform- 
ation but  that  which  is  asked  ?  Or  shall  he  be  ridiculed  and 
perhaps  silenced  in  court  for  attempting  to  narrate  all  that  he 
has  sworn  to  disclose  1  Here  again  the  morality  of  the  peo- 
ple is  injuriously  affected.  To  take  an  oath  to  do  a  certain 
prescribed  act,  and  then  to  do  only  just  that  which  custom  hap- 
pens to  prescribe,  is  to  ensnare  the  conscience  and  practically 
to  diminish  the  sanctions  of  veracity.  The  evil  may  be 
avoided  either  by  disusing  all  previous  promises  to  speak  the 
truth,  or  to  adapt  the  terms  of  the  promise  (if  that  can  be 
done)  to  the  duties  which  the  law  or  which  custom  expects. 
"  You  shall  true  answer  make  to  all  such  questions  as  shall 
be  asked  of  you,"  is  the  form  when  a  person  is  sworn  upon  a 
voir  dire ;  and  if  this  is  all  that  the  law  expects  when  he  is 
giving  evidence,  why  not  use  the  same  form  1  If  however, 
in  deference  to  the  reasonings  against  the  use  of  any  oaths, 
the  oath  in  evidence  were  abolished,  no  difficulty  could  re- 
main :  for  to  promise  in  any  form  to  speak  the  truth,  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  absurd. 

Whilst  the  oath  in  evidence  continues  to  be  imposed,  it  is 
not  an  easy  task  to  determine  in  what,  sense  the  witness 
should  understand  it.  If  you  decide  by  the  meaning  of  the 
legislature  which  imposed  the  oath,  it  appears  manifest  that 
he  should  tell  all  he  knows,  whether  asked  or  not.  But  what, 
it  may  be  asked,  is  the  meaning  of  a  law,  but  that  which  the 
authorized  expounders  of  the  law  determine  ?  And  if  they 
habitually  admit  an  interpretation  at  variance  with  the  terms 
of  the  oath,  is  not  their  sanction  an  authoritative  explanation 
of  the  legislature's  meaning  ?  These  are  questions  which  I 
pretend  not  with  confidence  to  determine.  The  mischiefs 
which  result  from  the  uncertainty,  are  to  be  charged  upon  the 
legislatures  which  do  not  remove  the  evil.  I  would,  however, 
suggest  that  the  meaning  of  a  form  in  such  cases  is  to  be 
sought,  not  so  much  in  the  meaning  of  the  original  imposers, 
as  in  that  of  those  who  now  sanction  the  form  by  permitting 
it  to  exist.     This  doubtless  opens  wide  the  door  to  extreme 


CHAP.  VIII.]       EFFECTS  OF  PARTICULAR  OATHS.  19f 

licentiousness  of  interpretation.  Nor  can  that  door  be  closed. 
There  is  no  other  remedial  measure  than  an  alteration  of  the 
forms  or  an  abolition  of  the  oath. 

Military  Oath. — **  I  swear  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  offi- 
cers who  are  set  over  me  :  So  help  me  God."  And  suppose 
an  officer  orders  him  to  do  something  which  morality  forbids 
— his  oath  then  stands  thus  :  "  I  swear  to  obey  man  rather 
than  God.""  The  profaneness  is  shocking.  Will  any  exten- 
uation be  offered,  and  will  it  be  said  that  the  military  man 
only  swears  to  obey  the  virtuous  orders  oi  his  superior  ?  We 
deny  the  fact :  the  oath  neither  means  nor  is  intended  to  mean 
any  such  thing.  It  may  indeed  by  possibility  happen  that  aa 
officer  may  order  his  inferior  to  do  a  thing  which  a  courtr 
martial  would  not  punish  him  for  refusing  to  do.  But  if  the 
law  intends  to  allow  such  exceptions,  what  excuse  is  there 
for  making  the  terms  of  the  oath  absolute  ?  Is  it  not  teaching 
military  men  to  swear  they  care  not  what,  thus  to  make  the 
terms  of  the  oath  one  thing  and  its  meaning  another  ?  But 
the  real  truth  is,  that  neither  the  law  nor  courts-martial  allow 
any  such  limitations  in  the  meaning  of  the  oath  as  will  bring 
it  within  the  limits  of  morality,  or  of  even  a  decent  reverence  to 
Him  who  commands  morality  to  man.  They  do  not  intend  to 
allow  the  Moral  Law  to  be  the  primary  rule  to  the  soldier. 
They  intend  the  contrary :  and  the  soldier  does  actually  sweax 
that,  if  he  is  ordered  so  to  do,  he  will  violate  the  law  of  God. 
Of  this  impiety  what  is  the  use  ?  Does  any  one  imagine 
that  a  soldier  obeys  his  superiors  because  he  has  sworn  to 
obey  them?  It  were  ridiculous.  When  courts-martial  in- 
flict a  punishment,  they  inflict  it  not  for  perjury  but  for  diso- 
bedience. 

I  would  devote  two  or  three  sentences  to  the  observation 
that  the  military  oath  is  sui  generis.  So  far  at  least  as  my 
information  extends,  no  other  oath  is  imposed  which  promises 
unconditional  obedience  to  other  men  ;  no  other  oath  exists  by 
which  a  man  binds  himself  to  violate  the  laws  of  God.  Why 
does  the  military  oath  thus  stand  alone,  the  explicit  contemner 
of  the  obligations  of  morality  ? — Because  it  belongs  to  a  cus- 
tom which  itself  contemns  morality.  Because  it  belongs  to  a 
custom  which  "  repeals  all  the  principles  of  virtue."  Because 
it  belongs  to  War. — There  is  a  lesson  couched  in  this,  which 
he  who  has  ears  to  hear  will  find  to  be  pregnant  with  instruction. 

Oath  against  Bribery  at  Elections. — "  I  do  swear  I 
have  not  received,  or  had,  by  myself  or  any  person  whatso- 
ever in  trust  for  me,  or  for  my  use  and  benefit,  directly  or  in- 
directly, any  sum  or  sums  of  money ;  office,  place,  or  em- 


200  MORAL  CHARACTER,  OBLTffATIONS,  AND     [eSSA?   II' 

plo3rment ;  gift  or  reward  ;  or  any  promise  or  security  for  anf 
money,  office,  employment,  or  gift,  in  order  to  give  my  vote 
at  this  election."  This  is  an  attempt  to  secure  incorruptness 
by  extreme  accuracy  in  framing  the  oath.  With  what  suc- 
cess, public  experience  tells.  No  bribery  oath  will  prevent 
bribery.  It  wants  efficient  sanctions— punishment  by  the  law 
or  reprobation  by  the  public.  A  man  who  possesses  a  vote 
in  a  close  borough,  and  whose  neighbours  and  their  fathers 
have  habitually  pocketed  a  bribe  at  every  election,  is  very 
little  under  the  influence  of  public  opinion.  That  public  with 
which  he  is  connected,  does  not  reprobate  the  act,  and  he 
learns  to  imagine  it  is  of  little  moral  turpitude.  As  to  legal 
penalties,  they  are  too  unfrequently  inflicted  or  too  difficult  of 
infliction  to  be  of  much  avail.  Why  then  is  this  nursery  of 
perjury  continued  ?  Which  action  should  we  most  deprecate, 
that  of  the  voter  who  perjures  himself  for  a  ten-pound  note, 
or  that  of  the  legislator  who  so  tempts  him  to  perjury  by  im- 
posing an  oath  which  he  knows  will  be  violated  ?  If  bribery 
be  wrong,  punish  it ;  but  it  is  utterly  indefensible  to  exact 
oaths  which  every  body  knows  will  be  broken.  Not  indeed 
that  any  thing  in  the  present  state  of  the  representation  will 
prevent  bribery.  We  may  multiply  oaths  and  denounce  pen- 
alties without  end,  yet  bribery  will  still  prevail.  But  though 
bribery  be  inseparable  from  the  system,  perjury  is  not.  We 
should  abolish  one  of  the  evils  if  we  do  not  or  cannot  abolish 
both. 

As  to  those  endless  contrivances  by  which  electors  avoid 
the  arm  of  the  law,  and  hope  to  avoid  the  guilt  of  perjury, 
they  are,  a»  it  respects  guilt,  all  and  always  vain.  The  in- 
tention of  the  Legislature  was  to  prevent  bribery,  and  he  who 
is  bribed,  violates  his  oath  whether  he  violates  its  literal  terms 
or  notT  The  shopkeeper  who  sells  a  yard  of  cloth  to  a  can- 
didate for  twenty  pounds,  is  just  as  truly  bribed,  and  he  just 
as  truly  commits  a  perjury,  as  if  the  candidate  had  said,  I 
give  you  this  twenty-pound  note  to  tempt  you  to  vote  for  me. 
I'hese  men  may  evade  legal  penalties  ;  there  is  a  power  which 
they  cannot  evade. 

Oath  against  Simony. — The  substance  of  the  oath  is,  "  I 
do  swear  that  I  have  made  no  simonical  payment  for  obtain- 
ing this  ecclesiastical  place  :  So  help  me  God  through  Jesus 
Christ !"  The  patronage  of  livings,  that  is,  the  legal  right  to 
give  a  man  the  ecclesiastical  income  of  a  parish,  may,  like 
other  property,  be  bought  and  sold.  But  though  a  person 
may  legally  sell  the  power  of  giving  the  income,  he  may  not 
sell  the  income  itself ;  the  reason  it  may  be  presumed  being, 


CHAP.  VIII.]       EFFECTS  OF  PARTICULAR  OATHS.  201 

that  a  person  who  can  only  give  the  income,  will  be  more 
likely  to  bestow  it  upon  such  a  clergyman  as  deserves  it,  than 
if  he  sold  it  to  the  highest  bidder.  It  may  however  be  ob- 
served in  passing,  that  the  security  for  the  judicious  presen- 
tation of  church  preferment  is  extremely  imperfect ;  for  the 
law,  whilst  it  tries  to  take  care  that  preferment  shall  be  pro- 
perly bestowed,  takes  no  care  that  the  power  of  bestowing  it 
shall  be  entrusted  to  proper  hands.  The  least  virtuous  man 
or  woman  in  a  district  may  possess  this  power ;  and  it  were 
vain  to  expect  that  they  will  be  very  solicitous  to  assign  care- 
ful shepherds  to  the  Christian  flocks. 

To  prevent  the  income  from  being  bought  and  sold,  the  law 
requires  the  acceptor  of  a  living  to  swear  that  he  has  made 
no  simoniacal  payment  for  it.  What  then  is  simony  ?  To 
answer  this  question  the  clergyman  must  have  recourse  to  the 
definitions  of  the  law.  Simony  is  of  various  kinds,  apd  the 
clergyman  who  is  under  strong  temptation  to  make  some  con- 
tract with,  or  payment  to  the  patron,  is  manifestly  in  danger 
of  making  them  in  the  fearing,  doubting,  hope,  that  they  are 
not  simoniacal.  And  so  he  makes  the  arrangement,  hardly 
knowing  whether  he  has  committed  simony  and  perjury  or 
not.  This  evil  is  seen  and  acknowledged  :  "  The  oath,"  says 
a  dignitary  of  the  church,  "  lays  a  snare  for  the  integrity  of 
the  clergy,  and  I  do  not  perceive  that  the  requiring  of  it,  in 
cases  of  private  patronage,  produces  any  good  effect  sufficient 
to  compensate  for  this  danger." 

University  Oaths. — The  various  statutes  of  colleges,  of 
which  every  member  is  obliged  to  promise  the  observance  on 
oath,  are  become  wholly  or  partly  obsolete  ;  some  are  need- 
less and  absurd,  some  illegal,  and  to  some,  perhaps,  it  is  im- 
possible to  conform.  Yet  the  oath  to  perform  them  is  con- 
stantly taken.  A  man  swears  that  he  will  speak,  within  the 
college,  no  language  but  Latin  ;  and  he  speaks  English  in  it 
every  day.  He  swears  he  will  employ  so  many  hours  out  of 
every  twenty-four  in  disputations;  and  does  not  dispute  for 
days  or  weeks  together.  What  remains,  then,  for  those  who 
take  these  oaths  to  do  ?  To  show  that  this  is  not  perjury. 
Here  is  the  field  for  casuistry  ;  here  is  the  field  in  which  in- 
genuity m.ay  exhibit  its  adroitness  !  in  which  sophistry  may 
delight  to  range  !  in  which  Duns  Scotus,  if  he  were  again  in 
the  world,  might  rejoice  to  be  a  combatant ! — And  what  do 
Ingenuity,  and  Casuistry,  and  Sophistry  do  1  Oh  !  they  dis- 
cover consolatory  truths  ;  they  discover  that  if  the  act  which 
you  promise  to  perform  is  unlawful,  you  may  swear  to  perform 
it  with  an  easy  conscience ;  they  discover  that  there  is  no 


202  MORAL  CHARACTER,  OBLIGATIONS,  AND     [eSSAT  11. 

harm  in  swearing  to  jump  from  Dover  to  Calais,  because  it  is 
"  impracticable  ;"  they  discover  that  it  is  quite  proper  to  swear 
to  do  a  foolish  thing  because  it  would  be  "  manifestly  inconve- 
nient" and  "  prejudicial"  to  do  it. — In  a  word,  they  discover 
so  many  agreeable  things  that  if  the  book  of  Cervantes  were 
appended  to  the  oath,  they  might  swear  to  imitate  all  the  deeds 
of  his  hero,  and  yet  remain  quietly  and  innocently  in  a  college 
all  their  lives. 

That  nothing  can  be  said  in  extenuation  of  those  who  take 
these  oaths,  cannot  be  affirmed ;  yet  that  the  taking  them 
is  wrong,  every  man  who  simply  consults  his  own  heart  will 
know.  Even  if  they  were  wrong  upon  no  other  ground  they 
would  be  so  upon  this,  that  if  men  were  conscientious  enough 
to  refuse  to  take  them,  the  "  necessity"  for  taking  them  would 
soon  be  withdrawn.  No  man  questions  that  these  oaths  are  a 
scandal  to  religion  and  to  religious  men  ;  no  man  questions 
that  their  tendency  is  to  make  the  public  think  lightly  of  the 
obligation  of  an  oath.  They  ought  therefore  to  be  abolished. 
It  is  imperative  upon  the  legislature  to  abolish  them,  and  it  is 
imperative  upon  the  individual,  by  refusing  to  take  them,  to 
evince  to  the  legislature  the  necessity  for  its  interference. 
Nothing  is  wanted  but  that  private  Christians  should  maintain 
Christian  fidelity.  If  they  did  do  this,  and  refused  to  take 
these  oaths,  the  legislature  would  presently  do  its  duty.  It 
needs  not  to  be  feared  that  it  would  suffer  the  doors  of  the 
colleges  to  be  locked  up,  because  students  were  too  consci- 
entious to  swear  falsely.  Thus,  although  the  obligation  upon 
the  legislature  is  manifest,  it  possesses  some  semblance  of  an 
excuse  for  refraining  from  reform,  since  those  who  are  imme- 
diately aggrieved,  and  who  are  the  immediate  agents  of  the  of- 
fence are  so  little  concerned,  that  they  do  not  address  even  a 
petition  for  interference.  That  some  good  men  feel  aggrieved 
is  scarcely  to  be  doubted  :  let  these  remember  their  obligations  : 
let  them  remember,  that  compliance  entails  upon  posterity  tho 
evil  and  the  offence,  and  sets,  for  the  integrity  of  successors, 
a  perpetual  snare. 

It  is  an  unhappy  reflection  that  men  endeavour  rather  to  pacify 
the  misgiving  voice  of  conscience  under  a  continuance  of  the 
evil,  than  exert  themselves  to  remove  it.  Unschooled  persons 
will  always  think  that  the  usage  is  wrong.  In  truth,  even  after 
the  licentious  interpretations  of  the  oaths  have  been  resorted  to — 
after  it  has  been  shown  what  he  who  takes  them  does  not  pro- 
mise, what  imaginable  security  is  there  that  he  will  perform 
that  which  he  does  promise — ^that  he  will  even  know  what  he 
promises  ?     None.     Being  himself  the  interpreter  of  the  oath, 


CHAP.  VIII.]       EFFECTS  OF  PARTICULAR  OATHS.  201 

and  having  resolved  that  the  oath  does  not  mean  what  it  says, 
he  is  at  liberty  to  think  that  it  means  any  thing ;  or,  which  I 
suppose  is  the  practical  opinion,  that  it  means  nothing.  If 
we  would  remove  the  evil  we  must  abolish  the  oath. 


SUBSCRIPTION  TO  ARTICLES  OF  RELIGION. 

Bishop  Clayton  said,  "  I  do  not  only  doubt  whether  the 
compilers  of  the  Articles,  but  even  whether  any  two  thinking 
men,  ever  agreed  exactly  in  their  opinion  not  only  with  re- 
gard to  all  the  Articles,  but  even  with  regard  to  any  one  of 
them."*  Such  is  the  character  of  that  series  of  propositions 
in  which  a  man  is  required  to  declare  his  belief  before  he  can 
become  a  minister  in  a  Christian  community.  The  event 
may  easily  be  foreseen  ;  some  will  refuse  to  subscribe  ;  some 
will  subscribe  though  it  violates  their  consciences  ;  some  will 
subscribe  regardless  whether  it  be  right  or  wrong  ;  and  some 
of  course  will  be  found  to  justify  subscription. 

Of  those  who  on  moral  grounds  refuse  to  subscribe  to  that 
which  they  do  not  believe,  it  may  be  presumed  that  they  are 
conscientious  men — men  who  prefer  sacrificing  their  interests 
to  their  duties.  These  are  the  men  whom  every  Christian 
church  should  especially  desire  to  retain  in  its  communion ; 
and  these  are  precisely  the  men  whom  the  Articles  exclude 
from  the  English  church. 

As  it  respects  those  who  perceive  the  impropriety  of  sub- 
scription and  yet  subscribe,  whose  consciences  are  wronged 
by  the  very  act  which  introduces  them  into  the  church — the 
evil  is  manifest  and  great.  Chillingworth  declared  to  Sheldtn 
that  "  if  he  subscribed,  he  subscribed  his  own  damnation," 
yet  not  long  afterwards  Chillingworth  was  induced  to  sub- 
scribe. Unhappy,  that  they  who  are  about  to  preach  virtue 
to  others,  should  be  initiated  by  a  violation  of  the  Moral  Law  ! 

With  respect  to  those  who  subscribe  heedlessly,  and  with- 
out regard  to  their  belief  or  disbelief  of  the  Articles— of  what 
use  is  subscription  1  It  is  designed  to  operate  as  a  test ;  but 
what  test  is  it  to  him  who  would  set  his  name  to  the  Articles 
if  they  were  exactly  the  contrary  of  what  they  are  ?  If  con- 
scientiousness keeps  some  men  out  of  the  church,  the  want  of 
conscientiousness  lets  others  in.  The  contrivance  is  admirably 
adapted  to  an  end ;  but  to  what  end  ?  To  the  separation  of  the 
more  virtuous  from  the  less,  and  to  the  admission  of  the  latter. 

A  reader  who  was  a  novice  in  these  affairs  would  ask,  in 
wonder,  For  what  purpose  is  subscription  exacted  ?  If  the 
*  Confessional,  3d  Edit.  p.  246 


204  MORAL  CHARACTER,  OBLIGATIONS,  AND     [eSSAY  II. 

Articles  are  so  objectionable,  and  if  subscription  is  productive 
of  so  much  evil,  why  are  not  the  Articles  revised,  or  why  is 
subscription  required  at  all  ?  These  are  reasonable  questions. 
They  involve,  however,  political  considerations ;  and  in  the 
Political  Essay  we  hope  to  give  such  an  enquirer  satisfaction 
respecting  them. 

And  with  respect  to  the  justifications  that  are  offered  of 
subscribing  to  doctrines  which  are  not  believed,  it  is  manifest, 
that  they  must  set  out  with  the  assumption  that  the  words  of 
the  Articles  mean  nothing — that  we  are  not  to  seek  for  their 
meaning  in  their  terms,  but  in  some  other  quarter.  It  is 
hardly  necessary  to  remark,  that  when  this  assumption  is 
made,  the  enquirer  is  launched  upon  a  boundless  ocean,  and 
though  he  has  to  make  his  way  to  a  port,  possesses  neither 
compass  nor  helm,  and  can  see  neither  sun  nor  star.  Who 
can  assign  any  limit  to  license  of  interpretation,  when  it  is 
once  agreed  tiiat  the  words  themselves  mean  nothing  ?  The 
world  is  all  before  us,  and  we  have  to  seek  a  place  of  rest 
from  Pyrrhonism  wherever  we  can  find  it.  We  are  told  to  go 
back  to  Queen  Elizabeth's  days,  and  to  find  out,  if  we  can, 
what  the  legislature  who  framed  the  Articles  meant :  always 
premising  that  we  are  not  to  judge  of  what  they  meant  by 
what  they  said.  How  is  it  discovered  that  they  did  not  mean 
what  they  said  ?  By  a  process  of  most  convincing  argumenta- 
tion ;  which  argumentation  consists  in  this,  "  It  is  difficult  to 
conceive  how" they  could  have  meant  it!*  These  are  agree- 
able and  convenient  solutions  ;  but  they  are  not  true.      . 

"  They  who  contend  that  nothing  less  can  justify  subscrip- 
tion to  the  Thirty-nine  Articles,  than  the  actual  belief  of  each 
and  every  separate  proposition  contained  in  them,  must  sup- 
pose that  the  legislature  expected  the  consent  of  ten  thousand 
men  and  that  in  perpetual  succession,  not  to  one  contro- 
verted proposition  but  to  many  hundreds.  It  is  difficult  to 
conceive  how  this  could  be  expected  by  any  who  observed  the 
incurable  diversity  of  human  opinion  upon  all  subjects  shori 
of  demonstration."!  Now  it  appears  that  the  Legislature  ot 
Elizabeth  actually  did  require  uniformity  of  opinion  upoo 
these  controverted  points.  Such  has  been  the  decision  ot 
the  Judges.  "  One  Smyth  subscribed  to  the  said  Thirty-nine 
Articles  of  religion  with  this  addition — so  far  forth  as  the 
same  were  agreeable  to  the  word  of  God ; — and  it  was  resolved 
by  Wray,  Chief  Justice  in  the  King's  Bench,  and  all  the 
Judges  of  England,  that  this  subscription  was  not  according 
to  the  statute  of  13th  Eliz.  Because  the  statute  required  aa 
*  Mor.  and  Pol.  PbU.  b.  3.  p.  1.  c.  22.  t  Id. 


CHAP.  VIII.]       EFFECTS  OF  PARTICULAR  OATHS.  205 

absolute  subscription,  and  this  subscription  made  it  condi- 
tional :  and  that  this  act  was  made  for  avoiding  diversity  of 
opinions,  6fc. ;  and  by  this  addition,  the  party,  might,  by  his 
own  private  opinion,  take  some  of  them  to  be  against  the  Word 
of  God,  and  by  this  means,  diversity  of  opinions  should  not  be 
avoided,  which  was  the  scope  of  the  statute ;  and  the  very  act 
made,  touching  subscription,  of  none  effect."* 

This  overthrows  the  convenient  explanations  of  modern 
times.  It  is  agreed  by  those  who  offer  these  explanations, 
that  the  meaning  of  Elizabeth's  legislature  is  that  by  which 
they  are  bound.  That  meaning  then  is  declared  by  all  the 
Judges  of  England  to  be,  that  subscribers  should  believe  the 
propositions  of  the  Articles.  The  modern  explanations  allow 
private  opinion  the  liberty  of  thinking  some  of  them  to  be 
*'  against  the  Word  of  God."  This  was  precisely  the  liberty 
which  the  legislature  intended  to  preclude.  The  modern 
explanations  affirm  the  Articles  to  be  conditional,  and  in  fact, 
that  they  impose  only  a  few  general  obligations ;  but  uncon- 
ditional subscription  was  the  very  thing  which  the  legislature 
required.  If  a  person  should  now  express  the  condition 
which  Smyth,  as  reported  by  Coke,  expressed,  and  should 
say^  I  believe  the  Articles  so  far  as  they  are  accordant  with 
Christian  Truth — it  appears  that  his  subscription  would  not 
be  accepted ;  and  yet  this  is  what  is  done  by  perhaps  every 
clerg)^man  in  England — with  this  difference  only,  that  the 
reservation  is  secretly  made  and  not  frankly  expressed.  So 
that  in  reality,  and  according  to  the  principles  laid  down  by 
the  apologists  of  subscription,!  almost  every  subscriber  sub- 
scribes falsely. 

-^  But  what,  it  will  be  asked,  is  to  be  done  ?  Refuse  to  sub- 
scribe. There  is  no  other  means  of  maintaining  your  purity, 
and  perhaps  no  other  means  of  procuring  an  abolition  of  the 
Articles.  At  least  this  means  would  be  effectual.  We  may 
be  sure  that  the  legislature  w^ould  revise  or  abolish  them  if  it 
was  found  that  no  one  would  subscribe.  They  would  not 
leave  the  pulpits  empty  in  compliment  to  a  barbarous  relic 
of  the  days  of  Elizabeth.  Perhaps  it  will  be  said,  that  al- 
though men  of  virtue  refused  to  subscribe,  the  pulpits  would 

*  Coke :  Instil.  4  cap.  74.  p.  324. 

t  These  principles  are,  that  the  meaning  of  a  promise  or  an  oath  is  to 
be  determined  by  the  meaning  of  those  who  impose  it.  This  as  a  general 
rale  is  true  ;  but  I  repeat  the  doubt  whether,  in  the  case  of  antiquated 
forms  a  proper  standard  of  their  meaning  is  not  to  be  sought  in  the  inten- 
tion of  the  legislatures  which  now  perpetuate  those  forms.  This  doubt, 
however,  in  whatever  way  it  preponderates,  will  not  afford  a  justification 
of  subscribing  to  forms  of  which  the  terms  are  notoriously  disregarded. 

18 


206  IMMORAL    AGENCV.  [eSSAT  II. 

Still  be  filled  with  unprincipled  men.  The  effect  would  speed- 
ily be  the  same :  the  legislature  would  not  continue  to  im- 
pose subscription  for  the  sake  of  excluding  from  the  ministry- 
all  but  bad  men.  Those  who  subscribe,  therefore,  bind  the 
burden  upon  their  own  shoulders  and  upon  the  shoulders  of 
I)osterity.  The  offence  is  great :  the  scandal  to  religion  is 
great :  and  even  if  refusal  to  subscribe  would  not  remove  the 
evil,  the  question  for  the  individual  is  not  what  may  be  the 
consequence  of  doing  his  duty,  but  what  his  duty  is.  We 
want  a  little  more  Christian  fidelity:  a  little  more  of  that 
spirit  which  made  our  forefathers  prefer  the  stake  to  tamper- 
ing with  their  consciences. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

IMMORAL  AGENCY. 


PubliGation  and  circulation  of  books — Seneca — Circulating   Libraries-^ 
Public-houses — Prosecutions — Political  affairs. 

A  GREAT  portion  of  the  moral  evil  in  the  world,  is  the 
result  not  so  much  of  the  intensity  of  individual  wickedness, 
as  of  a  general  incompleteness  in  the  practical  virtue  of  all 
classes  of  men.  If  it  were  possible  to  take  away  misconduct 
from  one  half  of  the  community  and  to  add  its  amount  to  the 
remainder,  it  is  probable  that  the  moral  character  of  our  species 
would  be  soon  benefited  by  the  change.  Now^  the  ill  dispo- 
sitions of  the  bad  are  powerfully  encouraged  by  the  want  of 
upright  examples  in  those  who  are  better.  A  man  may  de- 
viate considerably  from  rectitude,  and  still  be  as  good  as  his 
neighbours.  From  such  a  man,  the  motive  to  excellence 
which  the  constant  presence  of  virtuous  example  supplies,  is 
taken  away.  So  that  there  is  reason  to  believe,  that  if  the 
bad  were  to  become  worse,  and  the  reputable  to  become  pro- 
portionably  better,  the  average  virtue  of  the  world  would 
speedily  be  increased. 

One  of  the  modes  by  which  the  efficacy  of  example  in  re- 
putable persons  is  miserably  diminished,  is  by  what  we  have 
called  Immoral  Agency — ^by  their  being  willing  to  encourage, 
at  second  hand,  evils  which  they  would  not  commit  as  princi- 
pals.    Linked  together  as  men  are  in  society,  it  is  frequently 


CHAP.  IX.]  IMMORAL  AOKNCT.  2Q7 

difficult  to  perform  an  unwarrantable  action  without  some  sort 
of  co-operation  from  creditable  men.  This  co-operation  is 
not  often,  except  in  flagrant  cases,  refused ;  and  thus  not  only 
IS  the  commission  of  such  actions  facilitated,  but  a  general 
relaxation  is  induced  in  the  practical  estimates  which  men 
form  of  the  standard  of  rectitude. 

Since,  then,  so  much  evil  attends  this  agency  in  unwarrant- 
able conduct,  it  manifestly  becomes  a  good  man  to  look 
around  upon  the  nature  of  his  intercourse  with  others,  and  to 
consider  whether  he  is  not  virtually  promoting  evils  which 
his  judgment  deprecates,  or  reducing  the  standard  of  moral 
judgment  in  the  world.  The  reader  would  have  no  difficulty 
in  perceiving  that,  if  a  strenuous  opponent  of  the  slave  trade 
should  establish  a  manufactor}'-  of  manacles,  and  thumbscrews, 
and  iron  collars  for  the  slave  merchants,  he  would  be  grossly 
inconsistent  with  himself.  The  reader  would  perceive  too, 
that  his  labours  in  the  cause  of  the  abolition  would  be  almost 
nullified  by  the  viciousness  of  his  example,  and  that  he  would 
generally  discredit  pretensions  to  philanthropy.  Now,  that 
which  we  desire  the  reader  to  do  is,  to  apply  the  principles 
which  this  illustration  exhibits  to  other  and  less  flagrant 
cases.  Other  cases  of  co-operation  with  evil  may  be  less 
flagrant  than  this  ;  but  they  are  not,  on  that  account,  innocent. 
I  have  read,  in  the  life  of  a  man  of  great  purity  of  character, 
that  he  refused  to  draw  up  a  will  or  some  such  document 
because  it  contained  a  transfer  of  some  slaves.  He  thought 
that  slavery  was  absolutely  wrong ;  and  therefore  would  not, 
even  by  the  remotest  implication,  sanction  the  system  by  his 
example.*  I  think  he  exercised  a  sound  Christian  judgment; 
and  if  all  who  prepare  such  documents  acted  upon  the  same 
principles,  I  know  not  whether  they  would  not  so  influence 
pubUc  opinion  as  greatly  to  hasten  the  abolition  of  slavery 
itself.  Yet  where  is  the  man  who  would  refuse  to  do  this, 
or  to  do  things  even  less  defensible  than  this  1 

Publication  and  Circulation  of  Books. — It  is  a  very 
common  thing  to  hear  of  the  evils  of  pernicious  reading,  of 
how  it  enervates  the  mind,  or  how  it  depraves  the  principles. 
The  complaints  are  doubtless  just.     These  books  could  not 

*  One  of  the  publications  of  this  excellent  man  contains  a  paragraph 
much  to  our  present  purpose :  "  In  all  our  concerns,  it  is  necessary  that 
nothing  we  do  may  carry  the  appearance  of  approbation  of  the  works  of 
wickedness,  make  the  unrighteous  more  at  ease  in  unrighteousness,  or  oc- 
casion the  injuries  committed  against  the  oppressed  to  be  more  lightly 
looked  over." — Considerations  on  the  True  Harmony  of  Mankind,  c  3,  by 
John  Woolman. 


208  IMMORAL    AGENCY.  [esSAY  11. 

be  read,  and  these  evils  would  be  spared  the  woi'ld,  if  one  did 
not  write,  and  another  did  not  print,  and  another  did  not  sell, 
and  another  did  not  circulate  them.  Are  those  then,  without 
whose  agency  the  mischief  could  not  ensue,  to  be  held  inno- 
cent in  affording  this  agency  ?  Yet,  loudly  as  we  complain  of 
the  evil,  and  carefully  as  we  warn  our  children  to  avoid  it, 
how  seldom  do  we  hear  public  reprobation  of  the  writers ! 
As  to  printers,  and  booksellers,  and  library  keepers,  we 
scarcely  hear  their  offences  mentioned  at  all.  We  speak  not 
of  those  abandoned  publications  which  all  respectable  men 
condemn,  but  of  those  which,  pernicious  as  they  are  confessed 
to  be,  furnish  reading-rooms  and  libraries,  and  are  habitually 
sold  in  almost  every  bookseller's  shop.  Seneca  says,  "  He 
that  lends  a  man  money  to  carry  him  to  a  bawdy-house,  or 
a  weapon  for  his  revenge^  makes  himself  a  partner  of  his 
crime."  He,  too,  who  writes  or  sells  a  book  which  will,  in 
all  probability,  injure  the  reader,  is  accessory  to  the  mischief 
which  may  be  done  ;  with  this  aggravation,  when  compared 
with  the  examples  of  Seneca,  that  whilst  the  money  would 
probably  do  mischief  but  to  one  or  two  persons,  the  book  may 
injure  a  hundred  or  a  thousand.  Of  the  writers  of  injurious 
books,  we  need  say  no  more.  If  the  inferior  agents  are  cen- 
surable, the  primary  agent  must  be  more  censurable.  A  prin- 
ter or  a  bookseller  should,  however,  reflect,  that  to  be  not  so 
bad  as  another,  is  a  very  different  thing  from  being  innocent. 
When  we  see  that  the  owner  of  a  press  will  print  any  work 
that  is  offered  to  him,  with  no  other  concern  about  its  ten- 
dency than  whether  it  will  subject  him  to  penalties  from  the 
law,  we  surely  must  perceive  that  he  exercises  but  a  very 
imperfect  virtue.  Is  it  obligatory  upon  us  not  to  promote  ii) 
principles  in  other  men  ?  He  does  not  fulfil  the  obligation. 
Is  it  obligatory  upon  us  to  promote  rectitude  by  unimpeachable 
example  ?  He  does  not  exhibit  that  example.  If  it  were  right 
for  my  neighbour  to  furnish  me  with  the  means  of  moral 
injury,  it  would  not  be  wrong  for  me  to  accept  and  to  employ 
them. 

I  stand  in  a  bookseller's  shop,  and  observe  his  customers 
successively  coming  in.  One  orders  a  lexicon,  and  one  a 
work  of  scurrilous  infidelity;  one  Captain  Cook's  Voyages, 
and  one  a  new  licentious  romance.  If  the  bookseller  takes 
and  executes  all  these  orders  with  the  same  willingness,  I 
cannot  but  perceive  that  there  is  an  inconsistency,  an  incom- 
pleteness, in  his  moral  principles  of  action.  Perhaps  this 
person  is  so  conscious  of  the  mischievous  effects  of  such 
books,  that  he  would  not  allow  them  in  the  hands  of  his  chil- 


CHAP.  IX.]  IMMORAL  AGENCY.  209 

dren,  nor  suffer  them  to  be  seen  on  his  parlour  table.  But  if 
he  thus  knows  the  evils  which  they  inflict,  can  it  be  right  for 
him  to  be  the  agent  in  diffusing  them  ?  Such  a  person  does 
not  exhibit  that  consistency,  that  completeness  of  virtuous 
conduct,  without  which  the  Christian  character  cannot  be 
fully  exhibited.  Step  into  the  shop  of  this  bookseller's  neigh- 
bour, a  druggist,  and  there,  if  a  person  asks  for  some  arsenic, 
the  tradesman  begins  to  be  anxious.  He  considers  whether 
it  is  probable  the  buyer  wants  it  for  a  proper  puqiose.  If  he 
does  sell  it,  he  cautions  the  buyer  to  keep  it  where  others 
cannot  have  acgess  to  it ;  and,  before  he  delivers  the  packet, 
legibly  inscribes  upon  it  Poison.  One  of  these  men  sells 
poison  to  the  body,  and  the  other  poison  to  the  mind.  If  the 
anxiety  and  caution  of  the  druggist  is  right,  the  indifference 
of  the  bookseller  must  be  wrong.  Add  to  which,  that  the 
druggist  would  not  sell  arsenic  at  all  if  it  were  not  sometimes 
useful ;  but  to  what  readers  can  a  vicious  book  be  useful? 

Suppose  for  a  moment  that  no  printer  would  commit  such 
a  book  to  his  press,  and  that  no  bookseller  would  sell  it,  the 
consequence  would  be,  that  nine-tenths  of  these  manuscripts 
would  be  thrown  into  the  fire,  or  rather,  that  they  would 
never  have  been  written.  The  inference  is  obvious^  and 
surely  it  is  not  needful  again  to  enforce  the  consideration, 
that  although  your  refusal  might  not  prevent  vicious  books 
from  being  published,  you  are  not  therefore  exempted  from 
the  obligation  to  refuse.  A  man  must  do  his  duty  whether 
the  effects  of  his  fidelity  be  such  as  he  would  desire  or  not. 
Such  purity  of  conduct  might,  no  doubt,  circumscribe  a  man's 
business,  and  so  does  purity  of  conduct  in  some  other  profesr 
sions  ;  but  if  this  be  a  sufficient  excuse  for  contributing  to 
demoralize  the  world,  if  profit  be  a  justification  of  a  departure 
from  rectitude,  it  will  be  easy  to  defend  the  business  of  a 
pickpocket. 

I  know  that  the  principles  of  conduct  which  these  para- 
graphs recommend,  lead  to  grave  practical  consequences  :  I 
know  that  they  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  business  of  a 
printer  or  bookseller,  as  it  is  ordinarily  conducted,  is  not  coiir 
sistent  with  Christian  uprightness.  A  man  may  carry  on  a 
business  in  select  works  ;  and  this,  by  some  conscientious 
persons,  is  really  done.  In  the  present  state  of  the  press,  the 
difficulty  of  obtaining  a  considerable  business  as  a  bookseller 
without  circulating  injurious  works  may  frequently  be  great, 
and  it  is  in  consequence  of  this  difficulty  that  we  see  so  few 
booksellers  amongst  the  Quakers.  The  few  who  do  conduct 
the  business  generally  reside  in  large  towns,  where  the  de- 

Itt* 


210  IMMORAL    AGENCY.  [eSSAY  11. 

mand  for  all  books  is  so  great  that  a  person  can  procure  a 
competent  income  though  he  excludes  the  bad. 

He  who  is  more  studious  to  justify  his  conduct  than  to  act 
aright  may  say,  that  if  a  person  may  sell  no  book  that  can  in- 
jure another,  he  can  scarcely  sell  any  book.  The  answer  is., 
that  although  there  must  be  some  difficulty  in  discrimination, 
though  a  bookseller  cannot  always  inform  himself  what  the 
precise  tendency  of  a  book  is — yet  there  can  be  no  difficulty 
in  judging  respecting  numberless  books,  that  their  tendency 
is  bad.  If  we  cannot  define  the  precise  distinction  between 
the  good  and  the  evil,  we  can,  nevertheless,  perceive  the  evil 
when  it  has  attained  to  a  certain  extent.  He  who  cannot 
distinguish  day  from  evening  can  distinguish  it  from  night. 

The  case  of  the  proprietors  of  common  circulating  libraries 
is  yet  more  palpable  ;  because  the  majority  of  the  books  which 
they  contain  inflict  injury  upon  their  readers.  How  it  hap- 
pens that  persons  of  respectable  character,  and  who  join  with 
others  in  lamenting  the  frivolity,  and  worse  than  frivolity,  of 
the  age,  nevertheless  daily  and  hourly  contribute  to  the  mis- 
chief, without  any  apparent  consciousness  of  inconsistency,  it 
is  difficult  to  explain.  A  person  establishes,  perhaps,  one  of 
these  libraries  for  the  first  time  in  a  country  town.  He  sup- 
plies the  younger  and  less  busy  part  of  its  inhabitants  with  a 
source  of  moral  injury  from  which  hitherto  they  had  been 
exempt.  The  girl  who,  till  now,  possessed  sober  views  of 
life,  he  teaches  to  dream  of  the  extravagances  of  love ;  he 
familiarizes  her  ideas  with  intrigue  and  licentiousness ;  de- 
stroys her  disposition  for  rational  pursuits ;  and  prepares  her, 
it  may  be,  for  a  victim  of  debauchery.  These  evils,  or  such 
as  these,  he  inflicts,  not  upon  one  or  two,  but  iipon  as  many 
as  he  can ;  and  yet  this  person  lays  his  head  upon  his  pillow, 
as  if,  in  all  this,  he  was  not  ofi^ending  against  virtue  or  against 
man ! 

Inns, — When  in  passing  the  door  of  an  inn  I  hear  or  see  a 
company  of  intoxicated  men  in  the  "  excess  of  riot,"  I  cannot 
persuade  myself  that  he  who  supplies  the  wine,  and  profits  by 
the  viciousness,  is  a  moral  man,  In  the  private  house  of  a 
person  of  respectability  such  a  scene  would  be  regarded  as  a 
scandal.  It  would  lower  his  neighbour's  estimate  of  the  ex- 
cellence of  his  character.  But  does  it  then  constitute  a  suf- 
ficient justification  of  allowing  vice  in  our  houses,  that  we  get 
by  it  ?  Does  morality  grant  to  a  man  an  exemption  from  its 
obligations  at  the  same  time  as  he  procures  his  license  ? 
Drunkenness  is  immoral.  If,  therefore,  when  a  person  is  on 
the  eve  of  intoxication,  the  innkeeper  supplies  his  demand  for 


CHAP.  IX.]  IMMORAL   AGENCV.  211 

another  bottle,  he  is  accessory  to  the  immorality.  A  man 
was  lately  found  drowned  in  a  stream.  He  had  just  left  a 
public-house  where  he  had  been  intoxicated  during  sixty 
hours ;  and  within  this  time  the  publican  had  supplied  him 
(besides  some  spirits)  with  forty  quarts  of  ale.  Does  any 
reader  need  to  be  convinced  that  this  publican  had  acted  crimi^ 
naliy  ?  His  crime,  however,  was  neither  the  greater  nor  the 
less  because  it  had  been  the  means  of  loss  of  life :  no  such 
accident  might  have  happened ;  but  his  guilt  would  have  been 
the  same. 

Probity  is  not  the  only  virtue  which  it  is  good  policy  to 
practise.  The  innkeeper,  of  whom  it  was  known  that  he 
would  not  supply  the  means  of  excess,  would  probably  gain 
by  the  resort  of  those  who  approved  his  integrity  more  than 
he  would  lose  by  the  absence  of  those  whose  excesses  that 
integrity  kept  away.  An  inn  has  been  conducted  upon  such 
maxims.  He  who  is  disposed  to  make  proof  of  the  result, 
might  fix  upon  an  established  quantity  of  the  different  liquors, 
which  he  would  not  exceed.  If  that  quantity  were  determi- 
nately  fixed,  the  lover  of  excess  would  have  no  ground  of 
complaint  when  he  had  been  supplied  to  its  amount.  Such 
honourable  and  manly  conduct  might  have  an  extensive  effect, 
until  it  influenced  the  practice  even  of  the  lower  resorts  of 
intemperance.  A  sort  of  ill  fame  might  attach  to  the  house 
in  which  a  man  could  become  drunk ;  and  the  maxim  might 
be  established  by  experience,  that  it  was  necessary  to  the  re- 
spectability, and  therefore  generally  to  the  success,  of  a  pub- 
lic-house, that  none  should  be  seen  to  reel  out  of  its  doors. 

Prosecutions. — It  is  upon  principles  of  conduct  similar 
to  those  which  are  here  recommended,  that  many  persons  are 
reluctant,  and  some  refuse,  to  prosecute  offenders  when  they 
think  the  penalty  of  the  law  is  unwarrantably  severe.  This 
motive  operates  in  our  own  country  to  a  great  extent :  and  it 
ought  to  operate.  I  should  not  think  it  right  to  give  evidence 
against  a  man  who  had  robbed  my  house,  if  I  knew  that  my 
evidence  would  occasion  him  to  be  hanged.  Whether  the 
reader  may  think  similarly,  is  of  no  consequence  to  the  prin- 
ciple. The  principle  is,  that  if  you  think  the  end  vicious  and 
wrong,  you  are  guilty  of  "  Immoral  Agency"  in  contributing 
to  effect  that  end.  Unhappily,  we  are  much  less  willing  to 
act  upon  this  principle  when  our  agency  produces  only  moral 
evil,  than  when  it  produces  physical  suffering.  He  that  would 
not  give  evidence  which  would  "take  a  man's  life,  or  even  oc 
casion  him  loss  or  pain,  would,  with  little  hesitation,  be  an 
agent  of  injuring  his  moral  principles ;  and  yet,  perhaps  the 


212  IMMORAL    AGENCr.  [eSSAY  II. 

evil  of  tlie  latter  case  is  incomparably  greater  than  that  of  the 
former. 

Political  Affairs. — The  amount  of  Immoral  Agency 
which  is  practised  in  these  affairs,  is  very  great.  Look  to 
any  of  the  continental  governments,  or  to  any  that  have  sub- 
sisted there,  how  few  acts  of  misrule,  of  oppression,  of  injus- 
tice, and  of  crime,  have  been  prevented  by  the  want  of  agents 
of  the  iniquity  !  I  speak  not  of  notoriously  bad  men  :  of 
these,  bad  governors  can  usually  find  enough :  but  I  speak  of 
men  who  pretend  to  respectability  and  virtue  of  character, 
and  who  are  actually  called  respectable  by  the  world.  There 
is  perhaps  no  class  of  affairs  in  which  the  agency  of  others  is 
more  indispensable  to  the  accomplishment  of  a  vicious  act, 
than  in  the  political.  Very  little — comparatively  very  little 
— of  oppression  and  of  the  political  vices  of  rulers  should  we 
see,  if  reputable  men  did  not  lend  their  agency.  These  evils 
could  not  be  committed  through  the  agency  of  merely  bad 
men ;  because  the  very  fact  that  bad  men  only  would  abet 
them,  would  frequently  preclude  the  possibility  of  their  com- 
mission. It  is  not  to  be  pretended  that  no  public  men  possess 
or  have  possessed  sufficient  virtue  to  refuse  to  be  the  agents  oi 
a  vicious  government — ^but  they  are  few.  If  they  were  numer- 
ous, especially  if  they  were  as  numerous  as  they  ought  to  be, 
history,  even  very  modern  history,  would  have  had  a  far  other 
record  to  frame  than  that  which  now  devolves  to  her.  Can  it 
be  needful  to  argue  upon  such  things  ?  Can  it  be  needful  to 
prove  that,  neither  the  commands  of  ministers,  nor  "  systems 
of  policy,"  nor  any  other  circumstance,  exempts  a  public  man 
from  the  obligations  of  the  Moral  Law  ?  Public  men  often 
act  as  if  they  thought  that  to  be  a  public  man  was  to  be  brought 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  new  and  a  relaxed  morality.  They 
often  act  as  if  they  thought  that  not  to  be  the  prime  mover  in 
political  misdeeds,  was  to  be  exempt  from  all  moral  responsi- 
bility for  those  deeds.  A  dagger,  if  it  could  think,  would 
think  it  v/as  not  responsible  for  the  assassination  of  which  it 
v/as  the  agent.  A  public  man  may  be  a  political  dagger,  but 
he  cannot,  like  the  dagger,  be  irresponsible. 

These  illustrations  of  Immoral  Agency  and  of  the  obligation 
to  avoid  it  might  be  multiplied,  if  enough  had  not  been  offered 
to  make  our  sentiments,  and  the  reasons  upon  which  they  are 
founded,  obvious  to  the  reader.  Undoubtedly,  in  the  present 
state  of  society,  it  is  no  easy  task,  upon  these  subjects,  to 
wash  our  hands  in  innocency.  But  if  we  cannot  avoid  all 
agency,  direct  or  indirect,  in  evil  things,  we  can  avoid  much  : 


CHAP.   X.]        THE  INFLUENCE  OF   INDIVIDDALS,   ETC.  213 

and  it  will  be  sufficiently  early  to  complain  of  the  difficulty 
of  complete  purity,  when  we  haA'e  dismissed  from  our  conduct 
as  much  impurity  as  we  can. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  INFLUENCE  OF  INDIVIDUALS  UPON  PUBLIC 
NOTIONS  OF  MORALITY. 

Public  notions  of  morality — Errors  of  public  opinion:  their  efTects— 
Duelling' — Scottish  Bench — Glory — Military  virtues — Military  talent- 
Bravery— Courage — Patriotism  not  the  soldier's  motive — Military  fame 
— Public  opinion  of  unchastity:  In  women:  In  men — Power  of  char- 
acter— Character  in  Legal  men — Fame — -Faults  of  Great  men — The 
Press^ — Newspapers— History :  Its  defects :  Its  power. 

That  the  influence  of  Public  Opinion  upon  the  practice  of 
virtue  is  very  great,  needs  no  proof.  Of  this  influence  the 
reader  has  seen  some  remarkable  illustrations  in  the  discus- 
sion of  the  Efficacy  of  Oaths  in  binding  to  veracity.*  There 
is,  indeed,  almost  no  action  and  no  institution  which  Public 
Opinion  does  not  affect.  In  moral  affairs  it  makes  men  call 
one  mode  of  human  destruction  murderous  and  one  honour- 
able ;  it  makes  the  same  action  abominable  in  one  individual 
and  venial  in  another  :  in  public  institutions,  from  a  village 
workhouse  to  the  constitution  of  a  state,  it  is  powerful  alike 
for  evil  or  for  good.  If  it  be  misdirected,  it  will  strengthen 
and  perpetuate  corruption  and  abuse  ;  if  it  be  directed  aright, 
it  will  eventually  remove  corruptions  and  correct  abuses  with 
a  power  which  no  power  can  withstand. 

In  proportion  to  the  greatness  of  its  power  is  the  necessity 
of  rectifying  Public  Opinion  itself.  To  contribute  to  its  rec- 
titude is  to  exercise  exalted  philanthropy — to  contribute  to  its 
incorrectness  is  to  spread  wickedness  and  misery  in  the  world. 
The  purpose  of  the  present  chapter  is  to  remark  upon  some 
of  those  subjects  on  which  the  Public  Opinion  appears  to  be 
inaccurate,  and  upon  the  consequent  obligation  upon  individ- 
uals not  to  perpetuate  that  inaccuracy  and  its  attendant  evils 
by  their  conduct  or  their  language.  Of  the  positive  part  of 
the  obligation— that  which  respects  the  active  correction  of 
common  opinions  little  will  be  said.     He  who  does  not  pro- 

•  Essay  2,  chap.  7. 


214  INPLUENCS    OF    INDIVIDUALS    UPON  ESSAT  II. 

mote  the  evil  can  scarcely  fail  of  promoting  the  good.  A  man 
often  must  deliver  his  sentiments  respecting  the  principles 
and  actions  of  others,  and  if  he  delivers  them,  so  as  not  to  en- 
courage what  is  wrong,  he  will  practically  encourage  what  is 
right. 

It  might  have  been  presumed  of  a  people  who  assent  to  the 
authority  of  the  Moral  Law,  that  their  notions  of  the  merit  or 
turpitude  of  actions  would  have  been  conformable  with  the 
doctrines  which  that  law  delivers.  Far  other  is  the  fact. 
The  estimates  of  the  Moral  Law  and  of  public  opinion  are 
discordant  to  excess.  Men  have  practised  a  sort  of  transpo- 
sition with  the  moral  precepts,  and  have  assigned  to  them  ar- 
bitrary and  capricious,  and  therefore  new  and  mischievous, 
stations  on  the  moral  scale.  The  order  both  of  the  vices  and 
the  virtues  is  greatly  deranged. 

Suppose  with  respect  to  vices,  the  highest  degree  of  repro- 
bation in  the  Moral  Law  to  be  indicated  by  20,  and  to  descend 
by  units,  as  the  reprobation  became  less  severe,  and  suppose, 
in  the  same  manner,  we  put  20  for  the  highest  offence  ac- 
cording to  popular  opinion,  and  diminish  the  number  as  it  ac- 
counts less  of  the  offence,  we  should  probably  be  presented 
with  some  such  graduation  as  this  : 

Moral  Public 

Law.  Opinion. 

Murder 20  20 

Human  destruction  under  other  \-ia  n 

names \ 

Unchastity,  if  of  Women 18  18 

Unchastity,  if  of  Men 18  2 

Theft 17  17 

Fraud  and  other  modes  of  dis-    }  ,~  ^      .        . 

honesty \^^  6-4  or  1 

Lying 17  17 

Lying  for  particular  purposes  or  K  ~  « n 

to  particular  classes  of  persons  \  ^ 

Resentment 16  6  and  every  inferior  gradation. 

Profaneness 15  12  and  every  inferior  gradation. 

We  might  make  a  similar  statement  of  the  virtues.  This  in- 
deed is  inevitable  in  the  case  of  those  virtues  which  are  the  op- 
posites  of  some  of  these  vices.  Respecting  others  we  may  say    • 

Moral  Public 

Law.  Opinion. 

Forbearance 16  3  and  lapsing  into  a  vice. 

Fortitude 16  10 

Courage 14  14 

Bravery 1  20 

Patriotism 2  20 

Placability 18  4 


CHAP.  X.]  PUBLIC    NOTIONS    OP    MORALITY.  215 

How,  it  may  reasonably  be  asked,  do  these  strange  incon- 
gruities arise  1  First,  men  practise  a  sort  of  voluntary  decep- 
tion on  themselves ;  they  persuade  themselves  to  think  that 
an  offence  which  they  desire  to  commit,  is  not  so  vicious  as 
the  Moral  Law  indicates,  or  as  others  to  which  they  have  little 
temptation.  They  persuade  themselves  again,  that  a  virtue 
which  is  easily  practised,  is  of  great  worth,  because  they  thus 
flatter  themselves  with  complacent  notions  of  their  excellences 
at  a  cheap  rate.  Virtues  which  are  difficult  they,  for  the 
same  reason,  depreciate.  This  is  the  dictate  of  interest.  It 
is  manifestly  good  policy  to  think  lightly  of  the  value  of  a 
quality  which  we  do  not  choose  to  be  at  the  cost  of  possess- 
ing ;  and  who  would  willingly  think  there  was  much  evil  in 
a  vice  which  he  practised  every  day  ? — That  which  a  man 
thus  persuades  himself  to  think  a  trivial  vice  or  an  unimpor- 
tant virtue,  he  of  course  speaks  of  as  such  amongst  his  neigh- 
bours. They  perhaps  are  as  much  interested  in  propagating 
the  delusion  as  he  :  they  listen  with  willing  ears,  and  cherish 
and  proclaim  the  grateful  falsehood.  By  these  and  by  other 
means  the  public  notions  become  influenced ;  a  long  contin- 
uance of  the  general  chicanery  at  length  actually  confounds 
the  Public  Opinion  ;  and  when  once  an  opinion  has  become 
a  public  opinion,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  accounting  for  the 
perpetuation  of  the  fallacy. 

If  sometimes  the  mind  of  an  individual  recurs  to  the  purer 
standard,  a  multitude  of  obstacles  present  themselves  to  its 
practical  adoption.  He  hopes  that  under  the  present  circum- 
stances of  society  an  exact  obedience  to  the  Moral  Law  is 
not  required ;  he  tries  to  think  that  the  notions  of  a  kingdom 
or  a  continent  cannot  be  so  erroneous ;  and  at  any  rate  trusts  that 
as  he  deviates  with  millions,  millions  will  hardly  be  held  guilty 
at  the  bar  of  God.  The  misdirection  of  Public  Opinion  is  an 
obstacle  to  the  virtue  even  of  good  men.  He  who  looks  be- 
yond the  notions  of  others,  and  founds  his  moral  principles 
upon  the  Moral  Law,  yet  feels  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  con- 
form to  that  law  when  he  is  discountenanced  by  the  general 
notions  than  if  those  notions  supported  and  encouraged  him. 
What  then  must  the  effect  of  such  misdirection  be  upon  those 
to  whom  acceptance  in  the  world  is  the  principal  concern, 
and  who,  if  others  applaud  or  smile,  seem  to  be  indifferent 
whether  their  own  hearts  condemn  them  ? 

Now,  with  a  participation  in  the  evils  which  the  misdirec- 
tion of  public  opinion  occasions,  every  one  is  chargeable  who 
speaks  of  moral  actions  according  to  a  standard  that  varies 
from  that  which  Christianity  has  exhibited.     Here    is   th« 


.21<V  INFLUENCE    OF    INDIVIDUALS    UPON  [eSSAT  II. 

cause  of  the  evil,  and  here  must  be  its  remedy.  "  It  is  an 
important  maxim  in  morals  as  well  as  in  education  to  call 
things  by  their  right  names."*  "To  bestow  good  names  on 
bad  things,  is  to  give  them  a  passport  m  the  world  under  a  de- 
lusive disguise."! "The  soft  names  and  plausible  colours  under 
which  deceit,  sensuality,  and  revenge  are  presented  to  us  in 
common  discourse,  weaken  by  degrees  our  natural  sense  of 
the  distinction  between  good  and  evil."|  Public  notions  of 
morality  constitute  a  sort  of  line  of  demarcation,  which  is  re- 
garded by  most  men  in  their  practice  as  a  boundary  between 
rigbt  and  wrong.  He  who  contributes  to  fix  this  boundary  in 
the  wrong  place,  who  places  evil  on  the  side  of  virtue,  or 
goodness  on  the  side  of  vice,  offends  more  deeply  against  the 
morality  and  the  welfare  of  the  world,  than  multitudes  who 
are  punished  by  the  arm  of  law.  If  moral  offences  are  to  be 
estimated  by  their  consequences,  few  will  be  found  so  deep 
as  that  of  habitually  giving  good  names  to  bad  things  It  is 
well  indeed  for  the  responsibility  of  individuals  that  their  con- 
tribution to  the  aggregate  mischief  is  commonly  small.  Yet 
every  man  should  remember  that  it  is  by  the  contribution  of 
individuals  that  the  aggregate  is  formed ;  and  that  it  can  only 
toe  by  the  deductions  of  individuals  that  it  will  be  done 
away. 

Duelling. — If  two  boys  who  disagreed  about  a  game  of 
marbles  or  a  penny  tart,  should  therefore  walk  out  by  the 
river  side,  quietly  take-  off  their  clothes,  and  when  they  had 
got  into  the  water,  each  try  to  keep  the  other's  head  down 
until  one  of  them  was  drowned,  we  should  doubtless  think 
that  these  two  boys  were  mad.  If,  when  the  survivor  re- 
turned to  his  schoolfellows,  they  patted  him  on  the  shoulder, 
told  him  he  was  a  spirited  fellow,  and  that,  if  he  had  not  tried 
the  feat  in  the  water,  they  would  never  have  played  at  mar- 
bles or  any  other  game  with  him  again,  we  should  doubtless 
think  that  these  boys  were  infected  with  a  most  revolting  and 

*  Rees's  Encyclop.  Art.  PhHos.  Moral. 

t  Knox's  Essays,  No.  34.  t  Blair,  Serm.  9. 

Dr.  Carpenter  insists  upon  similar  truths  upon  somewhat  different 
subjects.  "  If  children  hear  us  express  as  much  approbation,  arid  in  the 
same  terms,  of  the  skill  of  a  gentleman  coach-driver,  of  the  abilities  of  a 
philosophical  lecturer,  and  of  an  individual  who  has  just  performed  an 
elevated  act  of  disinterested  virtue,  is  it  possible  that  they  should  not  feel 
great  confusion  of  ideas  ?  If  each  is  termed  a  noble  fellow,  and  with 
the  same  emphasis  and  animation,  how  can  the  youthful  understanding 
calculate  with  sufficient  accuracy  so  as  to  appreciate  the  import  of  the  ex- 
pression in  the  same  way  that  we  should  do?"  Principles  of  Education 
— Conscience. 


CHAP.  X.]  rUBLIC    NOTIONS    OF    MORALITY.  217 

disgusting  depravity  and  ferociousness.  We  should  instantly 
exert  ourselves  to  correct  their  principles,  and  should  leel  as- 
sured that  nothing  could  ever  induce  us  to  tolerate,  much  less 
to  encourage  such  abandoned  depravity.  And  yet  we  do 
both  tolerate  and  encourage  such  depravity  every  day. 
Change  the  penny  tart  for  some  other  trifle  ;  instead  of  boys 
put  men,  and  instead  of  a  river,  a  pistol — and  we  encourage 
it  all.  We  virtually  pat  the  survivor's  shoulder,  tell  him  he 
is  a  man  of  honour,  and  that,  if  he  had  not  shot  at  his  ac- 
quaintance, we  would  never  have  dined  with  him  again. 
"  Revolting  and  disgusting  depravity"  are  at  once  excluded 
from  our  vocabulary.  We  substitute  such  phrases  as  "  the 
course  which  a  gentleman  is  obliged  to  pursue" — "  it  was  ne- 
cessary to  his  honour" — "  one  could  not  have  associated  with 
him  if  he  had  not  fought." — We  are  the  schoolboys,  grown 
up  ;  and  by  the  absurdity,  and  more  than  absurdity  of  our 
phrases  and  actions,  shooting  or  drowning  (it  matters  not 
which)  becomes  the  practice  of  the  national  school. 

It  is  not  a  trifling  question  that  a  man  puts  to  himself  when 
he  asks.  What  is  the  amount  of  my  contribution  to  this  de- 
testable practice  ?  It  is  by  individual  contributions  to  the 
public  notions  respecting  it  that  the  practice  is  kept  up.  Men 
do  not  fire  at  one  another  because  they  are  fond  of  risking 
their  own  lives  or  other  men's,  but  because  public  notions  are 
such  as  they  are.  Nor  do  I  think  any  deduction  can  be  more 
manifestly  just,  than  that  he  uho  contributes  to  the  misdirec- 
tion of  these  notions  is  responsible  for  a  share  of  the  evil  and 
the  guilt.  When  some  offence  has  given  probability  lo  a 
duel,  every  man  acts  immorally  who  evinces  any  disposition 
to  coolness  with  either  party  until  he  has  resolved  to  fight ; 
and  if  eventually  one  of  them  falls,  he  is  a  party  to  his  de- 
struction. Every  word  of  unfriendliness,  every  look  of  in- 
difference, is  positive  guilt ;  for  it  is  such  words  and  such 
looks  that  drive  men  to  their  pistols.  It  is  the  same  after  a 
victim  has  fallen.  "  I  pity  his  family,  but  they  have  the  con- 
solation of  knowing  that  he  vindicated  his  honour,"  is  equiv- 
alent to  urging  another  and  another  to  fight.  Every  heed- 
less gossip  who  asks,  *'  Have  you  heard  of  this  aflair  of 
honour?"  and  every  reporter  of  news  who  relates  it  as  a 
proper  and  necessary  procedure,  participates  in  the  general 
crime. 

If  they  who  hear  of  an  intended  meeting  amongst  their 
friends  hasten  to  manifest  that  they  will  continue  their  inter- 
course with  the  parties  though  they  do  not  fight — if  none 
talks  of  vindicating  honour  by  demanding  satisfaction — ii'  he 

19 


318  INFLUINCE    or   INDIVIDUALS    UPON         [eSSAY  11. 

who  speaks  and  he  who  writes  of  this  atrocity,  speaks  and 
writes  as  reason  and  morals  dictate,  duelling  will  soon  dis- 
appear from  the  world.  To  contribute  to  the  suppression  of 
the  custom  is  therefore  easy,  and  let  no  man,  and  let  no  wo- 
man, who  does  not,  as  occasion  offers,  express  reprobation  of 
the  custom,  think  that  their  hands  are  clear  of  blood.  They 
especially  are  responsible  for  its  continuance  whose  station  or 
general  character  gives  peculiar  influence  to  their  opinions  in 
its  favour.  What  then  are  we  to  think  of  the  conduct  of  a 
British  Judge  who  encourages  it  from  the  bench  ?  A  short 
time  ago  a  person  was  tried  on  the  Perth  circuit  for  murder, 
having  killed  another  in  a  duel.  The  evidence  of  the  fact 
was  undisputed.  Before  the  verdict  was  pronounced,  the 
judge  is  said  to  have  used  these  words  in  his  address  to  the 
jury  :  "The  character  you  have  heard  testified  by  so  many 
respectable  and  intelligent  gentlemen  this  day,  is  as  high  as  is 
possible  for  man  to  receive,  and  I  consider  that  throughout  this 
affair  the  panel  has  acted  up  to  it."  So  that  it  is  laid  down 
from  the  bench  that  the  man  who  shoots  another  through 
the  heart  for  striking  him  with  an  umbrella,  acts  up  to  the 
highest  possible  character  of  man !  The  prisoner,  although 
every  one  knew  he  had  killed  the  deceased,  was  acquitted, 
and  the  judge  is  reported  to  have  addressed  him  thus  :  "  You 
must  be  aware  that  the  only  duty  I  have  to  perform  is  to  dis- 
miss you  from  that  bar  with  a  character  unsullied."*  If  the 
judge's  language  be  true,  Christianity  is  an  idle  fiction.  Who 
will  wonder  at  the  continuance  of  duelling,  who  will  wonder 
that  upon  this  subject  the  Moral  I.aw  is  disregarded,  if  we 
are  to  be  told  that  "  unsullied  character" — nay,  that  "  the  high- 
est possible  character  of  man,"  is  compatible  with  trampling 
Christianity  under  our  feet  ? 

How  happy  would  it  be  for  our  country  and  for  the  world, 
how  truly  glorious  for  himself,  if  the  king  would  act  towards 
the  duellist  as  his  mother  acted  towards  women  who  had  lost 
their  reputation.  She  rigidly  excluded  them  from  her  pres- 
ence. If  the  British  Monarch  refused  to  allow  the  man  who 
had  fought  a  duel  to  approach  him,  it  is  probable  that  erelong 
duelling  would  be  abolished,  not  merely  in  this  country  but  in 
the  Christian  world.  Nor  will  true  Christian  respect  be 
violated  by  the  addition,  that  in  proportion  to  the  power  of 
doing  good  is  the  responsibility  for  omitting  it. 

Glory  :  Military  Virtues. — To  prove  that  war  is  an 
evil  were  much  the  same  as  to  prove  that  the  light  of  the  sun 

*  The  Trial  is  reported  in  the  Caledonian  Mercury  of  September  25, 
1826 


eHAP.  X.]  PUBLIC    NOTIONfJ   OP   MORALITT.  J&19 

is  a  good.  And  yet,  though  no  one  will  dispute  the  truth,  there 
are  few  who  consider,  and  few  who  know  how  great  the  evil 
is.  The  practice  is  encircled  with  so  many  glittering  fic- 
tions, that  most  men  are  content  with  but  a  vague  and  inade- 
quate idea  of  the  calamities,  moral,  physical,  and  political, 
which  it  inflicts  upon  our  species.  But  if  few  men  consider 
how  prodigious  its  mischiefs  are,  they  see  enough  to  agree  in 
the  conclusion,  that  the  less  frequently  it  happens  the  better 
for  the  common  interests  of  man.  Supposing  then  that  some 
wars  are  lawful  and  unavoidable,  it  is  nevertheless  manifest, 
that  whatever  tends  to  make  them  more  frequent  than  neces- 
sity requires,  must  be  very  pernicious  to  mankind.  Now,  in 
consequence  of  a  misdirection  of  public  notions,  this  needless 
frequency  exists.  Public  opinion  is  favourable,  not  so  much 
to  war  in  the  abstract  or  in  practice,  as  to  the  profession  of 
arms ;  and  the  inevitable  consequence  is  this,  that  war  itself 
is  greatly  promoted  without  reference  to  the  causes  for  which 
it  may  be  undertaken.  By  attaching  notions  of  honour  to  the 
military  profession,  and  of  glory  to  military  achievements,  three 
wars  probably  have  been  occasioned  where  there  otherwise 
would  have  been  but  one.  To  talk  of  the  "  splendours  of  con- 
quest," and  the  "  glories  of  victory,"  to  extol  those  who  "  fall 
covered  with  honour  in  their  country's  cause,"  is  to  occasion 
the  recurrence  of  wars,  not  because  they  are  necessary,  but 
because  they  are  desired.  It  is  in  fact  contributing,  accord- 
ing to  the  speaker's  power,  to  desolate  provinces  and  set  vil- 
lages in  flames,  to  ruin  thousands  and  destroy  thousands — ^to 
inflict,  in  brief,  all  the  evils  and  the  miseries  which  war  in- 
flicts. "  Splendours,"—"  Glories,"—"  Honours  !"— the  lis- 
tening soldier  wants  to  signalize  himself  like  the  heroes  who 
are  departed  ;  he  wants  to  thrust  his  sickle  into  the  fields  of 
fame  and  reap  undying  laurels  : — How  shall  he  signalize 
himself  without  a  war,  and  on  what  field  can  he  reap  glory 
but  in  the  field  of  battle  ?  The  consequence  is  inevitable  : 
Multitudes  desire  war ; — they  are  fond  of  war — and  it  re- 
quires no  sagacity  to  discover,  that  to  desire  and  to  love  it  is 
to  make  it  likely  to  happen.  Thus  a  perpetual  motive  to  hu- 
man destruction  is  created,  of  which  the  tendency  is  as  inev- 
itable as  the  tendency  of  a  stone  to  fall  to  the  earth.  The 
present  state  of  public  opinion  manifestly  promotes  the  re- 
currence of  wars  of  all  kinds,  necessary  (if  such  there  are) 
and  unnecessary.  It  promotes  wars  of  pure  aggression,  of 
the  most  unmingled  wickedness  ;  it  promoted  the  wars  of  the 
departed  Louises  and  Napoleons.  It  awards  "  glory"  to  the 
spldief  wherever  be  his  achievements  and  in  whatever  cause , 


220  INFLUENCE    OF    INDIVIDUALS    UPON         [rsSAY  IL 

Now,  waiving  the  after  consideration  as  to  the  nature  of 
Glory  itself,  the  individual  may  judge  of  his  duties  with  re- 
spect to  public  opinion  by  its  effects.  To  minister  to  the 
popular  notions  of  glory  is  to  encourage  needless  v/ars  ;  it  is 
therefore  his  duty  not  to  minister  to  those  notions.  Common 
talk  by  a  man's  fireside  contributes  its  little  to  the  universal 
evil,  and  shares  in  the  universal  offence.  Of  the  writers  of 
some  books  it  is  not  too  much  to  suppose,  that  they  have  oc- 
casioned more  murders  than  all  the  clubs  and  pistols  of 
assassins  for  ages  have  effected.  Is  there  no  responsibility 
for  this  ?       , 

But  perhaps  it  will  afford  to  some  men  new  ideas  if  we  en- 
quire what  the  real  nature  of  the  military  virtues  is.  They 
receive  more  of  applause  than  virtues  of  any  other  kind. 
How  does  this  happen  ?  We  must  seek  a  solution  in  the 
seeming  paradox,  that  their  pretensions  to  the  characters  of 
Virtues  are  few  and  small.  They  receive  much  applause  be- 
cause they  merit  little.  They  could  not  subsist  without  it ; 
and  if  men  resolve  to  practice  war,  and  consequently  to  re- 
quire the  conduct  which  gives  success  to  war,  they  must  de- 
corate that  conduct  with  glittering  fictions,  and  extol  the  mili- 
tary virtues  though  they  be  neither  good  nor  great.  Of  every 
species  of  real  excellence  it  is  the  general  characteristic  that 
it  is  not  anxious  for  applause.  The  more  elevated  the  virtue 
the  less  the  desire,  and  the  less  is  the  public  voice  a  motive 
to  action.  What  should  we  say  of  that  man's  benevolence 
who  would  not  relieve  a  neighbour  in  distress  unless  the  do- 
nation would  be  praised  in  a  newspaper  ?  What  should  we 
say  of  that  man's  piety  who  prayed  only  when  he  was  "  seen 
of  men  ?"  But  the  military  virtues  live  upon  applause  ;  it  is 
their  vital  element  and  their  food,  their  great  pervading  mo- 
tive and  reward.  Are  there,  then,  amongst  the  respective 
virtues  such  discordancies  of  character — such  total  contrariety 
of  nature  and  essence  1  No,  No.  But  how,  then,  do  you 
account  for  the  fact,  that  whilst  all  other  great  virtues  are  in- 
dependent of  the  public  praise  and  stand  aloof  from  it,  the 
military  virtues  can  scarcely  exist  without  it  ? 

It  is  again  a  characteristic  of  exalted  Virtue,  that  it  tends 
to  produce  exalted  virtues  of  other  kinds.  He  that  is  distin- 
guished by  diffusive  benevolence,  is  rarely  chargeable  with 
profaneness  or  debauchery.  The  man  of  piety  is  not  seen 
drunk.  The  man  of  candour  and  humility  is  not  vindictive 
or  unchaste.  Can  the  same  thing  be  predicated  of  the  ten- 
dency of  military  virtues  ?  Do  they  tend  powerfully  to 
the  production  of  all  other  virtues  ?     Is  the  brave  man  pecu- 


CHAP.  X.]  PUBLIC    NOTIONS    OF    MORALITY.  221 

liarly  pious  ?  Is  the  military  patriot  peculiarly  chaste  ?  Is 
he  who  pants  for  glory  and  acquires  it,  distinguished  by  un- 
usual placability  and  temperance  ?  No  no.  How  then  do 
you  account  for  the  fact,  that  whilst  other  virtues  thus  strongly 
tend  to  produce  and  to  foster  one  another,*  the  military  vir- 
tues have  little  of  such  tendency,  or  none  ? 

The  simple  truth,  however  veiled  and  however  unwelcome, 
is  this,  that  the  military  virtues  will  not  endure  examination. 
They  are  called  what  they  are  not,  or  what  they  are  in  a  very 
inferior  degree  to  that  which  popular  notions  imply.  It  would 
not  serve  the  purposes  of  war  to  represent  these  qualities  as 
being  what  they  are  ;  we  therefore  dress  them  with  factitious 
and  alluring  ornaments  ;  and  they  have  been  dressed  so  long 
that  we  admire  the  show,  and  forget  to  enquire  what  is  under- 
neath. Our  applauses  of  military  virtues  do  not  adorn  them 
like  the  natural  bloom  of  loveliness  ;  it  is  the  paint  of  that 
which,  if  seen,  would  not  attract,  if  it  did  not  repel  us.  They 
are  not  like  the  verdure  which  adorns  the  meadow,  but  the 
greenness  that  conceals  a  bog.  If  the  reader  says  that  we  in- 
dulge in  declamation,  we  invite,  we  solicit  him  to  investigate 
the  truth.  And  yet,  without  enquiring  further,  there  is  con- 
clusive evidence  in  the  fact,  that  glory,  that  praise,  is  the  vital 
principle  of  military  virtue.  Let  us  take  sound  rules  for  our 
guides  of  judgment,  and  it  is  not  possible,  that  we  should  re- 
gard any  quality  as  possessing  much  virtue  which  lives  only 
or  chiefly  upon  praise.  And  who  will  pretend  that  the  ranks 
of  armies  would  be  filled  if  no  tongue  talked  of  bravery  and 
glory,  and  no  newspaper  published  the  achievements  of  a  re- 
giment ?t 

"  Truth  is  a  naked  and  open  daylight,  that  doth  not  show 
the  masques  and  mummeries  and  triumphs  of  the  world  half 
so  stately  and  daintily  as  candlelights. "J  Let  us  dismiss, 
then,  that  candlelight  examination  which  men  are  ^^  ont  to 
adopt  when  they  contemplate  military  virtues,  and  see  what 
appearance  they  exhibit  in  the  daylight  of  truth.  Military 
talent,  and  active  courage,  and  patriotism,  or  some  other  mo- 

*  "  The  virtues  are  nearly  related,  and  live  in  the  greatest  harmony 
with  each  other." — Opie. 

t  It  is  pleasant  to  hear  an  intelligent  woman  say,  "  I  cannot  tell  how 
or  why  the  love  of  glory  is  a  less  selfish  principle  than  the  love  of  riches  :"• 
and  it  is  pleasant  to  hear  one  of  our  then  principal  Reviews  say,  "  Glory 
is  the  most  selfish  of  all  passions  except  love."t  That  which  is  selfish 
can  hardly  be  very  virtuous. 

X  Lord  Bacon:  Essays. 

•  Memoirs  of  late  Jaue  Taylor.  t  West.  R«v.  No.  12. 

19* 


222  INFLUENCE    OF    INDIVIDUALS    UPON         [^SSAT  H. 

tive,  appear  to  be  the  foundations  and  the  subjects  of  our  ap- 
plause. 

With  respect  to  talent  little  needs  to  be  said,  since  few 
have  an  opportunity  of  displaying  it.  An  able  general  may 
exhibit  his  capacity  for  military  affairs  ;  but  of  the  mass  of 
those  who  join  in  battles  and  participate  in  their  "  glories," 
little  more  is  expected  than  that  they  should  be  obedient  and 
brave.  And  as  to  the  few  who  have  the  opportunity  of  dis- 
playing talent  and  who  do  display  it,  it  is  manifest  that  their 
claims  to  merit,  independently  of  the  purpose  to  which  their 
talent  is  devoted,  is  little  or  none.  A  man  deserves  no  ap- 
plause for  the  possession  or  for  the  exercise  of  talent  as  such. 
One  man  may  possess  and  exercise  as  much  ability  in  cor- 
rupting the  principles  of  his  readers,  as  another  who  corrects 
and  purifies  them.  One  man  may  exhibit  as  much  ability  in 
swindling,  as  another  in  effectually  legislating  against  swin- 
dlers. To  applaud  the  possession  of  talent  is  absurd,  and, 
like  many  other  absurd  actions,  is  greatly  pernicious.  Our 
approbation  should  depend  on  the  objects  upon  which  the 
talent  is  employed.  Military  talents,  like  all  others,  are  only 
so  far  proper  subjects  of  approbation  as  they  are  emplo)  ed 
aright.  Yet  the  popular  notion  appears  to  be,  that  the  display 
of  talent  in  a  military  leader,  is  per  se,  entitled  to  praise.  You 
might  as  well  applaud  the  dexterity  of  a  corrupt  minister  of 
state.  The  truth  is,  that  talent,  as  such,  is  not  a  proper  sub- 
ject of  moral  approbation  any  more  than  strength  or  beauty. 
But  if  we  thus  take  away  from  the  "  glories"  of  military  lead- 
ers all  but  that  which  is  founded  upon  the  causes  in  which 
their  talents  were  engaged,  what  will  remain  to  the  Alexan- 
ders, and  the  Caesars,  and  the  Jenghizes,  and  the  Louises,  and 
the  Charleses,  and  the  Napoleons,  with  whose  "  glories"  the 
idle  voice  of  fame  is  filled  ?  "  Tout  ce  qui  pent  etre  commun 
aux  bons  et  aux  mechans,  ne  le  rend  point  veritablement  esti- 
mable." Cannot  military  talents  be  exhibited  indifferently  by 
the  good  and  the  bad  ?  Are  they  not  in  fact  as  often  exhib- 
ited by  vicious  men  as  by  virtuous  ?  They  are,  and  therefore 
they  are  not  really  deserving  of  praise.  But  if  any  man 
should  say  that  the  circumstance  of  a  leader's  exerting  his 
talents  "  for  his  king  and  country"  is  of  itself  a  good  cause, 
and  therefore  entitles  him  to  praise,  I  answer  that  such  a  man 
is  deluding  himself  with  idle  fictions.  I  hope  presently  to 
show  this.  Meanwhile  it  is  to  be  remarked,  that  if  this  be  a 
valid  claim  to  approbation,  "  king  and  country"  must  always 
hjR  in  the  right.  Who  will  aflirm  this  ?  And  yet,  if  it  is  not 
shown,  you  may  as  well  applaud  the  brigand  chief  with  his 


CttAf.  X.]  PUBLIC    NdttONS    Of   MORALtTf.  ft53 

thirty  followers  as  the  greater  marauder  with  his  thirty  thou- 
sand. 

Valour  and  bravery,  however,  may  be  exhibited  by  the 
many — not  by  generals  and  admirals  alone,  but  by  ensigns  and 
midshipmen,  by  seamen  and  by  privates.  What  then  is  val- 
our, and  what  is  bravery  ?  "  There  is  nothing  great  but  what 
is  virtuous,  nor  indeed  truly  great  but  what  is  composed  and 
quiet."*  There  is  much  of  truth  in  this.  Yet  where  then  is 
the  greatness  of  bravery,  for  where  is  the  composure  and 
quietude  of  the  quality  ?  "  Valour  or  active  courage  is  for 
the  most  part  constitutional,  and  therefore  can  have  no  more 
claim  to  moral  merit  than  wit,  beauty,  or  health."t  Accord' 
ingly,  the  question  which  we  have  just  asked  respecting  mili- 
tary talent,  may  be  especially  asked  respecting  bravery.  Can- 
not bravery  be  exhibited  in  common  by  the  good  and  the  bad  ? 
—  Vet  further.  "It  is  a  great  weakness  for  a  man  to  value 
himbelf  upon  any  thing  wherein  he  shall  be  outdone  by  fools 
an  I  brutes."  Is  not  the  bravery  of  the  bravest  outdone  even 
b}  i  :Utes.  When  the  soldier  has  vigorously  assaulted  the 
enemy,  when  though  repulsed  he  returns  to  the  conflict,  when 
being  wounded  he  still  brandishes  his  sword,  till  it  drops  from 
his  grasp  by  faintness  or  death — he  surely  is  brave.  What 
then  is  the  moral  rank  to  which  he  has  attained  ?  He  has 
attained  to  the  rank  of  a  bull-dog.  The  dog,  too,  vigorously 
assails  his  enemy  ;  when  tossed  into  the  air  he  returns  to  the 
conflict ;  when  gored  he  still  continues  to  bite,  and  yields  not 
his  hold  until  he  is  stunned  or  killed.  Contemplating  bravery 
as  such,  there  is  not  a  man  in  Britain  or  in  Europe  whose 
bravery  entitles  him  to  praise  which  he  must  not  share  with 
the  combatants  of  a  cockpit.  Of  the  moral  qualities  that  are 
components  of  bravery,  the  reader  may  form  some  conception 
from  this  language  of  a  man  who  is  said  to  be  a  large  landed 
proprietor,  a  magistrate,  and  a  member  of  parliament.  "  I  am 
one  of  those  who  think  that  evil  alone  does  not  result  from 
poaching.  The  risk  poachers  run  from  the  dangers  that  beset 
them,  added  to  their  occupation  being  carried  on  in  cold  dark 
nights,  begets  a  hardihood  of  frame  and  contempt  of  danger 
that  is  not  without  its  value.  I  never  heard  or  knew  of  a 
poacher  being  a  coward.  They  all  make  good  soldiers ;  and 
military  men  are  well  aware  that  two  or  three  men  in  each 
troop  or  company,  of  bold  and  enterprising  spirits,  are  not 
without  their  efl'ect  on  their  comrades."  The  same  may  of 
course  be  said  of  smugglers  and  highwaymen.     If  these  are 

*  Seneca.  t  Soame  Jenyns:   Internal  Evid.of  CimBtiaaityy 

Prop.  3. 


224  INFLUENCE    OF    INDIVIDUALS    UPON         [eSSAT  II, 

tlie  (characters  in  whom  we  are  peculiarly  to  seek  for  bravery, 
what  are  iht!  moral  qualities  of  bravery  itself!  All  just,  all 
rational,  and  I  will  venture  to  affirm  all  permanent  reputa- 
tion refers  to  the  mind  or  to  virtue  ;  and  what  connexion  has 
animal  power  or  animal  hardihood  with  intellect  or  goodness  1 
]  do  not  decry  courage  :  he  who  was  better  acquainted  than  we 
are  with  the  nature  and  worth  of  human  actions,  attached  much 
value  to  courage,  but  he  attached  none  to  bravery.*  Courage  he 
recommended  by  his  precepts  and  enforced  by  his  example : 
bravery  he  never  recommended  at  all.  The  wisdom  of  this  dis- 
tinction and  its  accordancy  with  the  principles  of  his  religion  are 
plain.  Bravery  requires  the  existence  of  many  of  those  disposi- 
tions which  he  disallowed.  Animosity,  the  desire  of  retaliation, 
the  disposition  to  injure  and  destroy — all  this  is  necessary  to 
the  existence  of  bravery,  but  all  this  is  incompatible  with 
Christianity.  The  courage  which  Christianity  requires  is  to 
bravery  what  fortitude  is  to  daring — an  eifort  of  the  mental 
princij)les  rather  than  of  the  spirits.  It  is  a  calm  steady  de- 
terminateness  of  purpose,  that  will  not  be  diverted  by  f?di ci- 
tation or  awed  by  fear.  "  Behold,  I  go  bound  in  the  spirit 
\into  Jerusalem,  not  knowing  the  things  that  shall  befall  me 
there  ;  save  that  the  Holy  Ghost  witnesseth  in  every  city, 
saying  that  bonds  and  afflictions  abide  me.  But  none  of  these 
things  move  me,  neither  count  I  my  life  dear  unto  myself.^ 
What  resemblance  has  bravery  to  courage  like  this  ?  This 
courage  is  a  virtue,  and  a  virtue  which  it  is  difficult  to  acquire 
or  to  practise  ;  and  we  have  heedlessly  or  ingeniously  trans- 
ferred its  praise  to  another  quality  which  is  inferior  in  its  na- 
ture and  easier  to  acquire,  in  order  that  we  may  obtain  the 
reputation  of  virtue  at  a  cheap  rate. 

Of  those  who  thus  extol  the  lower  qualities  of  our  nature, 
few  perhaps  are  conscious  to  what  a  degree  they  are  deluded. 
In  exhibiting  this  delusion  let  us  not  forget  the  purpose  for 
which  it  is  done.  The  popular  notion  respecting  bravery 
does  not  terminate  in  an  innoxious  mistake.  The  consequences 
are  practically  and  greatly  evil.  He  that  has  placed  his 
hopes  upon  the  praises  of  valour,  desires  of  course  an  oppor- 
tunity of  acquiring  them,  and  this  opportunity  he  cannot  find 
but  in  the  destruction  of  men.  That  such  powerful  motives 
^\ill  lead  to  this  destruction  when  even  ambition  can  scarcely 
find  a  pretext,  we  need  not  the  testimony  of  experience  to  as- 

*  "  "Whatever  merit  valour  may  have  assumed  among  Pagans,  with 
Christians  it  can  pretend  to  xiou«."  Soame  Jeuyus:  Ilitvruai  £vid  of 
Christ  iauity.  Prop.  3« 

t  Actsiut.  2;2. 


CHAP.  X.]     PUBLIC  NOTIONS  OF  MORALITY.  225 

sure  us.  It  is  enough  that  we  consider  the  piinciples  which 
actuate  mankind. 

And  if  we  turn  from  actions  to  motives,  from  bravery  to 
patriotism,  we  are  presented  with  similar  delusions,  and  with 
similar  mischiefs  as  their  consequence.  To  "  fight  nobly  for 
our  country,"  to  "  fall  covered  with  glory  in  our  country's 
cause,"  to  "  sacrifice  our  lives  for  the  liberties  and  laws  and 
religion  of  our  country,"  are  phrases  in  the  mouth  of  multi- 
tudes. What  do  they  mean,  and  to  whom  do  they  apply  ? 
We  contend,  that  to  say  generally  of  those  who  perish  in  war 
that  "  they  have  died  for  their  country,"  is  simply  untrue  :  and 
for  this  simple  reason,  that  they  did  not  fight  for  it.  It  is  not 
true  that  patriotism  is  their  motive.  Why  is  a  boy  destined 
from  school  for  the  army  ?  Is  it  that  his  father  is  more  pa- 
triotic than  his  neighbour,  who  destines  his  son  for  the  bar  ? 
Or  if  the  boy  himself  begs  his  father  to  buy  an  ensigncy,  is 
it  because  he  loves  his  country,  or  is  it  because  he  dreams  of 
glory,  and  admires  scarlet  and  plumes  and  swords  ?  The  of- 
ficer enters  the  service  in  order  that  he  may  obtain  an  income, 
i>ot  in  order  to  benefit  his  fellow  citizens.  The  private  en- 
ters it  because  he  prefers  a  soldier's  life  to  another,  or  because 
he  has  no  wish  but  the  wish  for  change.  And  having  entered 
the  army,  what  is  the  motive  that  induces  the  private  or  his 
superiors  to  fight  ?  It  is  that  fighting  is  part  of  their  business  ; 
that  is  one  of  the  conditions  upon  which  they  were  hired. 
Patriotism  is  not  the  motive.  Of  those  who  fall  in  battle,  is 
there  one  in  a  hundred  who  even  thinks  of  his  country's  good  ? 
He  thinks  perhaps  of  glory  and  of  the  fame  of  his  regiment 
— he  hopes  perhaps  that  "  Salamanca"  or  "  Austerlitz"  will 
henceforth  be  inscribed  on  its  colours  ;  but  rational  views  of 
his  country's  welfare  are  foreign  to  his  mind.  He  has 
scarcely  a  thought  about  the  matter.  He  fights  in  battle  as  a 
horse  draws  in  a  carriage,  because  he  is  compelled  to  do  it, 
or  because  he  has  done  it  before  ;  but  he  probably  thinks  no 
more  of  his  country's  good  than  the  same  horse,  if  he  were 
carrying  corn  to  a  granary,  would  think  he  was  providing  for 
the  comforts  of  his  master.  The  truth  therefore  is,  that  we 
give  to  the  soldier  that  of  which  we  are  wont  to  be  sufficiently 
sparing — a  gratuitous  concession  of  merit.  If  he  but  "  fights 
bravely,"  he  is  a  patriot  and  secure  of  his  praise. 

To  sacrifice  our  lives  for  the  liberties  and  laws  and  religion 
of  our  native  land,  are  undoubtedly  high-sounding  words  ;  but 
who  are  they  that  will  do  it  ?  Who  is  it  that  will  sacrifice 
his  life  for  his  country  ?  Will  the  senator  who  supports  a 
war  ?     Will  the  writer  who  declaims  upon  patriotism  ?     Will 


^'{RW  INFLXTENCe    OF    INDlVIDtJALS   VFON         [eSiSAV  ft. 

the  minister  of  religion  who  recommends  the  sacrifice  ? 
Take  away  war  and  its  fictions,  and  there  is  not  a  man  of 
them  who  will  do  it.  Will  he  sacrifice  his  life  at  home  ?  If 
the  loss  of  his  life  in  London  or  at  York  would  procure  just 
so  much  benefit  to  his  country  as  the  loss  of  one  soldier's  in 
the  field,  would  he  be  willing  to  lay  his  head  upon  the  block  ? 
Is  he  willing,  for  such  a  contribution  to  his  country's  good,  to 
resign  himself  without  notice  and  without  remembrance  to 
the  executioner  1  Alas  for  the  fictions  of  war  !  where  is  such 
a  man  ?  Men  will  not  sacrifice  their  lives  at  all  unless  it  be 
in  war  ;  and  they  do  not  sacrifice  them  in  war  from  motives  of 
patriotism.  In  no  rational  use  of  language,  therefore,  can  it 
be  said  that  the  soldier  "  dies  for  his  country." 

Not  that  there  may  not  be  or  that  there  have  not  been  per- 
sons who  fight  from  motives  of  patriotism.  But  the  occur- 
rence is  comparatively  rare.  There  may  be  physicians  who 
qualify  themselves  for  practice  from  motives  of  benevolence 
to  the  sick  ;  or  lawyers  who  assume  the  gown  in  order  to 
plead  for  the  injured  and  oppressed ;  but  it  is  an  unusual  mo- 
tive, and  so  is  patriotism  to  the  soldier. 

And  after  all,  even  if  all  soldiers  fought  out  of  zeal  for  their 
country,  what  is  the  merit  of  Patriotism  itself?  I  do  not  say 
that  it  possesses  no  virtue,  but  I  affirm  andliope  hereafter  to 
show,  that  its  virtue  is  extravagantly  overrated,*  and  that  if 
every  one  who  fought  did  fight  for  his  country,  he  would  often 
be  actuated  only  by  a  mode  of  selfishness — of  selfishness 
which  sacrifices  the  general  interests  of  the  species  to  the 
interests  of  a  part. 

Such  and  so  low  are  the  qualities  which  have  obtained 
from  deluded  and  deluding  millions,  fame,  honours,  glories. 
A  prodigious  structure,  and  almost  without  a  base  : — a  struc- 
ture so  vast,  so  brilliant,  so  attractive,  that  the  greater  portion 
of  mankind  are  content  to  gaze  in  admiration,  without  any 
enquiry  into  its  basis  or  any  solicitude  for  its  durability.  If, 
however,  it  should  be  that  the  gorgeous  temple  will  be  able  to 
stand  only  till  Christian  truth  and  light  become  predominant, 
it  ^urely  will  be  wise  of  those  who  seek  a  niche  in  its  apart- 
ments as  their  paramount  and  final  good,  to  pause  ere  they 
pro-.eed.  If  they  desire  a  reputation  that  shall  outlive  guilt 
ana  fiction,  let  them  look  to  the  basis  of  military  fame.  If 
this  fame  should  one  day  sink  into  oblivion  and  contempt,  it 
wiii  aot  be  the  first  instance  in  which  wide-spread  glory  has 
becik  found  to  be  a  glittering  bubble  that  has  burst  and  been 
forgotten ,  Look  at  the  days  of  chivalry.  Of  the  ten  thou- 
»  EKsay  III,  c.  17. 


0HAP.  X.]  PUBLIC    NOTIONS    OF    MORALITY.  !R2l' 

sand  Quixotes  of  the  middle  ages,  where  is  now  the  honour 
or  the  name  ?  Yet  poets  once  sang  their  praises,  and  the 
chronicler  of  their  achiei'ements  beUeved  he  was  recording 
an  everlasting  fame.  Where  are  now  the  glories  of  the  tour- 
nament ?     Glories 

"  Of  which  all  Europe  rang  from  side  to  side." 

Where  is  the  champion  whom  princesses  caressed  and  nobles 
envied  ?  Where  are  the  triumphs  of  Scotus  and  Aquinas,  and 
where  are  the  folios  that  perpetuated  their  fame  ?  The  glories 
of  war  have  indeed  outlived  these ;  human  passions  are  less 
mutable  than  human  follies ;  but  I  am  willing  to  avow  the 
conviction,  that  these  glories  are  alike  destined  to  sink  into 
forgetful ness,  and  that  the  time  is  approaching  when  the  ap- 
plauses of  heroism  and  the  splendours  of  conquest  will  be 
remembered  only  as  follies  and  iniquities  that  are  past.  Let 
him  who  seeks  for  fame  other  than  that  which  an  era  of 
Christian  purity  will  allow,  make  haste ;  for  every  hour  that 
he  delays  its  acquisition  will  shorten  its  duration.  This  is 
certain  if  there  be  certainty  in  the  promises  of  Heaven. 

But  we  must  not  forget  the  purpose  for  which  these  illus- 
trations of  the  Military  Virtues  are  offered  to  the  reader ; — to 
remind  him  not  merely  that  they  are  fictions,  but  fictions 
which  are  the  occasion  of  excess  of  misery  to  mankind — to 
remind  him  that  it  is  his  business,  from  considerations  of  hu^ 
manity  and  of  religion,  to  refuse  to  give  currency  to  the  po- 
pular delusions — and  to  remind  him  that,  if  he  does  promote 
them,  he  promotes,  by  the  act,  misery  in  all  its  forms  and 
guilt  in  all  its  excesses.  Upon  such  subjects,  men  are  not 
left  to  exercise  their  own  inclinations.  MoraUty  interposes 
its  commands ;  and  they  are  commands  which,  if  we  would 
be  moral,  we  must  obey. 

Unchastity. — No  portion  of  these  pages  is  devoted  to  the 
enforcement  of  moral  obligations  upon  this  subject,  partly 
because  these  obligations  are  commonly  acknowledged  how 
little  soever  they  may  be  regarded,  and  partly  because,  as  the 
reader  will  have  seen,  the  object  of  these  Essays  is  to  recom- 
mend those  applications  of  the  Moral  Law  which  are  fre- 
quently neglected  in  the  practice  even  of  respectable  men. — • 
But  in  reference  to  the  influence  of  public  opinion  on  offences 
connected  with  the  sexual  constitution,  it  will  readily  be  per- 
ceived that  something  should  be  said,  when  it  is  considered 
that  some  of  the  popular  notions  respecting  them  are  extra- 
vagantly inconi^istent  with  the  Moral  Law.  The  want  of 
chastity  in  a  woman  is  visited  by  public  opinion  with  tli© 


228  IXFLUEXCE    OF    INDIVIDUALS    tJPOX         [eSSAY  II. 

spverest  reprobation — in  men,  with  very  little  or  with  none. 
Now,  inorality  maives  no  such  distinction.  The  offence  is  fre- 
quently adverted  to  in  the  Christian  Scriptures;  but  I  believe 
there  is  no  one  precept  which  intimates  that,  in  the  estimation 
of  its  writer,  there  was  any  diff'erence  in  the  turpitude  of  the 
ofl'ence  respectively  in  men  and  women.  If  it  be  in  this 
volume  that  we  are  to  seek  for  the  principles  of  the  Moral 
]  .aw,  how  shall  we  defend  the  state  of  popular  opinion  ?  "  If 
unchastity  in  a  woman,  whom  St.  Paul  terms  the  glory  of 
man,  be  such  a  ;scandal  and  dishonour,  then  certainly  in  a 
man,  who  is  both  the  image  and  glory  of  God,  it  must,  though 
commonly  not  so  thought,  be  much  more  deflowering  and 
dishonourable."*  But  this  departure  from  the  Moral  Law, 
like  all  other  departures,  produces  its  legitimate,  that  is,  per- 
nicious eflfects.  The  sex  in  whom  popular  opinion  reprobates 
the  olfences,  comparatively  seldom  commits  them :  the  sex 
in  whom  it  tolerates  the  offences,  commits  them  to  an  enor- 
mous extent.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  to  promote  the 
present  state  of  popular  opinion,  is  to  promote  and  to  encou- 
rage the  want  of  chastity  in  men. 

That  some  very  beneficial  consequences  result  from  the 
strong  direction  of  its  current  against  the  offence  in  a  woman, 
is  certain.  The  consciousness  that  upon  the  retention  of  her 
reputatiorl  (^opends  so  tremendous  a  stake,  is  probably  a  more 
efficacious  motive  to  its  preservation  than  any  other.  The 
abandonment  to  which  the  loss  of  personal  integrity  generally 
consigns  a  woman,  is  a  perpetual  and  fearful  warning  to  the 
sex.  Almost  every  human  being  deprecates  and  dreads  the 
general  disfavour  of  mankind ;  and  thus,  notwithstanding 
temptations  of  all  kinds,  the  number  of  women  who  do  incur 
it  is  comparatively  small. 

But  the  fact  that  public  opinion  is  thus  powerful  in  re- 
straining one  sex,  is  a  sufficient  evidence  that  it  would  also 
be  powerful  in  restraining  the  other.  Waiving  for  the  pres- 
ent the  question  whether  the  popular  disapprobation  of  the 
crime  in  a  woman  is  not  too  severe — if  the  man  who  was 
guilty  was  forthwith  and  immediately  consigned  to  infamy; 
if  he  was  expell  id  from  virtuous  society,  and  condemned  for 
the  remainder  of  life  to  the  lowest  degradation,  how  quickly 
would  the  frequency  of  the  crime  be  diminished !  The  re- 
formation amongst  men  would  effect  a  reformation  amongst 
women  too ;  and  the  reciprocal  temptations  which  each  ad- 
dresses to  the  other,  woidd  in  a  great  degree  be  withdrawn. 
*  Milton :  Christian  Doctrine,  p.  624 


CHAP.  X.]  PUBLIC    NOtlOXS    OF    MORALTTIT.  229 

If  there  were  few  seducers  few  would  be  seduced ;  and  few 
therefore  would  in  turn  become  the  seducers  of  men. 

But  instead  of  this  direction  of  public  opinion,  what  is  the 
ordinary  language  respecting  the  man  who  thus  violates  the 
Moral  Law  ?  We  are  told  that  "  he  is  rather  unsteady  ;"  that 
"  there  is  a  little  of  the  young  man  about  him  ;"  that  "  he  is 
not  free  from  indiscretions."  And  what  is  he  likely  to  think 
of  all  this  ?  Why,  that  for  a  young  man  to  have  a  little  of  the 
young  man  about  him  is  perfectly  natural ;  that  to  be  rather 
unsteady  and  a  little  indiscreet  is  not,  to  be  sure,  what  one 
would  wish,  but  that  it  is  no  great  harm  and  will  soon  wear, 
off.  To  employ  such  language  is,  we  say,  to  encourage  and 
promote  the  crime — a  crime  which  brings  more  wretchedness 
and  vice  into  the  world  than  almost  any  other ;  and  for  which, 
if  Christianity  is  to  be  believed,  the  Universal  Judge  will  call 
to  a  severe  account.  If  the  immediate  agent  be  obnoxious  to 
punishment,  can  he  who  encouraged  him  expect  to  escape  ? 
I  am  persuaded  that  the  frequency  of  this  gross  offence  is 
attributable  much  more  to  the  levity  of  public  notions  as 
founded  upon  levity  of  language,  than  to  passion  ;  and  per- 
haps, therefore,  some  of  those  who  promote  this  levity  may 
be  in  every  respect  as  criminal  as  if  they  committed  the  crime 
itself. 

Women  themselves  contribute  greatly  to  the  common  levity 
and  to  its  attendant  mischiefs.  Many  a  female  who  talks  in 
the  language  of  abhorrence  of  an  offending  sister,  and  averts 
her  eye  in  contumely  if  she  meets  her  in  the  street,  is  per- 
fectly willing  to  be  the  friend  and  intimate  of  the  equally 
offending  man.  That  such  women  are  themselves  duped  by 
the  vulgar  distinction  is  not  to  be  doubted — but  then  we  are 
not  to  imagine  that  she  who  practises  this  inconsistency 
abhors  the  crime  so  much  as  the  criminal.  Her  abhorrence 
is  directed,  not  so  much  to  the  violation  of  the  Moral  Law  as 
to  the  party  by  whom  it  is  violated.  "  To  little  respect  has 
that  woman  a  claim  on  the  score  of  modesty,  though  her  re- 
putation may  be  white  as  the  driven  snow,  who  smiles  on 
the  libertine  whilst  she  spurns  the  victims  of  his  lawless 
appetites."  No  No. — If  such  women  would  convince  us 
that  it  is  the  impurity  which  they  reprobate,  let  them  repro- 
bate it  wherever  it  is  found :  if  they  would  convince  us  that 
morals  or  philanthropy  is  their  motive  when  they  spurn  the 
sinning  sister,  let  them  give  proof  by  spurning  him  who  has 
occasioned  her  to  sin. 

The  common  style  of  narrating  occurrences  and  trials  of 
seduction    <Sic.,  in  the  public   prints,  is  very  mischievous, 

20 


y^  INFLJIENCfi    OF    INDIVIDUALS    tfPON         [eSSAY  tU 

These  flagitious  actions  are,  it  seems,  a  legitimate  subject  of 
merriment ;  one  of  the  many  droll  things  which  a  newspaper 
contains.  It  is  humiliating  to  see  respectable  men  sacrifice 
the  interests  of  society  to  such  small  temptation.  They 
pander  to  the  appetite  of  the  gross  and  idle  of  the  public : — 
they  want  to  sell  their  newspapers. — Much  of  this  ill-timed 
merriment  is  found  in  the  addresses  of  counsel,  and  this  is 
one  mode  amongst  the  many  in  which  the  legal  profession 
appears  to  think  itself  licensed  to  sacrifice  virtue  to  the  usages 
which  it  has,  for  its  own  advantage,  adopted.  There  is 
cruelty  as  well  as  other  vices  in  these  things.  When  we 
take  into  account  the  intense  suffering  which  prostitution 
produces  upon  its  victims  and  upon  their  friends,  he  who 
contributes,  even  thus  indirectly,  to  its  extension,  does  not 
exhibit  even  a  tolerable  sensibility  to  human  misery.  Even 
infidelity  acknowledges  the  claims  of  humanity ;  and  there- 
fore, if  religion  and  religious  morals  were  rejected,  this  heart- 
less levity  of  language  would  still  be  indefensible.  We  call 
the  man  benevolent  who  relieves  or  diminishes  wretchedness : 
what  should  we  call  him  who  extends  and  increases  it  ? 

In  connexion  with  this  subject,  an  observation  suggests 
itself  respecting  the  power  of  Character  in  affecting  the  whole 
moral  principles  of  the  mind.  If  loss  of  character  does  not 
follow  a  breach  of  morality,  that  breach  may  be  single  and 
alone.  The  agent's  virtue  is  so  far  deteriorated,  but  the 
breach  does  not  open  wide  the  door  to  other  modes  of  crime. 
If  loss  of  character  does  follow  one  offence,  one  of  the  great 
barriers  which  exclude  the  flood  of  evil  is  thrown  down  ;  and 
though  the  offence  which  produced  loss  of  character  be  really 
no  greater  than  the  offence  with  which  it  is  retained,  yet  its 
consequences  upon  the  moral  condition  are  incomparably 
greater.  The  reason  is,  that  if  you  take  away  a  person's 
reputation  you  take  away  one  of  the  principal  motives  to  pro- 
priety of  conduct.  The  labourer  who,  being  tempted  to  steal 
a  piece  of  bacon  from  the  farmer,  finds  that  no  one  will  take 
him  into  his  house  or  give  him  employment,  and  that  wherever 
he  goes  he  is  pointed  at  as  a  thief,  is  almost  as  much  driven 
as  tempted  to  repeat  the  crime.  His  fellow  labourer,  who 
has  much  more  heinously  violated  the  Moral  Law  by  a  flagi- 
tious intrigue  with  a  servant  girl,  receives  from  the  farmer  a 
few  reproaches  and  a  few  jests,  retains  his  place,  never 
perhaps  repeats  the  offence,  and  subsequently  maintains  a 
decent  morality. 

It  has  been  said,  "  As  a  woman  collects  all  her  virtue  into 
this  point,  the  loss  of  her  chastity  is  generally  the  destruction 


tnxf,  x.]        ptyiLic  notions  of  morality.  2^1 

of  her  moral  principle."  What  is  to  be  understood  by  c6I- 
lecting  virtue  into  one  point,  it  is  not  easy  to  discover.  The 
truth  is,  that  as  popular  notions  have  agreed  that  she  who 
loses  her  chastity  shall  retain  no  reputation,  a  principal  mo- 
tive to  the  practice  of  other  virtues  is  taken  away: — she 
therefore  disregards  them ;  and  thus  by  degrees  her  moral 
principle  is  utterly  depraved.  If  public  opinion  was  so  modi- 
fied that  the  world  did  not  abandon  a  woman  who  has  been 
robbed  of  chastity,  it  is  probable  that  a  much  larger  number 
of  these  unhappy  persons  would  return  to  virtue.  The  case 
of  men  offers  illustration  and  proof.  The  unchaste  man 
retains  his  character,  or  at  any  rate  he  retains  so  much  that 
it  is  of  great  importance  to  him  to  preserve  the  remainder. 
Public  Opinion  accordingly  holds  its  strong  rein  upon  other 
parts  of  his  conduct,  and  by  this  rein  he  is  restrained  from 
deviating  into  other  walks  of  vice.  If  the  direction  of  Public 
Opinion  were  exchanged,  if  the  woman's  offence  were  held 
venial  and  the  man's  infamous,  the  world  might  stand  in  won- 
der at  the  altered  scene.  We  should  have  worthy  and  re- 
spectable prostitutes,  while  the  men  whom  we  now  invite  to 
our  tables  and  marry  to  our  daughters,  would  be  repulsed  as 
the  most  abandoned  of  mankind.  Of  this  I  have  met  with  a 
curious  illustration. — Amongst  the  North  American  Indians 
"  seduction  is  regarded  as  a  despicable  crime,  and  more  blame 
is  attached  to  the  man  than  to  the  woman :  hence  the  offence 
on  the  part  of  the  female  is  more  readily  forgotten  and  for" 
given,  and  she  finds  little  or  no  difficulty  in  forming  a  subse- 
quent matrimonial  alliance  when  deserted  by  her  betrayer, 
who  is  generally  regarded  with  distrust,  and  avoided  in  social 
intercourse.''''* 

It  becomes  a  serious  question  how  we  shall  fix  upon  the 
degree  in  which  diminution  of  character  ought  to  be  conse* 
quent  upon  offences  against  morality.  It  is  not  I  think  too 
much  to  say,  that  no  single  crime,  once  committed,  under  the 
influence  perhaps  of  strong  temptation,  ought  to  occasion 
such  a  loss  of  character  as  to  make  the  individual  regard  him- 
self as  abandoned.  I  make  no  exceptions — not  even  for 
murder.  I  am  persuaded  that  some  murders  are  committed 
with  less  of  personal  guilt  than  is  sometimes  involved  in  much 
smaller  crimes  :  but  however  that  may  be,  there  is  no  reason 
why,  even  to  the  murderer,  the  motives  and  the  avenues  to 
amendment  should  be  closed.  Still  less  ought  they  to  be 
closed  against  the  female  who  is  perhaps  the  victim — strictly 
the  victim — of  seduction.  Yet  if  the  public  do  not  express, 
*  Hunter's  Memoirt, 


232  INFLUENCE    OF    INDIVIDUALS    UPON         [eSSAY  11. 

and  strongly  express,  their  disapprobation,  we  have  seen  that 
they  practically  encourage  offences.  In  this  difficulty  I  know 
of  no  better  and  no  other  guide  than  that  system  which  the 
tenor  of  Christianity  prescribes — Abhorrence  of  the  evil  and 
commiseration  of  him  who  commits  it.  The  union  of  these 
dispositions  will  be  likely  to  produce,  with  respect  to  offences 
of  all  kinds,  that  conduct  which  most  effectually  tends  to 
discountenance  them,  while  it  as  effectually  tends  to  reform 
the  offenders.  These,  however,  are  not  the  dispositions 
which  actuate  the  public  in  measuring  their  reprobation  of 
unchastity  in  women.  Something  probably  might  rightly  be 
deducted  from  the  severity  with  which  their  offence  is  visited  : 
much  may  be  rightly  altered  in  the  motives  which  induce  this 
severity.  And  as  to  men,  much  should  be  added  to  the  quan- 
tum of  reprobation,  and  much  correction  should  be  applied  to 
the  principles  by  which  it  is  regulated. 

Another  illustration  of  the  power  of  character,  as  such,  to 
corrupt  the  principles  or  to  preserve  them,  is  furnished  in  the 
general  respectability  of  the  legal  profession.  We  have  seen 
that  this  profession,  habitually  and  as  a  matter  of  course, 
violates  many  and  great  points  of  morality,  and  yet  I  know 
not  that  their  character  as  men  is  considerably  inferior  to  that 
of  others  in  similar  walks  of  life.  Abating  the  privileges 
under  which  the  profession  is  presumed  to  act,  many  of  their 
legal  procedures  are  as  flagitious  as  some  of  those  which  send 
unprivileged  professions  to  the  bar  of  justice.  How  then  does 
it  happen  that  the  moral  offenders  whom  we  imprison,  and 
try,  and  punish,  are  commonly  in  their  general  conduct  de- 
praved, whilst  the  equal  offenders  whom  we  do  not  punish 
are  not  thus  depraved  ?  The  prisoner  has  usually  lost  much 
of  his  reputation  before  he  becomes  a  thief,  and  at  any  rate 
he  loses  it  with  the  act.  But  a  man  may  enter  the  customary 
legal  course  with  a  fair  name:  Public  Opinion  has  not  so 
reprobated  that  course  as  to  make  it  necessary  to  its  pursuit 
that  a  man  should  already  have  become  depraved.  Whilst 
engaged  in  the  ordinary  legal  practice  he  may  be  unjust  at 
his  desk  or  at  the  bar,  he  may  there  commit  actions  essen- 
tially and  greatly  wicked,  and  yet  when  he  steps  into  his 
parlour  his  character  is  not  reproached.  A  jest  or  iwo  upon 
his  adroitness,  is  probably  all  the  intimation  that  he  receives 
that' other  men  do  not  regard  it  with  perfect  complacency. 
Such  a  man  will  not  pick  your  pocket  the  more  readily 
because  he  has  picked  a  hundred  pockets  at  the  bar.  This 
were  to  sacrifice  his  character :  the  other  does  not ;  and 
accordingly  all  those  motives  to  rectitude  which  the  desir© 


CHAP.  X.]  PUBLIC    NOTION'S    OP    MORALItf.  233 

of  preserving  reputation  supplies,  operate  to  restrain  him  from 
Other  offences.  If  public  opinion  were  rectified,  if  character 
were  lost  by  actual  violations  of  the  Moral  Law,  some  of  the 
ordinary  processes  of  legal  men  would  be  practised  only  by 
those  who  had  little  character  to  lose.  Not  indeed  that  Pub- 
lic Opinion  is  silent  respecting  the  habitual  conduct  of  the 
profession.  A  secret  disapprobation  manifestly  exists,  of 
which  sufficient  evidence  may  be  found  even  in  the  lampoons, 
and  satires,  and  proverbs,  which  pass  currently  in  the  world. 
Unhappily,  the  disapprobation  is  too  slight,  and  especially  it 
is  too  slightly  expressed.  When  it  is  thus  expressed,  the 
lawyer  sometimes  unites,  with  at  least  apparent  good-humour, 
in  the  jest — feeling,  perhaps,  that  conduct  which  cannot  be 
shown  to  be  virtuous,  it  is  politic  to  keep  without  the  pale 
of  the  vices  by  a  joke. 

Fame. — The  observations  which  were  offered  respecting 
contributing  to  the  passion  for  glory,  involve  kindred  doctrines 
respecting  contributions  generally  to  individual  Fame.  If 
the  pretensions  of  those  with  whose  applauses  the  popular 
voice  is  filled,  were  examined  by  the  only  proper  test,  the 
test  which  Christianity  allows,  it  would  be  found  that  multi- 
tudes whom  the  world  thus  honours  must  be  shorn  of  their 
beams.  Before  Bacon's  daylight  of  truth.  Poets  and  States- 
men and  Philosophers  without  number  would  hide  their  di- 
minished heads.  The  mighty  indeed  would  be  fallen.  Yet 
it  is  for  the  acquisition  of  this  fame  that  multitudes  toil.  It 
is  their  motive  to  action  ;  and  they  pursue  that  conduct  which 
will  procure  fame  whether  it  ought  to  procure  it  or  not.  The 
inference  as  to  the  duties  of  individuals  in  contributing  to 
fame,  is  obvious. 

"  The  profligacy  of  a  man  of  fashion  is  looked  upon  with 
much  less  contempt  and  aversion  than  that  of  a  man  of 
meaner  condition."*  It  ought  to  be  looked  upon  with  much 
more.  But  men  of  fashion  are  not  our  concern.  Our  busi- 
ness is  with  men  of  talent  and  genius,  with  the  eminent  and 
the  great.  The  profligacy  of  these,  too,  is  regarded  with 
much  less  of  aversion  than  that  of  less  gifted  men.  To  be 
great,  whether  intellectually  or  otherwise,  is  often  like  a  pass- 
port to  impunity ;  and  men  talk  g-s  if  we  ought  to  speak  leni- 
ently of  the  faults  of  a  man  who  delights  us  by  his  genius  or 
his  talent.  This  precisely  is  the  man  whose  faults  we  should 
be  most  prompt  to  mark,  because  he  is  the  man  whose  faults 
are  most  seducing  to  the  world.  Intellectual  superiority 
brings,  no  doubt,  its  congenial  temptations.  Let  these  affect 
•  Ad.  Smith :  Tlieo.  Mor.  Sent. 
30* 


^&^  INFITJENCE    OF    INDIVIDUAlS    tJPON  [eSSAT  It, 

our  judgments  of  the  man,  but  let  them  not  diminish  our  rep- 
robation of  his  offences.  So  to  extenuate  the  individual  as 
to  apologize  for  his  faults,  is  to  injure  the  cause  of  virtue  in 
one  of  its  most  vulnerable  parts.  "  Oh!  that  I  could  see  in 
men  who  oppose  tyranny  in  the  state,  a  disdain  of  the  tyran- 
ny of  low  passions  in  themselves.  I  cannot  reconcile  my- 
self to  the  idea  of  an  immoral  patriot,  or  to  that  separatioi 
of  private  from  public  virtue  which  some  men  think  to  hi 
possible."*  Probably  it  is  possible  :  probably  there  may  bo 
such  a  thing  as  an  immoral  patriot :  for  public  opinion  ap- 
plauds the  patriotism  without  condemning  the  immorality, 
if  men  constantly  made  a  fit  deduction  from  their  praises  of 
public  virtue  on  account  of  its  association  with  private  vice, 
the  union  would  frequently  be  severed ;  and  he  who  hoped 
for  celebrity  from  the  public  would  find  it  needful  to  be  good 
as  well  as  great.  He  who  applauds  human  excellence  and 
really  admires  it,  should  endeavour  to  make  its  examples  as 
pure  and  perfect  as  he  can.  He  should  hold  out  a  motive  to 
consistency  of  excellence,  by  evincing  that  nothing  else  can 
obtain  praise  unmingled  with  censure.  This  endeavour 
should  be  constant  and  uniform.  The  hearer  should  never 
be  allowed  to  suppose  that  in  appreciating  a  person's  merit's, 
we  are  indifferent  to  his  faults.  It  has  been  complained  of 
one  of  our  principal  works  of  Periodical  Literature,  that 
amongst  its  many  and  ardent  praises  of  Shakespeare,  it  has 
almost  never  alluded  to  his  indecencies.  The  silence  is 
reprehensible :  for  what  is  a  reader  to  conclude  but  that 
indecency  is  a  very  venial  offence  ?  Under  such  circum- 
stances, not  to  be  with  morality  is  to  be  against  it.  Silence 
is  positive  mischief.  People  talk  to  us  of  liberality,  and  of 
allo\yances  for  the  aberrations  of  genius,  and  for  the  tempta- 
tions of  greatness.  It  is  well.  Let  the  allowances  be  made. 
— But  this  is  frequently  only  affectation  of  candour.  It  is 
not  that  we  are  lenient  to  failings,  but  that  we  are  indifferent 
to  vice.  It  is  not  even  enlightened  benevolence  to  genius  or 
greatness  itself.  The  faults  and  vices  with  which  talented 
men  are  chargeable  deduct  greatly  from  their  own  happiness ; 
and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  their  misdeeds  have  been  the 
more  willingly  committed  from  the  consciousness  that  apolo- 
gists would  be  found  amongst  the  admiring  world.  It  is  suf- 
ficient to  make  that  world  knit  its  brow  in  anger,  to  insist 
upon  the  moral  demerits  of  a  Robert  Burns.  Pathetic  and 
voluble  extenuations  are  instantly  urged.  There  are  exten- 
uations of  such  a  man's  vices,  and  they  ought  to  be  regarded : 
*  Dr.  Fhce :  Revolutioa  Serm. 


CHAP.  X.]  niBLIC    NOTIONS    OF   MOftALlTY.  tti 

but  no  extenuations  can  remove  the  charge  of  vohmtary  and 
intentional  violations  of  morality.  Let  us  not  hear  of  the 
enthusiasm  of  poetry.  Men  do  not  write  poetry  as  they 
chatter  with  their  neighbours  :  they  sit  down  to  a  deliberate 
act ;  and  he  who  in  his  verses  offends  against  morals,  inten- 
tionally and  deliberately  offends. 

After  all,  posterity  exercises  some  justice  in  its  award. 
When  the  first  glitter  and  the  first  applauses  are  past— when 
death  and  a  few  years  of  sobriety  have  given  opportunity  to 
the  public  mind  to  attend  to  truth,  it  makes  a  deduction, 
though  not  a  due  deduction,  for  the  shaded  portions  of  the 
great  man's  character.  It  is  not  forgotten  that  Marlborough 
was  avaricious,  that  Bacon  was  mean ;  and  there  are  great 
names  of  the  present  day  of  whom  it  will  not  be  forgotten 
that  they  had  deep  and  dark  shades  in  their  reputation.  It  is 
perhaps  wonderful  that  those  who  seek  for  fame  are  so  indif- 
ferent to  these  deductions  from  its  amount.  Supposing  the 
intellectual  pretensions  of  Newton  and  Voltaire  were  equal, 
how  different  is  their  fame !  How  many  and  how  great 
qualifications  are  employed  in  praising  the  one !  How  few 
and  how  small  in  praising  the  other !  Editions  of  the  works 
of  some  of  our  first  writers  are  advertised,  "  in  which  the 
exceptionable  passages  are  expunged."  How  foolish,  how 
uncalculating  even  as  to  celebrity,  to  have  inserted  these 
passages !  To  write  in  the  hope  of  fame,  works  which  pos- 
terity will  mutilate  before  they  place  them  in  their  libraries ! 
— Charles  James  Fox  said,  that  if,  during  his  administration, 
they  could  effect  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade,  it  "  would 
entail  more  true  glory  upon  them,  and  more  honour  upon  their 
country,  than  any  other  transaction  in  which  they  could  be 
engaged."*  If  this  be  true,  (and  who  will  dispute  it?)  min- 
isters usually  provide  very  ill  for  their  reputation  with  pos- 
terity. How  anxiously  devoted  to  measures  comparatively 
insignificant !  How  phlegmatic  respecting  those  calls  of  hu- 
manity and  public  principle,  a  regard  of  which  will  alone 
secure  the  permanent  honours  of  the  world !  It  may  safely 
be  relied  upon,  that  "  much  more  unperishable  is  the  great- 
ness of  goodness  than  the  greatness  of  power,"!  or  the 
greatness  of  talent.  And  the  difference  will  progressively 
increase.  If,  as  there  is  reason  to  believe,  the  moral  condi- 
tion of  mankind  will  improve,  their  estimate  of  the  good  por- 
tion of  a  great  man's  character  will  be  enhanced,  and  their 
reprobation  of  the  bad  will  become  more  intense — until  at 
length  it  will  perhaps  be  found,  respecting  some  of  thoste 
*  FeU's  Memoirs.  t  Sir  R.  K.  Portet 


23f  IXFLU-ENGE    OF    IXDU'IDUALS    UPON         [eSSAY  II. 

who  now  receive  the  applauses  of  the  world,  that  the  balance 
of  public  opinion  is  against  them,  and  that,  in  the  universal 
estimate  of  merit  and  demerit,  they  will  be  ranked  on  the 
side  of  the  latter.  These  motives  to  virtue  in  great  men  arc 
not  addressed  to  the  Christian :  he  has  higher  motives  and 
better :  but  since  it  is  more  desirable  that  a  man  should  act 
well  from  imperfect  motives  than  that  he  should  act  ill,  we 
urge  him  to  regard  the  integrity  of  his  fame. 

The  Press. — It  is  manifest  that  if  the  obligations  which 
have  been  urged  apply  to  those  who  speak,  they  apply  with 
tenfold  responsibility  to  those  who  write.  The  man  who,  in 
talking  to  half  a  dozen  of  his  acquaintance,  contributes  to 
confuse  or  pervert  their  moral  notions,  is  accountable  for  the 
mischief  which  he  may  do  six  persons.  He  who  whites  a 
book  containing  similar  language,  is  answerable  for  a  so  much 
greater  amount  of  mischief  as  the  number  of  his  readers 
may  exceed  six,  and  as  the  influence  of  books  exceeds  that 
of  conversation,  by  the  evidence  of  greater  deliberation  in 
their  contents  and  by  the  greater  attention  which  is  paid  by 
the  reader.  It  is  not  a  light  matter,  even  in  this  view,  to 
write  a  book  for  the  public.  We  very  insufficiently  consider 
the  amount  of  the  obligations  and  the  extent  of  the  respon- 
sibility which  we  entail  upon  ourselves.  Every  one  knows 
the  power  of  the  press  in  influencing  the  public  mind.  He 
that  publishes  five  hundred  copies  of  a  book,  of  which  any 
part  is  likely  to  derange  the  moral  judgment  of  a  reader,  con- 
tributes materially  to  the  propagation  of  evil.  If  each  of 
his  books  is  read  by  four  persons,  he  endangers  the  infliction 
of  this  evil,  whatever  be  its  amount,  upon  two  thousand 
minds.  Who  shall  tell  the  sum  of  the  mischief?  In  this 
country  the  periodical  press  is  a  powerful  engine  for  evil  or 
for  good.  The  influence  of  the  contents  of  one  number  of  a 
newspaper  may  be  small,  but  it  is  perpetually  recurring. 
The  editor  of  a  journal,  of  which  no  more  than  a  thousand 
copies  are  circulated  in  a  week,  and  each  of  which  is  read 
by  half  a  dozen  persons,  undertakes  in  a  year  a  part  of  the 
moral  guidance  of  thirty  thousand  individuals.  Of  some 
daily  papers  the  number  of  readers  is  so  great,  that  in  the 
course  of  twelve  months  they  may  influence  the  opinions  and 
the  conduct  of  six  or  eight  millions  of  men.  To  say  nothing 
therefore  of  editors  who  intentionally  mislead  and  vitiate  the 
public,  and  remembering  with  what  carelessness  respecting 
the  moral  tendency  of  articles  a  newspaper  is  filled,  it  may 
safely  be  concluded  that  some  creditable  editors  do  harm  in 


CHAP.  X.]  PUBLIC    NOTIONS    OF   MORALITY.  237 

the  world  to  an  extent,  in  comparison  with  which  robberies 
and  treasons  are  as  nothing. 

It  is  not  easy  to  imagine  the  sum  of  advantages  which 
would  result  if  the  periodical  press  not  only  excluded  that 
which  does  harm,  but  preferred  that  which  does  good.  Not 
that  grave  moralities,  not,  especially,  that  religious  disquisi- 
tions, are  to  be  desired ;  but  that  every  reader  should  see  and 
feel  that  the  editor  maintained  an  allegiance  to  virtue  and  to 
truth.  There  is  hardly  any  class  of  topics  in  which  this 
allegiance  may  not  be  manifested,  and  manifested  without 
any  incongruous  associations.  You  may  relate  the  common 
occurrences  of  the  day  in  such  a  manner  as  to  do  either 
good  or  evil.  The  trial  of  a  thief,  the  particulars  of  a  con- 
flagration, the  death  of  a  statesman,  the  criticism  of  a  debate, 
and  a  hundred  other  matters,  may  be  recorded  so  as  to  exer- 
cise a  moral  influence  over  the  reader  for  the  better  or  the 
worse.  That  the  influence  is  frequently  for  the  worse  needs 
no  proof;  and  it  is  so  much  the  less  defensible  because  it 
may  be  changed  to  the  contrary  without  a  word,  directly,  re- 
specting morals  or  religion. 

However,  newspapers  do  much  more  good  than  hann, 
especially  in  politics.  They  are  in  this  country  one  of  the 
most  vigorous  and  beneficial  instruments  of  political  advan- 
tage. They  eflect  incalculable  benefit  both  in  checking  the 
statesman  who  would  abuse  power,  and  in  so  influencing  the 
public  opinion  as  to  prepare  it  for,  and  therefore  to  render 
necessary,  an  amelioration  of  political  and  civil  institutions. 
The  great  desideratum  is  enlargement  of  views  and  purity 
of  principle.  We  want  in  editorial  labours  less  of  partizan- 
ship,  less  of  petty  squabbles  about  the  worthless  discussions 
of  the  day:  we  want  more  of  the  philosophy  of  politics, 
more  of  that  grasping  intelligence  which  can  send  a  reader's 
reflections  from  facts  to  principles.  Our  Journals  are,  to 
what  they  ought  to  be,  what  a  chronicle  of  the  middle  ages 
is  to  a  philosophical  history.  The  disjointed  fragments  of 
political  intelligence  ought  to  be  connected  by  a  sort  of 
enlightened  running  commentary.  There  is  talent  enough 
embarked  in  some  of  these ;  but  the  talent  too  comnwnly 
expends  itself  upon  subjects  and  in  speculations  which  are 
of  little  interest  beyond  the  present  week. 

And  here  we  are  reminded  of  that  miserable  direction  to 
public  opinion  which  is  given  in  Historical  Works.*     I  do 

*  "Next  to  the  guilt  of  those  who  commit  wicked  actions,  is  that  of 
the  historian  who  glosses  them  over  and  excuses  them."  Southey: 
Book  of  the  Church,  c.  8. 


238  INFLUENCE    OF    INDIVIDUALS    ETC.  [eSSAT  II 

not  speak  of  party  bias,  though  that  is  sufficiently  mischiev- 
ous ;  but  of  the  irrational  selection  by  historians  of  compara- 
tively unimportant  things  to  fill  the  greater  portion  of  their 
pages.  People  exclaim  that  the  history  of  Europe  is  little 
more  than  a  history  of  human  violence  and  wickedness. 
But  they  confound  History  with  that  portion  of  history  which 
historians  record.  That  portion  is  doubtless  written  almost 
in  blood — but  it  is  a  very  small,  and  in  truth  a  very  subordi- 
nate portion.  The  intrigues  of  cabinets  ;  the  rise  and  fall  of 
ministers ;  wars  and  battles,  and  victories  and  defeats ;  the 
plunder  of  provinces  ;  the  dismemberment  of  empires  ;  these 
are  the  things  which  fill  the  pages  of  the  historian,  but  these 
are  not  the  things  which  compose  the  history  of  man.  He 
that  would  a'cquaint  himself  with  the  history  of  his  species, 
must  apply  to  other  and  to  calmer  scenes.  "  It  is  a  cruel  morti- 
fication, in  searching  for  what  is  instructive  in  the  history 
of  past  times,  to  find  that  the  exploits  of  conquerors  who 
have  desolated  the  earth  and  the  freaks  of  tyrants  who  have 
rendered  nations  unhappy,  are  recorded  with  minute  and 
often  disgusting  accuracy,  while  the  discovery  of  useful  arts 
and  the  progress  of  the  most  beneficial  branches  of  com- 
merce, are  passed  over  in  silence,  and  suffered  to  sink  into 
oblivion."*  Even  a  more,  cruel  mortification  than  this  is  to 
find  recorded  almost  nothing  respecting  the  intellectual  and 
moral  history  of  man.  You  are  presented  with  five  or  six 
weighty  volumes  which  profess  to  be  a  History  of  England ; 
and  after  reading  them  to  the  end  you  have  hardly  found  any 
thing  to  satisfy  that  interesting  question — how  has  my  coun- 
try been  enabled  to  advance  from  barbarism  to  civilization ; 
to  come  forth  from  darkness  into  light  ?  Yes  by  applying 
philosophy  to  facts  yourself,  you  may  attain  some,  though  it 
be  but  an  imperfect,  reply.  But  the  historian  himself  should 
have  done  this.  The  facts  of  history,  simply  as  such,  are  of 
comparatively  little  concern.  He  is  the  true  historian  of 
man  who  regards  mere  facts  rather  as  the  illustrations  of 
history  than  as  its  subject  matter.  As  to  the  history  of  cabi- 
nets and  courts,  of  intrigue  and  oppression,  of  campaigns 
and  generals,  we  can  almost  spare  it  all.  It  is  of  wonder- 
fully little  consequence  whether  they  are  remembered  or  not, 
except  as  lessons  of  instruction — except  as  proofs  of  the 
evils  of  bad  principles  and  bad  institutions.  For  any  other 
purpose,  Blenheim!  we  can  spare  thee.  And  Louis,  even 
Louis  ^^le  grand!"  we  can  spare  thee.  And  thy  successor 
and  his  Pompadour !  we  can  spare  ye  all. 

*  Robertson ;  Disq.  on  Anct.  Coram,  of  India. 


CHAP.  XI.]  INTELLECTUAL   EDnCATIOJI.  239 

Much  power  is  in  the  hands  of  the  historian  if  he  will  ex- 
ert it :  if  he  will  make  the  occurrences  of  the  past  subservi- 
ent to  the  elucidations  of  the  principles  of  human  nature — of 
the  principles  of  political  truth — of  the  rules  of  political  rec- 
titude ;  if  he  will  refuse  to  make  men  ambitious  of  power  by 
fdling  his  pages  with  the  feats  or  freaks  of  men  in  power :  if 
he  will  give  no  currency  to  the  vulgar  delusions  about  glory  : — 
if  he  will  do  these  things,  and  such  as  these,  he  will  deserve 
well  of  his  country  and  of  man ;  for  he  will  contribute  to  that 
rectification  of  Public  Opinion  which,  when  it  is  complete 
and  determinate,  will  be  the  most  powerful  of  all  earthly 
agents  in  ameliorating  the  social  condition  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XL 

INTELLECTUAL  EDUCATION. 

Ancient  Classics — London  University — The  Classics  in  Boarding-school* 
— English  grammar — Science  and  Literature — Improved  system  of 
Education — Orthography:  Writing:  Reading:  Geography:  Natural 
History:  Biography:  Natural  Philosophy:  Political  Science — Indica- 
tions of  a  revolution  in  the  system  of  Education — Female  Education 
— The  Society  of  Friends. 

"  It  is  no  less  true  than  lamentable,  that  hitherto  the  educa- 
tion proper  for  civil  and  active  life  has  been  neglected ;  that 
nothing  has  been  done  to  enable  those  who  are  actually  to 
conduct  the  aflairs  of  the  world,  to  carry  them  on  in  a  manner 
worthy  of  the  age  and  country  in  which  they  live,  by  commu- 
nicating to  them  the  knowledge  and  the  spirit  of  their  age  and 
country."* — ^"  Knowledge  does  not  consist  in  being  able  to 
read  books,  but  in  understanding  one's  business  and  duty  in 
life." — "  Most  writers  have  considered  the  subject  of  Educa- 
tion as  relative  to  that  portion  of  it  only  which  applies  to 
learning ;  but  the  first  object  of  all,  in  every  nation,  is  to 
make  a  man  a  good  member  of  society." — "  Education  con- 
sists in  learning  what  makes  a  man  useful,  respectable,  and 
J^appy,  in  the  line  for  which  he  is  destined."! 

If  these  propositions  are  true  it  is  evident  that  the  systems 
of  Education  which  obtain,  need  great  and  almost  total  reform- 

*  Art  4  ;  Education.    West.  Rev.  No  I,  t  Piayfair:  Causes 

^  Peciine  of  Nations,  p.  97,  98,  W, 


2i0  I^fTELLECTUAL    EDUCATION.  [eSSAT  II. 

ation.  What  does  a  boy,  in  the  middle  class  of  society, 
learn  at  school  of  the  knowledge  and  the  spirit  of  his  age  and 
country  ?  When  he  has  left  school,  how  much  does  he  under- 
stand of  the  business  and  duty  of  life  ? 

Education  is  one  of  those  things  which  Lord  Bacon  would 
descfibe  as  having  lain  almost  unaltered  "  upon  the  dregs  of 
time."  We  still  fancy  that  we  educate  our  children  when  we 
give  them,  as  its  principal  constituent,  that  same  instruction 
which  was  given  before  England  had  a  literature  of  its  own, 
and  when  Greek  and  Latin  contained  almost  the  sum  of  hu- 
man knowledge.  Then  the  knowledge  of  Greek  and  Latin 
was  called,  and  not  unjustly  called.  Learning.  It  was  the 
learning  which  procured  distinction  and  celebrity.  A  sort  of 
dignity  and  charm  was  thrown  around  the  attainments  and  the 
word  which  designated  them.  That  charm  has  continued  to 
operate  to  the  present  hour,  and  we  still  call  him  a  learned 
man  who  is  skilful  in  Latin  and  Greek.  Yet  Latin  and  Greek 
contain  an  extremely  small  portion  of  that  knowledge  which  the 
world  now  possesses  ;  an  extremely  small  portion  of  that  which 
it  is  of  most  consequence  to  acquire.  It  would  be  well  for  soci- 
ety if  this  word  Learning  could  be  forgotten,  or  if  we  could  make 
it  the  representative  of  other  and  very  different  ideas.  But  the 
delusion  is  continually  propagated.  The  higher  ranks  of  soci- 
ety give  the  tone  to  the  notions  of  the  rest ;  and  the  higher 
classes  are  educated  at  Westminster  and  Eton,  and  Cambridge 
and  Oxford.  At  all  these  the  languages  which  have  ceased  to  be 
the  languages  of  a  living  people — the  authors  which  communi- 
cate, relatively,  little  knowledge  that  is  adapted  to  the  present 
affairs  of  man — are  made  the  first  and  foremost  articles  of  Edu- 
cation. To  be  familiar  with  these,  is  still  to  be  a  "  learned"  man. 
Inferior  institutions  imitate  the  example ;  and  the  parent  who 
knows  his  son  will  be,  like  himself,  a  merchant  or  manufactu- 
rer, thinks  it  almost  indispensable  that  he  should  "  learn  Latin." 

It  may  reasonably  be  doubted  whether,  to  even  the  higher 
ranks  of  society,  this  preference  of  ancient  learning  is  wise. 
It  may  reasonably  be  doubted  whether,  even  at  Oxford,  a  lit- 
erary revolution  would  not  be  a  useful  revolution.  Indeed 
the  very  circumstance  that  the  system  of  education  there,  is 
not  essentially  different  from  what  it  was  centuries  ago,  is  al- 
most a  sufficient  evidence  that  an  alteration  is  needed.  If  the 
circumstances  and  the  contexture  of  human  society  are  altered 
— if  the  boundaries  of  knowledge  are  very  greatly  extended, 
and  if  that  knowledge  which  is  now  applicable  to  the  affairs 
of  life  is  extremely  different  from  that  which  was  applicable 
long  ages  ago — it  surely  is  plain  that  a  system  which  has  not, 


CHAP.  XI.]  INTELLECTtrAl,    KDUCATIOI^.  841 

or  has  only  slightly,  accommodated  itself  to  the  new  condition 
and  new  exigencies  of  human  affairs,  cannot  be  a  good  sys- 
tem, cannot  be  a  reasonable  and  judicious  system  ?  How 
stands  the  fact?  When  young  men  leave  college  to  take  part 
in  the  concerns  of  active  life,  how  much  assistance  do  they 
derive  from  classical  literature  ?  Look  at  the  House  of  Com- 
mons. How  much  does  this  literature  contribute  to  a  mem- 
ber's legislating  wisely  upon  questions  of  Political  Economy, 
of  Jurisprudence,  of  Taxation,  of  Reform  ?  Or  how  much 
does  it  contribute  to  the  capability  of  any  other  class  of  men 
to  serve  their  families,  their  country,  or  mankind  ?  I^  speak 
not  of  those  professions  to  which  a  dead  language  may  be 
necessary.  A  physician  learns  Latin  as  he  attends  the  dis- 
secting room  :  it  is  a  part  of  his  system  of  preparation  for  his 
pursuits  in  life.  Even  with  the  professions,  indeed,  the  need 
of  a  dead  language  is  factitious.  It  is  necessary  only  because 
usage  has  made  it  so.  But  I  speak  of  that  portion  of  man- 
kind who,  being  exempt  from  the  necessity  for  toil,  fill  the  va- 
rious gradations  of  society  from  that  of  the  prince  to  the  pri^ 
vate  gentleman.  Select  what  rank  or  what  class  you  please, 
and  ask  how  much  its  members  are  indebted  to  ancient  learn- 
ing for  their  capability  to  discharge  their  duties  as  parents,  ?is 
men,  or  as  citizens  of  the  state — the  answer  is  literally, 
"  Almost  nothing."  Now  this  is  a  serious  answer,  und  involves 
serious  consequences.  A  young  man,  when  he  enters  upon 
the  concerns  of  active  life,  has  to  set  about  acquiring  new 
kinds  of  knowledge,  knowledge  totally  dissimilar  to  the  greater 
part  of  that  which  his  "  education"  gave  him  ;  and  the  know- 
ledge which  education  did  give  him  he  is  obliged  practically 
to  forget — to  lay  it  aside  :  it  is  something  that  is  not  adapted, 
to  the  condition  and  the  wants  of  society.  But  for  what  pur-^ 
pose  are  people  educated  unless  it  be  to  prepare  them  for  this 
condition  and  these  wants  1  Or  how  can  that  be  a  judicious 
system  which  does  not  effect  these  purposes  ? 

That  no  advantages  result  from  the  study  of  ancient  classics 
it  would  be  idle  to  maintain.  But  this  is  not  the  question, 
'i'he  question  is.  Whether  so  many  advantages  result  from  this 
study  as  from  others  that  might  be  substituted  ;  and  1  am  per- 
suaded that  we  shall  become  more  and  more  willing  to  answer, 
No.  With  respect  to  the  sum  of  knowledge  which  the  works 
of  antiquity  convey,  as  compared  with  that  which  is  conveyed 
by  modern  literature,  the  disproportion  is  great  in  the  extreme. 
To  say  that  the  modern  is  a  hundred  times  greater  than  the 
ancient,  is  to  keep  far  from  the  language  of  exaggeration. 
And,  to  say  the  I  ruth,  the  majority  of  those  who  are  educated 

21 


t42  INTELLECTUAL    EDUCATTO^f.  [eSSAY  II. 

at  college  leave  it  with  but  an  imperfect  acquaintance  with 
those  languages  which  they  have  spent  years  in  professing  to 
acquire.  There  are  some  men  skilled  in  the  languages  ;  there 
are  some  "learned"  men;  but  the  very  circumstance  that 
great  skill  procures  celebrity,  is  an  evidence  that  great  skill  is 
rare.  Amongst  educated  laymen,  the  number  is  very  small 
of  those  whose  knowledge  of  Latin  bears  any  respectable 
proportion  to  their  knowledge  of  their  own  language — of  that 
language  which  they  have  hardly  professed  to  learn  at  all. 
If  the  London  University  should  be  successfully  established, 
it  is  probable  that  at  least  one  collateral  benefit  will  result  from 
it.  The  wide  range  of  subjects  which  it  proposes  to  embrace 
in  its  system  of  education,  will  possess  an  influence  upon 
other  institutions  ;  and  the  time  may  arrive  when  the  impulse 
of  public  opinion  shall  reduce  the  mathematics  of  one  of  our 
Universities  and  the  classics  of  both,  to  such  a  relative  sta- 
tion amongst  the  objects  of  human  study,  as  shall  be  better 
adapted  to  the  purposes  of  human  life. 

If  considerations  like  these  apply  to  the  •preference  of  clas 
sical  learning  by  those  classes  of  society  who  can  devote 
many  years  to  the  general  purposes  of  education,  much  more 
do  they  apply  to  those  who  fill  the  middle  ranks.  Yet  amongst 
these  ranks  the  charm  of  the  fiction  has  immense  power.  It 
has  descended  from  Universities  to  Boarding-schools  of  thirty 
pounds  a-year ;  and  the  parent  complacently  pays  the  extra 
"  three  guineas,"  in  order  that  his  boy  may  "  learn  Latin." 
We  affirm  that  the  knowledge  of  Latin  and  Greek  is  all  but 
useless  to  these  boys,  and  that  if  the  knowledge  were  useful 
ihey  do  not  acquire  it.  What  are  the  stations  which  they  are 
about  to  fill  ?  One  is  to  be  a  manufacturer,  and  one  a  banker, 
and  one  a  merchant,  and  one  a  ship-owner,  and  one  will  un- 
derwrite at  Lloyd's,  and  one  will  be  a  consul  at  Toulon.  Nay, 
we  might  go  lower  and  say,  one  will  be  a  tanner,  and  one  a 
draper,  and  one  a  corn-factor.  Yet  these  boys  must  learn 
Latin,  and  perhaps  Greek  too.  And  they  do  actually  spend 
day  after  day,  and  perhaps  year  after  year,  upon  "  Hie  ha.«c 
hoc," — Propria  quae  maribus," — "  As  in  praesenti," — ''  Et,  and  ; 
cum^  when;''  and  the  like.  What  conceivable  relationship  do 
these  things  bear  to  making  steam-engines,  or  discounting  bills, 
or  shipping  cargoes,  or  making  leather,  or  selling  cloth  ? 
None.  But  it  will  be  said,  What  relationship  does  any  merely 
literary  pursuit  bear  ?  Or  why  should  a  merchant's  son  read 
Paradise  Lost  ?  Such  questions  conduct  us  to  the  just  view 
of  the  case  ;  and  accordingly  we  answer.  Let  these  young  per- 
•003  attend  to  literature,  but  let  it  be  literature  of  the  most 


CHAP.  XI.]  INTELLECTUAL    EDUCATION.  !^43 

expedient  kind.  Let  them  read  Paradise  Lost.  Why  ?  Be- 
cause it  is  delightful,  and  because  they  can  do  it  without 
learning  a  lang'iage  in  order  to  acquire  the  power :  if  Paradise 
Lost  existed  only  in  Arabic,  I  should  think  it  preposterous  to 
te  ich  young  persons  Arabic  in  order  that  they  might  read  it. 
To  those  who  are  to  fill  the  active  stations  of  life,  literature 
must  always  be  a  subordinate  concern ;  and  it  would  be  vain 
lo  deny  that  our  own  language  possesses  a  sufficient  store  for 
them  without  learning  others  to  increase  it. 

But  indeed  the  children  of  the  middle  classes  do  not  learn 
the  languages.  They  do  not  learn  them  so  as  to  be  able  to 
appreciate  the  merits  and  the  beauties  of  ancient  literature. 
Ask  the  boys  themselves.  Ask  them  whether  they  could  hold 
an  hour's  conversation  with  Cicero  if  he  should  stand  before 
them.  The  very  supposition  is  absurd.  Or  can  they  read 
anl  enjoy  Cicero  as  they  read  and  enjoy  Addison?  No. 
They  do  not  learn  the  ancient  languages.  They  pore  over 
rules  and  exercises,  and  syntax  and  quantities  ;  but  as  to  learn- 
ing the  language,  in  the  same  sense  as  that  in  which  it  may 
be  Slid  they  learn  English,  there  is  not  one  in  a  hundred,  nor 
probably  in  ten  thousand,  who  does  it.  Yet  unless  a  person 
does  learn  a  language  so  as  to  read  it  at  least  with  perfect 
facility,  what  becomes  of  the  use  of  the  study  as  a  means  of 
elevating  the  taste  ?  This  is  one  of  the  advantages  which  are 
attributed  to  the  study  of  the  classics.  But  without  enquiring 
whether  the  taste  might  not  be  as  well  cultivated  by  other 
means,  one  short  consideration  is  sufficient :  that  the  taste  is 
not  cultivated  by  studying  the  classics  but  by  mastering  them — - 
by  acquiring  such  a  familiarity  with  these  works  as  enables  us 
to  appreciate  their  excellencies.  This  familiarity,  or  any  thing 
that  approaches  to  this  familiarity,  schoolboys  do  not  acquire. 
Playfair  makes  a  computation  from  which  he  concludes  that 
in  ordinary  boardingrschools,  "  not  above  one  in  a  hundred 
learns  to  read  even  Latin  decently  well ;  that  is,  one  good 
reader  for  every  ten  thousand  pounds  expended."  "As  to 
speaking  Latin,"  he  adds,  "  perhaps  one  out  of  a  thousand 
may  learn  that :  so  that  there  is  a  speaker  for  each  sum  of  one 
hundred  thousand  pounds  spent  on  the  language."* 

Then  it  is  said  that  the  act  of  studying  the  ancient  languages 
exercises  the  memory,  cultivates  the  habit  of  attention,  and 
teaches,  too,  the  art  of  reasoning.  Grant  all  this.  Cannot, 
then,  the  memory  be  exercised  as  well  by  acquiring  valuable 
knowledge  as  by  acquiring  a  mere  knowledge  of  words? 
Would  the  memoiy  lose  any  thing  by  affixing  ideas  to  iho 
•  Euq.  Causes  of  Decline  of  Nations,  p.  224 


344  INTELLECTUAL    EDUCATION.  [esSAY  II. 

words  it  learnt?  The  same  questions  apply  to  those  who 
urge  the  habit  of  attention,  and  to  all  those  advocates  of  the 
study  who  insist  upon  the  exercise  which  it  gives  to  the  mind. 
We  do  not  question  the  utility  of  this  exercise  ;  we  only  say, 
that  while  the  mind  is  exercised  it  should  also  be  fed.  That 
such  topics  of  advocacy  are  resorted  to,  is  itself  an  indication 
of  the  questionable  utility  of  the  study.  No  one  thinks  it 
necessary  to  adduce  such  topics  as  reasons  for  learning  Ad- 
tlition  and  Subtraction. 

The  intelligent  reader  will  perceive  that  the  ground  upon 
which  these  objections  to  classical  studies  are  urged, is,  that 
they  occupy  time  which  might  be  more  beneficially  employed. 
If  the  period  of  education  were  long  enough  to  learn  the  an- 
cient languages,  in  addition  to  the  more  beneficial  branches 
of  knowledge,  our  enquiry  would  be  of  another  kind.  But 
the  period  is  not  long  enough :  a  selection  must  be  made ; 
and  that  which  it  has  been  our  endeavour  to  show  is,  that,  in 
selecting  the  classics,  we  make  an  unwise  selection. 

The  remarks  which  follow  will  be  understood  as  applying 
to  the  middle  ranks  of  society ;  that  is,  to  the  ranks  in  which 
the  greatest  sum  of  talent  and  virtue  resides,  and  by  which 
the  business  of  the  world  is  principally  carried  on.  If  we 
take  up  a  card  of  terms  of  an  ordinary  Boarding-School,  we 
probably  meet  with  an  enumeration  something  like  this : — 
"  Reading,  Writing,  Arithmetic,  English  Grammar,  Composi- 
tion, History,  Geography,  Use  of  the  Globes,"  &c.;  besides 
the  "  accomplishments,"  and  French,  Greek,  and  Latin.  "  Edu- 
cation consists  in  learning  what  makes  a  man  use'ul,  respect- 
able, and  happy  in  the  line  for  which  he  is  destined."  Useful, 
respectable,  and  happy,  not  merely  in  his  counting-house,  but 
in  his  parlour ;  not  merely  in  his  own  house,  but  amongst  his 
neighbours,  and  as  a  member  of  civilized  society.  Now, 
surely  the  list  of  subjects  which  are  set  down  above  is,  to  say 
the  least,  very  imperfect.  Besides  reading,  writing,  and 
arithmetic,  what  is  the  amount  of  knowledge  which  it  con- 
veys 1  English  Grammar : — This  is,  in  fact,  not  learnt  by 
committing  to  memory  lessons  in  the  "  grammar  book."  Com- 
position : — This  is  of  consequence  ;  althougti,  as  school  econ- 
omy is  now  managed,  it  makes  a  better  appearance  on  the 
master's  card  than  on  the  boy's  paper.  History,  Geography, 
and  the  Globe  problems,  are  of  great  interest  and  value  ;  and 
the  great  unhappiness  is,  that  such  studies  are  postponed  to 
others  of  comparatively  little  worth. 

Since  human  knowledge  is  so  much  more  extensive  than 
the  opportunity  of  individuals  for  acquiring  it,  it  becomes  of 


CHAP.  XI.]  INTELLECTtTAL    EDUCATION  245 

the  greatest  importance  so  to  economize  the  opportunity  as  to 
make  it  subservient  to  the  acquisition  of  as  large  and  as  valu- 
able a  portion  as  we  can.  It  is  not  enough  to  show  that  a 
given  branch  of  education  is  useful ;  you  must  show  that  it  is 
the  most  useful  that  can  be  selected.  Remembering  this,  I 
think  it  would  be  expedient  to  dispense  with  the  formal  study 
of  English  Grammar — a  proposition  which,  I  doubt  not,  many 
a  teacher  will  hear  with  wonder  and  disapprobation.  We 
learn  the  grammar  in  order  that  we  may  learn  English  ;  and 
we  learn  English  whether  we  study  grammars  or  not.  Espe- 
cially we  shall  acquire  a  competent  knowledge  of  our  own 
language,  if  other  departments  of  our  education  were  improved. 
A  boy  learns  more  English  Grammar  by  joining  in  an  hour's 
conversation  with  educated  people,  than  in  poring  for  an  hour 
over  Murray  or  Home  Tooke.  If  he  is  accustomed  to  such 
society,  and  to  the  .perusal  of  well-written  books,  he  will  learn 
English  Grammar  though  he  never  sees  a  word  about  syntax; 
and  if  he  i«  not  accustomed  to  such  society  and  such  reading, 
the  "  grammar  books"  at  a  boarding-school  will  not  teach  it. 
Men  learn  their  own  language  by  habit  and  not  by  rules ;  and 
this  is  just  what  we  might  expect ;  for  the  grammar  of  a  lan- 
guage is  itself  formed  from  the  prevalent  habits  of  speech  and 
writing.  A  compiler  of  grammar  first  observes  these  habits, 
and  then  makes  his  rules ;  but  if  a  person  is  himself  familiar 
with  the  habits,  why  study  the  rules  ?  I  say  nothing  of  gram- 
mar as  a  general  science,  because,  although  the  philosophy 
of  language  be  a  valuable  branch  of  human  knowledge,  it 
were  idle  to  expect  that  schoolboys  should  understand  it. 
The  objection  is  to  the  system  of  attempting  to  teach  children 
formally  that  which  they  will  learn  practically  without  teaching, 
A  grammar  of  Murray's  lies  before  me,  of  which  the  leaves 
are  worn  into  rags  by  being  "  learnt."  I  find  the  child  is 
to  learn  that  words  are  articulate  sounds,  used  by  common 
consent  as  signs  of  our  ideas.  Now,  I  am  persuaded  that  to 
nine  out  of  every  ten  who  "  get  this  lesson  by  heart,"  it  con- 
veys little  more  information  than  if  the  sentence  were  in  Es- 
quimaux. They  do  not  know,  with  any  distinctness,  what 
"  articulate  sounds"  means — nor  what  the  phrase  "  common 
consent"  means — nor  what  "  signs  of  ideas"  means  ;  and  yet 
they  know,  without  learning,  all  that  this  formidable  sentence 
proposes  to  teach.  They  know  perfectly  well  that  they 
speak  to  their  brothers  and  sisters  in  order  to  convey  their 
ideas.  Again  :  "  An  improper  diphthong  has  but  one  of  the 
vowels  sounded,  as  ea  in  eagle,  oa  in  boat."  Does  not  every 
child  who  can  spell  the  words  eagle  and  boat  know  this  with 

2i* 


:l^l!5  INTELLECTUAL    EDUCATION,  [eSSAY  II 

out  hearing  a  word  about  improper  diphthongs  ?  This  species 
of  instruction  is  like  that  of  a  man  who,  seeing  a  boy  running 
after  a  hoop,  should  stop  him  to  make  him  learn  by  heart, 
that  in  order  to  run  he  must  use,  in  a  certain  order,  flexors 
and  extensors  and  the  tendon  Achilles.  A  little  girl  runs  to 
her  mother  and  says,  "  Mciry  has  given  me  Cowper's  Task  : 
This  is  what  I  wanted."  But  still  the  little  girl  must  learn 
from  her  "  grammar  book"  how  to  use  the  word  what.  And 
this  is  the  process : — "  What  is  a  kind  of  compound  relative, 
including  both  the  antecedent  and  the  relative,  and  is  equiva- 
lent to  that  which,  as.  This  is  what  I  wanted !"  It  really  is 
wonderful  that  such  a  system  of  instruction  should  be  con- 
tinued— a  system  which  most  laboriously  attempts  to  teach 
that  which  a  child  will  learn  without  teaching,  and  which  is 
almost  utterly  abortive  in  itself.  Children  do  not  learn  to 
speak  and  write  correctly  by  learning  lessons  like  these.  A 
gentleman  told  me  the  other  day,  that  he  learnt  one  of  Mur- 
ray's grammars  until  he  could  actually  repeat  it  from  begin- 
ning to  end ;  and  he  does  not  recollect  that  one  particle  of 
knowledge  was  conveyed  to  his  mind  by  it. 

Whilst  the  attempt  thus  to  teach  grammar  is  so  needless 
and  so  futile,  it  occupies  a  great  deal  of  a  boy's  time  ;  and 
by  doing  this,  it  does  great  mischief,  since  his  time  is  precious 
indeed.  He  might  learn  a  great  deal  more  of  grammar  by 
reading  useful  and  interesting  books,  and  by  conversation  re- 
specting science  and  literature  with  an  educated  master,  than 
by  acquiring  grammatical  rules  by  rote.  Grammar  would  be 
a  collateral  acquisition  ;  he  would  learn  it  whilst  he  was 
learning  other  important  things. 

In  general.  Science  is  preferable  to  Literature — the  know- 
ledge of  things  to  the  knowledge  of  words.  It  is  not  by  litera- 
ture, nor  by  merely  literary  men,  that  the  business  of  human 
society  is  now  carried  on.  "  Directly  and  immediately  we 
have  risen  to  the  station  which  we  occupy,  not  by  literature, 
not  by  the  knowledge  of  extinct  languages,  but  by  the  sciences 
of  politics,  of  law,  of  public  economy,  of  commerce,  of  mathe- 
matics ;  by  astronomy,  by  chemistry,  by  mechanics,  by  natu- 
ral history.  It  is  by  these  that  we  are  destined  to  rise  yet 
higher.  These  constitute  the  business  of  society,  and  in  these 
ought  we  to  seek  for  the  objects  of  education."* 

Yet  at  school  how  little  do  our  children  learn  of  these ! 
The  reader  will  ask,  what  system  of  education  we  would  re- 
commend ;  and  although  the  writer  of  these  pages  can  make 
no  pretensions  to  accuracy  of  knowledge  upon  the  subject,  he 

•  Art.  9    Outlinesof  Philosophical  Education,  &.C.    West.  Rev.  14  o.  7. 


CHAP.  Xt.]  INTELLECTUAL    IIDUCATION.  247 

thinks  that  an  improved  system  would  embrace,  even  in  or- 
dinary boarding-schools,  sucja  topics  of  instruction  as  these : 

Reading— rWrifin^ — Common  Arithmetic — Book-keeping. 

Geography — Natural  History,  embracing  Zoology,  Boiauy,  Mineralo- 
gy. &c. 

History  of  Mankind,  especially  the  History  of  recent  times. 

Biography,  particularly  of  moderns. 

Natural  Philosophy,  embracing  Mechanics,  Pneumatics,  Optics,  &c.  ; 
and  illustrated  by  experiments  :  and  embracing  also  Chemistry 
with  experiments— Galvanism,  &c. 

Geology — Land  Measuring — Familiar  Geometry. 

Elements  of  Political  science  :  embracing  Principles  of  Religious  and 
Civil  Liberty  ;  of  Civil  Obedience  ;  of  Penal  Law  and  the  general 
Administration  of  Justice  ;  of  Political  Economy,  &,c. 

If  the  reader  should  think  that  boys  under  sixteen  can  ac- 
quire little  or  no  knowledge  of  these  multifarious  subjects,  he 
is  t(»  remember  what  the  enumeration  excludes,  and  how  vast 
a  proportion  of  a  boy's  time  the  excluded  subjects  now  occupy. 
Th-^  whole,  perhaps,  of  all  his  forenoons  is  now  devoted  to 
La  jii — Latin  is  excluded.  An  hour  before  breakfast  is  prob- 
ably spent  in  learning  sentences  in  a  book  of  Grammar  : — 
this  mode  of  learning  Grammar  is  excluded.  The  amount  of 
knowledge  which  a  boy  might  acquire  during  these  hours  is 
very  great.  The  formal  learning  of  spelling  does  not  appear 
in  our  enumeration.  Li  many  schools,  this  occupies  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  every  week,  if  not  of  every  day.  Spell 
ing  may  be  learnt,  and  in  fact  is  learnt,  like  grammar,  by  habit. 
A  person  rea  Is  a  book,  and,  without  thinking  of  it,  insensibly 
learns  to  spell :  that  is,  he  perceives,  when  he  writes  a  word 
incorrectly,  that  it  does  not  bear  the  same  appearance  as  he 
has  been  accustomed  to  observe.  Some  persons,  when  they 
are  in  doubt  as  to  the  orthography  of  a  word,  write  it  in  two 
or  three  ways,  and  their  eye  tells  them  which  is  correct. 
Here  again  is  a  considerable  saving  of  time.  Nor.  is  this  all. 
I  would  noi  formally  teach  boys  to  write.  I  would  not  give 
them  a  Copy  Book  to  write,  hour  after  hour.  Reward  siveetens 
Labour  and  Industry  is  praised;  but,  since  they  would  have 
occasion  to  write  many  things  in  the  pursuit  of  their  other 
studies,  I  would  require  them  to  write  those  things  fairly : — ■ 
that  is,  once  more,  they  should  learn  to  write  whilst  they  are 
learning  to  think.  Nor  would  \  formally  teach  them  to  read, 
but  since  they  would  have  many  books  to  peruse,  they  should 
frequently  read  them  audibly  :  and  by  degrees  would  learn  to 
read  them  well.  And  they  woidd  be  much  more  likely  to 
read  them  well,  when  the  books  were  themselves  delightful 
than  when  they  went  up  to  the  master's  desk,  to  "  read  their 


248  IXTELLECTtTAL    EDtTCATION.  [ESSAT  IT. 

lessons."  Learning  "  words  and  meanings,"  as  the  schoolboy 
calls  it,  is  another  of  the  modes  in  which  much  time  is  wasted. 
The  conversation  to  which  a  young  person  listens,  the  books 
which  he  reads,  are  the  best  teachers  of  words  and  meanings. 
He  cannot  help  learning  the  meaning  of  words  if  they  fre- 
quently and  familiarly  occur ;  and  if  they  rarely  occur,  he  will 
gain  ver^'  little  by  learning  columns  of  Entick. 

With  this  exclusion  of  some  subjects  of  study,  and  altera- 
tion of  the  mode  of  pursuing  others,  a  schoolboy's  time  would 
really  be  much  more  than  doubled.  Every  year  would  prac- 
ticnily  be  expanded  into  two  or  three.  Let  us  refer  then  to 
somc^  of  the  subjects  of  Education  which  have  been  proposed. 

Ill  teaching  Geography,  too  little  use  is  made  of  maps  and 
too  much  of  books.  A  boy  will  learn  more  by  examining  a 
(  od  map  and  by  listening  to  a  few  intelligible  explanations, 
thin  by  wearying  himself  with  pages  of  geographical  lessons. 
Lesson-learning  is  the  bane  of  education.  It  disgusts  and 
wearies  young  persons  ;  and,  except  with  extreme  watchful- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  teacher,  is  almost  sure  to  deger  .rate 
into  learning  words  without  ideas.  It  is  not  an  easy  thing 
for  a  child  to  learn  half  a  dozen  paragraphs  full  of  proper 
names,  describing  by  what  mountains  and  seas  half  a  dozen 
countries  are  bounded.  Yet  with  much  less  labour,  he  might 
learn  the  facts  more  perfectly  by  his  eye,  and  with  less  proba- 
bility of  their  passing  from  his  memory.  The  lessons  will 
not  b(^  remembered  except  as  they  convey  ideas. 

To  most  if  not  to  all  young  persons,  Natural  History  is  a 
delightful  study.  Zoology,  if  accompanied  by  good  plates, 
conveys  permanent  and  usefid  knowledge.  Such  a  book  as 
"Wood's  Zoography  is  a  more  valuable  medium  of  education 
than  three-fourths  of  the  professed  school-books  in  existence. 

History  and  Biography  are,  if  it  be  not  the  fault  of  the 
teacher  or  his  books,  delightful  also.  Modern  times  should 
always  be  preferred  ;  partly  because  the  knowledge  they  com- 
municafe  is  more  certain  and  more  agreeable,  and  partly  he- 
cause  it  bears  an  incomparably  greater  relation  to  the  presctnt 
condition  of  men  ;  and  for  that  reason  it  is  better  adapted  to 
prepare  the  young  person  for  the  part  which  he  is  to  take  in 
active  life.  If  historical  books  even  for  the  young  possessed 
less  of  the  character  of  mere  chronicles  of  facts,  and  contained 
a  lew  of  those  connecting  and  illustrating  paragraphs  which 
a  man  of  philosophical  mind  knows  how  to  introduce.  History 
might  become  a  powerful  instrument  in  imparting  sound  prin- 
ciples to  the  mind,  and  thus  in  meliorating  the  general  con- 
dition of  society.     Both  Biography  and  History  shoidd  be 


iCttAP.  XI.]  INTELLECTUAL    EDXJCATtON.  JHS 

illustrated  with  good  plates.  The  more  we  can  teach  through 
the  eye  the  better.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  a  boy 
should  not  "  learn  lessons"  in  either.  He  should  read  these 
books,  and  means  should  afterwards  be  taken  to  ascertain 
whether  he  has  read  them  to  good  purpose. 

There  is,  according  to  my  views,  no  study  that  is  more 
adapted  to  please  and  improve  young  persons  than  that  of 
Natural  Philosophy.  When  I  was  a  schoolboy  I  attended  a 
few  lectures  on  the  Air  Pump,  Galvanism,  &c.,  and  I  value 
the  knowledge  which  I  gained  in  three  evenings,  more  highly 
than  any  other  that  I  gained  at  school  in  as  many  months. 
Whilst  our  children  are  poring  over  lessons  which  disgust 
them,  we  allow  that  magazine  of  wonders  which  heaven  has 
stored  up  to  lie  unexplored  and  unnoticed.  There  are  multi- 
tudes of  young  men  and  women  who  are  considered  respect- 
ably educated,  who  are  yet  wonderfully  ignorant  of  the  first 
principles  of  natural  science.  Many  a  boy  who  has  spent 
years  upon  Latin,  cannot  tell  how  it  comes  to  pass  that  water 
rises  in  a  pump  ;  and  would  stare  if  he  were  told  that  the  de- 
canters on  the  table  were  not  colder  than  the  baize  they  stand 
on.  I  would  rather  that  my  son  were  familiar  with  the  sub- 
jects of  Paley's  Theology,  that  that  he  should  surpass  Eliza- 
beth Carter  in  a  translation  of  Epictetus. 

Respecting  the  propriety  of  attempting  to  convey  any  know- 
ledge of  Political  Science,  many  readers  will  probably  doubt. 
Yet  why  ?  Is  it  not  upon  the  goodness  or  badness  of  political 
institutions  that  much  of  the  happiness  or  misery  of  mankind 
depends  ?  And  what  means  are  so  likely  to  amend  the  bad, 
or  to  secure  the  continuance  of  the  good,  as  the  intelligent 
opinion  of  a  people  ?  We  know  that  in  all  free  states  like 
our  own.  Public  Opinion  is  powerful.  W^hat  then  can  be 
more  obviously  true  than  that  it  should  be  made  as  just  as  we 
can  ?  Nor  would  it  be  to  much  purpose  to  reply,  that  every 
master  will  teach  his  own  political  creed,  and  only  nurse  up 
ignorant  and  angry  squabbles.  The  same  reason  would  apply 
against  inculcating  Religious  Principles  ;  yet  who  thinks 
these  principles  should  be  neglected  because  there  are  many 
creeds  ?  Besides,  one  of  the  best  means  of  educing  political 
truth  is  by  enquiry  and  discussion,  and  these  are  likely  to  be 
rationally  promoted  by  making  the  Elements  of  Political 
knowledge  a  subject  of  education.  To  say  the  truth,  these 
elements  are  not  really  very  abstruse  or  remote.  Having  once 
established  the  maxim — which  no  reasonable  man  disputes— 
that  the  proper  purpose  of  government  is  to  secure  the  hap- 
piness of  the  community,  very  little  is  wanted  in  applying 


S50  INTELLECTUAL    EDUCATION.  [eSSAY  II. 

the  principle  to  particular  questions  but  honest  conscientious 
thought.  The  difficuhies  are  occasioned  not  so  much  by  the 
nature  of  the  case,  as  by  the  interests  and  prejudices  which 
habit  and  existing  institutions  introduce  ;  and  how  shall  these 
interests  and  prejudices  be  so  effectually  prevented  from  in- 
fluencing the  mind,  as  by  the  inculcation  of  simple  truths  be- 
fore young  persons  mix  in  the  business  of  the  world  ? 

These  are  general  suggestions  :  details  are  foreign  to  our 
purpose ;  but  from  these  general  suggestions  the  intelligent 
parent  will  perceive  the  kind  of  education  that  is  proposed. 
If  such  an  education  would  convey  to  young  persons  some 
tolerable  portion  of  "  the  knowledge  and  the  spirit  of  their 
age  and  country,"  if  it  would  tend  to  make  them  "  useful,  re- 
spectable, and  happy"  in  the  various  relationships  of  life,  the 
objects  of  Intellectual  Education  are,  in  the  same  degree,  at- 
tained. So  limited  is  the  opportunity  of  the  young  for  acqui- 
ring knowledge  in  comparison  with  the  extent  of  knowledge 
itself,  that,  upon  some  subjects,  little  more  is  to  be  effected 
during  the  years  that  are  professedly  devoted  to  education, 
than  to  induce  the  desire  of  information,  and  the  habit  of  seek- 
ing it.  A  boy  cannot  be  expected  to  acquire  very  extensive 
information  respecting  the  application  of  the  mechanical 
powers  ;  but  if  he  sees  the  vajue  and  the  pleasure  of  studying 
it,  he  may  hereafter  benefit  his  country  and  the  world  by  his 
ingenuity.  Or  a  boy  cannot  be  expected  to  know  more  than 
the  elements  of  chemistry ;  yet  this  knowledge  may  in  future 
enable  him  to  add  greatly  to  the  comforts  and  conveniences 
of  human  life. 

There  are  indications  of  a  revolution  in  the  system  of  ed- 
ucation which  will  probably  lead  both  to  great  and  beneficial 
results.  Science  is  evidently  gaining  ground  upon  the  judg- 
ments and  affections  of  the  public.  Elementary  books  of 
Science  are  indeed  the  familiar  companions  of  young  persons 
after  they  have  left  school.  They  lay  aside  tenses  and  parsing 
for  "  Conversations  on  Chemistry."  This  is,  so  far,  as  it 
should  be  ;  and  it  would  be  better  still  if  similar  books  had 
taken  the  place  at  school,  of  accents  and  quantities,  and  cases 
and  genders,  and  lesson-learning  by  rote.  This  revolution  is 
also  indicated  by  the  topics  which  are  introduced  into  Me- 
chanics' Institutes.  These  Associations  seem  almost  instinct- 
ively to  prefer  science  to  literature,  simply  as  such.  Per- 
haps it  will  be  said  that  science  is  the  branch  of  knowledge 
which  is  more  peculiarly  adapted  to  their  employments  in  life. 
But  the  scientific  information  which  an  individual  ac(]uires, 
usually  produces  little  inunediate  effect  upon  his  mode   o( 


CHAP.  X!.]  IXTELLECTITAL    EDTTCATrON.  251 

working.  The  carpenter  cannot  put  up  a  staircase  the  better 
for  attending  a  lecture  on  Chemistry.  No :  they  preler 
science  because  it  is  preferable  :  preferable,  not  for  mechan- 
ics merely,  but  for  man.  It  is  of  less  consequence  to  Man 
to  know  what  Horace  wrote,  or  to  be  able  to  criticise  the 
Greek  Anthology,  th  m  to  know  by  what  laws  the  Deity  regu- 
lates the  operations  of  nature,  and  by  what  means  those  oper- 
ati<ms  are  made  subservient  to  the  purposes  of  life. 

A  consideration  of  the  kind  of  knowledge  which  education 
should  impart,  is  however  but  one  division  of  the  general  sub- 
J3ct.  The  consideration  of  the  best  mode  of  imparting  it,  is 
another.  Various  reasons  induce  the  writer  to  say  little  re- 
specting the  last — of  which  reasons  one  is,  that  he  does  not 
possess  information  that  satisfies  his  own  mind  ;  and  another, 
that  it  is  not  so  hnmediately  connected  with  the  general  pur- 
pose of  the  work.  That  great  improvements  have  recently 
been  made  in  the  mode  of  conveying  knowledge  to  large  num- 
bers, is  beyond  dispute.  Whether,  or  to  what  extent,  these 
improvements  are  applicable  to  schools  of  twenty  children  or 
to  families  of  three  or  four,  experience  will  be  likely  to  de- 
cide. With  the  prodigious  power  of  giving  publicity  and  ex- 
citing discussion  which  men  now  possess,  the  best  systems 
are  likely  ultimately  to  prevail. 

One  observation  may,  however,  safely  be  made — that  if  two 
systems-are  proposed,e  ich  with  apparently  nearly  equal  claims 
and  one  of  which  will  be  more  pleasurable  to  the  learnei, 
that  one  is  undoubtedly  the  best.  That  which  a  boy  delights 
in  he  will  learn  ;  and  if  the  subjects  of  instruction  were  as 
delightful  as  they  ought  to  be,  and  the  mode  of  conveying  were 
pleasurable  too,  4here  would  be  an  immense  addition  to  the 
stock  of  knowledge  which  a  school  boy  acquires.  We  com- 
plain of  the  aversion  of  the  young  to  learning,  and  the  young 
complain  of  their  weariness  and  disgust.  It  is  in  a  gre<it  de- 
gree our  own  faults.  Knowledge  is  delightful  to  the  humaa 
mind  ;  but  we  may,  if  we  please,  select  such  kinds  of  know- 
ledge, and  adopt  such  modes  of  imparting  it,  as  shall  make 
the  whole  system  not  delightful,  but  repulsive.  This,  to  a 
great  extent,  we  actually  do.  We  may  do  the  contrary  if  we 
will.  

There  does  not  appear  any  reason   why  the  education  of 

women   should   differ   in    its.  essentials,    from  that  of   men. 

"fThe  education  which  is  good   for  human   nature  is  good  for 

them.     They  are  a  part — and   they  ought  to  be  in  a  much 

greater  degree  than  they  are,  a  part— of  the  elTective  comriU- 


252  LVfELLirctuAt  iJixjCA-rio.t  [esfiAV  ti 

mors  to  the  welfare  and  intelligence  of  the  human  family.  In 
intellectual  as  well  as  in  other  affairs,  they  ought  to  be  fit 
helps  to  man.  The  preposterous  absurdities  of  chivalrous 
times  still  exert  a  wretched  influence  over  the  character  and 
allotment  of  women.  Men  are  not  polite  but  gallant ;  they 
do  not  act  towards  women  as  to  beings  of  kindred  habits 
and  character,  as  to  beings  who,  like  the  other  portion  of  man- 
kind, reason,  and  reflect,  and  judge,  but  as  to  beings  who 
please,  and  whom  men  are  bound  to  please.  Essentially 
there  is  no  kindness,  no  politeness  in  this  ;  but  selfishness 
and  insolence.  He  is  the  man  of  politeness  who  evinces  his 
respect  for  the  female  mind.  He  is  the  man  of  insolence  who 
tacitly  says,  when  he  enters  into  the  society  of  women,  that 
he  nee  Is  not  to  bring  his  intellects  with  him.  1  do  not  mean  to 
aflirra  that  these  persons  intend  insolence,  or  are  conscious 
always  of  the  real  character  of  their  habits  :  they  think  they 
are  attentive  and  polite  ;  and  habit  has  become  so  inveterate, 
that  they  really  are  not  pleased  if  a  woman  by  the  vigour  of 
her  conversation,  interrupts  the  pleasant  trifling  to  which  they 
are  accustomed.  Unhappily,  a  great  number  of  women  them- 
selves prefer  this  varnished  and  gilded  contempt  to  solid  re- 
spect. They  would  rather  think  themselves  fascinating  than 
respectable.  They  will  not  see,  and  very  often  they  do  not 
see,  the  practical  insolence  with  which  they  are  treated  ;  yet 
what  insolence  is  so  great  as  that  of  half  a  dozen  men,  who, 
hiving  been  engaged  in  an  intelligent  conversation,  suddenly 
exchange  it  for  frivolity  if  ladies  enter. 

For  this  unhappy  state  of  intellectual  intercourse,  female 
education  is  in  too  great  a  degree  adapted.  A  large  class  are 
taught  less  to  think  than  to  shine.  If  they  glitter,  it  matters 
little  whether  it  be  the  glitter  of  gilding  or  of  gold.  To  be 
accomplished  is  of  greater  interest  than  to  be  sensible.  It  is 
of  more  consequence  to  this  class  to  charm  by  the  tones  of  a 
piano,  than  to  delight  and  invigorate  by  intellectual  conversa- 
tion. The  effect  is  reciprocally  bad.  An  absurd  education 
disqualifies  them  for  intellectual  exertion,  and  that  very  dis- 
qualification perpetuates  the  degradation.  I  say  the  degrada- 
tion, for  the  word  is  descriptive  of  the  fact.  A  captive  is  not 
1he  less  truly  bound  because  Iiis  chains  are  made  of  silver 
,and  studded  with  rubies.  If  any  community  exhibits,  in  the 
Collective  character  of  its  females,  an  exception  to  these  re- 
m  irks,  it  is  1  think  exhibited  amongst  the  Society  of  Friends. 
"Within  the  last  twenty-five  years  the  public  have  had  many 
opportunities  of  observing  the  intellectual  condition  of  (juaker 
womea.     The  public  have  not  been  dazzled  ;-'^who  would 


ittfiifl^v  tt.]  IXTS1.LECTUAL    EDPCATIOJf.  853 

wish  it  ?  but  they  have  seen  intelligence,  sound  sense,  con- 
siderateness,  discretion.  They  have  seen  these  qualities  in 
a  degree,  and  with  an  approach  to  universality  of  diffusion, 
that  is  not  found  in  any  other  class  of  women  as  a  class. 
There  are,  indeed,  few  or  no  authors  amongst  them.  The 
quakers  are  not  a,  writing  people.  If  they  were,  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  that  the  intelligence  and  discretion  which  are 
manifested  by  their  women's  actions  and  conversation,  would 
be  exhibited  in  their  books. 

Unhappil)'  some  of  the  causes  which  have  produced  these 
qualities,  are  not  easily  brought  into  operation  by  the  public. 
One  of  the  most  efficient  of  these  causes  consists  in  that 
economy  of  the  society,  by  which  its  women  have  an  exten- 
sive and  a  separate  share  in  the  internal  administration  of  its 
affairs.  In  the  exercise  of  this  administration  they  are  al- 
most inevitably  taught  to  think  and  to  judge.  The  instrument 
is  powerful ;  but  how  shall  that  instrument  be  applied — 
where  shall  it  be  procured — by  the  rest  of  the  public  ? 

Not,  however,  that  the  intellectual  education  of  these  fe- 
males is  what  it  ought  to  be,  or  what  it  might  be.  They,  too, 
waste  their  hours  over  "  grammar  books,"  and  "  geography 
books,"  and  lesson  books — over  Latin  sometimes,  and  Greek  ; 
and,  if  the  remark  can  be  adventured  on.  Over  stitching  and 
hemming  too.  Something  must  be  amiss  when  a  girl  is  kept 
two  or  three  hours  every  day  in  acquiring  the  art  of  sewing. 
What  that  something  is — whether  it  is  practised  like  parsing 
because  it  is  common,  or  whether  more  accurate  proficiency  is 
expected  than  reason  would  prescribe,  I  presume  not  to  de- 
termine ;  but  it  may  safely  be  concluded,  that  if  a  portion 
equal  to  a  fourth  or  a  third  part  of  those  years  which  are  af- 
forded to  that  mighty  subject,  the  education  of  the  human 
mind,  is  devoted  to  the  acquisition  of  one  manual  art  like  this 
— mjre  is  devoted  than  any  one  who  reasons  upon  the  sub- 
ject can  justify. 

If  then  we  were  wise  enough  to  regard  women,  and  if  wo- 
men were  wise  enough  to  regard  themselves,  with  that  real 
practical  respect  to  which  they  are  entitled,  and  if  the  edu- 
cation they  received  was  such  as  that  respect  would  dictate, 
we  might  hereafter  have  occasion  to  say,  not  as  it  is  now 
said,  that  "  in  England  women  are  queens,"  but  something 
higher  and  greater ;  we  might  say  that  in  every  thing  social, 
intellectual,  and  religious,  they  were  fit  to  co-operate  with  man, 
and  to  cheer  and  assist  him  in  his  endeavours  to  promote  his 
own  happiness,  and  the  happiness  of  his  family,  his  country, 
and  the  world. 

23 


254  MORAL   EDUCATIOJT.  [esSJLY  U 

CHAPTER  XII. 

MORAL  EDUCATION. 

Union  of  moral  principle  with  the  affections — S5ociety — Morality  of  the 
Ancient  Classics — The  supply  of  motives  to  virtue — Conscience — Sub- 
jujjution  of  the  Will — Knowledge  of  our  own  minds — Offices  of  public 
worship. 

To  a  good  Moral  Education,  two  things  are  necessary : 
That  the  young  should  receive  information  respecting  what  is 
right  and  what  is  wrong ;  and,  That  they  should  be  furnished 
with  motives  to  adhere  to  what  is  right.  We  should  commu- 
cate  moral  Knowledge  and  moral  dispositions. 

I.  In  the  endeavour  to  attain  these  ends,  there  is  one  great 
pervading  difficidty,  consisting  in  the  imperfection  and  impu- 
rity of  the  actual  moral  condition  of  mankind.  Without  re- 
ferring at  present  to  that  moral  guidance  with  wliich  all  men, 
however  circumstanced,  are  furnished,*  it  is  evident  that  much 
of  the  practical  moral  education  which  an  individual  receives, 
is  acquired  by  habit,  and  from  the  actions,  opinions,  and  gen- 
eral example  of  those  around  him.  It  is  thus  that,  to  a  great 
extent,  he  acquires  his  moral  education.  He  adopts  the  no- 
tions of  others,  acquires  insensibly  a  similar  set  of  principles, 
and  forms  to  himself  a  similar  scale  of  right  and  wrong.  It 
is  manifest  that  the  learner  in  such  a  school  will  often  be 
taught  amiss.  Yet  how  can  we  prevent  him  from  being  so 
taught  ?  or  what  system  of  Moral  Education  is  likely  to  avail 
in  opposition  to  the  contagion  of  example  and  the  influence 
of  notions  insensibly,  yet  constantly  instilled  1  It  is  to  little 
purpose  to  take  a  boy  every  morning  into  a  closet,  and  there 
teach  him  moral  and  religious  truths  for  an  hour,  if  so  soon 
as  the  hour  is  expired,  he  is  left  for  the  remainder  of  the  day 
in  circumstances  in  which  these  truths  are  not  recommended 
by  any  living  examples. 

One  of  the  first  and  greatest  requisites,  therefore,  in  Moral 
Education,  is  a  situation  in  which  the  knowledge  and  the 
practice  of  morality  is  inculcated  by  the  habitually  virtuous 
conduct  of  others.  The  boy  who  is  placed  in  such  a  situa- 
tion is  in  an  efficient  moral  school,  though  he  may  never  hear 
delivered  formal  rules  of  conduct :  so  that,  if  parents  should 
ask  how  they  may  best  give  their  child  a  moral  education,  I 
answer,  Be  virtuous  yourselves. 

•  See  Esjsay  I.,  c  vL 


CHAP.  XII.]  MORAL    EDUCATION.  255 

The  young,  however,  are  unavoidably  subjected  to  bad  ex- 
ample as  to  good  :  many  who  may  see  consistent  practical 
lessons  of  virtue  in  their  parents'  parlours,  must  see  much 
that  is  contrary  elsewhere ;  and  we  must,  if  we  can,  so  rec- 
tify the  moral  perceptions  and  invigorate  the  moral  disposi- 
tions, that  the  mind  shall  effectually  resist  the  insinuation  of 
evil. 

Religion  is  the  basis  of  Morality.  He  that  would  impart 
moral  knowledge  must  begin  by  imparting  a  knowledge  of 
God.  We  are  not  advocates  of  formal  instruction — of  lesson 
learning— in  moral  any  mjre  than  in  intellectual  education.  Not 
that  we  affirm  it  is  undesirable  to  make  a  young  person  com- 
mit to  memory  maxims  of  religious  truth  and  moral  duty. 
These  things  may  be  right  but  they  are  not  the  really  efficient 
means  of  forming  the  moral  character  of  the  young.  These 
maxims  should  recommend  themselves  to  the  judgment  and 
affections,  and  this  can  hardly  be  hoped  whilst  they  are  pre- 
sented only  in  a  didactic. and  insulated  form  to  the  mind.  It 
is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  the  times,  that  there  is  a  pro- 
digious increase  of  books  that  are  calculated  to  benefit  whilst 
they  delight  the  young.  These  are  effective  instruments  in 
teaching  morality.  A  simple  narrative,  (offacts^  if  it  be  pos- 
sible,) in  which  integrity  of  principle  and  purity  of  conduct 
are  recommended  to  the  affections  as  well  as  to  the  judgment 
— without  affectation,  or  improbabilities,  or  factitious  senti- 
ment, is  likely  to  effect  substantial  good.  And  if  these  as- 
sociations are  judiciously  renewed,  ths  good  is  likely  to  be 
permanent  as  well  as  substantial.  It  is  not  a  light  task  to 
write  such  books,  nor  to  select  them.  Authors  colour  their 
pictures  too  highly.  They  must  indeed  interest  the  young, 
or  they  will  not  be  read  with  pleasure  :  but  the  anxiety  to 
give  interest  is  too  great,  and  the  effects  may  be  expected  to 
diminish  as  the  narrative  recedes  from  congeniality  to  the 
actual  condition  of  mankind. 

A  judicious  parent  will  often  find  that  the  moral  culture  of 
his  child  may  be  promoted  without  seeming  to  have  the  ob- 
ject in  view.  There  are  many  opportunities  which  present 
themselves  for  associating  virtue  with  his  affections — for  -^ 
throwing  in  a,mongst  the  accumulating  mass  of  mental  habits, 
principles  of  rectitude  which  shall  pervade  and  meliorate  the 
whole. 

As  the  mind  acquires  an  increased  capacity  of  judging,  I 
would  offer  to  the  young  person  a  sound  exhibition,  if  such 
can  be  found,  of  the  Principles  of  Morality.  He  should 
know,  with  as  great  disiiuctness  as  possible,  uou  only  hia 


25S  MORAL    EDUCATION.  [eSSAT  It. 

dut}',  but  the  rc-sons  of  it. .  It  has  very  unfortunately  hap- 
pened that  tho^e  who  have  professed  to  deliver  the  princi- 
ples of  morality,  have  commonly  intermingled  error  with 
truth,  or  have  set  out  with  propositions  fundamentally  un- 
sound. These  books  effect,  it  is  probable,  more  injury  than 
benefit.  Their  truths,  for  they  contain  truths,  are  frequently  de- 
duced from  fallacious  premises — from  premises  from  which  it  is 
equally  easy  to  deduce  errors.  The  fallacies  of  the  Moral  Phi- 
losophy of  Paley  are  now  in  part  detected  by  the  public  :  there 
was  a  time  when  his  opinions  were  regarded  as  more  nearly 
oracular  than  now ;  and  at  that  time  and  up  to  the  present 
time,  the  book  has  effectually  confused  the  moral  notions  of 
multitudes  of  readers.  If  the  reader  thinks  that  the  principles 
which  have  been  proposed  in  the  present  Essays  are  just,  he 
might  derive  some  assistance  from  them  in  conducting  the 
moral  education  of  his  elder  children. 

There  is  negative  as  well  as  positive  Education — some 
things  to  avoid  as  well  as  some  to  do.  Of  the  things  which 
are  to  be  avoided,  the  most  obvious  is  unfit  society  for  the 
young.  If  a  boy  mixes  without  restraint  in  whatever  society 
he  pleases,  his  education  will  in  general  be  practically  bad ; 
because  the  world  in  general  is  bad  :  its  moral  condition  is 
below  the  medium  between  perfect  puruy  and  utter  depra- 
vation. Nevertheless,  he  must  at  some  period  mix  in  society 
with  almost  all  sorts  of  men,  and  therefore  he  must  be  pre- 
pared for  it.  Very  young  children  should  be  excluded  if  pos- 
sible from  all  unfit  association,  because  they  acquire  habits 
before  they  possess  a  sufficiency  of  counteracting  principle. 
But  if  a  parent  has,  within  his  own  house,  sufficiently  en- 
deavoured to  confirm  and  invigorate  the  moral  character  of  his 
child,  it  were  worse  than  fruitless  to  endeavour  to  retain  him 
in  the  seclusion  of  a  monk.  He  should  feel  the  necessity 
and  acquire  the  power  of  resisting  temptation,  by  being  sub- 
jected, gradually  subjected,  to  that  temptation  whida  must 
one  day  be  presented  to  him.  In  the  endlessly  diversified 
circumstances  of  families,  no  suggestion  of  prudence  will  be 
applicable  to  all ;  but  if  a  parent  is  conscious  that  the  moral 
tendency  of  his  domestic  associations  is  good,  it  will  probably 
be  wise  to  send  his  children  to  day-schools  rather  than  to 
send  them  wholly  from  his  family.  Schools,  as  moral  instru- 
ments, contain  much  both  of  good  and  evil :  perhaps  no  means 
will  be  more  effectual  in  securing  much  of  the  good  and  avoid- 
ing much  of  the  evil,  than  that  of  allowing  his  children  to 
spend  their  evenings  and  esrly  mornings  at  home. 

In  ruminating  upon  Moral  Education,  we  cannot,  at  least  in 


CHAP.  Xll.]  MORAL    lEftUCAttOJr.  fS^7 

this  a^e  of  reading,  disregard  the  influence  of  books.  That 
a  young  person  should  not  read  every  book  is  plain.  No  dis- 
crimination can  be  attempted  here  ;  but  it  may  be  observed 
tliat  the  best  species  of  discrimination  is  that  which  is  sup- 
plied by  a  rectified  condition  of  the  mind  itself.  The  best 
species  of  prohibition  is  not  that  which  a  parent  pronounces, 
but  that  which  is  pronounced  by  purified  tastes  and  inclina- 
tions in  the  mind  of  the  young.  Not  that  the  parent  or  tutor 
can  expect  that  all  or  many  of  his  children  will  adequately 
make  this  judicious  discrimination  ;  but  if  he  cannot  do  every 
thing  he  can  do  much.  '1  here  are  many  persons  whom  a 
contemptible  or  vicious  book  disgusts,  notwithstanding  the 
fascinations  which  it  may  contain.  This  disgust  is  the  result 
of  education  in  a  large  sense ;  and  some  portion  of  this  dis- 
gust and  of  the  discrimination  which  results  from  it,  may  be 
induced  into  the  mind  of  a  boy  by  having  made  him  famil- 
iar with  superior  productions.  He  who  is  accustomed  to 
good  society,  feels  little  temptation  to  join  in  the  vociferations 
of  an  alehouse. 

And  here  it  appears  necessary  to  advert  to  the  moral  ten- 
dency of  studying,  without  selection,  the  ancient  classics. 
If  there  are  objections  to  the  study  resulting  from  this  ten- 
dency, they  are  to  be  superadded  to  those  which  were  stated 
in  the  last  chapter  on  intellectual  grounds  ;  and  both  united 
will  present  motives  to  hesitation  on  the  part  of  a  parent 
which  he  cannot,  with  any  propriety,  disregard.  The  mode 
in  which  the  writings  of  the  Greek  and  Latin  authors  oper- 
ate, is  not  an  ordinary  mode.  We  do  not  approach  them  as 
we  approach  ordinary  books,  but  with  a  sort  of  habitual  admi- 
ration, which  makes  their  influence,  whatever  be  its  nature, 
peculiarly  strong.  That  admiration  would  be  powerful  alike 
for  good  or  for  evil.  Whether  the  tendency  be  good  or  evil, 
the  admiration  will  make  it  great. 

Now,  previous  to  enquiring  what  the  positive  ill  tendency 
of  these  writings  is — what  is  not  their  tendency  ^  They  are 
Pagan  books  for  Christian  children.  They  neither  inculcate 
Christianity,  nor  Christian  disposiiions,  nor  tlie  love  of 
Christianity.  But  their  tendency  is  not  negative  merely. 
1  wey  do  inculcate  that  which  is  adverse  to  Christianity  and 
to  Christian  dispositions.  They  set  up,  as  exalted  virtues, 
that  which  our  own  religion  never  countenanced,  if  it  has  not 
specifically  condemned.  They  censure  as  faults  dispositions 
which  our  own  religion  enjoins,  or  dispositions  so  similar  that 
the  young  will  not  discriminate  between  them.  If  we  en- 
thusiastically admire  these  works,  who  will  pretend  that  we 


258  MORAL    EDUCATION.  [eSSAT  II 

shall  not  admire  the  moral  qualities  which  they  applaud? 
Who  will  pretend  that  the  mind  of  a  young  person  accurately 
adjusts  his  admiration  to  those  subjects  only  which  Chris- 
tianity approves  ?  No  :  we  admire  them  as  a  whole  ;  not 
perhaps  every  sentence  or  every  sentiment,  but  we  admire 
their  general  spirit  and  character.  In  a  word,  we  admire 
that  which  our  own  religion  teaches  us  not  to  imitate.  And 
what  makes  the  effect  the  more  intense  is,  that  we  do  this  at 
the  period  of  life  when  we  are  every  day  acquiring  our  moral 
notions.  We  mingle  them  up  with  our  early  associations 
respecting  right  and  wrong — with  associations  which  com- 
monly extend  their  influence  over  the  remainder  of  life.* 

A  very  able  Essay,  which  obtained  the  Norrisian  Medal  at 
Cambridge  for  1825,  forcibly  illustrates  these  propositions; 
and  the  illustration  is  so  much  the  more  valuable,  because  it 
appears  to  have  been  undesigned.  The  title  is,  "  No  valid 
argument  can  be  drawn  from  the  incredulity  of  the  Heathen 
Philosophers  against  the  truth  of  the  Christian  religion."! 
The  object  of  the  work  is  to  show,  by  a  reference  to  their 
writings,  that  the  general  system  of  their  opinions,  feelings, 
prejudices,  principles,  and  conduct,  was  utterly  incongruous 
with  Christianity  ;  and  that,  in  consequence  of  these  princi- 
ples, &c.,  they  actually  did  reject  the  religion.  This  is  shown 
with  great  clearness  of  evidence  ;  it  is  shown  that  a  class  of 
men,  who  thought  and  wrote  as  these  Philosophers  thought 
and  wrote,  would  be  extremely  indisposed  to  adopt  the  re- 
ligion and  morality  which  Christ  had  introduced.  Now,  this 
appears  to  me  to  be  conclusive  of  the  question  as  to  the  pres- 
ent tendency  of  their  writings.  If  the  principles  and  pre- 
judices of  these  persons  indisposed  them  to  the  acceptance 
of  Christianity,  those  prejudices  and  principles  will  indispose 
the  man  who  admires  and  imbibes  them  in  the  present  day. 
Not  that  they  will  now  produce  the  effect  in  the  same  degree. 
We  are  now  surrounded  with  many  other  media  by  which  opin- 
ions and  principles  are  induced,  and  these  are  frequently  in- 
fluenced by  the  spirit  of  Christianity.  The  study  and  the 
admiration  of  these  writings  may  not  therefore  be  expected 
to  make  men  absolutely  reject  Christianity,  but  to  indispose 
them,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  for  the  hearty  acceptance 
of  Christian  principles  as  their  rules  of  conduct. 

Propositions  have  been  made  to  supply  young  persons  with 

*  "  All  education  which  inculcates  Christian  Opinions  with  Pagan 
Tsistes,  awakens  conscience  but  to  tamper  with  it."  Schimmeipenuinck : 
Biblical  Fraffinents. 

t  By  James  Auiiraux  Jeremie. 


CHAP.  Xll.]  MORAL    EDUCATION.  259 

selected  ancient  authors,  or  perhaps  with  editions  in  which 
exceptionable  passages  are  expunged.  I  do  not  think  that 
this  will  greatly  avail.  It  is  not,  1  think,  the  broad  indecen- 
cies of  Ovid,  nor  any  other  insulated  class  of  sentiments  or 
descriptions,  that  effects  the  great  mischief;  it  is  the  perva- 
ding spirit  and  tenor  of  the  whole — a  spirit  and  tenor  from 
which  Christianity  is  not  only  excluded,  but  which  is  actually 
and  greatly  adverse  to  Christianity.  There  is  indeed  one  con- 
siderable benefit  that  is  likely  to  result  from  such  a  selection, 
and  from  expunging  particular  passages.  Boys  in  ordinary 
schools  do  not  learn  enough  of  the  classics  to  acquire  much 
of  their  general  moral  spirit,  but  they  acquire  enough  to  bs 
influenced,  and  injuriously  influenced,  by  being  familiar  with 
licentious  language  ;  and,  at  any  rate,  he  essentially  subserves 
the  interests  of  morality,  who  diminishes  the  power  of  op- 
posing influences  though  he  cannot  wholly  destroy  it. 

Finally,  the  mode  in  which  Intellectual  Education,  gener- 
ally, is  acquired,  may  be  made  either  an  auxiliary  of  Moral 
Education  or  the  contrary.  A  young  person  may  store  his 
mind  with  literature  and  science,  and  together,  with  the  ac- 
quisition, either  corrupt  his  principles,  or  amend  and  invigor- 
ate them.  The  world  is  so  abundantly  supplied  with  the 
means  of  knowledge — there  are  so  many  paths  to  the  desired 
temple,  that  we  may  choose  our  own  and  yet  arrive  at  it.  He 
that  thinks  he  cannot  possess  sufficient  knowledge  without 
plucking  fruit  of  unhallowed  trees,  surely  does  not  know  how 
boundless  is  the  variety  and  number  of  those  which  bear 
wholesome  fruit.  He  cannot  indeed  know  every  thing  with- 
out studying  the  bad ;  which,  however,  is  no  more  to  be  re- 
commended in  literature  than  in  life.  A  man  cannot  know 
all  the  varieties  of  human  society  without  taking  up  his  abode 
with  felons  and  cannibals. 

II.  But,  in  reality,  the  second  division  of  Moral  Educa- 
tion is  the  more  important  of  the  two — the  supply  of  motives 
to  adhere  to  what  is  right.  Our  great  deficiency  is  not  in 
knowledge  but  in  obedience.  Of  the  offences  which  an  indi- 
vidual commits  against  the  Moral  Law,  the  great  majori:y  are 
committed  in  the  consciousness  that  he  is  doing  wrong.  Moral 
Education  therefore  should  be  directed,  not  so  much  to  in- 
forming the  young  what  they  ought  to  do,  as  to  inducing  those 
moral  dispositions  and  principles  which  will  make  them  ad- 
here to  what  they  know  to  be  right. 

The  human  mind,  of  itself,  is  in  a  state  something  like  that 
of  men  in  a  state  of  nature,  where  separate  and  coufliciiug 
desires  and  motives  are  not  restrained  by  any  acknowledged 


C860  MORAL    EDUCATION.  [eSSAT  Tl. 

head.  Government,  as  it  is  necessary  to  society,  is  neces- 
sary in  the  individual  mind.  To  the  internal  community  of 
the  heart  the  great  question  is,  Who  shall  be  the  legislator  ? 
Who  shall  regulate  and  restrain  the  passions  and  affections  ? 
Who  shall  command  and  direct  the  conduct  ? — To  these  ques- 
tions the  breast  of  every  man  supplies  him  with  an  answer. 
He  knows,  becausa  he  feels  that  there  is  a  rightful  legislator 
in  his  own  heart :  he  knows,  because  he  feels,  that  he  ought 
to  obey  it. 

By  whatever  designation  the  reader  may  think  it  fit  to  indi- 
cate this  legislator,  whether  he  calls  it  the  law  written  in  the 
heart,  or  moral  sense,  or  moral  instinct,  or  conscience,  we  ar- 
rive at  one  practical  truth  at  last ;  that  to  the  moral  legislation 
which  does  actually  subsist  in  the  human  mind,  it  is  right  that 
the  individual  should  conform  his  conduct. 

The  great  point  then  is,  to  induce  him  to  do  this — to  in- 
duce him,  when  inclination  and  this  law  are  at  variance,  to 
sacrifice  the  inclination  to  the  law  ;  and  for  this  purpose  it 
appears  proper,  first  to  impress  him  with  a  high,  that  is,  with 
an  accurate  estimate  of  the  authority  of  the  law  itself.  We 
have  seen  that  this  law  embraces  an  actual  expression  of  the 
Will  of  God  ;  and  we  have  seen  that,  even  although  the  con- 
science may  not  always  be  adequately  enlightened,  it  never- 
theless constitutes  to  the  individual  an  authoritative  law.  It  is 
to  the  conscientious  internal  apprehension  of  rectitude  that  we 
should  conform  our  conduct.  Siich  appears  to  be  the  Will  of 
God. 

It  should  therefore  be  especially  inculcated,  that  the  dic- 
tate of  conscience  is  never  to  be  sacrificed ;  that  whatever 
may  be  the  consequences  of  conforming  to  it,  they  are  to  be 
ventured.  Obedience  is  to  be  unconditional — no  questions 
about  the  utility  of  the  law — no  computations  of  the  conse- 
quences of  obedience — no  presuming  upon  the  lenity  of  the 
divine  government.  "  It  is  important  so  to  regulate  the  un- 
derstand mg  and  imagination  of  the  young,  that  they  may  be 
prepared  to  obey,  even  where  they  do  not  see  the  reasons  of 
the  commands  of  God."  "  We  should  certainly  endeavour 
where  we  can,  to  show  them  the  reasons  of  the  divine  com- 
mands, and  this  more  and  more  as  their  understandings  gain 
strength  ;  but  let  it  be  obvious  to  them  that  we  do  ourselves 
consider  it  as  quite  sufficient  if  God  has  commanded  us  to  do 
or  to  avoid  any  thing."* 

Obedience  to  this  internal  legislator  is  not,  like  obedience 
lo  civil  government,  enforced.  The  law  is  promulgated,  but 
*  Carpenter :  Principles  of  Education. 


CHAP.   XII.]  MORAL    EDUCATTO:?.  26 1 

the  passions  and  inclinations  can  refuse  obedience  if  they 
will.  Penalties  and  rewards  are  indeed  annexed ;  but  he 
who  braves  the  penalty,  and  disregards  the  reward,  may  con- 
tinue to  violate  the  law.  Obedience  thereforemust  be  volun- 
tary, and  hence  the  paramount  importance,  in  moral  education, 
of  habitually  subjecting  the  will.  "  Parents,"  says  Hartley, 
"  should  labour,  from  the  earliest  dawnings  of  understanding 
and  desire,  to  check  the  growing  obstinacy  of  the  vrill,  curb 
all  sallies  of  passion,  impress  the  deepest,  most  amiable,  reve- 
rential, and  awful  impressions  of  God,  a  future  state,  and  all 
sacred  things." — "  Religious  persons  in  all  periods,  who  have 
possessed  the  light  of  revelation,  have  in  a  particular  manner 
been  sensible  that  the  habit  of  self-control  lies  at  the  founda- 
tion of  moral  worth."*  There  is  nothing  mean  or  mean- 
spirited  in  this.  It  is  magnanimous  in  philosophy  as  it  is 
right  in  morals.  It  is  the  subjugation  of  the  lower  qualities 
of  our  nature  to  wisdom  and  to  goodness. 

The  subjugation  of  the  will  to  the  dictates  of  a  higher  law, 
must  be  endeavoured,  if  we  would  succeed,  almost  in  infancy 
and  in  very  little  things  ;  from  the  earliest  dawnings,  as  Hart- 
ley says,  of  understanding  and  desire.  Children  must  first 
obey  their  parents,  and  those  wha  have  the  care  of  them. 
The  habit  of  sacrificing  the  will  to  another  judgment  being 
thus  acquired,  the  mind  is  prepared  to  sacrifice  the  \vill  to  the 
judgment  pronounced  within  itself.  Show,  in  «very  practica- 
ble case,  why  you  cross  the  inclinations  of  a  child.  Let 
obedience  be  as  little  blind  as  it  may  be.  It  is  a  great  failing 
of  some  parents  that  they  will  not  descend  from  the  impera- 
tive mood,  and  that  they  seem  to  think  it  a  derogation  from 
their  authority  to  place  their  orders  upon'  any  other  foundation 
than  their  wills.  But  if  the  child  sees — and  children  are 
wonderfully  quick-sighted  in  such  things — if  the  child  sees 
ihat  the  will  is  that  which  governs  his  parent,  how  shall  he 
efficiently  learn  that  the  will  should  not  govern  himself? 

The  internal  law  carries  with  it  the  voucher  of  its  own  rea- 
sonableness. A  person  does  not  need  to  be  told  that  it  is 
proper  and  right  to  obey  that  law.  The  perception  of  this 
rectitude  and  propriety  is  coincident  with  the  dictates  them- 
selves. Let  the  parent,  then,  very  frequently  refer  his  son 
and  his  daughter  to  their  own  minds ;  let  him  teach  them  to 
seek  for  instruction  there.  There  are  dangers  on  every  hand, 
and  dangers  even  here.  The  parent  must  refer  them,  if  it  be 
possible,  not  merely  to  conscience,  but  to  enlightened  con- 
science. He  must  unite  the  two  branches  of  Moral  Educa- 
*  Carpenter :   Pi-inciples  of  Education. 


262  UORAL    EDUCATTO!*.  [eSSAY  II. 

tion,  and  communicate  the  knowledge  whilst  he  endeavours 
to  induce  the  practice  of  morality.  Without  this,  his  children 
may  obey  their  consciences,  and  yet  be  in  error,  and  perhaps 
in  fanaticism.  With  it,  he  may  hope  that  their  conduct  will 
be  both  conscientious,  and  pure,  and  right.  Nevertheless,  an 
habitual  reference  to  the  internal  law  is  the  great,  the  primary 
concern  ;  for  the  great  majority  of  a  man's  moral  perceptions 
are  accordant  with  Truth. 

There  is  one  consequence  attendant  upon  this  habitual  re- 
ference to  the  internal  law,  which  is  highly  beneficial  to  the 
moral  character.  It  leads  us  to  fulfil  the  wise  instruction  of 
antiquity.  Know  thyself.  It  makes  us  look  within  ourselves  * 
it  brings  us  acquainted  with  the  little  and  busy  world  that  is 
within  us,  with  its  many  inhabitants  and  their  dispositions 
and  with  their  tendencies  to  evil  or  to  good.  This  is  valuable 
knowledge  ;  and  knowledge  for  want  of  which,  it  may  be 
feared,  the  virtue  of  many  has  been  wrecked  in  the  hour  of 
tempest.  A  man's  enemies  are  those  of  his  own  household ; 
and  if  he  does  not  know  their  insidiousness  and  their  strength 
if  he  does  not  know  upon  what  to  depend  for  assistance,  nor 
where  is  the  probable  point  of  attack,  it  is  not  likely  that  he 
will  efficiently  resist.  Such  a  man  is  in  the  situation  of  the 
governor  of  an  unprepared  and  surprised  city.  He  knows 
not  to  whom  to  apply  for  effectual  help,  and  finds  perhaps  that 
those  whom  he  has  loved  and  trusted  are  the  first  to  desert 
or  betray  him.  He  feebly  resists,  soon  capitulates,  and  at  last 
scarcely  knows  why  he  did  not  make  a  successful  defence. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that,  in  the  moral  education  which  com- 
monly obtains,  whether  formal  or  incidental,  there  is  little  that 
is  calculated  to  produce  this  acquaintance  with  our  own  minds ; 
little  that  refers  us  to  ourselves,  and  much,  very  much,  that 
calls  and  sends  us  away.  Of  many  it  is  not  too  much  to  say, 
that  they  receive  almost  no  moral  culture.  The  plant  of  vir- 
tue is  suffered  to  grow  as  a  tree  grows  in  a  forest,  and  takes 
its  chance  of  storm  or  sunshine.  This,  which  is  good  for 
oaks  and  pines,  is  not  good  for  man.  The  general  atmosphere 
around  him  is  infected,  and  the  juices  of  the  moral  plant  are 
often  themselves  unhealthy. 

In  the  nursery,  formularies  and  creeds  are  taught ;  but  this 
does  not  refer  the  child  to  its  own  mind.  Indeed,  unless  a 
wakeful  solicitude  is  maintained  by  those  who  teach,  the  ten- 
dency is  the  reverse.  The  mind  is  kept  from  habits  of  intro- 
version, even  in  the  offices  of  religion,  by  practically  directing 
its  attention  to  the  tongue.  "  Many,  it  is  to  be  feared,  ima- 
gine that  they  are  giving  their  children  religious  principles, 


CHAP.  XII.]  MORAT.    EDHCATIOX.  263 

when  they  are  only  teaching  them  religious  truths."     You 
cannot  impart  moral  education  as  you  teach  a  child  to  spell. 

From  the  nursery  a  boy  is  sent  to  school.  He  spends  six 
or  eight  hours  of  the  day  in  the  school-room,  and  the  remainder 
is  employed  in  the  sports  of  boyhood.  Once,  or  it  may  be 
twice,  in  the  day  he  repeats  a  form  of  prayer,  and  on  one  day 
in  the  week  he  goes  to  church.  There  is  very  little  in  al> 
this  to  make  him  acquainted  with  the  internal  community  .• 
and  habit,  if  nothing  else,  calls  his  reflections  away. 

From  school  or  from  college  the  business  of  life  is  begun 
It  can  require  no  argument  to  show,  that  the  ordinary  pursuit* 
of  life  have  little  tendency  to  direct  a  man's  meditations  t? 
the  moral  condition  of  his  own  mind,  or  that  they  have  mucV 
tendency  to  employ  them  upon  other  and  very  different  things 

Nay,  even  the  offices  of  public  devotion  have  almost  a  ten- 
dency to  keep  the  mind  without  itself.  What  if  we  say  thaf 
the  self-contemplation  which  even  natural  religion  is  likely  to 
produce,  is  obstructed  by  the  forms  of  Christian  worship^ 
"  The  transitions  from  one  office  of  devotion  to  another,  are 
contrived,  like  scenes  in  the  drama,  to  supply  the  mind  with 
a  succession  of  diversified  engagements."*  This  supply  of 
diversified  engagements,  whatever  may  be  its  value  in  other 
respects,  has  evidently  the  tendency  of  which  we  speak.  It 
is  not  designed  to  supply,  and  it  does  not  supply,  the  opportu- 
nity for  calmness  of  recollection.  A  man  must  abstract  him- 
self from  the  external  service  if  he  would  investigate  the 
character  and  dispositions  of  the  inmates  of  his  own  breast. 
Even  the  architecture  and  decorations  of  churches  come  in 
aid  of  the  general  tendency.  They  make  the  eye  an  auxiliary 
of  the  ear,  and  both  keep  the  mind  at  a  distance  from  those 
concerns  which,  are  peculiarly  its  own ;  from  contemplating 
its  own  weaknesses  and  wants ;  and  from  applying  to  God  for 
that  peculiar  help,  which  perhaps  itself  only  needs,  and  which 
God  only  can  impart.  So  little  are  the  course  of  education 
and  the  subsequent  engagements  of  life  calculated  to  foster 
this  great  auxiliary  of  moral  character.  It  is  difficult,  in  the 
wide  world,  to  foster  it  as  much  as  is  needful.  Nothing  but 
wakeful  solicitude  on  the  part  of  the  parent  can  be  expected 
sufficiently  to  direct  the  mind  within ;  whilst  the  general  ten- 
dency of  our  associations  and  habits  is  to  keep  it  without. 
Let  him,  however,  do  what  he  can.  The  habitual  reference 
to  the  dictates  of  conscience  may  be  promoted  in  the  very 
young  mind.  This  habit,  like  others,  becomes  strong  by  ex- 
ercise He  that  is  faithful  in  little  things  is  intrusted  with 
*  Paley,  p.  3,  b.  5,  c.  5. 


264  MORAL  KnucATTfiry.  [essay  tt. 

more ;  and  this  is  true  in  respect  of  knowledsre  as  in  respect 
of  other  departments  of  the  Christian  life.  Fidelity  of  obe- 
dience is  commonly  succeeded  by  increase  of  li^ht;  and 
every  act  of  obedience  and  every  addition  to  knowledge  fur- 
nishes new  and  still  stronger  inducements  to  persevere  in  the 
same  course.  Acquaintance  with  ourselves  is  the  inseparable 
attendant  of  this  course.  We  know  the  character  and  dispo- 
sitions of  our  own  inmates  by  frequent  association  with  them  : 
and  if  this  fidelity  to  the  internal  law,  and  consequent  know ' 
ledge  of  the  internal  world,  be  acquired  in  early  life,  the  pa- 
rent may  reasonably  hope  that  it  will  never  wholly  lose  its 
efficiency  amidst  the  bustle  and  anxieties  of  the  world. 

Undoulnedly,  this  most  efficient  security  of  moral  character 
is  not  likely  fully  to  operate  during  the  continuance  of  the 
present  state  of  society  and  of  its  institutions.  It  is  I  believe 
tnie,  that  the  practice  of  morality  is  most  complete  amongst 
those  persons  who  peculiarly  recommend  a  reference  to  the 
internal  law,  and  whose  institutions,  religious  and  social,  are 
congruous  with  the  habit  of  this  reference.  Their  history 
exhibits  a  more  unshaken  adherence  to  that  which  they  con- 
ceived to  be  right — fewer  sacrifices  of  conscience  to  interest 
or  the  dread  of  suffering — less  of  trimming  between  conflicting 
motives — more,  in  a  word,  of  adherence  to  rectitude  without 
regard  to  consequences.  We  have  seen  that  such  persons 
are  likely  to  form  accurate  views  of  rectitude ;  but  whether 
they  be  accurate  or  not,  does  not  affect  the  value  of  their 
moral  education  as  securing  fidelity  to  the  degree  of  knowledge 
which  they  possess.  It  is  of  more  consequence  to  adhere 
steadily  to  conscience  though  it  may  not  be  perfectly  en- 
rightened,  than  to  possess  perfect  knowledge  without  consis- 
tency of  obedience.  But  in  reality  they  who  obey  most,  know 
most ;  and  we  say  that  the  general  testimony  of  experience 
is,  that  those  persons  exhibit  the  most  unyielding  fidelity  to 
the  Moral  Law  whose  Moral  Education  has  peculiarly  directed 
taem  to  the  law  written  in  the  heart. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  EDUCATION  OF  THE  PEOPLE.  ^9 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

EDUCATION   OF  THE  PEOPLE. 

Advanta^s  of  extended  Education — Infant  Schools — Habits  of  enquiry. 

Whether  the  Education  of  those  who  are  not  able  to  pay 
for  educating  themselves  ought  to  be  a  private  or  a  national 
charge,  it  is  not  our  present  business  to  discuss.  It  is  in  this 
country,  at  least,  left  to  the  voluntary  benevolence  of  individ- 
uals, and  thi§  consideration  may  apologize  for  a  brief  reference 
to  it  here. 

It  is  not  long  since  it  was  a  question  whether  the  poor 
should  be  educated  or  not.  That  time  is  past,  and  it  may  be 
hoped  the  time  will  soon  be  passed  when  it  shall  be  a  ques- 
tion. To  what  extent  ? — that  the  time  will  soon  arrive  when  it 
will  be  agreed  that  no  limit  needs  to  be  assigned  to  the  edu- 
cation of  the  poor,  but  that  which  is  assigned  by  their  own 
necessities,  or  which  ought  to  be  assigned  to  the  education 
of  all  men.  There  appears  no  more  reason  for  excluding  a 
poor  man  from  the  fields  of  knowledge,  than  for  preventing 
him  from  using  his  eyes.  The  mental  and  the  visual  powers 
were  alike  given  to  be  employed.  A  man  should,  indeed, 
"  shut  his  eyes  from  seeing  evz7,"  but  whatever  reason  there 
is  for  letting  him  see  all  that  is  beautiful,  and  excellent,  and 
innocent  in  nature  and  in  art,  there  is  the  same  for  enabling 
his  mi;id  to  expatiate  in  the  fields  of  knowledge. 

The  objections  which  are  urged  against  this  extended  edu- 
cation, are  of  the  same  kind  as  those  which  were  urged  against 
any  education.  They  insist  upon  the  probability  of  abuse. 
It  was  said,  They  who  can  write  may  forge ;  they  who  can 
read  may  read  what  is  pernicious.  The  answer  was,  or  it 
might  have  been — They  who  can  hear,  may  hear  profaneness 
and  learn  it ;  they  who  can  see,  may  see  bad  examples  and 
follow  them  : — but  are  we  therefore  to  stop  our  ears  and  put 
out  our  eyes  ? — It  is  now  said,  that  if  you  give  extended  edu- 
cation to  the  poor,  you  will  elevate  them  above  their  stations ; 
that  a  critic  would  not  drive  a  wheelbarrow,  and  that  a  philos- 
opher would  not  shoe  horses,  or  weave  cloth.  But  these  con- 
sequences are  without  the  limits  of  possibility ;  because  the 
question  for  a  poor  man  is,  whether  he  shall  perform  such 
offices  or  starve :  and  surely  it  will  not  be  pretended  that 
hungry  men  would  rather  criticise  than  eat.  Science  and 
literature  would  not  solicit  a  poor  man  from  his  labour  more 

23. 


9S$  EDUCATION    OF    THE    PEOPLE-  [eSSAT  «- 

irresistibly  than  ease  and  pleasure  do  now ;  yet  in  spite  of 
these  solicitations  what  is  the  fact  ?  That  the  poor  man  works 
for  his  bread.     This  is  the  inevitable  result. 

It  is  not  the  positire  but  the  relative  amount  of  knowledge 
that  elevates  a  man  abore  his  station  in  society.  It  is  not 
because  he  knows  much,  but  because  he  knows  more  than  his 
fellows.  Educate  all,  and  none  will  fancy  that  he  is  superior 
to  his  neighbours.  Besides,  we  assign  to  the  possession  of 
knowledge,  effects  which  are  produced  rather  by  habits  of 
life.  Ease  and  comparative  leisure  are  commonly  attendant 
upon  extensive  knowledge,  and  leisure  and  ease  disqualify 
men  for  the  laborious  occupations  much  more  than  the  know- 
ledge itself. 

There  are  some  collateral  advantages  of  an  extended  edu- 
cation of  the  people,  which  are  of  much  importance.  It  has 
been  observed  that  if  the  French  had  been  an  educated  people, 
many  of  the  atrocities  of  their  Revolution  would  never  have 
happened,  and  I  believe  it.  Furious  mobs  are  composed,  not 
of  enlightened  but  of  unenlightened  men— of  men  in  whom 
the  passions  are  dominant  over  the  judgment,  because  the 
judgment  has  not  been  exercised,  and  informed,  and  habitu- 
ated to  direct  the  conduct.  A  factious  declaimer  can  much  less 
easily  influence  a  number  of  men  who  acquired  at  school  the 
rudiments  of  knowledge,  and  who  have  subsequently  devoted 
their  leisure  to  a  Mechanics'  Institute,  than  a  multitude  who 
cannot  write  or  read,  and  who  have  never  practised  reasoning 
and  considerate  thought.  And  as  the  Education  of  a  People 
prevents  political  evil,  it  effects  political  good.  Despotic 
rulers  well  know  that  knowledge  is  inimical  to  their  *power. 
This  simple  fact  is  a  sufficient  reason,  to  a  good  and  wise 
man,  to  approve  knowledge  and  extend  it.  The  attention  to 
public  institutions  and  public  measures  which  is  inseparable 
irom  an  educated  population,  is  a  great  good.  We  all  know 
that  the  human  heart  is  such,  that  the  possession  of  power  is 
commonly  attended  with  a  desire  to  increase  it,  even  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  general  weal.  It  is  acknowledged  that  a  check 
is  needed,  and  no  check  is  either  so  efficient  or  so  safe  as 
that  of  a  watchful  and  intelligent  public  mind :  so  watchful, 
that  it  is  prompt  to  discover  and  to  expose  what  is  amiss  ;  so 
intelligent,  that  it  is  able  to  form  rational  judgments  respecting 
the  nature  and  the  means  of  amendment,  In  all  public  insti- 
tutions there  exists,  and  it  is  happy  that  there  does  exist,  a 
port  of  vis  inerticB  which  habitually  resists  change.  This, 
which  is  beneficial  as  a  general  tendency,  is  often  injurious 
•from  its  excess  :  the  state  of  public  institutions  almost  through^ 


CHAP.  XIII.]  EDUCATION    OF    THE    PEOPLE.  267 

out  the  world,  bears  sufRcient  testimony  to  the  truth,  that  they 
need  alteration  and  amendment  faster  than  they  receive  it — • 
that  the  internal  resistance  of  change  is  greater  than  is  good 
for  man.  Unhappily,  the  ordinary  way  in  which  a  people 
have  endeavoured  to  amend  their  institutions,  has  been  by 
some  mode  of  violence.  If  you  ask  when  a  nation  acquired 
a  greater  degree  of  freedom,  you  are  referred  to  some  era  of 
revolution  and  probably  of  blood.  These  are  not  proper,  cer- 
tainly they  are  not  Christian,  remedies  for  the  disease.  It  is 
becoming  an  undisputed  proposition,  that  no  bad  institution 
can  permanently  stand  against  the  distinct  Opinion  of  a  People. 
This  opinion  is  likely  to  be  universal,  and  to  be  intelligent 
only  amongst  an  enlightened  community.  Now  that  reforma- 
tion of  public  institutions  which  results  from  public  opinion,  is 
the  very  best  in  kind,  and  is  likely  to  be  the  best  in  its  mode  : — 
in  its  kind,  because  public  opinion  is  the  proper  measure  of  the 
needed  alteration  ;  and  in  its  mode,  because  alterations  which 
result  from  such  a  cause,  are  likely  to  be  temperately  made. 

It  may  be  feared  that  some  persons  object  to  an  extended 
education  of  the  people  on  these  very  grounds  which  we  pro- 
pose as  recommendations  ;  that  they  regard  the  tendency  of 
education  to  produce  examination,  and,  if  need  be,  alteration 
of  established  institutions,  as  a  reason  for  withholding  it  from 
the  poor.  To  these,  it  is  a  sufficient  answer,  that  if  increase 
of  knowledge  and  habits  of  investigation  tend  to  alter  any  es- 
tablished institution,  it  is  fit  that  it  should  be  altered.  There 
appears  no  means  of  avoiding  this  conclusion,  unless  it  can 
be  shown  that  increase  of  knowledge  is  usually  attended  with 
depravation  of  principle,  and  that  in  proportion  as  the  judg- 
ment is  exercised  it  decides  amiss. 

Generally,  that  intellectual  education  is  good  for  a  poor  man 
which  is  good  for  his  richer  neighbours :  in  other  words,  that 
is  good  for  the  poor  which  is  good  for  man.  There  may  be 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule  ;  but  he  who  is  disposed  to 
doubt  the  fitness  of  a  rich  man's  education  for  the  poor,  will  do 
well  to  consider  first  whether  the  rich  man's  education  is  fit 
for  himself.  The  children  of  persons  of  property  can  un- 
doubtedly learn  much  more  than  those  of  a  labourer,  and  the 
labourer  must  select  from  the  rich  man's  system  a  part  only 
for  his  own  child.  But  this  does  not  affect  the  general  con 
elusion.  The  parts  which  he  ought  to  select  are  precisely 
those  parts  which  are  most  necessary  and  beneficial  to  the  rich. 

Great  as  have  been  the  improvements  in  the  methods  of 
conveying  knowledge  to  the  poor,  there  is  reason  to  think 
that  they  will  be  yet  greater.     Some  useful  suggestions  for 


S^68,  EDUCATION*    OF    THE    PEOPLE.  [eSSAY  II. 

the  instruction  of  older  children  may  I  think  be  obtained  from 
the  systems  in  Infant  Schools.  In  a  well  conducted  infant 
school,  children  acquire  much  knowledge,  and  they  acquire  it 
with  delight.  This  delight  is  of  extreme  importance  :  perhaps 
it  may  safely  be  concluded,  respecting  all  innocent  knowledge, 
that  if  a  child  acquired  it  with  pleasure  he  is  loell  taught.  It 
is  worthy  observation,  that  in  the  infant  system,  lesson-learn- 
ing is  nearly  or  wholly  excluded.  It  is  not  to  be  expected 
that  in  the  time  which  is  devoted  professedly  to  education  by 
the  children  of  the  poor,  much  ex;tent  of  knowledge  can  be 
acquired  ;  but  something  may  be  acquired  which  is  of  much 
more  consequence  than  mere  school-learning — the  love  and 
the  habits  of  enquiry.  If  education  be  so  conducted  that  it 
is  a  positive  pleasure  to  a  boy  to  learn,  there  is  little  doubt 
that  this  love  and  habit  will  be  induced.  Here  is  the  great 
advantage  of  early  intellectual  culture.  The  busiest  have 
some  leisure,  leisure  which  they  may  employ  ill  or  well ;  and 
that  they  will  employ  it  well  may  reasonably  be  expected 
when  knowledge  is  thus  attractive  for  its  own  sake.  That 
this  effect  is  in  a  considerable  degree  actually  produced,  is 
indicated  by  the  improved  character  of  the  books  which  poor 
men  read,  and  in  the  prodigious  increase  in  the  number  of 
those  books.  The  supply  and  demand  are  correspondent. 
Almost  every  year  produces  books  for  the  labouring  classes 
of  a  higher  intellectual  order  than  the  last.  A  journeyman 
in  our  days  can  understand  and  relish  a  work  which  would 
have  been  like  Arabic  to  his  grandfather. 

Of  moral  education  we  say  nothing  here,  except  that  the 
principles  which  are  applicable  to  other  classes  of  mankind 
are  obviously  applicable  to  the  poor.  With  respect  to  the  in- 
culcation of  peculiar  religious  opinions  on  the  children  who 
attend  schools  voluntarily  supported,  there  is  manifestly  the 
same  reason  for  inculcating  them  in  this  case  as  for  teaching 
them  at  all.  This  supposes  that  the  supporters  of  the  school 
are  not  themselves  divided  in  their  religious  opinions.  If  they 
are,  and  if  the  adherents  to  no  one  creed  are  able  to  support 
a  school  of  their  own,  there  appears  no  ground  upon  which 
they  can  rightly  refuse  to  support  a  school  in  which  no  reli- 
gious peculiarities  are  taught.  It  is  better  that  intellectual 
knowledge,  together  with  imperfect  religious  principles  should 
be  communicated,  than  that  children  should  remain  in  dark- 
ness. There  is  indeed  some  reason  to  suspect  the  genuine- 
ness of  that  man's  philanthropy,  who  refuses  to  impart  any 
knowledge  to  his  neighbours  because  he  cannot,  at  the  same 
time,  teach  them  his  own  creed. 


CHJ^P.  XIV.]  AMCJSEMENTS.  269 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

AMUSEMENTS. 

The  Stage — Religions  Amusements — Masquerades — Field  Sports — The 
Turf — Boxing — Wrestling — Opinions  of  Posterity — Popular  Amuse- 
ments needless. 

It  is  a  remarkable  circumstance,  that  in  almost  all  Chris- 
tian countries  many  of  the  public  and  popular  amusements 
have  been  regarded  as  objectionable  by  the  more  sober  and 
conscientious  part  of  the  community.  This  opinion  could 
scarcely  have  been  general  unless  it  had  been  just:  yet  why 
should  a  people  prefer  amusements  of  which  good  men  feel 
themselves  compelled  to  disapprove  ?  Is  it  because  no  pub- 
lic recreation  can  be  devised  of  which  the  evil  is  not  greater 
than  the  good  ?  or  because  the  inclinations  of  most  men  are 
such,  that  if  it  were  devised,  they  would  not  enjoy  it  ?  It 
may  be  feared  that  the  desires  which  are  seeking  for  gratifi- 
cation are  not  themselves  pure  ;  and  pure  pleasures  are  not 
congenial  to  impure  minds.  The  real  cause  of  the  objection- 
able nature  of  many  popular  diversions  is  to  be  sought  in  the 
want  of  virtue  in  the  people. 

Amusement  is  confessedly  a  subordinate  concern  in  life. 
It  is  neither  the  principal  nor  amongst  the  principal  objects 
of  proper  solicitude.  No  reasonable  man  sacrifices  the  more 
important  thing  to  the  less,  and  that  a  man's  religious  and 
moral  condition  is  of  incomparably  greater  importance  than 
his  diversion,  is  sufficiently  plain.  In  estimating  the  propri- 
ety or  rather  the  lawfulness  of  a  given  amusement,  it  may 
safely  be  laid  down,  That  none  is  lawful  of  which  the  aggre- 
gate consequences  are  injurious  to  morals  : — nor,  if  its  effects 
upon  the  immediate  agents  are,  in  general,  morally  bad  : — nor 
if  it  occasions  needless  pain  and  misery  to  men  or  to  ani- 
mals : — nor,  lastly,  if  it  occupies  much  time  or  is  attended 
with  much  expense. — Respecting  all  amusements,  the  ques- 
tion is  not  whether  in  their  simple  or  theoretical  character; 
they  are  defensible,  but  whether  they  are  defensible  in  their 
actually  existing  state. 

The  Drama. — So  that  if  a  person,  by  way  of  showing  the 
propriety  of  theatrical  exhibitions,  should  ask  whether  there 
was  any  harm  in  a  man's  repeating  a  composition  before 
others  and  accompanying  it  with  appropriate  gestures— ho 
would  ask  a  verv  foolish  question  :  because  he  would  ask  a 

23* 


2T0  AMUSEMENTS.  [essAY  II 

question  that  possesses  little  or  no  relevancy  to  the  subject.— 
What  are  the  ordinary  effects  of  the  stage  upon  those  who 
act  on  it  ?  One  and  one  only  answer  can  be  given — that 
whatever  happy  exceptions  there  may  be,  the  effect  is  bad  ; 
— ^that  the  moral  and  religious  character  of  actors  is  lower 
than  that  of  persons  in  other  professions.  "  It  is  an  undeni- 
able fact,  for  the  truth  of  which  we  may  safely  appeal  to  every 
age  and  nation,  that  the  situation  of  the  performers,  particu- 
larly of  those  of  the  female  sex,  is  remarkably  unfavourable 
to  the  maintenance  and  growth  of  the  religious  and  moral 
principle,  and  of  course  highly  dangerous  to  their  eternal  in- 
terests."* 

Therefore,  if  I  take  my  seat  in  the  theatre,  I  have  paid 
three  or  five  shillings  as  an  inducement  to  a  number  of  per- 
sons to  subject  their  principles  to  extreme  danger  ; — and  the 
defence  which  I  make  is,  that  I  am  amused  by  it.  Now,  we 
affirm  that  this  defence  is  invalid ;  that  it  is  a  defence  which 
reason  pronounces  to  be  absurd,  and  morality  to  be  vicious. 
Yet  I  have  no  other  to  make ;  it  is  the  sum  total  of  my  justi- 
fication. 

But  this,  which  is  sufficient  to  decide  the  morality  of  the 
question,  is  not  the  only  nor  the  chief  part  of  the  evil.  The 
evil  which  is  suffered  by  performers  may  be  more  intense, 
but  upon  spectators  and  others  it  is  more  extended.  The  night 
of  a  play  is  the  harvest  time  of  iniquity,  where  the  profligate 
and  the  sensual  put  in  their  sickles  and  reap.  It  is  to  no 
purpose  to  say  that  a  man  may  go  to  a  theatre  or  parade  a  sa- 
loon without  taking  part  in  the  surrounding  licentiousness.  All 
who  are  there  promote  the  licentiousness,  for  if  none  were 
there,  there  would  be  no  licentiousness  ;  that  is  to  say,  if  none 
purchased  tickets  there  would  be  neither  actors  to  be  depraved 
nor  dramas  to  vitiate,  nor  saloons  to  degrade  and  corrupt,  and 
shock  us. — The  whole  question  of  the  lawfulness  of  the  dra- 
matic amusements,  as  they  are  ordinarily  conducted,  is  resolv- 
ed into  a  very  simple  thing  :-^After  the  doors  on  any  given 
night  are  closed,  have  the  virtuous  or  the  vicious  dispositions 
of  the  Extenders  been  in  the  greater  degree  promoted  1  Every 
one  knows  that  the  balance  is  on  the  side  of  vice,  and  this 
conclusively  decides  the  question — "  Is  it  lawful  to  attend  ?" 

The  same  question  is  to  be  asked,  and  the  same  answer  I 
believe  will  be  returned,  respecting  various  other  assemblies 
for  purposes  of  amusement.  They  do  more  harm  than  good. 
They  please  but  they  injure  us  ;  and  what  makes  the  case 
etill  stronger  is,  that  the  pleasure  is  frequently  such  as  ought 
*  Wilberforce :  Practical  View,  c.  4,  s.  5. 


CHAP.   XIV>  AMUSEMENTS,  ^^71 

not  to  be  enjoyed,  A  tippler  enjoys  pleasure  in  becoming 
drunk,  but  he  is  not  to  allege  the  gratification  as  a  set-off 
against  the  immorality.  And  so  it  is  with  no  small  portion 
of  the  pleasures  of  an  assembly.  Dispositions  are  gratified 
which  it  were  wiser  to  thwart ;  and,  to  speak  the  truth,  if  the 
dispositions  of  the  mind  were  such  as  they  ought  to  be,  many 
of  these  modes  of  diversion  would  be  neither  relished  nor 
resorted  to.  Some  persons  try  to  persuade  themselves  that 
charity  forms  a  part  of  their  motive  in  attending  such  places  ; 
as  when  the  profits  of  the  night  are  given  to  a  benevolent  in- 
stitution. They  hope,  I  suppose,  that  though  it  would  not  be 
^uite  right  to  go  if  benevolence  were  not  a  gainer,  yet  that  the 
end  warrants  the  means.  But  if  these  persons  are  charitable, 
let  them  give  their  guinea  without  deducting  half  for  purpo- 
ses of  questionabl«  propriety.  Religious  amusements,  such 
as  Oratorios  and  the  Uke,  form  one  of  those  artifices  of  chi- 
canery by  which  people  cheat,  or  try  to  cheat,  themselves. 
The  music,  say  they,  is  sacred,  is  devotional ;  and  we  go  to 
hear  it  as  we  go  to  church  :  it  excites  and  animates  our  reli- 
gious sensibilities-  This,  in  spite  of  the  solemnity  of  the 
association,  is  really  ludicrous.  These  scenes  subserve  reli- 
gion no  more  than  they  subserve  chemistry.  They  do  not 
increase  its  power  any  more  than  the  power  of  the  steara-en* 
gine.  As  it  respects  Christianity,  it  is  all  imposition  and  fic- 
tion ;  and  it  is  unfortunate  that  some  of  the  most  solemn  topics 
of  our  religion  are  brought  into  such  unworthy  and  debasing 
alliance,* 

Masquerades  su-e  of  a  more  decided  character.  If  the 
pleasure  which  people  derive  from  meeting  in  disguises  con- 
sisted merely  in  the  "  fun  and  drollery"  of  the  thing,  we  might 
wonder  to  see  so  many  children  of  five  and  six  feet  high,  and 
leave  them  perhaps  to  their  childishness  : — but  the  truth  is, 
that  to  many  the  zest  of  the  concealment  consists  in  the  op- 
portunity which  it  gives  of  covert  licentiousness ;  of  doing 
that  in  secret,  of  which,  openly,  they  would  profess  to  be 
ashamed.  Some  men  and  some  women  who  affect  propriety 
when  the  face  is  shown,  are  glad  of  a  ievir  hours  of  concealed 
libertinism.  It  is  a  time  in  which  principles  are  left  to  guard 
the  citadel  of  virtue  without  the  auxiliary  of  public  opinion. 
And  ill  do  they  guard  it !  It  is  no  equivocal  indication  of  the 
slender  power  of  a  person's  principles,  when  they  do  not  re- 
strain him  any  longer  than  lus  misdeeds  will  produce  expo- 
Sure.  She  who  is  immodest  at  a  masquerade,  is  modest  no- 
*  See  also  Essay  II.  c.  1. 


2758  AMUSEMENTS.  [eSSAY  II. 

where.     She  may  affect  the  language  of  delicacy  and  maii> 
tain  external  decorum,  but  she  has  no  purity  of  mind. 

The  Field. — If  we  proceed  with  the  calculation  of  the 
benefits  and  mischiefs  of  Field  Sports,  in  the  merchant-liko 
manner  of  debtor  and  creditor,  the  balance  is  presently  foi'ml 
to  be  greatly  against  them.  The  advantages  to  him  who 
rides  after  hounds  and  shoots  pheasants,  are — ^that  he  is  amu- 
sed, and  possibly  that  his  health  is  improved  ;  some  of  the 
disadvantages  are — that  it  is  unpropitious  to  the  influence  of 
religion  and  the  dispositions  which  religion  induces  ;  that  it 
expends  money  and  time  which  a  man  ought  to  be  able  to 
employ  better  ;  and  that  it  inflicts  gratuitous  misery  upon  the 
inferior  animals.  The  value  of  the  pleasure  cannot  easily  be 
computed,  and  as  to  health  it  may  pass  for  nothing ;  for  if  a 
man  is  so  little  concerned  for  his  health  that  he  will  not  take 
exercise  without  dogs  and  guns,  he  has  no  reason  to  expect 
other  men  to  concern  themselves  for  it  in  remarking  upon  his 
actions.  And  then  for  the  other  side  of  the  calculation.  That 
field  sports  have  any  tendency  to  make  a  man  better,  no  one 
will  pretend  ;  and  no  one  who  looks  around  him  will  doubt 
that  their  tendency  is  in  the  opposite  direction.  It  is  not  ne- 
cessary to  show  that  every  one  who  rides  after  the  dogs  is  a 
worse  man  in  the  evening  than  he  was  in  the  morning :  the 
influence  of  such  things  is  to  be  sought  in  those  with  whom 
they  are  hai>ilaal.  Is  the  character  of  the  sportsman,  then, 
distinguished  by  religious  sensibility  ?  No.  By  activity  of 
Benevolence  ?  No.  By  intellectual  exertion  ?  No.  By 
purity  of  manners  ?  No.  Sportsmen  are  not  the  persons  who 
diffuse  the  light  of  Christianity,  or  endeavour  to  rectify  the 
public  morals,  or  to  extend  the  empire  of  knowledge.  Look 
igain  at  the  clerical  sportsman.  Is  he  usually  as  exemplary 
in  the  discharge  of  his  functions  as  those  who  decline  such 
diversions  1  His  parishioners  know  that  he  is  not.  So,  then, 
the  religious  and  moral  tendency  of  Field  Sports  is  bad.  It 
is  not  necessary  to  show  how  the  ill  effect  is  produced.  It  is 
sufficient  that  it  actually  is  produced. 

As  to  the  expenditure  of  time  and  money,  I  dare  say  we 
shall  be  told  that  a  man  has  a  right  to  employ  both  as  he 
chooses.  We  have  heretofore  seen  that  he  has  no  such  right. 
Obligations  apply  just  as  truly  to  the  mode  of  employing  lei- 
sure and  property,  as  to  the  use  which  a  man  may  make  of  u 
pound  of  arsenic.  The  obligations  are  not  indeed  alike  en 
forced  in  a  court  of  justice  :  the  misuser  of  arsenic  is  carried 
to  prison,  the  misuser  of  time  and  money  av/aits  as  sure  an 
enquiry  at  another  tribunal.     But  no  folly  is  more  absurd  thaa 


CHAP.  XIV.]  AMUSEMENTS.  27$ 

that  of  supposing  we  have  a  right  to  do  whatever  the  law  does 
not  punish.  Such  is  the  state  of  mankind,  so  great  is  the 
amount  of  misery  and  degradation,  and  so  great  are  the  effects 
of  money  and  active  philanthropy  in  meliorating  this  condition 
of  our  species,  that  it  is  no  light  thing  for  a  man  to  employ 
his  time  and  property  upon  vain  and  needless  gratifications. 
It  is  no  light  thing  to  keep  a  pack  of  hounds,  and  to  spend 
days  and  weeks  in  riding  after  them.  As  to  the  torture  which 
field  sports  inflict  upon  animals,  it  is  wonderful  to  observe  our 
inconsistencies.  He  who  has,  in  the  day,  inflicted  upon  half 
a  dozen  animals  almost  as  much  torture  as  they  are  capable 
of  sustaining,  and  who  has  wounded  perhaps  half  a  dozen 
more,  and  left  them  to  die  of  pain  or  starvation,  gives  in  the 
evening  a  grave  reproof  to  his  child,  whom  he  sees  amusing 
himself  with  picking  off  the  wings  of  flies !  The  infliction 
of  pain  is  not  that  which  gives  pleasure  to  the  sportsman,  (this 
were  ferocious  depravity,)  but  he  voluntarily  inflicts  the  pain 
in  order  to  please  himself.  Yet  this  man  sighs  and  moralizes 
over  the  cruelty  of  children !  An  appropriate  device  for  a 
sportsman's  dress  would  be  a  pair  of  balances,  of  which  one 
scale  Avas  laden  with  "  Virtue  and  humanity,"  and  the  other 
with  "  Sport ;"  the  latter  should  be  preponderating  and  lifting 
the  other  into  the  air. 

The  Turf  is  still  worse,  partly  because  it  is  a  stronghold 
of  gambhng,  and  therefore  an  efficient  cause  of  misery  and 
wickedness.  It  is  an  amusement  of  almost  unmingled  evil 
But  upon  whom  is  the  evil  chargeable  ?  Upon  the  fifty  or  one 
hundred  persons  only  who  bring  hordes  and  make  bets  ?  No  ; 
every  man  participates  who  attends  the  course.  The  great 
attraction  of  many  public  spectacles,  and  of  this  amongst 
others,  consists  more  in  the  company  than  in  the  ostensible 
object  of  amusement.  Many  go  to  a  race-ground  who  cannot 
tell  when  they  return  what  horse  has  been  the  victor.  Every 
one  therefore  who  is  present  must  take  his  share  of  the  mis- 
chief and  the  responsibility. 

It  is  the  same  with  respect  to  the  gross  and  vulgar  diver- 
sions of  boxing,  wrestling,  and  feats  of  running  and  riding. 
There  is  the  same  almost  pure  and  unmingled  evil — the  same 
popularity  resulting  from  the  concourses  who  attend,  and,  by 
consequence,  the  participation  and  responsibility  in  those 
who  do  attend.  The  drunkenness,  and  the  profaneness,  and 
the  debauchery,  lie  in  part  at  the  doors  of  those  who  are 
merely  lookers-on ;  and  if  these  lookers-on  make  pretensions 
to  purity  of  character,  their  example  is  so  much  the  more  in- 
fluential and  their  responsibility  tenfold  increased.     Defencea 


874  AMUSEMENTS.  [eSSAY  11. 

of  these  gross  amusements  are  ridiculous.  One  tells  us  of 
keeping  up  the  national  spirit,  which  is  the  same  thing  as  to 
say,  that  a  human  community  is  benefited  by  inducing  into  it 
the  qualities  of  the  bull-dog.  Another  expatiates  upon  invig- 
orating the  muscular  strength  of  the  poor,  as  if  the  English 
poor  were  under  so  little  necessity  to  labour,  and  to  strengthen 
themselves  by  labour,  that  artificial  means  must  be  devised  to 
increase  their  toil. 

The  vicissitudes  of  folly  are  endless  ;  the  vulgar  games  of. 
the  present  day  may  soon  be  displaced  by  others,  the  same  in 
genus,  but  differing  in  species.  At  the  present  moment, 
Wrestling  has  become  the  point  of  interest.  A  man  is  con- 
veyed across  the  kingdom  to  try  whether  he  can  throw  down 
another ;  and  when  he  has  done  it,  grave  narratives  of  the 
feat  are  detailed  in  half  the  newspapers  of  the  country! 
There  is  a  grossness,  a  vulgarity,  a  want  of  mental  elevation 
in  these  things,  which  might  induce  the  man  of  intelligence 
to  reprobate  them  even  if  the  voice  of  morality  were  silent. 
They  are  remains  of  barbarism — evidences  that  barbarism 
still  maintains  itself  amongst  us — proofs  that  the  higher  qual- 
ities of  our  nature  are  not  sufficiently  dominant  over  the  lower. 

These  grossnesses  will  pass  away,  as  the  deadly  conflicts 
of  men  with  beasts  are  passed  already.  Our  posterity  will 
wonder  at  the  barbarism  of  us,  their  fathers,  as  we  wonder  at 
the  barbarism  of  Rome.  Let  him,  then,  who  loves  intellect- 
ual elevation  advance  beyond  the  present  times,  and  anticipate, 
in  the  recreations  which  he  encourages,  that  period  when 
these  diversions  shall  be  regarded  as  indicating  one  of  the  in- 
termediate stages  between  the  ferociousness  of  mental  dark- 
ness and  the  purity  of  mental  light. 


These  criticisms  might  be  extended  to  many  other  species 
of  amusement ;  and  it  is  humiliating  to  discover  that  the  con- 
clusion will  very  frequently  be  the  same — that  the  evil  out- 
balances the  good,  and  that  there  are  no  grounds  upon  which  a 
good  man  can  justify  a  participation  in  them.  In  thus  conclu- 
ding, it  is  possible  that  the  reader  may  imagine  that  we  would 
exclude  enjoyment  from  the  world,  and  substitute  a  system  of 
irreproachable  austerity.  He  who  thinks  this  is  unacquainted 
with  the  nature  and  sources  of  our  better  enjoyments.  It  is 
an  ordinary  mistake  to  imagine  that  pleasure  is  great  only 
when  it  is  vivid  or  intemperate,  as  a  child  fancies  it  were  more 
delightful  to  devour  a  pound  of  sugar  at  once,  than  to  eat  an 
ounce  daily  in  his  food.  It  is  happily  and  kindly  provided 
that  the  greatest  sum  of  enjoyment  is  that  which  is  quietly  and 


CHAP.  XV.]  DUELLING.  ^t9 

constantly  "induced.  No  men  understand  the  nature  of  pleas- 
ure so  well,  or  possess  it  so  much,  as  those  who  find  it  with- 
in their  own  doors.  If  it  were  not  that  Moral  Education  is  so 
bad,  multitudes  would  seek  enjoyment  and  find  it  here,  who 
now  fancy  that  they  never  partake  of  pleasure  except  in 
scenes  of  diversion.  It  is  unquestionably  true  that  no  com- 
munity enjoys  life  more  than  that  which  excludes  all  these 
anmsements  from  its  sources  of  enjoyment.  We  use  there- 
fore the  language,  not  of  speculation,  but  of  experience,  when 
we  say,  that  none  of  them  is,  in  any  degree,  necessary  to  the 
happiness  of  life. 


CHAPTER  XV. 
DUELLING. 


Pitt  and  Tierney — Duelling  tlie  offsprin;?  of  intellectual  meanness,  fear, 
end  servilily — "  A  fighting  man" — Hindoo  immolations — ^Wilberforce 
— Seneca. 

It  is  not  to  much  purpose  to  show  that  this  strange  practice 
is  in  itself  wrong,  because  no  one  denies  it.  Other  grounds 
of  defence  are  taken,  although,  to  be  sure,  there  is  a  plain  ab- 
surdity in  conceding  that  a  thing  is  wrong  in  morals,  and 
then  trying  to  show  that  it  is  proper  to  practise  it. 

Public  notions  exempt  a  clergyman  from  the  "  necessity" 
of  fighting  duels,  and  they  exempt  other  men  from  the  "  neces* 
sity"  of  demanding  satisfaction  for  a  clergyman's  insult. 
Now,  we  ask  the  man  of  honour  whether  he  would  rather 
receive  an  insult  from  a  military  officer  or  from  a  clergyman  ? 
Which  would  give  him  the  greater  pain,  and  cause  him  the 
more  concern  and  uneasiness  ?  That  from  the  military  officer, 
certainly.  But  why  ?  Because  the  officer's  aflfront  leads  to 
a  duel,  and  the  clergyman's  does  not.  So,  then,  it  is  prefer- 
able to  receive  an  insult  to  which  the  "  necessity"  of  fighting 
is  not  attached  than  one  to  which  it  is  attached.  Why  then 
attach  the  necessity  to  any  man's  affront  ?  You  say,  that 
demanding  satisfaction  is  a  remedy  for  the  evil  of  an  insult. 
But  we  see  that  the  evil,  together  with  the  remedy,  is  worse 
than  the  evil  alone.  Why  then  institute  the  remedy  at  all  ? 
It  is  not  indeed  to  be  questioned  that  some  insults  may  be  for* 


270  DUELLING.  [essay  II 

bome,  because  it  is  known  to  what  consequences  'they  lead. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  for  what  purpose  does  one  man  insult 
another  ?  To  give  him  pain ;  now,  we  have  just  seen  that 
the  pain  is  so  much  the  greater  in  consequence  of  the  "  neces- 
sity" of  fighting,  and  therefore  the  motives  to  insult  another 
are  increased.  A  man  who  wishes  to  inflict  pain  upon  another, 
can  inflict  it  more  intensely  in  consequence  of  the  system  of 
duelling. 

The  truth  is,  that  men  fancy  the  system  is  useful,  because 
they  do  not  perceive  how  Public  Opinion  has  been  violently 
turned  out  of  its  natural  and  its  usual  course.  When  a  mili- 
tary man  is  guilty  of  an  insult,  public  disapprobation  fails  but 
lightly  upon  him.  It  reserves  its  force  to  direct  against  the 
insulted  party  if  he  does  not  demand  satisfaction.  But  when 
a  clergyman  is  guilty  of  an  insult,  public  disapprobation  falls 
upon  him  with  undivided  force.  The  insulted  party  receiTcs 
no  censure.  Now,  if  you  take  away  the  custom  of  demand- 
ing satisfaction,  what  will  be  the  result  1  Why,  that  public 
opinion  will  revert  to  its  natural  course  ;  it  will  direct  all  its 
penalties  to  the  offending  party,  and  by  consequence  restrain 
him  from  offending.  It  will  act  towards  all  men  as  it  now 
acts  towards  the  clergy ;  and  if  a  clergyman  were  frequently 
to  be  guilty  of  insults,  his  character  would  be  destroyed. 
The  reader  will  perhaps  more  distinctly  perceive  that  the  fan- 
cied utility  of  duelling  in  preventing  insults,  results  from  this 
misdirection  of  public  opinion  by  this  brief  argument. 

An  individual  either  fears  public  opinion,  or  he  does  not. 

If  he  does  not  fear  it,  the  custom  of  duelling  cannot  prevent 
him  from  insulting  whomsoever  he  pleases  ;  because  public 
opinion  is  the  only  thing  which  makes  men  fight,  and  he  does 
not  regard  it. 

If  he  does  fear  public  opinion,  then  the  most  effectual  way 
of  restraining  him  from  insulting  others,  is  by  directing  that 
opinion  against  the  act  of  insulting — just  as  it  is  now  directed 
in  the  case  of  the  clergy.* 

Thus  it  is  that  we  find — ^what  he  who  knows  the  perfection 
of  Christian  morality  would  expect — that  Duelling  as  it  is 
immoral,  so  it  is  absurd. 

It  appears  to  be  forgotten  that  a  duel  is  not  more  allowable 
to  secure  ourselves  from  censure  or  neglect  than  any  other  vio- 
lation of  the  Moral  Law.  If  these  motives  constitute  a  justi- 
fication of  a  duel,  they  constitute  a  justification  of  robbery  or 
poisoning.  To  advocate  duelling  is  not  to  defend  one  species 
of  offence,  but  to  assert  the  general  right  to  violate  tbe  laws 
•  See  West.  Rev.  No.  7.  Art  2. 


CHAP.  XV,]  DUELLING.  37X- 

of  God.  If,  as  Dr.  Johnson  reasoned,  the  "  notions  which 
prevail"  make  fighting  right,  they  can  make  anything  right. 
Nothing  is  wanted  but  to  alter  the  "  notions  which  prevail," 
and  there  is  not  a  crime  mentioned  in  the  statute-book  that 
will  not  be  lawful  and  honourable  to-morrow. 

It  is  usual  with  those  who  do  foolish  and  vicious  things,  or 
who  do  things  from  foolish  or  vicious  motives,  to  invent  some 
fiction  by  which  to  veil  the  evil  or  folly,  and  to  give  it,  if  pos- 
sible, a  creditable  appearance.  This  has  been  done  in  the 
case  of  duelling.  We  hear  a  great  deal  about  honour,  and 
spirit,  and  courage,  and  other  qualities  equally  pleasant,  and, 
as  it  respects  the  duellist,  equally  fictitious.  The  want  of  suf- 
ficient honour,  and  spirit,  and  courage,  is  precisely  the  very  rea- 
son why  men  fight.  Pitt  fought  with  Tierney  ;  upon  which 
Pitt's  biographer  writes — "  A  mind  like  his,  cast  in  no  common 
mould,  should  have  risen  superior  to  a  low  and  unworthy  pre^ 
judice,  the  folly  of  which  it  must  have  perceived,  and  the 
wickedness  of  which  it  must  have  acknowledged.  Could 
M?\  Pitt  be  led  away  by  that  false  shame  which  subjects  the 
decisions  of  reason  to  the  control  of  fear,  and  renders  the 
admonitions  of  conscience  subservient  to  the  powers  of  ridi- 
cule ?"*  Low  prejudice,  folly,  wickedness,  false  shame,  and 
fear,  are  the  motives  which  the  complacent  duellist  dignifies 
ivith  the  titles  of  honour,  spirit,  courage.  This,  to  be  sure,  is 
very  politic  ;  he  would  not  be  so  silly  as  to  call  his  motives 
by  their  right  names.  Others,  of  course,  join  in  the  chican- 
ery. They  reflect  that  they  themselves  may  one  day  have 
"  a  meeting,"  and  they  wish  to  keep  up  the  credit  of  a  system 
which  they  are  conscious  they  have  not  principle  enough  to 
reject. 

Put  Christianity  out  of  the  question — Would  not  even  the 
philosophy  of  paganism  have  despised  that  littleness  of  prin- 
ciple which  would  not  bear  a  man  up  in  adhering  to  conduct 
w'hich  he  knew  to  be  right — that  littleness  of  principle  which 
sacrifices  the  dictates  of  the  understanding  to  an  unworthy 
fear  ? — When  a  good  man,  rather  than  conform  to  some  vi- 
cious institution  of  the  papacy,  stood  firmly  against  the  frowns 
and  persecutions  of  the  world,  against  obloquy  and  infamy, 
we  say  that  liis  mental  principles  were  great  as  well  as  good. 
If  they  were,  the  principle*  of  the  duellist  are  mean  as  well 
as  vicious.  He  is  afraid  to  be  good  and  great.  He  knows 
the  course  which  dignity  and  virtue  prescribe,  but  he  will  not 
rise  above  those  lower  motives  which  prompt  him  to  deviate 
from  that  course.  It  does  not  afiect  these  conclusions  to  con- 
*  Gifibrd's  Life,  vol.  1,  p.  263. 
24 


278  DtliLLING.  [essay  lU 

cede,  that  he  who  is  afraid  to  refuse  a  challenge  may  generally 
be  a  man  of  elevated  mind.  He  may  be  such  ;  but  his  refu- 
sal is  an  exception  to  his  general  character.  It  is  an  instance 
in  which  he  impeaches  his  consistency  in  excellence.  If  it 
were  consistent,  if  the  whole  mind  had  attained  to  the  right- 
ful stature  of  a  Christian  man,  he  would  assuredly  contemn 
in  his  practice  the  conduct  which  he  disapproved  in  his  heart 
If  you  would  show  us  a  man  of  courage,  bring  forward  hini 
who  will  say,  I  will  not  fight.  Suppose  a  gentleman  who, 
upon  the  principles  which  Gifford  says  should  have  actuated 
Pitt  and  all  great  minds,  had  thus  refused  to  fight,  and  sup- 
pose him  saying  to  his  withdrawing  friends — "  I  have  acted 
with  perfect  deliberation  :  I  knew  all  the  consequences  of  the 
course  I  have  pursued  :  but  I  was  persuaded  that  I  should  act 
most  like  a  man  of  intellect,  as  well  as  like  a  Christian,  by 
declining  the  meeting;  and  therefore  I  declined  it.  I  feel 
and  deplore  the  consequences,  though  I  do  not  deprecate 
them.  I  am  not  fearful,  as  I  have  not  been  fearful ;  for  I 
appeaL  to  yourselves  whether  I  have  not  encountered  the 
more  appalling  alternative — whether  it  does  not  require  a 
greater  effort  to  do  what  I  have  done,  and  what  I  am  at  this 
moment  doing,  than  to  have  met  my  opponent." — Such  a 
man's  magnanimity  might  not  procure  for  him  the  companion,' 
ship  of  his  acquaintance,  but  it  would  do  much  more  ;  it  would 
obtain  the  suffrages  of  their  judgments  and  their  hearts. 
Whilst  they  continued  perhaps  externally  to  neglect  him,  they 
would  internally  honour  and  admire.  They  would  feel  that 
his  excellence  was  of  an  order  to  which  they  could  make  no 
pretensions  ;  and  they  would  feel,  as  they  were  practising 
this  strange  hypocrisy  of  vice,  that  thei/  were  the  proper  ob- 
jects of  contempt  and  pity. 

The  species  of  slavery  to  which  a  man  is  sometimes  re- 
duced by  being,  as  he  calls  it,  "  obliged  to  fight,"  is  really 
pitiable.  A  British  officer  writes  of  a  petulant  and  profligate 
class  of  men,  one  of  whom  is  sometimes  found  in  a  regiment, 
and  says,  "  Sensible  that  an  officer  must  accept  a  challenge, 
he  does  not  hesitate  to  deal  them  in  abundance,  and  shortly 
acquires  the  name  of  a  fighting  man ;  but  as  every  one  is  not 
willing  to  throw  away  his  life  when  called  upon  by  one  who 
is  indifferent  to  his  own,  many  become  condescending,  which 
this  man  immediately  construes  into  fear;  and,  presuming 
upon  this,  he  acts  as  if  he  imagined  no  one  dare  contradict 
him  but  all  must  yield  obedience  to  his  will.^^  Here  the  servile 
bondage  of  which  we  speak  is  brought  prominently  out.  Here 
is  the  crouching  aad  unmanly  fear.     Here  is  the  abject  sub- 


CHAP.  XV.]  DVELLIN0.  27t 

mission  of  sense  and  reason  to  the  grossest  vulgarity  of  inso- 
lence, folly  and  guilt.  The  officer  presently  gives  an  account 
of  an  instance  in  which  the  whole  mess  were  domineered 
over  by  one  of  these  fighting  men ; — and  a  pitiably  ludicrous 
account  it  is.  The  man  had  invited  them  to  dinner  at  some 
distance.  "  On  the  day  appointed,  there  came  on  a  most 
violent  snow  storm,  and  in  the  morning  we  despatched  a  ser- 
vant with  an  apology'."  But  alas  !  these  poor  men  could  not 
use  their  own  judgments  as  to  whether  they  should  ride  in  a 
**  most  violent  snow  storm"  or  not.  The  man  sent  back  some 
rude  message  that  he  "  expected  them."  They  were  afraid 
of  what  the  fighting  man  would  do  next  morning ;  and  so  th© 
whose  mess,  against  their  wills,  actually  rode  "  near  four 
miles  in  a  heavy  snow  storm,  and  passed  a  day,"  says  the 
officer,  "  that  was,  without  exception,  the  most  unpleasant  1 
ever  passed  in  my  life  !"*  In  the  instance  of  these  men,  the 
motives  to  duelling  as  founded  upon  Fear,  operated  so  power- 
fully that  the  officers  were  absolutely  enslaved— driven  against 
their  wills  by  Fear,  as  negroes  are  by  a  cart-whip. 

We  are  shocked  and  disgusted  at  the  immolation  of  women 
amongst  the  Hindoos,  and  think  that,  if  such  a  sacrifice  were 
attempted  in  England,  it  would  excite  feelings  of  the  utmost 
repulsion  and  abhorrence.  Of  the  custom  of  immolation, 
Duelling  is  the  sister.  Their  parents  are  the  same,  and,  like 
other  sisters,  their  lineaments  are  similar.  Why  does  a 
Hindoo  mount  the  funeral  pile  ?  To  vindicate  and  maintain 
her  honour.  AVhy  does  an  Englishman  go  to  the  heath  with 
his  pistols  ?  To  vindicate  and  maintain  his  honour.  W^hat  is 
the  nature  and  character  of  the  Hindoo's  honour  ?  Quite  fac- 
titious. Of  the  duellist's?  Quite  factitious.  How  is  the 
motive  applied  to  the  Hindoo?  To  her  fears  of  reproach. 
To  the  duellist?  To  his  fears  of  reproach.  What  then  is 
the  difference  between  the  two  customs  ?  This — that  one  is 
practised  in  the  midst  of  pagan  darkness,  and  the  other  in  the 
midst  of  Christian  light.  And  yet  these  very  men  give  their 
guineas  to  the  Missionary  Society,  lament  the  degradation  of 
the  Hindoos,  and  expatiate  upon  the  sacred  duty  of  enlighten- 
ing them  with  Christianity !    "  Physician  !  heal  thyself.''* 

One  consideration  connected  with  duelling  is  of  unusual 
interest.  "  In  the  judgment  of  that  religion  which  requires 
purity  of  heart,  and  of  that  Being  to  whom  thought  is  action, 
he  cannot  be  esteemed  innocent  of  this  crime,  who  lives  in  a 
settled,  habitual,  determination  to  commit  it,  when  circum- 
stances shall  call  upon  him  so  to  do.  This  is  a  considera- 
*  lieut.  Attburey :  Travels  in  North  America. 


280'  SUICIDE.  [essay,  ii. 

tion  which  places  the  crime  of  duelling  on  a  different  footing 
from  almost  any  other;  indeed  there  is  perhaps  no  other, 
which  mankind  habitually  and  deliberately  resolve  to  practise 
whenever  the  temptation  shall  occur.  It  shows  also  that  the 
crime  of  duelling  is  far  more  general  in  the  higher  classes 
than  is  commonly  supposed,  and  that  the  whole  sum  of  the 
guilt  which  the  practice  produces,  is  great  beyond  what  has 
perhaps  been  ever  conceived."* 

"It  is  the  intention,"  says  Seneca,  "and  not  the  effect 
which  makes  the  wickedness  :"  and  that  Greater  than  Seneca 
who  laid  the  axe  to  the  root  of  our  vices,  who  laid  upon  the 
mental  disposition  that  guilt  which  had  been  laid  upon  the 
act,  may  be  expected  to  regard  this  habitual  willingness  and 
intention  to  violate  his  laws,  as  an  actual  and  great  offence. 
The  felon  who  plans  and  resolves  to  break  into  a  house,  is 
not  the  less  a  felon  because  a  watchman  happens  to  prevent 
him ;  nor  is  the  offence  of  him  who  happens  never  to  be 
challenged,  necessarily  at  all  less  than  that  of  him  who  takes 
the  life  of  his  friend. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

SUICIDE. 


Unmanliness  of  Suicide — Forbidden  in  the  New  Testament — Its  folly- 
Legislation  respecting  suicide — Verdict  of  Felo  de  se. 

There  are  few  subjects  upon  which  it  is  more  difficult 
either  to  write  or  to  legislate  with  effect,  than  that  of  Suicide. 
It  is  difficult  to  a  writer,  because  a  man  does  not  resolve  upon 
the  act  until  he  has  first  become  steeled  to  some  of  the  most 
powerful  motives  that  can  be  urged  upon  the  human  mind ; 
and  to  the  legislator,  because  he  can  inflict  no  penalty  upon 
the  offending  party. 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  there  is  little  probability  of  diminish- 
ing the  frequency  of  this  miserable  offence  by  urging  the 
considerations  which  philosophy  suggests.  The  voice  of 
nature  is  louder  and  stronger  than  the  voice  of  philosophy ; 
and  as  nature  speaks  to  the  suicide  in  vain,  what  is  the  hope 
that  philosophy  will  be  regarded  ? — There  appears  to  be  but 

*  Wilberforce :  Practical  View,  c.  4.  s.  3. 


CHAP.  XVI.]  SUICIDE.  281 

one  efficient  means  by  which  the  mind  can  be  armed  against 
the  temptations  to  suicide,  because  there  is  bat  one  that  can 
support  it  against  ex)ery  evil  of  life — practical  religion — belief 
in  the  providence  of  God — confidence  in  his  wisdom — hope 
in  his  goodness.  The  only  anchor  that  can  hold  us  in  safety, 
is  that  which  is  fixed  "  within  the  vail."  Ke  upon  whom 
religion  possesses  its  proper  influence,  finds  that  it  enables 
him  to  endure,  with  resigned  patience,  every  calamity  of  life. 
When  patience  thus  fulfils  its  perfect  work,  suicide,  which  is 
the  result  of  impatience,  cannot  be  committed.  He  who  is 
surrounded,  by  whatever  means,  with  pain  or  misery,  should 
remember  that  the  present  existence  is  strictly  probationary — 
a  scene  upon  which  we  are  to  be  exercised,  and  tried,  and 
tempted ;  and  in  which  we  are  to  manifest  whether  we  are 
willing  firmly  to  endure.  The  good  or  evil  of  the  present 
life  is  of  importance  chiefly  as  it  influences  our  allotment  in 
futurity  :  sufferings  are  permitted  for  our  advantage  :  they  are 
designed  to  purify  and  rectify  the  heart.  The  universal 
Father  "  scourgeth  every  son  whom  he  receiveth ;"  and  the 
suflfering,  the  scourging,  is  of  little  account  in  comparison 
with  the  prospects  of  another  world.  It  is  not  worthy  to  be 
compared  with  the  glory  which  shall  follow — that  glory  of 
which  an  exceeding  and  eternal  weight  is  the  reward  of  a 
^^  patient  continuance  in  well  doing."  To  him  who  thus  re- 
gards misery,  not  as  an  evil  but  as  a  good  ;  not  as  the  unre- 
strained assault  of  chance  or  malice,  but  as  the  beneficent 
discipline  of  a  Father  ;  to  him  who  remembers  that  the  time 
is  approaching  in  which  he  will  be  able  most  feelingly  to  say, 
"  For  all  I  bless  Thee — most  for  the  severe" — every  afiiiction 
is  accompanied  with  its  proper  alleviation  :  the  present  hour 
may  distress  but  it  does  not  overwhelm  him  ;  he  may  be  per- 
plexed but  is  not  in  despair :  he  sees  the  darkness  and  feels 
the  storm,  but  he  knows  that  light  will  again  arise,  and  that 
the  storm  will  eventually  be  hushed  with  an  efficacious,  "Peace 
be  still;" so  that  there  shall  be  a  great  calm. 

Compared  with  these  motives  to  avoid  the  first  promptings 
to  suicide,  others  are  likely  to  be  of  little  effect ;  and  yet  they 
are  neither  inconsiderable  nor  few.  It  is  more  dignified, 
more  worthy  an  enlightened  and  manly  understanding,  to 
meet  and  endure  an  inevitable  evil  than  to  sink  beneath  it. 
The  case  of  him  who  feels  prompted  to  suicide,  is  something 
like  that  of  the  duellist  as  it  was  illustrated  in  the  preceding 
chapter.  Each  sacrifices  his  life  to  his  fears.  The  suicide 
balances  between  opposing  objects  of  dread,  (for  dreadful  self- 
destruction  must  be  supposed  to  be,)  and  chooses  the  altema- 

24* 


282  BtJiciDt:.  [essay  if. 

live  which  he  fears  least.  If  his  courage,  his  firmness,  his 
manliness,  were  greater,  he  who  chooses  the  alternative  of 
suicide,  like  him  who  chooses  the  duel,  would  endure  the 
evil  rather  than  avoid  it  in  a  manner  which  dignity  and  reli- 
gion forbid.  The  lesson  too  which  the  self-destroyer  teaches 
to  his  connexions,  of  sinking  in  despair  under  the  evils  of 
life,  is  one  of  the  most  pernicious  which  a  man  can  bequeath. 
The  pow^r  of  the  example  is  also  great.  Every  act  of  sui- 
cide tacitly  conveys  the  sanction  of  one  more  judgment  in  its 
favour:  frequency  of  repetition  diminishes  the  sensation  of 
abhorrence,  and  makes  succeeding  sufferers  resort  to  it  with 
less  reluctance.  "  Besides  which  general  reasons,  each  case 
will  be  aggravated  by  its  own  proper  and  particular  conse- 
quences ;  by  the  duties  that  are  deserted ;  by  the  claims  that 
are  defrauded ;  by  the  loss,  affliction,  or  disgrace  which  our 
death,  or  the  manner  of  it,  causes  our  family,  kindred,  or 
friends ;  by  the  occasion  we  give  to  many  to  suspect  the 
sincerity  of  our  moral  religious  professions,  and,  together 
with  ours,  those  of  all  others  ;"*  and  lastly,  by  the  scandal 
which  we  bring  upon  religion  itself  by  declaring,  practically, 
that  it  is  not  able  to  support  man  under  the  calamities  of  life. 

Some  men  say  that  the  New  Testament  contains  no  prohi- 
bition of  suicide.  If  this  were  true,  it  would  avail  nothing, 
because  there  are  many  things  which  it  does  not  forbid,  but 
which  every  one  knows  to  be  wicked.  But  in  reality  it  does 
forbid  it.  Every  exhortation  which  it  gives  to  be  patient, 
every  encouragement  to  trust  in  God,  every  consideration 
which  it  urges  as  a  support  under  affliction  and  distress,  is  a 
virtual  prohibition  of  suicide ; — ^because,  if  a  man  commits 
suicide,  he  rejects  every  such  advice  and  encouragement,  and 
disregards  every  such  motive. 

To  him  who  believes  either  in  revealed  or  natural  religion, 
there  is  a  certain  yb//y  in  the  commission  of  suicide  ;  for  from 
what  does  he  fly  ?  From  his  present  sufferings  ;  whilst  death, 
for  aught  that  he  has  reason  to  expect,  or  at  any  rate  for  aught 
that  he  knows,  may  only  be  the  portal  to  sufferings  more 
intense.  Natural  religion,  I  think,  gives  no  countenance  to 
the  supposition  that  suicide  can  be  approved  by  the  Deity, 
because  it  proceeds  upon  the  belief  that,  in  another  state  of 
existence,  he  will  compensate  good  men  for  the  sufferings  of 
the  present.  At  the  best,  and  under  either  religion,  it  is  a 
desperate  stake.  He  that  commits  murder  may  repent,  and 
we  hope,  be  forgiven ;  but  he  that  destroys  himself,  whilst  he 
*  Mor,  and  Pol.  Phil,  b.  4,  a  3, 


CHAP.  XVI.]  StJIClDB.  283 

incurs  a  load  of  guilt,  cuts  off,  by  the  act,  the  power  of  re- 
pentance. 

Not  every  act  of  suicide  is  to  be  attributed  to  excess  of 
misery.  Some  shoot  themselves  or  throw  themselves  into  a 
river  in  rage  or  revenge,  in  order  to  inflict  pain  and  remorse 
upon  those  who  have  ill  used  them.  Such,  it  is  to  be  sus- 
pected, is  sometimes  a  motive  to  self-destruction  in  disap- 
pointed love.  The  unhappy  person  leaves  behind  some  mes- 
sage or  letter,  in  the  hope  of  exciting  that  affection  and  com- 
miseration by  the  catastrophe,  which  he  could  not  excite 
when  alive.  Perhaps  such  persons  hope,  too,  that  the  world 
will  sigh  over  their  early  fate,  tell  of  the  fidelity  of  their  loves, 
end  throw  a  romantic  melancholy  over  their  story.  This 
needs  not  to  be  a  subject  of  wonder :  unnumbered  multitudes 
nave  embraced  death  in  other  forms  from  kindred  motives. 
We  hear  continually  of  those  who  die  for  the  sake  of  glory. 
This  is  but  another  phantom,  and  the  less  amiable  phantom 
of  the  two.  It  is  just  as  reasonable  to  die  in  order  that  the 
world  may  admire  our  true  love,  as  in  order  that  it  may  ad- 
mire our  bravery.  And  the  lover's  hope  is  the  better  founded. 
There  are  too  many  aspirants  for  glory  for  each  to  get  even 
his  "peppercorn  of  praise."  But  the  lover  may  hope  for 
higher  honours  ;  a  paragraph  may  record  his  fate  through  the 
existence  of  a  weekly  paper ;  he  may  be  talked  of  through 
half  a  county ;  and  some  kindred  spirit  may  inscribe  a  tribu- 
tary sonnet  in  a  lady's  album. 


To  legislate  efficiently  upon  the  crime  of  suicide  is  difficult, 
if  it  is  not  impossible.  As  the  legislator  cannot  inflict  a 
penalty  upon  the  offender,  the  act  must  pass  with  impunity 
unless  the  penalty  is  made  to  fall  upon  the  innocent.  I  say 
the  penalty ;  for  such  it  would  actually  be,  whatever  were 
the  provision  of  the  law — whether,  for  instance,  confiscation 
of  property,  or  indignity  to  the  remains  of  the  dead.  One 
would  make  a  family  poor,  and  the  other  perhaps  unhappy. 
It  does  not  appear  just  or  reasonable  that  these  should  suffer 
for  an  offence  which  they  could  not  prevent,  and  by  wliich 
they,  above  all  others,  are  already  injured  and  distressed. 

One  thing  appears  to  be  clear,  that  it  is  vain  for  a  Legisla- 
ture to  attempt  any  interference  of  which  the  people  do  not 
approve.  This  is  evident  from  the  experience  in  our  own 
country,  where  coroner's  juries  prefer  perjuring  themselves 
to  pronouncing  a  verdict  of  felo  de  se,  by  which  the  remains 
would  be  subjected  to  barbarous  indignities.  Coroners'  in- 
quests seem  to  proceed  rather  upon  the  pre-supposition  that  he 


284  SUICIDE.  [essat  II. 

who  destroys  himself  is  insane,  than  upon  the  evidence  which 
is  brought  before  them  ;  and  thus,  whilst  the  law  is  evaded, 
perjury  it  is  to  be  feared  is  very  frequent.  That  the  public 
mind  disapproves  the  existing  law  is  a  good  reason  for  alter- 
ing it ;  but  it  is  not  a  good  reason  why  coroners'  juries  should 
violate  their  oaths,  and  give  encouragement  to  the  suicide  by 
telling  him  that  disgrace  will  be  warded  off  from  his  memory 
and  from  his  family  by  a  generous  verdict  of  insanity.  It 
has  been  said  that  it  is  a  common  thing  for  a  suicide's  friends 
to  fee  the  coroner  in  order  to  induce  him  to  prevent  a  verdict 
of  felo  de  se.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  indeed  time  that  the  arm 
of  the  law  should  be  vigorously  extended.  What  punishment 
is  due  to  the  man  who  accepts  a  purse  as  a  reward  for  indu- 
cing twelve  persons  to  commit  perjury  1  It  is  probable  too, 
that  half-a-dozen  just  verdicts,  by  which  the  law  was  allowed 
to  take  its  course,  would  occasion  the  abolition  of  the  disgust- 
ing statute  ;*  for  the  public  would  not  bear  that  it  should  be 
acted  upon. 

The  great  object  is  to  associate  with  the  act  of  suicide 
ideas  of  guilt  and  horror  in  the  public  mind.  This  associa- 
tion would  be  likely  to  preclude,  in  individuals,  i\idX  first  com- 
placent contemplation  of  the  act  which  probably  precedes,  by 
a  long  interval,  the  act  itself.  The  anxiety  which  the  survi- 
ving friends  manifest  for  a  verdict  of  "  insanity,"  is  a  proof 
how  great  is  the  power  of  imagination,  and  how  much  they 
are  in  dread  of  public  opinion.  They  are  anxious  that  the 
disgrace  and  reproach  of  conscious  self-murder  should  not 
cling  to  their  family.  This  is  precisely  that  anxiety  of  which 
the  legislator  should  avail  himself,  by  enactments  that  would 
require  satisfactory  proof  of  insanity,  and  which,  in  default  of 
such  proof,  would  leave  to  its  full  force  the  stigma  and  the 
pain,  and  excite  a  sense  of  horror  of  the  act,  and  a  perception  of 
its  wickedness  in  the  public  mind.  The  point  for  the  exercise 
of  legislative  wisdom  is,  to  devise  such  an  ultimate  procedure 
as  shall  call  forth  these  feelings,  but  as  shall  not  become  nu- 
gatory by  being  more  dreadful  than  the  public  will  endure. — 
What  that  procedure  should  be,  I  pretend  not  to  describe  ;  but 
it  may  be  observed  that  the  simple  circumstance  of  pronounc- 
ing a  public  verdict  of  conscious  self-murder,  would,  amongst 
a  people  of  good  feelings,  go  far  towards  the  production  of  the 
desired  effect. — As  the  law  now  exists,  and  as  it  is  now  vio- 
lated, the  tendency  is  exactly  the  contrary  of  what  it  ought  to 

*  This  statute  has  been  repealed ;  and  the  law  now  simply  requires, 
when  a  verdict  of  felo  de  se  is  returned,  that  the  body  shall  be  interred 
privately,  at  night,  and  without  the  funeral  service.     Ed. 


CHAP.  XVII.]  RIGHTS    OP    SELF-DEFEN^CE.  285 

be.  By  the  almost  universal  custom  which  it  generates,  of 
declaring  suicides  to  have  been  insane,  it  effectually  diminishes 
thr.t  pain  to  individuals,  and  that  horror  in  the  public,  which 
the  crime  itself  would  naturally  occasion. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

RIGHTS  OF  SELF-DEFENCE. 


These  rigrhts  not  absolute — Their  limits — Personal  attack — Preservation 
of  property — Much  resistance  lawful — Effects  of  forbearance — Sharpe 
— Barclay — Ellvvood. 

The  right  of  defending  ourselves  against  violence  is  easily 
deducible  from  the  Law  of  Nature.  There  is  however  little 
need  to  deduce  it,  because  mankind  are  at  least  sufficiently 
persuaded  of  its  lawfulness. — The  great  question,  which  the 
opinions  and  principles  that  now  influence  the  world  makes  it 
needful  to  discuss  is,  Whether  the  right  of  self-defence  is  ab- 
solute and  unconditional — Whether  every  action  whatever  is 
lawful,  provided  it  is  necessary  to  the  preservation  of  life  ? 
They  who  maintain  the  afllrmative,  maintain  a  great  deal;  for 
they  maintain  that  whenever  life  is  endangered,  all  rules  of 
morality  are,  as  it  respects  the  individual,  suspended,  annihi- 
lated :  every  moral  obligation  is  taken  away  by  the  single  fact 
that  life  is  threatened. 

Yet  the  language  that  is  ordinarily  held  upon  the  subject 
implies  the  supposition  of  all  this.  "  If  our  lives  are  threat- 
ened with  assassination  or  open  violence  from  the  hands  of  rob- 
bers or  enemies,  any  means  of  defence  would  be  allowed, 
and  laudable."*  Again,  "  There  is  one  case  in  which  all  ex- 
tremities are  justifiable,  namely,  when  our  life  is  assaulted, 
and  it  becomes  necessary  for  our  preservation  to  kill  the  as- 
sailant."! 

The  reader  may  the  more  willingly  enquire  whether  these 
propositions  are  true,  because  most  of  those  who  lay  them 
down  are  at  little  pains  to  prove  their  truth.  Men  are  ex- 
tremely willing  to  acquiesce  in  it  without  proof,  and  writers 
and  speakers  think  it  unnecessary  to  adduce  it.     Thus  per- 

*  Grotius :  Rights  of  War  and  Peace.  t  Paley :  Mor.  and 

Pol.  Phil,  p  3,  b.  iv.  c.  1. 


886  HIGHTS    OF    SELF-DEFENCE.  [eSSaY  II. 

haps  it  happens  that  fallacy  is  not  detected  because  it  is  not 
sought. — If  the  reader  should  think  that  some  of  the  instances 
which  follow  are  remote  from  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  he 
is  requested  to  remember  that  we  are  discussing  the  sound- 
ness of  an  alleged  absolute  rule.  If  it  be  found  that  there  are 
or  have  been  cases  in  which  it  is  not  absolute — cases  in 
which  all  extremities  are  not  lawful  in  defence  of  life — ^then 
the  rule  is  not  sound :  then  there  are  some  limits  to  the  Right 
of  Self-Defence. 

If  "  any  means  of  defence  are  laudable,"  if  "  all  extremi- 
ties are  justifiable,"  then  they  are  not  confined  to  acts  of  re- 
sistance to  the  assailing  party.  There  may  be  other  condi- 
tions upon  which  life  may  be  preserved  than  that  of  violence 
towards  him.  Some  ruffians  seize  a  man  in  the  highway,  and 
will  kill  him  unless  he  will  conduct  them  to  his  neighbour's 
property  and  assist  them  in  carrying  it  oflT.  May  this  man 
unite  with  them  in  the  robbery  in  order  to  save  his  life,  or 
may  he  not  1  If  he  may,  what  becomes  of  the  law.  Thou 
shalt  not  steal  ?  If  he  may  not,  then  not  every  means  by 
which  a  man  may  preserve  his  life  is  "  laudable"  or  "  allowed." 
We  have  found  an  exception  to  the  rule.  There  are  twenty 
other  wicked  things  which  violent  men  may  make  the  sole 
condition  of  not  taking  our  lives.  Do  all  wicked  things  be- 
come lawful  because  life  is  at  stake  ?  If  they  do.  Morality  is 
surely  at  an  end :  if  they  do  not,  such  propositions  as  those 
of  Grotius  and  Paley  are  untrue. 

A  pagan  has  unalterably  resolved  to  offer  me  up  in  sacrifice 
on  the  morrow,  unless  I  will  acknowledge  the  deity  of  his 
gods  and  worship  them.  I  shall  presume  that  the  Christian 
will  regard  these  acts  as  being,  under  every  possible  circum- 
stance, unlawful.  The  night  offers  me  an  opportunity  of  as- 
sassinating him.  Now  I  am  placed,  so  far  as  the  argument 
is  concerned,  in  precisely  the  same  situation  with  respect  to 
this  man,  as  a  traveller  is  with  respect  to  a  ruffian  with  a  pis- 
tol. Life  in  both  cases  depends  on  killing  the  offender. — 
Both  are  acts  of  self-defence.  Am  I  at  liberty  to  assassinate 
this  man?  The  heart  of  the  Christian  surely  answers.  No. 
Here  then  is  a  case  in  which  I  may  not  take  a  violent  man's 
life  in  order  to  save  my  own. — We  have  said  that  the  heart  of 
the  Christian  answers,  No :  and  this  we  think  is  a  just  spe- 
cies of  appeal.  But  if  any  one  doubts  whether  the  assassina- 
tion would  be  unlawful,  let  him  consider  whether  one  of  the 
Christian  apostles  would  have  committed  it  in  such  a  case. 
Here,  at  any  rate,  the  heart  of  every  man  answers.  No.  And 
mark  the  reason — ^because  every  man  perceives  that  the  act 


CHAP.   XVII.]  RIGHTS    OF    SELF-DEFENCE.  287 

would  have  been  palpably  inconsistent  with  the  apostolic  charac- 
ter and  conduct ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  with  a  Chris' 
tian  character  and  conduct. 

Or  put  such  a  case  in  a  somewhat  different  form.  A  furi- 
ous Turk  holds  a  scimitar  over  my  head,  and  declares  he  will 
instantly  dispatch  me  unless  I  abjure  Christianity  and  ac- 
knowledge the  divine  legation  of  "the  Prophet."  Now  there 
are  two  supposable  ways  in  which  I  may  save  my  life ;  one 
by  contriving  to  stab  the  Turk,  and  one  "  by  denying  Christ 
before  men."  You  say  I  am  not  at  liberty  to  deny  Christ, 
but  I  am  at  liberty  to  stab  the  man.  Why  am  I  not  at  liberty 
to  deny  Him  ?  Because  Christianity  forbids  it.  Then  we 
require  you  to  show  that  Christianity  does  not  forbid  you  to 
take  his  life.  Our  religion  pronounces  both  actions  to  be 
wrong.  You  say  that,  under  these  circumstances,  the  killing 
is  right.  Where  is  your  proof  ?  What  is  the  ground  of  your 
distinction  ? — But,  whether  it  can  be  adduced  or  not,  our  im- 
mediate argument  is  established — That  there  are  some  things 
which  it  is  not  lawful  to  do  in  order  to  preserve  our  lives. — 
This  conclusion  has  indeed  been  practically  acted  upon.  A 
company  of  inquisitors  and  their  agents  are  about  to  conduct 
a  good  man  to  the  stake.  If  he  could  by  any  means  destroy 
these  men,  he  might  save  his  life.  It  is  a  question  therefore  of 
self-defence.  Supposing  these  means  to  be  within  his  power 
— supposing  he  could  contrive  a  mine,  and  by  suddenly  firing 
it,  blow  his  persecutors  into  the  air — would  it  be  lawful  and 
Christian  thus  to  act?  No.  The  comrnon  judgments  of  man- 
kind respecting  the  right  temper  and  conduct  of  the  martyr, 
pronounce  it  to  be  wrong.  It  is  pronounced  to  be  wrong  by 
the  language  and  example  of  the  first  teachers  of  Christianity. 
The  conclusion  therefore  again  is  that  all  extremities  are  not 
allowable  in  order  to  preserve  life ; — that  there  is  a  limit  to 
the  right  of  self-defence. 

It  would  be  to  no  purpose  to  say  that  in  some  of  the  in- 
stances which  have  been  proposed,  religions  duties  interfere 
with  and  limit  the  rights  of  self-defence.  This  is  a  common 
fallacy.  Religious  duties  and  moral  duties  are  identical  in 
point  of  obligation,  for  they  are  imposed  by  one  authority. 
Religious  duties  are  not  obligatory  for  any  other  reason  than 
that  which  attaches  to  moral  duties  also ;  namely  the  Will  of 
God.  He  who  violates  the  Moral  Law  is  as  truly  unfaithful 
in  his  allegiance  to  God,  as  he  who  denies  Christ  before  men. 

So  that  we  come  at  last  to  one  single  and  simple  question, 
whether  taking  the  life  of  a  person  who  threatens  ours,  is  oy 
is  not  compatible  with  the  Moral  Law.     We  refer  for  an  an- 


288  RIGHTS    OF    SELF-DEFENCE.  [eSSAY  II. 

swer  to  the  broad  principles  of  Christian  piety  and  Christian 
benevolence ;  that  piety  which  reposes  habitual  confidence 
in  the  Divine  Providence,  and  an  habitual  preference  of  futu- 
rity to  the  present  time  ;  and  that  benevolence  which  not  only 
loves  our  neighbours  as  ourselves,  but  feels  that  the  Samari- 
tan or  the  enemy  is  a  neighbour.  There  is  no  conjecture  in 
life  in  which  the  exercise  of  this  benevolence  may  be  sus- 
pended ;  none  in  which  we  are  not  required  to  maintain  and 
to  practise  it.  Whether  Want  implores  our  compassion,  or 
Ingratitude  returns  ill  for  our  kindness  ;  whether  a  fellow 
creature  is  drowning  in  a  river  or  assailing  us  on  the  high- 
way ;  every  where,  and  under  ail  circumstances,  the  duty 
remains. 

Is  killing  an  assailant,  then,  within  or  without  the  limits  of 
this  Benevolence  ? — iVs  to  the  man,  it  is  evident  that  no 
good-will  is  exercised  towards  him  by  shooting  him  through 
the  head.  Who  indeed  will  dispute  that,  before  we  can 
thus  destroy  him,  benevolence  towards  him  must  be  excluded 
from  our  minds  ?  We  not  only  exercise  no  benevolence  our- 
selves, but  preclude  him  from  receiving  it  from  any  human 
heart ;  and,  which  is  a  serious  item  in  the  account,  we  cut 
him  off  from  all  possibility  of  reformation.  To  call  sinners 
to  repentance,  was  one  of  the  great  characteristics  of  the 
mission  of  Christ.  Does  it  appear  consistent,  with  this  char- 
acteristic for  one  of  His  followers  to  take  away  from  a  sinner 
the  power  of  repentance  ?  Is  it  an  act  that  accords,  and  is 
congruous,  with  Christian  love  ? 

But  an  argument  has  been  attempted  here.  That  we  may 
"  kill  the  assailant  is  evident  in  a  state  of  nature,  unless  it 
can  be  shown  that  we  are  bound  to  prefer  the  aggressor's  life 
to  our  own ;  that  is  to  say,  tc  love  our  enemy  better  than  our- 
selves, which  can  never  be  a  debt  of  justice,  nor  any  where 
appears  to  be  a  duty  of  charity."  *  The  answer  is  this  :  That 
although  we  may  not  be  required  to  love  our  enemy  better 
than  ourselves,  we  are  required  to  love  him  as  ourselves ;  and 
therefore,  in  the  supposed  case,  it  would  still  be  a  question 
equally  balanced  which  life  ought  to  be  sacrificed  ;  for  it  is 
quite  clear  that,  if  we  kill  the  assailant,  we  love  him  less  than 
ourselves,  which  does  seem  to  militate  against  a  duty  of  char- 
ity. But  the  truth  is  that  he  who,  from  motives  of  obedience 
to  the  will  of  God,  spares  the  aggressor's  life  even  to  the  en- 
dangering hi^  own,  does  exercise  love  both  to  the  aggressor 
and  to  himself,  perfectly :  to  the  aggressor,  because  by  spa- 
ring his  life  we  give  him  the  opportunity  of  repentance  and 
*  Paley :  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil,  p  3,  b.  4.  c.  1. 


CHAP.  XVII."!  RIGHTS    OP    SELF-DEFENCfi.  289 

amendment :  to  Wmself,  because  every  act  of  obedience  to 
Qod  is  perfect  benevolence  towards  ourselves  ;  it  is  consult- 
ing and  promoting  our  most  valuable  interests  ;  it  is  propitia- 
ting the  favour  of  him  who  is  emphatically  "a  rich  rewarder." 
— So  that  the  question  remains  as  before,  not  whether  we 
should  love  our  enemy  better  than  ourselves,  but  whether 
Christian  principles  are  acted  upon  in  destroying  him  ;  and  if 
they  are  not,  whether  we  should  prefer  Christianity  to  our- 
selves ;  whether  we  should  be  willing  to  lose  our  life  for 
Christ's  sake  and  the  gospel's. 

Perhaps  it  will  be  said  that  we  should  exercise  benevo- 
lence to  the  public  as  well  as  to  the  offender,  and  that  we  may 
exercise  more  benevolence  to  them  by  killing  than  by  sparing 
him.  But  very  few  persons,  when  they  kill  a  man  who  at- 
tacks them,  kill  him  out  of  benevolence  to  the  public.  That 
is  not  the  motive  which  influences  their  conduct,  or  which 
they  at  all  take  into  the  account.  Besides,  it  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  the  public  would  lose  anything  by  the  forbear- 
ance. To  be  sure,  a  man  can  do  no  more  mischief  after  he 
is  killed  ;  but  then  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  robbers  are 
more  desperate  and  more  murderous  from  the  apprehension  of 
swords  and  pistols  than  they  would  be  without  it.  Men  are 
desperate  in  proportion  to  their  apprehensions  of  danger. 
The  plunderer  who  feels  a  confidence  that  his  own  life  will 
not  be  taken,  may  conduct  his  plunder  with  comparative  gen- 
tleness ;  whilst  he  who  knows  that  his  life  is  in  immediate 
jeopardy,  stuns  or  murders  his  victim  lest  he  should  be  killed 
himself.  The  great  evil  which  a  family  sustains  by  a  rob- 
bery is  often  not  the  loss,  but  the  terror  and  the  danger ;  and 
these  are  the  evils  which,  by  the  exercise  of  forbearance, 
would  be  diminished.  So  that,  if  some  bad  men  are  pre- 
vented from  committing  robberies  by  the  fear  of  death,  the 
public  gains  in  other  ways  by  the  forbearance  :  nor  is  it  by 
any  means  certain  that  the  balance  of  advantages  is  in  favour 
of  the  more  violent  course. -^The  argument  which  we  are 
opposing  proceeds  on  the  supposition  that  our  own  lives  are 
endangered.  Now  it  is  a  fact  that  this  very  danger  results, 
in  part,  from  the  want  of  habits  of  forbearance;  We  publicly 
profess  that  we  would  kill  an  assailant ;  and  the  assailant, 
knowing  this,  prepares  to  kill  us  when  otherwise  he  would 
forbear. 

And  after  all,  if  it  were  granted  that  a  person  is  at  liberty 

to  take  an  assailant's  life  in  order  to  preserve  his  own,  how  is 

he  to  know,  in  the  majority  of  instances,  whether  his  own 

would  be  taken  ?     When  a  man  breaks  into  a  person's  house, 

^25 


2-00  Rights  of  sELF-DErENCE.  [essay  ii. 

and  this  person,  as  soon  as  he  comes  up  with  the  robber, 
takes  out  a  pistol  and  shoots  hirn,  we  are  not  to  be  told  that 
this  man  was"  killed  "  in  defence  of  life."  Or  go  a  step  fur- 
ther, and  a  step  further  stilly  by  which  the  intention  of  the 
robber  to  commit  personal  violence  or  inflict  death  is  more 
and  more  probable :-— You  must  at  last  shoot  him  in  uncer- 
tainty whether  your  life  was  endangered  or  not.  Besides, 
you  can  withdraw — ^you  can  fly.  None  but  the  predeter- 
mined muYdereY  wishes  to  commit  murder.  But  perhaps  you 
exclaim — "  Fly  !  fly,  and  leave  your  property,  unprotected  !" 
Yes — unless  you  mean  to  say.  thrt  preservation  of  property, 
as  well  as  preservation  of  life,  makes  it  lawful  to  kill  an 
oifender.  .  This  were  to  adopt  a  nev/  and  a  very  difierent 
proposition;  but  a  proposition  vrhich  I  suspect  cannot  be 
separated  in  practice  from  the  former.  He  who  affirms  that 
he  may  kill  another  in  order  to  preserve  his  life,  and  that  he 
may  endanger  his  life  in  order  to  protect  his  property,  does 
in  reality  aflEirm  that  he  may  kill  another  in  order  to  preserve 
his  property.  But  such  a  prcpocition,  in  an  unconditional 
form,  no  one  surely  will  tolerate.  The  laws  of  the  land  do 
not  admit  it,  nor  do  they  even  admit  the  right  of  taking  an- 
other's life  simply  because  he  is  attempting  to  take  ours. 
Thsy  require  that  we  should  be  tender  even  of  the  murderer's 
life,  and  that^e  should  fly  rather  than  destroy  it.* 

We  say  that  the  proposition  that  we  may  take  life  in  order 
to  preserve  our  property  is  intolerable.  To  preserve  how 
much  ?  five  hundred  pounds,  or  fifty,  or  ten,  or  a  shilling  or  a 
cixpence  ?  It  has  actually  been  declared  that  the  rights  of 
self-defence  "justify  a  man  in  taking  all  forcible  methods 
which  are  necessary,  in  order  to  procure  the  restitution  of 
the  freedom  or  the  property  of  which  he  had  been  unjustly 
deprived."!  All  forcible  methods  to  obtain  restitution  of  pro- 
perty !  No  limit  to  the  nature  or  effects  of  the  force  !  No 
limit  to  the  insignificance  of  the  amount  of  the  property ! 
Apply,  then,  the  rule.  A  boy  snatches  a  bunch  of  giapes 
from  a  fruiterer's  stall.  The  fruiterer  runs  after  the  thief, 
but  finds  that  he  is  too  light  of  foot  to  be  overtaken.  More- 
over, the  boy  eats  as  he  runs.  "  All  forcible  methods,"  rea- 
sons the  fruiterer,  "  are  justifiable  to  obtain  restitution  of  pro- 
perty. I  may  fire  after  the  plunderer,  and  when  he  falls 
regain  my  grapes."  All  this  is  just  and  right,  if  Gisbome's 
proposition  is  true.  It  is  a  dangerous  thing  to  lay  down  max- 
ims in  morality. 

The  conclusion,  then,  to  which  \7e  are  Isd  by  these  enqui- 
*  Blackstone :  Com.  t.  4,  c.  4.  t  Gisborne :  I-Iordl  Philosophy. 


CHAP.  XVII.]  RIGHTS    OF    SELF-DEFENCE.  291 

ries  is,  that  he  who  kills  another,  even  upon  the  plea  of  self- 
defence,  does  not  do  it  in  the  predominance  nor  in  the  exer- 
cise of  Christian  dispositions:  and  if  this  is  true,  is  it  not  also 
true,  that  his  life  cannot  be  thus  taken  in  conformity  with  the 
Christian  law  1 

But  this  is  very  far  from  concluding  that  no  resistance  may 
be  made  to  aggression.  We  may  make,  and  we  ought  to 
make,  a  great  deal.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  civil  magistrate  to 
repress  the  violence  of  one  man  towards  another,  and  by  con- 
sequence it  is  the  duty  of  the  individual,  when  the  civil 
power  cannot  operate,  to  endeavour  to  repress  it  himself. 
I  perceive  no  reasonable  exception  to  the  rule — that  what- 
ever Christianity  permits  the  magistrate  to  do  in  order  to  re- 
strain violence,  it  permits  the  individual,  under  such  circum- 
stances to  do  also.  I  know  the  consequences  to  which  this 
rule  leads  in  the  case  of  the  punishment  of  death,  and  of 
other  questions.  These  questions  will  hereafter  be  discussed. 
In  the  mean  time,  it  may  be  an  act  of  candour  to  the  reader 
to  acknowledge,  that  our  chief  motive  for  the  discussions  of 
the  present  chapter,  has  been  to  pioneer  the  way  for  a  satis- 
factory investigation  of  the  Punishment  of  Death,  and  of  other 
modes  by  which  human  life  is  taken  away. 

Many  kinds  of  resistance  to  aggression  come  strictly  within 
the  fulfdment  of  the  law  of  benevolence.  He  who,  by 
securing,  or  temporarily  disabling  a  man,  prevents  him  from 
committing  an  act  of  great  turpitude,  is  certainly  his  benefac- 
tor ;  and  if  he  be  thus  reserved  for  justice,  the  benevolence 
is  great  both  to  him  and  to  the  public.  It  is  an  act  of  much 
kindness  to  a  bad  man  to  secure  him  for  the  penalties  of  the 
law :  or  it  would  be  such,  if  penal  law  were  in  the  state  in 
which  it  ought  to  be,  and  to  which  it  appears  to  be  making 
some  approaches.  It  would  then  be  very  probable  that  the 
man  would  be  reformed :  and  this  is  the  greatest  benefit 
which  can  be  conferred  upon  him  and  upon  the  community. 

The  exercise  of  Christian  forbearance  towards  violent  men 
is  not  tantamount  to  an  invitation  of  outrage.  Cowardice  is 
one  thing;  this  forbearance  is  another.  The  man  of  true 
forbearance  is  of  all  men  the  least  cowardly.  It  requires 
courage  in  a  greater  degree  and  of  a  higher  order  to  practise 
it  when  life  is  threatened,  than  to  draw  a  sword  or  fire  a 
pistol. — No :  It  is  the  peculiar  privilege  of  Christian  virtue 
to  approve  itself  even  to  the  bad.  There  is  something  in 
the  nature  of  that  calmness,  and  self-possession,  and  forbear- 
ance, that  religion  effects,  which  obtains,  nay  which  almost 
commands  regard   and  respect.     How   diflJerent  the   effect 


v 


292  RIGHTS    OF    SELF-DEFENCE.  [eSSAY  II. 

upon  the  violent  tenants  of  Newgate,  the  hardihood  of  a  turn- 
key and  the  mild  courage  of  an  Elizabeth  Fry !  Experience, 
incontestable  experience,  has  proved,  that  the  minds  of  few 
men  are  so  depraved  or  desperate  as  to  prevent  them  from 
being  injluenced  by  real  Christian  conduct.  Let  him  there- 
fore who  advocates  the  taking  the  life  of  an  aggressor,  first 
show  that  all  other  means  of  safety  are  vain ;  let  him  show 
that  bad  men,  notwithstanding  the  exercise  of  true  Christian 
forbearance,  persist  in  their  purposes  of  death :  when  he 
has  done  this  he  will  have  adduced  an  argument  in  favour  of 
taking  their  lives  which  will  not  indeed,  be  conclusive,  but 
which  will  approach  nearer  to  conclusiveness  than  any  that  has 
yet  been  adduced. 

Of  the  consequences  of  forbearance,  even  in  the  case  of 
personal  attack,  there  are  some  examples :  Archbishop 
Sharpe  was  assaulted  by  a  footpad  on  the  highway,  who 
presented  a  pistol  and  demanded  his  money.  The  Archbishop 
spoke  to  the  robber  in  the  language  of  a  fellow  man  and  of  a 
Christian.  The  man  was  really  in  distress,  and  the  prelate 
gave  him  such  money  as  he  had,  and  promised  that,  if  he 
would  call  at  the  palace,  he  would  make  up  the  amount  to 
fifty  pounds.  This  was  the  sum  of  which  the  robber  had 
said  he  stood  in  the  utmost  need.  The  man  called  and  re- 
ceived the  money.  About  a  year  and  a  half  afterwards,  this 
man  again  came  to  the  palace  and  brought  back  the  same 
sum.  He  said  that  his  circumstances  had  become  improved, 
and  that,  through  the  "  astonishing  goodness"  of  the  Arch- 
bishop, he  had  become  "  the  most  penitent,  the  most  grateful, 
and  happiest  of  his  species." — Let  the  reader  consider  how 
different  the  Archbishop's  feelings  were,  from  what  they 
would  have  been  if,  by  his  hand  this  man  had  been  cut  off.* 

Barclay,  the  Apologist,  was  attacked  'by  a  highwayman. 
He  substituted  for  the  ordinary  modes  of  resistance,  a  calm 
expostulation.  The  felon  dropped  his  presented  pistol,  and 
offered  no  further  violence.  A  Leonard  Fell  was  similarly 
attacked,  and  from  him  the  robber  took  both  his  money  and 
his  horse,  and  then  threatened  to  blow  out  his  brains.  Fell 
solemnly  spoke  to  the  man  on  the  wickedness  of  his  life. 
The  robber  was  astonished :  he  had  expected,  perhaps, 
curses,  or  perhaps  a  dagger.  He  declared  he  would  not 
keep  either  the  horse  or  the  money,  and  returned  both.  "  If 
thine  enemy  hunger, /eec?  him;   for  in  so  doing  thou  shalt 

*  See  Lond.  Chron.  Aug.  12,  1785.  See  also  life  of  Granville 
Sharpe,  Esq.,  p.  13. 


CHAP.  XVII.]  RIGHTS    OF    SELF-DEFENCE.  293 

heap  coals  of  fire  upon  his  head."* — The  tenor  of  the  shprt 
narrative  that  follows  is  somewhat  different.  Ell  wood,  who 
is  known  to  the  literary  world  as  the  suggester  to  Milton  of 
Paradise  Regained,  was  attending  his  father  in  his  coach. 
Two  men  waylaid  them  in  the  dark  and  stopped  the  carriage. 
Young  Ellwood  got  out,  and  on  going  up  to  the  nearest,  the 
ruffian  raised  a  heavy  club,  "  when,"  says  Ellwood,  "  I  whipt 
out  my  rapier  and  made  a  pass  upon  him.  I  could  not  have 
failed  running  him  through  up  to  the  hilt,"  but  the  sudden 
appearance  of  the  bright  blade  terrified  the  man  so  that  he 
stepped  aside,  avoided  the  thrust,  and  both  he  and  the  other 
fled.  "  At  that  time,"  proceeds  Ellwood,  "  and  for  a  good 
while  after,  I  had  no  regret  upon  my  mind  for  what  I  had 
done."  This  was  whilst  he  was  young,  and  when  the  for- 
bearing principles  of  Christianity  had  little  influence  upon 
him.  But  afterwards,  when  this  influence  became  powerful, 
"  a  sort  of  horror,"  he  says,  "  seized  on  me  when  I  considered 
how  near  I  had  been  to  the  staining  of  my  hands  with  human 
blood.  And  whensoever  afterwards  I  went  that  way,  and 
indeed  as  often  since  as  the  matter  has  come  into  my  remem- 
brance, my  soul  has  blessed  Him  who  preserved  and  with- 
held me  from  shedding  man's  blood. "f 

That  those  over  whom,  as  over  Ellwood,  the  influence  of 
Christianity  is  imperfect  and  weak,  should  think  themselves 
at  liberty  upon  such  occasions  to  take  the  lives  of  their  fel- 
low-men, needs  to  be  no  subject  of  wonder.  Christianity,  if 
we  would  rightly  estimate  its  obligations,  must  be  felt  in  the 
heart.  They  in  whose  hearts  it  is  not  felt,  or  felt  but  little, 
cannot  be  expected  perfectly  to  know  what  its  obligations  are. 
I  know  not  therefore  that  more  appropriate  advice  can  be 
given  to  him  who  contends  for  the  lawfulness  of  taking  ano- 
ther man's  life  in  order  to  save  his  own,  than  that  he  would 
first  enquire  whether  the  influence  of  religion  is  dominant  in 
his  mind.  If  it  is  not,  let  him  suspend  his  decision  until  he 
has  attained  to  the  fulness  of  the  stature  of  a  Christian  man. 
Then,  as  he  will  be  of  that  number  who  do  the  Will  of  Hea- 
ven, he  may  hope  to  "  know  of  this  doctrine  whether  it  be  of 
God." 

»  "  Select  Anecdotes,  &c."  by  John  Barclay.  t  Ellwood's  Life. 

25* 


ESSAY   III.* 

POLITICAL  RIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PRINCIPLES  OP  POLITICAL  TRUTH,  AND  OF 
POLITICAL  RECTITUDE. 

I. — "  Political  Power  is  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  is  possessed  by  con- 
sent of  the  community" — Governors  officers  of  the  Public — Transfer 
of  their  rights  by  a  whole  people — The  people  hold  the  sovereign 
power — Right  of  Governors — A  conciliating  system. 

II. — "Political  Power  is  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  subserves  the 
welfare  of  the  community" — Interference  with  other  nations — Present 
expedients  for  present  occasions — Proper  business  of  Governments. 

III. — "  Political  Power  is  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  subserves  the 
welfare  of  the  community  by  means  which  the  Moral  Law  permits" — 
The  Moral  Law  alike  binding  on  nations  and  individuals — Deviation 
from  rectitude  impolitic — "  The  Holy  Alliance" — Durable  fame. 

The  fundamental  principles  wliich  are  deducible  from  the 
law  of  nature  and  from  Christianity,  respecting  political  af- 
fairs, appear  to  be  these  : — 

1 .  Political  Power  is  rightly  possessed  only  when  it  is  pos- 
sessed by  consent  of  the  community  ; — 

2.  It  is  rightly  exercised  only  when  it  subserves  the  wel- 
fare of  the  community  ; — 

3.  And  only  when  it  subserves  this  purpose,  by  means 
which  the  Moral  Law  permits. 

[*  This  Essay  the  author  did  not  live  to  revise,  a  circumstance  which 
will  account  for  a  want  of  complete  connexion  of  the  different  parts  of  a 
subject  which  the  reader  will  sometimes  meet  with.  There  occur  also 
in  this  part  of  the  manuscript  numerous  memoranda,  which  the  author 
intended  to  make  use  of  in  a  future  revision.  These  are  to  be  distin- 
guished from  the  Notes,  as  the  former  refer,  not  to  any  particular  passage 
but  only  to  the  subject  of  the  chapter  or  section.  They  were  hastily,  as 
the  thought  occurred,  written  in  the  margin  or  on  a  blank  leaf  of  the 
manuscript,  and  they  are  here  introduced  at  the  bottom  of  the  page,  in 
those  parts  to  which  they  appear  to  have  the  nearest  reference. — Ed.] 


CHAP.  I.]       PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  TRUTH,  ETC.  205 

I. "  POLITICAL  POWER   IS    RIGHTLY    POSSESSED   ONLY   WHEN 

IT  IS  POSSESSED  BY  CONSENT  OF  THE  COMMUNITY." 

Perfect  liberty  is  desirable  if  it  were  consistent  with  the 
greatest  degree  of  happiness.  But  it  is  not.  Men  find  that, 
by  giving  up  a  part  of  their  liberty,  they  are  more  happy  than 
by  retaining,  or  attempting  to  retain,  the  whole.  Government, 
whatever  be  its  form,  is  the  agent  by  which  the  inexpedient 
portion  of  individual  liberty  is  taken  away.  Men  institute 
government  for  their  own  advantage,  and  because  they  find 
they  are  more  happy  with  it  than  without  it.  This  is  the 
sole  reason,  in  principle,  how  little  soever  it  be  adverted  to  in 
practice.  Governors,  therefore,  are  the  officers  of  the  public, 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word :  not  the  slaves  of  the  pub- 
lic ;  for  if  they  do  not  incline  to  conform  to  the  public  will, 
they  are  at  liberty,  like  other  officers,  to  give  up  their  office. 
They  are  servants,  in  the  same  manner,  and  for  the  same  pur- 
pose, as  a  solicitor  is  the  servant  of  his  client,  and  the  physician 
of  his  patient.  These  are  employed  by  the  patient  or  the 
client  voluntarily  for  his  own  advantage,  and  for  nothing  else. 
A  nation,  (not  an  individual^  but  a  nation,)  is  under  no  other 
obligation  to  obedience,  than  that  which  arises  from  the  con- 
viction that  obedience  is  good  for  itself: — ot  rather,  in  more 
proper  language,  a  nation  is  under  no  obligation  to  obedience  at 
all.  Obedience  is  voluntary.  If  they  do  not  think  it  proper  to 
obey — that  is,  if  they  are  not  satisfied  with  their  officers — 
they  are  at  liberty  to  discontinue  their  obedience,  and  to  ap- 
point other  officers  instead. 

That  which  is  thus  true  as  an  universal  proposition,  is  as- 
serted with  respect  to  this  country  by  the  present  king:*— 
"  The  powers  and  prerogatives  of  the  crown  are  vested  there' 
as  a  trust  for  the  benefit  of  the  people ;  and  they  are  sacred 
only  as  they  are  necessary  to  the  preservation  of  that  poise 
and  balance  of  the  constitution  which  experience  has  proved 
to  be  the  best  security  of  the  liberty  of  the  subject. "Y 

It  is  incidental  to  the  office  of  the  First  public  servants, 
that  they  should  exercise  authority  over  those  by  whom  they 
are  selected ;  and  hence  probably,  it  has  happened  that  the 
terms  "  public  officer,"  "  public  servant,"  have  excited  such 
strange  controversies  in  the  world.  Men  have  not  maintained 
sufficient  discrimination  of  ideas.  Seeing  that  governors  are 
great  and  authoritative,  a  man  imagines  it  cannot  be  proper 
to  say  they  are  servants.     Seeing  that  it  is  necessary  and 

♦  George  IV.  t  Letter  when  Prince  of  Wales,  tp  Wm.  Pitt. 

Giflford's  life  of  Pitt  vol.  2. 


5^96  PRINCIPLES    OF    POLITICAL    TRUTH,      [eSSAY    fl. 

tight  that  individuals  should  obey,  he  cannot  entertain  the 
notion  that  they  are  the  servants  of  those  whom  they  govern. 
The  truth  is,  that  governors  are  not  the  servants  of  individ- 
uals but  of  the  community.  They  are  the  masters  of  indi- 
viduals, the  servants  of  the  public  ;  and  if  this  simple  dis- 
tinction had  been  sufficiently  borne  in  mind,  much  perhaps 
of  the  vehement  contention  upon  these  matters  had  been 
avoided. 

But  the  idea  of  being  a  servant  to  the  public,  is  quite  con- 
sistent with  the  idea  of  exercising  authority  over  them. 
The  common  language  of  a  patient  is  founded  upon  similar 
grounds.  He  sends  for  a  physician  : — the  physician  comes 
at  his  desire — is  paid  for  his  services — and  then  the  patient 
says,  I  am  ordered  to  adopt  a  regimen,  I  am  ordered  to  Italy ; 
— and  he  obeys,  not  because  he  may  not  refuse  to  obey  if  he 
chooses,  but  because  he  confides  in  the  judgment  of  the  phy- 
sician, and  thinks  that  it  is  more  to  his  benefit  to  be  guided 
by  the  physician's  judgment  than  by  his  own.  But  it  will  be 
said  the  physician  cannot  enforce  his  orders  upon  the  patient 
against  his  will :  neither  I  answer  can  the  governor  enforce 
his  upon  the  public  against  theirs.  No  doubt  Governors  do 
sometimes  so  enforce  them.  What  they  do,  however,  and 
what  they  rightfully  do,  are  separate  considerations,  and  our 
business  is  only  with  the  latter. 

Grotius  argues  that  sovereign  power  may  be  possessed  by 
governors,  so  that  it  shall  not  rightfully  belong  to  the  com- 
munity. He  says,  "  From  the  Jewish  as  well  as  the  Roman 
law  it  appears,  that  any  one  might  engage  himself  in  private 
servitude  to  whom  he  pleased.  Now  if  an  individual  may  do 
so,  why  may  not  a  whole  people,  for  the  benefit  of  better 
government  and  more  certain  protection,  completely  transfer 
their  sovereign  rights  to  one  or  more  persons  without  reserv- 
ing any  portion  to  themselves  ?"*  I  answer,  no  individual 
may  do  this :  and,  if  he  might,  it  would  not  serve  the  doc- 
trine in  the  case  of  nations. — It  never  can  be  right  for  a  man 
to  resign  the  absolute  direction  of  his  conduct  to  another,  be- 
cause he  must  then  do  actions  good  or  had  as  that  other  might 
command — ^hfe  must  lie,  or  rob,  or  assassinate  ;  and  of  this 
common  sense  would  pronounce  the  impropriety,  if  the  Moral 
Law  did  not.  And  if  you  say  a  man  ought  not  so  to  resign 
himself  to  another,  then  I  answer,  he  does  not  transfer  sover- 
eign power  but  retains  it  himself — -which,  in  truth,  ends  the 
argument. 

But  if  the  doctrine  were  sound  for  the  individual,  it  is  un- 
*  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  b.  1.  c.  3,  s.  8. 


CHAP.  I.]  AND    OF    POLITICAL    RECTITUDE.  297 

sound  for  a  community.  What  is  meant  by  the  "  transfer  of 
their  sovereign  rights  by  a  whole  people  V  Is  every  man, 
woman,  and  child,  in  the  country  formally  to  sign  the  trans- 
fer ?  If  not,  how  shall  a  whole  people  transfer  it  ?  At  any 
rate,  if  they  did,  their  resignation  could  not  bind  their  chil- 
dren or  successors.  Besides,  there  is  the  same  objection  to 
this  transfer  of  the  sovereign  power  on  the  part  of  a  nation 
as  on  the  part  of  an  individual.  The  thing  is  absurd  in  rea- 
son, and  criminal  in  morals. 

Grotius  illustrates  his  argument  by  "  that  authority  to  which 
a  woman  submits  when  she  gives  herself  to  her  husband." 
But  she  does  not  submit  to  sovereign  authority.  He  says 
again,  "  some  powers  are  conferred  for  the  sake  of  the  gov- 
ernor, as  the  right  of  a  master  over  a  slave."  But  such  pow- 
ers are  hgygy  justly  conferred. 

After  all,  these  arguments  do  but  establish  in  reality,  the 
fundamental  position.  They  assume  that  a  people  can  re- 
sign the  sovereign  power ;  which  is  the  same  thing  as  to  ac- 
knowledge that  they  rightfully  possess  it.  Grotius  himself 
says,  "  A  state  is  a  perfect  body  of  free  men,  united  together 
in  order  to  enjoy  common  rights  and  advantages."* 

It  gives  some  anxiety  to  the  mind  of  the  writer,  lest  the 
reader  should  identify  his  principles  with  those  of  many  who 
have  asserted  the  "  sovereignty  of  the  people."  This  doc- 
trine has  been  insisted  upon  by  persons  who  have  mingled 
with  it,  or  deduced  from  it,  principles  which  the  writer  not 
merely  rejects,  but  abhors.  A  doctrine  is  not  unsound  be- 
cause it  has  been  advocated  or  perverted  by  bad  men  ;  and  it 
is  neither  rational  nor  honest  to  reprobate  a  truth  because  it 
has  been  viciously  associated.  Gifford,  in  his  life  of  Pitt, 
complains  of  Fox,  who  by  "  a  strange  perversion  of  terms, 
and  a  confusion  of  intellect  that  would  have  disgraced  even  a 
schoolboy,  called  his  sovereign  the  servant  of  the  people." 
"  This,"  says  Gifford,  "  was  a  servile  imitation  of  the  French 
regicides,  and  a  direct  encouragement  to  all  the  theoretical 
reveries  of  all  the  disaffected  in  England."  This  is  the  spe- 
cies of  association  which  I  would  deprecate  :  French  regi- 
cides taught  the  doctrine,  and  disaffected  theorists  taught  it. 
I  am  sorry  that  a  truth  should  be  so  connected  ;  but  it  is  not 
the  less  a  truth.  The  "  confusion  of  intellect"  of  which 
Gifford  speaks,  probably  subsisted  more  in  the  writer  than  in 
Fox — for  reasons  which  the  reader  has  just  seen,  and  because 
the  biographer  had  probably  confounded  the  doctrine  with  the 
conduct  of  some  who  supported  it.  The  reader  should  prac- 
*  Rights  of  War  and  Peace. 


29d  PRINCIPLES    OF    POLITICAL    TRUTH,       [eSSAY  III. 

tise  a  little  of  the  power  of  abstraction,  and  detach  accidental 
associations  from  truth  itself. 

In  reality,  it  cannot  be  asserted  that  the  people  do  not  right- 
fully possess  the  supreme  power,  without  asserting  that  gov- 
ernors may  do  what  they  will,  and  be  as  tyrannical  as  they 
will.  Who  may  prevent  them  ?  The  people  1  Then  the 
people  hold  the  sovereign  power. 

Many  political  constitutions  have  existed  in  which  the  gov- 
ernor was  held  to  be  absolutely  the  supreme  power.  The 
antiquity  of  such  constitutions,  or  the  regular  succession  of 
the  existing  governor,  does  not  make  his  pretensions  to  this 
power  just,  because  the  principles  on  which  it  is  ascertained 
that  the  people  are  supreme,  are  antecedent  to  all  questions  of 
usage,  and  superior  to  them.  No  injustice,  therefore,  is  done 
' — nothing  wrong  is  done — in  diminishing  or  taking  away  the 
power  of  an  absolute  monarch,  notwithstanding  the  regularity 
of  his  pretensions  to  it.  Yet  other  principles  have  been 
held :  and  it  was  said  of  Louis  the  Sixteenth,  that  as  he 
"  was  the  sole  maker  and  executor  of  the  laws,"  and  as  this 
power  "  had  been  exercised  by  him  and  by  his  ancestors  for 
centuries  without  question  or  control,  it  was  not  in  the  power 
of  the  states  to  deprive  him  of  any  portion  of  it  without  his 
own  consent."  So  that  we  are  told  that  many  millions  of 
persons  ought  to  be  subject  for  ever  to  the  vices  or  caprices 
of  one  man,  in  compliment  to  the  fact  that  their  predecessors 
had  been  subject  before  them.*  He  who  maintains  such  doc- 
trine, surely  forgets  for  what  purpose  government  is  instituted 
a;t  all. 

The  rule  that  "  Political  Power  is  rightly  possessed  only 
when  it  is  possessed  by  consent  of  the  community,"  neces- 
sarily applies  to  the  choice  of  the  person  who  is  to  exercise 
it.  No  man,  and  no  set  of  men,  rightly  govern  unless  they 
are  preferred  by  the  public  to  others.  It  is  of  no  conse- 
quence that  a  people  should  formally  select  a  president  or  a 
king.  They  continually  act  upon  the  principle  without  this. 
A  people  who  are  satisfied  with  their  governor  make,  day  by 

*  We  do  not  here  defend  the  conduct  of  the  states,  or  censure  that  of 
Xouis ;  we  speak  merely  of  the  poUtical  Truth.  That  atrocious  course 
of  wickedness,  the  French  Revohition,  was  occasioned  by  the  abuses  of 
the  old  government  and  its  ramifications.  The  French  people,  unhap- 
pily, had  neither  virtue  enough  nor  political  knowledge  enough,  to  reform 
these  abuses  by  proper  means.  A  revolution  of  some  kind,  and  at  some 
period,  awaits,  I  doubt  not,  every  despotic  government  in  Europe  and  in 
the  world.  Happy  will  it  be  for  those  rulers  who  timely  and  wisely  re- 
gard the  irresistible  progress  of  Public  Opinion !  And  happy  for  those 
communities  which  endeavour  reformation  only  by  virtuous  means. 


CHAP.  I.]  AND    OF    POLITICAL    RECTITUDE.  29t 

day,  the  choice  of  which  we  speak.  They  prefer  him  to  all 
others  ;  they  choose  to  be  served  by  him  rather  than  by  any 
other;  and  he,  therefore,  is  virtually,  though  not  formally, 
selected  by  the  public.  But,  when  we  speak  of  the  right  of 
a  particular  person  or  family  to  govern  a  people,  we  speak, 
as  of  all  other  rights,  in  conditional  langtiage.  The  right 
consists  in  the  preference  which  is  given  to  him ;  and  exists 
no  longer  than  that  preference  exists.  If  any  governor  were 
fully  conscious  that  the  community  preferred  another  man  or 
another  kind  of  government,  he  ought  to  regard  himself  in 
the  light  of  an  usurper  if  he  nevertheless  continues  to  retain 
his  power.  Not  that  every  government  ought  to  dissolve  it- 
self, or  every  governor  to  abdicate  his  office,  because  there 
is  a  general  but  temporary  clamour  against  it.  This  is  one 
thing — the  steady  deliberate  judgment  of  the  people  is  an- 
other. Is  it  too  much  to  hope  that  the  time  may  come  when 
governments  will  so  habitually  refer  to  the  purposes  of  gov- 
ernment, and  be  regulated  by  them,  that  they  will  not  even 
wish  to  hold  the  reins  longer  than  the  people  desire  it ;  and 
that  nothing  more  will  be  needed  for  a  quiet  alteration  than 
that  the  public  judgment  should  be  quietly  expressed  ? 

Political  revolutions  are  not  often  favourable  to  the  accurate 
illustration  of  political  truth  ;  because,  such  is  the  moral  con- 
dition of  mankind,  that  they  have  seldom  acted  in  conformity 
with  it.  Revolutions  have  commonly  been  the  effect  of  the 
triumph  of  a  party,  or  of  the  successes  of  physical  power.  Yet, 
if  the  illustration  of  these  principles  has  not  been  accurate, 
the  general  position  of  the  right  of  the  people  to  select  their 
own  rulers  has  often  been  illustrated.  In  our  own  country, 
when  James  11.  left  the  throne,  the  people  filled  it  with  an- 
other person,  whose  real  title  consisted  in  the  choice  of  the 
people.  James  continued  to  talk  of  his  rights  to  the  crown  ; 
but  if  William  was  preferred  by  the  public,  James  was,  what 
his  son  was  afterwards  called,  a  Pretender.  The  nonjurors 
appear  to  have  acted  upon  erroneous  principles,  (except  in- 
deed on  the  score  of  former  oaths  to  James  ;  which,  however, 
ought  never  to  have  been  taken.)  If  we  acquit  them  of  mo- 
tives of  party,  they  will  appear  to  have  entertained  some  no- 
tions of  the  rights  of  governors  independently  of  the  wishes 
of  the  people.  At  William's  death,  the  nation  preferred 
James's  daughter  to  his  son  ;  thus  again  elevating  their  judg- 
ments above  all  considerations  of  what  the  Pretender  called 
his  rights.  Anne  had  then  a  right  to  the  throne,  and  her  . 
brother  had  not.  At  the  death  of  Anne,  or  rather  in  contem- 
plation of  her  death,  the  public  had  again  to  select  their 


300  ^INCIPLES    OF    POLITICAL    TRUTH,       [eSSAY  III. 

governor  ;  and  they  chose,  not  the  immediate  representative 
of  the  old  family,  but  the  Elector  of  Hanover  ;  and  it  is  in 
virtue  of  the  same  choice,  tacitly  expressed  at  the  present 
hour,  that  the  heir  of  the  Elector  now  fills  the  throne. 

[The  habitual  consciousness  on  the  part  of  a  legislature, 
that  its  authority,  is  possessed  in  order  to  make  it  an  efficient 
guardian  and  promoter  of  the  general  welfare  and  the  general 
satisfaction,  would  induce  a  more  mild  and  conciliating  sys- 
tem of  internal  policy  than  that  which  frequently  obtains. 
Whether  it  has  arisen  from  habit  resulting  from  the  violent 
and  imperious  character  of  international  policy,  or  from  that 
tendency  to  unkindness  and  overbearing  which  the  con- 
sciousness of  power  induces,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  meas- 
ures of  government  are  frequently  adopted  and  conducted 
with  such  a  high  hand  as  impairs  the  satisfaction  of  the  gov- 
erned, and  diminishes,  by  example,  that  considerate  attention 
to  the  claims  of  others,  upon  which  much  of  the  harmony, 
and  therefore  the  happiness  of  society  consists.  Govern- 
ments are  too  much  afraid  of  conciliation.  They  too  habit- 
ually suppose  that  mildness  or  concession  indicates  want  of 
courage  or  want  of  power — ^that  it  invites  unreasonable  de- 
mands, and  encourages  encroachment  and  violence  on  the  part 
of  the  governed.  Man  is  not  so  intractable  a  being,  or  so  in- 
sensible of  the  influence  of  candour  and  justice.  In  private 
life,  he  does  not  the  most  easily  guide  the  conduct  of  his 
neighbours,  who  assumes  an  imperious,  but  he  who  assumes 
a  temperate  and  mild  demeanour.  The  best  mode  of  govern- 
ing, and  the  most  powerful  mode  too,  is  to  recommend  state 
measures  to  the  judgment  and  the  affections  of  a  people. 
If  this  had  been  sufficiently  done  in  periods  of  tranquillity, 
some  of  those  conflicts  which  have  arisen  between  govern- 
ments and  the  people  had  doubtless  been  prevented  ;  and  gov- 
ernments had  been  spared  the  mortification  of  conceding  that 
to  violence  which  they  refused  to  concede  in  periods  of  quiet. 
We  should  not  wait  for  times  of  agitation  to  do  that  which 
Fox  advised  even  at  such  a  time,  because  at  other  periods  it 
may  be  done  with  greater  advantage  and  with  a  better  grace. 
"  It  may  be  asked,"  said  Fox,  "  what  I  would  propose  to  do 
in  times  of  agitation  like  the  present  ?  I  will  answer  openly : 
—If  there  is  a  tendency  in  the  Dissenters  to  discontent,  what 
should  I  do  ?  I  would  instantly  repeal  the  corporation  and 
test  acts,  and  take  from  them  thereby  all  cause  of  complaint. 
If  there  were  any  persons  tinctured  with  a  republican  spirit, 
I  would  endeavour  to  amend  the  representation  of  the  Com- 
mons, and  to  prove  that  the  House  of  Commons,  though  not 


CHAP.  I.]  AND    OF    POLITICAL    RECTITUDE.  301 

chosen  by  all,  should  have  no  other  interest  than  to  prove  it- 
self the  representative  of  all.  If  men  were  dissatisfied  on 
account  of  disabilities  or  exemptions,  &c.,  I  would  repeal  the 
penal  statutes,  which  are  a  disgrace  to  our  law-books.  If 
there  were  other  complaints  of  grievance,  I  would  redress 
them  where  they  were  really  proved ;  but,  above  all,  I  would 
constantly,  cheerfully ,  patiently  listen  ;  I  would  make  it  known, 
that  if  any  man  felt,  or  thought  he  felt  a  grievance,  he  might 
come  freely  to  the  bar  of  this  House  and  bring  his  proofs. 
And  it  should  be  made  manifest  to  all  the  world  that  where 
they  did  exist  they  should  be  redressed  ;  where  not,  it  should 
be  made  manifest."* 

We  need  not  consider  the  particular  examples  and  measures 
which  the  statesman  instanced.  The  temper  and  spirit  is 
the  thing.  A  government  should  do  that  of  which  every  per- 
son would  see  the  propriety  in  a  private  man ;  if  misconduct 
was  charged  upon  him,  show  that  the  charge  was  unfounded ; 
or,  being  substantiated,  amend  his  conduct,] 


II. "  POLITICAL  POWER   IS  RIGHTLY  EXERCISED  ONLY  WHEN 

IT  SUBSERVES  THE  WELFARE  OF    THE    COMMUNITY." 

This  proposition  is  consequent  of  the  truth  of  the  last.  The 
community,  which  has  the  right  to  withhold  power,  delegates 
it,  of  course,  for  its  own  advantage.  If  in  any  case  its  advan- 
tage is  not  consulted,  then  the  object  for  which  it  was  dele- 
gated is  frustrated ;  or,  in  simple  words,  the  measure  which 
does  not  promote  the  public  welfare  is  not  right.  It  matters 
nothing  whether  the  community  have  delegated  specifically 
so  much  power  for  such  and  such  purposes  ;  the  power,  being 
possessed,  entails  the  obligation.  Whether  a  sovereign  de- 
rives absolute  authority  by  inheritance,  or  whether  a  president 
is  entrusted  with  limited  authority  for  a  year,  the  principles 
of  their  duty  are  the  same.  The  obligation  to  employ  it  only 
for  the  public  good,  is  just  as  real  and  just  as  great  in  one 
case  as  in  the  other.  The  Russian  and  the  Turk  have  the 
same  right  to  require  that  the  power  of  their  rulers  shall  be 
so  employed  as  the  Englishman  or  American.  They  may 
not  be  able  to  assert  this  right,  but  that  does  not  affect  its 
existence  nor  the  ruler's  duty,  nor  his  responsibility  to  that 
Almighty  Being  before  whom  he  must  give  an  account  of  his 
stewardship.     These  reasonings,  if  they  needed  confirmation, 

*  Fell's  Memoirs  of  the  Public  Life  of  C.  J.  Fox. 
26 


302  PRINCIPLES    OF    POLITICAL    TRUTH,       [esSAY  III. 

derive  it  from  the  fact  that  the  Deity  imperatively  requires 
us,  according  to  our  opportunities,  to  do  good  to  man. 

But,  how  ready  soever  men  are  to  admit  the  truth  of  this 
proposition,  as  a  proposition,  it  is  very  commonly  disregarded 
in  practice  ;  and  a  vast  variety  of  motives  and  objects  direct 
the  conduct  of  governments  which  have  no  connexion  with 
the  public  weal.  Some  pretensions  of  consulting  the  public 
weal  are,  indeed,  usual.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  when 
public  officers  are  pursuing  their  own  schemes  and  interests, 
they  will  tell  the  people  that  they  disregard  theirs.  When 
we  look  over  the  history  of  a  Christian  nation,  it  is  found  that 
a  large  proportion  of  these  measures  which  are  most  promi- 
ment  in  it,  had  little  tendency  to  subserve,  and  did  not  sub- 
serve the  public  good.  In  practice,  it  is  very  often  forgotten 
for  what  purpose  governments  are  instituted.  If  a  man  were 
to  look  over  twenty  treaties,  he  would  probably  find  that  a 
half  of  them  had  very  little  to  do  with  the  welfare  of  the  re- 
spective communities.  He  might  find  a  great  deal  about 
Charles's  rights,  and  Frederick's  honour,  and  Louis's  posses- 
sions, and  Francrs's  interests,  as  if  the  proper  subjects  of  in- 
ternational arrangements  were  those  which  respected  rulers 
rather  than  communities.  If  a  man  looks  over  the  state  pa- 
pers which  inform  him  of  the  origin  of  a  war,  he  will  probably 
find  that  they  agitate  questions  about  iMost  Christian  and  Most 
Catholic  Kings,  and  High  Mightinesses,  and  Imperial  Majes- 
ties— questions,  however,  in  which  Frenchmen,  and  Spaniards, 
and  Dutch,  and  Austrians,  are  very  little  interested  or  con- 
cerned, or  at  any  rate  much  less  interested  than  they  are  in 
avoiding  the  quarrel. 

Governments  commonly  trouble  themselves  unnecessarily 
and  too  much  with  the  politics  of  other,  nations.  A  prince 
should  turn  his  back  towards  other  countries  and  his  face 
towards  his  own — just  as  the  proper  place  of  a  landholder  is 
upon  his  own  estates  and  not  upon  his  neighbour's.  If  gov- 
ernments were  wise,  it  would  ere  long  be  found  that  a  great 
portion  of  the  endless  and  wearisome  succession  of  treaties, 
and  remonstrances,  and  embassies,  and  alliances,  and  memo- 
rials, and  subsidies,  might  be  dispensed  with,  with  so  little 
inconvenience  and  so  much  benefit,  that  the  world  would 
wonder  to  think  to  what  futile  ends  they  had  been  busying, 
and  how  needlessly  they  had  been  injuring  themselves. 

No  doubt,  the  immoral  and  irrational  system  of  international 
politics  which  generally  obtains,  makes  the  path  of  one  gov- 
ernment more  difficult  than  it  would  otherwise  be  ;  and  yet  it 
is  probable  that  the  most  efficacious  way  of  inducing  another 


CHAP.  I.]  AND    OF    POLITICAL    RECTITUDE.  303 

government  to  attend  to  its  proper  business,  would  be  to  attend 
to  our  own.  It  is  not  sufficiently  considered,  nor  indeed  is 
it  sufficiently  known,  how  powerful  is  the  influence  of  upright- 
ness and  candour  in  conciliating  the  good  opinion  and  the 
good  offices  of  other  men.  Overreaching  and  chicanery  in 
one  person,  induce  overreaching  and  chicanery  in  another. 
Men  distrust  those  whom  they  perceive  to  be  unworthy  of 
confidence.  Real  integrity  is  not  without  its  voucher  in  the 
hearts  of  others  ;  and  they  who  maintain  it  are  treated  with 
confidence,  because  it  is  seen  that  confidence  can  be  safely 
reposed.  Besides,  he  who  busies  himself  with  the  politics 
of  foreign  ^countries,  like  the  busy  bodies  in  a  petty  commu- 
nity, does  not  fail  to  ofiend.  In  the  last  century,  our  own 
country  was  so  much  of  a  busy  body,  and  had  involved  itself 
in  such  a  multitude  of  treaties  and  alliances,  that  it  was  found, 
I  believe,  quite  impossible  to  fulfil  one,  without,  by  that  very 
act,  violating  another.  This,  of  course,  would  oflfend.  In 
private  life,  that  man  passes  through  the  world  with  the  least 
annoyance  and  the  greatest  satisfaction,  who  confines  his  at- 
tention to  its  proper  business,  that  is,  generally,  to  his  own : 
and  who  can  tell  why  the  experience  of  nations  should  in  this 
case  be  different  from  that  of  private  men?  In  a  rectified 
state  of  international  affairs,  half  a  dozen  princes  on  a  conti- 
nent would  have  little  more  occasion  to  meddle  with  one  an- 
other than  half  a  dozen  neighbours  in  a  street. 

But  indeed,  Communities  frequently  contribute  to  their  own 
injury.  If  governors  are  ambitious,  or  resentful,  or  proud,  so, 
often,  are  the  people  ; — and  the  public  good  has  often  been 
sacrificed  by  the  public,  with  astonishing  preposterousness, 
to  jealousy  or  vexation.  Some  merchants  are  angry  at  the 
loss  of  a  branch  of  trade  ;  they  urge  the  government  to  inter- 
fere ;  memorials  and  remonstrances  follow  to  the  state  of 
whom  they  complain  ; — and  so,  by  that  process  of  exaspera- 
tion which  is  quite  natural  when  people  think  that  high  lan- 
guage and  a  high  attitude  is  politic,  the  nations  soon  begin  to 
fight.  The  merchants  applaud  the  spirit  of  their  rulers,  while 
in  one  year  they  lose  more  by  the  war  than  they  would  have 
lost  by  the  want  of  the  trade  for  twenty ;  and  before  peace 
returns,  the  nation  has  lost  more  than  it  would  have  lost  by 
the  continuance  of  the  evil  for  twenty  centuries.  Peace  at 
length  arrives,  and  the  government  begins  to  devise  means  of 
repairing  the  mischiefs  of  the  w^ar.  Both  government  and 
people  reflect  very  complacently  on  the  wisdom  of  their  mea- 
sures— ^forgetting  that  their  conduct  is  only  that  of  a  man  who 


304  PRINCIPLES    OF    POLITICAL    TRUTH,       [eSSAY  III. 

wantonly  fractures  his  own  leg  with  a  club,  and  then  boasts 
to  his  neighbours  how  dexterously  he  limps  to  a  surgeon. 

Present  expedients  for  present  occasions,  rather  than  a 
wide-embracing  and  far-seeing  policy,  is  the  great  character- 
istic of  European  politics.  We  are  hucksters  who  cannot 
resist  the  temptation  of  a  present  sixpence,  rather  than  mer- 
chants who  wait  for  their  profits  for  the  return  of  a  fleet.  Si 
quaeris  monumentum,  circumspice  !  Look  at  the  condition  of 
either  of  the  continental  nations,  and  consider  what  it  might 
have  been  if  even  a  short  line  of  princes  had  attended  to  their 
proper  business — had  directed  their  solicitude  to  the  improve- 
ment of  the  moral,  and  social,  and  political  condition  of  the 
people.  Who  has  been  more  successful  in  this  huckster 
policy  than  France  ?  and  what  is  France,  and  what  are  the 
French  people  at  the  present  hour  ? — Why,  as  it  respects  real 
welfare,  they  are  not  merely  surpassed,  they  are  left  at  an 
immeasurable  distance  by  a  people  who  sprung  up  but  as 
yesterday — by  a  people  whose  land,  within  the  memory  of 
our  grandfathers,  was  almost  a  wilderness — and  which  actu- 
ally was  a  wilderness  long  since  France  boasted  of  her  great- 
ness. Such  results  have  a  cause.  It  is  not  possible  that 
systems  of  policy  can  be  good,  of  which  the  effects  are  so 
bad.  I  speak  not  of  particular  measures,  or  of  individual  acts 
of  ill  policy — these  are  not  likely  to  be  the  result  of  the  con- 
dition of  man — but  of  the  whole  international  system ;  a  sys- 
tem of  irritability,  and  haughtiness,  and  temporary  expedients  ; 
a  system  of  most  unphilosophical  principles,  and  from  which 
Christianity  is  practically  almost  excluded.  Here  is  the  evi- 
dence of  fact  before  us.  We  %now  what  a  sickening  detail 
the  history  of  Europe  is  ;  and  it  is  obvious  to  remark,  that 
the  system  which  has  given  rise  to  such  a  history  must  be 
vicious  and  mistaken  in  its  fundamental  principles.  The  same 
class  of  history  will  continue  to  after  generations  unless  these 
principles  are  changed — unless  philosophy  and  Christianity 
obtain  a  greater  influence  in  the  practice  of  government ;  un- 
less, in  a  word,  governments  are  content  to  do  their  proper 
business,  and  to  leave  that  which  is  not  their  business  undone. 

When  such  principles  are  acted  upon,  we  may  reasonably 
expect  a  rapid  advancement  in  the  whole  condition  of  the 
world.  Domestic  measures  which  are  now  postponed  to  the 
more  stirring  occupations  of  legislators,  will  be  found  to  be  of 
incomparably  greater  importance  than  they.  A  wise  code  of 
criminal  law,  will  be  found  to  be  of  more  consequence  and 
interest  than  the  acquisition  of  a  million  square  miles  of  terri- 
tory:— a  judicious  encouragement  of  general  education,  will 


CHAP.  I.]  AND    OF    POLITICAL    RECTITUDE.  305 

be  of  more  value  than  all  the  "  glory"  that  has  been  acquired 
from  the  days  of  Alfred  till  now.  Of  moral  legislation,  how- 
ever, it  will  be  our  after  business  to  speak ;  meanwhile  the 
lover  of  mankind  has  some  reason. for  gratulation,  in  perceiv- 
ing indications  that  governments  will  hereafter  direct  their 
attention  more  to  the  objects  for  which  they  are  invested  with 
power.  The  statesman  who  promotes  this  improvement  will 
be  what  many  statesmen  have  been  called — a  great  man. 
That  government  only  is  great  which  promotes  the  prosperity 
of  its  own  people  ;  and  that  people  only  are  prosperous,  who 
are  wise  and  happy. 


III. "POLITICAL     POWER      IS      RIGHTLY      EXERCISED      ONLY 

WHEN    IT    SUBSERVES    THE    WELFARE    OF    THE    COMMUNITY 
BY    MEANS    WHICH    THE    MORAL    LAW    PERMITS." 

It  has  been  said  by  a  Christian  writer,  that  "  the  science 
of  politics  is  but  a  particular  application  of  that  of  morals ;" 
and  it  has  been  said  by  a  writer  who  rejected  Christianity, 
that  "  the  morality  that  ought  to  govern  the  conduct  of  individ- 
uals and  of  nations,  is  in  all  cases  the  same."  If  there  be 
truth  in  the  principles  which  are  advanced  in  the  first  of  these 
Essays,  these  propositions  are  indisputably  true.  It  is  the 
chief  purpose  of  the  present  work  to  enforce  the  supremacy 
of  the  Moral  Law ;  and  to  this  supremacy  there  is  no  excep- 
tion in  the  case  of  nations.  In  the  conduct  of  nations  this 
supremacy  is  practically  denied,  although,  perhaps,  few  of 
those  who  make  it  subservient  to  other  purposes  would  deny 
it  in  terms.  With  their  lips  they  honour  the  doctrine,  but  in 
their  works  they  deny  it.  Such  procedures  must  be  expected 
to  produce  much  self-contradiction,  much  vacillation  between 
truth  and  the  wish  to  disregard  it,  much  vagueness  of 
notions  respecting  political  rectitude,  and  much  casuistry  to 
educe  something  like  a  justification  of  what  cannot  be  justified. 
Let  the  reader  observe  an  illustration : — A  moral  philosopher 
says,  "  The  Christian  principles  of  love,  and  forbearance,  and 
kindness,  strictly  as  they  are  to  be  observed  between  man  and 
man,  are  to  be  observed  with  precisely  the  same  strictness  be- 
tween nation  and  nationP  This  is  an  unqualified  assertion  of 
the  truth.  But  the  writer  thinks  it  would  carry  him  too  far, 
and  so  he  makes  exceptions.  "  In  reducing  to  practice  the 
Christian  principles  of  forbearance,  &;c.,  it  will  not  be  always 
feasible,  nor  always  safe,  to  proceed  to  the  same  extent  as  in 
acting  towards  an  individual."     Let  the  reader  exercise  his 

26* 


306  PRINCIPLES    OF    POLITICAL    TRUTH,       [eSSAY  III. 

skill  in  casuistry,  by  showing  the  difference  between  conform- 
ing to  laws  with  "  precise  strictness,"  and  conforming  to  them 
in  their  "  full  extent." — Thus  far  Christianity  and  Expediency 
are  proposed  as  our  joint  governors. — We  must  observe  the 
Moral  Law,  but  still  we  must  regulate  our  observance  of  it  by 
considerations  of  what  is  feasible  and  safe.  Presently  after- 
wards, however,  Christianity  is  quite  dethroned,  and  we  are 
to  observe  its  laws  only  "  so  far  as  national  ability  and  national 
security  will  permit."* — So  that  our  rule  of  political  conduct 
stands  at  length  thus  :  obey  Christianity  with  precise  strictness 
■ — when  it  suits  your  interests. 

The  reasoning  by  which  such  doctrines  are  supported,  is 
such  as  it  might  be  expected  to  be.  We  are  told  of  the  "  cau- 
tion requisite  in  affairs  of  such  magnitude — the  great  uncer- 
tainty of  the  future  conduct  of  the  other  nation" — and  of  "  pa- 
triotism."— So  that,  because  the  affairs  are  of  great  magnitude, 
the  laws  of  the  Deity  are  not  to  be  observed !  It  is  all  very 
well,  it  seems,  to  observe  them  in  little  matters,  but  for  our 
more  important  concerns  we  want  rules  commensurate  with 
their  dignity — we  cannot  then  be  bound  by  the  laws  of  God ! 
The  next  reason  is,  that  we  cannot  foresee  "  the  future  con- 
duct" of  a  nation. — Neither  can  we  that  of  an  individual. 
Besides  this,  inability  to  foresee  inculcates  the  very  lesson 
that  we  ought  to  observe  the  laws  of  Him  who  can  foresee. 
It  is  a  strange  thing  to  urge  the  limitation  of  our  powers  of 
judgment,  as  a  reason  for  substituting  it  for  the  judgment  of 
Him  whose  powers  are  perfect.  Then  "  patriotism"  is  a  rea- 
son :  and  we  are  to  be  patriotic  to  our  country  at  the  expense 
of  treason  to  our  religion  ! 

The  principles  upon  which  these  reasonings  are  founded, 
lead  to  their  legitimata  results  :  "  In  war  and  negotiation," 
says  Adam  Smith,  "  the  laws  of  justice  are  very  seldom  ob- 
served. Truth  and  fair  dealing  are  almost  totally  disregarded. 
Treaties  are  violated,  and  the  violation,  if  some  advantage  is 
gained  by  it,  sheds  scarce  any  dishonour  upon  the  violator. 
The  ambassador  who  dupes  the  minister  of  a  foreign  nation, 
is  admired  and  applauded.  The  just  man,  the  man  who  in 
all  private  transactions  would  be  the  most  beloved  and  the 
most  esteemed, in  those  public  transactions  is  regarded  as  a 
fool  and  an  idiot,  who  does  not  imderstand  his  business  ;  and 
he  incurs  always  the  contempt,  and  sometimes  even  the  detes- 
tation, of  his  fellow  citizens."! 

Now,  against  all  such  principles— against  all  endeavours  to 

« 

*  Gisborue's  Moral  Philosophy.  t  Theory  of  Moral  Senti- 

ments. 


CHAP.   I.]  AND    OF    POLITICAL    RECTITUDE.  307 

defend  the  rejection  of  the  Moral  Law  in  political  affairs,  we 
would  with  all  emphasis  protest.  The  reader  sees  that  it  is 
absurd  : — can  he  need  to  be  convinced  that  it  is  unchristian  1 
Christianity  is  of  paramount  authority,  or  another  authority  is 
superior.  He  who  holds  another  authority  as  superior,  rejects 
Christianity  ;  and  the  fair  and  candid  step  would  be  avowedly 
to  reject  it.  He  should  say,  in  distinct  terms — Christianity 
throws  some  light  on  political  principles  ;  but  its  laws  are  to 
be  held  subservient  to  our  interests.  This  were  far  more  sa- 
tisfactory than  the  trimming  system,  the  perpetual  vacillation 
of  obedience  to  two  masters,  and  the  perpetual  endeavour  to 
do  that  which  never  can  be  done — serve  both. 

Jesus  Christ  legislated  for  man — ^not  for  individuals  only, 
not  for  families  only,  not  for  Christian  churches  only,  but  for 
man  in  all  his  relationships  and  in  all  his  circumstances.  He 
legislated  for  states.  In  his  moral  law  we  discover  no  indi- 
cations that  states  were  exempted  from  its  application,  or 
that  any  rule  which  bound  social  did  not  bind  political  com- 
munities. If  any  exemption  were  designed,  the  onus  probandi 
rests  upon  those  who  assert  it :  unless  they  can  show  that  the 
Christian  precepts  are  not  intended  to  apply  to  nations,  the 
conclusion  must  be  admitted  that  they  are.  But  in  reality,  to 
except  nations  from  the  obligations  is  impossible  ;  for  nations 
are  composed  of  individuals,  and  if  no  individual  may  reject 
the  Christian  morality,  a  nation  may  not.  Unless,  indeed,  it 
can  be  shown  that  when  you  are  an  agent  for  others  you  may 
do  what  neither  yourself  nor  any  of  them  might  do  separately 
—a  proposition  of  which  certainly  the  proof  must  be  required 
to  be  very  clear  and  strong. 

But  the  truth  is,  that  those  who  justify  a  suspension  of 
Christian  morality  in  political  affairs,  are  often  unwilling  to 
reason  distinctly  and  candidly  upon  the  subject.  They  satisfy 
themselves  with  a  jest,  or  a  sneer,  or  a  shrug ;  being  unwilling 
either  to  contemn  morality  in  politics,  or  to  practise  it :  and 
it  is  to  little  purpose  to  offer  arguments  to  him  who  does  not 
need  conviction,  but  virtue. 

Expediency  is  the  rock  upon  which  we  split — upon  which, 
strange  as  it  appears,  not  only  our  principles  but  our  interests 
suffer  continual  shipwreck.  It  has  been  upon  Expediency 
that  European  politics  have  so  long  been  founded,  with  such 
lamentably  inexpedient  effects.  We  consult  our  interests  so 
anxiously  that  we  ruin  them.  But  we  consult  them  blindly  : 
we  do  not  know  our  interests,  nor  shall  we  ever  know  them 
whilst  we  continue  to  imagine  that  we  know  them  better  than 
He  who  legislated  for  the  world.     Here  is  the  perpetual  folly 


308  PRINCIPLES    OF    POLITICAL    TRUTH,       [eSSAY  III. 

as  well  as  the  perpetual  crime.  Esteeming  ourselves  wise, 
we  have,  emphatically,  been  fools — of  which  no  other  evi- 
dence is  necessary  than  the  present  political  condition  of 
the  Christian  world.  If  ever  it  was  true  of  any  human  being, 
that  by  his  deviations  from  rectitude  he  had  provided  scourges 
for  himself,  it  is  true  at  this  hour  of  every  nation  in  Europe. 

Let  us  attend  to  this  declaration  of  a  man  who,  whatever 
may  have  been  the  value  of  his  general  politics,  was  certainly 
a  great  statesman  here  :  "  I  am  one  of  those  who  firmly  be- 
lieve, as  much  indeed  as  a  man  can  believe  any  thing,  that 
the  greatest  resource  a  nation  can  possess,  the  surest  principle 
of  power,  is  strict  attention  to  the  principles  of  justice.  I 
firmly  believe  that  the  common  proverb  of  honesty  being  the 
best  policy,  is  as  applicable  to  nations  as  to  individuals." — ■ 
"  In  all  interference  with  foreign  nations  justice  is  the  best 
foundation  of  policy,  and  moderation  is  the  surest  pledge  of 
peace." — "  If  therefore  we  have  been  deficient  in  justice  to- 
wards other  states,  we  have  been  deficient  in  wisdom."* 

Here,  then,  is  the  great  truth  for  which  we  would  contend 
— to  be  unjust  is  to  be  unwise.  And  smce  justice  is  not  im- 
posed upon  nations  more  really  than  other  branches  of  the 
Moral  Law,  the  universal  maxim  is  equally  true — to  deviate 
from  purity  of  rectitude  is  impolitic  as  well  as  wrong.  When 
will  this  truth  be  learnt  and  be  acted  upon  1  When  shall  we 
cast  away  the  contrivances  of  a  low  and  unworthy  policy, 
and  dare  the  venture  of  the  consequences  of  virtue  1  When 
shall  we,  in  political  affairs,  exercise  a  little  of  that  confidence 
in  the  knowledge  and  protection  of  God,  which  we  are  ready 
to  admire  in  individual  life  ? — Not  that  it  is  to  be  assumed  as 
certain  that  such  fidelity  would  cost  nothing.  Christianity 
makes  no  such  promise.  But  whatever  it  might  cost  it  would 
be  worth  the  purchase.  And  neither  reason  nor  experience 
allows  the  doubt  that  a  faithful  adherence  to  the  Moral  Law 
would  more  effectually  serve  national  interests,  than  they  have 
ever  yet  been  served  by  the  utmost  sagacity  whilst  violating 
that  law. 

The  contrivances  of  expediency  have  become  so  habitual 
to  measures  of  state,  that  it  may  probably  be  thought  the 
dreamings  of  a  visionary  to  suppose  it  possible  that  they 
should  be  substituted  by  purity  of  rectitude.  And  yet  I  be- 
lieve it  will  eventually  be  done — not  perhaps  by  the  resolution 
of  a  few  cabinets — it  is  not  from  them  that  reformation  is  to 
be  expected — ^but  by  the  gradual  advance  of  sound  principles 
upon  the  minds  of  men  ; — principles  which  will  assume  more 
*  Fell's  Memoirs  of  the  Public  Life  of  C.  J.  Fox.     -. 


GHAP.  I.]  AND    OF    POLITICAL    RECTITUDE.  309 

and  more  their  rightful  influence  in  the  world,  until  at  length 
the  low  contrivances  of  a  fluctuating  and  immoral  policy  will 
be  substituted  by  firm,  and  consistent,  and  invariable  integTity. 

The  convention  of  what  is  called  the  Holy  Alliance,  was 
an  extraordinary  event ;  and  little  as  the  contracting  parties 
may  have  acted  in  conformity  with  it,  and  little  as  they  or 
their  people  were  prepared  for  such  a  change  of  principles, 
it  is  a  subject  of  satisfaction  that  such  a  state  paper  exists. 
It  contains  a  testimony  at  least  to  virtue  and  to  rectitude  ;  and 
even  if  we  should  suppose  it  to  be  utterly  hypocritical,  the 
testimony  is  just  as  real.  Hypocrisy  commonly  affects  a 
character  which  it  ought  to  maintain :  and  the  act  of  hypoc- 
risy is  homage  to  the  character.  In  this  view,  I  say,  it  is 
subject  of  some  satisfaction  that  a  document  exists  which  de- 
clares that  these  powerful  princes  have  come  to  a  "  fixed  re- 
solution, both  in  the  administration  of  their  respective  states, 
and  in  their  political  relations  with  every  other  government, 
to  take  for  their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of  the  Christian  re- 
ligion— the  precepts  of  Justice,  Christian  Charity,  and  Peace  :" 
and  which  declares  that  these  principles,  "  far  from  being  ap- 
plicable only  to  private  concerns,  must  have  an  immediate  in- 
fluence on  the  councils  of  princes,  as  being  the  only  means 
of  consolidating  human  institutions,  and  remedying  their  im- 
perfections." 

The  time,  it  may  be  hoped,  will  arrive  when  such  a  de- 
claration will  be  the  congenial  and  natural  result  of  princi- 
ples that  are  actually  governing  the  Christian  world.  Mean- 
time, let  the  philosopher  and  the  statesman  keep  that  period 
in  their  view,  and  endeavour  to  accelerate  its  approach.  He 
who  does  this,  will  secure  a  fame  for  himself  that  will  in- 
crease and  still  increase  as  the  virtue  of  man  holds  its  onward 
course,  while  multitudes  of  the  great  both  of  past  ages  and 
of  the  present,  will  become  beacons  to  warn,  rather  than  ^ex- 
amples to  stimulate  us. 


310;  CIVIL    LIBERTY.  [eSSAY  III. 

CHAPTER  II. 

CIVIL  LIBERTY. 

Loss  of  Liberty — ^War — Useless  laws. 

Of  personal  liberty  we  say  nothing,  because  its  full  posses- 
sion is  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  society.  All  gov- 
ernment supposes  the  relinquishment  of  a  portion  of  personal 
liberty. 

Civil  Liberty  may,  however,  be  fully  enjoyed.  It  is  en- 
joyed, where  the  principles  of  political  truth  and  rectitude  are 
applied  in  practice,  because  there  the  people  are  deprived  of 
that  portion  only  of  liberty  which  it  would  be  pernicious  to  them- 
selves to  possess.  If  political  power  is  possessed  by  consent 
of  the  community  ;  if  it  is  exercised  only  for  their  good  ;  and 
if  this  welfare  is  consulted  by  Christian  means,  the  people 
are  free.  No  man  can  define  the  particular  enjoyments  or 
exemptions  which  constitute  civil  liberty,  because  they  are 
contingent  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  respective  nations. 
A  degree  of  restraint  may  be  necessary  for  the  general  wel- 
fare of  one  community,  which  would  be  wholly  unnecessary 
in  another.  Yet  the  first  would  have  no  reason  to  complain 
of  their  want  of  civil  liberty.  The  complaint,  if  any  be  made, 
should  be  of  the  evils  which  make  the  restraint  necessary. 
The  single  question  is,  whether  any  given  degree  of  restraint 
is  necessary  or  not.  If  it  is,  though  the  restraint  may  be 
painful,  the  civil  liberty  of  the  community  may  be  said  to  be 
complete.  It  is  useless  to  say  that  it  is  less  complete  than 
that  of  another  nation;  for  complete  civil  liberty  is  a  re- 
lative and  not  a  positive  enjoyment.  Were  it  otherwise,  no 
people  enjoy,  or  are  likely  for  ages  to  enjoy  full  civil  liberty ; 
because  none  enjoy  so  much  that  they  could  not,  in  a  more 
virtuous  state  of  mankind,  enjoy  more.  "  It  is  not  the  rigour, 
but  the  inexpediency  of  laws  and  acts  of  authority,  which 
makes  them  tyrannical."* 

Civil  liberty  (so  far  as  its  present  enjoyment  goes)  does  not 
necessarily  depend  upon  forms  of  government.  All  commu- 
nities enjoy  it  who  are  properly  governed.  It  may  be  enjoy- 
ed under  an  absolute  monarch  ;  as  we  know  it  may  not  be 
enjoyed  under  a  republic.  Actual,  existing  liberty,  depends 
upon  the  actual,  existing  administration. 

One    great  cause  of  diminutions  of  civil  liberty  is  War ; 

*  Paley :  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  p.  3,  \  6,  c.  5. 


CHAP.  II.]  CIVIL    LIBERTY.  311 

and  if  no  other  motive  induced  a  people  jealously  to  scrutinize 
the  grounds  of  a  war,  this  might  be  sufficient.  The  increased 
loss  of  personal  freedom  to  a  military  man  is  manifest ; — and 
it  is  considerable  to  other  men.  The  man  who  now  pays 
twenty  pounds  a-year  in  taxes,  would  probably  have  paid  but 
two  if  there  had  been  no  war  during  the  past  century.  If  he 
now  gets  a  hundred  and  fifty  pounds  a-year  by  his  exer- 
tions, he  is  obliged  to  labour  six  weeks  out  of  the  fifty-tw,o,  to 
pay  the  taxes  which  war  has  entailed.  That  is  to  say,  he  is 
compelled  to  work  two  hours  every  day  longer  than  he  him- 
self wishes,  or  than  is  needful  for  his  support.  This  is  a  ma- 
terial deduction  from  personal  liberty,  and  a  man  would  feel 
it  as  such,  if  the  coercion  were  directly  applied — if  an  officer 
came  to  his  house  every  afternoon  at  four  o'clock,  when  he 
had  finished  his  business,  and  obliged  him,  under  penalty  of 
a  distraint,  to  work  till  six.  It  is  some  loss  of  liberty,  again, 
to  a  man  to  be  unable  to  open  as  many  windows  in  his  house 
as  he  pleases — or  to  be  forbidden  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  a  debt  without  going  to  the  next  town  for  a  stamp — or  to 
be  obliged  to  ride  in  an  uneasy  carriage  unless  he  will  pay 
for  springs.  It  were  to  no  purpose  to  say  he  may  pay  for 
windows  and  springs  if  he  will,  and  if  he  can. — A  slave  may, 
by  the  same  reasoning,  be  shown  to  be  free  ;  because,  if  he 
will  and  if  he  can,  he  may  purchase  his  freedom.  There  is 
a  loss  of  liberty  in  being  obliged  to  submit  to  the  alternative  ; 
and  we  should  feel  it  as  a  loss  if  such  things  were  not  habit- 
ual, and  if  we  had  not  receded  so  considerably  from  the  lib- 
erty of  nature.  A  housewife  on  the  Ohio  would  think  it  a 
strange  invasion  of  her  liberty,  if  she  were  told  that  hence- 
forth the  police  would  be  sent  to  her  house  to  seize  her  goods 
if  she  made  any  more  soap  to  wash  her  clothes. 

Now,  indeed,  that  war  has  created  a  large  public  debt,  it  is 
necessary  to  the  general  good  that  its  interest  should  be  paid  : 
and  in  this  view  a  man's  civil  liberty  is  not  encroached  upon, 
though  his  personal  liberty  is  diminished.  The  public  wel- 
fare is  consulted  by  the  diminution.  I  may  deplore  the  cause 
without  complaining  of  the  law.  It  may,  upon  emergency, 
be  for  the  public  good  to  suspend  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act.  I- 
should  lament  that  such  a  state  of  things  existed,  but  I  should 
not  complain  that  civil  liberty  was  invaded.  The  lesson 
which  such  considerations  teach,  is,  jealous  watchfulness 
against  wars  for  the  future. 

There  are  many  other  acts  of  governments  by  which  civil 
liberty  is  needlessly  curtailed — among  which  may  be  reckoned 
the  number  of  laws.     Every  law  implies  restriction.     To  be 


312  CIVIL    LIBERTY.  [eSSAY  III. 

destitute  of  laws  is  to  be  absolutely  free  :  to  multiply  laws  is 
to  multiply  restrictions,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  to  dimin- 
ish liberty.  A  great  number  of  penal  statutes  lately  existed 
in  this  country,  by  which  the  reasonable  proceedings  of  a 
prosecutor  were  cramped,  and  impeded,  and  thwarted.  A 
statesman  to  whom  England  is  much  indebted,  has  supplied 
their  place  by  one  which  is  more  rational  and  more  simple ; 
and  prosecutors  now  find  that  they  are  so  much  more  able  to 
consult  their  own  understandings  in  their  proceedings,  that  it 
may,  without  extravagance,  be  said,  that  our  civil  liberty  is 
increased. 

"  A  law  being  found  to  produce  no  sensible  good  effects,  is 
a  sufficient  reason  for  repealing  it."*  It  is  not,  therefore,  suf- 
ficient to  ask  in  reply,  what  harm  does  the  law  occasion  1  for 
you  must  prove  that  it  is  does  good  :  because  all  laws  which 
do  no  good,  do  harm.  They  encroach  upon  or  restrain  the 
liberty  of  the  community,  without  that  reason  which  only  can 
make  the  deduction  of  any  portion  of  liberty  right — the  pub- 
lic good.  If  this  rule  were  sufficiently  attended  to,  perhaps 
more  than  a  few  of  the  laws  of  England  would  quickly  be 
repealed. 


CHAPTER  III. 

POLITICAL  LIBERTY. 

Political  Liberty  the  right  of  a  community — Public  satisfaction. 

This  is,  in  strictness,  a  branch  of  civil  liberty.  Political 
liberty  implies  the  existence  of  such  political  institutions  as 
secure^  with  the  greatest  practicable  certainty,  the  future  pos- 
session of  freedom — the  existence  of  which  institutions  is 
one  of  the  requisites,  in  a  general  sense,  of  Civil  liberty  ;  be- 
cause it  is  as  necessary  to  proper  government  that  securities 
for  freedom  should  be  framed,  as  that  present  freedom  should 
be  permitted. 

The  possession  of  political  liberty  is  of  great  importance. 

A  Russian  may  enjoy  as  great  a  share  of  personal  freedom  as 

an  Englishman ;  that  is,  he  may  find  as  few  restrictions  upon 

the  exercise  of  his  own  will;  but  he  has  no  security  for  the 

*  Paley :  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil,  p  3,  b.  6,  c.  5. 


CHAP.  III.]  POLITICAL    LIBERTY.  313 

continuance  of  this.  For  aught  that  he  knows,  he  may  be 
arbitrarily  thrown  into  prison  to-morrow ;  and  therefore,  though 
he  may  live  and  die  without  molestation,  he  is  politically  en- 
slaved. When  it  is  considered  how  much  human  happiness 
depends  upon  the  security  of  enjoying  happiness  in  future,  such 
institutions  as  those  of  Russia  are  great  grievances ;  and 
Englishmen,  though  they  may  regret  the  curtailment  of  some 
items  of  civil  liberty,  have  much  comparative  reason  to  think 
themselves  politically  free. 

The  possession  of  political  liberty  is  unquestionably  a  right 
of  a  community.  They  may,  with  perfect  reason  require  it 
even  of  governments  which  actually  govern  well.  It  is  not 
enough  for  a  government  to  say,  none  but  beneficial  laws  and 
acts  of  authority  are  adopted.  It  must,  if  it  would  fulfil  the 
duties  of  a  government,  accumulate,  to  the  utmost,  securities 
for  beneficial  measures  hereafter.  In  this  view,  it  may  be 
feared  that  no  government  in  Europe  fulfils  all  its  duty  to  the 
people. 

And  here  considerations  are  suggested  respecting  the  repre- 
sentation oi  a  people — a  point  which,  if  some  political  writers 
were  to  be  listened  to,  was  a  sine  qua  non  of  political  liberty. 
"  To  talk  of  an  abstract  right  of  equal  representation  is  absurd. 
It  is  to  arrogate  a  right  to  one  form  of  government,  whereas 
Providence  has  accommodated  the  different  forms  of  govern- 
ment to  the  different  states  of  society  in  which  they  subsist."* 
If  an  inhabitant  of  Birmingham  should  come  and  tell  me  that 
he  and  his  neighbours  were  debarred  of  political  liberty  be- 
cause they  sent  no  representatives  to  parliament,  I  should  say 
that  the  justness  of  his  complaint  was  problematical.  It  does 
not  follow  because  a  man  is  not  represented,  that  he  is  not 
politically  free.  The  question  is,  whether  as  good  securities 
for  liberty  exist,  without  permitting  him  to  vote,  as  with  it. 
If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  present  legislative  government  af- 
fords as  good  a  security  for  the  future  freedom  of  the  people 
as  any  other  that  might  be  devised,  the  inhabitant  of  Birming- 
ham enjoys,  at  present,  political  liberty.  It  is  a  very  common 
mistake  amongst  writers  to  assume  some  particular  privilege 
or  institution  as  a  test  of  this  liberty — as  something  without 
which  it  cannot  be  enjoyed ;  and  yet  I  suppose  there  is  no 
one  of  their  institutions  or  privileges  under  which  it  would' 
not  be  possible  to  enslave  a  people.  Simple  republicanism, 
universal  suffrage,  and  frequent  elections,  might  afford  no  bet- 
ter security  for  civil  liberty  than  absolute  monarchy.  In  fine, 
poUtical  liberty  is  not  a  matter  that  admits  of  certain  conclu- 
*  WiUiam  Pitt:  Gifford's  Life,  vol.  3. 
27 


314  REXIGIOUS    LIBERTY.  [eSSAY  III. 

sionS  from  theoretical  reasoning  ;  it  is  a  question  of  facts  ;  a 
question  to  be  decided,  like  questions  of  philosophy,  by  rea- 
soning founded  upon  experience.  If  the  inhabitant  of  Bir- 
mingham can  show,  from  relevant  experience,  good  ground  to 
conclude  that  greater  security  for  liberty  would  be  derived 
from  extending  the  representation,  he  has  reason  to  complain 
of  an  undue  privation  of  political  liberty  if  it  is  not  extended. 
But,  then,  it  is  always  incumbent  upon  the  legislature  to 
prove  the  probable  superiority  of  the  existing  institutions 
when  any  considerable  portion  of  the  people  desire  an  altera- 
tion. That  desire  constitutes  a  claim  to  investigation;  and 
to  an  alteration,  too,  unless  the  existing  institutions  appear  to 
be  superior  to  those  which  are  desired.  It  is  not  enough  to 
show  that  they  are  as  good ;  for  though  in  other  respects  the 
two  plans  were  equally  balanced,  the  present  are  not  so  good 
as  the  others  if  they  give  less  satisfaction  to  the  community. 
To  be  satisfied  is  one  great  ingredient  in  the  welfare  of  a 
people  ;  and  in  whatever  degree  a  people  are  not  satisfied,  in 
the  same  degree  civil  government  does  not  perfectly  effect  its 
proper  ends.  To  deny  satisfaction  to  a  people  without  show- 
ing a  reason,  is  to  withhold  from  them  the  due  portion  of  civil 
liberty. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

RELIGIOUS  LIBERTY. 


Civil  disabilities — Interference  of  the  Magistrate — Pennsylvania — Tolera- 
tion— America — Creeds — Religious  Tests — "  The  CathoLc  Question." 

The  magistrate  may  advert  to  subjects  connected  with  re- 
ligion so  far  as  the  public  good  requires  and  as  Christianity 
permits ;  or,  upon  these,  as  upon  other  subjects,  he  may  en- 
deavour to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  people  by  Christian 
means.  What  the  public  welfare  does  require,  and  what  means 
for  promoting  it  are  Christian,  are  separate  considerations. 

Upon  which  grounds  those  advocates  of  religious  liberty 
appear  to  assert  too  much,  who  assert,  as  a  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, that  a  government  never  has,  nor  can  have,  any  just 
concern,  with  religious  opinions.  Unless  these  persons  can 
show  that  no  advertence  to  them  is  allowed  by  Christianity 


CHAP.  IV.]  RELIGIOUS    LIBERTY.  SlS 

and  that  none  can  contribute  to  the  public  good,  circumstances 
may  arise  in  which  an  advertence  would  be  right.  No  one 
perhaps  will  deny  that  a  government  may  lawfully  provide  for 
the  education  of  the  people,  and  endeavour  to  diffuse  just  no- 
tions and  principles,  moral  and  religious,  into  the  public  mind. 
A  government,  therefore,  may  endeavour  to  discountenance 
unsound  notions  and  principles.  It  may  as  reasonably  dis- 
courage what  is  wrong,  as  cherish  what  is  right. 

But  by  what  means  ?  By  influencing  opinions,  not  by  pun- 
ishing persons  who  hold  them.  When  a  man  publishes  a 
book  or  delivers  a  lecture  for  the  purpose  of  enlightening  the 
public  mind,  he  does  well.  A  government  may  take  kindred 
measures  for  the  same  purpose,  and  it  does  well.  But  this  is 
all.  If  our  author  or  lecturer,  finding  his  opinions  were  not 
accepted,  should  proceed  to  injure  those  who  rejected  them, 
he  would  act,  not  only  irrationally  but  immorally.  If  a  gov- 
ernment, finding  its  measures  do  not  influence;  or  alter  the 
views  of  the  people,  injures  those  who  reject  its  sentiments, 
it  acts  immorally  too.  A  man's  opinions  are  not  alterable  at 
his  own  will ;  and  it  is  not  right  to  injure  a  man  for  doing 
that  which  he  cannot  avoid.  Besides,  in  religious  matters 
especially,  it  is  the  Christian  duty  of  a  man,  first,  to  seek 
truth  ;  and  next,  to  adhere  to  those  opinions  which  truth,  as 
he  believes,  teaches.  And  so  again,  it  is  not  right  to  injure  a 
man  for  doing  that  which  it  is  his  duty  to  do.  When,  therefore, 
it  is  aflirmed,  at  the  head  of  this  chapter,  that  the  magistrate 
may  advert  to  subjects  connected  with  religion,  nothing  more 
is  to  be  understood  than  that  he  may  endeavour  to  diffuse  just 
sentiments,  and  to  expose  the  contrary.  To  do  more  than 
this,  although  he  may  think  his  measures  may  promote  the 
public  welfare,  would  be  to  endeavour  to  promote  it  "  by  means 
which  the  Moral  Ijaw  forbids." 

To  inflict  civil  disabilities  is  "  to  do  more  than  this" — it  is 
"to  m/wre  a  man  for  doing  that  which  he  cannot  avoid,"  and 
"  that  which  it  is  his  duty  to  do."  Here,  indeed,  a  sophism 
has  been  resorted  to,  in  order  to  show  that  disabilities  are  not 
injuries.  It  is  said  of  the  Dissenters  of  this  country,  that  no 
penalty  is  inflicted  upon  them  by  excluding  them  from  offices 
— that  the  state  confers  certain  offices  upon  certain  conditions, 
with  which  conditions  a  dissenter  does  not  comply.  And  it 
is  said  that  this  is  no  more  a  penalty  or  a  hardship  than,  when 
the  law  defines  what  pecuniary  qualifications  capacitate  a  man 
for  a  seat  in  parliament,  it  inflicts  a  penalty  upon  those  who 
do  not  possess  them.  I  answer.  Both  are  penalties  and  hard- 
ships— and  that  the  argument  only  attempts  to  justify  one  ill 


816  RELIGIOUS    LIBERTY.  [eSSAY.  III. 

practice  by  the  existence  of  another.  It  will  be  said  that 
such  regulations  are  necessary  to  the  public  good. — Bring 
the  proof.  Here  is  a  certain  restraint :  "  The  proof  of  the 
advantage  of  a  restraint,"  says  Dr.  Paley,  "  lies  upon  the  legis- 
lature." Unless,  therefore,  you  can  show — what  to  me  is 
extremely  problematical — that  the  public  is  benefited  by  a  law 
that  excludes  a  poor  man  from  the  legislature — the  argument 
wholly  fails.  Consider  for  what  purpose  men  unite  in  society 
— "  in  order,"  says  Grotius,  "  to  enjoy  common  rights  and 
advantages" — of  which  rights  and  advantages,  eligibility  to  a 
representative  body  is  one.  Those  principles  of  political  rec- 
titude which  determine  that  a  law  which  needlessly  restrains 
natural  liberty  is  wrong,  determine  that  a  law  which  needlessly 
restrains  the  enjoyment  of  the  privileges  of  society,  is  wrong 
also.  It  is  therefore  not  true  that  a  dissenter  suffers  no  hard- 
ship or  penalty  on  account  of  his  opinions.  The  only  dijOfer- 
ence  between  disabilities  and  ordinary  penalties  is  this,  that 
one  inflicts  evil,  and  the  other  withholds  good ;  and  both  are, 
to  all  intents  and  purposes,  penalties. 

But  even  if  the  legislator  thought  he  could  show  that  the 
public  were  benefited  by  this  penalty,  upon  conscientious  dis- 
sidents, it  would  not  be  suflficient — for  the  penalty  itself  is 
wrong — it  is  not  Christian ;  and  it  is  vain  to  argue  that  an 
unchristian  act  can  be  made  lawful  by  prospects  of  advantage. 
Here,  as  every  where  else,  we  must  maintain  the  supremacy 
of  the  Moral  Law. 

All  these  reasonings  proceed  upon  the  supposition  that  a 
man  does  not,  in  consequence  of  his  opinions,  disturb  the 
peace  of  society  by  any  species  of  violence.  If  he  does,  he 
is  doubtless  to  be  restrained.  It  may  not  be  more  necessary 
for  the  magistrate  to  enquire  what  are  a  man's  opinions  of 
religion,  than  for  a  rider  to  enquire  what  are  the  cogitations 
of  his  horse.  So  long  as  my  horse  carries  me  well,  it  matters 
nothing  to  me  whether  he  be  thinking  of  safe  paces,  or  of 
meadows  and  corn  chests.  So  long  as  the  welfare  of  the 
public  is  secured,  it  matters  nothing  to  the  magistrate  what 
notion  of  Christianity  a  citizen  accepts.  But  if  my  horse,  in 
his  anxiety  to  get  into  a  meadow,  leaps  over  a  hedge,  and  im- 
pedes me  in  my  journey,  it  is  needful  that  I  employ  the  whip 
and  bridle  :  and  if  the  citizen,  in  his  zeal  for  opinions,  violates 
the  general  good,  it  is  needful  that  he  should  be  punished  or 
restrained.  And  even  then,  he  is  not  restrained  for  his  opin- 
ions but  for  his  conduct ;  just  as  I  do  not  apply  the  whip  to 
my  horse  because  he  loves  a  meadow,  but  because  he  goes 
out  of  the  road. 


CHAP.  IV.]  RteLlGlOltS    LlBERTi?".  §1'}' 

And  even  in  the  case  of  conduct,  it  is  needful  to  discrimin- 
ate, accurately,  what  is  a  proper  subject  of  animadversion, 
and  what  is  not.  I  perceive  no  truth  in  the  ingenious  argu- 
ment, "  that  a  man  may  entertain  opinions  however  pernicious, 
but  he  may  not  be  allowed  to  disseminate  them ;  as  a  man 
may  keep  poison  in  his  house,  but  may  not  be  allowed  to  give 
it  to  others  as  wholesome  medicine."  To  support  this  argu- 
ment you  must  have  recourse  to  a  petitio  principii.  How  do 
you  know  that  an  opinion  is  pernicious  ?  By  reasoning  and 
examination,  if  at  all ;  and  that  is  the  very  end  which  the 
dissemination  of  an  opinion  attains.  If  the  truth  or  falsehood 
of  an  opinion  were  demonstrable  to  the  senses,  as  the  mis- 
chief of  poison  is,  there  would  be  some  justness  in  the  argu- 
ment ;  but  it  is  not :  except,  indeed,  that  there  may  be  opin- 
ions so  monstrous,  that  they  immediately  manifest  their 
unsoundness  by  their  effects  on  the  conduct ;  and,  if  they  do 
this,  these  effects  and  not  the  dissemination  of  the  opinion, 
are  the  proper  subject  of  animadversion.  The  doctrine,  that 
a  man  ought  not  to  be  punished  for  disseminating  whatever 
opinions  he  pleases,  upon  whatever  subject,  will  receive  some 
illustration  in  a  future  chapter.  Meantime,  the  reader  will, 
I  hope,  be  prepared  to  admit,  at  least,  that  the  religious  opin- 
ions which  obtain  amongst  Christian  churches,  are  not  such 
as  to  warrant  the  magistrate  in  visiting  those  who  disseminate 
them  with  any  kind  of  penalty. — What  the  magistrate  may 
punish,  and  what  an  individual  ought  to  do,  are  very  different 
considerations :  and  though  there  is  reason  to  think  that  no 
man  should  be  punished  by  human  laws  for  disseminating 
vicious  notions,  it  is  to  be  believed  that  those  who  consciously 
do  it  will  be  held  far  other  than  innocent  at  the  bar  of  God. 

All  reference  to  creeds  in  framing  laws  for  a  general  society 
is  wrong.  And  it  is  somewhat  humiliating  that,  in  the  pres- 
ent age,  and  in  our  country,  it  is  necessary  to  establish  this 
proposition  by  formal  proof.  It  is  humiliating,  because  it 
shows  us  how  slow  is  the  progress  of  sound  principles  upon 
the  human  mind,  even  when  they  are  not  only  recommended 
by  reason,  but  enforced  by  experience.  It  is  now  nearly  a 
century  and  a  half  since  one  of  our  own  colonies  adopted  a 
system  of  religious  liberty,  which  far  surpassed  that  of  the 
parent  state  at  the  present  hour.  And  this  system  was  suc- 
cessful, not  negatively,  in  that  it  produced  no  evil,  but  posi- 
tively, in  that  it  produced  much  good.  One  hundred  and  fifty 
years  is  a  long  time  for  a  nation  to  be  learning  a  short  and 
plain  lesson.  In  Pennsylvania,  in  addition  to  a  complete  tol- 
eration of  "  Jews,  Turks,  Catholics,  and  people  of  all  persua^ 

27* 


$^t%  RELIGIOUS    LIBERTY.  [eSSAY  Hi. 

sions  in  religion,"*  there  was  no  disability  or  test  exacted  of 
any  professor  of  the  Christian  faith.  "  All  persons,"  says 
Burke,  "  who  profess  to  believe  in  one  God,  are  freely  toler- 
ated. Those  who  believe  in  Jesus  Christ,  of  whatever  de- 
nomination, are  not  excluded  from  employments  and  posts."! 
The  wisdom  or  justice  of  excluding  those  who  were  not 
Christians  from  employments  and  posts  may  be  doubted 
Penn,  however,  did  much ;  and  far  outstripped  in  enlightened 
institutions  the  general  example  of  the  world.  If  he  had 
lived  in  the  present  day,  it  is  not  improbable  that  a  mind  like 
his  would  have  seen  no  better  reason  for  excluding  those  who 
disbelieved  Christianity,  than  those  who  believed  it  imper- 
fectly or  by  parts.  The  consequences,  we  say,  were  happy. 
Burke  says  again  of  Penn,  "  He  made  the  most  perfect  free- 
dom, both  religious  and  civil,  the  basis  of  his  establishment ; 
and  this  has  done  more  towards  the  settling  of  the  province, 
and  towards  the  settling  of  it  in  a  strong  and  permanent  man- 
ner, than  the  wisest  regulations  could  have  done  on  any  other 
plan."J — "  By  the  favourable  terms,"  says  Morse,  "  which 
Mr.  Penn  oiEfered  to  settlers,  and  an  unlimited  toleration  of  all 
religious  denominations,  the  population  of  the  province  was 
extremely  rapid. "<^  And  yet  England  is,  at  this  present  hour, 
doubting  and  disputing  whether  tests  are  right ! 

Nor  is  example  wanted  at  the  present  day — "  In  America, 
the  question  is  not,  What  is  his  creed  ?  but,  What  is  his  con- 
duct ?  Jews  have  all  the  privileges  of  Christians — No  reli- 
gious test  is  required  to  qualify  for  public  office  ;  except  in 
some  cases,  a  mere  verbal  assent  to  the  truth  of  the  Christian 
religion.  While  I  was  in  New  York,"  adds  Duncan,  "  the 
sheriff  of  the  city  was  a  Jew."||  It  is  in  vain  to  make  any 
objection  to  the  argument  which  these  facts  urge,  unless  we 
can  show  that  the  effect  is  not  good.  And  where  is  the  man 
who  will  even  affect  to  do  this  ?  But  if  it  should  be  said  that 
what  is  wise  and  expedient  with  such  national  institutions  as 
those  of  America,  would  be  unwise  and  inexpedient  with  such 
institutions  as  those  of  England  or  Spain,  it  will  become  a 
most  grave  enquiry,  whether  the  fault  does  not  lie  with  the 
institutions  that  are  not  adapted  to  religious  liberty  : — for  re- 
ligious liberty  is  assuredly  adapted  to  man. 

Observe  what  absurdities  this  sacrifice  of  universal  rectitude 
to  particular  institutions  occasions.     There  may  be  ten  na- 

*  Clarkson's  Life  of  Penn. 

t  Account  of  the  European  Settlements  in  America.  t  Ibid. 

§  American  Geography.  See  also  Anderson's  Deduction  of  the  Origin 
of  Commerce,  U  Duncan's  travels  in  America. 


CHAP.  IV.]  RELIGIOUS    LIBERTY.  319 

tions  on  a  continent,  each  of  which  selects  a  different  creed 
for  its  preference,  and  excludes  all  others.  The  first  excludes 
all  but  Catholics — the  second  all  but  Episcopalians — ^the  third 
all  but  Unitarians — the  fourth  all  but  the  Greek  Church  ;  and 
so  on  with  the  rest.  If  it  be  right  that  Unitarians  should  be 
intrusted  with  power  on  one  side  of  a  river,  can  it  be  right 
that  they  shall  not  be  intrusted  with  it  on  the  other  ?  Or,  if 
such  an  absurdity  be  really  conducive  to  the  support  of  the 
incongnious  institutions  of  the  several  states,  is  it  not  an  evi- 
dence that  those  institutions  need  to  be  amended  ?  And  are 
not  the  principles  of  perfect  religious  liberty,  nevertheless, 
sound  and  true  ? 

Englishmen  have  not  to  complain  of  a  want  of  Toleration. 
But  toleration  is  a  word  which  ought  scarcely  to  be  heard  out 
of  a  Christian's  mouth.  1  tolerate  the  religion  of  my  brother ! 
I  miffht  as  well  say  I  tolerate  the  continuance  of  his  head 
upon  his  shoulders.  I  have  no  more  right  to  hold  his  creed  at 
my  disposal,  or  his  person  in  consequence  of  his  creed,  than  his 
h  .  ■.  The  idea  of  toleration  is  a  relic  of  the  effects  of  the 
papal  usurpation.  That  usurpation  did  not  tolerate  :  and  Pro- 
testants thought  it  was  a  great  thing  for  them  to  do  what  the 
papacy  had  thus  refused.  And  so  it  was.  It  was  a  great 
ihingfor  them.  Very  imperfectly,  however,  they  did  it ;  and 
it  was  a  great  thing  for  Penn,  who  was  brought  up  in  a  land 
of  intolerant  Protestants,  to  declare  universal  toleration  for 
all  within  his  borders.  But — (and  we  may  reverently  say, 
Thanks  be  to  God  I) — we  live  in  happier  times.  We  have 
advanced  from  intolerance  to  toleration  ;  and  now  it  is  time  to 
advance  from  toleration  to  Religious  Liberty  :  to  that  religious 
liberty  which  excludes  all  reference  to  creeds  from  the  civil 
institutions  of  a  people. 

The  reader  will  perhaps  have  observed,  that  Religious 
Liberty  and  Religious  Establishments  are  incompatible  things. 
An  establishment  presupposes  incomplete  religions  liberty. 
If  an  Establishment  be  right.  Religious  Liberty  is  not ;  and 
if  Religious  Liberty  be  right,  an  Establishment  is  not.  Dif- 
ferently constituted  religious  establishments  may,  no  doubt, 
impose  greater  or  less  restraint  upon  liberty  ;  but  every  idea 
of  an  establisliment — of  a  church  preferred  by  the  state — im- 
poses some  restraint.  It  is  the  same  with  Tests.  A  test,  of 
some  kind,  is  necessary  to  a  church  thus  preferred  by  the 
state  ;  for  how  else  shall  it  be  known  who  is  a  member  of  that 
church  and  who  is  not  ?  Religious  Liberty  is  incompatible 
with  Religious  Tests  :  for  which  reason  again,  all  arguments 


320  RELIGIOUS    LIBERTY.  [ESSAY    111. 

by  which  this  liberty  is  shown  to  be  right,  are  so  many  proofs 
that  religious  tests  are  wrong.  These  considerations  the 
reader  will  be  pleased  to  bear  in  mind,  when  he  considers  the 
question  of  Religious  Establishments. 

Tests  are  snares  for  the  conscience.  If  their  terms  are  so 
loose  that  any  man  can  take  them  with  a  safe  conscience, 
they  are  not  tests.  If  their  terms  are  definite,  they  make 
many  hypocrites.  Men  are  induced  to  assent,  or  subscribe, 
or  perform  (whatever  the  requisitions  of  the  test  may  be) 
against  their  consciences,  in  order  to  obtain  the  advantages 
which  are  contingent  upon  it.  An  attempt  was  once  made 
in  England  to  introduce  an  unexceptionable  test,  by  which 
the  party  was  to  declare  "  that  the  books  of  the  Old  and  New 
Testament  contained,  in  his  opinion  a  revelation  from  God." 
But  whom  did  this  exclude  ?  Perhaps  Deists,  Mahometans, 
Pagans,  Jews.  But,  as  a  snare,  the  operation  was  serious  ; 
for,  simple  as  the  test  appears,  it  was  liable  to  great  uncer- 
tainty of  meaning.  Did  it  mean  that  all  the  books  contained 
a  revelation  1  Then  some  think  that  all  the  books  rro  not 
authentic.  Did  it  mean  that  there  was  a  revelation  in  some 
of  the  books  of  the  Bible  ?  Then  Jews,  Mahometans,  Pa- 
gans, and  some  Deists  might,  for  aught  that  I  know,  conscien- 
tiously take  it.  No  unexceptionable  test  is  possible.  There 
are,  to  be  sure,  gradations  of  impropriety ;  and  in  England 
we  have  not  always  resorted  to  the  least  objectionable.  It 
was  well  observed  by  Charles  James  Fox,  that  "  the  idea  of 
making  a  religious  rite  the  qualification  for  holding  a  civil  em- 
ployment is  more  than  absurd,  and  deserves  to  be  considered 
as  a  profanation  of  a  sacred  institution." 


A  few,  and  only  a  few,  sentences,  will  be  allowed  to  the 
writer  upon  the  great,  the  very  great  question,  of  extending 
religious  liberty  to  the  Catholics  of  these  kingdoms.  I  call 
it  a  very  great  question,  not  because  of  the  difficulty  of  deci- 
ding it,  if  sound  principles  are  applied,  but  because  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  interests  that  are  involved,  and  of  the  con- 
sequences which  may  follow  if  those  principles  are  not  ap- 
plied. The  reader  will  easily  perceive,  from  the  preceding 
contents  of  this  chapter,  the  writer's  conviction,  that  full  Re- 
ligious Liberty  ought  to  be  extended  to  the  Catholics,  because 
it  ought  to  be  extended  to  all  men.  If  a  Catholic  acts  in  op- 
position to  the  public  welfare,  diminish  or  take  away  his 
freedom ;  if  he  only  thinks  amiss,  let  him  enjoy  his  freedom 
undiminished. 

To  this  I  know  of  but  one  objection  that  is  worth  noticing 


CHAP.  IV.]  RELIGIOITS    LIBERTY.  31^1 

here — that  they  are  harmless  only  because  they  have  not  the- 
power  of  doing  mischief,  and  that  they  wait  only  for  the  power  ta 
begin  to  do  it.  But  they  say,  "  This  is  not  the  case — we  have 
no  such  intentions."  Now,  in  all  reason,  you  must  believe 
them,  or  show  that  they  are  unworthy  of  belief.  If  you  be- 
lieve them,  Religious  Liberty  follows  of  course.  Can  you 
then  show  that  they  are  unworthy  of  belief  ?  Where  is  your 
evidence  ? 

You  say,  their  allegiance  is  divided  between  the  king  and 
a  foreign  power.  They  reply,  "  It  is  not ;"  "  We  hold  our- 
selves bound  in  conscience,  to  obey  the  civil  government  in 
all  things  of  a  temporal  and  civil  nature,  notwithstanding  any 
dispensation  to  the  contrary,  from  the  Pope  or  Church  of 
Rome." 

You  say  their  declarations  and  oaths  do  not  bind  them,  be- 
cause they  hold  that  they  can  be  dispensed  from  the  obligation 
of  all  oaths  by  the  Pope. — They  reply,  "  We  do  not ;"  "  We 
hold  that  the  obligation  of  an  oath  is  most  sacred ;  that  no 
power  whatsoever  can  dispense  with  any  oath,  by  which  a 
Catholic  has  confirmed  his  duty  of  allegiance  to  his  sovereign, 
or  any  obligation  of  duty  to  a  third  person." 

You  say,  they  hold  that  faith  is  not  to  be  kept  with  heretics. 
—They  reply,  "  We  do  not:'  "  British  Catholics,"  say  they, 
"  have  solemnly  sworn  that  they  reject  and  detest  that  unchris- 
tian and  impious  principle,  that  faith  is  not  to  be  kept  with 
heretics  or  infidels."  These  declarations  are  taken  from  a 
"  Declaration  of  the  Catholic  Bishops,  the  Vicars  Apostolic, 
their  coadjutors  in  Great  Britain,"  1825.  They  are  signed 
by  the  Catholic  Bishops  of  Great  Britain,  and  are  approved 
in  an  "  address"  signed  by  eight  Catholic  Peers  and  a  large 
number  of  other  persons  of  rank  and  character. 

Now  I  ask  of  those  who  contend  for  the  Catholic  disabil- 
ities, What  proof  do  you  bring  that  these  men  are  trying  to 
deceive  you  ?  I  can  anticipate  no  answer,  because  I  have 
heard  none.  Will  you,  then,  content  yourselves  by  saying, 
We  will  not  believe  them  ?  This  would  be  at  least  the  can- 
did course,  and  the  world  might  then  perceive  that  our  conduct 
was  regulated  not  by  reason,  but  by  prejudice  or  the  con- 
sciousness of  power.  "  It  is  unwarrantable  to  infer,  a  priori, 
and  contrary  to  the  professions  and  declarations  of  the  per- 
sons holding  such  opinions,  that  their  opinions  would  induce 
acts  injurious  to  the  common  weal."* 

But  if  nothing  can  be  said  to  show  that  the  Catholic  de- 
clarations do  not  bind  them,  something  can  be   said  to  show 
*  C.  J.  Fox:  Gifford's  Life  of  Pitt,  vol.  2. 


322  CIVIL    OBEDIENCE.  [^SSAY  III. 

that  they  do.  If  declarations  be  indeed  so  little  binding  upon 
their  consciences,  how  comes  it  to  pass  that  they  do  not  make 
those  declarations  which  would  remove  their  disabilities,  get 
a  dispensation  from  the  Pope,  and  so  enjoy  both  the  privileges 
and  an  easy  conscience  ?  Why,  if  their  oaths  and  declara- 
tions did  not  bind  them,  they  would  get  rid  of  their  disabil- 
ities to-morrow !  Nothing  is  wanting  but  a  few  hypocritical 
declarations,  and  Catholic  Emancipation  is  effected.  Why 
do  they  not  make  these  declarations  ?  Because  their  loords 
hind  them.  And  yet,  (so  gross  is  the  absurdity,)  although  it 
is  their  conscientiousness  which  keeps  them  out  of  office,  we 
say  they  are  to  be  kept  out  because  they  are  not  conscien- 
tious ! 

I  forbear  further  inquiry :  but  I  could  not,  with  satisfaction, 
avoid  applying  what  I  conceive  to  be  the  sound  principles  of 
Political  Rectitude  to  this  great  question  ;  and  let  no  man 
allow  his  prejudices  or  his  fears  to  prevent  him  from  applying 
them  to  this,  as  to  every  other  political  subject.  Justice  and 
Truth  are  not  to  be  sacrificed  to  our  weaknesses  and  appre- 
hensions ;  and  I  believe,  that  if  the  people  and  legislature  of 
this  country  will  adhere  to  justice  and  truth  with  regard  to 
our  Catholic  brethren,  they  will  find,  erelong,  that  they  have 
only  been  delaying  the  welfare  of  the  Empire. 


CHAPTER  V. 


CIVIL  OBEDIENCE. 


Expediency  of  Obedience — Obligations  to  Obedience — Extent  of  the 
Duty — Resistance  to  the  Civil  Power — Obedience  may  be  withdrawn 
— King  James — America — Non-compliance — Interference  of  the  Ma- 
gistrate— Oaths  of  Allegiance. 

Submission  to  Government  is  involved  in  the  very  idea  of 
the  institution.  None  can  govern,  if  none  submit :  and  hence 
is  derived  the  duty  of  submission,  so  far  as  it  is  independent 
of  Christianity.  Government  being  necessary  to  the  good  of 
society,  submission  is  necessary  also,  and  therefore  it  is  right 

This  duty  is  enforced  with  great  distinctness  by  Christian- 
ity— "  Be  subject  to  principalities  and  powers." — "  Obey  ma- 
gistrates."— "  Submit  to  every  ordinance  of  man." — The  great 


CHAP,  v.]  CIVIL    OBEDIENCE.  323 

question,  therefore,  is,  whether  the  duty  be  absolute  and  un- 
conditional ;  and  if  not,  what  are  its  limits,  and  how  are  they 
to  be  ascertained  ? 

The  law  of  nature  proposes  few  motives  to  obedience  ex- 
cept those  which  are  dictated  by  expediency.  The  object 
of  instituting  goverimient  being  the  good  of  the  governed, 
any  means  of  attaining  that  object  is,  in  the  view  of  natural 
reason,  right.  So  that,  if  in  any  case  a  government  does  not 
effect  its  proper  objects,  it  may  not  only  be  exchanged,  but 
exchanged  by  any  means  which  will  tend  on  the  whole  to  the 
public  good.  Resistance — arms — civil  war — every  act  is,  in 
the  view  of  natural  reason,  lawful  if  it  is  useful.  But  although 
good  government  is  the  right  of  the  people,  it  is,  nevertheless, 
not  sufficient  to  release  a  subject  from  the  obligation  of  obe- 
dience, that  a  government  adopts  some  measures  which  he 
thinks  are  not  conducive  to  the  general  good.  A  wise  pagan 
would  not  limit  his  obedience  to  those  measures  in  which  a 
government  acted  expediently  ;  because  it  is  often  better  for 
the  community  that  some  acts  of  misgovernment  should  be 
borne,  than  that  the  general  system  ot  obedience  should  be 
violated.  It  is,  as  a  general  rule,  more  necessary  to  the  wel- 
fare of  a  people  that  governments  should  be  regula,rly  obeyed, 
than  that  each  of  their  measures  should  be  good  and  right. 
In  practice,  therefore,  even  considerations  of  Utility  are  suf- 
ficient, generally,  to  oblige  us  to  submit  to  the  Civil  power. 

When  we  turn  from  the  law  of  nature  to  Christianity,  we 
find,  as  we  are  wont,  that  the  moral  cord  is  tightened,  and 
that  not  every  means  of  opposing  governments  for  the  public 
good  is  permitted  to  us.  The  consideration  of  what  modes 
of  opposition  Christianity  allows,  and  what  it  forbids,  is  of 
great  interest  and  importance. 

"  Let  every  soul  be  subject  unto  the  higher  powers.  For 
there  is  no  power  but  of  God :  the  powers  that  be  are  or- 
dained of  God.  Whosoever,  therefore,  resisteth  the  power, 
resisteth  the  ordinance  of  God.  For  rulers  are  not  a  terror 
to  good  works,  but  to  the  evil.  He  is  the  minister  of  God 
to  thee  for  good — a  revenger,  to  execute  wrath  upon  him  that 
doeth  evil.  Wherefore,  ye  must  needs  be  subject,  not  only 
for  wrath,  but  also  for  conscience  sake."* — Upon  this  often 
cited  and  often  canvassed  passage,  three  things  are  to  be  ob- 
served : — 

1.  That  it  asserts  the  general  duty  of  Civil  obedience,  be- 
cause govenmient  is  an  institution  sanctioned  by  the  Deity. 
*  Rom.  xiii.  1  to  5. 


324  CIVIL    OBEDIENCE.  [ESSAY  III. 

2.  That  it  asserts  this  duty  under  the  supposition  th.3.t  the 
governor  is  a  minister  of  God  for  good. 

3.  That  it  gives  but  little  other  information  respecting  the 
extent  of  the  duty  of  obedience. 

I.  The  obligation  to  obedience  is  not  founded,  therefore, 
simply  upon  expediency,  but  upon  the  more  satisfactory  and 
certain  ground,  the  expressed  will  of  God.  And  here  the  su- 
periority of  this  motive  over  that  of  fear  of  the  magistrate's 
power,  is  manifest.  We  are  to  be  subject,  not  only  for  wrath, 
but  for  conscience'  sake — not  only  out  of  fear  of  man,  but  out 
of  fidelity  to  God.  This  motive,  where  it  operates,  is  likely, 
as  was  observed  in  the  first  Essay,  to  produce  much  more 
consistent  and  conscientious  obedience  than  that  of  expedi- 
ency or  fear. 

II.  The  duty  is  inculcated  under  the  supposition  that  the 
governor  is  a  minister  for  good.  It  is  upon  this  supposition 
that  the  apostle  proceeds  :  "ybr  rulers  are  not  a  terror  to  good 
works,  but  to  the  evil ;"  which  is  tantamount  to  saying,  that 
if  they  be  not  a  terror  to  evil  works  but  to  good,  the  duty  of 
obedience  is  altered.  "  The  power  that  is  of  God"  says  an 
intelligent  and  Christian  writer,  "  leaves  neither  ruler  nor  sub- 
ject to  the  liberty  of  his  own  will,  but  limits  both  to  the  will 
of  God  ;  so  that  the  magistrate  hath  no  power  to  command 
evil  to  be  done  because  he  is  a  magistrate,  and  the  subject 
hath  no  liberty  to  do  evil  because  a  magistrate  doth  command 
it."*  When,  therefore,  the  Christian  teacher  says,  "  Let 
every  soul  be  subject  to  the  higher  powers,"  he  proposes  not  an 
absolute  but  a  conditional  rule — conditional  upon  the  nature  of 
the  actions  which  the  higher  powers  require.  The  expres- 
sion, "  There  is  no  power  but  of  God,"  does  not  invalidate 
this  conclusion,  because  the  Apostles  themselves  did  not 
yield  unconditional  obedience  to  the  powers  that  were.  Simi- 
lar observations  apply  to  the  parallel  passage  in  1st  Peter: 
"  Submit  yourselves  to  every  ordinance  of  man  for  the  Lord's 
sake  ;  whether  it  be  to  the  king  as  supreme,  or  unto  governors 
?s  unto  them  that  are  sent  by  him,  for  the  punishment  of  evil 
doers  and  for  the  praise  of  them  that  do  well."  The  supposi- 
tion of  the  just  exercise  of  power  is  still  kept  in  view. 

III.  The  precepts  give  little  other  information  than  this  re- 
specting the  extent  of  the  duty  of  obedience.  "  Whosoever 
resisteth  the  power,  resisteth  the  ordinance  of  God,"  is,  like 
the  direction,  to  "  be  subject,"  a  conditional  proposition.  What 
precise  meaning  was  here  attached  to  the  word  "  resisteth,'* 

*  Crisp :  "  To  the  Rulers  and  Inhabitants  in  Holland,  &c.  Abt.  Ann. 
1670, 


CHAP,  v.]  CIVIL    OBEDIENCE.  32$ 

cannot  perhaps  be  known ;  but  there  is  reason  to  think  that 
the  meaning  was  not  designed  to  be  precise — that  the  propo- 
sition was  general.  "  Magistrates  are  not  to  be  resisted," 
without  defining,  or  attempting  to  define,  the  limits  of  civil 
obedience. 

Upon  the  whole,  this  often  agitated  portion  of  the  Christian 
Scriptures  does  not  appear  to  me  to  convey  much  information 
respecting  the  duties  of  civil  obedience ;  and  although  it  ex- 
plicitly asserts  the  general  duty  of  obedience  to  the  magistrate, 
it  does  not  inform  us  how  far  that  duty  extends,  nor  what  are 
its  limits.  To  say  this,  however,  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
saying,  with  Dr.  Paley,  that  "  As  to  the  extent  of  our  civil 
rights  and  obligations,  Christianity  hath  left  us  where  she  found 
us ;  that  she  hath  neither  altered  nor  ascertained  it ;  that  the 
New  Testament  contains  not  one  passage,  which,  fairly 
interpreted,  affords  either  argument  or  objection  applicable  to 
any  conclusions  upon  the  subject  that  are  deduced  from  the 
law  and  religion  of  nature."  *  Although  the  13th  chapter  to 
the  Romans  may  contain  no  such  passage,  yet  I  think  it  can 
be  shown  that  the  New  Testament  does.  Indeed,  it  would  be 
a  strange  thing  if  the  Christian  Scriptures,  containing  as  they 
do  manifold  precepts  for  the  regulation  of  human  conduct, 
manifold  precepts,  of  which  the  application  is  very  wide,  not 
to  say  universal — it  would,  I  say,  be  a  strange  thing  if  none 
of  these  precepts  threw  any  light  upon  duties  of  such  wide  em- 
brace as  those  of  citizens  in  relation  to  governors. 

The  error  (assuming  that  there  is  an  error)  in  the  statement 
of  Dr.  Paley,  results,  probably,  from  the  supposition,  that  be- 
cause no  passage  specifically  directed  to  civil  obedience,  con- 
tained the  rules  in  question,  therefore  no  rules  were  to  be  found 
in  the  volume.  This  is  an  error  of  every  day.  There  are 
numberless  questions  of  duty  which  Christianity  decides,  yet 
respecting  which,  specifically,  not  a  word  is  to  be  found  in  the 
New  Testament.  These  questions  are  decided  by  general 
principles,  which  principles  are  distinctly  laid  down.  These 
three  words,  "  Love  your  enemies,"  are  of  greater  practical 
application  in  the  affairs  of  life,  than  twenty  propositions 
which  define  exact  duties  in  specific  cases.  It  is  for  these 
exact  definitions  that  men  accustom  themselves  to  seek ;  and 
when  they  are  not  to  be  found,  conclude  that  Christianity  gives 
no  directions  upon  the  subject. 

Thus  it  has  happened  with  the  question  of  Civil  Obedience. 

Now,  in  considering  the  general  principles  of  Christianity,  I 

think  very  satisfactory  knowledge  may  be  deduced  respecting 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  PhU.  b.  6,  c.  4. 

28 


326  ci:kil  obedience.  [EssAr  ui. 

resistance  to  the  civil  power.  Those  precepts  to  forbearance, 
to  gentleness,  to  love,  to  mildness,  which  are  .iterated  as  the 
essence  of  the  Christian  morality,  apply,  surely,  to  the  ques- 
tion of  resistance.  Surely  there  may  be  some  degrees  and 
kinds  of  resistance,  which,  being  incompatible  with  the  ob- 
servance of  these  principles,  Christianity  distinctly  forbids. — 
If  indeed  the  reader  has  given  assent  to  our  reasonings  re- 
specting self-defence,  (especially  if  he  shall  give  his  assent 
to  the  reasonings  on  War,)  he  will  readily  admit  that  Christi- 
anity forbids  an  armed  resistance  to  the  civil  power.  Let  me 
be  distinctly  understood.  It  forbids  this  armed  resistance, 
not  in  as  much  as  it  is  directed  to  the  civil  power,  but  in  as 
much  as  such  violence  to  any  power  is  incompatible  with  the 
purity  of  the  Christian  character. 

Concluding,  then,  that  specific  rules  respecting  the  extent 
of  Civil  Obedience  are  not  to  be  found  in  Scripture,  we  are 
brought  to  the  position,  that  we  must  ascertain  this  extent  by 
the  general  duties  which  Christianity  imposes  upon  mankind, 
and  by  the  general  principles  of  political  Truth.  In  attempt- 
ing, upon  these  grounds,  to  illustrate  our  civil  duties,  I  am  so- 
licitous to  remark  that  the  Individual  Christian  who,  regard- 
ing himself  as  a  journeyer  to  a  better  country,  thinks  it  best 
for  him  not  to  intermeddle  in  political  affairs,  may  rightly 
pursue  a  path  of  simpler  submission  and  acquiescence  than 
that  which  I  believe  Christianity  allows.  Whatever  may  be 
the  peculiar  business  of  individuals,  the  business  of  man  is  to 
act  as  the  Christian  citizen — not  merely  to  prepare  himself 
for  another  world,  but  to  do  such  good  as  he  may,  political  as 
well  as  social,  in  the  present.  And  yet  so  fundamenially,  so 
utterly  incongruous  with  Christian  rectitude,  is  the  state  of 
many  branches  of  political  affairs  in  the  present  day,  that  I 
know  not  whether  he  who  is  solicitous  to  adhere  to  this  rec- 
titude is  not  both  wise  and  riorht  in  standing  aloof.  This  con- 
sideration  applies,  especially,  to  circumstances  in  which  the 
limits  of  Civil  Obedience  are  brought  into  practical  illustra- 
tions. The  tumult  and  violence  which  ordinarily  attend  any 
approach  to  political  revolutions  are  such,  that  the  best  and 
proper  office  of  a  good  man  may  be  rather  that  of  a  modera- 
tor of  both  parties  than  of  a  partisan  with  either. — Neverthe- 
less, it  is  fit  that  the  Obligations  of  Civil  Obedience  should 
be  distinctly  understood. 

Referring,  then,  to  political  truth,  it  is  to  be  remembered 
vhat  governors  are  established,  not  for  their  own  advantage, 
Sut  for  the  people's.  If  they  so  far  disregard  this  object  of 
heir  establishment,  as  greatly  to  sacrifice  the  public  welfare, 


CHAP,  v.]  CIVIL    OBEDIENCE.  32'? 

the  people  (and  consequently  individuals)  may  rightly  consider 
whether  a  change  of  governors  is  not  dictated  by  utility  ;  and 
if  it  is,  they  may  rightly  endeavour  to  effect  such  a  change 
by  recommending  it  to  the  public,  and  by  transferring  their 
obedience  to  those  w^ho,  there  is  reason  to  believe,  will  better 
execute  the  offices  for  which  government  is  instituted.  I  per- 
ceive nothing  unchristian  in  this.  A  nian  who  lived  in  1688, 
and  was  convinced  that  it  was  for  the  general  good  that  Wil- 
liam should  be  placed  on  the  throne  instead  of  James,  was  at 
liberty  to  promote,  by  all  Christian  means,  the  accession  of 
William,  and  consequently  to  withdraw  his  own,  and  to  re- 
commend others  to  withdraw  their  obedience,  from  James. 
The  support  of  the  Bill  of  Exclusion  in  Charles  the  Second's 
reign,  was  nearly  allied  to  a  withdrawing  of  civil  obedience. 
The  Christian  of  that  day  who  was  persuaded  that  the  bill 
would  tend  to  the  public  welfare,  was  right  in  supporting  it, 
and  he  would  have  been  equally  right  in  continuing  his  sup- 
port if  Charles  had  suddenly  died,  and  his  brother  had  sud- 
denly stepped  into  the  throne.  If  I  had  lived  in  America 
fifty  years  ago,  and  had  thought  the  disobedience  of  the  colo- 
nies wrong,  and  that  the  whole  empire  would  be  injured 
by  their  separation  from  England,  I  should  have  thought  my- 
self at  liberty  to  urge  these  considerations  upon  other  n>en, 
and  otherwise  to  exert  myself  (always  within  the  limits  of 
Christian  conduct)  to  support  the  British  cause.  I  might,  in- 
deed, have  thought  that  there  was  so  much  violence  and 
wickedness  on  both  sides,  that  the  Christian  could  take  part 
with  neither :  but  this  is  an  accidental  connexion,  and  in  no 
degree  affects  the  principle  itself.  But  when  the  colonies 
were  actually  separated  from  Britain,  and  it  was  manifestly 
the  general  will  to  be  independent,  I  should  have  readily 
transferred  my  obedience  to  the  United  States,  convinced 
that  the  new  government  was  preferred  by  the  people  ;  that, 
therefore,  it  was  the  rightful  government ;  and,  being  such, 
that  it  was  my  Christian  duty  to  obey  it. 

Now  the  lawful  means  of  discouraging  or  prompting  an  al- 
teration of  a  government,  must  be  determined  by  the  general 
duties  of  Christian  morality.  There  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
nothing  in  political  affairs  which  conveys  a  privilege  to  throw 
off  the  Christian  character ;  and  whatever  species  of  opposi- 
tion or  support  involves  a  sacrifice  or  suspension  of  this 
character,  is,  for  that  reason,  wrong.  Clamorous  and  vehe- 
ment debatings  and  harangues — vituperation  and  calumny — 
acts  of  bloodshed  and  violence,  or  instigations  to  such  acts, 
are,  I  think,  measures  in  which  the  first  teachers  of  Christianity 


3^6  CIVIL    OBEDIENCE.  [eSSAY  III 

would  not  have  participated ;  measures  which  would  have 
violated  their  own  precepts  ;  and  measures,  therefore,  which 
a  Christian  is  not  at  liberty  to  pursue.  Objections  to  these 
sentiments  will  no  doubt  be  at  hand :  we  shall  be  told  that 
such  opposition  would  be  ineffectual  against  the  encroach- 
ments of  power  and  the  armies  of  tyranny — that  it  would  be 
to  no  purpose  to  reason  with  a  general  who  had  orders  to  en- 
force obedience  ;  and  that  the  nature  of  the  power  to  be  over- 
come, dictated  the  necessity  of  corresponding  power  to  over- 
come it.  To  all  which  it  is,  in  the  first  place,  a  sufficient 
answer,  that  the  question  is  not  what  evils  may  ensue  from  an 
adherence  to  Christianity,  but  what  Christianity  requires. 
We  renew  the  oft-repeated  truth,  that  Christian  rectitude  is 
paramount.  When  the  finst  Christians  refused  obedience  to 
some  of  the  existing  authorities — they  did  not  resist.  They 
exemplified  their  own  precepts — to  prefer  the  will  of  God  be- 
fore all ;  and  if  this  preference  subjected  them  to  evils — ^to 
bear  them  without  violating  other  portions  of  His  Will  in  order 
to  ward  them  off.  But  if  resistance  to  the  civil  power  was  thus 
unlawful  when  the  magistrate  commanded  actions  that  were 
morally  wrong,  much  more  clearly  is  it  unlawful,  when  the 
wrongness  consists  only  in  political  grievances.  The  incon- 
veniences of  bad  governments  cannot  constitute  a  superior 
reason  for  violence,  to  that  which  is  constituted  by  the  impo- 
sition of  laws  that  are  contrary  to  the  laws  of  God.  And  if 
any  one  should  insist  upon  the  magnitude  of  political  griev 
ances,  the  answer  is  at  hand — these  evils  cannot  cost  more 
to  the  community  as  a  state,  than  the  other  class  of  evils  costs 
to  the  individual  as  a  man. 

If  fidelity  is  required  in  private  life,  through  whatever  con 
sequences,  it  is  required  also  in  public.  The  national  suffer- 
ing can  never  be  so  great  as  the  individual  may  be.  The  in- 
dividual may  lose  his  life  for  his  fidelity,  but  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  a  national  martyrdom.  Besides  it  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  Christian  opposition  to  mis-government  would  be 
so  ineffectual  as  is  supposed.  Nothing  is  so  invincible  as  de- 
terminate non-compliance.  He  that  resists  by  force,  may  be 
overcome  by  greater  force  ;  but  nothing  can  overcome  a  calm 
and  fixed  determination  not  to  obey.  Violence  might,  no 
doubt,  slaughter  those  who  practised  it,  but  it  were  an  un- 
usual ferocity  to  destroy  such  persons  in  cool  malignity.  In 
such  enquiries  we  forget  how  much  difficulty  we  entail  upon 
ourselves.  A  rej;iment  which,  after  endeavouring  to  the  ut- 
termost to  destroy  its  enemies,  refuses  to  yield,  is  in  circum- 
stances totally  dissimilar  to  that  which  our  reasonings  sup 


CHAP,  v.]  CIVIL    OBEDlENCi!.        ^  32d 

pose.  Such  a  regiment  might  be  cut  to  pieces  ;  but  it  would 
be,  I  beheve,  a  "  new  thing  under  the  sun,"  to  go  on  slaughter- 
ing a  people,  of  whom  it  was  known  not  only  that  they  had 
committed  no  violence,  but  that  they  would  commit  none. 

Refer  again  to  America :  The  Americans  thought  that  it 
was  best  for  the  general  welfare  that  they  should  be  inde- 
pendent, but  England  persisted  in  imposing  the  tax.  Imagine, 
then,  America  to  have  acted  upon  Christian  principles,  and  to 
have  refused  to  pay  it,  but  without  those  acts  of  exasperation 
and  violence  which  they  committed.  England  might  have 
sent  a  fleet  and  an  army.  To  what  purpose  1  Still  no  one 
paid  the  tax.  The  soldiery  perhaps  sometimes  committed 
outrages,  and  they  seized  goods  instead  of  the  impost :  still 
the  tax  could  not  be  collected,  except  by  a  system  of  univer- 
sal distraint. — Does  any  man  who  employs  his  reason,  believe 
that  England  would  have  overcome  such  a  people  ?  does  he 
believe  that  any  government,  or  any  army  would  have  gone 
on  destroying  them  ?  especially  does  he  believe  this,  if  the 
Americans  continually  reasoned  coolly  and  honourably  with 
the  other  party,  and  manifested,  by  the  unequivocal  language 
of  conduct,  that  they  were  actuated  by  reason  and  by  Chris- 
tian rectitude  ?  No  nation  exists  which  would  go  on  slaugh- 
tering such  a  people.  It  is  not  in  human  nature  to  do  such 
things  ;  and  I  am  persuaded  not  only  that  American  independ- 
ence would  have  been  secured,  but  that  very  far  fewer  of  the 
Americans  would  have  been  destroyed  :  that  very  much  less 
of  devastation  and  misery  would  have  been  occasioned  if  they 
had  acted  upon  these  principles  instead  of  upon  the  vulgar 
system  of  exasperation  and  violence.  In  a  word,  they  would 
have  attained  the  same  advantage  with  more  virtue,  and  at  less 
cost. — With  respect  to  those  voluble  reasoners  who  tell  us 
of  meanness  of  spirit,  of  pusillanimous  submission,  of  base 
crouching  before  tyranny,  and  the  like,  it  may  be  observed 
that  they  do  not  know  what  mental  greatness  is.  Courage  is 
not  indicated  most  unequivocally  by  wearing  swords  or  by 
wielding  them.  Many  who  have  courage  enough  to  take  up 
arms  against  a  bad  government,  have  not  courage  enough  to 
resist  it  by  the  unbending  firmness  of  the  mind — to  maintain 
a  tranquil  fidelity  to  virtue  in  opposition  to  power ;  or  to  en- 
dure with  serenity  the  consequences  which  may  follow. 

The  Reformation  prospered  more  by  the  resolute  non-com- 
pliance of  its  supporters,  than  if  all  of  them  had  provided 
themselves  with  swords  and  pistols.  The  most  severely  per- 
secuted body  of  Christians  which  this  country  has  in  later 
ages  seen,  was  a  body  who  never  raised  the  arm  of  resistance. 

28* 


330  CIVIL    OBEDIENCE,  [eSSAY  Ut, 

They  wore  out  that  iron  rod  of  oppression  which  the  attri- 
tion of  violence  might  have  whetted  into  a  weapon  that 
would  have  cut  them  off  from  the  earth,  and  they  now  reap 
the  fair  fruit  of  their  principles  in  the  enjoyment  of  privileges 
from  which  others  are  still  debarred. 

There  is  one  class  of  cases  in  which  obedience  is  to  be 
refused  to  the  civil  power  without  any  view  to  an  alteration 
of  existing  institutions — that  is,  when  the  magistrate  com- 
mands that  which  it  would  be  imm.oral  to  obey.  What  is 
wrong  for  the  Christian  is  wrong  for  the  subject.  "  All  hu- 
man authority  ceases  at  the  point  where  obedience  becomes 
criminal."  Of  this  point  of  criminality  every  man  must 
judge  ultimately  for  himself;  for  the  opinion  of  another  ought 
not  to  make  him  obey  when  he  thinks  it  is  criminal,  nor  to 
refuse  obedience  when  he  thinks  it  is  lawful.  Some  even 
appear  to  think  that  the  nature  of  actions  is  altered  by  the 
command  of  the  state  ;  that  what  would  be  unlawful  without 
its  command  is  lawful  with  it.  This  notion  is  founded  upon 
indistinct  views  of  the  extent  of  civil  authority  ;  for  this  au- 
thority can  never  be  so  great  as  that  of  the  Deity,  and  it  is 
the  Deity  who  requires  us  not  to  do  evil.  The  Protestant 
would  not  think  himself  obliged  to  obey  if  the  state  should 
require  him  to  acknowledge  the  authority  of  the  Pope ;  and 
why  ?  Because  he  thinks  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
Divine  Will ;  and  this  precisely  is  the  reason  why  he  should 
refuse  obedience  in  other  cases.  He  cannot  rationally  make 
distinctions,  and  say,  "  I  ought  to  refuse  obedience  in  ac- 
knowledging the  Pope,  but  I  ought  to  obey  in  becoming  the 
agent  of  injustice  or  oppression."  If  I  had  been  a  French- 
man, and  had  been  ordered,  probably  at  the  instigation  of 
some  courtezan,  to  immure  a  man,  whom  I  knew  to  be  inno- 
cent, in  the  Bastile,  I  should  have  refused  ;  for  it  never  can 
be  right  to  be  the  active  agent  of  such  iniquity. 

Under  an  enlightened  and  lenient  government  like  our  own, 
the  cases  are  not  numerous  in  which  the  Christian  is  ex- 
empted from  the  obligation  to  obedience.  When,  a  century 
or  two  ago,  persecuting  acts  were  passed  against  some  Chris- 
tian communities,  the  members  of  these  communities  were  not 
merely  at  liberty,  they  were  required  to  disobey  them.  One 
act  imposed  a  fine  of  twenty  pounds  a-month  for  absenting 
one's  self  from  a  prescribed  form  of  worsliip.  He  who 
thought  that  form  less  acceptable  to  the  Supreme  B^ing  than 
another,  ought  to  absent  himself  notwithstanding  the  law.  So 
when  in  the  present  day,  a  Christian  thinks  the  profession  of 
arms,  or  the  payment  of  preachers  whom  he  disapproves,  is 


CHAP,  v.]  CIVIL   OBEDIENCE.  331 

xiorong,  lie  ought,  notwithstanding  any  laws,  to  decline  to  pay 
the  money  or  to  bear  the  arms. 

Illegal  commands  do  not  appear  to  carry  any  obligation  to 
obedience.  Thus,  when  the  Apostles  had  been  "  beaten 
openly  and  uncondemned,  being  Romans,"  they  did  not  regard 
the  directions  of  the  magistracy  to  leave  the  prison,  but  as- 
serted their  right  to  legal  justice,  by  making  the  magistrates 
"  come  themselves  and  fetch  them  out."  When  Charles  I. 
made  his  demands  of  supplies  upon  his  own  illegal  authority, 
I  should  have  thought  myself  at  liberty  to  refuse  to  pay  them. 
This  were  not  a  disobedience  to  government.  Government 
was  broken.  One  of  its  constituent  parts  refused  to  impose 
the  tax,  and  one  imposed  it.  I  might,  indeed,  have  held  my- 
self in  doubt  whether  Charles  constituted  the  government  or 
not.  If  the  people  had  thought  it  best  to  choose  him  alone 
for  their  ruler,  he  constituted  the  government,  and  his  demand 
would  have  been  legal ;  for  a  law  is  but  the  voice  of  that 
governing  power  whom  the  people  prefer.  As  it  was,  the 
people  did  not  choose  such  a  government :  the  demand  was 
illegal,  and  might  therefore  be  refused. 


Promises  or  Oaths  of  Allegiance  to  Governors  do  not  ap- 
pear easily  reconcilable  with  political  reason.  Promises  are 
made  for  the  advantage  or  security  of  the  imposer ;  and  to 
make  them  to  governors  seems  an  inversion  of  the  order  which 
just  principles  would  prescribe.  The  security  should  be 
given  by  the  employed  party,  not  by  the  employer.  A  com- 
munity should  not  be  bound  to  obey  any  given  officer  whom 
they  employ ;  because  they  may  find  occasion  to  exchange 
him  for  another.  Men  do  not  swear  fidelity  to  their  represent- 
atives in  the  senate.  Promising  fidelity  to  the  state  may  ap- 
pear exempt  from  these  objections,  but  the  promise  is  likely 
to  be  of  little  avail ;  for  what  is  the  state  ?  or  how  is  its  will 
to  be  discovered  but  by  the  voice  of  the  governing  power  ? 
To  promise  fidelity  to  the  state  is  not  very  dififerent  from 
promising  it  to  a  governor. 

If  it  be  said  that  promises  of  allegiance  may  be  useful  in 
periods  of  confusion,  or  when  the  public  mind  is  divided  re- 
specting the  choice  of  governors,  such  a  period  is  peculiarly 
unfit  for  promising  allegiance  to  one.  The  greater  the  insta- 
bility of  an  existing  government,  the  greater  the  unreason- 
ableness of  exacting  an  oath.  If  an  oath  should  maintain  a 
tottering  government  against  the  public  mind,  it  does  mischief, 
and  if  a  government  is  secure,  an  oath  is  not  needed. 

The  sequestered  ministers  in  the  time  of  Charles  II.,  were 


332  CIVIL    OBEDIENCE.  [£sSAt  III. 

required  to  take  an  oath,  "  declaring  that  they  would  not  at 
any  time  endeavour  an  alteration  in  the  government  of  the 
church  or  state."*  One  reason  of  their  ejection  was,  that 
they  would  not  declare  their  assent  to  every  thing  in  the  Book 
of  Common  Prayer.  Why  should  these  persons  be  required 
to  promise  not  to  endeavour  an  alteration  in  Church  Govern- 
ment, when,  probably,  some  of  them  thought  the  endeavour 
formed  a  part  of  their  Christian  duty  ?  Upon  similar  grounds 
it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  Roman  Catholics  of  our  day 
ought  to  declare  as  they  do,  that  they  will  not  endeavour  any 
alteration  in  the  religious  establishments  of  the  country.  To 
promise  this  without  limitation  is  surely  promising  more  than 
a  person  who  disapproves  that  establishment  ought  to  promise. 
The  very  essence  of  peculiar  religious  systems  tends  to  the 
alteration  of  all  others.  He  who  preaches  the  Romish  creed 
and  practice,  does  practically  oppose  the  Church  of  England, 
and  practically  endeavour  an  alteration  in  it.  And  if  a  man 
thinks  his  own  system  the  best,  he  ought,  by  Christian  means 
to  endeavour  to  extend  it. 

And  ev^en  if  these  declarations  were  less  objectionable  in 
principle,  their  practical  operation  is  bad.  Some  invasion  or 
revolution  places  a  new  prince  upon  the  throne — -that  very 
prince,  perhaps,  whom  the  people's  oath  of  allegiance  was 
expressly  designed  to  exclude.  What  are  such  a  people  to 
do  ?  Are  they  to  refuse  obedience  to  the  ruler  whom,  per- 
haps, there  are  the  best  reasons  for  obeying  ?  Or  are  they  to 
keep  their  oaths  sacred,  and  thus  injure  the  general  weal  1 
Such  alternatives  ought  not  to  be  imposed.  But  the  truth  is, 
that  allegiance  is  commonly  adjusted  to  a  standard  very  dis- 
tinct from  the  meaning  of  oaths.  How  many  revolutions 
have  oaths  of  allegiance  prevented?  In  general  a  people 
will  obey  the  power  whom  they  prefer,  whatever  oaths  may 
have  bound  them  to  another.  In  France,  all  men  were  required 
to  swear  "  that  they  would  be  faithful  to  the  Nation,  the  Law, 
and  the  King."  A  year  after  these  same  Frenchmen  swore 
an  everlasting  abjuration  of  monarchy !  And  now  they  are 
living  quietly  under  a  monarchy  again !  After  the  accession 
of  William  III.,  when  the  clergy  were  required  to  take  oaths 
contrary  to  those  which  they  had  before  taken  to  James,  very 
few  in  comparison  refused.  The  rest  "  took  them  with  such 
reservations  and  distinctions,  as  redounded  very  little  to  the 
honour  of  their  integrity."! 

Thus  it  is  that  these  oaths  which  are  objectionable  in  prin- 

*  Southey's  Book  of  the  Church  t  Smollet's  History  of 

England. 


CHAP.  VI.]        FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT.  333 

ciple,  are  so  nugatory  in  practice.  The  mischief  is  radical. 
Men  ought  not  to  be  required  to  engage  to  maintain,  at  a  fu- 
ture period,  a  set  of  opinions  which,  at  a  future  period  they 
may  probably  think  erroneous :  nor  to  maintain  allegiance  to 
any  set  of  men  whom,  hereafter,  they  may  perhaps  find  it  ex- 
pedient to  replace  by  others. 


CHAPTER  YI. 


FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT. 

Some  general  principles — Monarchy — Balance  of  interests  and  passions — 
Changes  in  a  constitution — Popular  government — The  world  in  a  state 
of  improvement — Character  of  legislators. 

There  is  one  great  cause  which  prevents  the  political 
moralist  from  describing,  absolutely,  what  form  of  government 
is  preferable  to  all  others — which  is,  that  the  superiority  of  a 
form  depends,  like  the  proper  degree  of  civil  liberty,  upon  the 
existing  condition  of  a  community.  Other  doctrine  has  in- 
deed been  held  :  "  Wherever  men  are  competent  to  look  the 
first  duties  of  humanity  in  the  face,  and  to  provide  for  their 
defence  against  the  invasion  of  hunger  and  the  inclemencies 
of  the  sky,  there  they  will,  out  of  all  doubt,  be  found  equally 
capable  of  every  other  exertion  that  may  be  necessary  to 
their  security  and  welfare.  Present  to  them  a  constitution 
which  shall  put  them  into  a  simple  and  intelligible  method  of 
directing  their  own  afi'airs,  adjudging  their  contests  among 
themselves,  and  cherishing  in  their  bosoms  a  manly  sense  of 
dignity,  equality,  and  independence,  and  you  need  not  doubt 
that  prosperity  and  virtue  will  be  the  result."* 

There  is  need  to  doubt  and  to  disbelieve  it — unless  it  can 
be  shown  from  experience  that  uncultivated  and  vicious  men 
require  nothing  more  to  make  them  wise  and  good  than  to  be 
told  the  way.  "  Present  to  them  a  coustitution."  Who  shall 
present  it?  Some  foreign  intelligence,  manifestly;  and  if 
this  foreign  intelligence  is  necessary  to  devise  a  constitution, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  keep  it  in  operation  and  in  order.  But 
when  this  is  granted,  it  is  in  efiect  granted  that  an  unculti- 
*  Godwin's  Enq.  Pol.  Just.  vol.  1.  p.  69. 


334  FORMS    OF    GOVERNMENT.  [eSSAY  lit. 

vated  and  vicious  people  are  not  "  capable  of  every  exertion 
that  may  be  necessary  to  their  security  and  welfare." 

But  if  certain  forms  cannot  be  specified  which  shall  be 
best  for  the  adoption  of  every  state,  there  are  general  princi- 
ples to  direct  us. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  form  of  government,  like  the  admin- 
istration of  power,  should  be  conformable  to  the  public  wish. 
In  a  certain  sense,  and  in  a  sense  of  no  trifling  import,  that 
form  is  best  for  a  people  which  the  people  themselves  prefer : 
and  this  rule  applies,  even  although  the  form  may  not  be  in- 
trinsically the  best ;  for  public  welfare  and  satisfaction  are 
the  objects  of  government,  and  this  satisfaction  may  some- 
times be  insured  by  a  form  which  the  public  prefer,  more  ef- 
fectually than  by  a  form,  essentially  better,  which  they  dis- 
like. Besides,  a  nation  is  likely  to  prefer  that  form  which 
accords  best  with  what  is  called  the  national  genius  ;  and 
thus  there  may  be  a  real  adaptation  of  a  form  to  a  people 
which  is  yet  not  abstractedly  the  best,  nor  the  best  for  theii 
neighbours.  But  when  it  is  said  that  that  form  of  govern- 
ment ought  to  be  adopted  for  a  people,  which  they  themselves 
prefer,  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  their  preference  is  often 
founded  upon  their  weaknesses  or  their  ignorance.  Men  ad- 
here to  an  established  form  because  they  think  little  of  a  bet- 
ter. Long  prescription  gives  to  even  bad  systems  an  obscure 
sanctity  amongst  unthinking  men.  No  reasonable  man  can 
suppose  that  the  government  of  Louis  the  Fourteenth  was 
good  for  the  French  people,  or  that  that  form, could  be  good 
which  enabled  him  to  trifle  with  or  to  injure  the  public  wel- 
fare. And  yet,  when  his  ambition  and  tyranny  had  reduced 
the  French  to  poverty  and  to  wretchedness,  they  still  clung 
to  their  oppressor,  and  made  wonderful  sacrifices  to  support 
his  power. — Now,  though  it  might  have  been  both  improper  and 
unjust  to  give  a  new  constitution  to  the  French  when  they 
preferred  the  old,  yet  such  examples  indicate  the  sense  in 
which  only  it  is  true  that  the  form  which  a  people  prefer  is 
the  best  for  them ; — and  they  indicate,  too,  most  powerfully, 
the  duty  of  every  citizen  and  of  every  legislator  to  diffuse 
just  notions  of  political  truth.  The  nature  of  a  government 
contributes  powerfully,  no  doubt,  to  the  formation  of  this  na- 
tional genius  ;  and  thus  an  imperfect  form  sometimes  contrib- 
utes to  its  own  duration. 

In  the  present  condition  of  mankind,  it  is  probable  that 
some  species  of  monarchy  is  best  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
world.  Republicanism  opens  more  wide  the  gates  of  ambi- 
tion.    He   who  knows  that  the  utmost  extent  of  attainable 


CHAP.  VI.]        FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT.  335 

power  is,  to  be  the  servant  of  a  prince,  is  not  likely  to  be 
fired  by  those  boundless  schemes  of  ambition  which  may  ani- 
mate the  repubHcan  leader.  The  virtue  of  the  generality  of 
mankind  is  not  sufficiently  powerful  to  prompt  them  to  politi- 
cal moderation  without  the  application  of  an  external  curb : 
and  thus  it  happens  that  the  order  and  stability  of  a  govern- 
ment is  more  efficiently  secured  by  the  indisputable  supremacy 
of  one  man.  Now,  order  and  stability  are  amongst  the  first 
requisites  of  a  good  constitution,  for  the  object  of  political  in- 
stitutions cannot  be  secured  without  them. 

I  accept  the  word  Monarchy  in  a  large  sense.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  the  security  of  these  advantages  even  in 
the  existing  state  of  human  virtue,  that  the  monarch  should 
possess  what  we  call  kingly  power.  By  monarchy  I  mean  a 
form  of  government  in  which  one  man  is  invested  with  power 
greatly  surpassing  that  of  every  other.  The  peculiar  means 
by  which  this  power  is  possessed,  do  not  enter  necessarily 
into  the  account.  The  individual  may  have  the  power  of  a 
Sultan  or  a  Czar,  or  a  King  or  a  President ;  that  is,  he  may 
possess  various  degrees  of  power,  and  yet  the  essential  prin- 
ciple of  monarchy  and  its  practical  tendencies  may  be  the 
same  in  all — the  same  to  repress  violence  by  extent  of  power — 
the  same  to  discountenance  ambition  by  the  hopelessness  of 
gratifying  unlimited  desire. 

It  is  usual  to  insist,  as  one  of  the  advantages  of  monarchy, 
upon  its  secrecy  and  despatch ;  which  secrecy  and  despatch, 
it  is  to  be  observed,  would  be  of  comparatively  little  impor- 
tance in  a  more  advanced  state  of  human  virtue.  Where 
diplomatic  chicanery  and  hostile  exertions  are  employed,  de- 
spatch and  secrecy  are  doubtless  very  subservient  to  success  ; 
but  take  away  the  hostility  and  chicanery — take  away,  that 
is,  such  wickedness  from  amongst  men,  and  secrecy  and  de- 
spatch would  be  of  little  interest  or  importance.  We  love 
darkness  rather  than  light,  because  our  deeds  are  evil.  Thus 
it  is  that  unnumbered  usages  and  institutions  find  advocacy, 
rather  in  the  immoral  condition  of  mankind,  than  in  direct 
evidences  of  their  excellence. 

"  An  hereditary  monarchy  is  universally  to  be  preferred  to 
an  elective  monarchy.  The  confession  of  every  writer  on  the 
subject  of  civil  government,  the  experience  of  ages,  the  exam- 
ple of  Poland  and  of  the  Papal  dominions,  seeim  to  place  this 
amongst  the  few  indubitable  maxims  which  the  science  of 
politics  admits  of."*  But,  without  attempting  to  decide  upon 
the  preferableness  of  hereditary  or  elective  monarchy,  i,t  may 
*  Paley :  Mor.  and  Pol.  PhU.,  p.  3,  b.  6,  c.  6. 


336  FORMS    OF    GOVERNMENT.  [eSSAY  III. 

be  questioned  whether  this  formidable  array  of  opinion  has 
not  been  founded  upon  the  mischiefs  which  actually  have  re- 
suhed  from  electing  princes,  rather  than  from  those  which  are 
inseparable  from  the  election.  The  election  of  the  kings  of 
Poland  convulsed  that  unhappy  country,  and  sometimes  em- 
broiled Europe.  The  -election  of  Popes  has  produced  similar 
effects  ;  but  this  is  no  evidence  that  popes  and  kings  cannot  be 
elected  by  pacific  means  ;  cardinals  and  lords  may  embroil  a 
nation,  when  other  electors  would  not. 

I  call  the  President  of  the  United  States  a  Monarch.  He 
is  not  called,  indeed,  an  emperor,  or  a  king,  or  a  duke,  but  he 
exercises  much  of  regal  power.  Yet  he  is  elected  :  and 
where  is  the  mischief  ?  The  United  States  are  not  convulsed  : 
civil  war  is  not  waged ;  foreign  princes  do  not  support  with 
armies  the  pretensions  of  one  candidate  or  another  ; — and  yet 
he  is  elected.  Who  then  will  say  that  other  monarchs  might 
not  be  elected  too  ?  It  will  not  be  easy  to  show  that  the  being 
invested  with  greater  power  than  the  President  of  America, 
necessarily  precludes  the  peaceable  election  of  a  prince.  The 
power  of  the  president  differs,  I  believe,  less  from  that  of  the 
king  of  England,  than  the  power  of  the  king  differs  from  that 
of  the  Russian  emperor.  No  man  can  define  the  maximum 
of  power,  which  might  be  conferred  without  public  mischief 
by  the  election  of  the  public.  Yet  I  am  attempting  to  eluci- 
date a  political  truth,  and  not  recommending  a  practice.  It 
is,  indeed,  possible,  that  when  the  genius  of  a  people,  and  the 
whole  mass  of  their  political  institutions  are  favourable  to  an 
election  of  the  supreme  magistrate,  election  would  be  prefer- 
able to  hereditary  succession.  But  election  is  not  without  its 
disadvantages,  especially  if  the  appointment  be  for  a  short 
time.  When  there  are  several  candidates,  and  when  the  in- 
clinations of  the  community  are  consequently  divided,  he  who 
actually  assumes  the  reins  is  the  sovereign  of  the  choice  of 
only  a  portion  of  the  people.  The  rest  prefer  another  :  which 
circumstance  is  not  only  likely  to  animate  the  hostilities  of 
faction,  but  to  make  the  elected  party  regard  one  portion  of 
the  people  as  his  enemies  and  the  other  as  his  friends.  But 
he  should  be  the  parent  of  all  the  people. 

Fox  observed  with  respect  to  the  British  Constitution,  that 
"  the  safety  of  the  whole  depends  on  the  jealousy  which  each 
retains  against  the  others,  not  on  the  patriotism  of  any  one 
branch  of  the  legislature."*  This  is  doubtless  true  ;  yet  surely 
it  is  a  melancholy  truth.  It  is  a  melancholy  consideration, 
that,  in  constructing  a  constitution,  it  is  found  necessary  not 
*  Speech  on  the  Regency  Question. 


CHAP.  VI.]  FORMS    OF    GOVERNMENT.  337 

lo  encourage  virtue  but  to  repress  vice,  and  to  contrive  mutual 
curbs  upon  ambition  and  licentiousness.  It  is  a  tacit,  but  a 
most  emphatical  acknowledgment,  how  much  private  inclina- 
tion triumphs  over  public  virtue,  and  how  little  legislators  are 
disposed  to  keep  in  the  right  political  path,  unless  they  are 
restrained  from  deviation  by  walls  and  spikes. 

Yet  it  is  upon  this  lamentable  acknowledgment  that  the 
great  institutions  of  free  states  are  frequently  founded.  A 
balance  of  interests  and  passions  is  contrived,  something  like 
the  balance  of  power,  of  which  we  hear  so  much  amongst 
the  nations  of  Europe — a  balance  of  which  the  necessity  (if 
it  be  necessary)  consists  in  the  wickedness,  the  ambition,  and 
the  violence  of  mankind.  If  nations  did  not  viciously  desire 
to  encroach  upon  one  another,  this  balance  of  power  would 
be  forgotten ;  and  in  a  purer  state  of  human  virtue,  the  jeal- 
ousies of  the  different  branches  of  a  legislature  will  not  need 
to  be  balanced  against  each  other.  Until  the  period  of  this 
advanced  state  of  human  excellence  shall  arrive,  I  know  not 
how  this  balance  can  be  dispensed  with.  It  may  still  be 
needful  to  oppose  power  to  power,  to  restrain  one  class  of 
interests  by  the  counteraction  of  others,  and  to  procure  gen- 
eral quiet  to  the  whole  by  annexing  inevitable  evils  to  the  en- 
croachments of  the  separate  parts.  •  Thus,  again,  it  happens 
that  constitutions  which  are  not  abstractedly  the  best,  or  even 
good,  may  be  the  best  for  a  nation  now. 

Whatever  be  the  form  of  a  government,  one  quality  appears 
to  be  essential  to  practical  excellence — that  it  should  be  sus- 
ceptible of  peaceable  change.  The  science  of  government, 
like  other  sciences,  acquires  a  constant  accession  of  light. 
The  intellectual  condition  of  the  world  is  advancing  with  on- 
ward strides.  And  both  these  considerations  intimate  that 
Forms  of  Government  should  be  capable  of  admitting,  without 
disturbance,  those  improvements  which  experience  may  dic- 
tate, or  the  advancing  condition  of  a  community  may  require. 
To  reject  improvement,  is  absurd ;  to  incapacitate  ourselves 
for  adopting  it,  is  absurd  also.  It  surely  is  no  unreasonable 
sacrifice  of  vanity  to  admit,  that  those  who  succeed  us  may 
be  better  judges  of  what  is  good  for  themselves,  than  we  caa 
be  for  them. 

Upon  these  grounds  no  constitution  should  be  regarded  as 
absolutely  and  sacredly  fixed,  so  that  none  ought  and  none 
have  a  right  to  alter  it.  The  question  of  right  is  easily  set- 
tled. It  is  inherent  in  the  community,  or  in  the  legislature  as 
their  agents.  It  would  be  strange,  indeed,  if  our  predecessors, 
five  or  six  centuries  ago,  had  a  right  to  make  a  constitution  for 

29 


^^  FORMS    OF    OOVERNHENT.  [eSSAT  IK. 

US,  which  we  have  no  right  to  alter  for  oursv^lves.  Such 
checks  ought,  no  doubt,  to  be  opposed  to  alteratioa.'  ♦hat  they 
may  not  be  lightly  and  crudely  made.  The  exercis*.  o^  poht- 
ical  wisdom  is  to  discover  that  point  in  which  sufficien'  obsta 
cles  are  opposed  to  hasty  innovation,  and  in  which  suft!".ient 
facihty  is  afforded  for  real  improvement  by  \irtiK>us  mee.Tt* 
The  common  disquisitions  about  the  value  of  stability  in  go- 
ernments,  like  those  about  the  sacredness  of  forms,  are  fr*. 
quently  founded  in  inaccurate  views.  What  confusion,  it  i. 
exclaimed,  and  what  anarchy  and  commotions  would  follow 
if  we  were  at  liberty  continually  to  alter  political  constitutions  ' 
But  it  is  forgotten  that  these  calamities  result  from  the  circum 
stance  that  constitutions  are  not  made  easily  alterable.  The 
interests  which  so  many  have  in  keeping  up  the  present  state 
of  things,  make  them  struggle  against  an  alteration  ;  and  it  is 
this  struggle  which  induces  the  calamities,  rather  than  any 
thing  necessarily  incidental  to  the  alteration  itself.  Take 
away  these  interests,  take  away  the  motives  to  these  struggles, 
and  improvements  may  be  peacefully  made.  Yet  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  to  take  away  these  interests  is  no  light 
task.  We  must  once  again  refer  to  "  the  present  condition 
of  mankind,"  and  confess  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether  any 
community  would  possess  a  stable  or  an  efficient  government, 
if  no  interests  bound  its  officers  to  exertion.  To  such  a  gov- 
ernment patronage  is  probably  at  present  indispensable.  They 
who  possess  patronage  and  they  who  are  enriched  or  exalted 
by  its  exercise,  array  themselves  against  those  propositions  of 
change  which  would  diminish  their  eminence  or  their  wealth. 
And  I  perceive  no  means  by  which  the  existence  of  these 
interests,  and  their  consequent  operation  can  be  avoided,  ex- 
cept by  that  elevation  of  the  moral  character  of  our  race 
which  would  bring  with  it  adequate  motives  to  serve  the  pub- 
lic without  regard  to  honours  or  rewards.  It  is  however  in- 
disputably true,  that  these  interests  should  be  as  much  as  is 
practicable  diminished  ;  and  in  whatever  degree  this  is  effected, 
in  the  same  degree  there  will  be  a  willingness  to  admit  those 
improvements  in  the  form  of  governments  which  prudence 
and  wisdom  may  prescribe. 

"  Let  no  new  practice  in  politics  be  introduced,  and  no  old 
one  anxiously  superseded  till  called  for  by  the  public  voice."* 
The  same  advice  may  be  given  respecting  the  alteration  of 

*  Godwin :  Pol.  Just.,  v.  2,  p.  593.  This  doctrine  is  adverse  to  thai 
which  is  quoted  in  the  first  page  of  this  chapter,  where  to  be  able  to  pro- 
vide for  mere  physical  wants,  is  stated  to  be  a  sufficient  qualification  for 
the  reception  of  an  entirely  new  svstem  of  politics 


CHAP.  VI.]        FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT.  339 

forms ;  because  alterations  which  are  not  so  called  for,  may 
probably  fail  of  a  good  effect  from  the  want  of  a  congenial 
temper  in  the  people,  and  because,  as  the  public  wish  is  the 
natural  measure  of  sound  political  institutions,  even  beneficial 
changes  ought  not  to  be  forced  upon  them  against  their  own 
consent.  The  public  mind,  however,  should  be  enlightened 
by  a  government.  The  legislator  who  perceives  that  another 
form  of  government  is  better  for  his  country,  does  not  do  all 
his  duty,  if  he  declares  himself  willing  to  concur  in  the  alter- 
ation when  the  country  desires  it :  he  should  create  that  desire 
by  showing  its  reasonableness.  Unhappily  there  is  a  vis 
inerticB  in  governments  of  which  the  tendency  is  opposite  to 
this.  The  interests  which  prompt  men  to  maintain  things  ag 
they  are,  and  dread  of  innovation,  and  sluggishness,  and  indif- 
ference, occasion  governments  to  be  amongst  the  last  portion 
of  the  community  to  diffuse  knowledge  respecting  political 
truth.  But,  when  the  public  mind  has  by  any  means  become 
enlightened,  so  that  the  public  voice  demands  an  alteration  of 
an  existing  form,  it  is  one  of  the  plainest  as  well  as  one  of  the 
greatest  duties  of  a  government  to  make  the  alteration :  not 
reluctantly  but  joyfully,  not  urging  the  prescription  of  ages, 
and  what  is  called  "  the  wisdom  of  our  ancestors,"  but  philo- 
sophically yet  soberly  accommodating  present  institutions  to 
the  present  state  of  mankind. 

If,  then,  it  is  asked  by  what  general  rule  Forms  of  Govern- 
ment should  be  regulated,  I  would  say — Accommodate  the 
form  to  the  opinion  of  the  community,  whatever  that  commu- 
nity may  prefer  :  and.  Adopt  institutions  such  as  will  facilitate 
the  peaceable  admission  of  alterations,  as  greater  light  and 
knowledge  become  diffused.  I  would  not  say  to  the  Sultan, 
Adopt  the  constitution  of  England  to-morrow :  because  the 
sudden  transition  would  probably  effect,  for  a  long  time,  more 
evil  than  good.  I  would  not  say  to  the  King  of  France, 
Descend  from  the  throne  and  establish  a  democracy  ;  because 
I  do  not  think,  and  experience  does  not  teach  us  to  think,  that 
democracy,  even  if  it  were  theoretically  best,  is  best  for 
France  at  the  present  day. 

Turning,  indeed,  to  the  probable  future  condition  of  the 
world,  there  is  reason  to  think  that  the  popular  branches  of 
all  governments  will  progressively  increase  in  influence,  and 
perhaps  eventually  predominate.  This  appears  to  be  the  na- 
tural consequence  of  the  increasing  power  of  public  opinion. 
The  public  judgment  is  not  only  the  proper,  but  almost  the 
necessary  eventual  measure  of  political  institutions ;  and  it 
appears  evident  that,  as  that  judgment  becomes  enlightened. 


340  FORMS    OF    GOVERNMENT.  [eSSAY  Hi 

it  will  be  exercised,  and  that,  as  it  is  exercised,  it  will  prevail. 
The  expression  of  public  opinion  upon  political  affairs,  and 
consequently  the  influence  of  that  opinion,  partakes  obviously 
of  the  principles  of  popular  government.  If  public  opinion 
governs,  it  must  govern  by  some  agency  by  which  public 
opinion  is  expressed ;  and  this  expression  can  in  no  way  so 
naturally  be  effected,  as  by  some  modification  of  popular  au- 
thority. These  considerations,  which  appear  obvious  to  rea- 
soning, are  enforced  by  experience.  There  is  a  manifest 
tendency  in  the  world  to  the  increase  of  the  power  of  the 
public  voice  ;  and  the  effect  is  seen  in  the  new  constitutions 
which  have  been  established  in  the  new  world  and  in  the  old. 
Few  permanent  revolutions  are  effected  in  which  the  commu- 
nity do  not  acquire  additional  influence  in  governing  them- 
selves. 

It  will  not  perhaps  be  disputed,  that  if  the  world  were  wise 
and  good,  the  best  form  of  government  would  be  that  of 
democracy  in  a  very  simple  state.  Nothing  would  be  want- 
ing but  to  ascertain  the  general  wish  and  to  collect  the  general 
wisdom.  If,  therefore,  the  present  propriety  of  other  forms 
of  government  results  from  the  present  condition  of  mankind, 
there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  they  may  gradually  lapse  away, 
as  that  condition,  moral  and  intellectual,  is  improved.  Whether 
mankind  are  thus  improving,  readers  may  differently  decide  ; 
and  their  various  decisions  will  lead  to  various  conclusions 
respecting  the  future  predominance  of  the  public  voice  :  the 
writer  of  these  pages  is  one  who  thinks  that  the  world  is  im- 
proving, that  virtue  as  well  as  knowledge  is  extending  its 
power  ;  and  therefore  that,  as  ages  roll  along,  every  form  of 
government  but  that  which  consists  in  some  organ  of  the  gen- 
eral mind,  will  gradually  pass  away.  It  may  be  hoped,  too, 
that  this  gradual  lapse  will  be  occasioned,  without  solicitude 
on  the  part  of  those  who  then  possess  privileges  or  power,  to 
retain  either  to  themselves.  That  same  state  of  virtue  and 
excellence  which  enabled  the  people  almost  immediately  to 
govern  themselves,  would  prevent  others  from  wishing  to  re- 
tain the  reins.  Purer  motives  than  the  love  of  greatness,  of 
power,  or  of  wealth,  would  influence  them  in  the  choice  of 
their  political  conduct.  They  might  have  no  motive  so  power- 
ful as  the  promotion  of  the  general  weal. 

As  no  limit  can  be  assigned  to  that  degree  of  excellence 
which  it  may  please  the  Universal  Parent  eventually  to  dif- 
fuse through  the  world,  so  none  can  be  assigned  to  the  sim^ 
plicity  and  purity  of  the  form  in  which  government  shall  be 
carried  on.     In  truth,  the  mind,  as  it  passes  onward  and  still 


CHAP.  VI.]  FORMS    OF    GOVERNMENT.  341 

onward  in  its  anticipations  of  purity,  stops  not  until  it  arrives 
at  that  period  when  all  government  shall  cease ;  when  there 
shall  be  no  wickedness  to  require  the  repressing  arm  of 
power ;  when  terror  to  the  evil-doerg-and  praise  to  them  that 
do  well,  shall  no  longer  be  needed,  because  none  will  do  evil 
though  there  be  no  ruler  to  punish,  and  all  will  do  well  from 
higher  and  better  motives  than  the  praise  of  man. 


In  speaking  of  political  constitutions,  it  is  not  sufficiently 
remembered  in  how  great  a  degree  good  government  depends 
upon  the  character  and  the  virtue  of  those  who  shall  conduct 
it.  There  is  much  of  truth  in  the  political  maxim,  that 
"  whatever  is  best  administered  is  best."  But  how  shall 
good  administration  be  secured  except  by  the  good  disposi- 
tions of  the  administrators  ?  The  great  present  concern  of 
mankind,  in  the  selection  of  their  legislators,  respects  their 
political  opinions  rather  than  their  moral  and  Christian  char- 
acter. This  exclusive  reference  to  political  biasses  is  surely 
unwise,  because  it  leaves  the  passions  and  interests  to  operate 
without  that  control  which  individual  virtue  only  can  impart. 
Thus  we  are  obliged  to  contrive  reins  and  curbs  for  the  public 
servants,  as  the  charioteer  contrives  them  for  an  unruly  horse  ; 
too  much  forgetting  that  the  best  means  of  securing  the  safety 
of  the  vehicle  of  state,  are  found  in  the  good  dispositions  of 
those  who  move  it  onward.  Political  tendencies  are  impor- 
tant ;  but  they  are  not  the  most  important  point ;  moral  ten- 
dencies are  the  first  and  the  greatest.  The  question  in  Eng- 
land should  be,  less,  "  ministerialist  or  oppositionist  ?"  in 
America,  less,  "  federalist  or  republican  ?"  than  in  both,  "  a 
good  or  a  bad  man  ?"  Rectitude  of  intention  is  the  primary 
requisite ;  and  whatever  preference  I  might  give  to  superior- 
ity of  talents  and  to  political  principles,  above  all,  and  before 
all,  I  should  prefer  the  enlightened  Christian ;  knowing  that 
his  character  is  the  best  pledge  of  political  uprightness,  and 
that  political  uprightness  is  the  best  security  of  good  govern- 
ment. 

29* 


S4d  POLITICAL    INFLUENCl.  [eSSAY  III 

CHAPTER  VII. 

POLITICAL  INFLUENCE.-^PARTY.— MINISTERIAL  UNION 

Influence  of  the  crown — Effects  of  influence — -Incongruity  of  public 
notions — Patronage — American  States — Dependency  on  the  mother 
country — Party — Ministerial  Union — "  A  party  man" — The  council 
board  and  the  senate — Resignation  of  offices. 

The  system  of  governing  by  influence  appears  to  be  a 
substitute  for  the  government  of  force — -an  intermediate  step 
between  awing  by  the  sword  and  directing  by  reason  and 
virtue.  When  the  general  character  of  political  measures  is 
such,  that  reason  and  virtue  do  not  sufficiently  support  them 
to  recommend  them,  on  their  own  merits,  to  the  public  appro- 
bation— these  measures  must  be  rejected,  or  they  must  be 
supported  by  foreign  means ;  and  when,  by  the  political  in- 
stitutions of  a  people,  force  is  necessarily  excluded,  nothing 
remains  but  to  have  recourse  to  some  species  of  Influence. 
There  is  another  ground  upon  which  Influence  becomes,  in  a 
certain  sense,  necessary — which  is,  that  there  is  so  much 
imperfection  of  virtue  in  the  majority  of  legislators — they 
are  so  much  guided  by  interested  or  ambitious  or  party  mo- 
tives, that  for  a  measure  to  be  recommended  by  its  own 
excellence,  is  sometimes  not  sufficient  to  procure  their  con- 
currence ;  and  thus  it  happens  that  Influence  is  resorted  to, 
not  merely  because  public  measures  are  deficient  in  purity, 
but  because  there  is  a  deficiency  of  uprightness  in  public 
men. 

Whilst  political  affairs  continue  to  be  conducted  on  their 
present,  or  nearly  on  their  present,  principles,  I  believe  influ- 
ence is  necessary  to  the  stability  of  almost  all  governments. 
How  else  shall  they  be  supported  ?  They  are  not  sufficiently 
virtuous  to  bespeak  the  general  and  unbiassed  support  of  the 
nations,  and  w^ithout  support  of  some  kind,  they  must  fall. 
That  which  Hume  says  of  England  is  perhaps  true  of  all 
civilized  states — "  The  influence  which  the  crown  acquires 
from  the  disposal  of  places,  honours,  and  preferments,  may 
become  too  forcible,  but  it  cannot  altogether  be  abolished 
without  the  total  destruction  of  monarchy,  and  even  of  all 
regular  authority y*  A  mournful  truth  it  is  !  because  it  neces- 
sarily implies  one  of  two  things — either  that  the  acts  "  of  au- 
thority" do  not  recommend  themselves  by  their  own  excel- 

*  Ilis'tory  of  England. 


niAP.  VH.J  L       t.\.  /FLUEXCE.  343 

iences,  or  that  subjv  cts  are  too  Iitl\  prmcipled  to  be  inlluenced 
by  such  excellences  alone. 

Whilst  the  generality  of  subjects  *ontinue  to  be  what  they 
are,  Iniluence  is  inseparable  from  tho,  privilege  of  appointing 
to  offices.  With  whomsoever  that  pi'vilege  is  eRtrusted,  he 
will  possess  influence,  and  consequently  power.  Multitudes 
are  hoping  for  the  gifts  which  he  has  uo  bestow ;  and  they 
accommodate  their  conduct  to  his  wishes,  iu  order  to  propiti- 
ate his  favour,  and  to  obtain  the  reward.  When  they  have 
obtained  it,  they  call  themselves  bound  in  i  ratitude  to  con- 
tinue their  deference ;  and  thus  the  influence  ind  the  power 
is  continually  possessed.  Now,  there  is  no  v\  ly  of  destroy- 
ing this  influence  but  by  making  men  good  ,•  lor  until  they 
are  good,  they  v/ill  continue  to  sacrifice  their  judgments  to 
their  interests,  and  support  men  or  measures,  ii.ot  because 
they  are  right,  but  because  the  support  is  attended  with  re- 
ward. It  matters  little  in  morals  by  whom  the  power  of  be- 
stowing offices  is  possessed,  unless  yau  can  ensure  tiie  virtue 
of  the  bestower.  Politicians  may  talk  of  taking  the  power 
from  crowns  and  vesting  it  in  senates :  but  it  will  be  oi  little 
avail  to  change  the  hands  who  distribute,  if  you  cannot  change 
the  hearts.  If  a  man  should  ask  whether  the  Influence  of  the 
crown  in  this  country  might  not  usefully  be  transferred  to  the 
House  of  Commons,  I  should  answer,  No.  Not  merely  be- 
cause it  would  overthrow  (for  it  certainly  would  overthrow) 
the  monarchy,  but  because  I  know  not  that  any  security 
would  be  gained  for  a  better  employment  of  this  influence 
than  is  possessed  already.  In  all  but  arbitrary  governnients 
it  appea.rs  indispensable  that  much  of  the  privilege  of  appoint- 
ing to  offices  should  rest  with  the  executive  power.  It  is  the 
peculiar  source  of  its  authority.  In  our  own  government,  the 
peers  possess  power  independently  of  their  political  charac- 
ter, and  the  commons  possess  it  as  representatives  of  the 
public  mind  ;  but  where,  without  Infiuence,  would  be  the 
power  of  the  king  ?  So  it  is  in  America.  They  have  two 
representative  bodies,  and  a  third  estate  in  the  office  of  their 
president.  But  that  president  could  not  execute  the  functions 
of  a  third  estate,  nor  the  office  of  an  executive  governor,  with- 
out having  the  means  of  infiuencing  the  people.  I  do  not 
know  whether  it  was  with  the  determinate  object  of  giving 
to  the  president  a  competent  share  of  power  that  the  Ameri- 
cans invested  him  with  the  privilege  of  appointing  to  offices  ; 
but  it  is  not  to  be  questioned,  that  if  they  had  not  done  it,  the 
fabric  of  their  government  would  speedily  have  fallen. 

The  degree  of  this  influence,  which  may  be  required  to 


344  POLITICAL    INFLUENCE.  [eSSAY  111. 

give  stability  to  an  executive  body,  (and  therefore  to  a  con- 
stitution,) will  vary  with  the  character  of  its  own  policy. 
The  more  widely  that  policy  deviates  from  rectitude,  the 
greater  will  be  the  demand  for  Influence  to  induce  concur- 
rence in  its  measures.  The  degree  of  influence  that  is  actu- 
ally exerted  by  a  government,  is  therefore  no  despicable  cri- 
terion of  the  excellence  of  its  practice.  In  the  United  States 
the  degree  is  less  than  in  England ;  and  it  may  therefore  be 
feared  that  we  are  inferior  to  them  in  the  purity  of  the  gen- 
eral administration  of  the  aflairs  of  state. 

But  let  it  be  constantly  borne  in  mind,  that  when  we  thus 
speak  of  the  "necessity"  for  influence  to  support  govern- 
ments, we  speak  only  of  governments  as  they  are,  and  of 
nations  as  they  are.  There  is  no  necessity  for  influence  to 
support  good  government  over  a  good  people.  All  influence 
but  that  which  addresses  itself  to  the  judgment,  is  wrong — . 
wrong  in  morals,  and  therefore  indefensible  upon  whatever 
plea.  Influence  is  in  part  necessary  to  a  government  in  the 
same  sense  that  oppression  is  necessary  to  a  slave  trader — • 
not  because  the  captain  is  a  man,  but  because  he  has  taken 
up  the  trade  in  slaves — ^not  because  the  government  is  a  gov- 
ernment, but  because  it  conducts  so  many  political  affairs 
upon  unchristian  principles  or  in  an  unchristian  manner. 
The  captain  says,  I  cannot  secure  my  slaves  without  oppres- 
sion— Let  them  go  free.  The  government  says,  I  cannot 
conduct  my  system  without  Influence — Make  the  system 
good. 

And  here  arises  the  observation,  that  if  a  government 
should  faithfully  act  upon  moral  principles,  that  demand  for 
influence  which  is  occasioned  by  the  ill  principles  of  senators 
or  the  public,  would  be  diminished  or  done  away.  The  op- 
position which  governments  are  wont  to  experience — inde- 
fensible as  that  opposition  frequently  is — is  the  result,  prin- 
cipally, of  the  general  character  of  political  systems.  Men, 
seeing  that  integrity  and  purity  are  sacrificed  by  a  govern- 
ment to  other  considerations,  adopt  kindred  means  of  oppo- 
sing it.  If  I  reason  with  a  man  upon  the  impropriety  of  his 
conduct,  he  will  probably  listen ;  if  I  use  violence,  he  will 
probably  use  violence  in  return.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
that,  if  political  measures  were  more  uniformly  conformable 
with  the  sober  judgments  of  a  community,  respect  and  affec- 
tion would  soon  become  so  general  and  powerful,  that  tnat 
clamorous  opposition  which  it  is  now  attempted  to  oppose  by 
influence,  would  be  silenced  by  the  public  voice.  Besidea 
the  very  fact  that  influence  is  exercised,  animates  opposition 


CHAP.  VII.]  POLITICAL    INFLUENCE.  345 

to  measures  of  state.  The  possession  of  power — that  is,  in 
a  great  degree,  of  Influence — is  a  tempting  bait ;  and  it  can- 
not be  doubted  that  some  range  themselves  against  an  execu- 
tive body,  not  so  much  from  objections  to  its  measures  as  from 
desire  of  its  power.  Take  away  the  influence,  therefore,  and 
you  take  away  one  operative  cause  of  opposition — one  great 
obstacle  to  the  free  progress  of  the  vessel  of  state. 

"  All  influence  but  that  which  addresses  itself  to  the  judg- 
ment, is  wrong.''^  Of  the  moral  oflence  which  this  influence 
implies,  many  are  guilty  who  oppose  governments,  as  well  as 
those  who  support  them,  or  as  governments  themselves.  It 
is  evidently  not  a  whit  more  virtuous  to  exert  influence  in 
opposing  governments  than  in  supporting  them :  nor,  indeed, 
is  it  so  virtuous.  To  what  is  a  man  influenced  ?  Obviously, 
to  do  that  which,  without  the  influence,  he  would  not  do; — • 
that  is  to  say,  he  is  induced  to  violate  his  judgment  at  the 
request  or  at  the  will  of  other  men.  It  can  need  no  argument 
to  show  that  this  is  vicious.  In  truth,  it  is  vicious  in  a  very 
high  degree ;  for  to  conform  our  conduct  to  our  own  sober 
judgment,  is  one  of  the  first  dictates  of  the  Moral  Law :  and 
the  viciousness  is  so  much  the  greater,  because  the  express 
purpose  for  which  a  man  is  appointed  to  legislate,  is  that  the 
community  may  have  the  benefit  of  his  uninfluenced  judg- 
ment. Breach  of  trust  is  added  to  the  sacrifice  of  individual 
integrity.  A  nation  can  gain  nothing  by  the  knowledge  or 
experience  of  a  million  of  "  influenced "  legislators.  It  is 
curious,  that  the  submission  to  influence  which  men  often 
practise  as  legislators,  they  would  abhor  as  judges.  What 
should  we  say  of  a  judge  or  a  juryman  who  accepted  a  place 
or  a  promise  as  a  bribe  for  an  unjust  sentence  ?  We  should 
prosecute  the  juryman  and  address  the  parliament  for  a  re- 
moval of  the  judge.  Is  it  then  of  so  much  less  consequence 
in  what  manner  affairs  of  state  are  conducted  than  the  affairs 
of  individuals,  that  that  which  would  be  disgraceful  in  one 
case,  is  reputable  in  another  ?  No  account  can  be  given  of 
this  strange  incongruity  of  public  notions,  than  that  custom 
has  in  one  case  blinded  our  eyes,  and  in  the  other  has  taught 
us  to  see.  Let  the  legislator  who  would  abhor  to  accept  a 
purse  to  bribe  him  to  write  Ignoramus  upon  a  true  bill,  apply 
the  principle  upon  which  his  abhorrence  is  founded  to  his 
political  conduct.  When  our  moral  principles  are  consistent 
these  incongruities  will  cease.  When  uniform  truth  takes 
the  place  of  vulgar  practice  and  opinion,  these  incongruities 
will  become  wonderful  for  their  absurdity ;  and  men  will 
scarcely  believe  that  their  fathers,  who.  could  see  so  clearly, 


S4d  POLITICAL    INfLUENCi:.  [esSAT  III. 

«aw  so  ill.  The  same  sort  of  stigma  which  now  attaches  to 
Lord  Bacon,  will  attach  to  multitudes  who  pass  for  honour- 
able persons  in  the  present  day. 

A  man  may  lawfully,  no  doubt,  take  a  more  active  part  in 
political  measures,  in  compliance  with  the  wishes  of  another, 
than  he  might  otherwise  incline  to  do ;  but  to  support  the 
measures  of  an  opposition  or  an  administration,  because  they 
are  their  measures,  can  never  be  lawful. — Nor  can  it  ever  be 
lawful  to  magnify  the  advantages  or  to  expatiate  upon  the 
mischiefs  of  a  measure,  beyond  his  secret  estimate  of  its 
demerits  or  its  merits.  That  legislator  is  viciously  influ- 
enced, who  says  or  who  does  any  thing  which  he  would 
think, it  not  proper  to  say  or  do  if  he  were  an  independent 
man. 

But  it  will  be  said.  Since  influence  is  inseparable  from  the 
possession  of  patronage,  and  since  patronage  must  be  vested 
somewhere,  what  is  to  be  done  ?  or  how  are  the  evils  of  In- 
fluence to  be  done  away  ?— a  question  which,  like  many  other 
questions  in  political  morality,  is  attended  with  accidental 
rather  than  essential  difficulties.  Patronage,  in  a  virtuous 
state  of  mankind,  would  be  small.  There  would  be  none  in 
the  church  and  little  in  the  state.  Men  would  take  the  over- 
sight of  the  Christian  flock,  not  for  filthy  lucre  but  of  a  ready 
mind.  If  the  ready  mind  existed,  the  influence  of  patronage 
would  be  needless :  and,  as  a  needless  thing,  it  would  be 
done  away.  And  as  to  the  state,  when  we  consider  how 
much  of  patronage  in  all  nations  results  from  the  vicious 
condition  of  mankind — especially  for  military  and  naval  ap- 
pointments— it  will  appear  that  much  of  this  class  of  patron- 
age is  accidental  also.  Take  away  that  wickedness  and 
violence  in  which  hostile  measures  originate,  and  fleets  and 
armies  would  no  longer  be  needed  ;  and  with  their  dissolution 
there  would  be  a  prodigious  diminution  of  Patronage  and  of 
Influence.  So,  if  we  continue  the  enquiry,  how  far  any  given 
source  of  influence  arising  from  patronage  is  necessary  to  the 
institution  of  civil  government,  we  shall  find,  at  last,  that  the 
necessary  portion  is  very  small.  We  are  little  accustomed 
to  consider  how  simple  a  thing  civil  government  is — nor 
what  an  unnumbered  multiplicity  of  offices  and  sources  of 
patronage  would  be  cut  of,  if  it  existed  in  its  simple  and 
rightful  state. 

Supposing  this  state  of  rectitude  to  be  attained,  and  the 
little  patronage  which  remained  to  be  employed  rather  as  an 
encouragement  and  reward  of  public  virtue  than  of  subserv- 
iency to  purposes  of  party,  we  should  have  no  reason  to  com- 


CHAP.  VII.]  POLITICAL    INFLUENCE.  347 

plain  of  the  existence  of  Influence  or  of  its  effects.  Swift 
said  of  our  own  country,  that  "  while  the  prerogative  of  giv* 
ing  all  employments  continues  in  the  crown,  either  immedi- 
ately or  by  subordination,  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  prince  to 
make  piety  and  virtue  become  the  fashion  of  the  age,  if,  at 
the  same  time,  he  would  make  them  necessary  quahfications 
for  favour  and  preferment."*  But  unhappily,  in  the  existing 
character  of  political  affairs  in  all  nations,  piety  and  virtue 
would  be  very  poor  recommendations  to  many  of  their  con- 
cerns. "  The  just  man,"  as  Adam  Smith  says,  "  the  man 
who,  in  all  private  transactions  would  be  the  most  beloved 
and  the  most  esteemed,  in  those  public  transactions  is  regarded 
as  a  fool  and  an  idiot,  who  does  not  understand  his  business."! 
It  would  be  as  absurd  to  think  of  making  *'  piety  and  virtue, 
qualifications'''  for  these  ofRces,  as  to  make  idiocy  a  qualifica" 
tion  for  understanding  the  Principia. — But  the  position  of 
Swift,  although  it  is  not  true  whilst  politics  remain  to  be  what 
they  are,  contains  truth  if  they  were  what  they  ought  to  be. 
We  should  have,  I  say,  no  reason  to  complain  of  the  exist- 
ence of  influence  or  of  its  effects,  if  it  were  reduced  to  its 
proper  amount,  and  exerted  in  its  proper  direction. 

It  has,  I  think,  been  justly  observed  that  one  of  the  princi- 
pal causes  of  the  separation  of  America  from  Britain,  con- 
sisted in  the  little  influence  which  the  crown  possessed  over 
the  American  States.  They  had  popular  assemblies,  guided 
as  such  assemblies  are  wont  to  be,  by  impatience  of  control, 
as  well  as  by  zeal  for  independence  ;  and  the  government 
possessed  no  patronage  that  was  sufficient  to  counteract  the 
democratic  principles.  Occasion  of  opposition  was  minis- 
istered  ;  and  the  effect  was  seen.  The  American  assemblies, 
and  the  corresponding  temper  of  the  people,  were  more  pow- 
erful than  the  little  influence  which  the  crown  possessed. 
What  was  to  be  done  ?  It  was  necessary  either  to  relinquish 
the  government,  which  could  no  longer  be  maintained  without 
force,  or  to  employ  force  to  retain  it.  The  latter  was  at- 
tempted ;  and,  as  was  to  be  expected,  it  failed.  I  say  failure 
was  to  be  expected  ;  because  the  state  of  America,  and  of 
England  too,  was  such,  that  a  government  of  force  could  not 
be  supposed  likely  to  stand.  Henry  VIII.  and  Elizabeth 
governed  England  by  a  species  of  force.  They  induced  par- 
liamentary compliance  by  intimidation.  This  intimidation  has 
given  place  to  influence.  But  every  man  will  perceive  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  return  to-  intimidation  again.  And  it 
»  Project  for  the  Advancement  of  Religion,     t  Theo.  of  Mor.  Sent 


848  POLITICAL    INFLUENCE. PARTY.  [eSSAT  IlL. 

■was  equally  impossible  to  adopt  it  permanently  in  the  case  of 
America. 

And  here  it  may  be  observed,  in  passing,  that  the  separation 
from  a  mother  country  of  extensive  and  remote  dependencies 
is  always  to  be  eventually  expected.  As  the  dependency  in- 
creases in  population,  in  intelligence,  in  wealth,  and  in  the 
various  points  which  enable  it  to  be,  and  which  practically 
constitute  it,  a  nation  of  itself — it  increases  in  the  tendency 
to  actual  separation.  This  separation  may  be  delayed  by  the 
peculiar  nature  of  the  parent's  government,  but  it  can  hardly 
be  in  the  end  prevented.  It  is  not  in  the  constitution  of  the 
human  species  to  remain  under  the  supremacy  of  a  foreign 
power,  to  which  they  are  under  no  natural  subordination,  after 
the  original  causes  of  the  supremacy  have  passed  away.  Ac- 
cordingly, there  is  reason  to  expect  that,  in  days  to  come,  the 
possessions  of  the  European  powers  on  the  other  quarters  of 
the  globe  will  one  after  another  lapse  away.  Happy  will  it 
be  for  these  powers  and  for  the  world,  if  they  take  counsel 
of  the  philosophy  of  human  affairs,  and  of  the  experience  of 
times  gone  by : — if  they  are  willing  tranquilly  to  yield  up  a 
superiority  of  which  the  reasonableness  and  the  propriety  is 
passed — a  superiority  which  no  efforts  can  eventually  main- 
tain— and  a  superiority  which  really  tends  not  to  the  welfare 
of  the  governing,  of  the  governed,  or  of  the  world. 

PARTY. 

The  system  of  forming  Parties  in  governments  is  perfectly 
congruous  with  the  general  character  of  political  affairs,  but, 
totally  incongruous  with  political  rectitude.  Of  this  incon- 
gruity considerate  men  are  frequently  sensible  ;  and  accord-' 
ingly  we  find  that  defences  of  party  are  set  up,  and  set  up  by 
men  of  respectable  poUtical  character.*  To  defend  a  custom 
is  to  intimate  that  it  is  assailed. 

What  does  the  very  nature  of  party  imply  ?  That  he  who 
adheres  to  it  speaks  and  votes  not  always  according  to  the 
dictates  of  his.  own  judgment,  but  according  to  the  plans  of 
other  men.  This  sacrifice  of  individual  judgment  violates 
one  of  the  first  and  greatest  duties  of  a  legislator — ^to  direct 
his  separate  and  unbiassed  judgment  to  the  welfare  of  the  state. 
There  can  be  no  proper  accumulation  of  individual  experience 
and  knowledge  amongst  those  who  vote  with  a  party. 

But,  indeed,  the  justifications  which  are  attempted  do  not 

•  Fox,  I  believe,  was  one  of  them,  aud  the  present  Lord  John  Russell, 
in  his  Life  o^  Lord  Russell,  is  another. 


CHAP.  VII.]  PARTY.  349 

refer  to  the  abstract  rectitude  of  becoming  one  of  a  party,  but 
to  the  unfailing  ground  of  defending  political  evil — Expedi- 
ency. An  administration,  it  is  said,  would  not  be  so  likely  to 
stand,  or  an  opposition  to  prevail,  when  each  man  votes  as  he 
thinks  rectitude  requires,  as  when  he  ranges  himself  under  a 
leader.  The  difference  is  like  that  which  subsists  in  war  be- 
tween a  body  of  irregular  peasantry  and  a  disciplined  army : 
each  man's  arm  is  as  strong  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other 
but  each  man's  is  not  equally  effective. 

Very  well.  If  we  are  to  be  told  that  it  is  fitting,  or  honest 
or  decent,  that  senates  and  cabinets  should  act  upon  the  prin 
ciples  of  conflicting  armies,  parties  may  easily  be  defended, 
but  surely  legislators  have  other  business  and  other  duties. 
It  only  exhibits  the  wideness  of  the  general  departure  from 
the  proper  modes  of  conducting  government  and  legislation, 
that  such  arguments  are  employed.  It  will  be  said,  thatthere*^ 
are  no  means  of  expelling  a  bad  administration  from  office 
but  by  a  systematic  opposition  to  its  measures.  If  this  wera 
true,  it  would  be  nothing  to  the  question  of  rectitude,  unless 
it  can  be  shown  that  the  end  sanctions  the  means.  Theques 
tion  is  not  whether  we  shall  overthrow  an  administration,  but 
whether  we  shall  do  what  is  right.  But,  even  with  respec*. 
to  the  success  of  political  objects,  it  is  not  very  certain  that 
simple  integrity  would  not  be  the  most  efficacious.  The  man 
who  habitually  votes  on  one  side,  loses,  and  he  ought  to  lose^ 
much  of  the  confidence  of  other  members  of  the  public.  At 
what  value  ought  we  to  estimate  the  mental  principles  of  a 
man,  who  forgoes  the  dictates  of  his  own  judgment,  and  acts 
in  opposition  to  it  in  order  to  serve  a  party  ?  What  is  the 
ground  upon  which  we  can  place  confidence  in  his  integrity  ? 
Facts  may  furnish  an  answer.  The  speeches,  and  statements, 
and  arguments,  of  such  persons,  are  listened  to  with  suspi- 
cion ;  and  an  habitual  and  large  deduction  is  made  from  their 
weight.  This  is  inevitable.  Hearers  and  the  public  cannot 
tell  whether  the  speaker  is  uttering  his  own  sentiments  or 
those  of  others  :  they  cannot  tell  whether  he  believes  his  own 
statements,  or  is  convinced  by  his  own  reasoning.  So  ihat, 
even  when  his  cause  is  good  and  his  advocacy  just,  he  loses 
hnlf  his  influence  because  men  are  afraid  to  rely  upon  him, 
and  because  they  still  do  not  know  whether  some  illusion  is 
not  underneath.  The  mind  is  kept  so  constantly  jealous  of 
fallacies,  that  it  excludes  one  half  of  the  truth.  But  when 
the  man  stands  up,  of  whom  it  is  known  that  he  is  sincere, 
that  what  he  says  he  thinks,  and  what  he  asserts  he  believes, 
the  mind  opens  itself  to  his  statements  without  apprehension 

30 


350  PARTY. MINISTERIAL    UNION.  [esSAY  III. 

of  deceit.     No  deductions  are  made  for  the  overcolourings 
of  party.     Integrity  carries  with  it  its  proper  sanction. 

Now  if,  generally,  the  measures  of  a  party  are  good,  the 
individual  support  of  upright  men  would  probably  more  effec- 
tually recommend  them  to  a  senate  and  to  a  nation,  than  the 
ranked  support  of  men  whose  uprightness  must  always  be 
questionable  and  questioned.  If  the  measures  are  not  good, 
it  matters  not  how  inefficiently  they  are  supported.  Let  those 
who  now  range  themselves  under  political  leaders  of  what- 
ever party,  throw  awuy  their  unworthy  shackles ;  let  them 
convince  the  legislature  and  the  public  that  they  are  abso- 
lutely sincere  men ;  and  it  is  probable  that  a  vicious  policy 
would  not  be  able  to  stand  before  them.  For  other  motives 
to  opposition  than  actual  viciousness  of  measures,  I  have  no- 
thing to  say.  He  whose  principles  allow  him  to  think  that 
other  motives  justify  opposition,  may  very  well  vote  against 
his  understanding.  The  principles  and  the  conduct  are  con- 
genial ;  but  both  are  bad. 

MINISTERIAL  UNION. 

The  unanimous  support  or  opposition  which  ordinarily  is 
given  to  a  measure  by  the  members  of  an  administration, 
whatever  be  their  private  opinions,  is  a  species  of  party. 
Like  other  modes  of  party,  it  results  from  the  impure  condi- 
tion of  political  affairs ;  like  them,  it  is  incongruous  with 
sound  political  rectitude — and,  like  them,  it  is  defended  upon 
pleas  of  expediency.  The  immorality  of  this  custom  is 
easily  shown  ;  because  it  sacrifices  private  judgment,  involves 
a  species  of  hypocrisy,  and  defrauds  the  community  of  that 
iminfluenced  judgment  respecting  public  affairs  for  which  all 
public  men  are  appointed.  "  Ministers  have  been  known, 
publicly  and  in  unqualified  terms,  to  applaud  those  very  meas- 
ures of  a  coadjutor  which  they  have  freely  condemned  in 
private."*  Is  this  manly?  Is  it  honest?  Is  it  Christian  ? 
If  it  is  not,  it  is  vicious  and  criminal ;  and  all  arguments  in 
its  defence — all  disquisitions  about  expediency — are  sopliis- 
tical  and  impertinent. 

"  The  necessity  for  the  co-operation"  (I  use  political  lan- 
guage) results  from  the  general  impurity  of  political  systems 
■ — systems  in  which  not  reason,  simply,  and  principle,  direct, 
but  influence  also,  and  the  spirit  of  party — and  the  love  of 
power.  Where  influence  is  to  be  employed,  union  amongst 
a  cabinet  is  likely  to  urge  it  in  fuller  force  : — Where  the 

•  Gisborne :  Duties  of  Men. 


HAP.  Vn.]  MINISTERIAL    UNlOiV.  351 

spirit  of  party  is  to  be  employed,  this  union  is  necessary  to 
the  object : — Where  the  love  of  power  is  the  g"uide,  consis- 
tency and  integrity  must  be  sacrificed  to  its  acquisition  or  re- 
tention. But  take  away  this  influence — which  is  bad ;  and 
this  spirit  of  party — which  is  bad  ;  and  this  love  of  power — 
which  is  bad  ;  and  the  minister  may  speak  and  act  like  a  con- 
sistent and  a  virtuous  man.  It  is  w^th  this,  as  with  unnum- 
bered cases  in  life,  that  what  is  called  the  necessity  for  a  par- 
ticular vicious  course  of  action  is  quite  adventitious,  resulting 
in  no  degree  from  the  operation  of  sound  principles,  but  from 
the  diffused  impurity  of  human  institutions. 

But,  indeed,  the  necessity  is  not  perhaps  so  obvious  as  is 
supposed.  The  same  reasons  as  those  which  make  the  sup- 
port of  a  partisan  comparatively  inefficient,  operate  upon  the 
ministerial  advocate.  He  is  regarded  as  a  party  man  ;  and 
as  the  exertions  of  a  party  man  his  arguments  are  received. 
People  say  or  think,  when  such  arguments  are  urged,  as  some 
men  say  and  think  of  the  labours  of  the  clergy — "  What  they 
say  is  a  matter  of  course ;" — "  It  is  their  business  ;  their 
trade."  No  one  disputes  that  these  feelings  have  a  powerful 
effect  in  diminishing  the  practical  effect  of  the  labours  of  the 
pulpit ;  and  they  have  the  same  effect  with  respect  to  the 
labours  of  a  ministry.  We  listen  to  a  minister  rather  as  a 
pleader  than  as  a  judge  ;  and  every  one  knows  what  dispro- 
portionate regard  is  paid  to  these.  Why  should  not  ministers 
be  judges  ?  Why  should  not  senates  confide  in  their  integ- 
rity, believe  their  statements,  give  candid  attention  to  their 
reasonings — as  we  attend  to,  and  believe,  and  confide  in,  what 
is  uttered  from  the  bench  ?  And  does  any  man  think  so  ill 
of  mankind  as  to  believe  that  if  an  administration  acted  thus, 
they  would  not  actually  possess  a  greater  influence  upon  the 
minds  of  men,  than  they  do  now  ?  Even  now,  when  men 
are  so  habituated  to  the  operation  of  influence  and  party,  I 
believe  that  a  minister  is  listened  to  with  much  greater  con- 
fidence and  satisfaction  when  he  dissents  from  his  colleagues, 
than  when  he  makes  common  cause.  We  then  insensibly 
reflect,  that  he  is  no  longer  the  pleader  but  the  judge.  The 
independence  of  his  judgment  is  unquestioned  ;  and  we  regard 
it  therefore  as  the  judgment  of  an  honest  man. 

Uniformity  of  opinion — or  more  properly,  unity  of  exertion 
— is  not  at  all  necessary  to  the  stability  of  a  cabinet.  Several 
recent  administrations  in  our  own  country  have  been  divided 
in  sentiment  upon  great  questions  of  national  policy,  and  their 
members  have  opposed  one  another  in  parliament.  With 
what  ill  eflfects  ?     Nay,  has  not  that  very  contrariety  recom- 


352  MINISTERIAL    UNION.  [eSSAY  III. 

mended  the  reasonings  of  all,  as  those  of  sincere  integrity  ? 
It  is  usual  with  some  politicians  to  declaim  vehemently  against 
"  unnatural  coalitions  in  cabinets."  As  to  individuals,  they, 
no  doubt,  may  be  censurable  for  political  tergiversation  ;  but 
as  to  cabinets  being  composed  of  men  of  different  sentiments 
— of  sentiments  so  different  as  their  respective  judgments 
may  occasion — it  is  both  allowable  and  expedient.  It  is  just 
what  a  wise  community  would  wish,  because  it  affords  a  se- 
curity for  that  canvass  of  public  measures  which  is  likely  to 
illustrate  their  character  and  tendencies.  But  it  is  a  sorrow- 
ful and  a  sickening  sight,  to  contemplate  a  number  of  per- 
sons frankly  urging  their  various  and  disagreeing  opinions  at 
a  council  board,  and  as  soon  as  some  resolution  is  come  to, 
all  proceeding  to  a  senate,  and  one  half  urging  the  very  ar- 
guments against  which  they  have  just  been  contending,  and 
by  which  they  are  not  yet  convinced.  Is  freedom  of  can- 
vass for  any  reasons  useful  and  right  at  the  council  board  1 
Is  it  not,  for  the  very  same  reasons,  useful  and  right  in  a  sen- 
ate ?  The  answer  would  be,  yes,  if  public  measures  were 
regarded  as  the  measures  of  the  community,  and  not  of  the 
administration  ;  because  then  the  desire  and  judgment  of  the 
community  would  be  sought  by  the  public  and  independent  dis- 
cussion of  the  question.  Here,  then,  at  last  is  one  great 
cause  of  the  evil — that  a  large  proportion  of  public  acts  are 
the  measures  of  adjninistrations ;  and,  being  such,  adminis- 
trations unitedly  support  them  whatever  be  the  individual 
opinions  of  their  members.  These  things  ought  not  so  to  be. 
I  would  not  indeed  say  that,  from  the  crown  of  the  head  to 
the  sole  of  the  foot,  there  is  no  soundness  in  the  system — but 
the  evil  is  mingled  deplorably  with  the  good.  It  is  sometimes 
in  practice  almost  forgotten,  that  an  administration  is  an  Ex- 
ecutive rather  than  a  Legislative  body — that  their  original  and 
natural  business  is  rather  to  do  what  the  legislature  and  con- 
stitution directs  than  to  direct  the  legislature  themselves.  I 
say  the  original  aiid  natural  business ;  for,  how  congenial  so- 
ever the  great  influence  of  administrations  in  public  affairs 
may  be  with  the  present  tenor  of  policy,  and  especially  of 
international  policy,  it  is  not  at  all  congenial  with  the  original 
purpose  and  simple  and  proper  objects  of  civil  government 
— ^the  welfare  of  the  community,  as  determined  by  an  en- 
lightened survey  of  the  national  mind. 

Of  the  want  of  advertence  to  these  simple  and  proper  ob- 
jects, one  effect  has  been  that,  in  this  country,  administrations 
have  frequently  given  up  their  offices  when  the  senate  has 
rejected  their  measures.     This  is  an  unequivocal  indication 


CHAP.  VIII.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  853 

of  the  wrong  station  in  which  cabinets  are  placed  in  the  legis 
lature — because  it  indicates,  that  if  a  cabinet  cannot  carry  its 
point,  it  is  supposed  to  be  unfit  for  its  office.  All  this  is  natu- 
ral enough  upon  the  present  system,  but  it  is  very  unnatural 
when  cabinets  are  regarded,  either  in  their  ministerial  ca- 
pacity, as  executive  officers,  or  in  their  legislative  capacity,  as 
ordinary  members  of  the  senate.  Executive  officers  are  to  do 
what  the  constitution  and  the  legislature  directs : — members 
of  a  senate  are  to  assist  that  legislature  in  directing  aright : 
in  all  which,  no  necessity  is  involved  for  ministers  to  resign 
their  offices  because  the  measures  which  they  think  best  are 
not  thought  best  by  the  majority.  That  a  ministry  should 
sometimes  judge  amiss  is  to  be  expected,  because  it  is  to  be 
expected  of  all  men :  but  surely  in  a  sound  state  of  political 
institutions,  their  fallibility  would  not  be  a  necessary  argument 
of  unfitness  for  their  offices,  nor  would  the  rejection  of  some 
of  their  opinions  be  a  necessary  evidence  of  a  loss  of  the  con- 
fidence of  the  public. 


CHAPTER  VIIL 

BRITISH  CONSTITUTION. 


Influence  of  the  Crown — House  of  Lords — Candidates  for  a  peerag^e— 
Sudden  creation  of  peers — The  Bench  of  Bishops — Proxies — House  of 
Commons — The  wishes  of  the  People — Extension  of  the  elective 
franchise — Universal  suffrage — Frequent  ejections — Modes  of  election 
— Annual  parliaments — Qualifications  of  voters  and  representatives— 
Of  choosing  the  clergy — Duties  of  a  representative — Systematic  oppo- 
sition— Placemen  and  pensioners — Posthumous  fame. 

That  the  British  Constitution  is  relatively  good,  is  satis  • 
factorily  indicated  by  its  effects.  Without  indulging  in  the 
ordinary  gratulations  of  our  "  own  country  being  the  first  coun- 
try in  the  world,"  it  is  unquestionably,  in  almost  every  respect, 
amongst  the  first — amongst  the  first  in  liberty,  in  intellectual 
and  moral  excellence,  and  in  whatever  dignifies  and  adorns 
mankind.  A  country  which  thus  surpasses  other  nations, 
and  which  has,  with  little  interruption,  possessed  a  nearly 
uniform  constitution  for  ages,  may  well  rest  assured  that  its 
constitution  is  good.     To  say  that  it  is  good,  is  however  very 

30* 


854  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [eSSAY   III. 

different  from  saying  that  it  is  theoretically  perfect,  or  practi- 
cally as  good  as  its  theory  will  allow.  Under  a  King,  Lords, 
and  Commons,  we  have  prospered ;  but  it  does  not  therefore 
follow  that  under  a  King,  Lords,  and  Commons,  we  might  not 
have  prospered  more. 

Whatever  may  be  the  future  allotment  of  our  country  as  to 
the  form  of  its  government,  whether  at  any  period,  or  at  what, 
the  progressive  advancement  of  the  human  species  will  occa- 
sion an  alteration,  we  are  not  at  present  concerned  to  enquire. 
Of  one  thing,  indeed,  we  may  be  assured,  that  if  it  should  be 
the  good  pleasure  of  Providence  that  this  advancement  in  ex- 
cellence shall  take  place,  the  practical  principles  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  its  constitutional  form,  will  be  gradually  moulded 
and  modified  into  a  state  of  adaptation  to  the  then  condition 
of  mankind. 

-  I.  Of  the  regal  part  of  the  British  Constitution  I  would  say 
little.  The  sovereign  is,  in  a  great  degree,  identified  with 
an  administration ;  and  into  the  principles  which  would  regu- 
late ministerial  conduct,  the  preceding  chapters  have  attempted 
some  enquiry. 

Yet  it  may  be  observed  that,  supposing  ministerial  influence 
to  be  "  necessary"  to  the  constitution,  there  appears  consider- 
able reason  to  think  that  its  amount  may  be  safely  and  rightly 
diminished.  As  this  influence  becomes  needless  in  proportion 
to  the  actual  rectitude  of  political  measures  ;  as  there  is  some 
reason  to  hope  that  this  rectitude  is  increasing ;  and  as  the 
public  capacity  to  judge  soundly  of  political  measures  is  mani- 
festly increasing  also ;  it  is  probable  that  some  portion  of  the 
influence  of  the  crown  might  be  given  up,  without  any  danger 
to  the  constitution  or  the  public  weal.  And,  waiving  all  ref- 
erence to  the  essential  moral  character  of  influence,  it  is  to  be 
remembered,  that  no  degree  of  it  is  defensible,  even  by  the 
politician,  but  that  which  apparently  subserves  the  reasonable 
purposes  of  government. 

It  is  recorded  that  in  1741,  in  Scotland,  "  sixteen  peers 
we^e  chosen  literally  according  to  the  list  transmitted  from 
court."*  Such  a  fact  would  convince  a  man,  without  further 
enquiry,  that  there  must  have  been  something  very  unsound 
in  the  ministerial  politics  of  the  day ;  or  at  any  rate,  (which 
is  nearly  the  same  thing,)  something  very  discordant  with  the 
general  mind. 

In  1793,  and  v/hilst,  of  course,  the  Irish  Parliament  existed, 
a  bill  was  brought  into  that  parliament  to  repeal  some  of  the 
Catholic  disabihties.     This  bill  the  "  parUament  loudly,  in- 
•  Smollett:  Hist.  England,  v.  3,  p.  71. 


CHAP.  VIII.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  8^4 

dignantly,  and  resolutely  rejected."  A.  few  months  afterwards. 
a  similar  bill  was  introduced  under  the  auspices  of  the  gov- 
ernment. Pitt  had  taken  counsel  of  Burke,  and  wished  to 
grant  the  Catholics  relief:  and  when  the  viceroy's  secretary 
accordingly  brought  in  a  bill,  two  members  only  opposed  it ; 
and  at  the  second  reading,  it  was  opposed  but  by  one  vote. 
Now,  whatever  may  be  said  of  the  "  necessity"  of  ministerial 
influence  for  the  purposes,  of  state,  nothing  can  be  said  in  fa- 
vour of  such  influence  as  this..  Every  argument  which  would 
show  its  expediency,  would  show  even  more  powerfully  the 
impurity  of  the  system  which  could  require  it. 

It  is  common  to  hear  complaints  of  ministerial  influence  in 
parliament.  "  That  kind  of  influence  which  the"  noble  lord 
alludes  to,"  said  Fox  in  one  of  his  speeches,  "  I  shall  ever 
deem  unconstitutional ;  for  by  the  influence  of  the  crown,  he 
means  the  influence  of  the  crown  in  parliament."*  But,  if  it 
is  concluded  that  influence  is  "  necessary,"  it  seems  idle  to 
complain  of  its  exercise  in  the  senate.  Where  should  it  be 
exerted  with  effect  ?  Whether  it  be  constitutional  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  say,  because  it  is  difficult  to  define  where  constitutional 
acts  end  and  unconstitutional  acts  begin.  But,  it  may  safely 
be  concluded  that,  in  such  matters,  questions  of  constitutional 
rectitude  are  little  relevant.  Influence  you  say — and  in  a  cer- 
tain sense  you  say  it  truly — is  necessary.  To  what  purpose, 
then,  can  it  be  to  complain  of  the  exercise  of  that  influence 
in  those  places  in  which  only  or  principally  it  is  effectual  ? 
It  would  be  impossible  for  persons,  with  our  views  of  political 
rectitude,  to  execute  the  office  of  minister  upon  any  system 
that  approached,  in  its  character,  to  the  present ;  but  were  it 
otherwise,  I  would  advise  a  minister  openly  to  avow  the  exer- 
cise of  influence  and  to  defend  it. — This  were  the  frank,  and 
I  think  the  rational  course.  Why  should  a  man  aflfect  secrecy 
or  concealment  about  an  act  "  politically  necessary."  I  would 
not  talk  about  disinterestedness  and  independence ;  but  tell 
the  world  that  influence  was  needful,  and  that  I  exerted  it. 
Not  that  such  an  avowal  would  stop,  or  ought  to  stop,  the 
complaints  of  virtuous  men.  The  morality  of  politics  is  not 
80  obscure  but  that  thousands  will  always  perceive  that  the 
exertion  of  influence  and  the  submission  to  it,  is  morally 
vicious.  This  conflict  will  continue.  Artifice  and  deception 
are  "necessary"  to  a  swindler,  but  all  honest  men  know  and 
feel  that  the  artifice  and  deception  are  wrong. 

II.  It  appears  to  hfive  been  discovered,  or  assumed,  in  most 
free  states,  that  it  is  expedient  that  there  should  be  two  de- 
«  Fell's  Public  Life  of  C.  J.  Fox. 


358  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [eSSAT  III. 

liberative  assemblies,  of  which  one  shall,  from  its  constitution, 
possess  less  of  a  democratical  tendency  than  the  other.  Not 
that,  in  a  purer  state  of  society,  two  such  assemblies  would 
be  necessary ;  but  because,  while  separate  iiidividuals  or  sep- 
arate classes  of  men  pursue  their  peculiar  interests,  and  are 
swayed  by  their  peculiar  prejudices,  it  is  found  needful  to 
obstruct  one  class  of  interests  and  tendencies  by  another. 
Such  a  purpose  is  answered  by  the  British  House  of  Lords. 

The  privileges  of  the  members  of  this  house  are  such  as  to 
offer  considerable  temptation  to  their  political  virtue.  A  body 
of  men,  whose  eminence  consists  in  artificial  distinctions  be- 
tween them  and  the  rest  of  the  community,  are  likely  to  desire 
to  make  these  distinctions  needlessly  great ;  and  for  that  pur- 
pose to  postpone  the  public  welfare  to  the  interests  of  an  order. 
We  all  know  that  there  is  a  collective  as  well  as  an  individ- 
ual ambition.  It  is  a  truth  which  a  peer  should  habitually 
inculcate  upon  himself,  that  however  rank  and  title  may  be 
conferred  for  the  gratification  of  the  possessor,  the  legislative 
privileges  of  a  peer  are  to  be  held  exclusively  subservient  to 
the  general  good.  I  use  the  word  exclusively  in  its  strict- 
est sense  :  so  that,  if  even  the  question  should  come,  whether 
any  part  or  the  whole  of  the  privileges  of  the  peerage  should 
be  withdrawn,  or  the  general  good  should  be  sacrificed,  I 
should  say  that  no  reasonable  question  could  exist  respecting 
the  proper  alternative.  Were  I  a  peer,  I  should  not  think 
myself  at  liberty  to  urge  the  privileges  of  my  order  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  public  ^v  eal :  for  this  were  evidently  to  postpone 
the  greater  interests  to  the  less.  If  rulers  of  all  kinds,  if 
civil  government  itself,  are  simply  the  officers  of  the  nation, 
surely  no  one  class  of  rulers  is  at  liberty  to  put  its  pretensions 
in  opposition  to  the  national  advantage. 

The  love  of  title  and  of  rank  constitutes  one  of  the  great 
temptations  of  the  political  man.  He  can  obtain  them  only 
from  the  crown  :  and  it  is  not  usual  to  bestow  them  except 
upon  those  who  support  the  administration  of  the  day.  The 
intensity  of  the  desire  which  some  men  feel  for  these  distinc- 
tions, has  a  correspondently  intense  effect.  Lord  Chatham 
said,  "  that  he  had  known  men  of  great  ambition  for  power 
and  dominion,  many  whose  characters  were  tarnished  by  gla- 
ring defects,  some  with  many  vices — who,  nevertheless,  could 
be  prevailed  upon  to  join  in  the  best  public  measures ;  but 
the  moment  he  found  any  man  who  had  set  himself  down  as 
a  candidate  for  a  peerage,  he  despaired  of  his  ever  being  a 
friend  to  his  country?"*  This  displays  a  curious  political 
»  Quoted  by  Fox. — Fell's  Memoirs. 


CHAP.  Vm.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  357 

phenomenon.  Can  the  reader  give  a  better  solution  than  the 
supposition  that,  in  the  love  itself  of  title,  there  is  something 
little  and  low,  and  that  the  minds  which  can  be  so  anxious 
for  it,  are  commonly  too  little  and  too  low  to  sacrifice  their 
hopes  to  friendship  for  their  country? — Many  who  are  not 
candidates  for  peerages,  nevertheless  look  upon  them  with  a 
wishing  eye ;  and  some  who  have  attained  to  the  lower  hon- 
ours of  the  order,  are  equally  solicitous  for  advancement  to 
the  higher.  So  that  even  upon  those  on  whom  the  temptation 
is  not  so  powerful  as  that  of  which  Chatham  speaks — some 
temptation  is  laid  ; — a  temptation  of  which  it  were  idle  to  dis- 
pute that  the  aggregate  effect  is  great. 

If,  without  reference  to  the  existing  state  of  Britain,  a  man 
should  ask  whether  the  legislators  of  a  nation  ought  to  be  sub- 
jected to  such  temptation — whether  it  were  a  judicious  politi- 
cal institution,  I  should  answer,  No ;  because  I  should  judge 
that  a  legislative  assembly  ought  to  have  no  inducements  or 
motives  foreign  to  the  general  good.  This  appears  to  be  so 
obviously  true,  that  the  necessity,  if  there  be  a  necessity,  for 
an  assembly  so  constituted,  only  evinces  how  imperfect  the 
political  character  of  a  people  is.  There  would  be  no  need 
for  having  recourse  to  an  objectionable  species  of  assembly, 
if  it  were  not  wanted  to  counteract  or  to  effect  purposes  which 
a  purely  constituted  assembly  could  not  attain. 

In  estimating  the  relative  worthiness  of  objects  of  human 
pursuit,  a  peerage  does  not  appear  to  rank  high.  I  know  not, 
indeed,  how  it  happens  that  men  contemplate  it  with  so  much 
complacency ;  and  that  so  few  are  found  who  appear  to  doubt 
whether  it  is  one  of  the  most  reasonable  and  worthy  objects 
of  human  desire.  A  title !  Only  think  what  a  title  is,  and 
what  it  is  not.  It  is  a  thing  which  philosophy  may  reasona- 
bly hold  cheap ;  a  thing  which  partakes  of  the  character  of 
the  tinsel  watch,  for  which  the  new-breeched  urchin  looks 
with  anxious  eyes,  and  by  which,  when  he  has  got  it,  he 
thinks  he  is  made  a  greater  man  than  before.  If  such  be  the 
character  of  title  when  brought  into  comparison  with  the  dig- 
nity of  man,  what  is  it  when  it  is  compared  with  the  dignity 
of  the  Christian  ?  Nothing.  It  may  be  affirmed,  without  any 
apprehension  of  error,  that  the  greater  the  degree  in  which 
any  man  is  a  Christian,  the  less  will  be  his  wish  to  be  called 
a  lord ;  and  that  when  he  attains  to  the  "  fulness  of  the  stat- 
ure" of  a  Christian  man,  no  wish  will  remain. — If  additional 
motives  can  be  urged  to  reduce  our  ambition  of  title,  some, 
perhaps,  may  be  found  in  considering  the  grounds  upon  which 
it  has  too  frequently  been   conferred.     Queen  Anne,  when 


858  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [esSAT  III. 

once  the  ministry  could  not  carry  a  measure  in  the  upper 
house,  made  twelve  new  peers  at  once.  These,  of  course, 
voted  for  the  measure.  What  honourable  and  elevated  mind 
would  have  purchased  one  of  these  titles  at  the  expense  of 
the  caustic  question  which  a  member  put  when  they  were  go- 
ing to  give  their  first  vote — "  Are  you  going  to  vote  by  your 
foreman  V 

Whether  the  heads  of  a  Christian  church  should  possess 
seats  in  the  legislature,  is  a  question  that  has  often  been  dis- 
cussed— If  a  Christian  bishop  can  attend  to  legislative  affairs 
without  infringing  upon  the  time  and  attention  which  is  due 
to  his  peculiar  office,  there   appears  nothing  in  that  office 
which  disquaUfies  him  for  legislative  functions.     The  better 
a  man  is,  the  more,  as  a  general  rule,  he  is  fit  for  a  legislator ; 
so  that,  assuming  that  bishops  are  peculiarly  Christian  men, 
it  is  not  unfit  that  they  should  assist  in  the  councils  of  the 
nation.     Nevertheless,  it  must  be  conceded,  that  there  is  no 
peculiar  congruity  between  the  office  of  the  Christian  over- 
seer and  that  of  an  agent  in  political  affairs.     They  are  not 
incompatible,  indeed,  but  the  connexion  is  not  natural.     Poli- 
tics do  not  form  the  proper  business  of  a  Christian  shepherd. 
They  are  wholly  foreign  to  his  proper  business ;  and  that 
retirement  from  the  things  of  the  world  which  Christianity 
requires  of  her  ministers,  and  which  she  must  be  supposed 
peculiarly  to  require  of  her  more  elevated  ministers,  indicates 
the  propriety  of  meddling  but  little  in  affairs, of  state.     But, 
when  it  comes  to  be  proposed  that  all  the  heads  of  a  Chris- 
tian church  shall  be  selected  for  legislators,  because  they  are 
heads  of  the  church — the  impropriety  becomes  manifest  and 
great.     To  make  a  high  religious  office  the  qualification  for 
a  political  office,  is  manifestly  wrong.     It  may  be  found  now 
and  then  that  a  good  bishop  is  fit  for  a  useful  legislator — but 
because  you  have  elevated  a  man  to  a  more  onerous  and  re- 
sponsible office  in  the  church,  forthwith  to  superadd  an  oner- 
ous and  responsible  office  in  the  state,  is  surely  not  to  consult 
the  dictates  of  Christianity  or  of  reason.     Nor  is  it  rational 
or  Christian  forthwith  to  add  a  temporal  peerage.     If  there 
be  any  one  thing,  not  absolutely  vicious,  which  is  incongru- 
ous with  the  proper  temper  and  character  of  an  exalted  shep- 
herd of  the  flock,  it  is  temporal  splendour.     Such  splendour 
accords  very  well  with  the  political  character  of  the  Romis?i 
church — but  with  Protestantism,  with  Christianity,  it  has  no 
accordance.      The  splendours  of  title  are  utterly  dissimilar 
in  their  character  to  the  character  of  the  heads  of  the  church, 
as  that  character  is  indicated  in  the  New  Testament.     How 


CHAP.  VIIl.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  359 

preposterous  is  the  association  in  idea  of  "  My  Lord"  with  a 
Paul  or  a  Barnabas ! — The  truth,  indeed,  is,  that  this  species 
of  fornication  did  not  originate  in  religion  nor  in  religious 
motives.  It  sprung  up  with  the  corruptions  of  the  papacy ; 
and  in  this,  as  in  some  other  instances,  we,  who  have  purified 
the  vicious  doctrine,  have  clung  to  the  vicious  practice. 

To  these  considerations  is  to  be  added  another :  that  the 
extent  of  jurisdiction  which  is  assigned  to  the  bishops  of  this 
country,  is  such  as  to  occupy,  if  the  office  be  rightly  exe- 
cuted, a  large  portion  of  a  bishop's  time — a  portion  so  large 
that  if  he  be  exemplary  as  a  bishop,  he  can  hardly  be  exem- 
plary as  a  legislator.  If,  as  will  perhaps  be  admitted,  the 
diligent  and  conscientious  pastor  of  an  ordinary  parish  has 
a  sufficient  employment  for  his  time,  it  cannot  be  supposed 
that  a  bishop  has  less.  He  who  presides  over  hundreds  of 
parishes  and  hundreds  of  pastors,  and  rightly  presides  over 
them,  can  surely  find  little  time  for  attendance  in  the  senate ; 
especially  when  that  attendance  takes  him,  as  it  necessarily 
does,  far  away  from  the  inferior  shepherds  and  from  the 
flocks. 

But,  when  it  comes  to  be  considered  that  our  bishops  are 
the  heads  of  an  established  church,  we  are  presented  with  a 
very  different  field  of  enquiry.  That  which  is  not  congruous 
with  Christianity  may  be  congruous  with  a  religious  estab- 
lishment. Nor,  in  a  religious  establishment  like  that  which 
obtains  in  England,  would  there,  perhaps,  be  any  propriety 
in  dismissing  bishops  from  the  house  of  Lords.  They  have 
to  watch  over  other  interests  than  those  of  religion — poli- 
tical interests^  and  where  shall  they  efficiently  watch  over 
them  if  they  have  no  voice  in  political  aflTairs  ?  Bishops 
in  this  country  have  not  merely  to  "  feed  the  flock  of  God 
which  is  among  them,"  but  to  take  care  that  that  flock  and 
their  shepherds  retain  their  privileges  and  their  supremacy : 
so  that  if  I  were  asked,  whether  bishops  ought  to  have  a  seat 
in  the  legislature,  I  should  answer — If  you  mean  by  a  bishop 
a  head  of  a  Christian  church,  he  has  other  and  better  busi- 
ness : — if,  by  a  bishop  you  mean  the  head  of  an  established 
church,  the  question  must  be  determined  by  the  question  of 
the  rectitude  of  an  established  church  itself. 

Without  stopping  to  decide  this  question,  it  may  be  ob- 
served, that  some  serious  mischiefs  result  from  the  institution 
as  it  exists,  A  bishop  should  be  not  only  of  unimpeachable, 
but,  as  far  as  may  be,  of  untempted  virtue.  His  office  as  a 
peer  subjects  him  to  gTeat  temptations.  Bishops  are  more 
dependent  upon  the  crown  than  any  other  class  of  peers, 


860  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [esSAY  III. 

because  vacancies  for  elevation  in  the  church  are  continually 
occurring ;  and  for  these  vacancies  a  bishop  hopes.  Since 
he  cannot  generally  expect  to  obtain  them  by  an  opposition, 
however  conscientious,  to  the  minister  of  the  day,  he  is  placed 
in  a  situation  which  no  good  man  ought  to  desire  for  himself ; 
that  of  a  powerful  temptation  to  sacrifice  his  integrity  to  his 
interests.  How  frequently,  or  how  far,  that  temptation  pre- 
vails, I  presume  not  to  determine  ;  but  it  is  plain,  whatever 
be  the  cause,  that  the  minister  can  count  upon  the  support  of 
the  bishops  more  confidently  than  upon  any  other  class  of 
peers.  This  is  not  the  experience  of  one  minister,  or  of  two, 
but,  in  general  language,  of  all.  History  states  informally, 
and  as  an  unquestioned  circumstance,  that  "  from  the  bench 
of  bishops  the  court  usually  expects  the  greatest  complaisance 
and  submission."*  I  perceive  nothing  in  the  nature  of  the 
Christian  office  to  induce  this  support  of  the  minister  of  the 
day.  I  do  not  see  why  a  Christian  pastor  should  do  this 
rather  than  a  legislator  of  another  station ;  for  it  will  hardly 
be  contended  that  there  is  so  much  goodness  and  purity  in 
ministerial  transactions,  that  a  Christian  pastor  must  support 
them  because  they  are  so  pure  and  so  good.  What  conclu- 
sion then  remains,  but  that  temptation  is  presented,  and  that 
it  prevails  ?  That  this,  simply  regarded,  is  an  evil  no  man 
can  doubt ;  but  let  him  remember  that  the  evil  is  not  neces- 
sarily incidental  even  to  the  legislating  bishop.  There  may 
be  bishops  without  solicitude  for  translations,  for  there  may 
be  a  church  without  dependence  on  the  Crown,  or  connexion 
with  the  state.  Whilst  this  connexion  and  this  dependence 
remains,  I  do  not  say  that  ecclesiastical  peers  cannot  be  ex- 
empt from  unworthy  influence,  but  there  is  no  hope  of  exemp- 
tion in  the  present  condition  of  mankind. 

The  system  which  obtains  in  the  House  of  Lords,  of  acr 
cepting  proxies  in  divisions,  appears  strangely  inconsistent 
with  propriety  and  reason.  It  intimates  utter  contempt  of 
the  debates  of  the  house,  because  it  virtually  declares  that 
the  arguments  of  the  speakers  are  of  no  weight  or  concern. 
Who  can  tell,  or  who  ought  to  tell,  when  he  gives  his  proxy 
to  another,  whether  the  discussion  might  not  alter  his  views 
and  make  him  vote  on  the  other  side  ?  Proxies  are  congru- 
ous enough  with  a  system  of  legislation  which  is  conducted 
upon  maxims  of  interest  and  party  ;  but  if  we  suppose  legis- 
lation to  proceed  upon  evidence  and  reasoning,  they  are  a 
preposterous  mockery  of  common  sense. 

The  number  of  peers  has  rapidly  increased.  This  may 
*  Hume's  England. 


CHAP.  VIII.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  361 

be  a  subject  of  regret  to  the  peerage  itself,  because  every 
addition  to  its  number  may  be  regarded  as  a  reduction  from 
the  dignity  of  each.  The  dignity  is  relative,  and  consists  in 
the  distinction  between  them  and  other  men,  which  distinc- 
tion becomes  less  as  peers  become  common.  As  the  peerage 
is  progressively  increased  in  number,  a  lord  will  be  progres- 
sively reduced  in  practical  rank.  The  title  remains  the  same, 
but  the  actual  distinction  between  him  and  other  men  is 
waning  away.  But,  though  this  may  cause  regret  to  a  peer, 
it  ought  to  cause  none  to  the  man  of  reason  or  the  patriot. 
As  to  reason,  if  our  estimates  of  title  be  accurate,  its  distinc- 
tions are  sufficiently  vain  ;  and  as  to  patriotism,  if  our  country 
is  increasing  in  knowledge  and  in  excellence,  it  is  increasing 
in  its  ability  to  direct  its  own  policy  without  the  intervention 
of  an  order  of  peers  ;  so  that,  supposing  the  cessation  of  that 
order  to  be  hereafter  desirable,  the  patriot  may  hope  that  its 
distinctions  will  be  yielded  up  to  the  general  weal  more  wil- 
lingly when  they  have  become  insignificant  by  diffusion,  than 
if  they  were  great  by  being  possessed  but  by  a  few. 


In  reflecting  then  upon  the  political  character  of  the  House 
of  Lords,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  its  utility  appears  to  be 
conditional — conditional  upon  the  state  of  the  community.  It 
may  be  needed  to  check  intemperate  measures — to  restrain, 
for  instance,  the  vicious  encroachments  of  democracy ;  but  it 
is  not  needed  in  any  other  sense.  It  is  like  the  physician's 
prescription  or  the  surgeon's  knife — ^useful  in  an  unhealthy 
state  of  the  social  body,  but  useless  if  it  were  sound.  The 
reader  will  say  that  this  is  strong  language,  and  so  it  is  ;  but 
he  has  no  reason  to  complain  if  it  is  the  language  of  truth ; 
and  that  it  is  true,  he  may  perhaps  be  convinced  by  authority, 
upon  such  a  subject,  less  questionable  than  mine.  "  Were 
the  voice  of  the  people  always  dictated  hy  reflection,  did  every 
man,  or  even  one  man  in  a  hundred,  think  for  himself,  or  actu- 
ally consider  the  measure  he  was  about  to  approve  or  censure, 
or  even  were  the  common  people  tolerably  steadfast  in  the 
judgment  which  they  formed,  I  should  hold  the  interference 
of  a  superior  order  not  only  superfluous,  hut  wronor.^^* 

III.  The  House  of  Commons  is  constitutionally  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  people,  and  the  degree  in  which  it  fulfils  this, 
its  constitutional  office,  is  to  be  estimated  by  the  degree  in 
which  the  public  wish  is  actually  represented  by  its  menib(TS. 
"  It  is  essential  to  the  happiness  of  the  people,  that  they 
should  be  convinced  that  they  and  the  members  of  this  house^ 
*  Paley:  Mor.  and  PoL  Phil.  b.  vi.  c.  7. 
31 


362  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [eSSAY  III. 

feel  an  identity  of  interest ;  that  the  nation  at  large,  and  the 
representatives  of  the  people,  hold  a  conformity  of  sentiment. 
This  is  the  essence  of  a  proper  representative  assembly."* 
It  is  not  necessary  to  the  just  fulfilment  of  this  office,  that 
every  measure  which  a  majority  of  the  people  desires,  should 
be  adopted  by  the  House,  because  its  members  are  often  bet- 
ter able  to  judge  what  is  good  for  the  majority,  than  they  are 
themselves  ;  and  because,  sometimes,  popular  opinions  are 
not,  I  think,  capricious,  but  fluctuating,  and  unreasonably  ve- 
hement. There  was  a  time  when  the  populace  were  in  tu- 
mult, and  almost  in  insurrection,  because  the  Legislature  had 
erected  turnpikes ;  but  if  three-fourths  of  the  population  of 
the  country  had  joined  in  the  outcry,  it  would  not  have  been 
a  good  reason  for  repealing  the  act.  But,  if  the  public  wish 
is  not  always  to  be  gratified  by  the  House  of  Commons,  it  is 
always  to  be  expressed  within  its  walls.  The  house  should 
know  what  the  people  desire,  though  they  are  at  liberty,  if 
they  think  it  needful,  to  reject  that  desire.  This,  it  is  obvi- 
ous, is  a  right  which  the  people  may  claim  of  the  republican 
part  of  the  constitution.  It  were  neither  decorous  nor  wise 
to  show  even  impatience  at  the  respectful  petitions  of  the 
people ; — not  decorous,  for  it  implies  forgetfulness  that  the 
house  is  the  servant  of  the  public  ; — not  wise,  for  a  candid 
attention  to  the  public  representations,  even  when  they  are 
not  acted  upon,  is  one  of  the  surest  means  of  conciliating 
the  esteem,  and  of  administering  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
community. 

In  estimating  the  extent  to  which  the  decisions  of  the  House 
of  Commons  ought  actually  to  correspond  with  the  public 
wishes,  no  narrow  limits  should  be  prescribed.  It  is  here, 
if  any  where,  that  the  people  are  to  be  heard.  Both  the  other 
branches  of  the  constitution  tend  naturally  to  their  separate 
and  privileged  interests  ;  so  that,  if  in  the  senate  of  a  repub- 
lican government  the  people  ought  to  be  represented,  much 
more  emphatically  ought  they  to  be  represented  by  the  Com- 
mons in  a  government  like  our  own.  '  *> 

The  most  accurate  test  of  the  degree  in  which  the  British 
House  of  Commoiis  fulfils  this  its  primary  office,  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  deliberate  judgments  of  reasonable  and  thinking 
men :  not  of  party  men,  or  interested  men,  but  of  the  tempe- 
rate and  the  good.  Now  there  is  reason  to  think,  that  in  the 
judgments  of  this  portion  of  the  community,  there  is  not  a 
just  and  sufficient  identity  between  the  public  voice  and  the 
measures  of  this  house. 

*  William  Pitt:  GifFord's  Life,  v.  iii. 


CHAP.  Vm.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  363 

But,  supposing  the  practical  representation  to  be  defective, 
how  is  the  defect  to  be  repaired  ?  A  question  this  of  far  less 
easy  solution  than  some  politicians  would  persuade  us !  Not 
frequency  of  parliaments,  not  extensions  of  the  franchise,  not 
altering  the  modes  of  election,  will  be  sufficient.  The  evil 
is  seated  primarily,  -and  essentially,  in  the  impure  condition, 
in  the  imperfect  virtue  of  man.  To  those  who  are  imperfect 
and  impure,  temptation  is  offered :  the  temptation  perhaps  of 
party — perhaps  of  interest — perhaps  of  resentment — perhaps 
of  ambition.  You  cannot  make  men  proof  against  these 
temptations  but  by  making  them  good ;  and  modes  of  electing, 
or  frequency  of  election,  will  not  do  this.  The  only  reforma- 
tion must  result  from  the  reformation  of  the  heart.  Electors 
themselves  are  not  solicitous  to  elect  good  men  :  they  are  in- 
fluenced by  passion,  and  interest,  and  party.  How  then 
should  they  select  those  who  are  independent,  and  disinter- 
ested, and  temperate  ? 

But  evils  which  cannot  be  removed  may  be  diminished ; 
and  since  the  evil  in  question  indicates  an  insufficient  degree 
of  liberty,  both  civil  and  political,  it  may  be  of  advantage  to 
enquire  whether  both  cannot  be,  and  ought  not  to  be  increased. 

Now,  remembering  that  it  lies  upon  the  legislature  to  prove 
that  the  present  institutions  are  the  best — what  is  the  evidence 
that  mischief  would  arise  from  an  extension  of  the  franchise 
and  from  an  alteration  of  the  modes  of  election  1  We  are  not 
required  to  evince  that  benefit  would  arise  from  such  meas- 
ures ;  because  their  propriety  is  dictated  by  the  principles 
of  political  truth,  unless  it  is  shown  that  they  would  be  perni- 
cious. Assuredly,  in  contemplating  mere  probabilities,  it  is 
more  probable  that  a  representative  will  be  virtuously  chosen, 
when  he  is  chosen  by  a  thousand  men  than  when  by  only 
ten.  The  reason  is  simple,  that  it  is  much  more  difficult  to 
offer  vicious  motives  to. the  electors.  If  the  probability  of 
advantage  in  such  an  alteration  is  disputable,  it  must  be  by 
the  production  of  very  strong  probabilities  on  the  other  side. 
And  until  those  probabilities  are  adduced,  I  see  not  how  it 
can  be  denied  that  from  the  public  is  withheld  a  portion  of 
their  civil  rights.  There  is  always  one  powerful  reason  for 
an  extension  of  the  legal  right  of  election,  which  is,  that  it 
tends  to  satisfy  the  people.  This  satisfaction  is  of  impor- 
tance, whether  the  wish  of  the  people  be  in  itself  desirable 
or  not :  so  that  of  two  measures  which  in  other  respects  were 
equally  eligible,  that  would  become  the  best  and  the  right 
one,  which  imparted  the  greatest  satisfaction  to  the  commu- 
nity.    It  cannot  be  hoped  that  this  satisfaction  will  ever  pre- 


1864  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [eSSAT  HI. 

vail  during  the  continuance  of  the  present  state  of  the  fran- 
chise. Its  irregular  and  inconsistent  character  will  always 
(even  setting  aside  its  consequences)  give  rise  to  uneasiness 
and  complaints.  A  large  county  can  never  think  political 
justice  is  exercised  while  it  sends  no  more  members  than  a 
little  borough.  Birmingham  and  Manchester  will  never  think 
it  is  exercised,  whilst  Old  Sarum  sends  two  members  and 
they  send  none. 

There  are,  no  doubt,  many  difficulties  interposed  in  the 
way  of  the  legislature  in  proceeding  to  a  reformation — which 
difficulties,  however,  will  generally  be  found  to  result  from 
the  existing  impurity  of  the  present  system.  It  is  not  per- 
haps impossible  that,  if  a  House  of  Commons  were  selected 
by  any  approach  to  universal  suffrage,  it  would  ere  long  in- 
terfere with  the  established  modes  of  governing.  Many,  it 
is  probable,  would  feel  that  their  prejudices  were  outraged, 
and  their  interests  invaded,  and  their  privileges  diminished  or 
taken  away.  These  prospects  interpose  difficulties  ;  and  yet 
unless  these  prejudices  are  reasonable,  and  these  interests 
virtuous,  and  these  privileges  dictated  by  the  public  good,  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  difficulties  of  reform  result,  not  from  any 
defect  in  the  principles  of  Political  Truth,  but  from  the  con- 
flict between  the  operation  of  those  principles  and  exception- 
able systems. 

Not,  indeed,  that  a  representative  body,  however  elected, 
is  to  be  concluded  as  necessarily  temperate  and  wise.  There 
is  much  reason  to  fear,  in  the  present  state  of  private  virtue, 
that  if  the  House  of  Commons  were  a  purely  popular  assem- 
bly, it  might  both  injudiciously  and  unjustifiably  excite  poli- 
tical distractions.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  they  found  that  any 
existing  institutions  required  amendment,  they  would  probably, 
on  the  other  hand,  seek  to  establish  popular  power  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  general  good. 

Nevertheless,  there  appears  sufficient  reason  for  thinking 
that  some  alteration,  and  considerable  alteration,  might  be 
made  in  the  system  of  representation,  which  would  do  good 
without  doing  evil.  If  the  British  empire  is  not  prepared  for 
a  purely  popular  representation,  it  is,  I  think,  prepared  for  a 
representation  more  popular  than  that  which  obtains.  Mild 
and  gradual  alteration  is  perhaps  the  best.  The  franchise 
may  be  extended,  one  by  one,  to  new  districts  or  new  towns, 
and  taken  away  or  modified,  one  by  one,  from  places  in  which 
the  electors  are  few,  or  in  which  they  are  corrupt.  By  such 
means  the  reformation  might  keep  pace,  and  only  keep  pace, 
with  the  general  progress  of  the  nation.     The  prospect  of 


CHAP.  VIII.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  3Q5 

successive  amendment  would  tend  to  satisfy  the  public,  and 
the  general  end  be  eventually  answered  by  innoxious  means. 

Some  want  of  enlargement  of  views  appears  to  exist  with 
respect  to  the  propriety  and  the  right  of  the  legislature  to  re- 
move the  elective  franchise.  It  seems  to  be  thought  that  a 
borough  ought  not  to  be  deprived  of  it,  unless  its  corruption 
is  both  general  and  distinctly  proved.  But  why  ?  The  fran- 
chise is  not  possessed  for  the  gratification  of  the  inhabitants 
of  a  particular  spot,  but  for  the  national  good.  It  might,  no 
doubt,  have  originally  been  given  for  their  gratification,  but 
this  was  always  an  unreasonable  motive  for  granting  it.  If 
the  general  advantage  requires  the  transfer  of  the  right  of 
election,  it  were  strange  indeed  if  the  inhabitants  of  a  little 
town  ought  to  prevent  it  by  exclaiming.  Do  not  encroach  upon 
our  privileges !  As  to  the  property  vested  in  the  privilege,  it 
is  founded,  if  not  in  corruption,  in  political  impropriety.  For 
a  householder  to  say,  I  have  given  a  hundred  pounds  more  for 
my  premises  because  they  conveyed  a  right  of  voting,  or  for 
a  patron  to  say,  I  have  given  an  extra  five  thousand  for  a 
manor  because  it  enabled  me  to  nominate  two  representatives, 
is  surely  a  very  insufficient  reason  for  continuing  a  franchise 
that  is  adverse  to  the  common  weal.  However,  it  is  prob- 
able that  the  great  object  is  not  to  take  away  privileges  but 
to  extend  them,  and  by  that  extension  to  secure  the  proba- 
bility of  uninfluenced  elections. 

Universal  Suffrage  is  a  by-word  of  political  scorn  :  and 
yet  it  is  probable  that  the  country  will  one  day  be  fit  for  the 
adoption  of  universal  suffrage.  The  objections  to  it  are 
founded — as,  antecedently  to  enquiry,  I  should  expect  they 
would  be  founded — upon  the  ignorant  and  vicious  state  of 
mankind.  If  knowledge  and  virtue  increase,  universal  suf- 
frage may  hereafter  be  rightly  adopted. — If  they  are  now  in- 
creasing, approaches  towards  such  suffrage  are  desirable  now. 
Nor  perhaps  is  the  public  preparation  for  these  approaches  so 
little  as  some  men  suppose.  A  part  of  our  objections  to  it  are 
quite  fortuitous  and  accidental,  and  easily  removable  by  legis- 
lative enactments.  Nor  again  is  it  to  be  forgotten,  that  some 
of  the  states  in  the  American  Union  do  actually  adopt  univer- 
sal suffrage,  or  something  that  is  very  much  like  it.  Upon 
this  subject  it  is  always  to  be  remembered,  that  unless  the 
withholding  of  the  privilege  of  election  is  necessary  to  the 
national  welfare,  the  possession  of  it  is,  in  strictness,  a  civil 
right.  It  can  never  be  shown  upon  other  grounds  than  ex- 
pediency, why  one  man  should  possess  the  privilege  whilst 
his  neighbour  should  not. 

31  • 


366  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [eSSAY  III 

The  present  modes  of  election  are  productive  of  much  evil 
— evil  by  facilitating  undue  influence — evil  by  occasioning 
immorality  and  riot — and  evil  hy  attaching  to  the  idea  of  fre- 
quent elections  ideas  of  national  inquietude  ^and  confusion. 
When  we  see,  at  the  time  of  an  election,  a  multitude  of  men 
brought  together,  many  of  them  perhaps  from  a  distance,  and 
fed  and  lodged  at  the  expense  of  one  of  the  candidates,  we 
certainly  see  that  the  door  is  opened  wide  for  the  entrance  of 
corruption.  In  1696  an  Act  was  passed,  "for  voiding  all  the 
elections  of  parliament  men,  at  which  the  elected  had  been 
at  any  expense  in  meat,  drink,  or  money,  to  procure  votes."* 
When  we  see  the  neighbouring  tenantry  of  the  several  large 
landowners,  (petty  freeholders  though  they  be,)  classed  in 
separate  bodies,  and  voting,  almost  to  a  man,  for  the  favourite 
of  their  landlord,  we  see  either  that  improper  influence  is 
grossly  employed,  or  that  the  exercise  of  private  judgment  is, 
with  such  voters,  only  a  name.  If  indeed  there  were  no  pos- 
sibility of  obtaining  more  considerate  votes  from  the  popula- 
tion, I  know  not  that  much  is,  to  be  hoped  from  a  great  exten- 
sion of  the  franchise,  or  from  an  alteration  of  the  modes  of 
election. — The  riot  and  confusion  of  elections  is  so  great,  that 
politicians  find  it  needful  to  advise  dissolutions  of  parliament, 
at  periods  when  it  is  supposed  that  the  excitement  may  be 
safely  occasioned  without  endangering  mischief  to  the  gene- 
ral tranquillity.  It  would  not  be  found  a  small  item  in  the  na- 
tional guilt,  if  we  were  to  compute  the  amount  of  private 
vice,  of  intemperance,  profaneness,  and  debauchery,  which  a 
general  election  occasions. — These  evils,  again  are  urged 
against  proposals  for  increasing  the  frequency  of  elections ! 
Thus  one  vicious  system  becomes  an  excuse  for  another. 
You  are  afraid  to  endeavour  parliamentary  integrity  by  fre- 
quent elections,  because  your  bad  system  of  elections  pro- 
duces so  much  mischief !  The  simple  and  obvious  remedy 
is,  to  elect  representatives  on  a  less  objectionable  system.  A 
few  propositions  respecting  the  modes  of  election,  will  prob- 
ably not  be  rejected  by  reasonable  men. 

That  the  elector  should  not  he  obliged  to  go  to  a  distance 
from  his  own  home: — ^because,  if  the  place  of  election  be 
distant,  he  will  either  refuse  to  go — which  nullifies  the  insti- 
tution with  respect  to  him ; — or  he  will  go,  and  expect  to  be 
reimbursed  his  expenses  and  his  loss  of  time — which  leads, 
almost  inevitably,  to  corruption. 

That  candidates  should  he  at  no  expense  in  conducting  the 
election : — ^because  their  payments  will  operate  as  bribes — be- 
*  Smollett :  History  of  England 


CHAP.  VIII.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  367 

cause  the  necessity  of  expense  precludes  virtuous  and  able 
men,  who  cannot  afford  it  from  being  chosen — and  because 
he  who  has,  in  this  sense,  purchased  his  seat,  is  in  danger  of 
thinking  himself  at  liberty  to  repay  himself  by  seeking  the 
rewards  of  political  subserviency. 

That  it  ought  not  to  he  known  for  what  candidate  an  elector 
votes  ;*  because,  if  it  is  known,  the  elector  will  probably  be 
afraid  to  vote  for  the  man  of,  his  own  choice,  lest  some  friend 
of  an  adverse  candidate,  in  whose  good  offices  he  is  inter- 
ested, should  withdraw  them. 

These  propositions  tend  to  the  recommendation  of  some 
species  of  ballot  for  securing  secrecy  ;  of  elections  at  the  public 
expense,  for  excluding  the  mischiefs  of  expenses  to  the  can- 
didate ;  and  of  the  visit,  probably,  of  proper  offi.cers  from  house 
to  house,  to  exclude  the  mischiefs  of  requiring  electors  to 
leave  their  homes.  Such  institutions  would,  I  belicA^e,  pre- 
vent many,  at  least,  of  the  mischiefs,  moral  and  political,  of 
the  present  system  ;  and  would  take  away  from  the  advocate 
of       ig-lived  parliaments  one  popular  reason  in  their  favour. 

['•  Annual  Parliaments"  is  another  by-word  of  contempt ; 
and  perhaps  they  will  never  be  expedient.  This  is  one  ques- 
tion ;  the  expediency  of  septennial  parliaments  is  another. 
Nor  is  it  a  very  philosophical  nor  a  very  honest  mode  of  con- 
temning an  alteration,  to  assume  that  there  is  no  practical  in- 
termediate period  between  one  year  and  seven.  The  Ameri- 
can House  of  representatives  is  elected  for  two  years,  and  as 
their  senate  also  is  a  representative  body,  whilst  our  House  of 
Lords  is  not,  it  is  probable  that  biennial  parliaments,  with  a 
reformed  mode  of  election,  would  be  practicable  and  bene- 
ficial here.] 

[The  electors  of  a  district  choose  a  man  of  whom  they 
hope  rather  than  know  the  character.  They  find  in  the  course 
of  a  year  or  two  that  he  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  discharge 
his  public  duty.  To  prevent  such  electors  from  making  ano- 
ther choice — to  oblige  them,  for  seven  years,  to  be,  in  effect, 
destitute  of  a  representation,  is  a  serious  grievance,  and  it 
may  be  a  serious  evil. J 

*  I  am  disposed  to  acknowledge  that  this  secrecy  of  suffrages  is  not 
congruous  with  that  manly  independence  which  it  were  desirable  to  pro- 
mote. In  a  better  state  of  society  open  voting  appears  the  more  virtu- 
ous and  honourable  course  ;  for  why  should  a  man  desire  to  conceal  that 
which  he  thinks  it  right  to  do?  Besides,  Balloting  endangers  the  prac- 
tice of  hypocrisy,  by  promising  or  pretending  to  vote  according  to  the 
wish  of  another,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  secrecy  to  vote  against  it. 
Yet  I  see  not  that  these  consequences  are  such  as  to  vitiate  the  system 
as  applicable  and  as  expedient  m  the  present  day. 


308  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [eSSAY  III. 

[A  little  before  a  dissolution  there  is  sometimes  a  manifest 
endeavour  to  conciliate  the  public  by  the  adoption  of  some 
measure  which  they  approve.  Can  it  be  doubted  that  there 
would  be  an  advantage  in  making  such  measures  more  fre- 
quently necessary  ? — or  that  more  frequent  parliaments  would 
perceive  the  necessity,  and  act  upon  it  ?] 

With  respect  to  the  qualifications  for  voting,  no  rule  can  be 
prescribed,  because  no  rule  can  define  how  large  a  portion  of 
the  people,  or  whether  the  whole  ought  to  possess  votes. 
The  security  of  the  virtuous  exercise  of  the  privilege  is 
manifestly  the  object  to  be  attained — which  security  must  be 
sought  according  to  some  general  rule.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  (until  all  men  are  fit  to  become  electors)  any  general 
rule  is  better  than  that  of  amount  of  property ;  not  so  much 
because  the  possession  of  property  exempts  men  from  vicious 
influence,  as  because,  amongst  the  possessors  of  some  com- 
petent property,  is  the  largest  portion  of  thinking  men.  We 
Wdjit  not  only  an  unbiassed,  but  a  rational  judgment.  In  the 
present  state  of  property,  the  preference,  in  towns,  o^  free- 
holders to  renters,  appears  to  be  carried  too  far.  Tlie  man 
who  rents  a  house  for  forty  pounds  a-year,  is  much  more 
likely  to  give  a  free  and  considerate  vote  than  he  who  pos- 
sesses only  a  freehold  of  three  or  four  pounds.  Whatever 
qualification  is  required,  it  should  be  universally  uniform.  At 
any  rate,  it  should  vary  only  in  compliance  with  the  local  ne- 
cessities of  a  district.  "  Freedom"  of  burghs  and  cities,  and 
the  rules  by  which  freedom  is  obtainable,  are  relics  of  a  bar- 
barous state  of  policy — relics  which  appear  unworthy  of  the 
present  age.  They  are  like  the  local  jurisdictions  of  char- 
tered magistracy,  which  one  of  our  judges  recently  reprobated 
from  the  bench  as  blots  in  the  constitution. 

No  qualifications  should  be  required  in  a  representative,  but 
the  single  and  sufficient  one,  that  his  constituents  prefer  him 
to  any  other  man.  It  is  a  hardship  upon  them  and  upon  him 
to  thwart  their  choice — the  best  perhaps  that  could  be  made 
— ^because  the  candidate  does  not  possess  a  certain  amount 
of  wealth.  The  case  is  diflferent  from  that  of  the  electors ; 
for  though  the  exaction  of  wealth  in  a  representative  may  ex- 
clude some  of  the  fittest  men  in  the  country  to  assist  the 
councils  of  the  state,  yet  from  the  eligibility  of  every  man, 
there  is  no  danger  that  such  a  proportion  of  poorer  men  would 
be  elected,  as  to  impede  the  legislature  by  their  ignorance  or 
vice. 

'J'he  peculiar  circumstances  of  a  people  may  indeed  occa- 
sion the  propriety  of  requiring  some  qualification  in  their  le- 


CHAP.  VIII.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  369 

gislators.  When  the  American  colonies  had  separat<jd  them 
selves  from  England,  and  were  anxious  to  perpetuate  their 
independence,  and  when  they  observed  that  their  country  was 
continually  replenishing  with  new  adventurers,  it  was  per- 
haps reasonable  to  enact,  that  the  members  of  their  govern- 
ment should  have  been  American  citizens  a  certain  number 
of  years.  But  local  and  temporary  necessities  do  not  affect 
the  general  truth. 

Canvassing  for  votes  is  a  vulgar  and  unworthy  custom.  I 
know  not  how  it  happens  that  a  man  of  honourable  mind  is 
content  to  wander  over  the  country,  and  call  obeisantly  at  the 
doors  of  ignorant  and  low  men,  to  solicit  them  to  choose  him 
for  their  representative.  Why,  if  they  prefer  him  they  ought 
to  choose  him  without  solicitation.  If  they  do  not,  they  ought 
not  to  choose  him  with  it.  I  should  not  like  the  conscious- 
ness that  I  possessed  my  seat,  not  because  I  deserved  it,  but 
because  I  begged  the  voters  to  elect  me.  Gentlemen,  I  doubt 
not,  often  feel  the  humiliation,  and  experience  the  disgust  of 
these  canvasses.  It  is  one  amongst  the  many  sacrifices  of 
manly  dignity  which  are  connected  with  political  affairs. 

To  an  enquirer  who  was  uninformed  of  the  national  circum- 
stances, it  might  appear  an  unaccountable  absurdity  to  preclude 
Christian  ministers  from  becoming  the  representative  legis- 
lators of  a  Christian  people.  The  better  a  man  is,  the  better 
fitted  he  is  for  a  legislator ;  and  assuming  that  Christian  pas- 
tors are  amongst  the  best  men,  there  seems  no  rational  mo- 
tive to  exclude  them  from  the  senate.  Abating  the  peculiar 
circumstances  of  a  people,  I  can  perceive  no  reason  for  ex- 
cluding them  which  would  not  hold  in  favour  of  excluding 
Christianity  itself.  To  Christian  legislators,  Christianity  is 
the  primary  rule  ;  who  then  would  refuse  admittance  to  those 
of  whom  it  may  be  presumed  that  they  best  understand  the 
Christian  law  ?  But  when  we  turn  from  the  dictates  of  ab- 
stract reason  and  propriety  to  the  state  of  a  nation  in  which 
there  is  an  established  church — a  church  which  assigns  to 
one  minister  one  specific  spot  for  the  exercise  of  its  functions 
— we  are  presented  with  a  very  different  scene.  You  cannot 
elect  one  of  them  (setting  sinecures  out  of  the  question)  with- 
out taking  him  away  from  his  appointed  charge,  nor  without 
leaving  that  charge  to  be  as  sheep  without  a  shepherd.  Never- 
theless, since  there  are,  in  fact,  more  clergymen  than  parishes, 
it  does  not  appear  obvious  why  they  should  be  refused  eligi- 
bility. I  would  not,  as  in  the  case  of  the  bishops,  make  any 
number,  or  any  order,  of  clergy  legislators  because  they  were 
clergy ;  but  neither  would  I,  because  they  were  clergy,  refuse 


B90  BRITISH    CONSTiTUTION.  [eSSAY    III. 

to  admit  them.  Perhaps,  if  the  institution  were  remodelled, 
clergy  might  be  allowed  to  be  eligible — for  their  exclusion,  it 
may  be  presumed,  is  the  result  originally  rather  of  accident 
than  design.  They  once  had  a  convocation  ®f  their  own,  with 
considerable  political  power ;  and  when  that  convocation  fell 
into  disuse,  no  one  perhaps  thought  of  their  reasonable  claims 
for  admissibility  to  the  House  of  Commons.  Let  the  writer 
be  understood  ;  he  is  not  proposing  that  Episcopal  clergy,  as 
such,  should  be  admitted  into  our  House  of  Commons,  but  he 
is  saying,  that  Christian  ministers  should  not,  as  such,  be  ex- 
cluded from  the  councils  of  a  Christian  nation.  Penn  was 
not  the  worse  legislator  because  he  was  an  active  minister  of 
the  gospel. 

But,  after  all,  it  is  disputed  whether  any  alteration  in  the 
constitution  of  the  House  of  Commons,  or  in  the  system  of 
representation,  would  produce  good  effects — whether  more 
virtue  or  more  talent  could  be  collected  than  is  collected  now. 
A  question  this,  of  which  the  negative  has  the  advantage  of 
experience,  and  the  positive  has  not.  We  know  that  the 
present  system  has  done  good — the  effect  of  another  is  in- 
volved in  uncertainty.  Now,  let  it  be  considered,  first,  that 
from  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  through  several  succeeding  reigns 
down  to  the  Revolution,  the  actual  power  of  the  House  of 
Commons  increased.  Was  not  that  increase  productive,  on  the 
whole,  and  is  it  not  at  the  present  hour  productive,  of  good 
effects  ?  Granting  that  it  was — will  any  man  affirm  that  one 
hundred  and  forty  years  have  added  nothing  to  the  capability 
of  the  British  public  to  judge  soundly  respecting  political  af- 
fairs ?  If  the  capacity  of  sound  judgment  is  increased,  is  it 
unreasonable — remembering  the  principles  of  political  truth 
— ^that  that  judgment  should  possess  a  greater  influence  in  the 
conduct  of  public  affairs  ?  If  that  influence  ought,  in  reason, 
to  be  increased,  how  shall  the  increase  be  so  judiciously  con- 
trived as  by  making  the  House  of  Commons  a  more  accurate 
and  immediate  representative  of  the  public  mind  1 

As  to  the  virtue,  then,  of  the  House  of  Commons,  its  pecu- 
liar and  characteristic  virtue  consists  in  the  accuracy  of  their 
representation ;  and  no  man,  I  think,  will  deny  that  a  greater 
practical  repress entation  is  possible  than  that  which  now  ob- 
tains. It  is  asked,  "  If  such  a  number  of  such  men  be  liable 
to  the  influence  of  corrupt  motives,  what  assembly  of  men 
will  be  secure  from  the  same  danger  ?"*  But  this  is  not  the 
question  :  for  even  if  six  hundred  and  fifty-eight  men  could 
not  be  selected  who  would  be  more  proof  against  corruption 
Paley:  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  6.  c.  7. 


€HAP.  Vni.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  37t 

when  elected  for  seven  years,  yet  the  same  men  might 
be  found  more  proof  against  it  if  they  were  elected  only  for 
two.  A  minister,  then,  instead  of  having  to  provide  the  in- 
ducements of  influence  for  six  hundred  and  fifty-eight  men, 
would  have  to  provide  them  for  nearly  two  thousand.  Either 
he  must  augment  three  or  four  fold  the  aggregate  amount  of 
his  influence,  or  he  must,  in  the  same  proportion,  diminish  its 
power  upon  individuals .  To  think  of  so  increasing  the  amount 
is  absurd.  He  must,  therefore,  curtail  its  individual  streams. 
It  would,  then,  be  much  less  worth  the  while  of  a  member  to 
submit  to  corruption.  The  temptation  would  be  diminished, 
and  with  the  diminution  of  temptation  there  would  be  an  in- 
crease of  practical  virtue.  Nor  is  this  all.  It  is,  I  believe, 
an  undisputed  fact,  that  those  who  represent  the  largest  num- 
ber of  electors  are,  in  the  aggregate,  less  subject  to  influence 
than  those  who  represent  a  few.  An  altered  mode  of  repre- 
sentation might  increase  the  number  of  those  whose  constitu- 
ents were  numerous,  or  make  them  numerous  to.  all — and  thus 
that  scale  of  virtuous  independence  which  is  now  found  amongst 
a  part  of  the  representatives,  might  then  be  found  in  all. 

Then,  as  to  the  accumulation  of  talent.  I  think  it  question- 
able whether  the  brilliancy  oi  the  House  of  Commons  would 
not  be  diminished  by  such  an  alteration  as  that  of  which  we 
speak :  partly  because,  in  the  language  of  Dr.  Paley,  "  when 
boroughs  are  set  to  sale,  those  men  are  likely  to  become  pur- 
chasers, who  are  enabled,  by  their  talents,  to  make  the  best 
of  their  bargain."  Granting  all  this,  the  answer  is  at  hand — 
that  splendour  of  abilities  is  much  less  necessary  than  integ- 
rity of  virtue.  If  the  question  is  between  talent  and  rectitude 
— ^i-ectitude  is  our  choice.  Unusual  talents,  how  much  so- 
ever they  may  amuse  and  delight  the  house,  and  how  accept- 
ably soever  they  may  fill  the  columns  of  a  newspaper,  are 
greatly  overrated  in  value — at  least  they  are  greatly  overrated 
in  reference  to  a  sound  state  of  political  affairs.  The  tortuous 
and  wily  policy  which  obtains,  needs,  no  doubt,  much  sagacity 
and  adroitness  to  conduct  it  successfully  and  with  a  fair  face. 
What  is  really  wanted  in  a  legislator  is  not  brilliancy  of  talent, 
but  a  sound,  and  an  enlightened,  and  an  upright  mind.  Nor 
is  it  to  be  forgotten,  that  the  splendid  talents  of  those  who 
"  seek  to  make  the  best  of  their  bargain,"  may  be  an  evil 
rather  than  a  good.  The  bargain,  it  is  to  be  feared,  will  be  a 
losing  one  to  the  public  ;  and  by  him  who  makes  the  best,  the 
public  may  lose  the  most.  After  all,  it  needs  not  to  be  feared 
that  six  or  seven  hundred  of  such  men  as  a  House  of  Com- 
naons  will  always  contain,  will  possess  a  sufficient  aggregate 


372  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [eSSAY  III. 

of  ability  for  all  the  needful  and  all  the  virtuous  business  of 
the  house. 

It  has  sometimes  been  enquired,  What  are  the  duties  of  a 
representative  with  respect  to  his  constituents  ? — Generally, 
it  is  his  duty  to  represent  their  opinions,  and  to  act  and  vote 
upon  his  own.  It  has  been  well  remarked,  that  a  senator 
should  consider  himself  not  so  much  the  representative  of  one 
portion  of  the  community,  as  the  legislator  for  all :  and  he 
can  fulfil  this  superior  duty  only  by  exercising  his  individual 
judgment.  Nevertheless,  a  man  with  a  nice  sense  of  justice 
and  honour,  if  it  be  found  that  the  majority  of  his  votes  were 
at  variance  with  the  desires  of  his  constituents,  ought  to  re- 
flect that  he  is  really  no  longer  their  representative,  and  to 
offer  the  resignation  of  their  trust  into  their  hands. 

It  is  curious,  that  whilst  it  is  thus  made  a  question  whether 
a  man  should  follow  his  own  judgment  in  opposition  to  that 
of  his  constituents,  no  question  seems  to  be  entertained  whether 
a  man  should  follow  his  own  judgment  in  opposition  to  his 
patron's.  There  the  elector's  opinion  is  to  prevail : — else, 
the  representative  is  not  a  roan  of  honour  ! — else,  he  does  not 
fulfil  the  condition  on  which  he  was  appointed  ! — At  the  con- 
templation of  such  things  common  sense  is  confounded,  and 
purity  turns  away  her  eyes.* 

Amongst  the  extraordinary  doctrines  which  have  arisen  out 
of  the  impurity  of  political  transactions,  that  of  the  "  constitu- 
tional propriety  of  a  systematic  opposition"  is  one.  To  assert 
this,  is  to  exhibit  the  political  disease — as  he  who  has  got 
the  gout  manifests  the  disorder  to  his  visiters  by  his  swathed 
and  cushioned  leg.  You  cannot  frame  a  more  preposterous 
proposition  than  that  good  government  ought  to  be  systemati- 
cally opposed.  If  a  government  ought  to  be  opposed,  it  is 
only  because  it  is  not  good.  If,  being  good,  it  is  systemati- 
cally opposed,  there  is  viciousness  in  the  opposition.  In 
V.  hatever  way  you  defend  an  organized  opposition,  you  assume 
the  existence  of  evil.  The  motives  in  which  the  systematic 
opposition  of  some  men  is  founded,  correspond  with  the  per- 
vading impurity.  Although  there  is  reason  to  be  assured  that 
of  some  the  very  frequent  opposition  to  a  ministry  is  the  re- 
sult of  political  integrity,  of  others  it  cannot  be  doubted  that 
the  motives  are  kindred  to  those  which  are  intimated  in  the 
humiliating  note  below.f 

*  Some  members  who  have  owed  their  seats  to  patronage,  have  I  be- 
lieve, had  the  virtue  to  stipulate  for  the  freedom  of  their  votes.  Of  this 
jiumiier  it  is  said  that  the  late  Lord  Chancellor  Eldon  was  one. 

t  Opposition  *'hud  received  a  mortal  wound  by  the  death  of  the  lat« 


CHAP.  Vin.]  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  373 

[The  invective,  and  the  ridicule,  and  retort,  and  personality, 
which  are  frequently  indulged  within  the  walls  of  parliament, 
and  from  which  much  amusement  appears  to  be  derived  to  the 
members  and  to  the  pubUc,  imply,  to  be  sure,  a  sufficient  de- 
gree of  forgetfulness  of  the  purpose  for  which  parliaments 
meet.  A  spectator  might  sometimes  imagine  that  the  object 
of  the  assembly  was  to  witness  exhibitions  of  intellectual  glad- 
iators, rather  than  to  debate  respecting  the  welfare  of  a  great 
nation.  Nor  can  it  be  supposed  that  if  this  welfare  were  suf- 
ficiently, that  is  to  say,  constantly,  dominant  in  the  recollec- 
tion, there  would  be  so  much  solicitude  to  expose  individual 
weaknesses  and  absurdity,  or  to  obtain  personal  triumph.] 

Much  is  said  about  "  the  exclusion  of  placemen  and  pen- 
sioners from  parliament" — the  propriety  or  impropriety  of 
which  is  to  be  determined  by  the  same  rules  as  the  question 
of  political  influence.  If  influence  is  necessary  to  the  exist- 
ence of  the  present  form  of  government,  and  if  that  influence 
is  necessary  in  parliament,  I  see  little  ground  to  declaim 
against  the  admission  of  placemen.  In  a  purer  state  of  so- 
ciety they  would,  no  doubt,  be  improper  members,  because 
then  none  ought  to  be  members  who  have  any  inducement  to 
sacrifice  the  interests  of  the  public  to  their  own.  By  the  act 
of  settlement,  indeed,  it  was  provided,  "that  no  person  who 
has  an  ofiice  or  place  of  profit  under  the  king,  or  receives 
a  pension  from  the  crown,  shall  be  capable  of  serving  as 
member  of  the  House  of  Commons."  The  spirit  of  this  pro- 
vision is  practically  superseded,  though  its  letter  so  far  oper- 
ates that  a  king's  counsel  who  receives  a  few  pounds  a  year 
as  a  salary  from  the  crown,  is  incapable  of  possessing  a  seat. 
However,  subsequently  to  the  act  of  settlement,  various  at- 
tempts were  made  really  to  exclude  the  possessors  of  offices 
and  pensions.  Bill  after  bill  actually  passed  the  house,  but 
the  measure  was  rejected  and  again  rejected  by  the  Lords.— 
To  pass  such  a  bill  in  the  present  day,  and  to  act  upon  it,  would 
probably  be  tantamount  to  an  overthrow  of  the  constitution. 

It  has  sometimes  been  a  subject  of  wonder  to  the  writer, 
when  reflecting  upon  the  anxious  solicitude  of  men  for  posthu- 
mous celebrity,  that  this  single  motive  has  not  induced  more 

Prince  of  Wales,  some  of  whose  adherents  had  prudently  sung  their 
paliuodia  to  the  ministry,  and  been  gratified  with  profitable  employ- 
ments ;  while  others,  setting  too  great  a  price  upon  their  own  importance, 
kept  aloof  till  the  market  was  over,  and  were  left  to  pine  in  secret  over 
their  disappointed  ambition." — Smollett's  England :  v.  3,  p.  391 

32 


5?74  BRITISH    CONSTITUTION.  [^SSAY  111. 

vigorous  attempts  on  the  part  of  a  minister  to  regulate  liis 
measures  by  a  stricter  regard  to  the  dictates  of  everlasting 
rectitude.  I  have  wondered,  because  it  is  manifest  from  ex- 
perience that  posterity  will  and  does  regard  those  dictates  in 
its  estimate  of  the  honours  of  the  dead.  A  very  few  years  dis- 
miss much  of  the  false  colouring  which  temporary  interests  and 
politics  throw  over  a  minister's  conduct.  It  is  ere  long  found 
that  he  obtains  the  largest  share  of  posthumous  celebrity,  who 
has  most  constantly  adhered  to  virtue.  I  propose  not  the  hope 
of  this  celebrity  as  a  motive  to  the  Christian :  he  has  higher 
inducements  ;  but  I  propose  it  to  the  man  of  ambition.  The 
simple  love  of  fame  would  be,  if  he  were  rational  with  respect 
to  his  own  interests,  a  sufficient  inducement  to  prefer  that 
conduct  which  will  for  ever  recommend  itself  to  the  approba- 
tion of  mankind.  When  we  shall  see  the  statesman  who  has, 
in  private  and  in  public,  but  one  standard  of  rectitude,  and 
that  one  the  standard  which  is  proposed  in  the  gospel ;  the 
statesman  who  is  convinced,  and  acts  upon  the  conviction,  that 
every  thing  is  wrong  in  the  minister  which  would  be  wrong 
in  the  man  ; — we  shall  see  a  statesman  whom  probably  the 
clamour  of  to-day  will  call  a  fool  or  a  traitor,  but  whom  good 
men  now,  and  all  men  hereafter,  will  regard  as  having  at- 
tained almost  to  the  pinnacle  of  virtue  and  honour — and  whom 
God  will  receive  with  the  sentence  of  Well  done. 

In  concluding  these  brief  disquisitions  upon  the  British 
government,  I  would  be  allowed  to  state  the  conviction,  and 
to  urge  it  upon  those  who  complain  of  its  defects  in  theory 
or  in  practice,  that  there  is  nothing  in  that  theory  or  in  that 
practice  which  warrants  the  attempt  at  amendment  by  any 
species  of  violence.  I  say  this,  even  if  I  did  not  think,  as  I 
do,  that  violence  is  unlawful  upon  other  grounds.  There  are 
no  evils  which  make  violence  politically  expedient.  The  right 
way  of  effecting  amendments  is  by  enlightening  the  national 
mind — ^by  enabling  the  public  to  think  justly  and  temperately 
of  political  affairs.  If  to  this  temperate  and  just  judgment, 
any  part  of  the  practice  or  of  the  form  of  our  government 
should  appear  clearly  and  unquestionably  adverse  to  the  gen- 
eral good,  it  needs  not  to  be  feared  that  the  corresponding  al- 
teration will  be  made — made  by  that  best  of  all  political  agents, 
the  power  of  deliberate  public  opinion.  "  The  will  of  the 
people  when  it  is  determined,  permanent,  and  general,  almost 
always  at  length  prevails,"*  And  if  it  should  appear  to  the 
lorer  of  his  country,  that  the  prevalence  of  this  will  is  too  long 
*  Paley :  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  6,  c.  7. 


CHAP.  IX.]  MORAL    LEGlSLAflON.  375 

delayed,  let  him  take  comfort  in  the  recollection  that  less  is 
lost  by  the  postponement  of  reformation,  than  would  be  lost  m 
the  struggle  consequent  upon  intemperate  measures. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
MORAL  LEGISLATION. 


Duties  of  a  Ruler — The  two  objects  of  moral  legislation — Education  of 
the  People — Bible  Society — Lotteries — Public-houses — Abrogation  of 
bad  laws — Primogeniture — Accumulation  of  property. 

If  a  person  who  considered  the  general  objects  of  the  in- 
stitution of  civil  government,  were  to  look  over  the  titles 
of  the  acts  of  a  legislature  during  fifteen  or  twenty  years,  he 
would  probably  be  surprised  to  find  the  proportion  so  small  of 
those  of  which  it  was  the  express  object  to  benefit  the  moral 
character  of  the  people.  He  would  find  many  laws  that  re- 
spected foreign  policy,  many  perhaps  that  referred  to  in- 
ternal political  economy,  many  for  the  punishment  of  crime — 
but  few  that  tended  positively  to  promote  the  general  hap- 
piness by  increasing  the  general  virtue.  This,  I  say,  may  be 
a  reasonable  subject  of  surprise,  when  it  is  considered  that 
the  attainment  of  this  happiness  is  the  original  and  proper  ob- 
ject of  all  government.  There  is  a  general  want  of  adver- 
tence to  this  object,  arising  in  part,  perhaps,  from  the  insuffi- 
cient degTce  of  conviction  that  virtue  is  the  best  promoter  of 
the  general  weal. 

To  prevent  an  evil  is  always  better  than  to  repair  it: 
for  which  reason,  if  it  be  in  the  power  of  the  legislator  to  di- 
minish temptation  or  its  influence,  he  will  find  that  this  is  the 
most  efficacious  means  of  diminishing  the  ofTences  and  of  in- 
creasing the  happiness  of  a  people.  He  who  vigilantly  de- 
tects and  punishes  vicious  men,  does  well ;  but  he  who  pre- 
vents them  from  becoming  vicious,  does  better.  It  is  better, 
both  for  a  sufferer,  for  a  culprit,  and  for  the  community,  that 
a  man's  purse  should  remain  in  his  pocket,  than  that,  when  it 
is  taken  away,  the  thief  should  be  sure  of  a  prison. 

So  far  as  is  practicable,  a  government  ought  to  be  to  a  peo- 
ple, what  a  judicious  parent  is  to  a  family — not  merely  the 
ruler,  but  the  instructor  and  the  guide.     It  is  not  perhaps  so 


376  MORAL    LEGISLATIONi  [eSSAY  III. 

much  in  the  power  of  a  government  to  form  the  character  of 
a  people  to  virtue  or  to  vice,  as  it  is  in  the  power  of  a  parent 
to  form  that  of  his  children.  But  much  can  be  done  if  every 
thing  cannot  be  :  and  indeed  when  we  take  into  account  the 
relative  duration  of  the  political  body  as  compared  with  that 
of  a  family,  we  may  have  reason  to  doubt  whether  govern- 
ments cannot  effect  as  much  in  ages  as  parents  can  do  in 
years.  Now,  a  judicious  father  adopts  a  system  of  moral  cul- 
ture as  well  as  of  restraint :  he  does  not  merely  lop  the  va- 
grant branches  of  his  intellectual  plant,  but  he  trains  and  di- 
rects them  in  their  proper  course.  The  second  object  is  to 
punish  vice — the  Jirst  to  promote  virtue.  You  may  punish 
vice  without  securing  virtue;  but,  if  you  secure  virtue,  the 
whole  work  is  done. 

Yet  thi«  primary  object  of  moral  legislation  is  that  to  which, 
comparatively,  little  attention  is  paid.  Penalties  are  multi- 
plied upon  the  doers  of  evil,  but  little  endeavour  is  used  to 
prevent  the  commission  of  £vil  by  inducing  principles  and 
habits  which  overpower  the  tendency  to  the  commission.  In 
this  respect,  we  begin  to  legislate  at  the  secondary  part  of  our 
office  rather  than  at  the  first.  We  are  political  surgeons, 
who  cut  out  the  tumours  in  the  state,  rather  than  the  prescri- 
bers  of  that  wholesome  regimen  by  which  the  diseases  in  the 
political  body  are  prevented. 

But  here  arises  a  difficulty — How  shall  that  political  parent 
.teach  virtue  which  is  not  virtuous  itself  1  The  governments 
of  most  nations,  however  they  may  inculcate  virtue  in  their 
enactments,  preach  it  very  imperfectly  by  their  example. — > 
What  then  is  to  be  done  ?  "  Make  the  tree  good."  The  first 
step  in  moral  legislation  is  to  rectify  the  legislator.  It  holds 
of  nations  as  of  men,  that  the  beam  should  be  first  removed 
out  of  our  own  eye.  Laws,  in  their  insulated  character,  will 
be  but  partially  effectual,  whilst  the  practical  example  of  a 
government  is  bad.  To  this  consideration  sufficient  atten- 
tion is  not  ordinarily  paid.  We  do  not  adequately  estimate 
the  influence  of  a  government's  example  upon  the  public 
character.  Government  is  an  object  to  which  we  look  up  as 
to  our  superior ;  and  the  many  interests  which  prompt  men  to 
assimilate  themselves  to  the  character  of  the  government,  ad- 
ded to  the  natural  tendency  of  subordinate  parts  to  copy  the 
example  of  the  superior,  occasions  the  character  of  a  govern- 
ment, independently  of  its  particular  measures,  to  be  of  im- 
mense influence  upon  the  general  virtue.  Illustrations  abound. 
If,  in  any  instance,  political  subserviency  is  found  to  be  a 
more  efficient  recommendation  than  integrity  of  character,  it 


CHAP.  IX.]  MORAL    LEGISLATION.  377 

is  easy  to  perceive  that  subserviency  is  practically  inculcated, 
and  that  integrity  is  practically  discouraged. 

Amongst  that  portion,  then,  of  a  legislator's  office  which 
consists  in  endeavouring  the  moral  amelioration  of  a  people, 
the  amendment  of  political  institutions  is  conspicuous.  In 
proportion  to  the  greatness  of  the  influence  of  governments,  is 
the  obligation  to  direct  that  influence  in  favour  of  virtue.  A 
government  of  which  the  principles  and  practice  were  accord- 
ant with  rectitude,  would  very  powerfully  aflfect  the  general 
morals.  He,  therefore,  who  explodes  one  vicious  principle, 
or  who  amends  one  corrupt  practice,  is  to  be  regarded  as 
amongst  the  most  useful  and  honourable  of  public  men. 

If,  however,  in  any  state  there  are  difficulties,  at  present 
insurmountable,  in  the  way  of  improving  political  institu- 
tions, still  let  us  do  what  we  can.  Precept  without  example 
may  do  some  good :  nor  are  we  to  forget,  that  if  the  public 
virtue  is  increased  by  whatever  means,  it  will  react  upon  the 
governing  power.  A  good  people  will  not  long  tolerate  a 
bad  government. 

Amongst  the  most  obvious  means  of  rectifying  the  general 
morals  by  positive  measures,  one  is  the  encouraging  a  ju- 
dicious education  of  the  people.  Upon  this  judiciousness  al- 
most all  its  success  depends.  The  great  danger  in  underta- 
king a  national  system  of  education,  is,  that  some  peculiar 
notions  will  be  instilled  for  political  purposes,  and  that  it  will 
be  converted  into  a  source  of  patronage.  In  a  word,  the 
great  danger  is,  that  national  education  should  become,  like 
national  churches,  an  ally  of  the  state ;  and  if  this  is  done, 
the  system  will  inevitably  become,  if  not  corrupt,  lamentably 
alloyed  with  corruption.  It  does  not  seem  as  if  the  people  of 
this  country  would  countenance  any  endeavour  to  institute  an 
education  like  this,  because  an  attempt  has  been  made,  and 
the  public  voice  was  lifted  successfully  against  it.  A  gov- 
ernment, if  it  would  rightly  provide  for  the  education  of  the 
community,  must  forget  the  peculiarities  of  creeds,  political  or 
religious.  It  must  regard  itself  not  as  the  head  of  a  party, 
but  as  the  parent  of  the  people. 

We  know  that  schools  exist  which  impart  an  important 
and  valuable  education  to  the  poor,  and  to  which  men  of 
all  principles  and  all  creeds  are  willing  to  subscribe.  Here 
is  eflfectod  much  good  with  little  or  no  evil.  The  great  defect 
is  in  the  limited  extent  of  the  good.  The  public  cannot  or  do 
not  give  enough  of  their  money  to  provide  education  for  all. 
Is  there,  then,  any  sufficient  reason  why  a  government  should 
not  supply  the  deficiency;  or  why  it  should  not  undertake 

32* 


378  MORAL    LEGISLATION.  [^SSAY  lit, 

the  whole,  and  leave  private  bounty  to  flow  in  other  channels  ? 
The  great  difficulty  is  to  provide  for  the  purity  of  the  em- 
ployment of  the  funds  :  for  this  employment  may  be  made  an 
ally  of  the  petty  politics  of  a  town,  as  the  whole  institution  may 
be  made  an  ally  of  the  state.  However,  as  the  annual  grants  to 
almost  all  such  institutions  would  be  small,  it  might  perhaps  es- 
cape that  universal  bane.  One  thing  would  be  indispensable — 
to  provide  that  the  authority  by  which  appointments  to  master- 
ships, &c.,  are  made,  should  be  studiously  constituted  with  a 
view  to  the  exclusion  of  every  motive  but  the  single  object  of  the 
institution.  Whether  it  is  possible  to  exclude  improper  motives 
may  be  doubted ;  but  it  is  perhaps  as  possible  to  exclude  them 
from  those  as  from  the  many  institutions  which  the  pul^lic  money 
now  supports.  There  is  one  way  indeed  in  which  education 
may  be  promoted  with  little  danger  of  this  petty  corruption — 
by  the  purchase  of  land  and  erection  of  school-houses.  This, 
together  with  the  supply  of  books  and  the  like,  forms  a  prin- 
cipal item  in  the  expense  of  these 'schools  :  and  it  might  be 
hoped  that,  if  the  government  did  this,  the  public  would  do 
the  remainder. 

But  you  say.  All  this  will  add  to  the  national  burdens.  We 
need  not  be  very  jealous  on  this  head,  whilst  we  are  so  little 
jealous  of  more  money  worse  spent.  Is  it  known,  or  is  it 
considered,  that  the  expense  of  an  ordinary  campaign  would 
endow  a  school  in  every  parish  in  England  and  Ireland  for 
ever?  Yet  how  coolly  (who  will  contradict  me  if  I  say — 
how  needlessly  ?)  we  devote  money  to  conduct  a  campaign  ! — 
Prevent,  by  a  just  and  conciliating  policy,  one  single  war,  and 
the  money  thus  saved  would  provide,  perpetually,  a  competent 
mental  and  moral  education  for  every  individual  who  needs  it 
in  the  three  kingdoms.  Let  a  man  for  a  moment  indulge  his 
imagination — let  him  rather  indulge  his  reason,  in  supposing 
that  one  of  our  wars  during  the  last  century  had  been  avoided, 
and  that,  fifty  years  ago,  such  an  education  had  been  provided 
Of  what  comparative  importance  is  the  war  to  us  now  ?  In 
the  one  case,  the  money  has  provided  the  historian  with  ma- 
terials to  fill  his  pages  with  armaments,  and  victories,  and  de- 
feats : — it  has  enabled  us 

To  point  a  moral  or  adorn  a  tale  ; 

— in  the  other,  it  would  have  effected,  and  would  be  now 
effecting,  and  would  be  destined  for  ages  to  effect,  a  great 
amount  of  solid  good  ;  a  great  increase  of  the  virtue,  the  order, 
and  the  happiness  of  the  people. 

I  suppose  that  the  British  and  Foreign  Bible  Society,  du- 


CttAP.  IX.]  MORAL    LfeGiSLAtiOif.  $79 

ring  the  twenty  or  thirty  years  that  it  has  existed,  has  done 
more  direct  good  in  the  world — ^has  had  a  greater  effect 
in  meliorating  the  condition  of  the  human  species — than  all 
the  measures  which  have  been  directed  to  the  same  ends,  of 
all  the  prime  ministers  in  Europe  during  a  century.  But 
suppose  much  less  than  this,  suppose  it  has  done  more  good 
than  the  moral  measures  of  any  one  court,  and  will  not  this 
single  and  simple  fact  prove  that  much  more  is  in  the  power 
of  the  legislator  than  he  is  accustomed  to  think ;  and  prove 
too,  that  there  is  an  unhappy  want  of  advertence  amongst  the 
conductors  of  governments  to  some  of  the  most  interesting 
and  important  duties  of  their  office  ?  With  what  means  has 
this  amount  of  moral  good  in  all  quarters  of  the  earth  been 
effected  1  Why,  with  a  revenue  that  never  amounted  to  a 
hundred  thousand  pounds  in  any  one  year  !  A  sum  which,  if 
we  compare  it  with  sums  that  are  expended  for  measures  of 
very  questionable  utility,  is  really  trifling.  Supposing  that 
the  legislature  of  this  country  had  given  an  annual  fifty  thou- 
sand pounds  to  this  institution,  no  man  surely  will  dispute 
that  the  sums  would  have  done  incalculably  more  good  in  our 
own  country — to  say  nothing  of  the  world — than  fifty  thou- 
sand pounds  of  public  money  ordinarily  effects.  In  passing, 
it  may  be  observed  too,  that  such  an  appropriation  of  money 
by  a  government,  would  probably  do  much  in  propitiating  the 
friendliness  and  good  offices  of  other  nations. 

"  No  consideration  of  emolument  can  be  put  in  competition 
with  the  morals  of  a  nation  ;  and  no  minister  can  be  justified, 
either  on  civil  or  religious  grounds,  in  rendering  the  latter 
subservient  to  the  former."  *  Such  a  truth  should  be  brought 
into  practical  operation.  If  it  had  been,  lotteries  in  England 
had  not  been  so  long  endured — if  it  were,  the  prodigious  mul- 
titudes of  public-houses  would  not  be  endured  now.  That 
these  haunts  and  schools  of  vice  are  pernicious,  no  one 
doubts.  Why  is  an  excess  of  them  permitted  ? — They  in- 
crease the  revenue.  "  Emolument  is  put  in  competition  with 
morals,"  and  it  prevails.  Even  on  grounds  of  political  econ- 
omy, however,  the  evil  is  great — for  they  materially  diminish 
the  effective  labour  of  the  population.  If  to  this  we  add  the 
multitudes  whom  the  idleness  of  drunkards  throws  upon  the 
parishes,  perhaps  as  much  is  really  lost  in  wealth  by  this 
penny-wise  policy,  as  is  lost  in  virtue.  Besides,  all  needless 
alehouse-keepers  are  dead  weights  upon  the  national  industr}-'. 
They  contribute  as  little  to  the  wealth  of  the  state  as  he  who 
lives  upon  the  funds. 

*  Gifford:  Life  of  Pitt 


380  MORAL    LEGISLATION.  [eSSAY  III 

"  It  would  be  no  injustice,"  says  Playfair,  "  if  publicans 
were  prevented  from  legal  recovery  for  beer  or  spirits  con- 
sumed in  their  houses ;  in  the  same  manner  that  paym«mt 
cannot  be  enforced  of  any  person  under  twenty-one  years  of 
age,  except  for  necessaries."*  This,  however,  were  to  at- 
tempt to  cure  one  evil  by  another.  It  were  a  practical 
encouragement  of  continual  fraud.  The  short  and  simple 
way  is  to  refuse  licenses,  and  to  take  care  that  those  who 
have  the  power  of  licensing  shall  exercise  it  justly. 

This  sound  proposition,  that  neither  on  "  civil  nor  reli- 
gious grounds"  is  it  right  to  consult  policy  at  the  expense 
of  morals,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  at  the  basis  of  political  truth. 
Here,  then,  let  Political  Truth  be  applied.  It  will  be  found, 
by  the  far-seeing  legislator,  to  be  expedient  as  well  as  right. 


Bishop  Warburton  says,  ^'  Though  a  multiplication  of  good 
laws  does  nothing  against  a  general  corruption  of  manners, 
yet  the  abrogation  of  bad  ones  greatly  promotes  reform ation."t 
The  truth  of  the  first  clause  is  very  disputable  :  the  last 
is  unquestionably  true.  This  abrogation  of  bad  laws,  forms 
a  very  important  part  of  moral  legislation  ;  and  unhappily,  it 
is  a  part  which  there  are  peculiar  difficulties  in  effecting. 
There  are  few  bad  laws  of  which  there  are  not  some  persons 
who  are  interested  in  the  continuance.  The  interests  of 
these  persons,  the  supineness  of  others,  the  pride  of  a  third 
class,  and  the  superstitious  attachment  of  a  fourth  to  ancient 
things,  occasion  many  laws  to  remain  on  the  statute  books  of 
nations,  long  after  their  perniciousness  has  been  ascertained. 

Thus  it  has  happened  in  our  own  country  with  respect  to 
the  game  laws.  It  is  perfectly  certain  that  they  greatly  in- 
crease the  vices  of  the  people,  and  yet  they  remain  unre- 
pealed. Why  ?  Voluble  answers  can  no  doubt  be  given,  but 
they  will  generally  be  resolvable  into  vanity  or  selfishness. 
The  legislator  who  shall  thoroughly  amend  the  game  laws, 
(perhaps  thorough  amendment  will  not  be  far  from  aiotoion,)  will 
be  a  greater  benefactor  to  his  country  than  multitudes  who 
are  rewarded  with  offices  and  coronets. 

Thus,  too,  it  has  happened  with  the  system  of  primogeni- 
ture. The  two  great  effects  of  this  system  are,  first,  to  in- 
crease the  inequality  of  property,  and  next  to  perpetuate  the 
artificial  distinctions  of  rank. 

That  the  existing  inequality  of  property  is  a  great  political 
and  moral  evil,  it  was  attempted  in  the  third  chapter  of  the 

»  Causes  of  Decline  of  Nations,  4to,  p.  226.  t  Letters  to 

Bishop  Hurd,  No.  32 


CHAP.  IX.]  MORAL   LEGISLATION.  381 

preceding  essay  to  show.  The  means  of  diminishing  this  in- 
equality, which  in  that  chapter  were  urged  as  an  obUgation  of 
private  life,  are  not  likely  to  be  fully  effectual  so  long  as  the 
law  encourages  its  continuance.  A  man  who  possesses  an 
estate  in  land  dies  without  a  will.  He  has  two  sons.  Why 
should  the  law  declare  that  one  of  these  should  be  rich  and 
the  other  poor  ?  Is  it  reasonable  ?  Is  it  just  ?  As  to  its 
reasonableness,  I  discover  no  conceivable  reason,  why,  be- 
cause one  brother  is  born  a  twelvemonth  before  another,  he 
should  possess  ten  times  as  much  property  as  the  younger. 
Affection  dictates  equality ;  and  in  such  cases  the  dictate  of 
affection  is  commonly  the  dictate  of  reason.  We  have  seen, 
what  antecedently  to  enquiry  we  might  expect,  that  the  prac- 
tical effects  are  bad.  Civil  laws  ought,  as  moral  guides  of 
the  community,  to  discourage  great  inequality  of  property. 
How  then  shall  we  sufficiently  deplore  a  system  which  ex- 
pressly encourages  and  increases  it  ?  Some  time  ago,  (and 
probably  at  the  present  day,)  the  laws  of  Virginia  did  not 
permit  one  son  to  inherit  the  landed  estates  of  his  father  to 
the  exclusion  of  his  brothers.  The  effect  was  beneficial,  for 
it  actually  diminished  the  disparity  of  property.*  We,  how- 
ever, not  only  do  not  forbid  the  descent  of  estates  to  one  son, 
but  we  actually  ordain  it.  It  were  sufficient,  surely,  to  allow 
private  vanity  to  have  its  own  will  in  "  keeping  up  a  family" 
at  the  expense  of  sense  and  virtue,  without  encouraging  it  to 
do  this  by  legal  enactments  when  it  might  otherwise  be  more 
wise.  The  descent  of  intestates'  estates  in  land  to  the  elder 
son  has  the  effect  of  an  example,  and  of  inducing  vicious  no- 
tions upon  those  who  make  their  wills.  That  which  is  ha- 
bitual to  the  mind  as  a  provision  of  the  law,  acquires  a  sort 
of  sanction  and  fictitious  propriety,  by  which  it  is  recom- 
mended to  the  public. 

The  partial  distribution  of  intestates'  estates  is,  however, 
only  of  casual  operation.  Of  the  laws  which  make  certain 
estates  inalienable,  or,  which  is  not  very  different,  allow  the 
present  possessor  to  entail  them,  the  effect  is  constant  and 
habitual.  To  prevent  a  reasonable  and  good  man  from  making 
that  division  of  his  property  which  reason  and  goodness  pre- 
scribe, is  a  measure  which,  if  it  be  adopted,  ought  surely  to 
be  recommended  by  very  powerful  considerations.  And  what 
are  they — except  that  they  enable  or  oblige  a  man  to  keep  up 

*  The  Virginians  singularly  confounded  good  moral  legislation  with 
bad,  for  they  made  a  law  declaring  all  landed  property  inviolable.  The 
consequence  was  what  might  have  been  expected :  many  got  into  debt 
aud  remamed  quietly  on  their  estates,  laughing  at  their  creditors. 


MORAL   LEGISLATION.  [esSAT  III. 

the  splendour  of  his  family  ?  Splendour  of  family !  Oh !  to 
what  an  ignis  fatuus,  to  what  a  pitiable  scheme  of  vanity,  are 
affection,  and  reason,  and  virtue,  obliged  to  bow  !  Where  is 
the  man  who  will  stand  forward  and  affirm  that  this  splendour 
is  dictated  by  a  regard  to  the  proper  dignity  of  our  nature  ? 
Where  is  he  who  will  affirm  that  it  is  dictated  by  sound  prin- 
ciples of  virtue  ? — Where,  especially,  is  he  who  will  affirm 
that  it  is  dictated  by  religion  ?  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  re- 
ligion, nor  virtue,  nor  human  dignity :  religion  despises  it  as 
idly  vain  ;  morality  reprobates  it  as  sacrificing  sense  and  af- 
fection to  vanity  ;  dignity  rejects  it  as  a  fictitious  and  unwor- 
thy substitute  for  itself.  Yet,  perhaps,  this  humiliating  motive 
of  vanity  is  the  most  powerful  of  those  which  induce  attach- 
ment to  the  system  of  primogeniture,  or  which  would  occasion 
opposition  to  attempts  at  reform.  Perhaps  it  will  be  said, 
that  to  make  the  real  estate  of  a  man  inalienable  is  really  a 
kindness  to  his  successors,  by  preventing  him  from  squander- 
ing it  away — -to  which  the  answer  is,  that  there  is  no  more 
reason  for  preventing  the  extravagance  of  those  who  possess 
much  property  than  those  who  possess  little.  No  legislature 
thinks  of  enacting  that  a  man  who  has  two  thousand  pounds 
in  the  funds  shall  not  sell  it  and  spend  it  if  he  thinks  fit.  In 
general,  men  take  care  of  their  property  without  compulsion 
from  the  law ;  and  if  it  is  affirmed  that  the  heads  of  great 
families  are  more  addicted  to  this  profusion  and  extravagance 
than  other  men,  it  will  only  additionally  show  the  mischiefs 
of  excessive  possessions.  Why  should  they  be  more  addict- 
ed to  it  unless  the  temptations  of  greatness  are  unusually 
powerful,  and  unusually  prevail  ? 

But  it  will  be  said,  that  the  system  is  almost  necessary  to 
an  order  of  nobility.  I  am  sorry  for  it.  If,  as  is  probably  at 
present  the  case,  that  order  is  expedient  in  the  political  con- 
stitution, and  if  its  weight  in  the  constitution  must  be  kept  up 
by  the  system  of  primogeniture,  I  do  not  affirm  that,  with  re- 
spect to  the  peerage,  this  system  should  be  at  present  abol- 
ished. But  then  let  the  enlightened  man  consider  whither 
these  considerations  lead  him.  If  a  system  essentially  irra- 
tional and  injurious,  is  indispensable  to  a  certain  order  of 
mankind,  what  is  it  but  to  show,  that,  in  the  constitution  of 
that  order  itself,  there  is  something  inherently  wrong  1  Some- 
thing that,  if  the  excellence  of  mankind  were  greater,  it  would 
be  found  desirable  to  amend  ?  Nor  here,  in  accordance  with 
that  fearless  pursuit  of  truth,  whether  welcome  or  unwelcome, 
which  I  propose  to  myself  in  these  pages,  can  I  refrain  from 
the  remark,  that  in  surveying  f7'om  different  points  the  con- 


CHAP.  IX.]  MORAL    LEGISLATION.  383 

stituent  principles  of  an  order  of  peers,  we  are  led  to  one 
and  the  same  conclusion — that  there  is  in  these  principles 
something  really  aijd  inherently  wrong ;  something  which 
adapts  the  order  to  an  imperfect,  and  only  to  an  imperfect, 
state  of  mankind. 

If  then  we  grant  the  propriety  of  an  exception  in  the  case 
of  the  peerage,  we  do  not  grant  it  with  respect  to  other  men. 
Much  may  be  done  to  diminish  the  inequality  of  property, 
and  with  it  to  diminish  the  vices  of  a  people,  by  abolishing 
the  system  of  primogeniture  except  in  the  case  of  peers. 

Of  so  great  ill  consequence  is  excessive  wealth,  and  the 
ejEfect  to  which  it  tends,  excessive  poverty,  that  a  government 
might  perhaps  rightly  discountenance  the  accumulation  of  ex- 
treme personal  property.  Probably  there  is  no  means  of  doing 
this,  without  an  improper  encroachment  upon  liberty,  except 
by  some  regulations  respecting  wills.  I  perceive  nothing 
either  unreasonable  or  unjust  in  refusing  a  probate  for  an 
amount  exceeding  a  certain  sum.  Supposing  the  law  would 
allow  no  man  to  bequeath  more  than  a  given  sum,  what  would 
be  the  ill  effect  ?  That  it  would  discourage  enterprising  in- 
dustry ?  That  industry  is  of  little  use  which  extends  its  de- 
sires of  accumulation  to  an  amount  that  has  no  limit.  The 
man  of  talent  and  application,  after  he  had  so  far  benefited 
himself  and  his  country  by  his  exertions  or  inventions,  as  to 
acquire  such  property  as  would  procure  for  him  all  the  ac- 
commodations of  life  which  he  could  rationally  enjoy,  may 
retire  from  the  accumulation  of  more,  and  leave  the  result  of 
his  talents  to  bring  comfort  and  competence  to  other  men.  It 
may  be  said,  that  a  man  might  still  accumulate  a  larger  sum 
to  dispose  of  before  his  death  : — So  he  might ;  but  few  would 
do  it.  Of  those  who  are  ambitious  of  so  much  more  than 
conduces  to  the  welfare  of  themselves  and  their  children,  few 
would  continue  to  toil  in  order  to  give  it  away.  Benevolence 
does  not  generally  form  a  part  of  the  motives  to  such  accu- 
mulation. If  once  the  law  refused  the  bequest  of  more  than 
a  fixed  sum,  by  appropriating  the  excess  to  the  exigencies  of 
the  state,  or  to  measures  of  public  utility,  men  would  learn  to 
set  limits  to  their  desires.  That  restless  pursuit  of  wealth 
which  is  pernicious  to  the  pursuer  and  to  other  men,  would 
be  powerfully  checked ;  and  he  who  had  acquired  enough, 
might  habitually  give  place  to  the  many  who  had  too  little. 
The  writer  of  these  pages  makes  no  pretensions  to  a  know- 
ledge of  the  minute  details  of  moral  legislation.  It  is  his 
business,  in  a  case  like  this,  whilst  enforcing  the  end  only  to 
suggest  the  means,     Other  and  better  means  of  diminishing 


384  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  [eSSAY  III. 

the  inequality  of  property  than  those  which  have  just  been 
alluded  to,  may  probably  be  discovered  by  practical  men. 
But  of  the  end  itself  it  becomes  the  writer  of  morality  to 
speak  with  earnestness  and  with  confidence.*  It  admits  of 
neither  dispute  nor  doubt,  that  in  our  own  country,  and  in 
many  others,  there  subsist  extremes  of  wealth  and  poverty 
which  are  highly  injurious  to  private  virtue  and  to  the  public 
good ;  and  therefore  it  admits  neither  of  dispute  nor  doubt, 
that  the  endeavour  to  diminish  these  extremes,  is  an  impor- 
tant, (unhappy — that  it  is  also  a  neglected !)  branch  of  moral 
legislation. 


CHAPTER  X. 

ADMINISTRATION  OF  JUSTICE. 

Substitution  of  justice  for  law — Court  of  Chancery — Of  fixed  laws — 
Their  inadequacy — They  increase  litigation — Delays — Expenses — In- 
formalities— Precedents — Verdicts — Legal  proof— Courts  of  Arbitration 
— An  extended  system  of  trbiiration — Arbitration  in  criminal  trials — 
Constitution  of  courts  of  arbitration — Their  effects — Some  alterations 
suggested — Technicalities — Useless  laws. 

In  considering  this  great  subject  the  enquirer  after  truth  is 
presented,  as  upon  some  kindred  subjects,  with  one  great  per- 
vading difficulty.  If  he  applies  the  conclusions  of  abstract 
truth,  such  is  the  imperfect  condition  of  mankind,  that  it  loses 
a  portion  of  its  practical  adaptation  to  its  object.  If  he  de- 
viates from  this  truth,  where  shall  he  seek  for  a  director  of 
his  judgment  ?  He  is  left  to  roam  amongst  endless  specula- 
tions, where  nothing  is  to  be  found  with  the  impress  of  cer- 
tain rectitude. 

The  dictate  of  simple  truth  respecting  the  Administration 
of  Justice  is,  that  if  two  men  differ  upon  a  question  of  prop- 
erty or  of  right,  that  decision  should  be  made  between  them 

*  The  legal  division  of  the  personal  property  of  intestates  admits  of 
easy  amendment.  Two  men  die,  of  whom  each  leaves  six  thousand 
pounds  behind  him.  One  has  a  wife  and  one  child,  and  the  other  a  wife 
and  eight  children.  It  can  hardly  be  rational  to  give  to  the  widow  in 
both  these  cases  the  same  share  of  the  property.  In  one  or  two  nations 
the  law  gives  a  third  of  the  income  of  the  real  estates,  in  addition,  to  the 
widow ;  but  better  regulations  even  than  this  were  easily  devised. 


CHAP.  X.]  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  385 

which  Justice,  in  that  specific  case,  requires  ;  that  if  a  person 
has  committed  a  pubUc  offence,  that  punishment  should  be 
awarded  which  his  actucA  deserts  and  the  proper  objects  of 
punishment  demand. 

But  if  this  truth  is  appKed  in  the  present  state  of  society, 
it  is  found  so  difficult  to  obtain  judges  who  will  apply  the 
sound  principles  of  equity,  judges  who  will  exercise  absolute 
-discretionary  power  without  improper  biasses,  that  the  en- 
quirer is  fearful  to  pronounce  a  judgment  respecting  the  rule 
which  should  regulate  the  administration  of  justice. 

Men,  seeing  the  difficulties  to  which  an  attempt  to  admin- 
ister simple  equity  is  exposed,  have  advanced  as  a  fundamen- 
tal maxim — that  the  law  shall  be  made  by  one  set  of  men  and 
its  execution  entrusted  to  another — thus  endeavouring,  on  the 
one  hand,  to  prevent  rules  from  being  made  under  the  bias  re- 
sulting from  the  contemplation  of  particular  cases,  and  on  the 
other,  to  preclude  the  appliers  of  the  rules  from  the  influence 
of  the  same  bias,  by  obliging  them  to  decide  according  to  a 
preconcerted  law. 

But,  when  we  have  gone  thus  far — when  we  have  allowed 
that  questions  between  man  and  man  shall  be  decided  by  a 
rule  that  is  independent  of  the  merits  of  the  present  case,  we 
have  departed  far  from  the  pure  dictate  of  rectitude.  We 
have  made  the  standard  to  consist  not  of  justice  but  of  law ; 
and  having  done  this,  we  have  opened  wide  the  door  to  the 
entrance  of  injustice.     iVnd  it  does  enter  indeed  ! 

The  consideration  of  this  state  of  things  indicates  one  sat- 
isfactory truth — that  we  should  pursue  the  rule  of  abstract 
rectitude  to  the  utmost  of  our  power  ;  that  we  should  con- 
stantly keep  in  view,  that  whatever  decision  is  made  upon  any 
other  ground  than  that  of  simple  justice,  it  is  so  far  defeating 
the  object  for  which  Courts  of  Justice  are  established  :  and 
therefore,  that  in  whatever  degree  it  is  practicable  to  find  men 
who  will  decide  every  specific  question  according  to  the  dic- 
tates of  justice  upon  that  question,  in  the  same  degree  it  is 
right  to  supersede  the  application  of  inferior  principles. 

Am  I  then  sacrificing  the  fundamental  principles  upon 
which  the  morality  of  these  Essays  is  founded?  Am  I,  at 
last,  conceding  that  expediency  ought  to  take  precedence  of 
rectitude  1  No  :  but  I  am  saying,  that  if  the  state  of  human 
virtue  is  such  that  not  one  can  be  found  to  judge  justly  be- 
tween his  brethren — men  must  judge  as  justly  as  they  can, 
and  a  legislator  must  contrive  such  boundaries  and  checks  for 
those  who  have  to  administer  justice,  as  shall  make  the  imr 
perfectioaof  human  virtue  as  little  pernicious  as  he  may.     If 

33 


386  ADMINISTRATION    OF   JTrSTTCE.  [eSSAT  IH, 

this  virtue  were  perfect,  courts  of  Jaw  might  perhaps  safely 
and  rightly  be  shut  up.  There  would  be  a  rule  of  judgment 
preferable  to  law  •  and  law  itself,  so  far  as  it  consists  of  ab- 
solute rules  for  the  direction  of  decisions  between  man  and 
man,  might  almost  be  done  away. 

Now,  in  considering  the  degree  in  which  this  great  desid- 
eratum— the  substitution  of  justice  for  law — can  be  effected, 
let  us  be  especially  careful  that  we  throw  no  other  impedi- 
ments in  the  way  of  justice  than  those  which  are  interposed 
by  the  want  of  purity  in  mankind.  Let  us  never  regard  a 
system  of  administering  justice  as  fixed,  so  that  its  maxims 
shall  not  be  altered  whenever  an  increase  of  purity  dictates 
that  an  alteration  may  be  made.  All  the  existing  national 
systems  of  administering  justice  are  imperfect  and  alloyed  ; 
— a  mixture  of  evil  and  good.  It  were  sorrowful  indeed  to 
assume  that  they  cannot  be,  or  to  provide  that  they  shall  not 
be,  amended. 

The  system  in  this  country,  like  most  systems  which  are 
the  gradual  accretion  of  the  lapse  of  ages,  is  incongruous  in 
its  different  parts.  In  the  decisions  that  are  founded  upon 
legal  technicalities,  the  method  of  applying  absolute  uniform 
law  is  adopted.  In  the  assessment  of  damages  there  is  exer- 
cised very  great  discretionary  power.  In  pronouncing  ver- 
dicts upon  prisoners,  juries  are  scarcely  allowed  any  discretion 
at  all.  They  say  absolutely  either  not  guilty  or  guilty. — 
Then  again,  discretion  is  entrusted  to  the  judge,  and  he  may 
pronounce  sentences  of  imprisonment  or  of  transportation, 
varying  according  to  his  judgment  in  their  duration  or  circum- 
stances. The  reader  should  well  observe  this  admission  of 
discretionary  power  to  the  judicial  court,  because  it  is  a  prac- 
tical acknowledgment  that  considerations  of  equity  are  in- 
dispensable to  the  administration  of  justice,  whatever  may  be 
the  multiplicity  or  precision  of  the  laws.  Our  judges  are  en- 
trusted, on  the  circuits,  with  the  discretionary  power  of  com- 
muting capital  punishments  or  leaving  the  offender  for  execu- 
tion. This  is  equivalent  to  an  acknowledgment,  that  even 
the  most  tremendous  sanctions  of  the  state  are  more  safely 
applied  upon  principles  of  equity  than  upon  principles  of  Law. 
Let  the  reader  bear  this  in  his  mind. 

Of  the  general  tendency  and  attendant  evils  of  uniform  law, 
some  illustrations  have  been  offered  in  the  preceding  Essay, 
and  some  observations  have  been  offered  in  the  chapter  on 
Arbitration,  on  the  advantages  of  administering  justice  upon 
principles  of  equity,  that  is,  by  a  large  discretionary  power. 
Now  it  will  be  our  business  to  enquire  into  some  of  the  rea- 


C^AP.  X.]  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  $87 

sonings  by  which  the  application  of  uniform  law  is  recom- 
mended— to  illustrate  yet  further  the  moral  claims  of  Courts 
of  Equity,  and  to  show  if  we  can  that  some  greater  approxi- 
mation to  the  adoption  of  these  courts  is  practicable  even  in 
the  present  condition  of  mankind. 

The  administration  of  justice,  according  to  a  previously 
made  rule,  labours  under  this  fundamental  objection,  that  it  as- 
sumes a  knowledge  in  the  maker  of  the  rule  which  he  does 
not  possess.  It  assumes  that  he  can  tell  beforehand,  not  only 
what  is  a  good  decision  in  a  certain  class  of  questions,  but 
what  is  the  best ;  and  the  objection  appears  so  much  the  more 
palpable,  because  it  assumes,  that  a  party  who  judges  a  case 
before  it  exists,  can  better  tell  what  is  justly  due  to  an  offended, 
or  an  offending  person,  than  those  who  hear  all  the  particu- 
lars of  the  individual  case.  This  objection,  which  it  is  evi- 
dent can  never  be  got  over,  is  practically  felt  and  acknow- 
ledged. Every  relaxation  of  a  strict  adherence  to  the  law, 
every  concession  of  discretionary  power  to  juries  or  to  courts, 
is  an  acknowledgment  of  the  inherent  inadequacy  and  im- 
propriety of  fixed  rules.  You  perceive  that  no  fixed  rules 
can  define  and  discriminate  justly  for  specific  cases.  Multi- 
ply them  as  you  may,  the  gradations  in  the  demands  for  equi- 
table decision  will  multiply  yet  faster  ;  so  that  you  are  forced. 
at  last  to  concede  something  to  equity,  though  perhaps  there 
has  not  hitherto  been  conceded  enough.  Our  Court  of 
Chancery  was  originally,  and  still  is  called  a  Court  of  Equity, 
the  erection  of  which  court  is  paying  a  sort  of  tacit  homage 
to  equity  as  superior  to  law,  and  making  a  sort  of  tacit  ac- 
knowledgment how  imperfect  and  inefficient  the  fundamental 
principles  of  fixed  law  are.  It  is  perhaps  a  subject  of  regret 
that  this  court  is  now  a  court  of  equity  rather  in  name  than  in 
fact.  It  proceeds,  in  a  great  degree,  according  to  the  rule, 
of  precedent ;  one  of  the  principal  differences  between  its 
practical  character  and  that  of  legal  courts  being,  that  in  one 
a  jury  decides  questions,  and  in  the  other  a  judge. 

And  after  all,  the  fixedness  of  the  law  is  much  less  in  prac- 
tice than  in  theory,  We  all  know  how  various  and  contra- 
dictory are  the  "  opinions  "  of  legal  men,  so  that  a  person 
may  present  his  "  case  "  to  three  or  four  able  lawyers  in  suc- 
cession, and  receive  from  each  a  different  answer.  Nay,  if 
several  should  agree  when  they  are  applied  to  as  judges  in 
the  case,  it  is  found,  when  a  person  comes  into  court,  that 
counsel  can  find  legal  arguments,  and  unanswerable  argu- 
ments too,  on  both  sideg  of  the  question,  till  at  last  the  ques- 
tion is  decided,  not  by  a  fixed  law,  but  by  a  preponderance  of 


388-  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  [esSAY  III. 

weight  0^  conflicting  precedents.  Indeed  the  unfixedness  of 
the  law  is  practically  so  great,  that  common  fame  has  made  it 
a  proverb. 

Another  inconvenience  which  is  inseparable  from  the  use 
of  fixed  rules  is,  that  they  almost  preclude  a  court  from  at- 
tending sufficiently  to  one  very  important  point  in  the  admin- 
istration of  justice,  the  intention  of  offending  parties.  Law 
says,  if  a  man  steals  another  person's  watch  under  such  and 
such  circumstances,  he  shall  receive  such  and  such  a  punish- 
ment. Yet  the  guilt  of  two  men  who  steal  watches  under  the 
same  visible  circumstances,  is  often  totally  disproportionate  ; 
and  this  disproportion  indicates  the  propriety  of  corresponding 
gradations  of  penalty.  Yet  fixed  law  awards  the  same  pen- 
alty to  both.  If  it  is  said  that  a  court  may  take  intention  and 
motives  into  the  account  in  its  sentence,  so  it  may ;  but  in 
whatever  degree  it  does  this,  in  the  same  degree  it  acknow- 
ledges the  incompetency  and  inaptitude  of  fixed  laws. 

"  The  motives  and  intentions  of  the  parties."  When  we 
consider  that  the  personal  guilt  of  a  man  depends  more  upon 
these  than  upon  his  simple  acts,  and  consequently  that  these 
rather  than  his  acts  indicate  his  deserts,  it  appears  desirable 
♦hat  human  tribunals  should  measure  their  punishments  as 
much  by  a  reference  to  actual  deserts  as  is  consistent  with 
the  public  good.  I  would  not  undertake  to  affirm  that  the 
guilt  of  the  offender  is  to  us  the  ultimate  standard  of  just  pun- 
ishment, because  it  may  be  necessary  to  the  prevention  of 
crimes,  that  of  two  offences  equal  in  guilt,  one  should  be  pun- 
ished more  severely  than  another,  on  account  of  the  greater 
facilities  for  its  commission — that  is,  on  account  of  the  greater 
impracticability  of  guarding  against  the  offence,  or  of  detect- 
ing the  offender  after  it  is  committed.  But,  in  speaking  of 
the  propriety  of  adverting  to  intention,  this  is  not  the  point  in 
view.  I  speak  not  of  the  difference  between  two  classes  of 
crimes,  but  of  the  actual  motives,  inducements  and  tempta- 
tions of  the  individual  offender.  Stealing  five  pounds  worth 
of  property  in  sheep,  although  it  may  be  no  more  vicious,  as 
an  act,  than  stealing  a  five-pound  note  from  the  person,  may 
perhaps  be  rightly  visited  with  a  severer  punishment.  This 
is  one  thing.  But  two  men  may  each  steal  a  sheep  with 
very  different  degrees  of  personal  guilt.  This  is  another. 
And  this  is  the  point  of  wliich  we  speak.  A  man  who  is 
able  to  maintain  himself  in  respectability,  but  will  not  apply 
himself  to  an  honest  occupation — who  lives  by  artifices,  or 
frauds,  or  thefts,  or  gambling,  or  contracting  debts,  watches 
night  after  night  an  opportunity  to  carry  off  sheep  from  an  in- 


CHAP.  X.]  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  389 

closure.  He  succeeds,  and  spends  the  value  in  drunkenness, 
or  at  a  bagnio.  A  man  of  decent  character  who  in  a  period 
of  distress,  endeavours  in  vain  to  procure  employment  or 
bread — who  pawns,  day  after  day,  his  furniture,  his  clothing, 
his  bed,  to  obtain  food  for  his  children  and  his  wife — who 
finds  at  last  that  all  is  gone,  and  that  hunger  continues  its  de- 
mands— passes  a  sheep  field.  The  thought  of  robbing  starts 
suddenly  before  him,  and  he  as  suddenly  executes  it.  He 
carries  home  the  meat,  and  is  found  by  the  police  hastily  cut- 
ting slices  for  his  voracious  family.  Ought  these  two  men  to 
receive  the  same  punishment?  It  is  impossible.  Justice, 
common  sense,  Christianity  forbid  it.  We  cannot  urge,  in 
such  cases,  that  human  tribunals,  being  unable  to  penetrate 
the  secret  motives  of  action,  must  leave  it  to  the  Supreme  Be- 
ing to  apportion  punishment  strictly  to  guilt.  We  can  dis- 
cover, though  not  the  exact  amount  of  guilt,  a  great  deal  of 
difference  between  its  degrees.  We  do  actually  know,  that 
of  two  persons  who  commit  the  same  crime,  one  is  often 
much  more  criminal  than  another  ;  and  were  it  not  ^hat  our 
jurisprudence  habituates  us  so  much  to  refer  simply  to  acts, 
we  might  know  much  more  than  we  do.  We  are  often  igno- 
rant of  motives  only  because  we  dp  not  enquire  for  them.  A 
law  says,  "  If  any  person  shall  enter  a  field  and  steal  a  sheep 
or  horse,  he  shall  suffer  death ;"  and  so,  when  a  court  comes 
to  try  a  man  charged  with  the  act,  they  perhaps  scarcely  think 
of  any  other  consideration  than  whether  he  stole  the  animal 
or  not.  Of  ten  who  do  thus  steal,  no  two  probably  deserve 
exactly  the  same  punishment,  and  some,  undoubtedly  deserve 
much  less  than  others. 

Discrimination,  then,  is  necessary  to  the  demands  alike  of 
humanity,  and  reason,  and  religion.  But  how  shall  sufficient 
discrimination  be  exercised  under  a  system  of  fixed  laws  ? 
If  the  decisions  of  courts  must  be  regulated  by  the  acts  of  the 
offender,  how  shall  they  take  into  account  those  endless  gra- 
dations of  personal  desert,  to  refer  to  which  is  a  sine  qua  non 
of  the  administration  of  justice  ?  Now,  in  order  to  satisfy 
these  demands,  courts  must  by  some  means  be  entrusted  with 
a  greater  discretionary  power  ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing, 
decisions  upon  maxims  of  equity  must,  in  a  greater  degree, 
take  the  place  of  decisions  regulated  by  law. 

The  next  great  objection  is,  that  to  place,  for  example, 
men's  property  at  the  discretion  of  a  court  of  equity  that  was 
not  bound  down  by  fixed  rules,  would  make  the  possession  of 
every  man's  property  uncertain.  Nobody  would  know  whether 
the  estate  which  he  and  his  fathers  enjoyed,  might  not  t(H 

33* 


390  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  [eSSAY    III 

morrow,  by  the  decision  of  some  court  of  equity,  be  taken  away. 
But  this  supposes  that  the  decisions  of  these  courts  would  be 
arbitrary  and  capricious  ;  whereas,  the  supposition  upon  which 
we  set  out — the  supposition  upon  which  alone  we  reason,  is, 
that  means  can  be  devised  by  which  their  decisions  shall  be 
generally  at  least  accordant  with  rectitude.  They  must  de- 
viate very  widely  from  rectitude  if  they  took  away  a  man's 
estate  without  some  reason  which  appeared  to  them  to  be  good  ; 
and  it  could  hardly  appear  to  be  good,  on  a  full  hearing  of  the 
case,  unless  the  merits  of  that  case  were  very  questionable  ; 
but  in  proportion  to  that  questionableness  would  be  the  small- 
ness  of  the  grievance  if  the  estate  were  taken  away.  Let 
any  man  suppose  a  case  for  himself — ^he  possesses  a  house, 
to  which  no  one  ever  disputed  his  title  till  some  person 
chooses  to  bring  his  title  before  a  court  of  equity — of  the  mem- 
bers of  which  court  the  possessor  nominates  one  half ;  does  any 
man  in  his  senses  suppose  that  the  property  would  be  endan- 
gered ?  or  rather,  does  any  man  suppose  that  a  person  would 
be  foolish  enough  to  call  the  title  in  question  ?  But  we  must 
repeat  the  other  alternative.  If  a  person  holds  an  estate  by  a 
decision  of  law  which  he  would  not  have  held  by  a  decision 
of  rectitude,  we  do  not  listen  to  his  complaints  though  it  be 
taken  away.     It  is  just  what  we  desire. 

It  has  been  contended,  that  to  depart  further  from  the  sys- 
tem of  deciding  by  law,  would  tend  to  the  increase  of  litiga- 
tion; that  nothing  prevents  litigation  so  much  as  previous 
certainty  of  the  rule  of  decision ;  and  that  if,  instead  of  this 
certainty,  the  decision  of  a  court  were  left  to  a  species  of 
chance,  there  would  be  litigation  without  end.  But  in  this 
argument  it  is  not  sufficiently  considered  that  previous  cer- 
tainty of  the  rule  of  decision  is  very  imperfectly  possessed — • 
that,  as  we  have  just  been  observing,  the  law  is  not  fixed  ; 
and,  consequently,  that  that  discouragement  of  litigation  which 
would  arise  out  of  previously  known  rules,  very  imperfectly 
operates.  Nor,  again,  is  it  enough  considered,  that  the  de- 
cision of  a  court  of  equity,  if  properly  constituted,  would  not 
be  a  matter  of  chance,  nor  any  thing  that  is  like  it.  Though  a 
legal  rule  would  not  bind  a  court,  still  it  would  be  bound — Abound 
by  the  dictates — commonly  the  very  intelligible  dictates — of 
right  and  wrong.  "  Reason,"  it  has  been  said,  "  is  a  thousand 
times  more  explicit  and  intelligible  than  law  ;"  and  if  reason 
were  not  more  intelligible,  still  the  moral  judgments  in  the  mind 
assuredly  are.  Again,  many  causes  are  now  brought  into 
court,  not  because  they  are  morally  good,  but  legally  good. 
Of  this  the  contending  parties  are  often  conscious,  and  they 


fiHAP.   X,]  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  391 

would  therefore  be  conscious  that  a  court  which  regulated  its 
decisions  by  the  moral  qualities  of  a  case,  would  decide 
against  them.  At  present.^  when  a  man  contemplates  a  law- 
suit, he  has  to  judge  as  well  as  be  can  of  the  probability  of 
success,  by  enquiring  into  the  rules  of  law  and  decisions  of 
former  cases.  If  a  court  of  equity  were  to  be  the  judge,  he 
would  have  to  appeal  to  a  much  nearer  and  more  determinate 
ground  of  probability — to  his  own  consciousness  of  the  justness 
of  his  cause.  We  are  therefore  to  set  the  discouragement  of 
litigation,  which  arrises  from  this  source,  against  that  which 
arises  from  the  supposed  fixedness  of  law ;  and  I  am  dis- 
posed to  conclude  that  in  a  well  constituted  court  this  dis- 
couragement would  be  practically  the  greater.  Another  point 
is  this : — It  is  unhappily  certain,  that  either  the  ignorance  or 
the  cupidity  of  some  legal  men  prompts  many  to  engage  in  law- 
suits who  have  little  even  of  legal  reason  to  hope  for  success. 
This  cause  of  litigation  equity  would  do  away;  a  lawyer  would 
riot  be  applied  to,  for  a  lawyer  would  have  no  better  means 
of  foreseeing  the  probable  decision  of  a  court  of  equity  than 
another  man. 

Here,  too,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  great,  what  if  I 
say  the  crying  evils  of  the  present  state  of  legal  practice,  re- 
sult from — ^the  employment  of  fixed  laws.  It  has  indeed 
been  acknowledged  by  an  advocate  of  these  laws,  that  they 
''  erect  the  practice  of  the  law  into  a  separate  profession."* 
Now,  suppose  all  the  evils,  all  the  expenses,  all  the  disposi- 
tion to  litigation  and  dispute,  all  the  practical  injustice,  which 
results  from  this  profession  were  done  away — would  not  the 
benefit  be  very  great  ?  Would  it  not  be  a  great  advantage  to 
the  quiet,  and  the  pockets,  and  the  virtue  of  the  nation  ?  I 
regard  this  one  circumstance  as  forming  a  recommendation  of 
equity  so  poAverful,  that  serious  counterbalancing  evils  must 
be  urged  to  overcome  its  weight.  Even  to  the  political  econ- 
omist the  dissolution  or  great  diminution  of  the  profession  is 
of  some  importance.  I  am  no  proficient  in  his  science  :  but 
it  requires  little  proficiency  to  discover,  that  the  existence  of 
a  large  number  of  persons  who  not  only  contribute  little  to  the 
national  prosperity,  but  often  deduct  from  it,  is  no  trifling  evil 
in  a  state.  But  it  is  not  simply  as  it  respects  the  profession 
that  fixed  laws  are  thus  injurious.  They  are  the  great  ulti- 
mate occasion  of  those  obstacles  to  the  attainment  of  justice 
which  are  felt  to  be  a  grievance  ivL  almost  all  civilized  nations. 
The  delays  and  the  expenses,  and  the  undefined  annoyances 
6f  vexation  and  disappointment,  deter  many  from  seeking 
*  Paley:  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  6,  c.  8. 


392  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE..  [ESSAT  UK 

their  just  rights.  Delays  are  occasioned  in  a  great  degree  by 
forms  ;  and  forms  are  a  part  of  the  system  of  fixed  laws.  Ex* 
penses  are  entailed  by  the  necessity  of  complying  \Vith  these 
forms,  and  of  employing  those  persons  whose  knowledge  is 
requisite  to  tell  us  what  those  forms  are  \  and  the  acquisition 
of  this  knowledge  requires  so  much  time  and  care,  that  he 
who  imparts  it  must  be  well  paid.  As  to  indeterminate  vex- 
ations and  disappointments,  they  too  result  principally  from 
the  fixedness  of  rules.  A  man  with  a  cause  of  unquestioned 
rectitude  is  too  often  denied  justice  on  account  of  the  inter- 
vention of  some  absolute  rule — that  has  little  or  no  relevance 
to  the  question  of  rectitude.  Persons^  fearing  these  various 
evils,  decline  to  endeavour  the  attainment  of  their  just  rights, 
rights  which,  if  equity  were  in  a  greater  degree  substituted 
for  law,  would  be  of  comparatively  easy  attainment. 

The  reader  can  hardly  too  vigorously  impress  upon  his 
mind  the  consideration,  that  the  various  sacrifices  of  rectitude 
which  are  made  under  colour  of  the  legality  of  people's  claims, 
result  from  the  system  of  fixed  laws.  If  to  avail  one's-self 
of  an  informality  in  a  will  to  defraud  the  claims  of  justice 
be  wrong^ — the  evil  and  the  temptation  is  to  be  laid  at  the 
door  of  fixed  law.  If  an  undoubted  criminal  escapes  jus- 
tice merely  because  he  cannot  legally  be  convicted^  the  evil 
— which  is  serious — is  to  be  laid  at  the  door  of  fixed  law. 
And  so  of  a  hundred  other  cases — cases  of  which  the  aggre- 
gate ill  consequence  is  so  great,  as  to  form  a  weighty  objec- 
tion to  whatever  system  may  occasion  them. 

I  make  little  distinction  between  deciding  by  fixed  law  and 
by  precedents,  because  the  principles  of  both  are  the  same^ 
and  both,  it  is  probable,  will  stand  or  fall  together.  Prece- 
dents are  laws — ^but  of  somewhat  less  absolute  authority ; 
which  indeed  they  ought  to  be,  since  they  are  made  by  courts 
of  justice  and  not  by  the  legislature.  They  are  a  sort  of  sup- 
plemental statutes,  which  attempt  to  supply  (what  however 
can  never  be  suppUed)  the  deficiencies  of  fixed  laws.  A  stat- 
ute is  a  general  rule  ;  a  precedent  prescribes  a  case  in  which 
that  rule  shall  be  observed ;  but  a  thousand  cases  still  arise 
which  neither  statute  nor  precedent  can  reach. 

So  habitual  is  become  our  practice  of  judging  questions 
rather  by  a  previously  made  rule  than  by  their  proper  merits, 
that  even  the  House  of  Lords,  which  is  the  highest  court  of 
equity  in  the  state,  searches  out,  when  a  question  is  brought 
before  it,  its  precedents  !  Long  debates  ensue  upon  th«  paral- 
lelism of  decisions  a  century  or  two  ago  ;  when,  if  the  merits 
of  the  case  only  were  regarded,  perhaps  not  an  hour  would 


CHAP.  X.]  ADMINIbTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  39^ 

be  spent  in  the  decision.  Then  the  House  is  cramped  and 
made  jealous  lest  its  present  vote  should  be  a  precedent  for 
another  decision  fifty  years  to  come.  New  debates  are  started 
as  to  the  bearing  of  the  precedent  upon  some  imagined  ques- 
tion in  after  times ;  and  at  last  the  decision  is  regulated  per- 
liaps  as  much  by  fears  of  distant  consequences,  as  by  a  regard 
to  present  rectitude.  Do  away  precedents,  and  the  House 
might  pursue  unshackled  the  dictate  of  Virtue.  And  after 
all,  when  precedents  are  sought  and  found,  the  House  usually 
acts  upon  the  opinion  of  its  legal  members — thus  subverting 
the  very  nature  of  a  court  of  equity.  It  would  seem  the  ra- 
tional and  consistent  course,  that  in  the  House  of  Lords,  when 
it  constitutes  such  a  court,  the  law  lords  should  be  almost  the 
last  to  give  a  sentiment ;  for  if  it  be  to  be  decided  by  lawyers, 
to  what  purpose  is  it  brought  to  the  House  of  Peers  ? 

And  another  inconvenience  of  fixed  law — or  at  any  rate  of 
fixed  laws  such  as  ours  are— is,  that  in  cases  of  criminal  trials 
the  jury  are  bound  down,  as  we  have  before  noticed,  to  an  ab- 
solute verdict  either  to  acquit  the  prisoner  of  all  crime  and 
exempt  him  from  all  punishment,  or  to  declare  that  he  is  guilty 
and  leave  him  to  the  sentence  of  the  court.  Now  since  many 
verdicts  are  founded  upon  a  balance  of  probabiHties — probabil- 
ities which  leave  the  juror's  mind  uncertain  of  the  prisoner's 
guilt,  it  would  seem  the  dictate  of  reason  that  corresponding 
verdicts  should  be  given.  If  it  is  quite  certain  that  a  man  has 
stolen  a  watch,  it  seems  reasonable  that  he  should  receive  a 
greater  punishment  than  he  of  whom  it  is  only  highly  probable 
that  he  has  stolen  it.  But  the  verdict  in  each  case  is  the 
same — till,  as  the  probability  diminishes,  the  minds  of  the  jury 
at  last  preponderate  on  the  other  side,  and  they  pronounce  an 
absolute  verdict  of  acquittal.  From  this  state  of  things  it  hap- 
pens that  some  are  punished  more  severely  than  the  amount 
of  probability  warrants,  and  that  many  are  not  punished  at  all, 
because  there  is  no  alternative  to  the  jury  between  the  abso- 
lute acquittal  and  absolute  conviction.  Now  the  imperfection 
of  human  judgment,  the  impossibility  of  penetrating  always 
into  the  real  facts  and  motives  of  men,  indicates  that  some 
penalties  may  justly  be  awarded,  even  though  a  court  enter- 
tains doubts  of  a  prisoner's  guilt.  Man  must  doubt  because 
he  cannot  know.  We  may  rightly  therefore  proceed  upon 
probabilities  and  punish  upon  probabilities  ;  so  that  we  should 
not  wholly  exempt  a  man  from  punishment  because  we  are 
not  sure  that  he  is  guilty,  nor  inflict  a  certain  stipulated  amount 
of  it  because  we  are  only  strongly  persuaded  that  he  is.  Pun- 
ishment may  rightly  then  be  regulated  by  probabilities :  but 


394  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  [esSAY  III 

how  shall  this  be  done  without  a  large  discretionary  power 
in  those  who  judge  ?  And  how  shall  such  discretionary  power 
be  exercised  whilst  we  act  upon  the  maxims  of  fixed  law  ? 

The  requisition  of  what  is  called  legal  proof  is  one  result 
of  fixed  law  that  is  attended  with  much  evil.  It  not  unfre- 
quently  happens,  that  a  man  who  claims  a  right  adduces  such 
evidence  of  its  validity  that  the  court — that  every  man — is 
convinced  he  ought  to  possess  it :  but  there  is  some  deficiency 
in  that  precise  kind  of  proof  which  the  law  prescribes ;  and 
so,  in  deference  to  law,  justice  is  turned  away.  It  is  the 
same  with  crimes.  Crimes  are  sometimes  proved  to  the  satis- 
faction of  every  one  who  hears  the  evidence  ;  but  because 
there  is  some  want  of  strict  legal  proof,  the  criminal  is  again 
turned  loose  upon  society.  Such  things,  decisions  founded 
upon  equity  would  do  away.  All  that  the  court  would  require 
would  be  a  satisfactory  conviction  of  the  prisoner's  guilt  or  of 
the  claimant's  rights  ;  and  having  obtained  that  satisfaction,  it 
would  decide  accordingly. 

Here,  too,  a  consideration  is  suggested  respecting  the  pre- 
rogative which  is  vested  in  the  crown  of  pardoning  offenders. 
The  crown,  if  any,  is  doubtless  the  right  repository  of  this 
prerogative  ;  but  it  is  not  obvious,  upon  principles  of  equity, 
that  any  repository  is  right.  If  an  ofTender  deserves  punish- 
ment, he  ought  to  receive  it — and  if  he  does  not  deserve  it, 
no  sentence  ought  to  be  passed  upon  him.  This,  of  which 
the  truth  is  very  obvious,  simply  considered,  is  only  untrue 
when  you  introduce  fixed  laws.  These  fixed  laws  require 
you  to  deliver  a  verdict,  and,  when  it  is  delivered,  to  pass  a 
sentence  ; — and  then,  finding  your  sentence  is  improper  or  un- 
just, you  are  obliged  to  go  to  a  court  of  equity  to  remedy  the 
evil.  Why  should  we  pass  a  sentence  if  it  is  not  deserved  ? 
"Why  is  a  sentence  the  indispensable  consequence  of  a  ver- 
dict 1  Why  rather  is  a  formal  verdict  pronounced  at  all  ? 
There  appears  in  the  view  of  equity  no  need  for  all  these 
forms.  What  we  want  is  to  assign  to  an  offender  his  due 
punishment ; — and  when  no  other  is  assigned,  there  is  no  need 
for  prerogatives  of  pardon. 

Proceeding,  then,  upon  the  conviction  that  law  as  distin- 
guished from  justice  is  attended  with  many  evils,  let  us  en- 
quire whether  the  obstacles  to  decisions  by  considerations  of 
justice  are  insuperable.  Now  I  do  believe  that  many  of  the 
objections  which  suggest  themselves  to  an  enquirer's  mind 
are  really  adventitious — that  the  administration  of  simple  jus- 
tice may  be  detached  from  many  of  those  inconveniences 
which  attach  no  doubt  to  ill-constituted  discretionary  courts. 


CHAP.  X.]  ADMIXISrRATlON"    31?    JUSTICE,  395 

So  confident  has  been  the  objection  to  decisions  upon  ruiea 
of  equity,  that  Dr.  Paley,  in  the  eighth  chapter  of  the  Politi- 
cal division  of  his  Philosophy,  has  these  words :  "  The  first 
maxim  of  a  free  state  is,  that  the  laws  be  made  by  one  set  of 
men  and  administered  by  another.  When  these  offices  are 
united  in  the  same  person  or  assembly,  particular  laws  are 
made  for  particular  cases,  springing  oftentimes  from  partial 
motives^  and  directed  to  private  ends.''''  But  if  these  partial 
motives  and  private  ends  can  be  wholly  or  in  a  great  degree 
excluded,  the  objection  which  is  founded  upon  them  is  in  a 
great  degree  or  wholly  at  an  end.  If  these  offices  were 
united  in  any  person  or  assembly,  appointed  or  constituted  as 
the  administerers  of  justice  now  are,  I  doubt  not  that  partial 
motives  and  private  ends  would  prevail.  But  the  necessity 
for  this  is  merely  assumed  ^  and  upon  this  assumption  Paley 
proceeds:  ^'  Let  it  be  supposed  that  the  courts  of  Westminster 
Hall  made  their  own  laws,  or  that  the  two  houses  of  parlia- 
ment, with  the  king  at  their  head,  tried  and  decided  causes  at 
their  bar" — ^then,  he  says,  the  inclinations  of  the  judges  would 
inevitably  attach  on  one  side  or  the  other,  and  would  interfere 
with  the  integrity  of  justice.  No  doubt  this  would  happen ; 
but  because  this  would  happen  to  the  courts  of  Westminster 
Hall,  or  to  the  legislative  assemblies,  it  does  not  follow  that 
it  would  happen  to  all  arbitrators,  however  appointed.  Thus 
it  is  that  the  mind,  habitually  associating  ideas  which  may 
reasonably  be  separated,  founds  its  conclusions,  not  upon  the 
proper  and  essential  merits  of  the  question,  but  upon  the  ques- 
tion as  it  is  accidentally  brought  before  it.  The  proper  ground 
on  which  to  seek  objections  to  decision  on  rules  of  equity,  is 
not  in  the  want  of  adaptation  of  present  judicial  institutions, 
but  on  the  impracticability  of  framing  institutions  in  which 
these  rules  might  safely  prevail ;  and  this  impracticability  has 
never,  so  far  as  the  writer  knows,  been  shown. 

Now,  without  assigning  the  extent  to  which  arbitration 
may  eventually  take  place  of  law,  or  the  degree  in  which  it 
may  be  adopted  in  the  present  state  of  any  country,  it  may  be 
asked — Since  a  large  number  of  disagreements  are  actually 
settled  by  arbitration,  that  is,  by  rules  of  equity,  why  may  not 
that  number  be  greatly  increased  ?  It  is  common  in  cases  of 
partnership,  and  other  agreements  between  several  parties,  to 
stipulate  that  if  a  difference  arises  it  shall  be  settled  by  arbi- 
trators. It  must  be  presumed  that  this  mode  of  settling  is 
regarded  as  the  best,  else  why  formally  stipulate  for  it  ?  The 
superiority,  too,  must  be  discovered  by  experience.  It  is  then 
in  fact  found  that  a  great  number  of  questions  of  property  and 


396  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE,  [fiSSAY  III. 

Other  concerns,  are  settled  more  cheaply  and  more  satisfac- 
torily by  equity  than  by  law.  Why  then,  we  repeat,  may  not 
that  number  be  indefinitely  increased,  or  who  wOl  ,assign  a 
limit  to  its  increase  ?  Now  the  constitution  of  these  efficient 
courts  of  equity,  is  not  permanent.  They  are  not  composed 
of  judges  previously  appointed  to  decide  all  disputes.  They 
are  not  composed,  as  the  courts  of  Westminster  Hall  are,  or 
as  the  houses  of  parliament  are,  or  as  benches  of  magistrates 
are.  If  they  were,  they  would  be  open  to  the  undue  influence 
and  private  purposes  of  those  who  composed  them.  But  the 
members  of  these  courts  are  appointed  by  the  disputants  them- 
selves, or  by  some  party  to  whom  they  mutually  agree  to 
commit  the  appointment.  Supposing  then  the  worst,  that  the 
disputing  parties  appoint  men  who  are  interested  in  their  fa- 
vours ;  still  the  balance  is  equal : — both  may  do  the  same. 
The  court  is  not  influenced  by  undue  motives,  though  its  mem- 
bers are  ;  and  if,  in  consequence  of  such  motives  or  of  any 
other  cause,  the  court  cannot  agree  upon  a  verdict,  what  do 
they  do  1  They  appoint  an  umpire,  or,  which  is  the  same 
thing,  the  disputants  appoint  one.  This  umpire  must  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  impartial ;  for  otherwise  the  disputants  would  not 
both  have  assented  to  his  appointment.  At  the  worst,  then, 
an  impartial  decision  may  be  confidently  hoped ;  and  what 
may  not  be  hoped  under  better  circumstances  ?  It  is,  I  be- 
lieve, common  for  disagreeing  parties  to  nominate  at  once, 
disinterested  and  upright  men ;  and  if  they  do  this,  and  take 
care,  too,  that  they  shall  be  intelligent  men,  almost  every  thing 
is  done  which  is  in  the  power  of  mav\  to  secure  a  just  decision 
between  them. 

Disinterestedness — uprightness — intelligence  : — these  are 
the  qualities  which  are  needed  in  an  arbitrator.  That  he 
should  be  disinterested;  that  is,  that  he  should  possess  no 
motive  to  prefer  the  interests  of  either  party,  is  obviously 
indispensable.  But  this  is  not  enough.  Other  motives  than 
interest  operate  upon  some  men ;  and  there  is  no  sufficient 
?scurity  for  the  integrity  of  a  decision,  but  in  that  habitual  up 
Tightness  in  the  arbitrator  by  which  the  sanctions  of  morality 
are  exercised  and  made  influential.  The  requisiteness  of  in- 
telligence, both  as  it  implies  competent  talent  and  competent 
knowledge,  is  too  manifest  for  remark. 

Now,  one  of  the  great  objections  which  are  made  to  a  judi- 
cature appointed  for  the  decision  of  one  dispute,  and  that  one 
only,  is,  *'  the  want  of  legal  science" — "  the  ignorance  of  those 
who  are  to  decide  upon  our  rights."*     This  objection  applies 
*  Paley :  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  G,  c.  7. 


5HAP.  X.]  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  397 

in  great  force  to  ordinary  juries,  but  it  scarcely  applies  at  all 
to  intelligent  arbitrators  properly  selected— and  not  applying, 
we  are  at  liberty  to  claim  in  favour  of  arbitration  Avithout 
abatement,  that  " indifFerency,"  that  "integrity"  that  "disin- 
terestedness," which  it  is  allowed  that  a  casual  judicature 
possesses. 

Men  become  skilful  by  habit  and  experience.  The  man 
who  is  now  selected  for  the  first  time  in  his  life  to  exercise 
the  office  of  an  arbitrator,  feels  perhaps  some  difficulties.  He 
is  introduced  into  a  new  situation  in  society ;  and,  like  other 
novices,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  he  will  be  under  difficulties  re- 
specting his  decision.  But  if  the  system  of  arbitration  should 
become  as  common  as  lawsuits  are  now,  men  would  soon 
learn  expertness  in  the  duties  pf  arbitrators.  If,  in  a  moder- 
ate town,  there  were  twelve  or  twenty  men,  whose  characters 
and  knowledge  recommended  them  generally,  and  especially 
to  the  confidence  of  their  neighbours — these  are  the  men  who 
would  be  selected  to  adjust  their  disputes.  And  even  if  the 
same  individuals  were  not  often  employed,  the  habit  of  judging, 
a  familiarity  with  such  matters,  becomes  diffused,  just  as  every 
other  species  of  knowledge  becomes  diffused  upon  subjects 
that  are  common,  in  the  world. 

Another  ground  of  difficulty  to  an  arbitrator  in  the  present 
state  of  things,  is  the  habit,  which  is  so  general  in  the  com- 
munity, of  referring  for  justice  to  rules  of  law,  A  man  when 
he  enters  an  arbitration  room,  is  continually  referring  in  his 
mind  to  law-books  and  precedents.  This* is  likely  to  confuse 
his  principles  of  decision,  to  intermix  foreign  things  with  one 
another,  and  to  produce  sometimes  perhaps  a  decision  founded 
half  upon  law  and  half  upon  justice.  This  may  indeed  occa-^ 
sionally  be  in  some  sort  imposed  upon  him — at  least  he  would 
feel  a  hesitation,  a  sort  of  repugnance  to  deliver  a  decision 
which  was  absolutely  contrary  to  the  rule  of  law.  But  this 
inconvenience  is  in  a  great  degree  accidental  and  factitious. 
As  the  principles  of  equity  assumed  their  proper  dominance 
in  the  adjustment  of  disputes,  fixed  laws  would  proportionably 
decline  in  influence  and  in  their  practical  hold  upon  the  minds 
of  men.  Their  judgments  would  gradually  become  emanci- 
pated from  this  species  of  shackle  ; — they  would  rise,  disen- 
cumbered of  arbitrary  maxims,  and  decide  according  to  those 
maxims  of  moral  equity  for  the  dictates  of  which  no  man  has 
far  to  seek.  The  whole  system  tends  to  the  invigoration  and 
elevation  of  the  mind.  A  man  who  is  conscious  of  an  abso- 
lute authority  to  decide — of  an  uncontrolled  discretionary 
power,  in  a  question  perhaps  of  important  interests.'  is  ani- 

34  ■     ' 


398  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  [esSAV  III 

mated  by  the  moral  eminence  of  his  station  to  exert  a  vigorous 
and  honorable  endeavour  to  award  sound  justice.  Y'ou  are 
not  to  expect  in  such  a  man,  what  we  find  in  arbitrary  judges, 
that  his  very  absoluteness  will  make  him  capricious  and  tyran- 
nical ;  for  the  moment  he  has  pronounced  his  decision,  a 
calamity,  if  that  decision  have  been  unjust,  awaits  him ; — -the 
reprobation  of  his  neighbours,  of  his  friends,  and  of  the  public. 
The  exercise  of  his  discretion  is  bound  to  the  side  of  upright- 
ness, though  not  by  ordinary  pains  and  penalties,  yet  by  vir- 
tual pains  and  penalties,  which  to  such  men  as  are  chosen  for 
arbitrators  are  amongst  the  most  powerful  that  can  be  applied. 

One  thing  is  indispensable  to  an  extended  system  of  arbi- 
tration, that  the  civil  magistrate  should  sanction  its  decisions 
by  a  willing  enforcement  of  the  verdict.  It  is  usual  for  dis- 
putants who  refer  to  arbitrators  to  sign  an  agreement  to  abide 
by  their  decision ;  and  this  agreement  may  by  some  simple 
process  of  law  be  enforced.  The  law  does  indeed  now^  sanc- 
tion arbitrations  ;  but  then  it  is  in  a  formal  and  expensive 
way.  A  deed  is  drawn  up,  and  a  stamp  must  be  affixed,  and 
a  solicitor  must  be  employed  ; — so  that  at  last  the  disagreeing 
parties  do  but  partly  reap  the  benefits  of  arbitration.  This 
should  be  remedied.  The  reader  will  observe  that  I  say  law 
is  wanted  to  enforce  the  decisions  of  equity.  No  doubt  it  is. 
It  is  wanted  for  the  same  reason  as  government  is  wanted,  to 
exert  power,  which  power,  it  is  evident,  must  be  exercised  by 
the  government.  But  if  any  critic  should  say  that  this  ac- 
knowledges the  insufficiency  of  equity,  I  answer,  that  we  are 
speaking  of  unconnected  things.  The  business  of  equity  is 
to  decide  between  right  and  wrong,  and  to  say  what  is  right 
• — with  which  the  infliction  of  penalties  or  the  enforcement 
of  decisions  has  no  concern.  A  court  and  jiu*y  say  that  a 
man  shall  be  sent  for  six  months  to  a  prison,  but  it  forms  no 
part  of  their  business  to  execute  the  sentence. 

With  respect  to  the  applicability  of  courts  of  equity  to  crim- 
inal trials,  I  see  nothing  that  necessarily  prevents  it.  Men 
who  can  judge  respecting  matters  of  property  and  personal 
rights,  can  judge  respecting  questions  of  innocence  and  guilt. 
In  one  view,  indeed,  they  can  judge  more  easily ;  because 
moral  desert  is  determinable  upon  more  simple  and  obvious 
principles  than  claims  of  property.  Many  who  would  feel 
much  difficulty  in  deciding  involved  disputes  about  money  or 
land,  would  feel  none  in  determining,  with  sufficient  accuracy, 
the  degree  of  an  offender's  guilt. 

It  being  manifest,  then,  that  offences  against  the  peace  of 
society  may  be  as  properly  referred  to  courts  of  equity  as 


CHAP.  X.]  ADMIXISTRATtON    OF    JUSTICE.  399 

questions  of  right — what  should  be  the  constitution  of  such 
a  court  ?  But  here  the  reader  is  to  remember,  that  the  objec- 
tion is  not  merely  or  principally  to  the  constitution  of  present 
courts,  but  to  the  principles  of  fixed  law  upon  which  justice 
is  administered.  So  that,  if  principles  of  equity  were  substi- 
tuted, the  constitution  of  the  court  would  become  a  secondaiy 
concern ;  and  courts  consisting  of  a  jury  and  a  judge  might 
not  be  bad,  though  they  were  not  the  best.  If  half  a  dozen 
intelligent  and  upright  men  could  be  appointed  to  examine 
the  truth  of  charges  against  a  prisoner,  and  if  they  were  al- 
lowed to  award  a  just  punishment,  I  should  have  little  fear, 
after  making  allowances  for  the  frailties  of  humanity,  that 
their  penalties  would  generally  be  just ; — at  any  rate,  that 
they  would  be  more  accordant  with  justice  than  penalties 
which  are  regulated  by  fixed  law.  The  difficulty  is  in  pro- 
curing the  arbitrators,  a  difficulty  greater  than  that  which  ob- 
tains in  cases  of  private  right.  For  in  the  first  place  offend- 
ers against  the  peace  of  society  generally  excite  the  feelings 
of  the  public,  and  especially  of  the  neighbourhood,  against 
them.  Men  too  often  prejudge  cases,  and  the  prisoner  is  fre- 
quently condemned  in  the  public  mind  before  any  evidence 
has  been  brought  before  a  jury.  This  indicates  a  difficulty 
in  selecting  impartial  men.  And  then,  in  the  case  of  arbitra- 
tions, each  party  chooses  one  or  more  of  the  judges.  Shall 
the  same  privilege  be  allowed  to  persons  charged  with  crime  ? 
If  it  were,  would  they  not  select  persons  who  would  frustrate 
all  the  endeavours  to  administer  justice  ?  Besides,  where  is 
the  conflicting  party  who  shall  be  equally  interested  in  ap- 
pointing arbitrators  of  opposite  dispositions  ?  And  if  both 
did  appoint  such,  what  is  the  hope  of  a  temperate  and  rational 
decision  1  Again,  there  are  offences  which  are  regarded  with 
peculiar  severity  by  particular  classes  of  men.  A  court  com- 
posed of  country  gentlemen,  would  hardly  award  a  fair  verdict 
against  a  poacher. 

These  considerations  and  others  indicate  difficulty  ;  and 
perhaps  the  difficulty  cannot  better  be  avoided  than  by  a  court 
selected  by  chance.  In  the  selection  of  juries  there  have 
recently  been  introduced  improvements.  Still,  if  equity  rather 
than  law  is  to  be  regarded,  something  more  is  needed.  Now, 
though  a  jury  be  ignorant,  the  judge  is  learned  ;  and  a  learned 
judge  is  indispensable  where  law  is  to  be  applied.  But  if 
simple  justice  be  the  object,  such  a  judge  becomes  compara- 
tively little  requisite  ;  yet  when  we  have  dispensed  with  the 
intelligence  of  the  judge,  we  must  provide  for  greater  intelli- 
gence in  the  jury.    A  jury  from  the  lower  classes  of  the  com- 


400  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  [eSSAY  III. 

mimity  may  serve  with  tolerable  sufficiency  the  purposes  of 
justice  in  the  present  system ;  but  if  they  were  converted 
from  jurymen  into  arbitrators,  much  more  of  intelligence, 
and,  we  may  add,  much  more  of  elevation  of  character,  is 
required.  To  endeavour  to  obtain  this  intelligence  and  up- 
rightness by  a  mode  of  chance  selection,  must  always  be  very 
uncertain  of  success.  If  those  who  were  eligible  for  this 
species  of  jury,  were  obliged  to  possess  a  certain  qualifica- 
tion in  point  of  property :  if,  of  those  who  were  thus  eligible, 
a  competent  number  were  selected  by  ballot,  and  if  the  pris- 
oner and  the  prosecutor  were  allowed  a  large  right  of  chal- 
lenge, perhaps  every  thing  would  be  done  which  is  in  the 
power  of  man. 

The  number  of  arbitrators  who  form  a  court  of  equity 
should  always  be  small.  Large  numbers  effect  less  good  by 
accumulating  wisdom,  than  harm  by  putting  off  patient  inves 
tigation  to  one  another,  and  by  "  dividing  the  shame "  of  a 
partial  decision. 

The  members  of  such  courts,  though  capable  of  deciding 
with  competent  propriety  on  questions  of  right  and  wrong 
when  facts  are  laid  before  them,  may  be  incapable,  from  wanl 
of  habit,  of  eliciting  those  facts  from  reluctant  or  partial  wit- 
nesses. Now,  I  perceive  no  reason  why,  both  in  criminaJ 
and  civil  courts,  a  person  could  not  be  employed,  whose  pro- 
fession it  was^to  elicit  the  truth.  Is  he  to  be  d^  pleader  or  ap 
advocate  ?  No.  The  very  name  is  sufficient  to  discredit  the 
office  in  the  view  of  pure  morality.  One  professional  man 
only  should  be  employed.  That  one  should  be  employed  by 
neither  party  separately,  but  by  both,  or  by  the  state.  It 
should  be  his  simple  and  sole  business  to  elicit  the  truth,  and 
to  elicit  it  from  the  witnesses  of  both  sides.  Securities 
against  corruption  in  this  man,  are  obviously  as  easy  as  in 
arbitrators  themselves.  The  judges  of  England  evince,  in 
general,  an  admirable  example  of  impartiality ;  and  as  to  cor- 
ruptness, it  is  almost  unknown.  What  reason  is  there  for 
questioning  that  officers  such  as  we  speak  of,  may  not  be  in- 
corrupt and  impartial  too  ?  If  handsome  remuneration  be 
necessary  to  secure  them  from  undue  influence  and  to  main- 
tain the  dignity  of  their  office,  let  them  by  all  means  have  it. 
Even  in  a  present  court  of  law  or  justice — suppose  the  ex- 
amination of  witnesses  was  taken  from  barristers  and  con- 
ducted by  the  judge,  does  not  every  man  perceive  that  the 
truth  might  be  elicited  by  one  interrogator  of  the  witnesses 
of  both  parties  ?  And  does  not  every  one  perceive  that  such 
an  interrogator  would  elicit  it  in  a  far  more  upright  and  manly 


CHAP.  X.]  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  401 

way,  than  is  now  the  case  ?  Pleading  is  a  thing  which,  in 
the  administration  of  justice,  ought  not  to  be  so  much  as 
named. 

Bearing  along  in  our  minds,  then,  the  inconveniences  and 
the  evils  of  Fixed  Laws — ^let  us  suppose  that  a  circuit  was 
taken,  and  that  courts  were  held  from  which  the  application 
of  fixed  law  was,  so  far  as  is  practicable,  excluded.  Suppose 
these  courts  to  consist  of  three  or  five  or  seven  men,  selected 
according  to  the  utmost  skill  of  precautionary  measures,  for 
their  intelligence  and  uprightness,  and  of  one  publicly  autho- 
rized and  dignified  person,  whose  office  it  should  be  to  assist 
the  court  in  the  discovery  of  the  truth.  Suppose  that,  when 
the  facts  of  the  case,  and  as  far  as  possible  the  motives  and 
intentions  of  the  parties,  were  laid  open,  these  three,  or  five, 
or  seven  men,  pronounced  a  decision  as  accordant  as  they 
could  do  with  the  immutable  principles  of  right  and  wrong, 
and  excluding  almost  all  reference  to  fixed  laws,  and  prece- 
dents, and  technicalities  ; — is  it  not  probable,  is  it  not  reason- 
able, to  expect  that  the  purposes  of  justice  would  be  more 
effectually  answered  than  they  are  at  present  1  And  even  if 
justice  was  not  better  administered,  would  not  such  a  system 
exclude  various  existing  evils  connected  with  legal  institu- 
tions, evils  so  great  as  to  be  real  calamities  to  the  state  ? 

Perhaps  it  is  needless  to  remark,  that  all  courts  of  equity 
which  are  recognized  by  the  state  should  be  public.  Individ- 
uals who  refer  their  disputes  to  private  arbitrators,  may  have 
them  privately  adjusted  if  they  please.  But  publicity  is  a 
powerful  means  of  securing  that  impartiality  which  it  is  the 
first  object  in  the  administration  of  justice  to  secure. 

There  is  one  advantage,  collateral  indeed  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  equity,  but  not  therefore  the  less  considerable,  thai 
it  would  have  a  strong  tendency  to  diffuse  sound  i^eas  of  jus- 
tice in  the  public  mind.  As  it  is,  it  may  unhappily  be  affirmed 
that  courts  of  judicature  spread  an  habitual  confusion  of  ideas 
upon  the  subject ;  and,  what  is  worse,  very  frequently  incul- 
cate that  as  just  which  is  really  the  contrary.  Our  notions 
of  a  court  of  judicature  are,  or  they  ought  to  be,  that  it  is  a 
place  sacred  to  justice.  But  when,  superinduced  upon  this 
notion,  it  is  the  fact,  that  by  very  many  of  its  decisions  jus- 
tice is  put  into  the  background ;  that  law  is  elevated  into 
supremacy ;  that  the  technicalities  of  forms,  and  the  finesse 
of  pleaders,  triumph  over  the  decisions  of  rectitude  in  the 
mind — ^the  effect  cannot  be  otherwise  than  bad.  It  cannot 
do  otherwise  than  confound,  in  the  public  mind,  notions  of 
good  and  evil,  and  teach  them  to  think  that  every  thing  is 

34* 


'402      -  ADMINISTRATION    OF    JUSTICE.  [eSSAY  III. 

virtuous  which  courts  of  justice  sanction. — If,  instead  of  this, 
the  pubUc  were  habituated  to  a  constant  appeal  to  equity,  and 
to  a  constant  conformity  to  its  dictates,  the  effect  would  be 
opposite,  and  therefore  good.  Justice  would  stand  promi- 
nently forward  to  the  public  view  as  the  object  of  reverence 
and  regard.  The  distinctions  between  equity  and  injustice 
would  become,  by  habit,  broad  and  defined.  Instead  of  con- 
founding the  public  ideas  of  morality,  a  court  of  judicature 
would  teach,  very  powerfully  teach,  discrimination.  A  court, 
seriously  endeavouring  to  discover  the  decision  of  justice, 
and  uprightly  awarding  it  between  man  and  man,  would  be 
a  spectacle  of  which  the  moral  influence  could  not  be  lost 
upon  the  people. 


In  thus  recommending  the  application  of  pure  moral  prin- 
ciples in  the  administration  of  justice,  the  writer  does  not 
presume  to  define  how  far  the  present  condition  of  human 
virtue  may  capacitate  a  legislature  to  exchange  fixed  rules  of 
decision  for  the  impartial  judgments  of  upright  men.  That 
it  may  be  done  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  it  is  now  done, 
he  entertains  no  doubt.  A  legislature  might  perhaps  begin 
with  that  pernicious  species  of  arbitrary  rules  which  consists 
of  technicalities  and  forms.  To  deny  justice  to  a  man  be- 
cause he  has  not  claimed  it  in  a  specific  form  of  words,  or 
because  some  legal  inaccuracy  has  been  committed  in  the 
proceedings,  must  always  disapprove  itself  to  the  plain  judg- 
ments of  mankind.  Begin  then  with  the  most  palpable  and 
useless  rules.  Whatever  can  be  dispensed  with,  it  is  a  sa- 
cred duty  to  abolish,  and  every  act  of  judicious  abolition  M'^ill 
facilitate  the  abolition  of  others  : — it  will  prepare  the  public 
mind  for  the  contemplation  of  purer  institutions,  and  gradu- 
ally enable  it  to  adopt  those  institutions  in  the  national 
practice. 

As  to  the  particular  modes  of  securing  the  administration 
of  simple  justice,  the  writer  would  say,  that  those  which  he 
has  suggested,  he  has  suggested  with  deference.  His  busi- 
ness is  rather  with  the  principles  of  sound  political  institu- 
tions, than  with  the  form  and  mode  of  applying  them  to  prac- 
tice. Other  and  better  means  than  he  has  suggested  are 
probably  to  be  found.  The  candid  reader  will  acknowledge, 
that  in  advocating  institutions  so  different  from  those  which 
actually  obtain,  the  political  moralist  is  under  peculiar  diffi- 
culties and  disadvantages.     The  best  machinery  of  social  in- 


CHAP.  XI.]    PROPER  SUBJECTS  OF  PENAL  ANIMADVERSION.    403 

stitutions  is  discovered  rather  from  experience  than  from 
reasoning,  and  upon  this  machinery,  in  the  present  instance, 
experience  has  thrown  little  light. 


Here  as  in  some  other  parts  of  this  work,  the  reader  will  observe  that 
alterations  are  proposed  and  improvements  suggested  which  have  been 
actually  adopted  since  these  Essays  were  written.  Our  courts,  and  also 
the  legislature,  have  lately  paid  some  attention  to  the  modes  in  which 
public  justice  is  administered.  As  yet,  the  alterations  which  have  been 
made  are  chiefly  confined  to  the  criminal  laws:  but  our  judges  are  now 
beginning  to  exert  the  discretionary  power  which  is  vested  in  them?  in 
preventing  the  course  of  justice  from  being,  so  frequently  as  it  heretofore 
has  been,  intercepted  by  technicalities  and  verbal  inacuracy.  Of  this 
the  public  had  lately  an  instance  in  the  cause  of  GuUey  v.  the  Bishop  of 
Exeter.  A  Parliamentary  Commission  has  been  appointed,  and  is  now 
sitting,  whose  object  it  is  to  devise  improvements  in  the  practice  of  our 
courts  of  judicature. — Ed. 


CHAPTER  XL 


OF  THE  PROPER  SUBJECTS  OF  PENAL  ANIMAD- 
VERSION. 

Crimes  regarded  by  the  Civil  and  the  Moral  Law — Created  ofFences — • 
Seduction — Duelling — Insolvents — Criminal  debtors — Gradations  of 
guilt  in  insolvency — Libels:  mode  of  punishing — -Effects  of  the  laws 
respecting  libels — Effects  of  public  censure — Libels  on  the  Government 
— Advantages  of  a  free  statement  of  the  truth — Freedom  of  the  Press. 

The  man  who  compares  the  actions  which  are  denounced 
as  wrong  in  the  Moral  Law,  with  those  which  are  punished  by 
civil  government,  will  find  that  they  are  far  from  an  accord- 
ance. The  Moral  Law  declares  many  actions  to  be  wicked, 
which  human  institutions  do  not  punish  ;  and  there  are  some 
that  these  institutions  punish,  of  which  there  is  no  direct  re- 
prehension in  the  communicated  Will  of  God. 

It  is  not  easy  to  refer  all  these  incongruities  to  the  applica- 
tion of  any  one  general  principle  of  discrimination.  You 
cannot  say  that  the  magistrate  adverts  only  to  those  crimes 
which  are  pernicious  to  society,  for  all  crimes  are  pernicious. 
Nor  can  you  say  that  he  selects  the  greatest  for  his  animad- 
version, because  he  punishes  many  of  which  the  guilt  is  in- 
comparably less  than  others  which  he  passes  by.     Nor  again 


404  PROPER    SUBJECTS    OF  [esSAY  III. 

can  you  say  that  he  punishes  only  those  in  which  there  is  an 
injured  and  complaining  party ;  for  he  punishes  some  of 
which  all  the  parties  were  voluntary  agents.  Lastly — ;and 
what  seems  at  first  view  very  extraordinary — we  find  that 
civil  governments  create  offences  which,  simply  regarded,  have 
no  existence  in  the  view  x)f  morality,  and  punish  them  with 
severity,  whilst  others,  unquestionably  immoral,  pass  with  im- 
punity. 

The  practical  rule  which  appears  to  be  regarded  in  the  se- 
lection of  offences  for  punishment,  is  founded  upon  the  ex- 
isting circumstances  of  the  community. 

Offences  against  which,  from  any  cause,  the  public  disap- 
probation is  strongly  directed,  are  usually  visited  by  the  arm 
of  the  civil  magistrate,  partly  because  that  disapprobation  im- 
plies that  the  offence  disturbs  the  order  of  society,  and  partly 
because,  in  the  case  of  such  offences,  penal  animadversion  is 
efficient  and  vigorous  by  the  ready  co-operation  of  the  public. 
Thus  it  is  with  almost  all  offences  against  property,  and  with 
those  which  personally  injure  or  alarm  us.  Every  man  is 
desirous  of  prosecuting  a  housebreaker,  for  he  feels  that  his 
own  house  may  be  robbed.  Every  man  is  desirous  of  pun- 
ishing an  assault  or  a  threatening  letter,  because  he  considers 
that  his  peace  may  be  disturbed  by  the  one,  and  his  person 
injured  by  the  other.  This  general  and  strong  reprobation 
makes  detection  comparatively  easy,  and  punishment  efficient. 

Examples  of  the  contrary  kind  are  to  be  found  in  the 
crimes  of  drunkenness,  of  profane  swearing,  of  fornication, 
of  duelling.  Not  that  we  have  any  reason  to  expect,  that  at 
the  bar  of  heaven  some  of  these  crimes  will  be  at  all  less  ob- 
noxious to  punishment  than  the  former,  but  because,  from 
whatever  reason,  the  public  very  negligently  co-operate  with 
law  in  punishing  them,  and  manifest  little  desire  to  see  its  penal- 
ties inflicted.  An  habitual  drunkard  does  much  more  harm  to 
his  family  and  to  the  world,  than  he  who  picks  my  pocket  of 
a  guinea  ;  yet  we  raise  a  hue  and  cry  after  the  thief,  and 
suffer  the  other  to  become  drunk  every  day.  So  it  is  with 
duelling  and  fornication.  The  public  know  very  well  that 
these  things  are  wrong,  and  pernicious  to  the  general  welfare ; 
but  scarcely  any  one  will  prosecute  those  who  commit  them. 
The  magistrate  may  make  laws,  but  in  such  a  state  of  public 
feeling  they  will  remain  as  a  dead  letter  ;  or,  which  perhaps 
is  as  bad,  be  called  out  upon  accidental  and  irregular  oc- 
casions. 

Another  rule  which  appears  to  be  practically,  though  not 
theoretically,  adopted  is,  to  punish- those  offences  of  which 


CHAP.  XI.]  PfiNAL    ANIMADVERSION.  405 

there  is  a  natural  prosecutor.  Thus  it  is  with  every  kind  of 
robbery  and  violence.  Some  one  especially  is  aggrieved 
the  sense  of  grievances  induces  a  ready  prosecution,  and 
whatever  is  readily  prosecuted  by  the  people  will  generally 
be  denounced  in  the  laws  of  the  state.  The  opposite  fact  is 
exhibited  in  the  case  of  many  offences  against  the  public, 
such  as  smuggling,  and  generally  in  the  case  of  all  frauds 
upon  the  revenue.  No  individual  is  especially  aggrieved, 
(unless  in  the  case  of  regular  dealers  whose  business  is  in- 
jured by  illicit  trading,)  and  the  consequence  is,  either  that 
numberless  frauds  of  this  kind  are  suffered  to  pass  with  im- 
punity, or  that  the  government  is  obliged  to  employ  persons 
to  detect  the  offenders,  and  to  prosecute  them  itself.  There 
are  some  crimes  which  seem  in  this  respect  of  an  interme- 
diate sort;  where  there  is  a  natural  prosecutor,  and  yet 
where  that  prosecutor  is  not  the  most  aggrieved  person. 
This  is  instanced  in  the  case  of  seduction.  The  father  pro- 
secutes, but  he  does  not  sustain  one  half  the  injury  that  is 
suffered  by  the  daughter.  There  are  obvious  reasons  why 
the  most  injured  party  should  be  at  best  an  inefficient  prose- 
cutor ;  and  the  result  is  consonant — that  this  offence  is  fre- 
quently not  punished  at  all,  or,  as  is  the  case  in  our  own  country, 
it  is  punished  very  slightly — so  slightly,  that  in  no  case  does 
the  person  of  the  offender  suffer.  This  lenity  does  not  arise 
from  the  venialness  of  this  crime,  or  that  of  adultery.  They 
are  amongst  the  most  enormous  that  can  be  perpetrated  by 
man.  Of  the  less  flagitious  of  the  two,  it  has  been  affirmed 
"  that  riot  one  half  of  the  crimes  for  which  men  suffer  death 
by  the  laws  of  England  are  so  flagitious  as  this."*  This  en- 
ormity is  distinctly  asserted  in  both  the  Old  Testament  and 
the  New  ;  in  the  first,  adultery  was  punished  with  death ;  in  the 
second,  both  this  and  foriiication,  which  is  less  criminal  than 
seduction,  is  repeatedly  assorted  with  the  greatest  of  crimes,  and 
alike  threatened  with  the  tremendous  punishments  of  religion. 
Such  considerations  lead  the  enquirer  to  expect  that  the 
offences  which  are  denounced  in  a  statute  book  will  bear  some 
relation  to  the  state  of  virtue  in  the  people.  The  more  vir- 
tuous the  people  are,  the  greater  will  be  the  number  of  crimes 
which  can  be  efficiently  visited  by  the  arm  of  power.  Thus, 
during  some  part  of  the  seventeenth  century,  that  is,  during 
the  interregnum,  adultery  was  punished  with  death ;  and  it 
may  be  remarked,  without  paying  a  compliment  to  the  religion 
or  politics  of  those  times,  that  the  actual  practice  of  morality 
was  then,  amongst  a  large  proportion  of  the  nation,  at  a 
*  Pafey:  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  .3,  p.  ^.^Seduction. 


406  PROPER    SUBJECTS    OF  [esSAY  III. 

higher  standard  than  it  is  now.  No  society  exists  without 
some  species  of  penal  justice — from  that  of  a  gang  of  thieves 
to  that  of  a  select  and  pious  Christian  community.  The 
thieves  will  punish  some  crimes,  but  they  will  be  few.  The 
virtuous  community  will  punish,  or,  which  for  our  present 
purpose  is  the  same  thing,  animadvert  upon,  very  many.  In 
a  well-ordered  family  many  things  are  held  to  be  offences,  and 
are  noticed  as  such  by  the  parent,  which  in  a  vicious  family 
pass  unregarded. 

When  therefore  we  contemplate  the  unnumbered  offences 
against  morality  which  the  magistrate  does  not  attempt  to  dis- 
courage, we  may  take  comfort  from  hoping  that,  as  the  virtue, 
of  mankind  increases,  it  may  increase  in  more  than  a  simple"''^ 
ratio.  As  the  public  become  prepared  for  it,  governments 
will  lend  their  aid  ;  and  thus  they  who  have  now  little  re- 
straint from  some  crimes  but  that  which  exists  in  their  own 
minds,  may  hereafter  be  deterred  by  the  fear  of  human  pen- 
alty. And  this  induces  the  observation,  that  to  throw  obsta- 
cles in  the  way  of  increasing  the  subjects  of  penal  animad- 
version, is  both  impolitic  and  wrong.  This,  unhappily,  has 
frequently  been  done  in  our  own  country.  Some  public 
writers  (writers  not  of  great  eminence  to  be  sure)  have  taken 
great  pains  to  ridicule  legislation  respecting  cruelty  to  ani- 
mals— and  the  endeavours  on  the  part  of  well-disposed  men 
to  enforce  almost  obsolete  statutes  against  some  other  com- 
mon crimes.  There  are,  surely,  a  sufficiejacy  of  obstacles  to 
the  extension  of  the  subjects  of  penal  legislation,  without 
needlessly  adding  more.  Besides  these  men  directly  encour- 
age the  crimes.  To  sneer  at  him  who  prosecutes  a  ferocious 
man  for  cruelty  to  an  animal,  is  to  encourage  cruelty.  When 
a  man  is  brought  before  a  magistrate  for  profaneness — to  joke 
about  how  the  culprit  swore  in  the  court,  is  to  teach  men  to 
be  profane. 


That  which  we  have  called,  in  the  commencement  of  this 
chapter,  the  creation  of  offences,  demands  peculiar  solicitude 
on  the  part  of  a  government.  By  a  created  offence,  I  mean 
an  act  which,  hut  far  the  law,  would  be  no  offence  at  all.  Of 
this  class  are  some  offences  against  the  game  laws.  He  who 
on  another  continent  was  accustomed  without  blame  to  knock 
down  hares  and  pheasants  as  he  found  occasion,  would  feel 
the  force  of  this  creation  of  offences  when,  on  doing  the 
same  thing  in  England,  he  was  carried  to  a  jail.  The  most 
fruitful  cause  of  these  factitious  offences  is  in  extensive  tax- 
ation.    When  a  new  tax  is  imposed,  the  legislature  endeav- 


CHAP.  XI.]  PENAL    ANIMADVERSION.  407 

ours  to  secure  its  due  payment  by  requiring  or  forbidding  cer- 
tain acts.  These  acts,  which  antecedently  were  indifferent, 
become  criminal  by  the  legislative  prohibition,  or  obligatory 
by  the  legislative  command ;  and  non-compliance  is  therefore 
punished  as  an  oflfence  by  the  civil  power.*  There  is  no 
more  harm  in  a  man's  buying  brandy  in  France  and  bringing 
it  to  England,  than  in  buying  a  horse  of  his  neighbour.  The 
law  lays  a  duty  upon  brandy,  prohibits  any  man  from  bring- 
ing it  to  the  country  except  through  a  custom-house,  and  treats 
as  criminals  those  who  do. 

Now  we  do  not  affirm  that  those  who  commit  these  created 
offences  do  not  absolutely  offend  against  morality.  They  do 
offend ;  for  in  general  every  evasion  or  violation  of  the  laws 
of  the  state  is  an  immoral  act.  But  this  does  not  affect  the 
truth,  that  such  offences  should  be  as  few  as  they  can  be. 
The  reasons  are,  first,  that  they  are  encroachments  upon  civil 
liberty,  and  secondly,  which  is  our  present  concern — that  they 
are  pernicious  to  the  public.  Men  perceive  the  distinction 
between  moral  crimes  and  legal  crimes,  without  perhaps  ever 
having  enquired  into  its  foundation.  And  they  act  upon 
this  perception.  He  who  has  been  convicted  of  killing 
hares,  or  evading  taxes,  or  smuggling  lace,  is  commonly 
willing  to  tell  you  of  his  exploits.  He  who  has  been  con- 
victed of  stealing  from  his  neighbour,  hangs  down  his  head 
for  shame.  The  sanctions  of  law  ought  to  approve  them- 
selves to  the  common  judgments  of  mankind.  Whatever 
the  state  denounces,  that  the  public  ought  to  feel  to  be  crimi- 
nal, and  to  be  willing  to  suppress.  The  penalties  of  the  law 
ought  to  be  accompanied  in  men's  minds  by  the  sanction  of 
morality.  They  should  feel  that  to  be  punished  by  a  magis- 
trate was  tantamount  to  being  a  bad  man.  When,  instead 
of  this,  there  is  an  intricate  admixture — when  we  see  some 
things  which  are,  simply  regarded,  innocent,  visited  by  the 
same  punishment  as  others  that  all  men  feel  to  be  wicked, 
men  are  likely  to  feel  a  diminished  respect  for  penal  law 
itself.  They  learn  to  regard  the  requisitions  of  law  as  hav- 
ing little  countenance  from  rectitude ;  and  think  that  to  vio- 
late them,  though  it  may  be  dangerous,  is  not  wrong.  It  does 
not  approve  itself,  as  a  whole,  to  the  public  judgment ;  and  there 
are  many  perhaps  who  feel,  on  this  account,  a  diminished  res- 
pect for  penal  institutions  without  being  able  to  assign  the  reason. 

*  I  have  somewhere  met  with  a  book  which  contended  that  to  commit 
these  created  offences  was  no  breach  of  morality.  This,  however  is  not 
true,  because  the  obligation  to  obey  civil  government,  in  its  innocent  en- 
actments, is  clearly  stated  in  the  Moral  Law. 


408  I'ROPER    SUBJECTS    OP  [eSSAY  lit. 

In  the  extension  of  this  political  and  moral  evil  the  great- 
est of  all  agents  is  war.  With  respect  to  the  creation  of  of- 
fences, it  stands  sui  generis,  and  converts  a  greater  number  of 
indifferent  actions  into  punishable  ones,  than  all  other  agents 
united.  War  produces  the  extensive  taxation  of  which  we 
speak;  but  the  practical  system  has  offences  peculiar  to  itself 
— offences  which  the  Moral  Law  of  our  Creator  never  de- 
nounced, but  which  the  system  of  war  visits  with  tremendous 
punishments.  Adam  Smith  adverts  to  this  deplorable  circum- 
stance. He  says  that  the  punishment  of  death  to  a  sentinel 
who  falls  asleep  upon  his  watch,  "  how  necessary  soever,  al- 
ways appears  to  be  excessively  severe.  The  natural  atrocity 
of  the  crime  seems  to  be  so  little,  and  the  punishment  so 
great,  that  it  is  with  great  difficulty  that  our  heart  can  reconcile 
itself  to  ity*  Nor  will  the  heart,  nor  ought  the  heart,  ever  to 
be  reconciled  to  it.  It  is,  I  know,  perfectly  easy  to  urge  ar- 
gumentvS  in  its  favour  from  expediency  and  the  like  ;  but  urge 
these  arguments  as  you  may,  the  uninitiated  or  unhardened 
heart  will  never  be  convinced ;  and  it  is  vain  to  tell  us  that 
that  is  right,  which  the  immutable  dictates  in  our  minds  pro- 
nounce to  be  wrong.  There  are,  indeed,  few  spectacles  more 
calculated  to  sicken  the  heart  and  to  make  it  turn  in  disgust 
away  from  the  monstrousness  of  human  institutions,  than  a 
contemplation  of  martial  law — a  code  which  not  only  creates 
a  multiplicity  of  offences  that  were  never  prohibited  by  our 
merciful  Parent,  but  which  visits  the  commission  of  those  of- 
fences with  inflictions  that  ought  not  to  be  so  much  as  named 
amongst  a  Christian  people. 

Whilst  then  the  philanthropist  hopes  that  some  of  those  in- 
trinsically criminal  actions  to  which  human  penalties  are  not 
attached,  will  one  day  become  the  object  of  their  animadver- 
sion, he  hopes  that  this  other  class,  which  are  not  intrinsically 
vicious,  will  gradually  be  expunged  from  amongst  penal  laws. 
Both  the  additions  to,  and  the  deductions  from,  the  system 
which  morality  dictates,  are  the  result  of  the  impure  or  cor- 
rupt condition  of  society. 

Meantime  some  approaches  to  a  juster  standard  to  regulate 
penal  animadversion  may  be  made,  by  transferring,  in  our  own 
country,  some  offences  from  the  civil  to  the  criminal  courts. 
An  instance  exists  in  the  crime  of  seduction  and  its  affinities. 
This  crime,  whether  we  regard  it  simply  or  in  its  conse- 
quences, or  in  the  deliberation  with  which  it  is  committed,  is, 
as  we  have  just  seen,  excessively  flagitious.  How  then  does 
it  happen  that  its  perpetration  is  regarded  as  a  matter  for  the 
*  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments. 


CHAP.  XI.]  PENAL   ANIMADVERSION.  409 

cognizance  only  of  legal  courts,  and  for  the  punishment  only 
of  a  pecuniary  fine  ?  What  should  we  say  to  that  mode  of 
jislice  which  allowed  the  ruffian  who  assaults  your  person  to 
escape  by  paying  money  ?  Yet  even  a  severe  assault  does 
not  approach,  in  enormity,  to  the  crime  of  which  we  speak. 
I  would  punish  seducers  in  their  persons.  I  would  send 
them  to  prison  like  other  malefactors  ;  and  oblige  them  to  la- 
bour, or  subject  them  to  that  system  of  prison  discipline 
which  might  give  hope  (if  any  thing  could  give  hope)  of  re- 
formation. Alas  !  if  there  is  no  reason  for  not  acting  thus, 
there  is  a  motive.  That  class  of  society  to  whom  the  fra- 
ming of  laws  is  entrusted,  regard  the  crime  with  but  very  am- 
biguous detestation.  "  The  law  of  honour,"  it  is  said,  "  ap- 
plauds the  address  of  a  successful  intrigue."  How  should 
they  who  value  themselves  upon  being  the  subjects  of  the 
law  of  honour,  wish  to  consign  a  man  to  prison  for  that  which 
the  law  of  honour  applauds  ?  I  doubt  not  that,  if  seduction 
were  confined  to  low  life,  the  legislature  would  quickly  send 
seducers  to  the  criminal  courts.  Would  they  were  sent ! 
The  very  idea  of  the  punishment  would,  amongst  gay  men 
in  the  superior  walks  of  life,  often  prevent  the  crime.  To  be 
seized  by  police  !  To  be  carried  to  a  jail !  To  be  brought 
to  the  bar  with  thieves  and  murderers  !  To  be  sentenced  by 
the  court !  To  be  carried  back  to  labour  in  a  prison,  or  to  be 
embarked  for  New  South  Wales ! — The  idea,  I  say,  of  this 
would  go  far  to  prevent  the  perpetration  of  this  abandoned 
crime. 

Duelling  is  another  of  the  crimes  which  should ,  be  pros- 
ecuted in  criminal  courts.  It  is  indeed  prosecuted  there  if  any 
where  ;  but  it  is  seldom  prosecuted  at  all.  The  ultimate 
cause  is  easily  discovered  : — the  crime  is  sanctioned  by  the 
law  of  honour.  Like  the  preceding,  if  it  were  practised  only 
by  the  poor,*  it  would  quickly  be  visited  by  the  arm  of  the 
law.  Of  the  probability  of  this,  we  have  an  illustration  in 
the  case  of  boxing.  One  or  more  of  the  judges  have  recently 
declared,  that  if  a  man  is  convicted  of  having  caused  another's 
death  in  a  boxing  match,  they  will  inflict  the  sentence  which 
the  law  denounces  upon  manslaughter.  The  law  of  honour 
has  no  voice  here  ;  and  here  the  voice  of  reason  and  common 
sense  is  regarded.     Make  boxing-matches,  like  duelling,  a 

*  In  Franne,  it  is  said,  and  in  America,  duelling  is  descending  to  the 
inferior  classes  of  Society.  If  this  should  become  general,  we  may  soon 
reckon  upon  an  efficient  diminution  of  the  practice.  The  rich  will  for- 
bear it  on  account  of  its  vulgarity,  and  they  will  t^e  care  to^  punish  it 
when  it  is  practised  only  by  the  poor. 

35 


410  PROPER    SUBJECTS    OF  [eSSAY  III. 

part  of  the  system  of  the  law  of  honour,  and  we  shall  hear 
very  little  about  the  punishment  of  manslaughter.  The  reader 
saw,  in  the  last  Essay,  what  an  influence  the  law  of  honour 
had  in  a  case  of  duelling  on  the  mind,  and  on  the  charge  of  a 
judge  on  the  Scotch  bench. — These  things  suggest  sorrowful 
reflections ! 

Much  and  very  contradictory  decLamation  is  often  employed 
respecting  the  treatment  which  is  due  to  those  who  become 
insolvent.  By  our  present  law,  the  debtor  may  be  arrested, 
that  is,  he  may  be  imprisoned ;  on  which  account  it  may  be 
allowable  to  range  the  discussion  under  the  head  of  penal  law. 
Imprisonment  for  debt  is,  in  eflect,  a  penalty,  although  it  be 
not  inflicted  by  a  court  of  justice. 

One  class  of  persons  declaims  against  the  oppression  of 
immuring  men  in  a  prison  who  have  committed  no  crime ; 
against  the  cruelty  of  the  relentless  creditor,  who,  when  mis- 
fortune has  overtaken  a  fellow  creature,  adds  to  his  miseries 
the  terrprs  of  the  law,  and  deprives  him  of  the  opportunity 
of  exertion,  and  his  family  of  the  means  of  support : — and 
all  this,  it  is  said,  is  done  without  obtaining  any  other  advan- 
tage to  the  persecutor  than  the  gratification  of  his  resentment 
or  malignity.  Another  class  expatiates  upon  the  unprincipled 
fraud  which  is  committed  upon  industrious  traders  by  spend- 
thrifts or  villains — upon  the  hardship  of  leaving  honest  men 
at  the  mercy  of  every  idle  or  profligate  person  who  has  ad- 
dress enough  to  obtain  credit,  and  upon  the  absurdity  of  that 
philanthropy  which  would  prevent  them  from  deterring  him 
from  his  frauds  by  the  terrors  of  a  jail. 

To    determine    between   these  vehement   and   conflicting 
opinions,  the  great  question  is.  Whether  a  debtor  is  a  crimi- 
nal ?    If  he  is,  there  is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  be  treated 
as  a  criminal ;  and  if  he  is  not,  there  is  no  reason  why  an  in- 
nocent man  should  meet  the  fate  which  is  due  only  to  the 
guilty.     These   contradictory  opinions   appear  to  result  from 
the  circumstance,  that  one  set  of  persons  regard  insolvents  as 
criminals,  and  the  other  as  unfortunate  men.     The  truth,  how 
ever,  is,  that  many  are  of  one  class  and  many  of  the  other 
It  is  therefore  no  subject  of  surprise,  that  when  one  set  of 
persons  view  one  side  of  the  question,  and  another  the  oppo 
site,  they  should  involve  themselves  and  the  subject  in  con 
flict  and  contradiction. 

From  these  considerations  one  conclusion  appears  plainly 
to  follow — ^that  no  undiscriminating  law  upon  the  subject  can 
be  even  tolerably  just ;  that  to  concede  the  power  of  imprison- 
ing all  debtors,  is  to  permit  oppression:  that  to  deny  it  to  any, 


*HAP-  XI.]  PENAL   ANIMADVERSION.  411 

is  to  withhold  punishment  from  guilt.  In  order  therefore  to 
attain  the  ends  of  justice,  it  is  absolutely  indispensable  that 
discrimination  should  be  made  in  every  individual  case. 

Suppose,  then,  the  first  legal  step  towards  enforcing  pay- 
ment from  a  debtor  were,  not  to  obtain  a  writ,  but  to  summon 
him  before  a  magistrate.  If  he  refuses  to  attend  to  the  sum 
mons  a  warrant  might  be  granted  for  his  arrest,  since  the  rea- 
sonable inference  would  be,  that  his  motives  for  withholding 
payment,  or  the  causes  by  which  he  had  become  unable  to 
pay,  were  such  as  he  was  afraid  to  acknowledge.  If  he  at- 
tended, the  case  would  be  heard — not  from  lawyers  but  from 
the  parties  themselves.  Supposing  it  appeared  that  the  debtor 
was  capable  of  paying  but  unwilling,  or  that,  although  then 
unable,  his  inability  had  been  occasioned  by  manifest  miscon- 
duct : — let  him  be  committed  to  prison.  And  why  ?  Because 
he  is  an  offender  against  public  justice,  and,  like  other  offend- 
ers, should  await  his  punishment. 

Supposing,  again,  it  appeared  that  the  debtor  could  not  pay, 
and  that  his  insolvency  involved  no  fault : — let  him  be  regard- 
ed as  a  man  overtaken  by  misfortune,  as  a  man  whom  it  would 
be  oppressive  and  wrong  to  punish,  and  who  therefore  should 
be  set  at  large.     His  property  of  course  would  be  secured. 

Discrimination  of  this  kind,  whatever  might  be  the  mode 
of  its  exercise,  appears  to  be  a  sine  qua  non  of  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice.  It  is  exceedingly  obvious,  that  when  ac- 
tions of  which  the  external  consequences  may  be  the  same, 
result  some  from  innocent  and  some  from  criminal  causes, 
they  should  not  receive  the  same  treatment  at  the  hand  of  the 
law  : — just  as  he  who  accidentally  occasions  a  man's  death 
should  not  receive  the  same  treatment  as  he  who  commits 
murder.  Now  this  manifest  requisite  of  justice  is  in  no  other 
way  attainable  in  the  case  of  insolvency,  than  by  investigating 
the  conduct  of  every  individual  man. 

When  the  criminal  debtors  are  committed  like  other  crim- 
inals to  prison,  they  should  be  regarded  as  public  offenders, 
and  as  such  become  amenable  to  penal  animadversion. 
Courts  of  a  simple  construction  might  perhaps  be  erected  for 
this  class  of  offenders,  which  might  possess  the  power  of 
awarding  such  punishments  for  the  various  degrees  of  guilt 
as  the  law  thought  fit  to  prescribe.  Nor  does  there  appear 
any  reason  for  deviating  materially  from  those  species  of  pun- 
ishment which  are  properly  employed  for  other  offenders,  be- 
cause insolvency  is  occasioned  by  guilt  in  endless  gradations, 
and  sometimes  by  great  crime.  The  number  of  insolvents 
who  are  entirely  innocent  is  comparatively  small,  and  of  those 


412  PROPER    SUBJECTS    OF  [eSSAT  III. 

who  are  not  innocent  the  gradations  of  criminality  are  without 
end.  Some  are  incautious  or  imprudent,  some  are  heedlessly 
and  some  shamefully  negligent,  and  some  again  are  atrociously 
profligate.  The  whole  amount  of  injury  which  is  inflicted 
upon  the  people  of  this  country  by  criminal  insolvency,  is 
much  greater  than  that  which  is  inflicted  by  any  one  other 
crime  which  is  ordinarily  punished  by  the  law.  Neither 
swindling,  nor  forgery,  nor  robbery,  in  their  varieties,  pro- 
duces an  equal  amount  of  mischief.  To  every  single  indi- 
vidual who  loses  his  property  by  theft  or  fraud,  there  are  pro- 
bably twenty  who  lose  it  by  criminal  debtors.  Such  facts 
evidently  furnish  weighty  considerations  for  the  legislator  as 
the  guardian  of  the  public  welfare  ;  and  that  system  of  juris- 
prudence is  surely  defective  which  allows  so  much  public 
mischief  almost  without  restraint.  Justice  and  policy  alike 
indicate  the  necessity  of  more  efficient  security  against  the 
want  of  probity  in  debtors,  than  has  hitherto  been  furnished 
by  the  law. 

A  man  who  begins  business  with  a  thousand  pounds  of  his 
own,  and  who  keeps  a  stock  of  goods  to  the  value  of  fifteen 
hundred,  is  obliged  in  honesty  to  insure.  If  he  does  not  in- 
sure, and  a  fire  destroys  his  goods,  so  that  his  creditors  lose 
five  hundred  pounds,  he  surely  is  chargeable  with  a  moral  of- 
fence. It  cannot  be  just  knowingly  to  endanger  the  loss  of 
other  men's  property,  which  has  been  entrusted  in  the  con- 
fidence of  its  repayment.  But  if  such  a  man  commits  injus- 
tice towards  others,  upon  what  grounds  is  he  to  be  exempted 
from  the  rightful  consequences  of  injustice  ?  We  would  not 
speak  of  such  a  man  as  a  criminal,  nor  aflirm  that  he  deserves 
severity  of  punishment ;  but  we  say  that,  since  he  has  need- 
lessly and  negligently  sacrificed  the  property  of  other  men,  it 
is  fit  that  the  penal  legislator  should  notice  and  discountenance 
his  ofl!ence. 

Another  trader,  without  any  vicious  intention,  "  neglects 
his  business."  His  customers  by  degrees  leave  him.  Year 
passes  after  year  with  an  income  continually  diminishing, 
until  at  length  he  finds  that  his  property  is  less  than  his  debts. 
This  man  is  more  vicious  than  the  former,  and  should  be  vis- 
ited by  a  greater  amount  of  punishment.  Another,  with  a 
prosperous  business  and  no  great  vices,  allows  a  more  expen- 
sive domestic  establishment  than  his  income  warrants.  His 
property  gradually  lapses  away  and  at  last  he  cannot  pay 
twenty  shillings  in  the  pound  to  his  creditors.  Can  it  be  dis- 
puted that  a  man  who  knows  that  he  is  in  a  course  of  life 
which  will  probably  end  in  defrauding  others  of  their  prop- 


CHAP.  XI.]  PENAL   ANIMADVERSION.  413 

erty,  should  be  regarded  in  any  other  light  than  as  an  offender 
,  against  justice  ?  And  can  it  be  unreasonable  for  the  jurispru- 
dence of  a  community  to  act  towards  such  an  offender  as  if 
he  were  a  dishonest  man  ? 

Another  engages  in  speculations  which  endanger  the  prop- 
erty of  his  creditors,  and  which,  if  they  do  not  succeed,  will 
defraud  them.  Such  speculations  certainly  are  dishonest ; 
and  when  they  prove  unsuccessful,  he  who  makes  them  should 
be  treated  as  the  committer  of  voluntary  fraud.  The  pro- 
priety of  this  is  enforced  by  the  consideration,  that  it  is  nearly 
impossible  for  creditors  to  provide  against  such  fraudulence ; 
and  laws  should  be  severe  in  proportion  as  the  facilities  of 
wrong  are  great. 

Such  gradations  might  be  multiplied  indefinitely,  until  we 
arrived  at  those  in  which  men  contract  debts  without  the  pro- 
bable prospect  of  payment ;  and  thence  up  to  the  intentionally 
and  voluntarily  fraudulent.  For  such  offenders  the  penalties 
should  be  severe.  The  guilt  of  some  of  them  is  at  least  as 
great  as  that  of  him  who  robs  you  of  your  purse  or  forges 
your  signature.  With  respect,  indeed,  to  those  who  pursue  a 
deliberate  course  of  fraud,  and,  under  pretence  of  business, 
possess  themselves  of  the  property  of  others,  and  expend  it 
or  carry  it  off,  there  are  few  crimes  connected  with  property 
that  are  equally  atrocious.  The  law,  indeed,  appears  to  ac- 
knowledge this,  for  its  penalty  for  a  fraudulent  bankrupt  is  des- 
perately severe.  Without  stopping  to  enquire  why  it  is  so 
seldom  inflicted,  one  truth  appears  to  be  plain,  that  a  penal 
system  which,  like  ours,  scarcely  adverts  to  crimes  so  ex- 
tended and  so  great,  must  be  greatly  defective.  Surely  there 
are  many  persons  who  walk  our  streets  every  day,  yet  who 
are,  in  the  view  both  of  natural  and  of  Christian  justice,  in- 
comparably more  guilty  and  more  justly  obnoxious  to  punish- 
ment, than  the  majority  of  those  whom  the  law  confines  in 
jails  or  transports  beyond  the  ocean. 

We  are  persuaded,  that  if  the  penal  law  took  cognizance 
of  all  insolvents,  and  regarded  all  who  could  not  satisfactorily 
account  for  their  insolvency  as  public  delinquents — if  these 
were  prosecuted  as  systematically  as  thieves  are  now,  and  if 
by  these  means  the  idea  of  "  crime "  was  associated  with 
their  conduct  in  the  public  mind,  the  deplorable  mischiefs  of 
bankruptcy  would  be  quickly  and  greatly  diminished.  In  the 
restraint  of  all  crimes  the  power  of  public  opinion  is  great. 
At  present,  unhappily,  the  man  whose  offence  is  justly  worthy 
of  imprisonment  or  transportation,  obtains  his  certificate,  and 
then  becomes  the  accepted  associate  of  virtuous  men.     But 

35* 


414  PROPER    SUBJECTS    OF  [eSSAY  HI. 

teach  the  public  to  connect  with  him  the  idea  not  of  a  bank- 
rupt but  of  a  prisoner  ;  not  of  a  man  who  has  acted  dishon- 
ourably towards  his  creditors,  but  of  a  convicted  criminal — 
and  this  association  would  cease.  Who  would  admit  a  foot- 
pad to  his  table  ?  And  who  would  admit  to  his  table  a  man 
who  was  just  like  a  footpad  ?  It  requires  little  knowledge  of 
the  constitution  of  society  to  know,  that  when  the  offences  of 
fraudulent  and  negligent  insolvency  are  ranked  in  the  public 
estimation  with  those  of  ordinary  criminals,  men  will  be  in- 
fluenced by  a  new,  and  a  powerful,  and  an  efficient  motive  to 
avoid  them. 


It  is  a  question  that  involves  some  difficulties,  whether  the 
publication  of  statements  injurious  to  individuals,  to  a  govern- 
ment, or  to  religion,  are  proper  subjects  of  penal  animadver- 
sion. That  the  publishers  of  these  statements  frequently  act 
criminally  is  certain,  and  they  are  therefore  justly  obnoxious 
to  punishment :  but  still  it  is  to  be  enquired,  whether  they  can 
be  efficiently  punished ;  and  whether,  if  they  be,  the  punish- 
ment can  be  such  as  to  attain  the  proper  ends  of  all  punish- 
ment— reformation,  example,  and  redress. 

And  here  we  are  presented,  at  the  outset,  with  a  great  im- 
pediment resulting  from  the  nature  of  fixed  law.  If  a  libeller 
is  to  be  legally  punished,  the  law  must  give  some  definition 
of  what  a  libel  is.  Now  it  is  actually  impossible  to  frame  any 
definition  which  shall  not  either  on  the  one  hand  give  license 
to  injurious  publications  by  its  laxity,  or  on  the  other  prohibit 
a  just  publication  of  the  truth  by  its  rigour.  The  utmost  sa- 
gacity of  legislation  cannot  avoid  one  of  these  two  conse- 
quences. They  are  not  a  Scylla  and  Charybdis  which  a  wary 
helmsman  may  avoid :  on  the  one  or  the  other  the  legislator 
will  infallibly  find  himself  wrecked. 

If  libellers,  like  other  offenders,  were  tried  by  courts  of 
equity,  which  were  guided  in  their  award  by  the  simple  merits 
of  the  case,  without  any  regard  to  the  definitions  of  law — the 
case  would  be  difierent.  We  might  then  expect  that  the  pub- 
lication of  wholesome  truths  would  receive  no  punishment 
though  they  constituted  what  is  defined  to  be  a  libel  now,  and 
that  the  publication  of  gratuitous  malignity  would  receive  a 
punishment  though  lawyers  now  might  say  that  the  book  was 
not  a  libel. 

Yet  even  if  these  difficulties  resulting  from  the  vain  attempt 
at  legal  definitions  were  surmounted,  and  equity  alone  were 
entrusted  with  the  decision,  it  may  still  be  greatly  doubted 


CHAP.  XI.]  PENAL    ANIMADVERSION.  415 

whether,  in  the  large  majority  of  this  class  of  publications, 
all  attempts  at  direct  punishment  would  not  be  better  avoided. 

Refer  to  the  objects  of  punishment.  Assume  for  the  pres- 
ent that  reformation  is  the  first.  Is  it  probable,  from  the 
motives  and  nature  of  the  offence  that  the  reformation  of 
the  offender  can  often  be  hoped  from  any  species  of  judicial 
penalties  1- 

The  second  object  we  suppose  to  be  example.  Men  may,  no 
doubt,  be  deterred  from  publishing  injurious  statements  by  the 
fear  of  consequences  ;  and  thus  far  the  end  is  attained.  Sup- 
posing that  the  publishers  could  generally  be  discovered,  and 
that  the  decisions  of  the  courts  were  practically  just,  I  should 
think  the  object  of  example  would  be  a  strong  reason  for 
inflicting  judicial  punishment  upon  the  libeller : — still  other 
considerations  will  presently  be  submitted,  which  induce  the 
belief  that  such  punishment  is  not  the  most  effectual  nor  the 
most  proper  means  of  prevention. 

Then  as  to  redress.  There  is  only  one  way  in  which  ra- 
tio -.  :1  redress  can  be  attained  by  the  aspersed  party  ;  and  that 
is,"  by  proving  and  making  known  the  falsehood  of  the  asper- 
sion.   But  this  can  be  done  without  applying  to  judicial  courts. 

The  reader  will  ask.  What  then  is  it  proposed  to  do  ?  and, 
in  furnishing  a  reply,  I  shall  proceed  upon  the  supposition 
that  courts  of  law  only  exist. 

A  statement  injurious  to  a  private  individual  is  published 
to  the  world.  He  prosecutes  the  libeller  under  the  most 
favourable  circumstances.  He  can  prove  that  it  is  legally  a 
libel,  and  he  can  prove  also  that  it  is  false.  What  then  does 
he  gain  by  proceeding  to  law?  Nothing  individually,  but 
that  he  proves  the  falsehood ;  and  this  he  may  do  more  satis- 
factorily, more  cheaply,  and  more  efficiently,  without  a  court 
of  law  than  within  it.  If  there  are  documents,  or  if  there  is 
testimony  by  which  he  can  prove  the  falsehood,  they  can  be 
adduced  before  the  public  without  the  intervention  of  courts, 
and  juries,  and  pleaders.  Besides,  the  verdict  of  law  upon 
such  cases  is  habitually^  received  with  a  sort  of  suspicion  and 
want  of  confidence  in  its  foundation ;  because  we  know  that 
verdicts  are  continually  given  against  the  publishers  of  libels 
although  the  libel  is  true.  Now,  in  whatever  degree  the  pub- 
lic doubts  respecting  the  absolute  falsehood  of  the  libel,  in 
the  same  degree  the  great  private  object  of  prosecuting  the 
libeller  is  frustrated.  The  same  evidence  of  falsehood  ad- 
duced without  the  intervention  of  law,  would  be  much  more 
effectual,  because  it  would  be  exempted  from  the  same  suspi- 
cion.— I  put  other  motives  to  prosecution,  such  as  a  regard  to 


418  PROPER    StTBJECtS    OP  [eSSAY  IH 

the  public,  out  of  the  question, because  these  are  not  often  the 
motives  which  operate.  In  such  matters  men  usually  act  not 
from  public  but  from  private  views. 

But  the  prosecutor's  circumstances  may  be  less  favourable. 
Suppose  the  statement,  however  injurious,  is  not  legally  a 
libel.  Then  whatever  evidence  he  produces,  the  verdict  is 
against  him,  and  the  public,  who  do  not  trouble  themselves 
with  nice  distinctions,  perhaps  think  that  the  imputation  upon 
his  character  is  deserved.  Again,  it  may  be  a  libel,  and  yet 
he  may  fail  of  producing  legal  proof.  The  most  mortifying 
and  insignificant  deficiencies  in  proof  disappoint  all  his  hopes. 
The  publication  of  a  libel  which  all  the  world  has  seen,  and 
of  wliich  every  body  knows  the  publisher,  does  not  admit 
perhaps  of  legal  proof.  No  man  can  be  brought  forward 
who  has  seen,  with  his  own  eyes,  that  a  certain  man  did 
publish  it.  And  here  again  the  prosecutor  obtains  no  redress. 
But  further. — Many  public  statements  are  libellous,  and  are 
cruelly  injurious  to  the  sufferer,  which,  nevertheless,  are  true. 
To  prosecute  these  statements  is  worse  than  merelv  .ain. 
You  only  extend  further  and  wider  the  reproach  whica  w'as 
confined  withiri  narrower  limits  before.  You  make  the  evil 
to  yourself  more  intense  as  well  as  more  extended ;  for  the 
prosecuted  party  will  no  doubt  take  care  to  bring  proof  of  the 
truth  of  his  statements.  Thus  the  scandal  which  was  accepted 
with  doubt,  and  by  a  few,  previous  to  the  trial,  is  accepted 
with  certainty  and  by  a  multitude  afterwards. 

What  then  is  to  be  done  ?  Is  every  man  to  be  at  liberty  to 
say  with  impunity  whatever  he  pleases,  true  or  false,  against 
other  men  1  Not  with  impunity  ;  but  with  impunity  from  the 
law.  That  this  legal  impunity  may  be  productive  of  some 
evils  is  undoubtedly  true.  But  the  question  is  not  whether 
evils  exist,  but  whether  they  can  be  remedied. — Let  us  suppose, 
then,  that  there  was  no  such  thing  as  libel  law.  I  think  it 
probable  that  if  these  laws  were  repealed  to-morrow,  the  press 
would  quickly  inundate  the  public  with  torrents  of  vilification 
and  slander.  The  malignity  of  bad  men  would,  for  a  while, 
prevent  them  from  perceiving  the  alteration  which  awaited 
the  public  habits.  They  would  think  that  an  aspersion  would 
continue  to  have  the  same  effect  in  practically  injuring  and 
blackening  the  characters  of  others,  as  it  has  now,  that  it  is 
comparatively  unfrequent  from  the  restraints  of  law.  But  what 
woidd  be  the  result  ?  Inevitably  this  ;  that  the  public  would 
very  quickly  regard  libels  as  they  regard  all  other  common 
things,  with  heedless  indifference.  They  would  not  seize  upon 
them  as  they  now  do  with  a  vicious  avidity.    Published  slander 


CHAP.  XI.]  PENAL    ANIMADVERSION.  4lt 

would  become  to  the  public,  what  the  abuse  of  fishwomen  is 
to  the  inhabitants  of  Billingsgate,  a  thing  which  they  do  not 
regard — a  thing  about  which  they  do  not  trouble  themselves 
to  consider  whether  the  mutual  vilifications  be  true  or  false, 
and  for  which  they  scarcely  think  either  the  worse  or  the 
better  of  the  quarrellers.  With  respect  to  published  slander, 
such  a  state  of  things  could  not  last.  Private  malignity  would 
often  die  for  want  of  food.  It  would  not  publish  the  asper- 
sion which  when  published,  no  one  would  regard,  and  the 
flood  of  vituperation  would  soon  subside. 

But,  suppose,  for  a  moment,  that  the  contrary  were  possible. 
What  would  then  happen  ?  Why,  the  public  would  habituate 
themselves  to  discriminatiour.  They  would  not,  they  could 
not,  accept  every  libel  as  true  :  and  in  general  they  would  ac- 
cept none  as  true  of  which  the  truth  was  not  proved.  Here 
again  the  desire  of  virtue  would  be  in  a  great  degree  fulfilled  ; 
for  we  need  not  trouble  ourselves  to  repress  libels  by  which 
no  man's  mind  is  influenced.  In  all  suppositions,  too,  the 
proper  means  of  redress  are  in  the  suflerer's  power — ^to  ad- 
duce proof  of  the  falsehood  and  malignity  of  the  assertion. 
And  this  is  not  only  the  greatest  object  to  himself,  but  it  would 
also  be  a  positive  punishment  to  the  slanderer,  whilst  the  cus- 
tom would  become  a  terror  to  other  promulgators  of  slander. 
What  punishment  is  so  likely  to  be  influential  as  to  be 
proved  to  be  a  malicious  and  lying  vilifier  of  innocent  men  1 
What  motive  so  powerful  to  prevent  this  vilification,  as  the 
knowledge  that  this  proof  would  be  laid  before  the  public  ? 

If  an  innocent  person,  whose  character  had  been  in  this 
manner  publicly  aspersed,  should  ask  what  I  would  advise 
him  to  do  ? — I  should  say — Think  nothing  of  law  :  go  to  those 
persons  who  have  the  means  of  testifying  the  falsehood  of  the 
aspersion  ;  procure  their  explicit  and  attested  allegations  ;  or, 
if  by  any  other  means  your  innocence  can  be  shown — avail 
yourself  of  them,  and  forthwith  lay  your  exculpation  before 
the  public.  Here  the  great  end  is  attained.  Your  character 
is  not  injured  ;  and  as  to  the  slanderer,  he  is  punished  by  being 
made  the  subject  of  public  reprobation  and  disgust.  A  few 
days  previous  to  that  on  which  I  write,  a  wide, extended  daily 
newspaper  published  some  insinuations  against  the  character 
of  a  gentleman  eminent  in  society.  What  was  done  1  Why, 
the  same  day  or  the  next,  a  nobleman  who  happened  to  know 
the  truth,  and  whose  word  no  one  would  dispute,  sent  a  note 
to  another  paper  saying,  the  insinuation  was  unfounded.  Was 
not  every  object  then  attained  1  Would  this  gentleman  have 
been  further  benefited  by  prosecuting  the  editor  1  or  could 


4i8  PR6PER    SUBJECTS    OP  [eSSAY  III. 

tills  editor  have  been  more  appropriately  punished  than  by 
this  exposure  of  his  malignity  ? 

But  it  will  be  said,  that  there  do  not  exist  the  means  of  dis- 
proving some  aspersions,  however  false.  This  is  correct ; 
but  what  is  to  be  done  ?  If  the  sufferer  cannot  disprove  it  in 
a  newspaper  or  pamphlet,  neither  can  he  in  a  court  of  law : 
and  unless  it  is  disproved,  a  prosecution,  besides  procuring 
little  or  no  redress,  publishes  the  aspersion  to  a  tenfold  number. 
Yet  such  a  person  may  demand  proof  of  the  slanderer,  and 
require  that  he  come  forward.  This,  and  such  things,  may 
be  done  in  a  manner  that  so  indicates  integrity  and  innocence, 
that  in  failure  of  a  justification  of  the  slander  it  would  recoil 
upon  the  author. 

The  most  pitiable  situation  is  that  of  a  person,  now  perhaps 
virtuous  and  good,  who  is  charged  with  some  of  the  crimes 
or  vices  of  which  he  was  actually  guilty  in  past  times.  Here 
the  libel  cannot  be  repelled,  for  it  is  true.  To  invite  investi- 
gation is  to  publish  and  deepen  the  slander.  It  must  therefore 
be  borne  :  a  painful  alternative  but  unavoidable  ;  and  he  who 
endures  it  will,  perhaps,  if  he  be  now  a  Christian,  regard  it  with 
humility,  as  a  not  unjust  retribution  of  his  former  sins. 

But  to  allow  the  unrestrained  publication  of  facts  or  false- 
hood, is  not  a  matter  purely  evil.  The  statutes  which  prevent 
men  from  publishing  libels,  prevent  them  also  from  publishing 
truths — ^truths  which  all  men  ought  to  hear.  There  are  some 
actions  which  can  in  no  other  way  be  punished  or  discounte- 
nanced than  by  exposing  them  to  the  public  reprobation.  I 
saw  the  other  day,  in  a  newspaper,  (I  think  these  popular 
references  much  to  the  purpose,)  a  narrative  of  the  gross  cru- 
elty of  some  gentleman  to  his  horse,  by  which  a  large  part  of 
the  animal's  tongue  had  been  cut  or  torn  from  its  mouth.  The 
narrator  said  he  was  afraid  to  mention  this  man's  name  on 
account  of  the  libel  laws.  Suppose  the  statement  to  have 
been  true,  and  the  name  to  have  been  made  public  ;  would  it 
not  have  been  a  proper  and  a  severe  punishment  for  the  inhu- 
manity ?  Would  it  not  have  deterred  others  from  such  inhu- 
manity ?  In  a  word,  ought  not  such  charges  to  be  published  ? — 
And  thus  it  would  be  with  a  multitude  of  other  offences,  for 
which  scarcely  any  punishment  is  so  effectual  as  the  repro- 
bation of  the  public.  "  There  is  no  terror  that  comes  home 
to  the  heart  of  vice,  like  the  terror  of  being  exhibited  to  the 
public  eye."  I  am  willing  to  acknowledge,  that  if  the  publi- 
cation of  many  species  of  vicious  conduct  was  more  frequent — 
so  frequent  as  to  be  habitual,  it  would  eventually  tend  to  the 
extension  of  private  and  of  public  virtue.     Men  who  were  in 


CHAP.  XI.]  PENAL    ANIMADVERSION.  419 

any  way  ill-disposed,  would  find  themselves  under  a  constant 
apprehension  of  exposure,  from  which  almost  no  vigilance 
could  secure  an  escape.  The  writer  from  whom  I  have  quoted 
the  sentence  above  holds  much  stronger  language  than  mine. 
"  If  truth,"  says  he,  "  were  universally  told  of  men's  dispo- 
sitions and  actions,  gibbets  and  wheels  might  be  dismissed 
from  the  face  of  the  earth.  The  knave  unmasked  would  be 
obliged  to  turn  honest  in  his  own  defence.  Nay,  no  man 
would  have  time  to  grow  a  knave.  Truth  would  follow  him 
in  his  first  irresolute  essays,  and  public  disapprobation  arrest 
him  in  the  commencement  of  his  career."*  All  this  is  not 
now  to  be  hoped  :  yet  when  men  knew  that  the  exposure  of 
their  misdeeds  was  in  the  uncontrollable  power  of  the  press, 
and  that  there  were  no  means  of  securing  themselves  from  its 
punishment  but  by  being  virtuous,  would  not  they  be  more 
anxious  to  practise  virtue  1  Would  not  the  dread  of  exposure 
operate  upon  some  of  the  unpunished  vices  of  private  life,  as 
the  dread  of  public  opinion  operates  upon  more  public  vices 
now  ?  The  restraining  power  of  public  opinion  we  know  is 
great : — by  dispensing  with  libel  laws  we  should  extend  that 
power. 

Finally,  the  repeal  of  these  laws  would  be  attended  with 
one  of  two  consequences.  If  the  consequence  was,  that  these 
publications  were  not  increased  in  number,  no  evil  could  be 
done.  If  they  were  increased,  and  greatly  increased  in  num- 
ber, the  public  would  soon  learn  to  discriminate.  Tales  are 
believed  now,  because  they  are  seldom  told,  and  the  public 
discrimination  is  not  sufficiently  habituated  to  distinguish  the 
false  from  the  true.  If  it  were,  the  true  only  would  pass  cur- 
rent. These  often  ought  to  pass  ;  and  as  to  the  false- — who 
would  publish  what  no  one  would  believe  ?  f 

Publications  to  the  discredit  of  government  or  of  its  officers, 
assume  a  different  character  ;  but  the  difference  appears  to  be 
such  as  still  more  strongly  to  argue  against  visiting  them  with 
legal  penalties.  Charles  James  Fox  remarked  upon  this  dif- 
ference. He  thought  however  that  private  libels,  some  of  the 
true  as  well  as  the  false,  might  rightly  be  punished  by  the 
state ;    but  "  in  questions  relating  to  public  men,"  says  he, 

*  Godwin :  Enq.  Pol.  Just.  v.  2.  p.  643. 

t  I  learn  from  a  book  which  professes  to  give  information  respecting 
"  Society  and  Manners  in  High  and  Low  Life,"  that  there  existed  'and 
perhaps  there  still  exists)  a  House  of  Call  in  London,  where  he  who  had 
malice  without  ability  might  bespeak  a  libel  upon  any  subject.  The 
price  was  seven  and  sixpence.  In  a  few  hours  he  might  hear  the  scandal, 
if  such  was  his  order,  sung  about  the  streets. — Such  a  fact  may  well  af- 
fect our  jr<«8olution  to  punish  Ubellers  by  the  grave  power  of  the  law 


420  PI16PER    SUBJECTS    OF  [eSSAY  III. 

"  verity  in  respect  of  public  measures  ought  to  be  regarded  as 
a  complete  justification  of  a  libel."*  Whether  truth  be  a^'u^- 
tification  of  a  political  libel — is  one  question,  Whether  such  a 
libel  ought  to  be  punished  by  the  law — is  another.  But  I 
think  that  no  statement  respecting  public  measures  ought  to 
be  punished  by  the  law — for  this  simple  reason  amongst 
others : — if  the  statement  be  true,  it  is  commonly  right  that 
the  truth  should  be  publicly  known ;  if  it  be  false,  the  mis- 
chief is  better  remedied  by  publicly  showing  the  falsehood 
than  by  any  other  means.  Surely  to  repel  the  aspersion 
upon  public  men,  by  showing  that  it  is  unfounded,  is  more 
consistent  with  the  dignity  of  a  government  than  to  pursue  the 
vituperator  with  fines  and  imprisonments.  Surely  this  more 
dignified  course  would  recommend  the  government  and  its 
measures  to  the  judgments  of  all  wise  and  judicious  men. 

To  what  purpose  will  you  prosecute  a  true  statement.  If 
a  hundred  men  hear  of  it  before  the  prosecution,  ten  thousand 
perhaps  will  hear  of  it  afterwards.  Nor  is  this  all:  for  I 
scarcely  know  an  act  which  can  more  powerfully  tend  to 
weaken  a  government,  than  first  to  act  amiss,  and  then  vin- 
dictively to  pursue  him  who  mentions  the  misconduct.  If  the 
object  of  a  government  in  instituting  such  a  prosecution  be  to 
strengthen  its  own  hands,  surely  it  pursues  the  object  by  most 
inexpedient  means  ; — and  as  to  suppressing  truth  by  the  mere 
influence  of  terror,  it  is  a  mode  of  governing  for  which  no 
man  in  this  country  ought  to  lift  his  voice. 

A  very  serious  point  in  addition  is  this — that  almost  all 
polftical  libels,  vv^hether  true  or  false,  are  countenanced  by  a 
party.  A  prosecution,  therefore,  however  seemingly  success- 
ful, is  sometimes  totally  defeated,  because  the  party  recom- 
penses the  victim  for  his  sufferings  or  his  losses.  The  pro- 
secution and  those  who  conduct  it  become  the  laughing-stock 
of  the  party.  In  the  days  of  Pitt,  a  person  published  a  libel 
which  that  statesman  declared  in  the  House  of  Commons  to 
be  "  the  most  infamous  collection  of  sedition  and  treason  that 
ever  was  published."t  The  man  was  prosecuted,  found  guilty, 
and  sentenced  to  some  imprisonment.  What  was  the  result  1 
Why,  the  party  made  a  subscription  for  him  to  the  amount,  it 
was  said,  of  four  thousand  pounds.  What  bad  man  would  not 
publish  a  libel  to  be  so  paid  1  What  discreet  government 
would  prosecute  a  libel  to  be  so  defeated. 

But  if  the  uses  of  a  free  statement  of  the  truth  be  so  great 
in  the  case  of  private  persons,  much  more  is  it  desirable  in 
the  case  of  political  affairs.     To  discuss,  and,  if  needful,  tern 
»  FeU's  Memoirs.  t  Gifford's  Life. 


CHAP.  XI.]  PENAL    ANIMADVERSION.  421 

perately  to  animadvert  upon  the  conduct  of  governments,  is 
the  proper  business  of  the  public.  How  else  shall  the  judg- 
ment of  a  people  be  called  forth  and  expressed  ?  How  else 
shall  they  induce  an  amendment  in  public  measures  ?  The 
very  circumstance  that  government  is  above  the  customary 
control  of  the  laws,  is  a  good  reason  for  allowing  the  people 
freely  to  deliver  their  sentiments  upon  its  conduct.  Many  ill 
actions  of  the  private  man  may  be  punished  by  the  law ;  but 
how  shall  the  ill  actions  of  public  persons  be  discountenanced 
if  it  be  not  by  the  expression  of  the  public  mind  ?  A  people 
have  sometimes  no  other  means  of  promoting  reformations  in 
the  conduct  of  government,  than  by  exposing  those  parts  in 
which  reformation  is  needed.  The  argument  then  is  short. — 
To  prosecute  false  political  libels  is  unreasonable,  for  there 
are  better  and  wiser  means  of  procedure.  To  prosecute  true 
statements  is  wrong,  because  tnuh  ought  to  be  freely  told ; 
and  if  it  were  not  wrong,  it  would  be  absurd,  because  a  gov- 
ernment inflicts  more  injury  upon  itself  by  the  prosecution 
than  was  inflicted  by  the  statement  itself. 


As  the  subject  maligned  rises  in  dignity,  we  are  presented 
with  stronger  and  still  stronger  dissuasions  to  the  legal  prose- 
cution of  the  maligner.  There  are  more  reasons  against  prose- 
cuting a  political  than  a  private  aspersion :  there  are  more 
reasons  against  prosecuting  aspersions  upon  religion  than 
either. — Supposing,  which  we  must  suppose,  that  religion  is 
true,  then  all  libels  upon  it  must  be  false  :  and,  like  other 
false  libels,  are  better  met  by  proving  the  truth  than  by  punish- 
ing the  liar.  "  Christianity  is  but  ill  defended,"  says  Paley, 
"  by  refusing  audience  or  toleration  to  the  objections  of  unbe- 
lievers."* It  is  a  scandal  to  religion  to  prosecute  the  man 
who  makes  objections  to  its  truths  :  for  what  is  the  inference 
in  the  objector's  mind  but  this,  that  we  resort  to  force  because 
we  cannot  produce  arguments  ?  Nor  let  me  be  misinterpreted 
if  I  ask,  What  is  Christianity,  or  who  shall  define  it  ?  I  may 
be  of  opinion,  and  in  fact  I  am  of  opinion,  that  some  of  the 
doctrines  which  the  professors  of  Christianity  promulgate,  are 
as  much  opposed  to  Christianity  as  some  of  the  arguments 
of  unbelievers.  But  this  is  not  a  good  reason  for  making  my 
judgment  the  standard  of  Truth.  Yet,  without  a  standard, 
how  shall  we  prosecute  him  who  impugns  Christianity?  How, 
lather,  shall  we  know  whether  he  impugns  Christianity  or 
something  else  ? 

Truth  is  an  overmatch  for  falsehood.     Where  they  are  al- 
«  Mor.  and  Pol.  PhU.  b.  5,  c.  9. 
36 


'432  t>ROPER    SUBJECTS    Of  [eSSAY  III. 

lo-wed  fairly  to  conflict,  truth  is  sure  of  the  victory.  Who  then 
would  rob  her  of  the  victory  by  silencing  falsehood  by  force  ? 
It  is  by  such  contests  that  the  cause  of  truth  is  promoted. 
The  assailant  calls  forth  defenders ;  and  it  has  in  fact  hap- 
pened, that  the  proofs  and  practical  authority  of  religion  have 
been  strengthened  by  defences  which,  but  for  the  assaults  of 
error,  might  never  have  been  made  or  sought. 

If  it  be  said  that  fair  argument,  however  unsound,  may  be 
tolerated,  and  that  you  only  mean  to  punish  the  authors  of 
reproachful  and  scandalous  attacks  upon  religion — we  answer, 
that  these  attacks,  like  every  other,  are  better  repelled  by  ex- 
posure or  by  neglect  than  by  force.  You  can  scarcely  prose- 
cute these  bad  men  (so  experience  teaches)  without  making 
them  cry  out  about  persecution,  and  without  calling  around 
them  a  party  who  might  otherwise  have  held  their  peace. 
They  exclaim,  "  The  sufferer  believed  what  he  wrote,  and 
thought  that  to  publish  it  was  for  the  general  good  !"  All  this 
may  be  false,  but  it  is  specious.  At  any  rate  you  cannot  dis- 
prove it.  Sympathy  for  the  man  induces  sympathy  for  his 
principles. — Another  way  in  which  a  prosecution  defeats  its 
proper  object  is,  that  to  prosecute  a  writing,  whether  scandal- 
ous or  only  false,  is  a  sure  way  of  making  the  book  read. 
Thousands  enquire  for  a  profligate  book  because  they  hear  it 
is  of  so  much  importance  as  to  be  prosecuted,  who  else  would 
not  have  enquired  because  they  would  not  have  heard  of  it. 
So  it  Avas  about  forty  years  ago  with  Paine's  Works.  What, 
says  gaping  curiosity,  can  this  book  be,  which  ministers  and 
bishops  are  so  anxious  that  we  should  not  read  ?  Multitudes 
have  read  the  profligate  later  works  of  the  unhappy  Lord 
Byron,  but  probably  unnumbered  multitudes  more  would  have 
read  them,  if  they  had  been  prosecuted  by  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral and  burnt  by  the  hangman.  As  it  is,  it  may  be  hoped  they 
will  sink  into  oblivion  by  the  weight  of  their  own  obscene 
profaneness.*  

One  objection  applies  to  nearly  all  prosecutions  of  books — 
that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  restrain  the  licentiousness  of 

*  This  man  affords  an  instance  of  that  strange  detraction  from  our 
own  reputation  with  posterity  to  which  we  have  before  referred.  He  cer- 
tainly wished  that  "  dull  oblivion"  should  not 

"  bar 

His  name  from  out  the  temple  where  the  dead 
Are  honour'd  by  the  nations." — 
How  prq)osterous,  then,  to  be  the  suicide  of  so  large  a  portion  of  his 
hopes,  by  writuig  what  experience  might  teach  him  the  nations  would 
not  honour ! 


CHAP.  XI.]  PENAL   ANIMADVERSION.  423 

the  press  without  diminishing  its  wholesome  freedom.  The 
boundaries  of  freedom  and  hcentiousness  cannot  be  defined 
by  law.  No  law  can  be  devised  which  shall  at  once  exclude 
the  evil  and  permit  the  good.  Now  to  restrain  the  freedom 
of  the  press  is  amongst  the  greatest  mischiefs  which  can  be 
inflicted  on  mankind.  The  reader  wall  be  prepared  to  ac- 
knowledge the  magnitude  of  the  mischief,  if  he  considers  how 
powerful  and  how  proper  an  agent  public  opinion  is  in  pro- 
moting social  and  political  reformations.  There  is  no  agent 
of  reformation  so  desirable  as  the  quiet  influence  of  the  public 
judgment ;  and,  in  order  to  make  this  judgment  sound  and 
powerful,  the  press  should  be  free. 


The  general  conclusion  that  is  suggested  by  the  present 
chapter,  is  what  the  intelligent  and  Christian  reader  might 
expect — ^that  the  legislator  should  endeavour,  so  far  as  from 
time  to  time  becomes  practicable,  to  direct  penal  animadver- 
sion to  those  actions  which  are  prohibited  by  the  Moral  Law  ; 
that  he  should  endeavour  this,  both  by  addition  and  deduction  ; 
by  ceasing  to  punish  that  which  morality  does  not  condemn, 
and  by  extending  punishment  to  more  of  those  actions  which 
it  does  condemn. 

As  to  the  seeming  exception  in  the  case  of  libels,  we  do  not 
contend  so  much  for  their  impunity,  as  that  the  law  is  not  the 
best  means  of  punishment.  By -taking  the  care  of  restraining 
this  oflfence  from  the  law,  and  placing  it  in  the  hands  of  the 
public,  the  punishment  would  sometimes  be  not  only  more  ef- 
fectual but  more  severe. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


OF  THE  PROPER  ENDS  OF  PUNISHMENT. 


The  three  Objects  of  Punishment :-— Reformation  of  the  Offender : — Ex- 
ample : — Restitution — Punishment  may  be  increeised  as  well  as  dimin- 
ished. 

Why  is  a  man  who  commits  an  offence  punished  for  the 
act?     Is  it  for  his  own  advantage,  or  for  that  of  others,  or  for 


434  THE  PROPER  ENDS  OF  PUNISHMENT.       [eSSAY  III. 

both  ? — For  both,  and  primarily  for  his  own  :*  which  answer 
will  perhaps  the  more  readily  recommend  itself,  if  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  good  of  others,  that  is,. of  the  public,  is  best 
consulted  by  those  systems  of  punishment  which  are  most 
effectual  in  benefiting  the  offender  himself. 

When  we  recur  to  the  precepts  and  the  spirit  of  Chris- 
tianity, we  find  that  the  one  great  pervading  principle  by  which 
it  requires  us  to  regulate  our  conduct  towards  others,  is 
that  of  operative,  practical  good-will — that  good-will  which,  if 
they  be  in  suffering,  will  prompt  us  to  alleviate  the  misery, 
if  they  be  vicious,  will  prompt  us  to  reclaim  them  from  vice. 
That  the  misconduct  of  the  individual  exempts  us  from  the 
obligation  to  regard  this  rule,  it  would  be  futile  to  imagine. 
It  is  by  him  that  the  exercise  of  benevolence  is  peculiarly 
needed.  He  is  the  morally  sick,  M^ho  needs  the  physician  ; 
and  such  a  physician  he,  who  by  comparison  is  morally  whole, 
should  be.  If  we  adopt  the  spirit  of  the  declaration,  "  I  came 
not  to  call  the  righteous  but  sinners  to  repentance,"  we  shall 
entertain  no  doubt  that  the  reformation  of  offenders  is  the 
primary  business  of  the  Christian  in  devising  punishments. 
There  appears  no  reason  why,  in  the  case  of  public  criminals, 
the  spirit  of  the  rule  should  not  be  acted  upon — "  If  a  brother 
be  overtaken  in  a  fault  restore  such  an  one."  Amongst  the 
Corinthians  there  was  an  individual  who  had  committed  a 
gross  offence,  such  as  is  now  punished  by  the  law  of  England. 
Of  this  criminal  Paul  speaks  in  strong  terms  of  reprobation 
in  the  first  epistle.  The  effect  proved  to  be  good ;  and  the 
offender  having  apparently  become  reformed,  the  Corinthians 
were  directed  in  the  second  epistle,  to  forgive  and  to  comfort 
him. 

When  therefore  a  person  has  committed  a  crime,  the  great 
duty  of  those  who  in  common  with  himself  are  candidates  for 
the  mercy  of  God,  is  to  endeavour  to  meliorate  and  rectify 
the  dispositions  in  which  his  crime  originates;  to  subdue 
the  vehemence  of  his  passions — to  raise  up  in  his  mind  a 
power  that  may  counteract  the  power  of  future  temptation. 
We  should  feel  towards  these  mentally  diseased,  as  we  feel 
towards  the  physical  sufferer — compassion ;  and  the  great 
object  should  be  to  cure  the  disease.  No  doubt,  in  endeav- 
ouring this  object,  severe  remedies  must  often  be  employed. 
It  is  just  what  we,  should  expect ;  and  the  remedies  will  prob- 

*  "  The  end  of  all  correction  is  either  the  amendment  of  wicked  men 
or  to  prevent  the  influence  of  ill  example."  This  is  the  rule  of  Seneca  ; 
and  by  mentioning  amendment  first,  he  appears  to  have  regarded  it  as 
the  primary  object. 


CHAP.  XII-l        THE  PROPER  ENDS  OF  PUNISHMENT.  426 

ably  be  severe  in  proportion  to  the  inveteracy  and  malignity 
of  the  complaint.  But  still  the  end  should  never  be  forgotten, 
and  I  think  a,  just  estimate  of  our  moral  obligations,  will  lead 
us  to  regard  the  attainment  of  that  end  as  paramomit  to  every 
other. 

There  is  one  great  practical  advantage  in  directing  the  at- 
tention especially  to  this  moral  cure,  which  is  this,  that  if  it 
be  successful,  it  prevents  the  offender  from  offending  again. 
It  is  well  known  that  the  proportion  of  those  who,  having  once 
suffered  the  stated  punishment,  again  transgress  the  laws  and 
are  again  convicted,  is  great.  But  to  whatever  extent  reforma- 
tion was  attained,  this  unhappy  result  would  be  prevented. 

The  second  object  of  punishment,  that  of  example,  appears 
to  be  recognised  as  right  by  Christianity,  when  it  says  that 
the  magistrate  is  a  "  terror"  to  bad  men ;  and  when  it  admon- 
ishes such  to  be  "  afraid"  of  his  power.  There  can  be  no 
reason  for  speaking  of  punishment  as  a  terror,  unless  it  were 
right  to  adopt  such  punishments  as  would  deter.  In  the  pri- 
vate discipline  of  the  church  the  same  idea  is  kept  in  view : 
— "  Them  that  sin  rebuke  before  all,  that  others  also  may 
feary*  The  parallel  of  physical  disease  may  also  still  hold. 
The  offender  is  a  member  of  the  social  body ;  and  the  physi- 
cian who  endeavours  to  remove  a  local  disease,  always  acts 
with  a  reference  to  the  health  of  the  system. 

In  stating  reformation  as  the  first  object,  we  also  conclude, 
that  if,  in  any  case,  the  attainment  of  reformation  and  the  ex- 
hibition of  example  should  be  found  to  be  incompatible,  the 
former  is  to  be  preferred.  I  say  if;  for  it  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  such  cases  will  ever  arise.  The  measures  which 
are  necessary  to  reformation  must  operate  as  example ;  and 
in  general,  since  the  reformation  of  the  more  hardened  offend- 
ers is  not  to  be  expected,  except  by  severe  measures,  the  in- 
fluence of  terror  in  endeavouring  reformation  will  increase 
with  the  malignity  of  the  crime.  This  is  just  what  we  need, 
and  what  the  penal  legislator  is  so  solicitous  to  secure.  The 
point  for  the  exercise  of  wisdom  is,  to  attain  the  second  object 
in  attaining  the  first.  A  primary  regard  to  the  first  object  is 
compatible  with  many  modifications  of  punishment,  in  order 
more  effectually  to  attain  the  second.  If  there  are  two  meas- 
ures, of  which  both  tend  alike  to  reformation,  and  one  tends 
most  to  operate  as  example,  that  one  should  unquestionably 
be  preferred. 

There  is  a  third  object  which,  though  subordinate  to  the 
others,  might  perhaps  still  obtain  greater  notice  from  the  legis- 
*  1  Tim.  V.  20. 
36* 


426  THE  PROPER  ENDS  OF  PUNISHMENT.       [esSAY  111 

lator  than  it  is  wont  to  do — Restitution  or  Compensation.* 
Since  what  are  called  criminal  actions  are  commonly  injuries 
committed  by  one  man  upon  another,  it  appears  to  be  a  very 
obvious  dictate  of  reason  that  the  injury  should  be  repaired ; 
— ^that  he  from  whom  the  thief  steals  a  purse  should  regain 
its  value ;  that  he  who  is  injured  in  his  person  or  otherwise, 
should  receive  such  compensation  as  he  may.  When  my 
house  is  broken  into  and  a  hundred  pounds'  worth  of  property 
is  carried  off,  it  is  but  an  imperfect  satisfaction  to  me  that  the 
robber  will  be  punished.  I  ought  to  recover  the  value  of  my 
property.  The  magistrate,  in  taking  care  of  the  general, 
should  take  care  of  the  individual  weal.  The  laws  of  England 
do  now  award  compensation  in  damages  for  some  injuries. 
This  is  a  recognition  of  the  principle  ;  although  it  is  remark- 
able, not  only  that  the  number  of  offences  which  are  thus  pun- 
ished is  small,  but  that  they  are  frequently  of  a  sort  in  which 
])ecuniary  loss  has  not  been  sustained  by  the  injured  party. 

I  do  not  imagine  that  in  the  present  state  of  penal  law,  or  of 
the  administration  of  justice,  a  general  regard  to  commp^sa- 
tion  is  practicable,  but  this  does  not  prove  that  it  ought  not  to 
be  regarded.  If  in  an  improved  state  of  penal  affairs,  it 
should  be  found  practicable  to  oblige  offenders  to  recompense 
by  their  labour  those  who  had  suffered  by  their  crime,  this 
advantage  would  attend,  that  while  it  wouid  probably  involve 
considerable  punishment,  it  would  approve  itself  to  the  offend- 
er's mind  as  the  demand  of  reason  and  of  justice.  This  is 
no  trifling  consideration ;  for  in  every  species  of  coercion  and 
punishment,  public  or  domestic,  it  is  of  consequence  that  the 
punished  party  should  feel  the  justice  and  propriety  of  the 
measures  which  are  adopted. 

The  writer  of  these  Essays  would  be  amongst  the  last  to 
reprobate  a  strict  adherence  to  abstract  principles,  as  such  ; 
but  some  men,  in  their  zeal  for  such  principles,  have  proposed 
strange  doctrines  upon  the  subject  of  punishment.  It  has 
been  said  that  when  a  crime  has  been  committed  it  cannot  be 
recalled  ;  that  it  is  a  "  past  and  irrevocable  action,"  and  that 
to  inflict  pain  upon  the  criminal  because  he  has  committed  it, 
"  is  one  of  the  wildest  conceptions  of  untutored  barbarism." 
No  one  perhaps  would  affirm  that,  in  strictness,  such  a  motive 
to  punishment  is  right ;  but  how,  when  an  offence  is  commit- 

*  "  The  law  of  nature  commands  that  reparation  be  made."  Mor. 
and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  6,  c.  8.  And  this  dictate  of  nature  appears  to  have  been 
recognized  in  the  Mosaic  law,  in  which  compensation  to  the  suffering 
party  is  expressly  required. 


CHAP.  XII.]        THE  PROPER  ENDS  OP  PUNISHMENT.  42t 

ted,  can  you  separate  the  objects  of  punishment  so  as  not 
practically  to  punish  because  the  man  has  offended  ?  If  you 
regulate  the  punishment  by  its  legitimate  objects,  you  punish 
because  the  offender  needs  it ;  and  as  all  offenders  do  need  it, 
you  punish  all,  which  amounts  in  practice  to  nearly  the  same 
thing  as  punishing  because  they  have  committed  a  crime. 
However,  as  an  abstract  principle,  there  might  be  little  oc- 
casion to  dispute  about  it ;  but  when  it  is  made  a  foundation 
for  such  doctrine  as  the  following,  it  is  needful  to  recall  the 
supreme  authority  of  the  Moral  Law  :  "  We  are  bound,  under 
certain  urgent  circumstances,  to  deprive  the  offender  of  the 
liberty  he  has  abused.  Further  than  this,  no  circumstance 
can  authorize  us.  The  infliction  of  further  evil,  when  his 
power  to  injure  is  removed,  is  the  wild  and  unauthorized  dic- 
tate of  vengeance  and  rage."  This  is  affirmative  ;  and  in 
turn  I  would  affirm  that  it  is  the  sober  and  authorized  dictate 
of  justice  and  good-will.  But  indeed  why  may  we  even 
restrain  him  1  Obviously  for  the  sake  of  others  ;  and  for  the 
sake  of  others  we  may  also  do  more.  Besides,  this  philoso-r 
phy  leaves  the  offender's  reformation  out  of  the  question.  If 
he  is  so  wicked  that  you  are  obliged  to  confine  him  lest 
he  should  commit  violence  again,  he  is  so  wicked  that 
you  are  obliged  to  confine  him  for  his  own  good.  And,  in  re- 
ality, the  writer  himself  had  just  before  virtually  disproved 
his  own  position.  "Whatever  gentleness,"  he  says,  "the 
intellectual  physician  may  display,  it  is  not  to  be  believed 
that  men  can  part  with  rooted  habits  of  injustice  and  vice 
without  the  sensation  of  considerable  pain."*  But,  to  occasion 
this  pain  in  order  to  make  them  part  with  vicious  habits  is  to 
do  something  "  further"  than  to  take  away  liberty. 


Respecting  the  relative  utility  of  different  modes  of  punish- 
ment and  of  prison  discipline,  we  have  little  to  say,  partly 
because  the  practical  recognition  of  reformation  as  a  primary 
object  affords  good  security  for  the  adoption  of  judicious 
measures,  and  partly  because  these  topics  have  already  ob- 
tained much  of  the  public  attention.  One  suggestion  may, 
however,  be  made,  that  as  good  consequences  have  followed 
from  making  a  prisoner's  confinement  depend  for  its  duration 
on  his  conduct,  so  that  if  it  be  exemplary  the  period  is  dimin- 
ished, there  appears  no  sufficient  reason  why  the  parallel 
system  should  not  be  adopted  of  increasing  the  original  sen- 
tence if  his  conduct  continue  vicious.  There  is  no  breach  of 
reason  oi  of  justice  in  this.  For  the  reasonable  object  of  pun- 
*  Godwin :  Enq.  Pol.  Just.  v.  ii.  p.  748,  751. 


48?  PUNISHMENT    OF    DEATH.  [eSSAT  lit. 

isliment  is  to  attain  certain  ends,  and  if,  by  the  original  sen- 
tence, it  is  found  that  these  ends  arc  not  attained,  reason  ap- 
pears to  dictate  that  stronger  motives  should  be  employed. — 
It  caimot  surely  be  less  reasonable  to  add  to  a  culprit's  penal- 
ty if  his  conduct  be  bad,  than  to  deduct  from  it  if  it  be  good. 
For  a  sentence  should  not  be  considered  as  a  propitiation  of 
the  law,  nor  when  it  is  inflicted  should  it  be  considered,  as  of 
necessity,  that  all  is  done.  The  sentence  which  the  law 
pronounces  is  a  general  rule — good  perhaps  as  a  general  rule, 
but  sometimes  inadequate  to  its  end.  And  the  utility  of  re- 
taining the  power  of  adding  to  a  penalty  is  the  same  in  kind, 
and  probably  greater  in  degree,  than  the  power  of  diminishing 
it.  In  one  case  the  culprit  is  influenced  by  hope,  and  in  the 
other  by  fear.  Fear  is  the  more  powerful  agent  upon  some 
men's  minds,  and  hope  upon  others.  And  as  to  the  justice  of 
such  an  institution,  it  appears  easily  to  be  vindicated  ;  for 
what  is  the  standard  of  justice  ?  The  sentence  of  the  law  ? 
No ;  for  if  it  were,  it  would  be  unjust  to  abate  of  it  as  well  as 
to  add.  Is  it  the  original  crime  of  the  offender  ?  No  ;  for  if 
it  were,  the  same  crime,  by  whatever  variety  of  conduct  it 
was  afterwards  followed,  must  always  receive  an  equal  pen- 
alty. The  standard  of  justice  is  to  be  estimated  by  the  ends 
for  which  punishments  are  inflicted.  Now,  although  it  would 
be  too  much  to  affirm  that  any  penalty,  or  duration  of  penalty, 
would  be  just  until  these  ends  were  attained,  yet  surely  it  is 
not  unjust  to  endeavour  their  attainment  by  some  additions  to 
an  original  penalty  when  they  cannot  be  attained  without. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


PUNISHMENT  OF  DEATH. 


Of  the  three  objects  of  punishment,  the  punishment  of  death  regards  but 
one — Reformation  of  minor  offenders:  Greater  criminals  neglected — 
Capital  punishments  not  efficient  as  examples — Public  executions- 
Paul — Grotius — Murder — The  punishment  of  death  irrevocable — Rous- 
seau— Recapitulation. 

W  I  SELECT  for  observation  this  peculiar  mode  pf  punishment 

on  account  of  its  peculiar  importance. 

And  here  we  are  impressed  at  the  outset  with  the  consid- 


CHAP.  Xljl.  PTTNISHKENT    OP    DEATH.  4^9 

eration,  that  of  the  three  great  objects  which  havfe  just  been 
proposed  as  the  proper  ends  of  punishment,  the  punishment 
of  death  regards  but  one ;  and  that  one  not  the  first  and  the 
greatest.  The  only  end  which  is  consulted  in  taking  the  life 
of  an  offender,  is  that  of  example  to  other  men.  His  own 
reformation  is  put  almost  out  of  the  question.  Now  if  the 
principles  delivered  in  the  preceding  chapter  be  sound,  they 
present  at  once  an  almost  insuperable  objection  to  the  punish- 
ment of  death.  If  reformation  be  the  primary  object,  and 
if  the  punishment  of  death  precludes  attention  to  that  object, 
the  punishment  of  death  is  wrong. 

To  take  the  life  of  a  fellow-creature  is  to  exert  the  utmost 
possible  power  which  man  can  possess  over  man.  It  is  to 
perform  an  action  the  most  serious  and  awful  which  a  hu- 
man being  can  perform.  Respecting  such  an  action,  then, 
can  any  truth  be  more  manifest  than  that  the  dictates  of 
Christianity  ought  especially  to  be  taken  into  account  ?  If 
these  dictates  are  rightly  urged  upon  us  in  the  minor  concerns 
of  life,  can  any  man  doubt  whether  they  ought  to  influence  us 
in  the  greatest  ?  Yet  what  is  the  fact  ?  Why,  that  in  de- 
fending capital  punishments,  these  dictates  are  almost  placed 
out  of  the  question.  We  hear  a  great  deal  about  security  of 
property  and  life,  a  great  deal  about  the  necessity  of  making 
examples ;  but  almost  nothing  about  the  Moral  Law.  It 
might  be  imagined  that  upon  this  subject  our  religion  imposed 
no  obligations  ;  for  nearly  every  argument  that  is  urged  in  fa- 
vour of  capital  punishments  would  be  as  valid  and  as  appro- 
priate in  the  mouth  of  a  Pagan  as  in  our  own.  Can  this 
be  right  ?  Is  it  conceivable  that,  in  the  exercise  of  the  most . 
tremendous  agency  which  is  in  the  power  of  man,  it  can  be 
right  to  exclude  all  reference  to  the  expressed  will  of  God  ? 

I  acknowledge  that  this  exclusion  of  the  Christian  law  from 
the  defences  of  the  punishment,  is  to  me  almost  a  conclusive 
argument  that  the  punishment  is  wrong.  Nothing  that  is 
right  can  need  such  an  exclusion ;  and  we  should  not  practise 
it  if  it  were  not  for  a  secret  perception,  that  to  apply  the  pure 
requisitions  of  Christianity  would  not  serve  the  purpose  of 
the  advocate.  Look  for  a  moment  upon  the  capital  offender 
and  upon  ourselves.  He,  a  depraved  and  deep  violator  of 
the  law  of  God — one  who  is  obnoxious  to  the  vengeance 
of  heaven — one,  however,  whom  Christ  came  peculiarly  to 
call  10  repentance  and  to  sn,ve— Ourselves,  his  brethren — 
brethren  by  the  relationship  of  nature — brethren  in  some 
degree  in  offences  against  God — ^brethren  especially  in  the 
trembling  hope  of  a  common  salvation.     How  ought  beings  so 


430  PUNISHMENT   OF    DEATH.  [eSSAY  III 

situated  to  act  towards  one  another  1  Ought  we  to  kill  or  to 
amend  him  ?  Ought  we,  so  far  as  is  in  our  power,  to  cut  off 
his  future  hope,  or,  so  far  as  is  in  our  power,  to  strengthen  the 
foundation  of  that  hope  ?  Is  it  the  reasonable  or  decent  of- 
fice of. one  candidate  for  the  mercy  of  God  to  hang  his 
fellow-candidate  upon  a  gibbet  ?  I  am  serious,  though  men 
of  levity  may  laugh.  If  such  men  reject  Christianity,  I  do 
not  address  them.  If  they  admit  its  truth,  let  them  manfully 
show  that  its  principles  should  not  thus  be  applied. 

No  one  disputes  that  the  reformation  of  offenders  is  desira- 
ble, though  some  may  not  allow  it  to  be  the  primary  object. 
For  the  purposes  of  reformation  we  have  recourse  to  constant 
oversight — to  classification  of  offenders — to  regular  labour — 
to  religious  instruction.  For  whom?  For  minor  criminals. 
Do  not  the  greater  criminals  need  reformation  too  ?  If  all 
these  endeavours  are  necessary  to  effect  the  amendment  of 
the  less  depraved,  are  they  not  necessary  to  affect  the  amend- 
ment of  the  more  ?  But  we  stop  just  where  our  exertions  are 
most  needed ;  as  if  the  reformation  of  a  bad  man  was  of  the 
less  consequence  as  the  intensity  of  his  wickedness  became 
greater.  If  prison  discipline  and  a  penitentiary  be  needful 
for  sharpers  and  pickpockets,  surely  they  are  necessary 
for  murderers  and  highwaymen.  Yet  we  reform  the  one  and 
hang  the  other ! 

Since,  then,  so  much  is  sacrificed  to  extend  the  terror 
of  example,  we  ought  to  be  indisputably  certain  that  the  ter- 
ror of  capital  punishment  is  greater  than  that  of  all  others. — 
We  ought  not  certainly  to  sacrifice  the  requisitions  of  the 
Christian  law  unless  we  know  that  a  regard  to  them  would  be 
attended  with  public  evil.*  Do  we  know  this?  Are  we 
indisputably  certain  that  capital  punishments  are  more  effi- 
cient as  examples  than  any  others  1  We  are  not.  We  do 
not  know  from  experience,  and  we  cannot  know  without  it. — 
In  England  the  experiment  has  not  been  made.  The  punish- 
ment therefore  is  wrong  in  us,  whatever  it  might  be  in  a  more 
experienced  people.  For  it  is  wrong  unless  it  can  be  shown 
to  be  right.  It  is  not  a  neutral  affair.  If  it  is  not  indispen- 
sably necessary,  it  is  unwarrantable.  And  since  we  do  not 
know  that  it  is  indispensable,  it  is,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned, 
unwarrantable. 

And  with  respect  to  the  experience  of  other  nations,  who 
will  affirm  that  crimes  have  been  increased  in  consequence  of 
the  diminished  frequency  of  executions  ?     Who  will  affirm 

*  We  ought  not  for  any  reason  to  do  this ;  but  I  speak  in  the  present 
paragraph  of  the  pretensions  of  expediency. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  PUNISHMENT    OF    DEATH.  431 

that  the  laws  and  punishments  of  America  are  not  as  effectual 
as  our  own  ?  Yet  they  have  abolished  capital  punishment  for 
all  private  crimes  except  murder  of  the  first  degree.  Where, 
then,  is  our  pretension  to  a  justification  of  our  own  practice  ? 
It  is  a  satisfaction  that,  so  many  facts  and  arguments  are  be- 
fore the  public  which  show  the  inefficacy  of  the  punishment 
of  death  in  this  country ;  and  this  is  one  reason  why  they  are 
not  introduced  here.  "  There  are  no  practical  despisers 
of  death  like  those  who  touch,  and  taste,  and  handle  death 
daily,  by  daily  committing  capital  offences.  They  make  a 
jest  of  death  in  all  its  forms ;  and  all  its  terrors  are  in  their 
mouths  a  scorn."  *  "  Profligate  criminals,  such  as  common 
thieves  and  highwaymen,"  "have  always  been  accustomed  to 
look  upon  the  gibbet  as  a  lot  very  likely  to  fall  to  them. 
When  it  does  fall  to  them  therefore,  they  consider  themselves 
only  as  not  quite  so  lucky  as  some  of  their  companions, 
and  submit  to  their  fortune  without  any  other  uneasiness  than 
what  may  arise  from  the  fear  of  death — a  fear  which  even,  by 
such  worthless  wretches,  we  frequently  see  can  be  so  easily 
and  so  very  completely  conquered."  A  man  some  time  ago 
was  executed  for  uttering  forged  bank-notes,  and  the  body 
was  delivered  to  his  friends.  What  was  the  effect  of  the  ex- 
ample upon  them  ?  Why,  with  the  corpse  lying  on  a  bed  be- 
fore them,  they  were  themselves  seized  in  the  act  of  again 
uttering  forged  hank-notes.  The  testimony  upon  a  subject 
like  this,  of  a  person  who  has  had  probably  greater  and  better 
opportunities  of  ascertaining  the  practical  efficiency  of  pun- 
ishments than  any  other  individual  in  Europe,  is  of  great  im- 
portance. "  Capital  convicts,"  says  Elizabeth  Fry,  '•  pacify 
their  conscience  with  the  dangerous  and  most  fallacious 
notion,  that  the  violent  death  which  awaits  them  will  serve  as 
a  full  atonement  for  all  their  sins."  f  It  is  their  passport  to 
felicity — the  purchase -money  of  heaven  !  Of  this  deplorable 
notion  the  effect  is  doubly  bad.  First,  it  makes  them  compara- 
tively little  afraid  of  death,  because  they  necessarily  regard  it 
as  so  much  less  an  evil ;  and,  secondly,  it  encourages  them 
to  go  on  in  the  commission  of  crimes,  because  they  imagine 
that  the  number  or  enormity  of  them,  however  great,  will  not 
preclude  them  from  admission  into  heaven.  Of  both  these 
mischiefs,  the  punishment  of  death  is  the  immediate  source. 
Substitute  another  punishment,  and  they  will  not  think  that 
that  is  an  "atonement  for  their  sins,"  and  will  not  receive 
their  present  encouragement  to  continue  their  crimes.    But 

*  Irving's  Orations.  t  Observations  on  the  visiting,  &c.,  of 

Female  Prisoner^,  p.  73. 


432  .  PUNISHMENT   OF    DEATH.  [ESSAY  III. 

with  respect  to  example,  this  unexceptionable  authority  speaks 
in  decided  language.  "  The  terror  of  example  is  very  gener- 
ally rendered  abortive  by  the  predestinarian  notion,  vulgarly 
prevalent  among  thieves,  that  '  if  they  are  to  be  hanged  they 
are  to  be  hanged,  and  nothing  can  prevent  it.'  "*  It  may  be 
said  that  the  same  notion  might  be  attached  to  any  other  pun- 
ishment, and  that  thus  that  other  would  become  abortive  ;  but 
there  is  little  reason  to  expect  this,  at  least  in  the  same  de- 
gree. The  notion  is  now  connected  expressly  with  hanging, 
and  it  is  not  probable  that  the  same  notion  would  ever  be 
transferred  with  equal  power  to  another  penalty.  Where 
then  is  the  overwhelming  evidence  of  utility,  which  alone, 
even  in  the  estimate  of  expediency,  can  justify  the  punish- 
ment of  death  ?     It  cannot  be  adduced ;  it  does  not  exist. 

But  if  capital  punishments  do  little  good,  they  do  much 
harm.  "  The  frequent  public  destruction  of  life  has  a  fear- 
fully hardening  effect  upon  those  whom  it  is  intended  to  in- 
timidate. While  it  excites  in  them  the  spirit  of  revenge,  it 
seldom  fails  to  lower  their  estimate  of  the  life  of  man,  and 
renders  them  less  afraid  of  taking  it  away  in  their  turn  by 
acts  of  personal  violence."!  This  is  just  what  a  consideration 
of  the  principles  of  the  human  mind  would  teach  us  to  ex- 
pect. To  familiarize  men  with  the  destruction  of  life,  is  to 
teach  them  not  to  abhor  that  destruction.  It  is  the  legitimate 
process  of  the  mind  in  other  things.  He  who  blushes  and 
trembles  the  first  time  he  utters  a  lie,  learns  by  repetition  to 
do  it  with  callous  indifference.  Now  you  execute  a  man  in 
order  to  do  good  by  the  spectacle — while  the  practical  conse- 
quence, it  appears,  is,  that  bad  men  turn  away  from  the  spec- 
tacle more  prepared  to  commit  violence  than  before.  It  will 
be  said,  that  this  effect  is  produced  only  upon  those  who  are 
already  profligate,  and  that  a  salutary  example  is  held  out  to 
the  public.  But  the  answer  is  at  hand — The  public  do  not 
usually  begin  with  capital  crimes.  These  are  committed 
after^  the  person  has  become  depraved — that  is,  after  he  has 
arrived  at  that  state  in  which  an  execution  will  harden  rather 
than  deter  him.  We  "  lower  their  estimate  of  the  life  of  man." 
It  cannot  be  doubted.  It  is  the  inevitable  tendency  of  exe- 
cutions. There  is  much  of  justice  in  an  observation  of  Bec- 
caria's.  "  Is  it  not  absurd  that  the  laws  which  detect  and 
punish  homicide  should,  in  order  to  prevent  murder,  publicly 
commit  murder  themselves  ?"J  By  the  procedures  of  a  court, 
we  virtually  and  perhaps  literally  expatiate  upon  the  sacred- 

*  Observations  on  the  visiting,  &c.,  of  Female  Prisoners,  p.  73. 
t  Ibid.  X  Essay  on  Capital  Punishments,  c.  28. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  PUNISHMENT    OF    DEATH.  433 

ness  of  human  life,  upon  the  dreadful  guilt  of  taking  it  away 
— and  then  forthwith  take  it  away  ourselves  !  It  is  no  sub- 
ject of  wonder  that  this  "  lowers  the  estimate  of  the  life  of 
man."  The  next  sentence  of  the  writer  upon  whose  testi- 
mony I  offer  these  comments,  is  of  tremendous  import : — 
"  There  is  much  reason  to  believe  that  our  public  executions 
have  had  a  direct  and  positive  tendency  to  promote  both  mur- 
der and  suicide"  "  Why,  if  a  considerable  time  elapse  be- 
tween the  trial  and  the  execution,  do  we  find  the  severity  of 
the  public  changed  into  compassion  ?  For  the  same  reason 
that  a  master,  if  he  do  not  beat  his  slave  in  the  moment  of 
resentment,  often  feels  a  repugnance  to  the  beating  him  at 
all."*  This  is  remarkable.  If  executions  were  put  off  for 
a  twelvemonth,  I  doubt  whether  the  public  would  bear  them. 
But  why  if  they  were  just  and  right  ?  Respecting  "  the  con- 
tempt and  indignation  with  which  every  one  looks  on  an  exe- 
cutioner," Beccaria  says  the  reason  is,  "  that  in  a  secret  cor- 
ner of  the  mind,  in  which  the  original  impressions  of  nature 
are  still  preserved,  men  discover  a  sentiment  which  tells  them 
that  their  lives  are  not  lawfully  in  the  power  of  any  one."t 
Let  him  who  has  the  power  of  influencing  the  legislature  of 
the  country  or  public  opinion,  (and  who  has  not?)  consider 
the  responsibility  which  this  declaration  implies,  if  he  lifts 
his  voice  for  the  punishment  of  death ! 

But  further :  the  execution  of  one  offender  excites  in  others 
"  the  spirit  of  revenge."  This  is  extremely  natural.  Many 
a  soldier,  I  dare  say,  has  felt  impelled  to  revenge  the  death 
of  his  comrades  ;  and  the  member  of  a  gang  of  thieves,  who 
has  fewer  restraints  of  principle,  is  likely  to  feel  it  too.  But 
upon  whom  is  his  revenge  inflicted  ?  Upon  the  legislature, 
or  the  jury,  or  the  witnesses  ?  No,  but  upon  the  public — 
upon  the  first  person  whose  life  is  in  their  power,  and  which 
they  are  prompted  to  take  away.  You  execute  a  man,  then, 
in  order  to  save  the  lives  of  others ;  and  the  eflfect  is,  that 
you  add  new  inducements  to  take  the  lives  of  others  away. 

Of  a  system  which  is  thus  unsound — unsound  because  it 
rejects  some  of  the  plainest  dictates  of  the  Moral  Law — and 
unsound  because  so  many  of  its  effects  are  bad,  I  should  be 
ready  to  conclude,  with  no  other  evidence,  that  it  was  utterly 
inexpedient  and  impolitic — ^that  as  it  was  bad  in  morals,  it 
was  bad  in  policy.  And  such  appears  to  be  the  fact. — "  It  is 
incontrovertibly  proved  that  punishments  of  a  milder  and  less 

*  Godwin :  Enq.  Pol.  Just.  v.  2,  p.  726.  t  Beccaria :  Essay  on 

Capital  Punishments,  chap.  28. 

37 


434  PUNIglUTENT    OF    DEATH.  [eSSAY  III. 

injurious  nature  are  calculated  to  produce,  for  every  good  pur 
pose,  afar  more  -powerful  effect^''* 

Finally. — "  The  best  of  substitutes  for  capital  punishment 
will  be  found  in  that  judicious  management  of  criminals  in 
prison  which  it  is  the  object  of  the  present  tract  to  recom- 
mend ;"t  which  management  is  Christian  management — a 
system  in  which  reformation  is  made  the  first  object,  but  in 
which  it  is  found  that  in  order  to  effect  reformation  severity 
to  hardened  offenders  is  needful.  Thus  then  we  arrive  at 
the  goal : — we  begin  with  urging  the  system  that  Christianity 
dictates  as  right ;  we  conclude  by  discovering  that,  as  it  is 
the  right  system,  so  it  is  practically  the  best. 


But  an  argument  in  favour  of  capital  punishments  has  been 
raised  from  the  Christian  Scriptures  themselves. — "  If  I  be 
an  offender,  or  have  committed  any  thing  worthy  of  death,  1 
refuse  not  to  die.";j:  This  is  the  language  of  an  innocent  per- 
son who  was  persecuted  by  malicious  enemies.  It  was  an 
assertion  of  innocence  ;  an  assertion  that  he  had  done  nothing 
worthy  of  death.  The  case  had  no  reference  to  the  question 
of  the  lawfulness  of  capital  punishment,  but  to  the  question 
of  the  lawfulness  of  inflicting  it  upon  him.  Nor  can  it  be 
supposed  that  it  was  the  design  of  the  speaker  to  convey  any 
sanction  of  the  punishment  itself,  because  the  design  would 
have  been  wholly  foreign  to  the  occasion.  The  argument  of 
Grotius  goes  perhaps  too  far  for  his  own  purpose.  "  /f  /  he 
an  offender,  or  have  done  any  thing  worthy  of  death,  I  refuse 
not  to,  die."  He  refused  not  to  die,  then,  if  he  were  an  offender, 
if  he  had  done  one  of  the  "  many  and  grievous  things"  which 
the  Jews  charged  upon  him.  But  will  it  be  contended  that 
he  meant  to  sanction  the  destruction  of  every  person  who  was 
thus  "an  offender  ?" — His  enemies  were  endeavouring  to  take 
his  life,  and  he,  in  earnest  asseveration  of  his  innocence,  says, 
"  If  you  can  fix  your  charges  upon  me,  take  it." 

Grotius  adduces,  as  an  additional  evidence  of  the  sanction 
of  the  punishment  by  Christianity,  this  passage,  "  Servants, 
be  subject  to  your  masters  with  all  fear,  &c. — What  glory  is 
it,  if,  when  ye  be  buffeted  for  your  faults,  ye  shall  take  it 
patiently  1  but  if,  when  ye  do  well,  and  suffer  for  it,  ye  take 
it  patiently,  this  is  acceptable  with  God."^  Some  arguments 
disprove  the  doctrine  which  they  are  advanced  to  support, 
and  this  surely  is  one  of  them.     It  surely  cannot  be  true  that 

*  Observations  on  the  visiting,  &c.,  of  Female  Prisoners,  p.  75. 
t  Ibid.  p.  76.  X  Acts,  XXV.  XI ;  see  Grotius:  Rights  of  War  and 

Peace.  §  1  Pet.  U.  18,  20. 


CHAP.  Xni.]  PUNISHMENT    OF    DEATH.  435 

Christianity  sanctions  capital  punishments,  if  this  is  the  best 
evidence  of  the  sanction  that  can  be  found.* 

Some  persons  again  suppose  that  there  is  a  sort  of  moral 
obligation  to  take  the  life  of  a  murderer  :  "  Whoso  sheddeth 
man's  blood,  by  man  shall  his  blood  be  shed."  This  suppo- 
sition is  an  example  of  that  want  of  advertence  to  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  Christian  morality,  which  in  the  first  Essay  we 
had  occasion  to  notice.  Our _  law  is  the  Christian  law,  and 
if  Christianity  by  its.  precepts  or  spirit  prohibits  the  punish- 
ment of  death,  it  cannot  be  made  right  to  Christians  by  refer- 
ring to  a  commandment  which  was  given  to  Noah.  There 
is,  in  truth,  some  inconsistency  in  the  reasonings  of  those 
who  urge  the  passage.  The  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  verses 
of  Genesis  ninth,  each  contains  a  law  delivered  to  Noah. 
Of  these  three  laws,  we  habitually  disregard  two  :  how  then 
can  we  with  reason  insist  on  the  autliority  of  the  third  ?t 

After  all,  if  the  command  were  in  full  force,  it  would  not 
justify  our  laws  ;  for  they  shed  the  blood  of  many  who  have 
not  shed  blood  themselves. 

And  this  conducts  us  to  the  observation,  that  the  grounds 
upon  which  the  United  States  of  America  still  affix  death  to 
murder  of  the  first  degree,  do  not  appear  very  clear ;  for  if 
other  punishments  are  found  effectual  in  deterring  from  crimes 
of  all  degrees  of  enormity  up  to  the  last,  how  is  it  shown  that 
they  would  not  be  effectual  in  the  last  also  ?  There  is  nothing 
in  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind  to  indicate,  that  a  mur- 
derer is  influenced  by  passions  which  require  that  the  coun- 
teracting power  should  be  totally  diffejent  from  that  which  is 
employed  to  restrain  every  other  crime.  The  difference  too 
in  the  personal  guilt  of  the  perpetrators  of  some  other  crimes, 
and  of  murder,  is  sometimes  extremely  small.  At  any  rate, 
it  is  not  so  great  as  to  imply  a  necessity  for  a  punishment 
totally  dissimilar.  The  truth  appears  to  be,  that  men  enter- 
tain a  sort  of  indistinct  notion  that  murder  is  a  crime  which 
requires  a  peculiar  punishment,  which  notion  is  often  founded, 
not  upon  any  process  of  investigation,  by  which  the  propriety 
of  this  peculiar  punishment  is  discovered,  but  upon  some 
vague  ideas  respecting  the  nature  of  the  crime  itself.  But 
the  dictate  of  philosophy  is,  to  employ  that  punishment  which 
will  be  most  efficacious.     Efficacy  is  the  test  of  its  propri- 

*  "Wickliffe,"  says  Priestley,  "seems  to  have  thought  it  wrong  to  take 
away  the  life  of  a  man  on  any  account." 

t  Indeed  it  would  almost  appear  from  Genesis  ix.  5,  that  even  accidental 
homicide  was  thus  to  be  punished  with  death :  and  if  so,  it  is  wholly  dis- 
regarded in  our  present  practice. 


436  PUNISHMENT    OF    DEATH.  [eSSAY  III 

ety;  and  in  estimating  this  efficacy,  the  character  of  the 
crime  is  a  foreign  consideration.  Again,  the  dictate  of 
Christianity  is,  to  employ  that  punishment  which,  while  it 
deters  the  spectator,  reforms  the  man.  Now,  neither  philoso- 
phy nor  Christianity  appears  to  be  consulted  in  punishing 
murder  with  death,  because  it  is  murder.  And  it  is  worthy 
of  especial  remembrance,  that  the  purpose  for  which  Grotius 
defends  the  punishment  of  death  is,  that  he  may  be  able  to 
defend  the  practice  of  war  : — a  bad  foundation  if  this  be  its 
best! 

It  is  one  objection  to  capital  punishment  that  it  is  abso- 
lutely irrevocable.  If  an  innocent  man  suffers  it  is  impos- 
sible to  recall  the  sentence  of  the  law.  Not  that  this  con- 
sideration alone  is  a  sufficient  argument  against  it,  but  it  is 
one  argument  amongst  the  many.  In  a  certain  sense  indeed, 
all  personal  punishments  are  irrevocable.  The  man  who  by 
a  mistaken  verdict  has  been  confined  twelve  months  in  a 
prison,  cannot  be  repossessed  of  the  time.  But  if  irrevoca- 
ble punishments  cannot  be  dispensed  with,  they  should  not 
be  made  needlessly  common,  and  especially  those  should  be 
regarded  with  jealousy  which  admit  of  no  removal  or  relaxa- 
tion in  the  event  of  subsequently  discovered  innocence,  or 
subsequent  reformation.  It  is  not  sufficiently  considered  that 
a  jury  or  a  court  of  justice  never  know  that  a  prisoner  is 
guilty. — A  witness  may  know  it  who  saw  him  commit  the 
act,  but  others  cannot  know  it  who  depend  upon  testimony, 
for  testimony  may  be  mistaken  or  false.  All  verdicts  are 
founded  upon  probabilities — probabilities  which,  though  they 
sometimes  approach  to  certainty,  never  attain  to  it.  Surely 
it  is  a  serious  thing  for  one  man  to  destroy  another  upon 
grounds  short  of  absolute  certainty  of  his  guilt.  There  is  a 
sort  of  indecency  attached  to  it — an  assumption  of  a  degree 
of  authority  which  ought  to  be  exercised  only  by  Him  whose 
knowledge  is  infallibly  true.  It  is  unhappily  certain  that 
some  have  been  put  to  death  for  actions  which  they  never 
committed.  At  one  assizes,  we  believe,  not  less  than  six 
persons  were  hanged,  of  whom  it  was  afterwards  discovered 
that  they  were  entirely  innocent.  A  deplorable  instance  is 
given  by  Dr.  Smollett : — "  Rape  and  murder  were  perpetrated 
upon  an  unfortunate  woman  in  the  neighbourhood  of  London, 
and  an  innocent  man  suffered  death  for  this  complicated  out- 
rage, while  the  real  criminals  assisted  at  his  execution,  heard 
him  appeal  to  Heaven  for  his  innocence,  and  in  the  character 
of  friends  embraced  him  while  he  stood  on  the  brink  of  eter- 


CHAP.  XIIl.]  PUNISHMENT    OF    i)UATH.  437 

nity."*  Others  equally  innocent,  but  whose  innocence  has 
never  been  made  known,  have  doubtless  shared  the  same 
fate.  These  are  tremendous  considerations,  and  ought  to 
make  men  solemnly  pause  before,  upon  grounds  necessarily 
uncertain,  they  take  away  that  life  which  God  has  given,  and 
which  they  cannot  restore. 

Of  the  merely  philosophical  speculations  respecting  the 
rectitude  of  capital  punishments,  whether  affirmative  or  nega- 
tive, I  would  say  little  ;  for  they  in  truth  deserve  little.  One 
advantage  indeed  attends  a  brief  review — that  the  reader  will 
perceive  how  little  the  speculations  of  philosophers  will  aid 
us  in  the  investigation  of  a  Christian  question. 

The  philosopher,  however,  would  prove  what  the  Christian 
cannot,  and  Mably  accordingly  says,  "  In  the  state  of  nature, 
I  have  a  right  to  take  the  life  of  him  who  lifts  his  arm  against 
mine.  This  right,  upon  entering  into  society,  I  surrender  to 
the  magistrate.''^  If  we  conceded  the  truth  of  the  first  posi- 
tion, (which  we  do  not,)  the  conclusion  from  it  is  an  idle 
sophism ;  for  it  is  obviously  preposterous  to  say,  that  because 
I  have  a  right  to  take  the  life  of  a  man  who  will  kill  me  if  I 
do  not  kill  him,  the  state,  which  is  in  no  such  danger,  has  a 
right  to  do  the  same.  That  danger  which  constitutes  the  al- 
leged right  in  the  individual,  does  not  exist  in  the  case  of  the 
state.  The  foundation  of  the  right  is  gone,  and  where  can 
be  the  right  itself?  Having,  however,  been  thus  told  that 
the  state  has  a  right  to  kill,  we  are  next  informed,  by  Filan- 
gieri,  that  the  criminal  has  no  right  to  live.  He  says,  "  If  I 
have  a  right  to  kill  another  man,  he  has  lost  his  right  to  life"f 
Rousseau  goes  a  little  further.  He  tells  us,  that  in  conse- 
quence of  the  "social  contract"  which  we  make  with  the 
sovereign  on  entering  into  society,  "  Life  is  a  conditional 
grant  of  the  state  :"J  so  that  we  hold  our  lives,  it  seems,  only 
as  "  tenants  at  will,"  and  must  give  them  up  whenever  their 
owner,  the  state  requires  them.  The  reader  has  probably 
hitherto  thought  that  he  retained  his  head  by  some  other 
tenure. 

The  right  of  taking  an  offender's  life  being  thus  proved, 
Mably  shows  us  how  its  exercise  becomes  expedient.  "  A 
murderer,"  says  he,  "  in  taking  away  his  enemy's  life,  believes 
he  does  him  the  greatest  possible  evil.  Death,  then,  in  the 
murderer's  estimation,  is  the  greatest  of  evils.  By  the  fear 
of  death,  therefore,  the  excesses  of  hatred  and  revenge  must 
be  restrained."     If  language  wilder  than  this  can  be  held, 

*  Hist,  of  Eng.  V.  3,  p.  318.  t  Montagu  on  Punishment  of 

Death.  t  Contr.  Soc.  ii.  5,  Montagu. 

37* 


438  RELIGIOUS   ESTABLISHMENTS.  [ESSAf  lit. 

Rousseau,  I  think,  holds  it.  He  says,  "  The  preservation  of 
both  sides  (the  criminal  and  the  state)  is  incompatible  ;  one 
of  the  two  must  perish."  How  it  happens  that  a  nation  "  must 
perish,"  if  a  convict  is  not  hanged,  the  reader,  I  suppose,  will 
not  know.  Even  philosophy,  however,  concedes  as  much  : 
"Absolute  necessity  alone"  says  Pastoret,  "  can  justify  the 
punishment  of  Death ;"  and  Rousseau  himself  acknowledges 
that  "  we  have  no  right  to  put  to  death,  even  for  the  sake  of  ex- 
ample, any  but  those  who  cannot  be  permitted  to  live  without 
danger."  Beccaria  limits  the  right  to  one  specific  case — and 
in  doing  this  he  appears  to  sacrifice  his  own  principle,  (de- 
duced from  that  splendid  fiction,  the  "  social  contract,")  which 
is,  that  "  the  punishment  of  death  is  not  authorized  by  any 
right : — ^no  such  right  exists." 

For  myself,  I  perceive  little  value  in  such  speculations  to 
whatever  conclusions  they  lead,  for  there  are  shorter  and 
surer  roads  to  truth ;  but  it  is  satisfactory  to  find  that,  even 
upon  the  principles  of  such  philosophers,  the  right  to  put 
criminals  to  death  is  not  easily  made  out. 


The  argument,  then,  respecting  the  punishment  of  death, 
is  both  distinct  and  short. 

It  rejects,  by  its  very  nature,  a  regard  to  the  first  and  great- 
est object  of  punishment. 

It  does  not  attain  either  of  the  other  objects  so  well  as 
they  may  be  attained  by  other  means. 

It  is  attended  with  numerous  evils  peculiarly  its  own. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

RELIGIOUS   ESTABLISHMENTS. 

The  primitive  church — The  established  church  of  Ireland — America — 
Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  established  churches — Alliance  of  a 
church  with  the  state — An  established  church  perpetuates  its  own  evils 
— Persecution  generally  the  growth  of  religious  establishments— State 
religions  injurious  to  the  civil  welfare  of  a  people — Legal  provision  for 
Christian  teachers — Voluntary  payment — Advancement  in  the  church 
— The  appointment  of  religious  teachers. 

A  LARGE  number  of  persons  embark  from  Europe,  and  col- 
onize an  uninhabited  territory  in  the  South  Sea.     They  erect 


CliAP.  XIV.]  RELIGTOtlS    KSTABLlSttMfiNTS.  439 

a  government — suppose  a  republic — and  make  all  persons,  of 
whatever  creed,  eligible  to  the  legislature.  The  community 
prospers  and  increases.  In  process  of  time  a  member  of  the 
legislature,  who  is  a  disciple  of  John  Wesley,  persuades 
himself  that  it  will  tend  to  the  promotion  of  religion  that  the 
preachers  of  methodism  should  be  supported  by  a  national 
tax  ;  that  their  stipends  should  be  sufficiently  ample  to  pre- 
vent them  from  necessary  attention  to  any  business  but  that 
of  religion ;  and  that  accordingly  they  shall  be  precluded 
from  the  usual  pursuits  of  commerce  and  from  the  profes- 
sions. He  proposes  the  measure.  It  is  contended  against 
by  the  episcopalian  members,  and  the  independents,  and  the 
catholics,  and  the  unitarians — by  all  but  the  adherents  to  his 
own  creed.  They  insist  upon  the  equality  of  civil  and  reli- 
gious rights,  but  in  vain.  The  majority  prove  to  be  metho- 
dists  ;  they  support  the  measure :  the  law  is  enacted  ;  and 
methodism  becomes,  thenceforth,  the  religion  of  the  state. 
This  is  a  Religious  Establishment. 

i  i  X  it  is  a  religious  establishment  in  its  best  form  ;  and,  per- 
hapa,  none  ever  existed  of  which  the  constitution  was  so  sim- 
ple and  so  pure.  During  one  portion  of  the  papal  history,  the 
Romish  church  was  indeed  not  so  much  an  "  establishment"  of 
the  state  as  a  separate  and  independent  constitution.  For  though 
some  species  of  alliance  subsisted,  yet  the  Romanists  did  not 
acknowledge,  as  Protestants  now  do,  that  the  power  of  estab- 
lishing a  religion  resides  in  the  state. 

In  the  present  day  other  immunities  are  possessed  by  ec- 
clesiastical establishments  than  those  which  are  necessary  to 
constitute  the  institution — such,  for  example,  as  that  of  ex- 
clusive eligibility  to  the  legislature  :  and  other  alliances  with 
the  civil  power  exist  than  that  which  necessarily  results  from 
any  preference  of  a  particular  faith — such  as  that  of  placing 
ecclesiastical  patronage  in  the  hands  of  a  government,  or  of 
those  who  are  under  its  influence.  From  these  circumstances 
it  happens,  that  in  enquiring  into  the  propriety  of  religious 
establishments,  we  cannot  confine  ourselves  to  the  enquiry 
whether  they  are  proper  as  they  usually  exist.  And  this  is 
so  much  the  more  needful,  because  there  is  little  reason  to 
expect  that  when  once  an  ecclesiastical  establishment  has 
been  erected — when  once  a  particular  church  has  been  se- 
lected for  the  preference  and  patronage  of  the  civil  power- 
that  preference  and  patronage  will  be  confined  to  those  cir- 
cumstances which  are  necessary  to  the  subsistence  of  an  es- 
tablishment at  all. 

It  is  sufficiently  obvious  that  it  matters  nothing  to  the  ex- 


440  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  [eSSAY  HI. 

istence  of  an  established  church,  what  the  faith  of  that  church 
is,  or  what  is  the  form  of  its  government.  It  is  not  the  creed 
which  constitutes  the  establishment,  but  the  preference  of  the 
civil  power ;  and  accordingly  the  reader  will  be  pleased  to 
bear  in  mind,  that  neither  in  this  chapter  nor  in  the  next 
ha\e  we  any  concern  with  religious  opinions.  Our  business 
is  not  with  churches,  but  with  church  establishments. 

The  actual  history  of  religious  establishments  in  Christian 
countries,  does  not  differ  in  essence  from  that  which  we  have 
supposed  in  the  South  Sea.  They  have  been  erected  by  the 
influence  or  the  assistance  of  the  civil  power.  In  one  coun- 
try a  religion  may  have  owed  its  political  supremacy  to  the 
superstitions  of  a  prince  ;  and  in  another  to  his  policy  or  am- 
bition :  but  the  effect  has  been  similar.  Whether  supersti- 
tion or  policy,  the  contrivances  of  a  priesthood,  or  the  fortui- 
tous predominance  of  a  party,  have  given  rise  to  the  estab- 
lished church,  is  of  comparatively  little  consequence  to  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  institution. 

Of  the  divine  right  of  a  particular  church  to  supremacy  I 
say  nothing ;  because  none  with  whom  I  am  at  present  con- 
cerned to  argue  imagine  that  it  exists. 

The  only  ground  upon  which  it  appears  that  religious  es- 
tablishments can  be  advocated  are,  first,  that  of  example  or 
approbation  in  the  primitive  churches  ;  and,  secondly,  thai  of 
public  utility. 

I.  The  primitive  church  was  not  a  religious  establishment 
in  any  sense  or  in  any  degree.  No  establishment  existed  un- 
til the  church  had  lost  much  of  its  purity.  Nor  is  there  any 
expression  in  the  New  Testament,  direct  or  indirect,  which 
would  lead  a  reader  to  suppose  that  Christ  or  his  apostles  re- 
garded an  establishment  as  an  eligible  institution.  "  We  find, 
in  his  religion  no  scheme  of  building  up  a  hierarchy,  or  of 
ministering  to  the  views  of  human  governments.'''' — "  Our  reli- 
gion, as  it  came  out  of  the  hands  of  its  Founder  and  his 
apostles,  exhibited  a  complete  abstraction  from  all  views  either 
of  ecclesiastical  or  civil  policy.''^*  The  evidence  which  these 
facts  supply  respecting  the  moral  character  of  religious  estab- 
lishments, whatever  be  its  weight,  tends  manifestly  to  show 
that  that  character  is  not  good.  I  do  not  say  because  Chris- 
tianity exhibited  this  "  complete  abstraction,"  that  it  therefore 
necessarily  condemned  establishments  ;  but  I  say  that  the  bear- 
ing and  the  tendency  of  this  negative  testimony  is  against 
them. 

In  the  discourses  and  writings  of  the  first  teachers  of  our 
*  Paley :  Evidences  of  Christianity,  p.  2,  c.  2. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  441 

religion,  we  find  such  absolute  disinterestedness,  so  little  dis- 
position to  assume  political  superiority,  that  to  have  become 
the  members  of  an  established  church  would  certainly  have 
been  inconsistent  in  them.  It  is  indeed  almost  inconceivable 
that  they  could  ever  have  desired  the  patronage  of  the  state 
for  themselves  or  for  their  converts.  No  man  conceives  that 
Paul  or  John  could  have  participated  in  the  exclusion  of  any 
portion  of  the  Christian  church  from  advantages  which  they 
themselves  enjoyed.  Every  man  perceives  that  to  have  done 
this,  would  have  been  to  assume  a  new  character,  a  character 
which  they  had  never  exhibited  before,  and  which  was  incon- 
gruous with  their  former  principles  and  motives  of  action. 
But  why  is  this  incongruous  with  the  apostolic  character  un- 
less it  is  incongruous  with  Christianity?  Upon  this  single 
ground,  therefore,  there  is  reason  for  the  sentiment  of  "  many 
well-informed  persons,  that  it  seems  extremely  questionable 
whether  the  religion  of  Jesus  Christ  admits  of  any  civil  es- 
tablishment at  all."* 

I  lay  stress  upon  these  considerations.  We  all  know  that 
much  may  be  learnt  respecting  human  duty  by  a  contempla- 
tion of  the  spirit  and  temper  of  Christianity  as  it  was  exhi- 
bited by  its  first  teachers.  When  the  spirit  and  temper  is 
compared  with  the  essential  character  of  religious  establish- 
ments, they  are  found  to  be  incongruous — foreign  to  one  an- 
other— having  no  natural  relationship  or  similarity.  I  should 
regard  such  facts,  in  reference  to  any  question  of  rectitude, 
as  of  great  importance  ;  but  upon  a  subject  so  intimately  con- 
nected with  religion  itself,  the  importance  is  peculiarly  great. 

II.  The  question  of  the  utility  of  religious  establishments 
is  to  be  decided  by  a  comparison  of  their  advantages  and 
their  evils. 

Of  their  advantages,  the  first  and  greatest  appears  to  be 
that  they  provide,  or  are  assumed  to  provide,  religious  instruc- 
tion for  the  whole  community.  If  this  instruction  be  left  by 
the  state  to  be  cared  for  by  each  Christian  church  as  it  pos- 
sesses the  zeal  or  the  means,  it  may  be  supposed  that  many 
districts  will  be  destitute  of  any  public  religious  instruction. 
At  least  the  state  cannot  be  assured  before  hand  that  every 
district  will  be  supplied.  And  when  it  is  considered  how 
great  is  the  importance  of  regular  public  worship  to  the  virtue 
of  a  people,  it  is  not  to  be  denied,  that,  a  scheme  which,  by 
destroying  an  establishment,  would  make  that  instruction  in- 
adequate or  uncertain,  is  so  far  to  be  regarded  as  of  question- 
able expediency.  But  the  effect  which  would  be  produce^ 
*  Simpson's  Plea  for  Religion  and  the  Sacred  Writings. 


442  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS  [eSSAY  III. 

by  dispensing  with  establishments  is  to  be  estimated,  so  far 
as  is  in  our  power,  by  facts.  Now  dissenters  are  in  the  situa- 
tion of  separate  unestablished  churches.  If  they  do  not  pro- 
vide for  the  public  officers  of  religion  voluntarily,  they  will 
not  be  provided  for.  Yet  where  is  any  considerable  body  of 
dissenters  to  be  found  who  do  not  provide  themselves  with  a 
chapel  and  a  preacher  ?  And  if  those  churches  which  are 
not  established,  do  in  fact  provide  public  instruction,  how  is  it 
shown  that  it  would  not  be  provided  although  there  were  no 
established  religion  in  a  state  ?  Besides,  the  dissenters  from 
an  established  church  provide  this  under  peculiar  disadvan- 
^  tages  ;  for  after  paying,  in  common  with  others,  their  quota  to 
the  state  religion,  they  have  to  pay  in  addition  to  their  own. 
But  perhaps  it  will  be  said  that  dissenters  from  a  state  reli- 
gion are  actuated  by  a  zeal  with  which  the  professors  of  that 
religion  are  not ;  and  that  the  legq-1  provision  supplies  the  de- 
ficiency of  zeal.  If  this  be  said,  the  enquiry  imposes  itself 
—How  does  this  disproportion  of  zeal  arise  ?  Why  should 
dissenters  be  more  zealous  than  churchmen  ?  What  account 
can  be  given  of  the  matter,  but  that  there  is  something  in  the 
patronage  of  the  state  which  induces  apathy  upon  the  church 
that  it  prefers  ?  One  other  account  may  indeed  be  offered — 
that  to  be  a  dissenter  is  to  be  a  positive  religionist,  whilst  to 
be  a  churchman  is  frequently  only  to  be  nothing  else  ;  that 
an  establishment  embraces  all  who  are  not  embraced  by 
others  ;  and  that  if  those  whom  other  churches  do  not  in- 
clude were  not  cared  for  by  the  state  religion,  they  would  not 
be  cared  for  at  all.  This  is  an  argument  of  apparent  weight, 
but  the  effect  of  reasoning  is  to  diminish  that  weight.  For 
what  is  meant  by  "  including,"  by  "  caring  for,"  the  indifferent 
and  irreligious  ?  An  established  church  only  offers  them  in- 
struction ;  it  does  not  "  compel  them  to  come  in,"  and  we 
have  just  seen  that  this  offer  is  made  by  unestablished 
churches  also.  Who  doubts  whether  in  a  district  that  is  suf- 
ficient to  fill  a  temple  of  the  state  religion,  there  would  be 
found  persons  to  offer  a  temple  of  public  worship  though  the 
state  did  not  compel  it  ?  Who  doubts  whether  this  would  be 
the  case  if  the  district  were  inhabited  by  dissenters  ?  and  if 
it  would  not  be  done  supposing  the  inhabitants  to  belong  to 
the  state  religion,  the  conclusion  is  inevitable,  that  there  is  a 
tendency  to  indifference  resulting  from  the  patronage  of  XW. 
state. 

Let  us  listen  to  the  testimony  of  Archbishop  Newcome. 
He  speaks  of  Ireland,  and  says,  "  Great  numbers  of  country- 
parishes  are  without  churches^  notwithstanding  the  largeness 


CHAP.  XIV.]  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  443 

and  frequency  of  parliamentary  grants  for  building  them  ;"  but 
meeting-houses  and  Romish  chapels,  which  are  built  and  re- 
paired  with  greater  zeal,  are  in  sufficient  numbers  about  the 
country."*  This  is  remarkable  testimony  indeed.  That 
church  which  is  patronised  and  largely  assisted  by  the  state, 
does  not  provide  places  for  public  worship :  those  churches 
which  are  not  patronised  and  not  assisted  by  the  state,  do  pro- 
vide them,  and  provide  them  in  "  sufficient  numbers"  and 
"  with  greater  zeal."  What  then  becomes  of  the  argument, 
that  a  church  establishment  is  necessary  in  order  to  provide 
instruction  which  would  not  otherwise  be  provided  1 

Yet  here  one  point  must  be  conceded.  It  does  not  follow 
because  one  particular  state  religion  is  thus  deficient,  that 
none  would  be  more  exemplary.  The  fault  may  not  be  so 
much  in  religious  establishments  as  such,  as  in  that  particular 
establishment  which  obtains  in  the  instance  before  us. 

Kindred  to  the  testimony  of  the  Irish  primate  is  the  more 
cautious  language  of  the  archdeacon  of  Carlisle  : — "  I  do  not 
know,"  says  he,  "  that  it  is  in  any  degree  true  that  the  influ- 
ence of  religion  is  the  greatest  where  there  are  the  fewest 
dissenters. "t  This,  I  suppose,  may  lawfully  be  interpreted 
into  positive  language — that  the  influence  of  religion  is  the 
greatest  where  there  are  numerous  dissenters.  But  if  numer- 
ous adherents  to  unestablished  churches  be  favourable  to  re- 
ligion, it  would  appear  that,  although  there  were  none  but  un- 
established churches  in  a  country,  the  influence  of  religion 
would  be  kept  up.  If  established  churches  are  practically 
useful  to  religion,  what  more  reasonable  than  to  expect  that 
where  they  possessed  the  more  exclusive  operation,  their 
utility  would  be  the  greatest  ?  Yet  the  contrary,  it  appears,  is 
the  fact.  It  may  indeed  be  urged  that  it  is  the  existence  of 
a  state  religion  which  animates  the  zeal  of  the  other  churches, 
and  that  in  this  manner  the  state  religion  does  good.  To 
which  it  is  a  sufficient  answer,  that  the  benefit,  if  it  is  thus 
occasioned,  is  collateral  and  accidental,  and  offers  no  testi- 
mony in  favour  of  establishments  as  such ; — and  this  is  our 
concern.  Besides,  there  are  many  sects  to  animate  the  zeal 
of  one  another,  even  though  none  were  patronised  by  the  state. 

To  estimate  the  relative  influence  of  religion  in  two  countries 
is  no  easy  task.  Yet,  I  believe,  if  Ave  compare  its  influence 
in  the  United  States  with  that  which  it  possesses  in  most  of 
the  European  countries  which  possess  state  religions,  it  will 
be  found  that  the  balance  is  in  favour  of  the  community  in 

*  See  Gisbome's  Duties  of  Men.  t  Paley :  Evidences  of  Chris- 

tianity. ^ 


444  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  [eSSAY  III 

which  there  is  no  established  church :  at  any  rate,  the  balance 
is  not  so  much  against  it  as  to  afford  any  evidence  in  favour 
of  a  state  religion.  A  traveller  in  America  has  remarked, 
"  There  is  more  religion  in  the  United  States  than  in  England, 
and  more  in  England  than  in  Italy.  The  closer  the  monopoly, 
the  less  abundant  the  supply."*  Another  traveller  writes 
almost  as  if  he  had  anticipated  the  present  disquisition—"  It 
has  been  often  said,  that  the  disinclination  of  the  heart  to  re- 
ligious truth,  renders  a  state  establishment  absolutely  neces- 
sary for  the  purpose  of  Christianizing  the  country.  Ireland 
and  America  can  furnish  abundant  evidence  of  the  fallacy  of 
such  an  hypothesis.  In  the  one  country  we  see  an  ecclesi- 
astical establishment  of  the  most  costly  description  utterly 
inoperative  in  dispelling  ignorance  or  refuting  error ;  in  the 
other  no  establishment  of  any  kind,  and  yet  religion  making 
daily  and  hourly  progress,  promoting  enquiry,  diffusing  know- 
ledge, strengthening  the  weak,  and  mollifying  the  hardened."! 
In  immediate  connexion  with  this  subject  is  the  argument 
that  Dr.  Paley  places  at  the  head  of  those  which  he  advances 
in  favour  of  religious  establishments — that  the  knowledge  and 
profession  of  Christianity  cannot  be  upholden  without  a  clergy 
supported  by  legal  provision,  and  belonging  to  one  sect  of  Chris- 
tians.1^.  The  justness  of  this  proposition  is  founded  upon  the 
necessity  of  research.  It  is  said  that  "  Christianity  is  an  his- 
torical religion,"  and  that  the  truth  of  its  history  must  be  in- 
vestigated ;  that  in  order  to  vindicate  its  authority  and  to  as- 
certain its  truths,  leisure  and  education  and  learning  are  indis- 
pensable— so  that  such  an  "  order  of  clergy  is  necessary  to 
perpetuate  the  evidences  of  revelation,  and  to  interpret  the 
obscurity  of  those  ancient  writings  in  which  the  religion  is 
contained."  To  all  this  there  is  one  plain  objection,  that 
when  once  the  evidences  of  religion  are  adduced  and  made 
public,  when  once  the  obscurity  of  the  ancient  writings  is  in- 
terpreted, the  work,  so  far  as  discovery  is  concerned, is  done  ; 
and  it  can  hardly  be  imagined  that  an  established  clergy  is 
necessary  in  perpetuity  to  do  that  which  in  its  own  nature  can 
be  done  but  once.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  validity  of 
this  argument  in  other  times,  when  few  but  the  clergy  pos- 
sessed any  learning,  or  when  the  evidences  of  religion  had 
not  been  sought  out,  it  possesses  little  validity  now.  These 
evidences  are  brought  before  the  world  in  a  form  so  clear  and 
accessible  to  literary  and  good  men,  that,  in  the  present  state 
of  society,  there  is  little  reason  to  fear  they  will  be  lost  for 

*  Hall.  t  Duncan's  Trav.  in  America. 

t  See  Mor.  and  Pol.  PhU.  b.  6  c.  10. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  445 

want  of  an  established  church.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten  that  with 
respect  to  our  own  country,  the  best  defences  of  Christianity 
which  exist  in  the  language,  have  not  been  the  work  either  of 
the  estabUshed  clergy  or  of  members  of  the  established  church. 
The  expression,  that  such  "  an  order  of  clergy  is  necessary 
to  perpetuate  the  evidences  of  revelation,"  appears  to  contain 
an  illusion.  Evidences  can  in  no  other  sense  be  perpetuated 
than  by  being  again  and  again  brought  before  the  public.  If 
this  be  the  meaning,  it  belongs  rather  to  the  teaching  of  re- 
ligious truths  than  to  their  discovery ;  but  it  is  upon  the  dis- 
covery, it  is  upon  the  opportunity  of  research,  that  the  argument 
is  founded  :  and  it  is  particularly  to  be  noticed,  that  this  is  the 
primary  argument  which  Paley  adduces  in  deciding  "  the  first 
and  most  fundamental  question  upon  the  subject." 

It  pleases  Providence  to  employ  human  agency  in  the  vin- 
dication and  diffusion  of  his  truth ;  but  to  employ  the  expres- 
sion "  the  knowledge  and  profession  of  Christianity"  cannot 
be  upholden  without  an  established  clergy,  approaches  to 
irreverence.  Even  a  rejector  of  Christianity  says,  "  If  public 
worship  be  conformable  to  reason,  reason  without  doubt  will 
prove  adequate  to  its  vindication  and  support.  If  it  be  from 
God  it  is  profanation  to  imagine  that  it  stands  in  need  of  the 
alliance  of  the  state."*  And  it  is  clearly  untrue  in  fact ;  be- 
cause, without  such  a  clergy,  it  is  actually  upheld,  and  because, 
during  the  three  first  centuries,  the  religion  subsisted  and 
spread  and  prospered  without  any  encouragement  from  the 
state.  And  it  is  remarkable,  too,  that  the  diffusion  of  Chris- 
tianity in  our  own  times  in  Pagan  nations,  is  effected  less  by 
the  clergy  of  established  churches  than  by  others. f 

Such  are  amongst  the  principal  of  the  direct  advantages  of 
religious  establishments  as  they  are  urged  by  those  who  ad- 
vocate them.  Some  others  will  be  noticed  in  enquiring  into 
the  opposite  question  of  their  disadvantages. 

These  disadvantages  respect  either  the  institution  itself — 
or  religion  generally — or  the  civil  welfare  of  a  people. 

I.  The  institution  itself.  "  The  single  end  we  ought  to 
propose  by  religious  establishments  is,  the  preservation  and 
communication  of  religious  knowledge.  Every  other  idea, 
and  every  other  end,  that  have  been  mixed  with  this,  as  the 
making  of  the  church  an  engine,  or  even  an  ally,  of  the  state  • 

»  Godwin's  Pol.  Just.  2,  608. 

t  In  the  preceding  discussion,  I  have  left  out  all  reference  to  the  pro- 
per qualification  or  appointment  of  Christian  ministers,  and  have  assumed 
(but  without  conceding)  that  the  magistrate  is  at  hberty  to  adjust  those 
matters  if  he  pleases. 

38 


446  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMEXTS.  [eSSAY  III. 

converting  it  into  the  means  of  strengthening  or  diffusing  in- 
fluence ;  or  regarding  it  as  a  support  of  regal,  in  opposition  to 
popular  forms  of  government ;  have  served  only  to  debase  the 
institution,  and  to  introduce  into  it  numerous  corruptions  and 
abuses."*  This  is  undoubtedly  true.  Now,  we  affirm  that 
this  "  debasement  of  the  institution,"  this  "  introduction  of 
numerous  corruptions  and  abuses,"  is  absolutely  inseparable 
from  religious  establishments  as  they  ordinarily  exist;  that 
wherever  and  whenever  a  state  so  prefers  and  patronizes  a 
particular  church,  these  debasements  and  abuses  and  corrup- 
tions will  inevitably  arise. 

"  An  engine  or  ally  of  the  state."  How  will  you  frame — 
I  will  not  say  any  religious  establishment,  but — any  religious 
establishment  that  approaches  to  the  ordinary  character,  with- 
out making  it  an  engine  or  ally  of  the  state  ?  Alliance  is  in- 
volved in  the  very  idea  of  the  institution.  The  state  selects, 
and  prefers,  and  grants  privileges  to,  a  particular  church. 
The  continuance  of  these  privileges  depends  upon  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  state  in  its  present  principles.  If  the  state  is 
altered,  the  privileges  are  endangered  or  may  be  swept  away. 
The  privileged  church,  therefore,  is  interested  in  supporting 
the  state,  in  standing  by  it  against  opposition ;  or,  which  is  the 
same  thing,  that  church  becomes  an  ally  of  the  state.  You 
cannot  separate  the  effect  from  the  cause.  Wherever  the  state 
prefers  and  patronises  one  church,  there  will  be  an  alliance 
between  the  state  and  that  church.  There  may  be  variations 
in  the  strength  of  this  alliance.  The  less  the  patronage  of 
the  state,  the  less  strong  the  alliance  will  be.  Or  there  may 
be  emergencies  in  which  the  alliance  is  suspended  by  the 
influence  of  stronger  interests ;  but  still  the  alliance,  as  a 
general  consequence  of  the  preference  of  the  state,  will  inevi- 
tably subsist.  When,  therefore,  ♦Dr.  Paley  says,  that  to  make 
an  establishment  an  ally  of  the  state  is  to  introduce  into  it 
numerous  corruptions  and  abuses,  he  in  fact  says,  that  to  make 
an  establishment  at  all  is  to  introduce  into  a  church  numerous 
corruptions  and  abuses. 

It  matters  nothing  what  the  doctrines  or  constitution  of  the 
church  may  be.  The  only  point  is,  the  alliance,  and  its  de- 
gree. It  may  be  episcopal,  or  presbyterian,  or  independent ; 
but  wherever  the  degree  of  alliance — ^that  is,  of  preference 
and  patronage — is  great,  there  the  abuses  and  corruptions  will 
be  great.  In  this  country  during  a  part  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, independency  became,  in  effect,  the  established  church. 
It  became  of  course  an  ally  of  the  state  ;  and  fought  from  its 
»  Paley:  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  6,  c.  10. 


CHAP.   XIV.]  RELIOIOtTS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  44? 

pulpits  the  battles  of  the  state.  Nor  will  any  one,  I  suppose, 
deny  that  this  alliance  made  independency  worse  than  it  was 
before, — that  it  "introduced  into  it  corruptions  and  abuses." 

The  less  strict  the  alliance,  the  fewer  the  corruptions  that 
spring  from  an  alliance.  One  state  may  impose  a  test  to  dis- 
tinguish  the  ministers  of  the  preferred  church,  and  leave  the 
selection  to  the  church  itself :  another  may  actually  appoint 
some  or  all  of  the  ministers.  These  differences  in  the  close- 
ness of  the  alliance  will  produce  differences  in  the  degree  of 
corruption  ;  but  alliance  and  corruption  in  both  cases  there  will 
be.  He  who  receives  a  legal  provision  from  the  minister  of  the 
day,  will  lend  his  support  to  the  minister  of  the  day.  He  who  re- 
ceives it  by  the  operation  of  a  general  law,  will  lend  his  support 
to  that  political  system  which  is  likely  to  perpetuate  that  law. 

"  The  means  of  strengthening  or  diffusing  influence."  This 
abuse  of  religious  establishments  is  presupposed  in  the  ques- 
tion of  alliance.  It  is  by  the  means  of  influence  that  the 
alliance  is  produced.  There  may  be  and  there  are  gradations 
in  the  directness  or  flagrancy  of  the  exercise  of  influence, 
but  influence  of  some  kind  is  inseparable  from  the  selection 
and  preference  of  a  particular  church. 

"  A  support  of  regal  in  opposition  to  popular  forms  of  gov- 
ernment." This  attendant  upon  religious  establishments  is 
accidental.  An  establishment  will  support  that  form,  what- 
ever it  be,  by  which  it  is  itself  supported.  In  one  country  it 
may  be  the  ally  of  republicanism,  in  another  of  aristocracy, 
and  in  another  of  monarchy  ;  but  in  all  it  will  be  the  ally  of 
its  own  patron.  The  establishment  of  France  supported  the 
despotism  of  the  Louises.  The  establishment  of  Spain  sup- 
ports at  this  hour  the  pitiable  policy  of  Ferdinand.  So  accu- 
rately is  alliance  maintained,  that  in  a  mixed  government  it 
will  be  found  that  an  establishment  adheres  to  that  branch  of 
the  government  by  which  its  own  pre-eminence  is  most  sup- 
ported. In  England  the  strictest  alliance  is  between  the 
church  and  the  executive  ;  and  accordingly,  in  ruptures  be- 
tween the  executive  and  legislative  powers,  the  establishment 
has  adhered  to  the  former.  There  was  an  exception  in  the 
reign  of  James  II.  :  but  it  was  an  exception  wliich  confirms 
the  rule  ;  for  the  establishment  then  found  or  feared  that  its 
alliance  with  the  regal  power  was  about  to  he  broken. 

Seeing,  then,  the  debasement  of  a  Christian  church — ^that 
the  introduction  into  it  of  corruptions  and  abuses,  is  insepar- 
able from  religious  establishments,  what  is  this  debasement 
and  what  are  these  abuses  and  corruptions  ? 

Now,  without  entering  into  minute  enquiry,  many  evils 


448  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  [eSSAY  111. 

arise  obviously  from  the  nature  of  the  case.  Here  is  an  in- 
troduction, into  the  office  of  the  Christian  ministry,  of  motives 
and  interests,  and  aims,  foreign  to  the  proper  business  of  the 
office  ;  and  not  only  foreign  but  incongruous  and  discordant 
with  it.  Here  are  secular  interests  mixed  up  with  the  mo- 
tives of  religion.  Here  are  temptations  to  assume  the  minis- 
terial function  in  the  church  that  is  established,  for  the  sake 
of  its  secular  advantages.  Here  are  inducements,  when  the 
function  is  assumed,  to  accommodate  the  manner  of  its  exer- 
cise to  the  inclinations  of  the  state ;  to  suppress,  for  example, 
some  religious  principles  which  the  civil  power  does  not  wish 
to  see  inculcated  ;  to  insist  for  the  same  reason  with  undue 
emphasis  upon  others  ;  in  a  word,  to  adjust  the  religious  con- 
duct so  as  to  strengthen  or  perpetuate  the  alliance  with  the 
state.  It  is  very  easy  to  perceive  that  these  temptations  will 
and  must  frequently  prevail ;  and  wherever  they  do  prevail, 
there  the  excellence  and  dignity  of  the  Christian  ministry  are 
diminished,  are  depressed ;  there  Christianity  is  not  exem- 
plified in  its  purity:  there  it  is  shorn  of  a  portion  of  its 
beams.  The  extent  of  the  evil  will  depend  of  course  upon 
the  vigour  of  the  cause  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  evil  will  be  pro- 
portionate to  the  alliance.  If  a  religious  establishment  were 
erected  in  which  the  executive  power  of  the  country  ap- 
pointed all  its  ministers,  there  would,  I  doubt  not,  ensue  an 
almost  universal  corruption  of  the  ministry.  As  an  establish- 
ment recedes  in  its  constitution  from  this  closeness  of  al- 
liance, a  corresponding  increase  of  purity  may  be  expected. 

During  the  reformation,  and  in  Queen  Elizabeth's  time,  "  of 
nine  thousand  four  hundred  beneficed  clergy,"  (adherents  to 
Papacy,)  "  only  one  hundred  and  seventy-seven  resigned  their 
preferment  rather  than  acknowledge  the  Queen's  supremacy,"* 
yet  the  Pope  to  them  was  head  of  the  church.  One  particu- 
lar manner  in  which  the  establishment  of  a  church  injures  the 
character  of  the  church  itself  is,  by  the  temptation  which  it 
holds  out  to  equivocation  or  hypocrisy.  It  is  necessary  to 
the  preference  of  the  teachers  of  a  particular  sect,  that  there 
should  be  some  means  of  discovering  who  belong  to  that  sect : 
— there  must  be  some  test.  Before  the  man  who  is  desirous 
of  undertaking  the  ministerial  office, ,  there  are  placed  two 
roads,  one  of  which  conducts  to  those  privileges  which  a 
state  religion  enjoys,  and  the  other  does  not.  The  latter  may 
be  entered  by  all  who  will :  the  former  by  those  only  who 
affirm  their  belief  of  the  rectitude  of  some  church  forms  or 
of  some  points  of  theology.  It  requires  no  argument  to  prove 
*  Southey :  Book  of  the  Church,  Sir  Thomas  More. 


CHAP.  XlV.]  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  449 

that  this  is  to  tempt  men  to  affirm  that  which  they  do  not  be- 
lieve :  that  it  is  to  say  to  the  man  who  does  not  believe  the 
stipulated  points,  Here  is  money  for  you  if  you  will  violate 
your  conscience.  By  some  the  invitation  will  be  accepted  ;* 
and  what  is  the  result  ?  Why  that,  just  as  they  are  going 
publicly  to  insist  upon  the  purity  and  sanctity  of  the  Moral 
Law,  they  violate  that  law  themselves.  The  injury  which  is 
thus  done  to  a  Christian  church  by  establishing  it,  is  negative 
as  well  as  positive.  You  not  only  tempt  some  men  to  equiv- 
ocation or  hypocrisy,  but  exclude  from  the  office  others  of 
sounder  integrity.  Two  persons,  both  of  whom  do  not  as- 
sent to  the  prescribed  points,  are  desirous  of  entering  the 
church.  One  is  upright  and  conscientious,  the  other  subser- 
vient and  unscrupulous.  An  establishment  excludes  the  good 
man  and  admits  the  bad.  "  Though  some  purposes  of  order 
and  tranquillity  may  be  answered  by  the  establishment  of 
creeds  and  confessions,  yet  they  are  at  all  times  attended  with 
serious  inconveniences  :  they  check  enquiry ;  they  violate  li- 
berty ;  they  ensnare  the  consciences  of  the  clergy,  by  hold- 
ing out  temptations  to  prevarication."! 

And  with  respect  to  the  habitual  accommodation  of  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  ministry  to  the  desires  of  the  state  it  is  manifest 
that  an  enlightened  and  faithful  minister  may  frequently  find 
himself  restrained  by  a  species  of  political  leading-strings. 
He  has  not  the  full  command  of  his  intellectual  and  religious 
attainments.  He  may  not  perhaps  communicate  the  whole 
counsel  of  God.  J  It  was  formerly  conceded  to  the  English 
clergy  that  they  might  preach  against  the  horrors  and  impolicy 
of  war,  provided  they  were  not  chaplains  to  regiments  or  in 
the  navy.  Conceded!  Then  if  the  state  had  pleased,  it 
might  have  withheld  the  concession ;  and  accordingly  from 
some  the  state  did  withhold  it.  They  were  prohibited  to 
preach  against  that,  against  which  the  apostles  wrote  !  What 
would  these  apostles  have  said  if  a  state  had  bidden  them 
keep  silence  respecting  the  most  unchristian  custom  in  the 
world  ?  They  would  have  said,  Whether  we  ought  to  obey 
God  rather  than  man,  judge  ye.  What  would  they  have 
done  ?     They  would  have  gone  away  and  preached  against  it 

*  "  Chillingworth  declared  in  a  letter  to  Dr.  Sheldon,  that  if  he  sub- 
scribed he  subscribed  his  own  damnation,  and  yet  in  no  long  space  of 
time  he  actually  did  subscribe  to  the  articles  of  the  church  again  and 
again."     Simpson's  Plea. 

t  Paley :  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  6,  c.  10. 

X  "  Honest  and  dismterested  boldness  in  the  path  of  duty  is  one  of  the 
first  requisites  of  a  minister  of  the  gospel."  Gisbome.  But  how  shall 
thev  be  thus  disinterested  ?     Mem.  in  the  MS. 

38* 


450  RELIGIOUS  Establishments.  [essay  iit. 

as  before.  One  question  more  should  be  asked — ^What  would 
they  have  said  to  an  alliance  which  thus  brought  the  Chris- 
tian minister  under  bondage  to  the  state  ? 

The  next  point  of  view  in  which  a  religious  establish- 
ment is  injurious  to  the  church  itself  is,  that  it  perpetuates  any 
evils  which  happen  to  exist  in  it.  The  reason  is  this :  the 
preference  which  a  state  gives  to  a  particular  church  is  given 
to  it  as  it  is.  If  the  church  makes  alterations  in  its  constitu- 
tion, its  discipline,  or  its  forms,  it  cannot  tell  whether  the  state 
would  continue  to  prefer  and  to  patronise  it.  Besides,  if  al- 
terations are  begun,  its  members  do  not  know  whether  the  alac- 
rity of  some  other  church  might  not  take  advantage  of  the 
loosening  alliance  with  the  state,  to  supplant  it.  In  short, 
they  do  not  know  what  would  be  the  consequences  of  amend- 
ments, nor  where  they  would  end.  Conscious  that  the 
church  as  it  is  possesses  the  supremacy,  they  think  it  more 
prudent  to  retain  that  supremacy  with  existing  evils,  than  to 
endanger  it  by  attempting  to  reform  them.  Thus  it  is  that 
whilst  unestablished  churches  alter  their  discipline  or  consti- 
tution as  need  appears  to  require,  established  churches  remain 
century  after  century  the  same,*  Not  to  be  free  to  alter,  can 
only  then  be  right  when  the  church  is  at  present  as  perfect  as 
it  can  be  ;  and  no  one  perhaps  will  gravely  say  that  there  is 
any  established  church  on  the  globe  which  needs  no  amend- 
ment. Dr,  Hartley  devoted  a  portion  of  his  celebrated  work 
to  a  discussion  of  the  probability  that  all  the  existing  church 
establishments  in  the  world  would  be  dissolved  ;  and  he  founds 
this  probability  expressly  upon  the  ground  that  they  need  so 
much  reformation. 

"  In  all  exclusive  establishments,  where  temporal  emolu- 
ments are  annexed  to  the  profession  of  a  certain  system  of 
doctrines,  and  the  usage  of  a  certain  routine  of  forms,  and 
appropriated  to  an  order  of  men  so  and  so  qualified,  that  order 
of  men  will  naturally  think  themselves  interested  that  things 
should  continue  as  they  are.  A  reformation  might  endang'er  their 
emoluments."!  This  is  the  testimony  of  a  dignitary  of  one  of 
these  establishments.  And  the  fact  being  admitted,  what  is  the 
amount  of  the  evil  which  it  involves  ?  Let  another  dignitary 
reply  :  "  He  who,  by  a  diligent  and  faithful  examination  of  the 
original  records,  dismisses  from  the  system  one  article  which 
contradicts  the  apprehension,  the  experience,  or  the  reasoning 

*  It  was  not  to  religious  establishments  that  Protestants  were  indebted 
for  the  first  efforts  of  reformation.  They  have  uniformly  resisted  reform- 
ation.    Mem.  in  the  MS. 

t  Archdeacon  Blackburn's  Confessional:  Pref. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  RfiLIGiOTTS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  461 

of  mankind,  does  more  towards  recommending  the  belief,  and 
with  the  belief  the  influence  of  Christianity,  to  the  understand- 
ings and  consciences  of  serious  enquirers,  and  through  them 
to  universal  reception  and  authority,  than  can  be  effected  by 
a  thousand  contenders  for  creedsand  ordinances  of  human  es- 
tablishments." If  the  benefits  of  dismissing  such  an  article 
are  so  great,  what  must  be  the  evil  of  continuing  it  ?  If  the 
benefit  of  dimissing  one  such  article  be  so  great,  what  must  be 
the  evil  of  an  established  system  which  tends  habitually  and 
constantly  to  retain  many  of  them  ?  Yet  these  "  articles, 
which  thus  contradict  the  reasoning  of  mankind,"  are  actually 
retained  by  established  churches.  "  Creeds  and  confessions," 
says  Dr.  Paley,  "  however  they  may  express  the  persuasion, 
or  be  accommodated  to  the  controversies  or  to  the  fears  of  the 
age  in  which  they  are  composed,  in  process  of  time,  and  by 
reason  of  the  changes  which  are  wont  to  take  place  in  the 
judgment  pf  mankind  upon  religious  subjects,  they  come  at 
length  to  contradict  the  actual  opinions  of  the  church  whose 
doctrines  they  profess  to  contain."*  It  is  then  confessed  by 
the  members  of  an  established  church  that  religious  establish- 
ments powerfully  obstruct  the  belief,  the  influence,  the  uni- 
versal reception  and  authority  of  Christianity.  Great,  indeed, 
must  be  the  counter  advantages  of  these  establishments  if  they 
counterbalance  this  portion  of  its  evils. 

II.  This  last  paragraph  anticipates  the  second  class  of  dis- 
advantages attendant  upon  religious  establishments  :  their  ill 
effects  upon  religion  generally.  It  is  indisputable,  that  much 
of  the  irreligion  of  the  world  has  resulted  from  those  things 
which  have  been  mixed  up  with  Christianity,  and  placed  be- 
fore mankind  as  parts  of  religion.  In  some  countries,  the 
mixture  has  been  so  flagrant  that  the  majority  of  the  thinking 
part  of  the  population  have  almost  rejected  religion  altogether. 
So  it  was,  and  so  it  may  be  feared  it  still  is,  in  France.  The 
intellectual  part  of  her  people  rejected  religion,  not  because 
they  had  examined  Christianity  and  were  convinced  that  it 
was  a  fiction,  but  because  they  had  examined  what  was  pro- 
posed to  them  as  Christianity  and  found  it  was  absurd  or 
false.  So  numerous  were  the  "  articles  that  contradicted  the 
experience  and  judgment  of  mankind,"  that  they  concluded 
the  whole  was  a  fable  and  rejected  the  whole. 

Now  that  which  the  French  church  establishment  did  in 
an  extreme  degTee,  others  do  in  a  less  degree.     If  the  French 
church  retained  a  hundred  articles  that  contradicted  the  judg- 
ment of  mankind,  and  thus  made  a  nation  of  unbelievers,  the 
*  Paley :  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  6,  c.  10. 


452  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  [eSSAY  III. 

church  which  retains  ten  or  five  such  articles,  weakens  the 
general  influence  of  religion  although  it  may  not  destroy  it. 

Nor  is  it  merely  by  unauthorized  doctrinal  articles  or  forms 
that  the  influence  of  religion  is  impaired,  but  by  the  general 
evils  which  aflect  the  church  itself.  It  is  sufficiently  manifest, 
that  whatever  tends  to  diminish  the  virtue,  or  to  impeach  the 
character,  of  the  ministers  of  religion,  must  tend  to  diminish 
the  influence  of  religion  upon  mankind.  If  the  teacher  is  not 
good,  we  are  not  to  expect  goodness  in  the  taught.  If  a  man 
enters  the  church  with  impure  or  unworthy  motives,  he  can- 
not do  his  duty  when  he  is  there.  If  he  makes  religion  sub- 
servient to  interest  in  his  own  practice,  he  cannot  effectually 
teach  others  to  make  religion  paramount  to  all.  Men  asso- 
ciate (they  ought  to  do  it  less)  the  idea  of  religion  with  that 
of  its  teachers ;  and  their  respect  for  one  is  frequently  mea- 
sured by  their  respect  for  the  other.  Now,  that  the  eflect  of 
religious  establishments  has  been  to  depress  their  teachers  in 
the  estimation  of  mankind,  cannot  be  disputed.  The  effect  is, 
in  truth,  inevitable.  And  it  is  manifest  that  whatever  con- 
veys disrespectful  ideas  of  religion  diminishes  its  influence 
upon  the  human  mind.  In  brief,  we  have  seen  that  to  estab- 
lish a  religion  is  morally  pernicious  to  its  ministers  ;  and 
whatever  is  injurious  to  them  diminishes  the  power  of  religion 
in  the  world. 

Christianity  is  a  religion  of  good-will  and  kind  affections. 
Its  essence,  so  far  as  the  intercourse  of  society  is  concerned, 
is  Love.  Whatever  diminishes  good- will  and  kind  aflfections 
amongst  Christians,  attacks  the  essence  of  Christianity.  Now, 
religious  establishments  do  this.  They  generate  ill-will,  heart- 
burnings, animosities — those  very  things  which  our  religion 
deprecates  more  almost  than  any  other.  It  is  obvious  that  if 
a  fourth  or  a  third  of  a  community  think  they  are  unreason- 
ably excluded  from  privileges  which  the  other  parts  enjoy, 
feelings  of  jealousy  or  envy  are  likely  to  be  generated.  If  the 
minority  are  obliged  to  pay  to  the  support  of  a  religion  they 
disapprove,  these  feelings  are  likely  to  be  exacerbated.  They 
soon  become  reciprocal ;  attacks  are  made  by  one  party  and 
repelled  by  another,  till  there  arises  an  habitual  sense  of  uii- 
kindness  or  ill-will.*     The  deduction  from  the  practical  influ- 

*  I  once  met  with  rather  a  grotesque  definition  of  rehgious  dissent,  but 
it  illustrates  my  proposition : — "  Dissenterism  " — that  is,  "  systematic  op- 
position to  the  established  religion." 

"  The  placing  all  the  religious  sects  (in  America)  upon  an  equal  foot- 
ing with  respect  to  the  government  of  the  country,  has  effectually  se- 
niirorl  fVio  riAnoA  nf  thA  pnmmnnitv.  at  the.  samft  time  that  it  has  essen- 


ing  witn  respect  to  me  government  oi  me  country,  nas  eiieuiu. 
cvured  the  peace  of  the  community,  at  the  same  time  that  it  has 


CHAP.  XIV.]  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  453 

ence  of  religion  upon  the  minds  of  men  which  this  effect  of 
religious  establishments  occasions,  is  great.  The  evil,  I 
trust,  is  diminishing  in  the  world ;  but  then  the  diminution 
results,  not  from  religious  establishments,  but  from  that  power 
of  Christianity  which  prevails  against  these  evils. 

From  these,  and  from  other  evidences  of  the  injurious  effects 
of  religious  establishments  upon  the  religious  condition  of 
mankind,  we  shall  perhaps  bc'  prepared  to  assent  to  the  ob- 
servations which  follow :  "  The  history  of  the  last  eighteen 
centuries  does,  indeed,  afford,  in  various  ways,  a  strong  pre- 
sumptive evidence,  that  the  cause  of  true  Christianity  has  very 
materially  suffered  in  the  world  in  consequence  of  the  con- 
nexion between  the  church  and  the  state.  It  is  probably 
in  great  measure  the  consequence  of  such  an  union  that  the 
church  has  assumed,  in  almost  all  Christian  countries,  so  sec- 
ular a  character — that  Christianity  has  become  so  lament- 
ably mixed  up  with  the  spirit,  maxims,  motives,  and  poli- 
tics of  a  vain  and  evil  world.  Had  the  union  in  question  never 
been  attempted,  pure  religion  might  probably  have  found  a 
freer  course  ;  the  practical  effects  of  Christianity  might  have 
been  more  unmixed  and  more  extensive  ;  and  it  might  have 
spread  its  influence  in  a  much  more  efficient  manner  than  is 
now  the  case,  even  over  the  laws  and  politics  of  kings  and 
nations.  Before  its  union  with  the  state,  our  holy  religion 
flourished  with  comparative  incorruptness  ;  afterwards  it 
gradually  declined  in  its  purity  and  its  power  until  all  was 
nearly  lost  in  darkness,  superstition,  and  spiritual  tyranny."  * 
"  Religion  should  remain  distinct  from  the  political  constitu- 
tion of  a  state.  Intermingled  with  it,  what  purpose  cah  it 
serve,  except  the  baneful  purpose  of  communicating  and  of 
receiving  contamination  ?"  f 

III.  Then  as  to  the  effect  of  religious  establishments  upon 
the  civil  welfare  of  a  state — we  know  that  the  connexion  he- 
tween   religious    and    civil   welfare   is   intimate    and   great. 

tially  promoted  the  interests  of  truth  and  virtue." — Mem.  Dr.  Priestley,  p. 
175.     Mem.  in  the  MS. 

Pennsylvania. — "  Although  there  are  so  many  sects  and  such  a  differ- 
ence of  religious  opinions  in  this  province,  it  is  surprising  the  harmony 
which  subsists  among  them  ;  they  consider  themselves  as  children  of  the 
same  father,  and  live  like  brethren  because  they  have  the  liberty  of 
thinking  like  men  ;  to  this  pleasing  harmony,  in  a  great  measure  is  to  be 
attributed  the  rapid  and  flourishing  state  of  Pennsylvania  above  all  the 
other  provinces."  Travels  through  the  Interior  parts  of  North  America, 
by  an  Officer.  1791.  Lond.  The  officer  was  Thomas  Aubery,  who 
was  taken  prisoner  by  the  Americans.     Mem.  in  the  MS. 

*  J.  J.  Gurney :  Peculiarities,  c.  7.        t  Charles  James  Fox :  Fell's  Life, 


454  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  [eSSAY  III 

Whatever  therefore  diminishes  the  influence  of  religion  up- 
on a  people,  diminishes  their  general  welfare.  In  addition, 
however,  to  this  general  consideration,  there  are  some  partic- 
ular modes  of  the  injurious  effects  of  religious  establishments 
which  it  may  be  proper  to  notice. 

And,  first,  religious  establishments  are  incompatible  with 
complete  religious  liberty.  This  consideration  we  requested 
the  reader  to  bear  in  mind  when  the  question  of  religious  lib- 
erty was  discussed.  *  "  If  an  establishment  be  right,  re- 
ligious liberty  is  not ;  and  if  religious  liberty  be  right,  an 
establishment  is  not."  Whatever  arguments  therefore  exist 
to  prove  the  rectitude  of  complete  religious  liberty,  they 
prove  at  the  same  time  the  wrongness  of  religious  establish- 
ments. Nor  is  this  all ;  for  it  is  the  manifest  tendency  of 
these  establishments  to  withhold  an  increase  of  religious  lib- 
erty, even  when  on  other  grounds  it  would  be  granted.  The 
secular  interests  of  the  state  religion  are  set  in  array  against  au 
increase  of  liberty.  If  the  established  church  allows  other 
churches  to  approach  more  nearly  to  an  equality  with  itself, 
its  own  relative  eminence  is  diminished ;  and  if  by  any 
means  the  state  religion  adds  to  its  own  privileges,  it  is  by 
deducting  from  the  privileges  of  the  rest.  The  state  religion  is, 
besides,  afraid  to  dismiss  any  part  even  of  its  confessedly  use- 
less privileges,  lest,  when  an  alteration  is  begun,  it  should  not 
easily  be  stopped.  And  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  it  is 
temporal  rather  than  religious  considerations — interest  rather 
than  Christianity — which  now  occasions  restrictions  and  dis- 
abilities and  tests. 

In  conformity  with  these  views,  persecution  has  generally 
been  the  work  of  religious  establishments.  Indeed,  some 
alliance  or  some  countenance  at  least  from  the  state  is  neces- 
sary to  a  systematic  persecution.  Popular  outrage  may  per- 
secute men  on  account  of  their  religion,  as  it  often  has  done  ; 
but  fixed  stated  persecutions  have  perhaps  always  been  the 
work  of  the  religion  of  the  state.  It  was  the  state  religion  of 
Rome  that  persecuted  the  first  Christians  ;  not  to  mention 
that  it  was  the  state  religion  of  Judea  that  put  our  Saviour 
himself  to  death, — "  Who  was  it  that  crucified  the  Saviour  of 
the  world  for  attempting  to  reform  the  religion  of  his  country  ? 
The  Jewish  priesthood. — Who  was  it  that  drowned  the  altars 
of  their  idols  with  the  blood  of  Christians  for  attempting  to 
abolish  Paganism  ?  The  Pagan  priesthood. — Who  was  it 
that  persecuted  to  flames  and  death  those  who,  in  the  time 
of  WicklifTe  and  his  followers,  laboured  to  reform  the  errors 
*  Essay  3,  c.  4. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  455 

of  Popery  ?  The  Popish  priesthood. — Who  was  it,  and  who 
is  it  that,  both  in  England  and  in  Ireland  since  the  Reforma- 
tion— but  I  check  my  hand,  being  unwilling  to  reflect  upon 
the  dead,  or  to  exasperate  the  living."*  We  also  are  unwill- 
ing to  reflect  upon  or  to  exasperate,  but  our  business  is  with 
plain  truth.  Who,  then,  was  it  that  since  the  Reformation 
has  persecuted  dissentients  from  its  creed,  and  who  is  it  that 
at  this  hour  thinks  and  speaks  of  them  with  unchristian  an- 
tipathy ?  The  English  Priesthood.  It  was,  and  it  is,  the 
state  religion  in  some  European  countries  that  now  persecutes 
Dissenters  from  its  creed.  It  was  the  state  religion  in  this 
country  that  persecuted  the  Protestants  ;  since  Protestantism 
has  been  established,  it  is  the  state  religion  which  has  persecuted 
Protestant  Dissenters.  Is  this  the  fault  principally  of  the 
faith  of  these  churches,  or  of  their  alliance  with  the  state  ? 
No  man  can  be  in  doubt  for  an  answer. 

We  are  accustomed  to  attribute  too  much  to  bigotry.  Big- 
otry has  been  very  great  and  very  operative  ;  but  bigotry  alone 
would  not  have  produced  the  disgraceful  and  dreadful  trans- 
actions which  fill  the  records  of  ecclesiastical  history.  No. 
Men  have  often  been  actuated  by  the  love  of  supremacy  or 
of  money,  whilst  they  were  talking  loudly  of  the  sacredness 
of  their  faith.  They  have  been  less  afraid  for  religion  than 
for  the  dominance  of  a  church.  When  the  creed  of  that 
church  was  impugned,  those  who  shared  in  its  advantages 
were  zealous  to  suppress  the  rising  enquiry  ;  because  the  dis- 
credit of  the  creed  might  endanger  the  loss  of  the  advantages. 
The  zeal  of  a  Pope  for  the  real  presence,  was  often  quite  a 
fiction.  He  and  his  cardinals  cared  perhaps  nothing  for  the  real 
presence,  as  they  sometimes  cared  nothing  for  morality.  But 
men  might  be  immoral  without  encroaching  upon  the  Papal 
Power — they  could  not  deny  the  doctrine  without  endangering 
its  overthrow. 

Happily,  persecution  for  religion  is  greatly  diminished; 
yet,  whilst  we  rejoice  in  the  fact,  we  cannot  conceal  from  our- 
selves the  consideration,  that  the  diminution  of  persecution 
has  resulted  rather  from  the  general  diffusion  of  better  princi- 
ples than  from  the  operation  of  religious  establishments  as  such. 

In  most  or  in  all  ages,  a  great  portion  of  the  flagitious  trans- 
actions which  furnish  materials  for  the  ecclesiastical  historian, 
have  resulted  from  the  political  connexions  or  interests  of  a 
church.  It  was  not  the  interest  of  Christianity  but  of  an  es- 
tablishment, which  made  Becket  embroil  his  king  and  other 

*  Miscellaneous  Tracts  by  Richard  Watson,  D.  D.,  Bishop  of  Lan- 
fUff,  V.  2. 


456  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  [eSSAT  III. 

sovereigns  in  distractions.  It  was  not  the  interests  of  Chris- 
tianity but  of  an  establishment,  which  occasioned  the  mon- 
strous impositions  and  usurpations  of  the  Papal  see.  And  I 
do  not  know  whether  there  has  ever  been  a  religious  war  of 
which  religion  was  the  only  or  the  principal  cause.  Besides 
all  this,  there  has  been  an  inextricable  succession  of  intrigues 
and  cabals — of  conflicting  interests — and  clamour  and  dis- 
traction, which  the  world  would  have  been  spared  if  secular 
interests  had  not  been  brought  into  connection  with  religion. 

Another  mode  in  which  religious  establishments  are  inju- 
rious to  the  civil  welfare  of  a  people,  is  by  their  tendency  to 
resist  political  improvements.  That  same  cause  which  in- 
duces state  religions  to  maintain  themselves  as  they  are,  indu- 
ces them  to  maintain  the  patron  state  as  it  is.  It  is  the  state 
in  its  present  condition,  that  secures  to  the  church  its  advan- 
tages ;  and  the  church  does  not  know  whether,  if  it  were  to 
encourage  political  reformation,  the  new  state  of  things  might 
not  endanger  its  own  supremacy.  There  are  indeed  so  many 
other  interests  and  powers  concerned  in  political  reformations, 
that  the  state  religion  cannot  always  prevent  alterations  from 
being  effected.  Nor  would  I  affirm  that  they  always  endea- 
vour to  prevent  it.  And  yet  we  may  appeal  to  the  general 
experience  of  all  ages,  whether  established  churches  have 
not  resisted  reformation  in  those  political  institutions  upon 
which  their  own  privileges  depended.  Now,  these  are  seri- 
ous things.  For  after  all  that  can  be  said,  and  justly  said,  of 
the  mischiefs  of  political  changes  and  the  extravagances  of 
political  empiricism,  it  is  sufficiently  certain  that  almost  every 
government  that  has  been  established  in  the  world,  has  needed 
from  time  to  time  important  reformations  in  its  constitution  or 
its  practice.  And  it  is  equally  certain,  that  if  there  be  any 
influence  or  power  which  habitually  and  with  little  discrimi- 
nation supports  political  institutions  as  they  are,  that  influence 
or  power  must  be  very  pernicious  to  the  world. 

W«  have  seen  that  one  of  the  requisites  of  a  religious  es- 
tablishment is  a  "  legal  provision  "  for  its  ministers — that  is 
to  say,  the  members  of  all  the  churches  which  exist  in  a  state 
must  be  obliged  to  pay  to  the  support  of  one,  whether  they 
approve  of  that  one  or  not. 

Now  in  endeavouring  to  estimate  the  effects  of  this  system, 
with  a  view  to  ascertain  the  preponderance  of  public  advan- 
tages, we  are  presented  at  the  outset  with  the  enquiry — Is 
this  compulsory  maintenance  right  1  Is  it  compatible  with 
Christianity  ?  If  it  is  not,  there  is  an  end  of  the  controversy ; 
for  it  is  nothing  to  Christians  whether  a  system  be  politic  cor 


C^AP.  XIV.]  RELIGTOtrS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  457 

impolitic,  if  once  they  have  discovered  that  it  is  wrong.  Bui 
I  waive  for  the  present  the  question  of  rectitude.  The  reader 
is  at  liberty  to  assume  that  Christianity  allows  governments  to 
make  this  compulsory  provision  if  they  think  fit.  I  waive, 
too,  the  question  whether  a  Christian  minister  ought  to  receive 
payment  for  his  labours,  whether  that  payment  be  voluntary 
w  not. 

The  single  point  before  us  is,  then,  the  balance  of  advan- 
tages. Is  it  more  advantageous  tha,t  ministers  should  be  paid 
by  a  legal  provision  or  by  voluntary  subscription  ? 

That  advantage  of  a  legal  provision  which  consists  in  the 
supply  of  a  teacher  to  every  district  has  already  been  noticed ; 
so  that  our  enquiry  is  reduced  to  a  narrow  limit.  Supposing 
that  a  minister  would  be  appointed  in  every  district  although 
the  state  did  not  pay  him,  is  it  more  desirable  that  he  should 
be  paid  by  the  state  or  voluntarily  by  the  people  ? 

0(  the  legal  provision  some  of  the  advantages  are  these : 
it  holds  out  no  inducement  to  the  irreligious  or  indifferent  to 
absent  themselves  from  public  worship  lest  they  should  be 
expected  to  pay  the  preacher.  I\iblic  worship  is  conducted 
— the  preacher  delivers  his  disuourse— whether  such  persons 
go  or  not.  They  pay  no  more  for  going,  and  no  less  for  stay- 
ing away :  and  it  is  probable,  in  the  present  religious  stale 
of  mankind,  that  some  go  to  places  for  worship  since  it  costs 
them  nothing,  who  otherwise  would  stay  away.  But  it  is 
manifestly  better  that  men  should  attend  even  in  such  a  state 
of  indifference  than  that  they  should  not  attend  at  all.  Upon 
the  voluntary  system  of  payment,  this  gX)od  effect  is  not  so 
fully  secured ;  for  though  the  doors  of  chapels  be  open  to  all, 
yet  few  persons  of  competent  means  would  attend  them  con- 
stantly without  feeling  that  they  might  be  expected  to  con- 
tribute to  the  expenses.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  non-attend- 
ance of  indifferent  persons  would  be  greatly  increased  by  the 
adoption  of  the  voluntary  system,  especially  if  the  payments 
were  as  moderate  as  they  easily  might  be  ; — but  it  is  a  ques- 
tion rather  of  speculation  than  of  experience,  and  the  reader 
is  to  give  upon  this  account  to  the  system  of  legal  provision, 
such  an  amount  of  advantage  as  he  shall  think  fit. 

Again, — Preaching,  where  there  is  a  legal  provision,  is  not 
**  a  mode  of  begging."  If  you  adopt  voluntary  payment,  that 
payment  depends  upon  the  good  pleasure  of  the  hearers,  and 
there  is  manifestly  a  temptation  upon  the  preacher  to  accom- 
modate his  discourses,  or  the  manner  of  them,  to  the  wishes 
of  his  hearers,  rather  than  to  the  dictates  of  his  own  judgment. 
But  the  man  who  receives  his  stipend  whether  his  hearers  be 

39 


458  RELIGIOUS    ESTAFLISHMEIifTS.  [esSAY  III. 

pleased  or  not,  is  under  no  such  temptation.  He  is  at  liberty 
to  conform  the  exercise  of  his  functions  to  his  judgment  with- 
out the  diminution  of  a  subscription.  This^  I  think,  is  an 
undeniable  advantage. 

Another  consideration  is  this  : — That  where  the>  e  is  a  re- 
ligious establishment  with  a  legal  provision,  it  is  usual,  not 
to  say  indispensable,  to  fill  the  pulpits  only  with  persons  who 
entertain  a  certain  set  of  religious  opinions.  It  would  be  ob- 
viously idle  to  assume  that  these  opinions  are  true,  but  they 
are.  or  are  in  a  considerable  degree,  uniform.  Assuming  then, 
that  one  set  of  opinions  is  as  sound  as  another,  is  it  better 
that  a  district  should  always  hear  one  s«t,  or  that  the  teachers 
of  twenty  different  sets  should  successively  gain  possession 
of  the  pulpit,  as  the  choice  of  the  people  might  direct  ?  1 
presume  not  \o  determine  such  a  question ;  but  it  may  be  ob- 
served, that,  in  point  of  fact,  those  churches  which  do  pro- 
ceed upon  the  voluntary  system,  are  not  often  subjected  to 
such  fluctuations  of  doctrine.  There  does  not  appear  much 
difficulty  in  constituting  churches  upon  the  voluntary  plan 
which  shall  in  practice  secure  considerable  uniformity  in  the 
sentiments  of  the  teachers.  And  as  to  the  bitter  animosities 
and  distractions  which  have  been  predicted  if  a  choice  of  new 
teachers  was  to  be  left  to  the  people — they  do  not,  I  believe 
ordinarily  follow.  Not  that  I  apprehend  the  ministers,  for  in- 
stance, of  an  independent  church  are  always  elected  with 
that  unanimity  and  freedom  from  heart-burnings  which  ought  to 
subsist,  but  that  animosities  do  not  subsist  to  any  great  extent. 
Besides,  the  prediction  appears  to  be  fouiided  on  the  suppo- 
sition, that  a  certain  stipend  was  to  be  appropriated  to  one 
teacher  or  to  another,  according  as  he  might  obtain  the  greater 
number  of  votes — whereas  every  man  is  at  liberty,  if  he 
pleases,  to  withdraw  his  contribution  from  him  whom  he  dis- 
approves, and  to  give  it  to  another.  And,  after  all,  there  may 
be  voluntary  support  of  ministers  without  an  election  by  those 
who  contribute,  as  is  instanced  by  the  Methodists  in  the  pres- 
ent day. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  some  advantages  attendant  on 
the  voluntary  system  which  that  of  a  legal  provision  does  not 
possess. 

And  first  it  appears  to  be  of  importance  that  there  should 
^be  a  union,  a  harmony,  a  cordiality  between  the  minister  and 
the  people.  It  is,  in  truth,  an  indispensable  requisite.  Chris- 
tianity, which  is  a  religion  of  love,  cannot  flourish  where  un- 
kindly feelings  prevail.  Now,  I  think  it  is  manifest  that  har- 
mony and  cordiality  are  likely  to  prevail  more   where  the 


CHAP.  XIV.]  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  459 

minister  is  chosen  and  voluntarily  remunerated  by  his  hearers, 
than  where  they  are  not  consulted  in  the  choice  ;  where  they 
are  obliged  to  take  him  whom  others  please  to  appoint,  and 
where  they  are  compelled  to  pay  him  whether  they  like  him 
or  not.  The  tendency  of  this  last  system  is  evidently  opposed 
to  perfect  kindliness  and  cordiality.  There  is  likely  to  be  a 
sort  of  natural  connexion,  a  communication  of  good  offices 
induced  between  hearers  and  the  man  whom  they  themselves 
choose  and  voluntarily  remunerate,  which  is  less  likely  in  the 
other  case.  ,  If  love  be  of  so  much  consequence  generally  to 
the  Christian  character,  it  is  especially  of  consequence  that 
it  should  subsist  between  him  who  assumes  to  be  a  dispenser, 
and  them  who  are  in  the  relation  of  hearers  of  the  gospel  of 
Christ. 

Indeed  the  very  circumstance  that  a  man  is  compelled  to  pay 
a  preacher,  tends  to  the  introduction  of  unkind  and  unfriendly 
feelings.  It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  men  will  pay  him 
more  graciously  or  with  a  better  will  than  they  pay  a  tax- 
gatherer  ;  and  we  all  know  that  the  tax-gatherer  is  one  of  the 
last  persons  whom  men  wish  to  see.  He  who  desires  to  ex- 
tend the  influence  of  Christianity,  would  be  very  cautious  of 
establishing  a  system  of  which  so  ungracious  a  regulation 
formed  a  part.  There  is  truth-  worthy  of  grave  attention  in 
the  ludicrous  verse  of  Cowper's — 

A  rarer  man  than  you 

In  pulpit  none  shall  hear ; 

But  yet,  methinks  to  tell  you  true, 
You  sell  it  plaguy  dear. 

It  is  easy  to  perceive  that  the  influence  of  that  man's  exhor- 
tations-must  be  diminished,  whose  hearers  listen  with  the  re- 
flection that  his  advice  is  "  plaguy  dear."  The  reflection,  too, 
is  perfectly  natural,  and  cannot  be  helped.  And  when  super- 
added to  this  is  the  consideration,  that  it  is  not  only  sold 
"  dear,"  but  that  payment  is  enforced — material  injury  must  be 
sustained  by  the  cause  of  religion.  In  this  view  it  may  be 
remarked,  that  the  support  of  an  establishment  by  a  general 
tax  would  be  preferable  to  the  payment  of  each  pastor,  by  his 
own  hearers.  Nor  is  it  unworthy  of  notice  that  some  persons 
will -always  think  (whether  with  reason  or  without  it)  that 
compulsory  maintenance  is  not  right ;  and  in  whatever  degree 
they  do  this,  there  is  an  increased  cause  of  dissatisfaction  or 
estrangement. 

Again,  the  teacher  who  is  independent  of  the  congregation 
— who  will  enjoy  all  his  emoluments  whether  they  are  satis- 
fied with  him  or  not — is  under  manifest  temptation  to  remiss- 


465  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  [eSSAY  lit. 

ness  in  his  duty  ;  not  perhaps  to*  remissness  in  those  partie* 
ulars  on  which  his  superiors  would  animadvert,  but  in  those 
which  respect  the  unstipulated  and  undefinable,  but  very  im- 
portant duties  of  private  care,  and  of  private  labours.  To 
mention  this  is  sufficient.  No  man  who  reflects  upon  the 
human  constitution,  or  who  looks  around  him,  will  need  argu- 
ments to  prove  that  they  are  likely  to  labour  negligently  whose 
profits  are  not  increased  by  assuidity  and  zeal.  I  know  that 
the  power  of  religion  can,  and  that  it  often  does,  counteract 
this  ;  but  that  is  no  argument  for  putting  temptation  in  the  way. 
So  powerful  indeed  is  this  temptation,  that  with  a  very  great 
number  it  is  acknowledged  to  prevail.  Even  if  we  do  not 
assert,  with  a  clergyman,  that  a  great  proportion  of  his  breth- 
ren labour  only  so  much  for  the  religious  benefit  of  their  par- 
ishioners as  will  screen  them  from  the  arm  of  the  law,  there 
is  other  evidence  which  is  unhappily  conclusive.  The  des- 
perate, extent  to  which  non-residence  is  practised,  is  infallible 
proof  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  clergy  are  remiss  in  the 
discharge  of  the  duties  of  a  Christian  pastor.  They  do  not 
discharge  them  con  amore ;  and  how  should  they  ?  It  was 
not  the  wish  to  do  this  which  prompted  them  to  become  cler- 
gymen at  first.  They  were  influenced  by  another  object,  and 
that  they  have  obtained — they  possess  an  income  :  and  it  is 
not  to  be  expected  that,  when  this  is  obtained,  the  mental  de- 
sires should  suddenly  become  elevated  and  purified,  and  that 
they  who  entered  the  church  for  the  sake  of  its  emoluments, 
should  commonly  labour  in  it  for  the  sake  of  religion. 

Although  to  many  the  motive  for  entering  the  church  is 
the  same  as  that  for  engaging  in  other  professions,  it  is  an 
unhappiness  peculiar  to  the  clerical  profession,  that  it  does 
not  ofl'er  the  same  stinmlus  to  subsequent  exertion ;  that  a:d- 
vancement  does  not  usually  depend  upon  desert.  The  man 
who  seeks  for  an  income  from  surgery,  or  the  bar,  is  continu- 
ally prompted  to  pay  exemplary  attention  to  its  duties.  Un- 
less the  surgeon  is  skilful  and  attentive,  he  knows  that  practice 
is  not  to  be  expected :  unless  the  pleader  devotes  himself  to 
statutes  and  reports,  he  knows  that  he  is  not  to  expect  cases 
and  briefs.  But  the  clergyman,  whether  he  studies  the  Bible 
or  not — whether  he  be  diligent  and  zealous  or  not— still  pos- 
sesses his  living.  Nor  would  it  be  rational  to  expect,  that 
where  the  ordinary  stimulus  to  human  exertion  is  wanting, 
the  exertion  itself  should  generally  be  found.  So  naturally 
does  exertion  follow  from  stimulus,  that  we  believe  it  is  an 
observation  frequently  made  that  curates  are  more  exemplary 
than  beneficed  clergymen.     And  if  beneficed  clergymen  wer© 


CHAP.   XIV.]  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS.  46-1 

more  solicitous  thaa  they  are  to  make  the  diligence  of  their 
curates  the  principal  consideration  in  employing  them,  this 
diiference  between  curates  and  their  employers  would  be  much 
greater  than  it  is.  Let  beneficed  clergynien  employ  and  re- 
ward curates  upon  as  simple  principles  as  those  are  on  which 
a  merchant  employs  and  rewards  a  clerk,  and  it  is  probable 
that  nine-tenths  of  the  parishes  in  England  would  wish  for  a 
curate  rather  than  a  rector. 

But  this  very  consideration  affords  a  powerful  argument 
against  the  present  system.  If  much  good  would  result  from 
making  clerical  reward  the  price  of  desert,  much  evil  results 
from  making  it  independent  of  desert.  This  effect  of  the  En- 
glish Establishment  is  not,  like  some  others,  inseparable  from 
the  institution.  It  would  doubtless  be  possible,  even  with 
compulsory  maintenance,  so  to  appropriate  it  that  it  should 
form  a  constant  motive  to  assiduity  and  exertion.  Clergymen 
might  be  elevated  in  their  profession  according  to  their  fidelity 
to  their  office  ;  and  if  this  were  done — if,  as  opportunity 
offered,  all  were  likely  to  be  promoted  who  deserved  it ;  and 
if  all  who  did  not  deserve  it  were  sure  to  be  passed  by,  a  new 
face  would  soon  be  put  upon  the  affairs  of  the  church.  The 
complaints  of  neglect  of  duty  would  quickly  be  diminished, 
and  non-residence  would  soon  cease  to  be  the  reproach  of 
three  thousand  out  of  ten.  We  cannot,  however,  amuse  our- 
selves with  the  hope  that  this  will  be  done,  because,  in  refer- 
ence to  the  civil  constitution  of  the  church,  there  is  too  near 
an  approach  to  that  condition  in  which  the  whole  head  is  sick, 
and  the  whole  heart  faint. 

If  then  it  be  asserted,  that  it  is  one  great  advantage  of  the 
establishment  that  it  provides  a  teacher  for  every  parish,  it  is 
one  great  disadvantage,  that  it  makes  a  large  proportion  of 
those  teachers  negligent  of  their  duty.  ^ 

There  may  perhaps  be  a  religious  establishment  in  which 
the  ministers  shall  be  selected  for  their  deserts^  though  I  know 
not  whether  in  any  it  is  actually  and  sufficiently  done.  That 
it  is  one  of  the  first  requisites  in  the  appointment  of  religious 
teachers  is  plain  ;  and  this  point  is  manifestly  better  consulted 
by  a  system  in  which  the  people  voluntarily  pay  and  choose 
their  pastors,  than  when  they  do  not.  Men  love  goodness  in 
others,  though  they  may  be  bad  themselves ;  and  they  espe- 
cially like  it  in  their  religious  teachers :  so  that,  when  they 
come  to  select  a  person  to  fdl  that  office,  they  are  likely  to 
select  one  of  whom  they  think  at  least  that  he  is  a  good  man. 

The  same  observation  holds  of  non-residence.  Non-resi- 
39* 


462  RELIGIOUS    ESTALISHMENTS.  [eSSAY   III. 

dence  is  not  necessary  to  a  state  religion.  By  the  system  of 
voluntiry  payment  it  is  impassible. 

It  has  sometimes  been  said  (with  whatever  truth)  that  ia 
times  of  public  discontent  these  persons  have  been  disposed  to 
disaffection.  If  this  be  tru«,  compulsory  support  is  in  this 
respect  a  political  evil,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  cause  of  the  alien- 
ation of  a  part  of  the  community.  \¥e  will  not  suppose  so 
strong  a  case  as  that  this  alienation  might  lead  to  physical 
opposition;  but  supposing  the  dissatisfaction  only  to  exist, 
affords  no  inconsiderable  topic  of  the  statesman's  enquiry. 
Happiness  is  the  object  of  civil  government,  and  this  object 
is  frustrated  in  part  in  respect  of  those  who  think  themselves 
aggrieved  by  its  policy.  And  when  it  is  considered  how  nu- 
merous the  dissenters  are,  and  that  they  increase  in  number, 
the  political  impropriety  and  impolicy  of  keeping  them  in  a 
state  of  dissatisfaction  becomes  increased. 

The  best  security  of  a  government  is  in  the  satisfaction 
and  affection  of  the  people ;  which  satisfaction  is  always 
diminished,  and  which  affection  is  always  endangered,  in  re- 
spect of  those  who,  disapproving  a  certain  church,  are  com- 
pelled to  pay  to  its  support.  This  is  a  consequence  of  a 
"  legal  provision"  that  demands  much  attention  from  the  legis- 
lator. Every  legislator  knows  that  it  is  an  evil.  It  is  a  point 
that  no  man  disputes,  and  that  every  man  knows  should  be 
prevented,  unless  its  cause  effects  a  counterbalance  of  ad- 
vantages. 

Lastly,  Upon  the  question  of  the  comparative  advantages 
of  a  legal  provision,  and  a  voluntary  remuneration  in  securing 
the  due  discharge  of  the  ministerial  function,  what  is  the  evi- 
dence of  facts  1  Are  the  ministers  of  established,  or  of  un- 
established  churches,  the  more  zealous,  the  more  exemplary, 
the  more  laborious,  the  more  devoted  ?  Whether  of  the  two 
are  the  more  beloved  by  their  hearers  ?  Whether  of  the  two 
lead  the  more  exemplary  and  religious  lives  ?  Whether  of  the 
two  are  the  more  active  in  works  of  philanthropy  ?  It  is  a 
question  of  facts,  and  facts  are  before  the  world. 


The  discussions  of  the  present  chapter  conduct  the  mind 
of  the  writer  to  these  short  conclusions : 

That  of  the  two  grounds  upon  which  the  propriety  of  Re- 
ligious Establishments  is  capable  of  examination,  neither  af- 
fords evidence  in  their  favour:  That  Religious  Establishments 
derive  no  countenance  from  the  nature  of  Christianity,  or  from 
the  example  of  the  primitive  churches ;  and,  That  they  aro 
not  recommended  hy  practical  Utility. 


CflAP.  XvJ      RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMEXTS,    ETC  46^ 


CHAPTER  XV, 

THE  RELIGIOUS   ESTABLISHMENTS  OF  ENGLAND   AND 
IRELAND. 

The  English  Chnrch  the  offspring  of  the  Reformation,  the  Church  estab- 
lishment,  of  Papacy — Alliance  of  Church  and  State — "  The  Priesthood 
averse  from  Reformation  " — Noble  Ecclesiastics — Purchase  of  Advow- 
sons — Non-residence — Pluralities — Parliamentary  Returns — The  Cler- 
'gy  fear  to  preach  the  truth — Moral  Preaching — Recoil  from  Works  of 
Philanthropy— Tithes— "  The  Church  is  in  Danger"— The  Church 
establishment  is  in  daager — Monitory  Suggestion. 

THE  ENGLISH  ESTABLISHMENT  IS  OF  PAPAL  ORIGIN. 

If  the  <jonclusions  of  the  last  chapter  be  just,  it  will  now 
become  our  business  to  enquire  how  far  the  disadvantages 
which  are  incidental  to  religious  establishments  actually  oper- 
ate in  our  own,  and  whether  there  subsist  any  additional  dis- 
advantages resulting  from  the  peculiar  constitution  or  circum- 
stances of  the  English  church. 

We  have  no  concern  with  religious  opinions  or  forms  of 
church  government,  but  with  the  ckurcftas  connected  with  the 
state.  It  is  not  with  an  Episcopalian  church,  but  with  an  estab- 
lished church,  that  we  are  concerned.  If  there  must  exist 
a  religious  establishment,  let  it  by  all  means  remain  m  its 
present  hands.  The  experience  which  England  has  had  of 
the  elevation  of  another  sect  to  the  supremacy,  is  not  euch  as 
to  maJte  us  wish  to  see  another  elevated  again,*     Nor  would 

*  The  religious  sect  who  are  no%y  commonly  called  Puritans,  "  pro- 
hibited the  use  of  the  Common  Prayer,  not  merely  in  churches,  chapels, 
and  places  of  public  worship,  but  in  anj'  private  place  or  family  as  well, 
under  a  penalty  of  five  pounds  for  the  first  offence,  ten  pounds  for  the 
second,  and  for  the  third  a  year's  imprisonment.'*  These  men  did  not 
understand,  or  did  not  practise  the  fundamental  duties  of  toleration.  For 
religious  liberty  they  had  still  less  regard.  "  They  passed  an  ordinance 
by  which  eight  heresies  were  made  punishedile  with  death  upon  the  first 
offence,  unless  the  offender  abjured  his  errors,  and  irremissibly  if  he  re- 
iapsed.  Sixteen  other  opinions  were  to  be  punished  with  imprisonment, 
till  the  offender  shoulid  find  sureties  that  he  would  maintain  them  no 
more."t  And  tliey  quite  abolished  the  Episcopal  rank  and  order,  as  if 
each  church  might  not  decide  for  itself  by  what  form  its  discipline  should 
be  conducted  ?  To  have  separated  the  civil  privileges  from  the  episcopal 
order  was  within  the  province  of  the  Legislature,  and  to  have  abolished 
those  privileges  would,  we  think,  have  been  wise. 


Soutbey's  Book  of  ihe  Church.  t  Id. 


464  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [eSSAT  TH, 

any  sect  WiiicL  taxes  a  just  view  of  its  own  religious  interest* 
desire  the  supremacy  for  itself. 

The  origin  of  the  English  establishment  is  papal.  The 
political  alliance  of  the  church  is  shnilar  now  to  what  it  was 
in  the  first  years  of  Henry  YIII.  When  Henry  countenanced 
the  preachers  of  the  reformed  opinions,  when  he  presented 
some  of  them  with  the  benefices  which  had  hitherto  been  pos- 
sessed by  the  Romish  clergy  ;  and  when  at  length  these  ben- 
efices and  the  other  privileges  of  the  state  religion  were 
bestowed  upon  the  "  reformed"  only — ^no  essential  change  was 
efiected  in  the  political  constitution  of  the  church.  In  one 
point  indeed  the  alliance  with  the  state  was  made  more  strict, 
because  the  supremacy  was  transferred  from  the  pope  to  the 
monarch.  So  that  the  same  or  a  kindred  political  character 
was  put  in  connexion  with  other  men  and  new  opinions.  The 
church  was  altered  but  the  establishment  remained  nearly  the 
same  :  or  the  difference  that  did  obtain  made  the  establishment 
more  of  a  state  religion  than  before.  The  origin  therefore  of 
the  English  establishment  is  papal.  It  was  planted  by  papal 
policy,  and  nurtured  by  pervading  superstition :  and  as  to  the 
transfer  of  the  supremacy,  but  little  credit  is  due  to  its  origin 
or  its  motives.  No  reverence  is  due  to  our  establishment  on 
account  of  its  parentage.  The  church  is  the  offspring  of  the 
reformation — the  church  establishment  is  not.  It  is  not  a 
daughter  of  protestantism  but  of  the  papacy — ^brought  into  un- 
natural alliance  with  a  better  faith.  Unhappily,  but  little 
anxiety  was  shown  by  some  of  the  reformers  to  purify  the 
political  character  of  the  church  when  its  privileges  came  into 
their  own  hands.  They  declaimed  against  the  corruptions  of 
the  former  church,  but  were  more  than  sufficiently  willing  to 
retain  its  profits  and  its  power. 


The  alliance  with  the  state  of  which  we  have  spoken,  as 
the  inseparable  attendant  of  religious  establishments,  is  in  this 
country  peculiarly  close.  "  Church  and  State"  is  a  phrase 
that  is  continually  employed,  and  indicates  the  intimacy  of 
the  connexion  between  them.  The  question  then  arises, 
whether  those  disadvantages  which  result  generally  from  the 
alliance,  result  in  this  country,  and  whether  the  peculiar  in- 
timacy is  attended  with  peculiar  evils. 

Bishops  are  virtually  appointed  by  the  prince;  and  it  is 
manifest  that  in  the  present  principles  of  political  affairs,  re- 
gard will  be  had,  in  their  selection,  to  the  interests  of  the  state. 
The  question  will  not  always  be,  when  a  bishoprick  becomes 
vacant,  Who  is  the  fittest  man  to  take  the  oversight  of  the 


CHAP.  XV.]       ENGLAND  AND  IRELAND.  466 

church  ?  but  sometimes — What  appointment  will  most  effect- 
ually strengthen  the  administration  of  the  day  ? — Bishops  are 
temporal  peers,  and  as  such  they  have  an  efficient  ability 
to  promote  the  views  of  the  government  by  their  votes  in  par- 
liament. Bishops  in  their  turn  are  patrons  ;  and  it  becomes 
also  manifest  that  these  appointments  will  sometimes  be  regu- 
lated by  kindred  views.  He  who  was  selected  by  the  cabinet 
because  he  would  promote  their  measures,  and  who  cannot 
hope  for  advancement  if  he  opposes  those  measures,  is  not 
liliely  to  select  clergymen  who  oppose  them.  Many  ecclesi- 
astical appointments,  again,  are  in  the  hands  of  the  individual 
officers  of  government — of  the  prime  minister,  for  example, 
or  the  lord  chancellor.  That  these  officers  will  frequently 
regard  political  purposes,  or  purposes  foreign  to  the  ivorth  of 
men,  in  making  these  appointments,  is  plain.  Now,  when  we 
reflect  that  the  highest  dignities  of  the  church  are  in  the 
patronage  of  the  king,  and  that  the  influence  of  their  dignita- 
ries upon  the  inferior  clergy  is  necessarily  great,  it  becomes 
obvious,  that  there  will  be  diffused  through  the  general  whole 
of  the  hierarchy  a  systematic  alliance  with  the  ruling  power. 
Nor  is  it  assuming  any  thing  unreasonable  to  add,  that  whilst 
the  ordinary  principles  that  actuate  mankind  operate,  the  hie- 
rarchy will  sometimes  postpone  the  interests  of  religion  to 
their  own. 

Upon  the  practical  authority  of  cabinets  over  the  church, 
Bishop  Warburton  makes  himself  somewhat  mirthful : — "  The 
rabbins  make  the  giant  Gog  or  Magog  contemporary  with 
Noah,  and  convinced  by  his  preaching.  So  that  he  was  dis- 
posed to  take  the  benefit  of  the  ark.  But  here  lay  the  distress 
— it  by  no  means  suited  his  dimensions.  Therefore,  as  he 
could  not  enter  in,  he  contented  himself  to  ride  upon  it  astride. 
Image  now  to  yourself  this  illustrious  cavalier,  mounted  on 
his  hackney^  and  see  if  he  does  not  bring  before  you  the  church, 
bestrid  by  some  lumpish  minister  of  state,  who  turns  and 
winds  it  at  his  pleasure.  The  only  difference  is,  that  Gog 
believed  the  preacher  of  righteousness  and  religion."* 

If,  then,  to  convert  a  religious  establishment  into  "  a  means 
of  strengthening  or  diffusing  influence,  serves  only  to  debase 
it,  and  to  introduce  into  it  numerous  corruptions  and  abuses," 
these  debasements,  corruptions,  and  abuses  must  necessarily 
subsist  in  the  establishment  of  England. 

And  first  as  to  the  church  itself. — It  is  not  too  much  to  be- 
lieve that  the  honourable  earnestness  of  many  of  the  reformers 
to  purify  religion  from  the  corruptions  of  the  papacy,  was 
*  Bishop  Warburton's  Letters  to  Bishop  Hurd,  Letter  47. 


466  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [essAY  III. 

cooled,  and  eventually  almost  destroyed  by  the  acquisition  of 
temporal  immunities.  When  they  had  acquired  them,  the  un- 
happy reasoning  began  to  operate — Let  us  let  well  alone:  if 
we  encourage  further  changes  our  advantages  will  perhaps  pass 
into  other  hands.  We  are  safe  as  we  are ;  and  we  will  not  en- 
danger the  loss  of  present  benefits  hy  further  reformation.  What 
has  been  the  result  ?— That  the  church  has  never  been  fully 
reformed  to  the  present  hour.  If  any  reader  is  disposed  to 
deny  this,  I  place  the  proposition  not  upon  my  feeble  authority, 
but  upon  that  of  the  members  of  the  church  and  of  the  reform- 
ers themselves.  The  reader  vi^ill  be  pleased  to  notice  that 
there  are  few  quotations  in  the  present  chapter  except  from 
members  of  the  church  of  England. 

"  If  any  person  will  seriously  consider  the  low  and  super- 
stitious state  of  the  minds  of  men  in  general  in  the  time  of 
James  I.,  much  more  in  the  reigns  of  his  predecessors,  he 
will  not  be  surprised  to  find  that  there  are  various  matters  in 
our  ecclesiastical  constitution  which  require  some  alteration. 
Our  forefathers  did  great  things,  and  we  cannot  be  sufficiently 
thankful  for  their  labours,  but  much  more  remains  to  be  done."* 
Hartley  says  of  the  ecclesiastical  powers  of  the  Christian 
world — "  They  have  all  left  the  true,  pure,  simple  religion, 
and  teach  for  doctrines  the  commandments  of  men.  They 
are  all  merchants  of  the  earth,  and  have  set  up  a  kingdom 
of  this  world,  abounding  in  riches,  temporal  power,  and  ex- 
ternal pomp.''t  Dr-  Henry  More  (he  was  zealous  for  the 
honour  of  the  church)  says  of  the  reformed  churches,  they 
have  "  separated  from  the  great  Babylon  to  build  those  that 
are  lesser  and  more  tolerable,  but  yet  not  to  be  tolerated  for 
ever."t 

"  It  pleased  God  in  his  unsearchable  wisdom  to  suffi3r  the 
progress  of  this  great  work,  the  reformation,  to  be  stopped  in 
the  midway^  and  the  effects  of  it  to  be  greatly  weakened  by 
many  unhappy  divisions  among  the  reformed."^ 

"  The  innovations  introduced  into  cur  religious  establish- 
ment at  the  reformation,  were  great  and  glorious  for  those 
times  :  but  some  further  innovations  are  yet  wanting  (would 
to  God  they  may  be  quietly  made  !)  to  bring  it  to  perfection. "|| 

"  I  have  always  had  a  true  zeal  for  the  church  of  England  ; 

*  Simpson's  Plea,  p.  137.  t  Essay  on  Man,  1749,  v.  2,  p.  370. 

X  Myst.  of  Iniquity :  p.  553.  This  poor  man  found  tliat  his  language 
laboured  under  the  imputation  of  being  unclerical,  unguarded,  and  impo- 
litic ;  and  he  afterwards  showed  sohcitude  to  retract  it.  See  p.  476,  &c. 
of  same  work. 

§  Dr.  Lowth,  afterwards  Bishop  of  London:  Visitation  Sermon.    1758 

U  Dr.  Watson,  Bishop  of  Landaff:  Misc.  Tracts,  v.  2,  p.  17,  &c. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  ENGLAND    AND    IRELAND.  467 

yet  I  must  say — there  are  many  things  in  it  that  have  been  very 
uneasy  to  me."* 

"  Cranmer,  Bucer,  Jewel,  and  others,  never  considered  the 
reformation  which  took  place  in  their  own  times  as  com- 
plete."t 

Long  after  Cranmer's  days,  some  of  the  brightest  orna- 
ments of  the  church  still  thought  a  reformation  was  needed. 
Tillotson,  Patrick,  Tennison,  Kidder,  Stillingfleet,  Burnet, 
and  others,^  endeavoured  a  further  reformation,  though  in 
vain. 

"  We  have  been  contented  to  suffer  our  religious  constitu- 
tion, our  doctrines,  and  ceremonies,  and  forms  of  public  wor- 
ship, to  remain  nearly  in  the  same  unpurged,  adulterated,  and 
superstitious  state  in  which  the  original  reformers  left  them."^ 

I  attribute  this  want  of  reformation  primarily  to  the  political 
alliance  of  the  church.  Why  should  those  who  have  the 
power  to  effect  it  refuse,  unless  it  was  that  they  feared  some 
ill  result  ?  And  what  ill  result  could  arise  from  religious  re- 
formation if  it  were  not  the  endangering  of  temporal  advan- 
tages? 

"I  would  only  ask,"  said  Lord  Bacon,  two  hundred  years 
ago,  "  why  the  civil  state  should  be  purged  and  restored  by 
good  and  wholesome  laws,  made  every  third  or  fourth  year 
in  parliament  assembled,  devising  remedies  as  fast  as  time 
breedeth  mischief;  and  contrariwisf,  the  ecclesiastical  state 
should  still  continue  upon  the  dregs  of  time,  and  receive  no 
alteration  now  for  these  five-and-forty  years  and  more. — If 
St.  John  were  to  indite  an  epistle  to  the  church  of  England, 
as  he  did  to  them  of  Asia,  it  would  sure  have  the  clause 
habeo  adversus  te  pauea."\\  What  would  Ivord  Bacon  have 
said  if  he  had  lived  to  our  day,  when  two  hundred  years  more 
have  passed,  and  the  establishment  still  continues  "  upon  the 
dregs  of  time !" — But  Lord  Bacon's  question  should  be  an- 
swered ;  and  though  no  reason  can  be  given  for  refusing  to 
reform,  a  cause  can  be  assigned. 

"  Whatever  truth  there  may  be  in  the  proposition  which 
asserts  that  the  multitude  is  fond  of  innovation,  I  think  that 
the  proposition  which  asserts  that  the  priesthood  is  averse  from, 
reformation,  is  far  more  generally  true."^  This  is  the  cause. 
They  who  have  the  power  of  reforming,  are  afraid  to  touch 
the  fabric.  They  are  afraid  to  remove  one  stone  however 
decayed,  lest  another  and  another  should  be  loosened,  until 

*  Bishop  Burnet :  Hist.  Own  Times,  v.  2,  p.  634. 
t  Simpson's  Plea.  t  Id.  §  H-  ||  Works:  Edit. 

1803,  V.  2,  p.  527.  ^  Bishop  Watson :  Misc.  Tracts,  v.  2. 


468  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [esSAY  III. 

the  fabric,  as  a  political  institution,  should  fall.  Let  us  hear 
again  episcopal  evidence.  Bishop  Porteus  informs  us,  that 
himself  with  some  other  clergymen,  (amongst  whom  were 
Dr.  Percy  and  Dr.  York,  both  subsequently  bishops,)  attempt- 
ed to  induce  the  bishops  to  alter  some  things  "  which  all  reas- 
onable persons  agreed  stood  in  need  of  amendment."  The 
answer  given  by  Archbishop  Cornwallis  was  exactly  to  the 
purpose — "  I  have  consulted,  severally,  my  brethren  the  bish- 
ops ;  and  it  is  the  opinion  of  the  bench  in  general,  that  no- 
thing can  in  prudence  be  done  in  the  matter."*  Here  is  no 
attempt  to  deny  the  existence  of  the  evils — no  attempt  to  show 
that  they  ought  not  to  be  amended,  but  only  that  it  would  not 
"  be  prudent"  to  amend  them.  What  were  these  considera- 
tions of  prudence  ?  Did  they  respect  religion  1  Is  it  impru- 
dent to  purify  religious  offices?  Or  did  they  respect  the 
temporal  privileges  of  the  church  ? — -No  man  surely  can 
doubt,  that  if  the  church  had  been  a  religious  institution  only, 
its  heads  would  have  thought  it  both  prudent  and  right  to 
amend  it. 

The  matters  to  which  Bishop  Porteus  called  the  attention 
of  the  bench  were,  "  the  liturgy,  but  especially  the  articles." 
These  Articles  afford  an  extraordinaiy  illustration  of  that  ten- 
dency to  resist  improvement  of  which  we  speak. 

"  The  requiring  subscription  to  the  thirty -nine  articles  is  a 
great  imposition."!  "  Do  the  articles  of  the  church  of  Eng- 
land want  a  revisal  ? — Undoubtedly.":!: — In  1772,  a  clerical 
petition  was  presented  to  the  House  of  Commons  for  relief 
upon  the  subject  of  subscription :  and  what  were  the  senti- 
ments of  the  house  respecting  the  articles  ?  One  member 
said,  "  I  am  persuaded  they  are  not  warranted  by  Scripture, 
and  I  am  sure  they  cannot  be  reconciled  to  common  sense."*^ 
Another — "  They  are  contradicted,  absurd,  several  of  them 
damnable,  not  only  in  a  religious  and  speculative  light,  but 
also  in  a  moral  and  practical  view."l|  Another — "  The  arti- 
cles, I  am  sure,  want  a  revisal ;  because  several  of  them  are 
heterodox  and  absurd,  warranted  neither  by  reason  nor  by 
Scripture.  Many  of  them  seem  calculated  for  keeping  out 
of  the  church  all  but  those  who  will  subscribe  any  thing,  and 
sacrifice  every  consideration  to  the  mammon  of  unrighteous- 
ness."^ And  a  fourth  said — "  Some  of  them  are,  in  my  opin- 
ion, unfounded  in,  some  of  them  inconsistent  with,  reason  and 

*  Works  of  Bishop  Porteus:     vol.  I.  t  Bishop  Burnet :  Hist.  Own 

Times,  v.  3,  p.  634.  X  Bishop  Watson  :  Misc.  Tracts,  v.  2,  p.  17. 

§  Lord  George  Germain.  11  Sir  William  Meredith- 

If  Lord  John  Cavendish. 


CHAP.  XV.]  ENGLAND    AND    ICELAND.  469 

Scripture ;  and  some  of  them  subversive  of  the  very  genius 
and  design  of  the  gospel."*  The  articles  found,  it  appears, 
in  the  House  of  Commons  one,  and  one  only  defender ;  and 
that  one  was  Sir  Roger  Newdigate,  the  member  for  Oxford.f 
— And  thus  a  "  Church  of  Christ"  retains  in  its  bosom  that 
which  is  confessedly  irrational,  inconsistent  with  Scripture, 
contradictory,  absurd,  subversive  of  the  very  genius  and  de- 
sign of  the  gospel : — for  what'  Because  the  church  is  allied 
to  the  state ;  because  it  is  a  Religious  Establishment. 

There  is  such  an  interest,  an  importance,  an  awfulness  in 
these  things,  resulting  both  from  their  effects  and  the  respon- 
sibility which  they  entail,  that  I  would  accumulate  upon  the 
general  necessity  for  reformation  some  additional  testimonies. 

In  1746  was  presented  to  the  convocation,  "  Free  and  Can- 
did Disquisitions  by  Dutiful  Sons  of  the  Church,"  in  which 
they  say,  "  Our  duty  seems  as  clear  as  our  obligations  to  it 
are  cogent ;  and  is,  in  one  word,  to  reform.'^  Of  this  book 
J\.rchdeacon  Blackburn  tells  us  that  it  was  treated  with  "  much 
contempt  and  scorn  by  those  who  ought  to  have  paid  the 
greatest  regard  to  the  subject  of  it ;"  and  that  "  it  caused  the 
forms  of  the  church  to  be  weighed  in  the  balance  of  the  sanc- 
tuary, where  they  have  heen  found  greatly  wanting ^X 

"  Our  confirmations,  and  I  may  add  even  our  ordinations 
for  the  sacred  ministry,  are  dwindled  into  painful  and  disgust- 
ing ceremonies,  as  they  are  usually  administered."^ 

Another  archdeacon,  who  was  not  only  a  friend  bf  the 
church  but  a  public  advocate  of  religious  establishments,  says, 
"  Reflection,  we  hope,  in  some,  and  time  we  are  sure  in  all, 
will  reconcile  men  to  alterations  established  in  reason.  If 
there  be  any  danger  it  is  from  some  of  the  clergy,  who  would 
rather  suffer  the  vineyard  to  be  overgrown  with  weeds  than  stir 
the  ground ;  or,  what  is  worse,  call  these  weeds  the  fairest 
flowers  in  the  garden."  This  is  strong  language  :  that  which 
succeeds  is  stronger  still.  "  If  we  are  to  wait  for  improve- 
ment till  the  cool,  the  calm,  the  discreet  part  of  mankind  begin 
it ;  till  church  governors  solicit,  or  ministers  of  state  propose 
it,  I  will  venture  to  pronounce,  that  (without  His  interposition 
with  whom  nothing  is  impossible)  we  may  remain  as  we  are 

*  Sir  George  Sackville. 

t  Pari.  Hist.  v.  17.  The  petition,  after  all  this,  was  rejected  by  two 
hundred  and  seventeen  votes  against  seventy-one.  Can  any  thing  more 
clearly  indicate  the  fear  of  reforming? — a  fear  that  extends  itself  to  the 
.state,  because  the  state  thinks  (with  reason  or  without  it)  that  to  endan- 
ger the  stability  of  the  church  were  to  endanger  its  own. 

t  The  Confessional  §  Sim]>sou's  Plea. 

40 


470  REMGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [esSAY  III 

till  the  renovation  of  all  things."*  Why  "  church  governors" 
and  "  ministers  of  state"  should  be  so  peculiarly  backward  to 
improve,  is  easily  known.  Ministers  of  state  are  more  anx- 
ious for  the  consolidation  of  their  power  than  for  the  amend- 
ment of  churches ;  and  church  governors  are  more  anxious 
to  benefit  themselves  by  consolidating  that  power,  than  to 
reform  the  system  of  which  they  are  the  heads.  But  let  no 
man  anticipate  that  we  shall  indeed  remain  as  we  are  till  the 
renovation  of  all  things.  The  work  will  be  done  though  these 
may  refuse  to  do  it.  "  If,"  says  a  statesman,  "  the  friends  of 
the  church,  instead  of  taking  the  lead  in  a  mild  reform  of 
abuses,  contend  obstinately  for  their  protection,  and  treat 
every  man  as  an  enemy  who  aims  at  reform,  they  will  cer- 
tainly be  overpowered  at  last,  and  the  correction  applied  by 
those  who  will  apply  it  with  no  sparing  hand.^'j  If  these  de- 
clarations be  true  (and  who  will  even  question  their  truth  ?) 
we  may  be  allowed,  without  any  pretentions  to  extraordinary 
sagacity,  to  add  another :  that  to  these  unsparing  correctors 
the  work  will  assuredly  be  assigned.  How  infatuated,  then, 
the  policy  of  refusing  reformation  even  if  policy  only  were 
concerned ! 


The  next  point  in  which  the  effect  of  the  state  alliance 
is  injurious  to  the  church  itself,  is  by  its  effects  upon  the 
ministry. 

It  is  manifest  that  where  there  are  such  powerful  motives 
of  interest  to  assume  the  ministerial  office,  and  where  there 
are  such  facilities  for  the  admission  of  unfit  men — unfit  men 
will  often  be  admitted.  Human  nature  is  very  stationary ; 
and  kindred  results  arose  very  many  centuries  ago.  "  The 
attainments  of  the  clergy  in  the  first  ages  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
church  were  very  considerable.  But  a  great  and  total  degen- 
eracy took  place  during  the  latter  years  of  the  Heptarchy, 
and  for  two  generations  after  the  union  of  its  kingdoms." 
And  why  ?  Because  "  mere  worldly  views  operated  upon  a 
great  proportion  of  them  ;  no  other  way  of  life  offered  so  fair 
a  prospect  of  power  to  the  ambitious,  of  security  to  the  pru- 
dent, of  tranquillity  and  ease  to  the  easy-minded. "j: — Such 
views  still  operate,  and  they  still  produce  kindred  effects. 

It  is  manifest,  that  if  men  undertake  the  office  of  Christian 

*  A  Defence  of  the  Considerations  on  the  propriety  of  requiring  a  sub- 
scription to  Articles  of  Faith.     By  Dr.  Paley :  p.  35. 

t  Letters  on  the  subject  of  the  British  and  Foreign  Bible  Society,  by 
the  present  Lord  Bexley. 

t  Southey :  Book  of  the  Church,  c.  6. 


CHAP.  XV.]  ENGLAND    AND    IRELAND.  471 

teachers  not  from  earnestness  in  the  cause,  but  from  the  desire 
of  profit  or  power  or  ease,  the  office  will  frequently  be  ill  dis- 
charged. Persons  who  possess  little  of  the  Christian  minis- 
ter but  the  name,  will  undertake  to  guide  the  flock  ;  and  hence 
it  is  inevitable  that  the  ministry,  as  a  body,  will  become  re- 
duced in  the  scale  of  religious  excellence.  So  habitual  is 
the  system  of  undertaking  the  office  ybr  the  sake  of  its  emolu- 
ments, that  men  have  begun  to  avow  the  motive  and  to  defend 
it,  "  It  is  no  reproach  to  the  church  to  say  that  it  is  supplied 
with  ministers  by  the  emoluments  it  affords."*  Would  it  not 
have  been  a  reproach  to  the  first  Christian  churches,  or  could 
it  have  been  said  of  them  at  all  ?  Does  he  who  enters  the 
church  for  the  sake  of  its  advantages,  enter  it  "  of  a  ready 
mind?" — But  the  more  lucrative  ofiices  of  the  church  are 
talked  of  with  much  familiarity  as  "  prizes,"  much  in  the 
same  manner  as  we  talk  of  prizes  in  a  lottery.  "  The  same 
fund  produces  more  effect — when  distributed  into  prizes  of 
different  value  than  when  divided  into  equal  shares."!  This 
"  effect"  is  described  as  being  "  both  an  allurement  to  men  of 
talents  to  enter  into  the  church,  and  as  a  stimulus  to  the  in- 
dustry of  those  who  are  already  in  it."  But  every  man  knows 
that  talent  and  industry  are  not  the  only  nor  the  chief  things 
which  obtain  for  a  person  the  prizes  of  the  church.  There 
is  more  of  accuracy  in  the  parallel  passage  of  another  moral- 
ist. "  The  medical  profession  does  not  possess  so  many 
splendid  prizes  as  the  church  and  the  bar,  and  on  that  account^ 
perhaps,  is  rarely,  if  ever,  pursued  by  young  men  of  noble 
families."!  Here  is  the  point :  it  is  rather  to  noble  families 
than  to  talent  and  industry,  that  the  prizes  are  awarj^ed. 
There  are,  indeed,  rich  preferments,  but  these,  it  is  observed, 
do  not  usually  fall  to  merit  as  the  reward  of  it,  but  are  lavished 
where  interest  and  family  connexion  put  in  their  irresistible 
claim."^  That  plain-speaking  man  Bishop  Warburton  writes 
to  his  friend  Hurd,  "  Reckon  upon  it,  that  Durham  goes  to 
some  nohle  ecclesiastic.  'Tis  a  morsel  only  for  them."H  It 
is  manifest  that  when  this  language  can  be  appropriate,  the 
office  of  the  ministry  must  be  dishonoured  and  abused.  Re- 
specting the  priesthood,  it  is  acknowledged  that  "  the  charac- 
ters of  men  are  formed  much  more  by  the  temptations  than 
the  duties  of  their  profession."^  Since  then  the  temptations 
are  worldly,  what  is  to  be  expected  but  that  the  character 
should  be  worldly  too  1 — Nor  would  any  thing  be  gained  by 

»  Knox's  Essays,  No.  18.  t  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  b.  6,  c.  10. 

X  Gisborae's  Duties  of  Men.  §  Knox's  Essays,  No.  53. 

I)  Warburton's  Letters  to  Hurd,  No.  47.  T  Mor.  and  Pol.  Phil.  p.  266. 


472  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [eSSAY  III. 

the,  dexterous  distinction  that  I  have  somewhere  met  with, 
that  although  the  motive  for  "  taking  the  oversight  of  the 
flock"  be  indeed  "  lucre,"  yet  it  does  not  come  under  the  apos- 
tolical definition  of  "  filthy." 

Of  the  eventual  consequences  of  thus  introducing  unquali- 
fied, and  perhaps  irreligious,  nobles  into  the  gOA^ernment  of 
the  church,  Bishop  Warburton  speaks  in  strong  language. 
"  Our  grandees  have  at  last  found  their  way  back  into  the 
church.  I  only  wonder  they  have  been  so  long  about  it. 
But  be  assured  that  nothing  but  a  new  religious  revolution,  to 
sweep  away  the  fragments  that  Harry  the  VIII .  left  after 
banqueting  his  courtiers,  will  drive  them  out  again."*  When 
that  revolution  shall  come  which  will  sweep  away  these 
prizes,  it  will  prove  not  only  to  these  but  to  other  things  to  be 
a  besom  of  destruction. 

If  the  fountain  be  bitter,  the  current  cannot  be  sweet. 
The  principles  which  too  commonly  operate  upon  the  digni- 
taries of  the  church,  descend,  in  some  degree,  to  the  inferior 
ranks.  I  say  in  some  degree  ;  for  I  do  not  believe  that  the 
degree  is  the  same  or  so  great.  Nor  is  it  to  be  expected. 
The  temptation  which  forms  the  character,  is  diminished  in  its 
power,  and  the  character  therefore  may  rise. 

I  believe  that  (reverently  be  it  spoken)  through  the  goodness 
of  God,  there  has  been  produced  since  the  age  of  Hartley,  a 
considerable  improvement  in  the  general  character  (at  least 
oif  the  inferior  orders)  of  the  English  clergy.  In  observing 
the  character  which  he  exhibited,  let  it  be  remembered  that 
that  character  was  the  legitimate  ofTspring  of  the  state  re- 
ligion. The  subsequent  amendment  is  the  offspring  of  another, 
and  a  very  different,  and  a  purer  parentage.  "  The  superior 
clergy  are  in  general  ambitious,  and  eager  in  the  pursuit  of  riches ; 
flatterers  of  the  great,  and  subservient  to  party  interest ;  neg- 
ligent of  their  own  immediate  charges,  and  also  of  the  in- 
ferior clergy  and  their  immediate  charges.  The  inferior 
clergy  imitate  their  superiors,  and,  in  general,  take  little  more 
care  of  their  parishes  than  barely  what  is  necessary  to  avoid 
the  censures  of  the  law. — I  say  this  is  the  general  case  ;  that 
is,  far  the  greater  part  of  the  clergy  of  all  ranks  in  this  king- 
dom are  of  this  kind."t — These  miserable  eflects  upon  the 
character  of  the  clergy  are  the  effects  of  a  Religious  Estab- 
lishment. If  any  man  is  unwilling  to  admit  the  truth,  let  him 
adduce  the  instance  of  an  unestablished  church,  in  the  past 
eighteen  hundred  years,  in  which  such  a  state  of  things  has 

*  Warburton's  Letters  to  Hurd,  No.  47.  t  Hartley :  Observations 

on  man. 


CHAP.  XV.]  ENGLAND    AND    IRELAND.  47^ 

existed.  Of  the  times  of  Gregory  Nazianzen,  Bishop  Burnet 
says — "  The  best  men  of  that  age,  instead  of  pressing  into 
orders  or  aspiring  to  them,  fled  from  them,  excused  themselves, 
and  judging  themselves  unworthy  of  so  holy  a  character  and 
so  high  a  trust,  were  not  without  difficulty  prevailed  upon  to 
submit  to  that  which,  in  degenerate  ages,  men  rUn  to  as  a  sub- 
sistence or  the  means  of  procuring  it,"* 

It  might  almost  be  imagined  that  the  right  of  private  pat- 
ronage was  allowed  for  the  express  purpose  of  deteriorating 
the  character  of  the  ministers  of  religion — ^because  it  can 
hardly  be  supposed  that  any  church  would  allow  such  a  sys- 
tem without  a  perfect  consciousness  of  its  effects.  To  allow 
any  man  or  woman,  good  or  bad,  who  has  money  to  spend,  to 
purchase  the  power  of  assigning  a  Christian  minister  to  a 
Christian  flock,  is  one  of  those  desperate  follies  and  enormi- 
ties which  should  never  be  spoken  of  but  in  the  language  of 
detestation  and  horror.f  A  man  buys  an  advowson  as  he 
buys  an  estate,  and  for  the  same  motives.  He  cares  perhaps 
nothing  for  the  religious  consequences  of  his  purchase,  or  for 
the  religious  assuidity  of  the  person  to  whom  he  presents  it. 
Nay,  the  case  is  worse  than  that  of  buying  as  you  buy  an  es- 
tate ;  for  land  will  not  repay  the  occupier  unless  he  cultivates 
it — but  the  living  is  just  as  profitable  whether  he  exerts  him- 
self zealously  or  not.  He  who  is  unfit  for  the  estate  by  want 
of  industry  or  of  talent,  is  nevertheless  fit  for  the  living! 
These  are  dreadful  and  detestable  abuses.  Christianity  is 
not  to  be  brought  into  juxtaposition  with  such  things.  It 
were  almost  a  shame  to  allow  a  comparison.  "  Who  is  not 
aware  that,  in  consequence  of  the  prevalence  of  such  a  sys- 
tem, the  holy  things  of  God  are  often  miserably  profaned  ?"| — "  It 
is  our  firm  persuasion,  that  the  present  system  of  bestowing 
church  patronage  is  hastening  the  decay  of  morals,  the  pro- 
gress of  insubordination,  and  the  downfall  of  the  establishment 
itself."  Morality  and  subordination  have  happily  other  sup- 
ports:— the  fate  of  the  establishment  is  sealed.  I  say  sealed. 
It  cannot  perpetually  stand  without  thorough  reformation ; 
and  it  cannot, be  reformed  while  it  remains  an  establishment. 

*  Disc,  of  the  Pastoral  Care,  12th  ed.  p.  77.  "  Under  Lanfranc's 
primacy  no  promotion  in  the  church  was  to  be  obtained  by  purchase,  nei- 
ther was  any  unfit  person  raised  to  the  episcopal  rank."* 

t  Upon  such  persons  "  rests  the  awful  responsibility  (I  might  almost 
call  it  the  divine  prerogative)  of  assigning  a  flock  to  the  shepherd,  and  of 
selecting  a  shepherd  for  the  flock."    Gurney's  Peculiarities,  3d.  ed.  p.  164. 

X  Christian  Observer,  v.  20,  p.  1 1. 

•  Southey  :  Book  of  the  Church,  chap.  7. 
40* 


474  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [eSSAY  III. 

Another  mode  in  which  the  state  religion  of  England  is  inju- 
rious to  the  character  of  its  ministers,  is  by  its  allowance  and  prac- 
tical encouragement  of  non-residence  and  pluralities.  These 
are  the  natural  effects  of  the  principles  of  the  system.  It  is 
very  possible  that  there  should  be  a  state  religion  without 
them  ;  but  if  the  alliance  with  the  state  is  close — if  a  princi- 
pal motive  in  the  dispensation  of  benefices  is  the  promotion 
of  political  purposes — if  the  prizes  of  the  church  are  given 
where  interest  and  family  connexions  put  in  their  claim — ^it 
becomes  extremely  natural  that  several  preferments  should  be 
bestowed  upon  one  person.  And  when  once  this  is  counte- 
nanced or  done  by  the  state  itself,  inferior  patrons  will  as  nat- 
urally follow  the  example.  The  prelate  who  receives  from 
the  state  three  or  four  preferments,  naturally  gives  to  his  son 
or  his  nephew  three  or  four  if  he  can. 

Pluralities  and  non-residence,  whatever  may  be  said  in 
their  favour  by  politicians  or  divines,  will  always  shock  the 
common  sense  and  the  virtue  of  mankind.  Unhappily,  they  are 
evils  which  seem  to  have  increased.  "  Theodore,  the  seventh 
archbishop  of  Canterbury,  restricted  the  bishops  and  secular 
clergy  to  their  own  dioceses ;"  and  no  longer  ago  than  the 
reign  of  James  I.,  "  when  pluralities  were  allowed,  which 
was  to  be  as  seldom  as  possible,  the  livings  were  to  be  near 
each  other."*  But  now  we  hear  of  one  dignitary  who  possesses 
ten  different  preferments,  and  of  another  vAio,  with  an  annual 
ecclesiastical  revenue  of  fifteen  thousand  pounds,  did  not 
see  his  diocese  for  many  year-«  together. f  And  as  to  that 
proximity  of  livings  which  was  directed  in  James's  time,  they 
are  now  held  in  plurality  not  only  at  a  distance  from  each 
other,  but  so  as  that  the  duties  cannot  be  performed  by  one 
person.^ 

Of  the  moral  character  of  this  deplorable  custom,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  we  should  speak.  "  I  do  not  enter,"  says  an 
eminent  prelate,  "  into  the  scandalous  practices  of  non-resi- 
dence and  pluralities.  This  is  so  shameful  a  profanation  of 
holy  things,  that  it  ought  to  be  treated  with  detestation  and 
horror."§  Another  friend  of  the  church  says,  "  He  who 
grasps  at  the  revenue  of  a  benefice,  and  studies  to  evade  the 

*  Soathey  :  Book  of  the  Church,  c.  6. 

t  For  these  examples  see  Simpson's  Plea.  I  say  nothing  of  present 
examples. 

t  Here  it  may  be  observed  how  imperfect  is  the  argument  (see  Paley,) 
that  a  religious  establishment  does  good  by  keeping  an  enlightened  man 
in  each  parish.     Mem.  in  the  MS. 

^  Burnet :    Hist.  Own  Times,  v.  2,  p.  646. 


CHAP.  X^.]  ENGLAND    AND    IRELAND.  475 

personal  discharge  of  the  various  functions  which  that  reve- 
nue is  intended  to  reward,  and  the  performance  of  those  mo- 
mentous duties  to  God  and  man,  which,  by  accepting  the 
living,  he  has  undertaken,  evinces  either  a  most  reprehensi- 
ble neglect  of  proper  consideration,  or  a  callous  depravity  of  . 
heart."*  It  may  be  believed  that  all  are-  not  thus  depraved 
who  accept  pluralities  without  residence.  Custom,  although 
it  does  not  alter  the  nature  of  actions,  affects  the  character  of 
the  agent ;  and  although  I  hold  no  man  innocent  in  the  sight 
of  God  who  supports,  in  his  example,  this  vicious  practice, 
yel  some  may  do  it  now  with  a  less  measure  of  guilt  than  that 
which  would  have  attached  to  him  who  first,  for  the  sake  of 
money,  introduced  the  scandal  into  the  church. 

The  public  has  now  the  means  of  knowing,  by  the  returns 
to  Parliament,  the  extent  in  which  these  scandalous  customs 
exist — an  extent  which,  when  it  was  first  communicated  to 
the  Earl  of  Harrowby,  "  struck  me."  says  he,  "  with  sur- 
prise, I  could  almost  say  with  horror."  Alas,  when  temporal 
peers  are  horror-struck  by  the  scandals  that  are  tolerated  and 
practised  by  their  spiritual  teachers  ! 

By  one  of  these  returns  it  appears  that  the  whole  number 
of  places!  is  ten  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixty-one.  Of 
the  possessors  of  these  livings,  more  than  one  half  were  non- 
resident. The  number  of  residents  was  only  four  thousand 
four  hundred  and  twenty-one. — But  the  reader  will  perhaps 
say.  What  matters  the  residence  of  him  who  receives  the  mo- 
ney, so  that  a  curate  resides  1  Unfortunately,  the  proportion 
of  absentee  curates  is  still  greater  than  that  of  incumbents. 
Out  of  three  thousand  six  hundred  and  ninety  four  who  are  em- 
ployed, only  one  thousand  five  hundred  and  eighty-seven  live 
in  the  parishes  they  serve  ;  so  that  two  thousand  one  hundred 
and  seven  parishes  are  left  without  even  the  residence  of  a 
curate.  Besides  this,  there  are  nine  hundred  and  seventy  in- 
cumbents who  neither  live  in  their  parishes  themselves  nor 
employ  any  curate  at  all !  What  is  the  result  ?  That  above 
one  half  of  those  who  receive  the  stipends  of  the  charch,  live 
away  from  their  flocks  ;  and  that  there  are  in  this  country 
three  thousand  and  seventy-seven  flocks  amongst  whom  no 
shepherd  is  to  be  found ! — When  it  is  considered  that  all  this 
is  a  gratuitous  addition  to  the  necessary  evils  of  state  re- 

*  Gisborne :  Duties  of  Men. 

t  The  diocese  of  St.  David's  is  not  included,  and  the  return  Includes 
some  dignities,  sinecures,  and  dilapidated  churches.  It  cites  that  of  1810. 
I  do  not  know  but  the  details  are  substantially  the  same  at  the  present 
time. 


4t6  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [eSSAY  IU. 

ligions,  that  there  may  be  established  churches  without  it, 
it  speaks  aloud  of  those  mischiefs  of  our  establishments  which 
are  peculiarly  its  own. 

One  other  consideration  upon  this  subject  remains.  An  in- 
ternal discipline  in  a  church,  both  over  its  ministers  and  its 
members,  appears  essential  to  the  proper  exercise  of  Christian 
duty.  From  what  cause  does  it  happen  that  there  is  little  ex- 
ercise of  discipline,  or  none,  in  the  church  of  England  ?  The 
reader  will  perhaps  answer  the  question  to  himself:  "The 
exercise  of  efficient  discipline  in  the  church  is  impossible ;" 
and  he  would  answer  truly.  It  is  impossible.  Who  shall 
exercise  it  ?  The  first  Lord  of  the  Treasury  ?  He  will  not, 
and  he  cannot.  The  Bench  of  Bishops  ?  Alas  !  there  is  the 
origin  of  a  great  portion  of  the  delinquency.  If  they  were  to 
establish  a  discipline,  the  first  persons  upon  whom  they  must 
exercise  it  would  be  themselves.  Who  ever  heard  of  per- 
sons, so  situated,  instituting  or  re-establishing  a  discipline  in 
the  church?  Who  then  shall  exercise  it?  The  subordinate 
clergy  ?  If  they  have  the  will,  they  have  not  the  power  ;  and 
if  they  had  the  power,  who  can  hope  that  they  would  use  it  ? 
Who  can  hope  that,  whilst  above  half  of  these  clergy  are  non- 
residents, they  will  erect  a  discipline  by  which  residence 
shall  be  enforced  ? — I  say,  discipline,  efficient  discipline  is 
impossible ;  and  I  submit  it  to  the  reader  whether  any  Estab- 
lishment in  which  Christian  Discipline  is  impossible,  is  not 
esi^entially  bad. 


From  the  contemplation  of  these  effects  of  the  English  es- 
tablishment upon  its  formularies,  its  ministers,  and  its  disci- 
pline, we  must  turn  to  its  effects  generally  upon  the  religious 
welfare  of  the  people. 

This  welfare  is  so  involved  with  the  general  character  of 
the  establishment  and  its  ministers,  that  to  exhibit  an  evil  in 
one  is  to  illustrate  an  injury  to  the  other.  If  the  operation  of 
the  state  religion  prevents  ministers  from  inculcating  some 
portions  of  divine  truth,  its  operation  must  indeed  be  bad. 
And  how  stands  the  fact  ?  "  Aspiring  clergymen,  wishing  to 
avoid  every  doctrine  which  would  retard  their  advancement, 
were  very  little  inclined  to  preach  the  reality  or  necessity  of 
divine  influence."*  The  evil  which  this  indicates  is  twofold  : 
first,  the  vicious  state  of  the  heado  of  the  church  ;  for  why  else 
should  "  advancement"  be  refuse  i  to  those  who  preached  the  doc- 
trine of  the  gospel ; — and  next,  the  injury  to  religion ;  for  reli- 
gion must  needs  be  injured  if  a  portion  of  its  truths  are  concealed. 
*  Vicessimus  Knox :  Christian  philosophy,  3d  edition,  p  24. 


CHAP.  XV.]  ENGLAND    AND    IllELAND.  477 

Another  quotation  gives  a  similar  account :  "  Regular  divines 
of  great  virtue,  learning  and  apparent  piety,  feared  to  preach 
the  Holy  Ghost  and  his  operations,  the  main  doctrines  of  the 
Gospel,  lest  they  should  countenance  the  puritan,  the  quaker, 
or  the  methodist,  and  lose  the  esteem  of  their  own  order  or  of 
the  higher  powers."*  Did  Paul  or  Barnabas  ever  "  fear  to 
preach  the  main  doctrines  of  the  gospel "  from  considerations 
like  these,  or  from  any  considerations  whatever  1  Did  our 
Lord  approve  or  tolerate  such  fear  when  he  threatened  with 
punishment  any  man  who  should  take  away  from  the  words 
of  his  book  ?  But  why  again  should  the  clerical  order  or  the 
higher  powers  disesteem  the  man  who  preached  the  main 
doctrines  of  the  gospel,  unless  it  were  from  motives  of  interest 
founded  in  the  establishment  1 

And  thus  it  is,  that  they  who  are  assumed  to  be  the  reli- 
gious leaders  of  the  people,  who  ought,  so  far  as  is  in  their 
power,  to  guide  the  people  into  all  truth,  conceal  a  portion  of 
that  truth  from  motives  of  interest !  If  this  concealment  is 
practised  by  men  of  great  virtue,  learning,  and  apparent  piety, 
what  are  we  to  expect  in  the  indifferent  or  the  bad !  We  are 
to  expect  that  not  one  but  many  doctrines  of  the  gospel  will  be 
concealed.  We  are  to  expect  that  discourses  not  very  differ- 
ent from  those  which  Socrates  might  have  delivered  will  be 
dispensed,  instead  of  the  whole  counsel  of  God.  What  has 
been  the  fact  ?  Of  "  moral  preaching,"  Bishop  Lavington 
says,  "  We  have  long  been  attempting  the  reformation  of  the 
nation  by  discourses  of  this  kind.  With  what  success  ? 
None  at  all.  On  the  contrary,  we  have  dexterously  preached 
the  people  into  downright  infidelity.^''  Will  any  man  affirm 
that  this  has  not  been  the  consequence  of  the  state  religion  ? 
Will  any  man,  knowing  this,  affirm  that  a  state  religion  is  right 
or  useful  to  Christianity  ? 

But  as  to  the  tendency  of  the  system  to  diffuse  infidelity, 
we  are  not  possessed  of  the  testimony  of  Bishop  Lavington 
alone.  "  It  is  evident  that  the  worldly-mindedness  and  neglect 
of  duty  in  the  clergy,  is  a  great  scandal  to  religion,  and  cause 
of  infidelity."!  Again  :  "  Who  is  to  blame  for  the  spread  of 
infidelity  ?  The  bishops  and  clergy  of  the  land  more  than 
any  other  people  in  it.  We,  as  a  body  of  men,  are  almost 
solely  and  exclusively  culpable. "J  Ostervald,  in  his  "  Trea- 
tise concerning  the  Causes  of  the  present  Corruption  of  Chris- 
tians," makes  the  same  remark  of  the  clergy  of  other  churches ; 
— "  The  cause  of  the  corruption  of  Christians  is  chiefly  to  be 

*  Vicessimus  Knox:  Christian  Philosophy,  3d  edition,  p.  23. 

t  Hartley  :  Observations  on  Man.        X  Simpson's  Plea,  3d  edit.  p.  76. 


478  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [esSAY  HI. 

found  in  the  clergy."  Now,  supposing  this  to  be  the  language 
of  exaggeration — supposing  that  they  corrupt  Christians  only 
as  much  as  men  who  make  no  peculiar  pretensions  to  religion 
- — how  can  such  a  fact  be  accounted  for,  but  by  the  conclu- 
sion that  there  is  something  corrupting  in  the  clerical  system  ? 

The  refusal  to  amend  the  constitution  or  formularies  of  the 
church,  is  another  powerful  cause  of  injury  to  religion.  Of 
one  particular  article — the  Athanasian  creed — a  friend  of  the 
church,  and  one  who  mixed  with  the  world,  says,  "  I  really 
believe  that  creed  has  made  more  deists  than  all  the  writings 
of  all  the  oppugners  of  Christianity,  since  it  was  first  unfor- 
tunately adopted  in  our  liturgy."*  Would  this  deist-making 
document  have  been  retained  till  now  if  the  church  were  not 
allied  to  the  state  ? — Bishop  Watson  uses  language  so  unspa- 
ring, that  just  and  true  as  it  is,  I  know  not  whether  I  would 
cite  it  from  any  other  pen  than  a  bishop's  :  "A  motley  mon- 
ster of  bigotry  and  superstition — a  scarecrow  of  shreds  and 
patches,  dressed  up  of  old  by  philosophers  and  popes  to  amuse 
the  speculative,  and  to  affright  the  ignorant."  Do  I  quote 
this  because  it  is  the  unsparing  language  of  truth  ?  No  ;  but 
because  of  that  which  succeeds  it :  "  Now,''^  says  the  bishop, 
"  a  butt  of  scorn,  against  which  every  unfledged  witling  of  the 
age  essays  his  wanton  efforts,  and,  before  he  has  learned  his 
catechism,  is  fixed  an  infidel  for  life  !  This  I  am  persuaded 
is  too  frequently  the  case,  for  I  had  too  frequent  opportunities 
to  observe  it."t  If,  by  the  church  as  it  subsists,  many  are 
fixed  infidels  for  life,  how  diffusively  must  be  spread  that  mi- 
nor, but  yet  practical  disrespect  for  religion,  which,  though  it 
amounts  not  to  infidelity,  makes  religion  an  unoperative  thing 
— unoperative  upon  the  conduct  and  the  heart — unoperative 
in  animating  the  love  and  hope  of  the  Christian — unoperative 
in  supporting  under  afiiiction,  and  in  smoothing  and  brightening 
the  pathway  to  the  grave  ! 

To  these  minor  consequences  also  we  have  unambiguous 
testimony  :  "  Where  there  is  not  this  open  and  shameless  dis- 
avowal of  religion,  few  traces  of  it  are  to  be  found.  Improving 
in  every  other  branch  of  knowledge,  we  have  become  less 
and  less  acquainted  with  Christianity. "| — Two-thirds  of  the 
lower  order  of  people  in  London,"  says  Sir  Thomas  Bernard, 
"  live  as  utterly  ignorant  of  the  doctrines  and  duties  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  are  as  errant  and  unconverted  pagans,  as  if  they 
had  existed  in  the  wildest  part  of  Africa." — "  The  case,"  con- 

*  Observations  on  the  Liturgy,  by  an  Under  Secretary  of  State, 
t  Misc.  Tracts  by  Watson,  Bishop  of  LandafF,  v.  2,  p.  49. 
t  Wilberforce :  Practical  View,  6th  edit.  p.  389. 


CHAP.  XV.]       ENGLAND  AND  IRELAND.  479 

tinues  the  Quarterly  Review,  "is  the  same  in  Manchester, 
Leeds,  Bristol,  Sheffield,  and  in  all  our  large  towns.  The 
greatest  part  of  the  manufacturing  populace,  of  the  miners, 
and  colliers,  are  in  the  same  condition ;  and  if  they  are  not 
universally  so,  it  is  more  owing  to  the  zeal  of  the  methodista 
than  to  any  other  cause."*  How  is  it  accounted  for,  that  in  a 
country  in  which  a  teacher  is  appointed  to  diffuse  Christianity 
in  every  parish,  a  considerable  part  of  the  population  are  con- 
fessed to  be  absolute  pagans?  How,  especially  is  it  accounted 
for,  that  the  few  who  are  reclaimed  from  paganism,  are  re- 
claimed, not  by  the  established,  but  by  an  unestablished 
church  ?  It  is  not  difficult  to  account  for  all  this,  if  the  con- 
dition of  the  established  church  is  such  as  to  make  what  fol- 
lows the  flippant  language  of  a  clergyman  who  afterwards 
was  a  bishop :  "The  person  I  engaged  in  the  summer,"  as  a 
curate,  "  is  run  away ;  as  you  will  think  natural  enough,  when 
I  tell  you  he  was  let  out  of  jail  to  be  promoted  to  this  service."t 

The  in  effect  of  non-residence  upon  the  general  interests 
of  religion  is  necessarily  great.  A  conscientious  clergyman 
finds  that  the  offices  of  his  pulpit  are  not  the  half  of  his  busi- 
ness :  he  finds  that  he  can  often  do  more  in  promoting  the  re- 
ligious welfare  of  his  parishioners  out  of  his  pulpit  than  in  it. 
It  is  out  of  his  pulpit  that  he  evinces  and  exercises  the  most 
unequivocal  affection  for  his  charge  ;  that  he  encourages  or 
warns  as  individuals  have  need ;  that  he  animates  by  the 
presence  of  his  constant  example  ;  that  he  consoles  them  in 
their  troubles ;  that  he  adjusts  their  disagreements ;  that  he 
assists  them  by  his  advice.  It  is  by  living  amongst  them,  and 
by  that  alone,  that  he  can  be  "  instant  in  season,  and  out  of 
season,"  or  that  he  can  fulfil  the  duties  which  his  station  in- 
volves. How  prodigious,  then,  must  be  the  sum  of  mischief 
which  the  non-residence  of  three  thousand  clergymen  inflicts 
upon  religion!  How  yet  more  prodigious  must  be  the  sum 
of  mischief  which  results  from  that  negligence  of  duty  of 
which  non-residence  is  but  one  effect !  Yet  all  this  is  occa- 
sioned by  our  religious  estabUshment.  "The  total  absence 
of  non-residence  and  pluralities  in  the  Church  of  Scotland, 
and  the  annual  examination  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  parish 
by  its  minister,  are  circumstances  highly  advantageous  to  re- 
ligion r\ 

The  minister  in  the  English  church  is  under  peculiar  dis- 
advantages in  enforcing  the  truths  or  the  duties  of  religion 

*  Quarterly  Review,  April  1816,  p.  233. 

t  Letters  between  Bishop  Warburton  and  Bishop  Hurd. 

\  Gisborne  :  Duties  of  Men. 


480  RELIOIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [essAY  III. 

upon  irreligious  or  sceptical  men.  Many  of  the  topics  which 
such  men  urge  are  directed,  not  against  Christianity,  but  against 
that  exhibition  of  Christianity  which  is  afforded  by  the  church. 
It  has  been  seen  that  this  is  the  cause  of  infidelity.  How  then 
shall  the  established  clergyman  efficiently  defend  our  religion  ? 
He  may  indeed  confine  himself  to  the  vindication  of  Chris- 
tianity without  reference  to  a  church ;  but  then  he  does  not 
defend  that  exhibition  of  Christianity  which  his  own  church 
affords.  The  sceptic  presses  him  with  those  things  which  it 
is  confessed  are  wrong.  He  must  either  defend  them,  or  give 
them  up  as  indefensible.  If  he  defends  them,  he  confirms  the 
sceptic  in  his  unbelief ;  if  he  gives  them  up,  he  declares  not 
only  that  the  church  is  in  the  wrong,  but  that  himself  is  in  the 
wrong  too ;  and  in  either  case,  his  fitness  for  an  advocate  of 
our  religion  is  impaired. 

Hitherto,  I  have  enforced  the  observations  of  this  chapter 
by  the  authority  of  others.  Now,  I  have  to  appeal  for  con- 
firmation to  the  experience  of  the  reader  himself.  That  pe- 
culiar mode  of  injury  to  the  cause  of  virtue,  of  which  I  speak 
has  received  its  most  extensive  illustrations  during  the  pres- 
ent century ;  and  it  has  hitherto,  perhaps,  been  the  subject, 
rather  of  private  remark  than  of  public  disquisition.  I  refer 
to  a  sort  of  instinctive  recoil  from  new  measures  that  are  de- 
signed to  promote  the  intellectual,  the  moral,  or  the  religious 
improv^ement  of  the  public.  I  appeal  to  the  experience  of 
those  philanthropic  men  who  spend  their  time  either  in  their 
own  j.eighbourhoods,  or  in  "  going  about  doing  good,"  whether 
they  lo  not  meet  with  a  greater  degree  of  this  recoil  from 
work  5  of  philanthropy,  amongst  the  teachers  and  members  of 
the  state  religion  than  amongst  other  men — and  whether  this 
recoil  is  not  the  strongest  amongst  that  portion  who  are  re- 
puted to  be  the  most  zealous  friends  of  the  church.  Has  not 
this  been  your  experience  with  respect  to  the  Slave  Trade 
and  to  Slavery — with  respect  to  the  education  of  the  people 
— with  respect  to  scientific  or  literary  institutions  for  the  la- 
bouring ranks — with  respect  to  sending  preachers  to  pagan 
countries — with  respect  to  the  Bible  Society  ?  Is  it  not  famil- 
iar to  you  to  be  in  doubt  and  apprehension  respecting  the  as- 
sistance of  these  members  of  the  establishment,  when  you  have 
no  fear  and  no  doubt  of  the  assistance  of  other  Christians  ? 
Do  you  not  call  upon  others,  and  invite  their  co-operation  with 
confidence  ?  Do  you  not  call  upon  these  with  distrust,  and 
is  not  that  distrust  the  result  of  your  previous  experience  ? 

Take,  for  example,  that  very  simple  institution,  the  Bible 
Society — simple,  because  its  only  object  is,  to  distribute  the 


CHAP.  XV.]  ENGLAND    AND    IRELAND.  481 

authorized  records  of  the  dispensations  of  God.  It  is  an  in- 
stitution upon  which  it  may  be  almost  said,  that  but  one  opinion 
is  entertained — that  of  its  great  utility :  but  one  desire  is  felt 
— that  of  co-operation,  except  by  the  members  of  established 
churches.  From  this  institution  the  most  zealous  advocates 
of  the  English  church  stand  aloof.  Whilst  Christians  of  other 
names  are  friendly  almost  to  a  man,  the  proportion  is  very 
large  of  those  churchmen  who  show  no  friendliness.  It  were 
to  no  purpose  to  say  that  they  have  claims  peculiarly  upon 
themselves,  for  so  have  other  Christians — claims  which  gen- 
erally are  complied  with  to  a  greater  extent.  Besides,  it  is 
obvious  that  these  claims  are  not  the  grounds  of  the  conduct 
that  we  deplore.  If  they  were,  we  should  still  possess  the 
cordial  approbation  of  these  persons — ^their  personal,  if  not 
their  pecuniary  support.  From  such  persons  silence  and  ab- 
sence are  positive  discouragement.  How  then  are  we  to  ac- 
count for  the  phenomenon  1  By  the  opera'tion  of  a  state  re- 
ligion. For  when  our  philanthropist  applies  to  the  members 
of  another  church,  their  only  question  perhaps  is.  Will  the 
projected  institution  be  useful  to  mankind  ?  But  when  he  ap- 
plies to  such  a  member  of  the  state  religion,  he  considers, 
How  will  it  affect  the  establishment  ? — Will  it  increase  the 
influence  of  dissenters  ? — May  it  not  endanger  the  immunities 
of  the  church  1 — Is  it  countenanced  by  our  superiors  ? — Is  it 
agreeable  to  the  administration  1  And  when  all  these  consid- 
erations have  been  pursued,  he  very  commonly  finds  some- 
thing that  persuades  him  that  it  is  most  "prudent"  not  to 
encourage  the  proposition.  It  should  be  remarked  too,  as  an 
additional  indication  of  the  cause  of  this  recoil  from  works  of 
goodness,  that  where  the  genius  of  the  state  religion  is  most 
influential,  there  is  commonly  the  greatest  backwardness  in 
works  of  mental  and  religious  philanthropy.  The  places  of 
peculiar  frigidity  are  the  places  in  which  there  are  the  great- 
est number  of  the  dignitaries  of  the  church. 

Thus  it  is  that  the  melioration  of  mankind  is  continually 
and  greatly  impeded,  by  the  workings  of  an  institution  of  whiah 
the  express  design  is  to  extend  the  influence  of  religion  and 
morality.  Greatly  impeded :  for  England  is  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal sources  of  the  current  of  human  improvement,  and  in 
England  the  influence  of  this  institution  is  great.  These  are 
fruits  which  are  not  borne  by  good  and  healthy  trees.  How 
can  the  tree  be  good  of  which  these  are  the  fruits  ?  Are  these 
fruits  the  result  of  episcopacy  1  No,  but  of  episcopacy  wedded 
to  the  state.  Were  this  union  dissolved,  (and  the  parties  are 
not  of  that  number  whom  God  hath  joined,)  not  only  would 

41 


482  RELIOIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [ESSAY  III. 

human  reformation  go  forward  with  an  accelerated  pace,  but 
episcopalianism  itself  would  in  some  degree  arise,  and  shake 
herself  as  from  the  dust  of  the  earth.  She  would  find  thai 
her  political  alliance  has  bound  around  her  glittering  but  yel 
enslaving  chains — chains  which,  hugged  and  cherished  as 
they  are,  have  ever  fixed  her,  and  ever  will  fix  her,  to  the 
earth,  and  make  her  earthly. 

The  mode  in  which  the  legal  provision  for  the  ministry  is 
made  in  this  country,  contains,  like  many  other  parts  of  the 
institution,  evils  superadded  to  those  which  are  necessarily 
incidental  to  a  state  religion.  If  there  be  any  one  thing  which, 
more  than  another,  ought  to  prevail  between  a  Christian  min- 
ister and  those  whom  he  teaches,  it  is  harmony  and  kindli- 
ness of  feeling:  and  this  kindliness  and  harmony  is  peculiarly 
diminished  by  the  system  of  Tithes.  There  is  no  circum- 
stance which  so  often  "  disturbs  the  harmony  that  should  ever 
subsist  between  a  clergyman  and  his  parishioners  as  conten- 
tions respecung  tithes."*  Vicessimus  Knox  goes  further: 
*'  One  great  cause  of  the  clergy's  losing  their  influence  is,  that 
the  laity  in  this  age  of  scepticism  grudge  them  their  tithes. 
The  decay  of  religion  and  the  contempt  of  the  clergy  arise  in 
a  great  measure  from  this  source."!  What  advantages  can 
compensate  for  the  contempt  of  Christian  ministers  and  the 
decay  of  religion  ?  Or  who  does  not  perceive  that  a  legal 
provision  might  be  made  which  would  be  productive,  so  far 
as  the  new  system  of  itself  was  concerned,  of  fewer  evils  ? — 
Of  the  political  ill  consequences  of  the  tithe  system  I  say  no- 
thing here.  If  they  were  much  less  than  they  are,  or  if  they 
did  not  exist  at  all,  there  is  sufficient  evidence  against  the 
system  in  its  moral  effects. 

It  is  well  known,  and  the  fact  is  very  creditable,  that  the 
clergy  exact  tithes  with  much  less  rigour,  and  consequently 
occasion  far  fewer  heartburnings,  than  lay  claimants.  The 
■want  of  cordiality  often  results,  too,  from  the  cupidity  of  the 
payers,  who  invent  vexatious  excuses  to  avoid  payment  of 
the  whole  claim,  and  are  on  the  alert  to  take  disreputable  ad- 
vantages. 

But  to  the  conclusions  of  the  Christain  moralist  it  matters  lit- 
tle by  what  agency  a  bad  system  operates.  The  principal  point 
of  his  attention  is  the  system  itself.  If  it  be  bad,  it  will  be  sure 
to  find  agents  by  whom  its  pernicious  principles  will  be  elicited 
and  brought  into  practical  operation.  It  is  therefore  no  extenu- 
ation of  the  system,  that  the  clergy  frequently  do  not  disagree 
■with  their  parishioners  :  -whilst  it  is  a  part  of  the  system  that 
*  Gisbome  :  Duties  of  Men.  t  Essays,  No.  10. 


CHAP.  XV.]  ENGLAND   AND    IRELAND.  483 

Tithes  are  sold,  and  sold  to  him,  of  whatever  character,  who 
will  give  most  for  them — he  will  endeavour  to  make  the  most 
of  them  again.  So  that  the  evils  which  result  from  the  Tithe 
system,  although  they  are  not  chargeable  upon  religious  estab- 
lishments, are  chargeable  upon  our  own,  and  are  an  evidence 
against  it.  The  animosities  which  Tithe  farmers  occasion 
are  attributable  to  the  Tithe  system.  Ordinary  men  do  not 
make  nice  discriminations.  He  who  is  angry  with  the  Tithe 
farmer  is  angry  with  the  rector,  who  puts  the  power  of  vexa- 
tion into  his  hands,  and  he  who  is  out  of  temper  with  the 
teacher  of  religion  loses  some  of  his  complacency  in  religion 
itself.  You  cannot  then  prevent  the  loss  of  harmony  between 
the  shepherd  and  his  flock,  the  loss  of  his  influence  over  their 
affections,  the  contempt  of  the  clergy,  and  the  decay  of  religion 
from  Tithes.  You  must  amend  the  civil  institution,  or  you 
cannot  prevent  the  religious  mischief. 


Reviewing,  then,  the  propositions  and  arguments  which 
have  been  delivered  in  the  present  chapter — propositions 
which  rest  upon  the  authority  of  the  parties  concerned,  what 
is  the  general  conclusion  ?  If  Religious  Establishments  are 
constitutionally  injurious  to  Christianity,  is  not  our  establish- 
ment productive  of  superadded  and  accumulated  injury  ?  Let 
not  the  writer  of  these  pages  be  charged  with  enmity  to 
religion  because  he  thus  speaks.  Ah  !  they  are  the  best 
friends  of  the  church  who  endeavour  its  amendment.  I  may- 
be one  of  those  who,  in  the  language  of  Lord  Bexley,  shall 
be  regarded  as  an  enemy,  because,  in  the  exhibition  of  its 
evils,  I  have  used  great  plainness  of  speech.  But  I  can- 
not help  it.  I  have  other  motives  than  those  which  are 
affected  by  these  censures  of  men ;  and  shall  be  content 
to  bear  my  portion,  if  I  can  promote  that  purification  of  a 
Christian  Church,  of  which  none  but  the  prejudiced  or 
the  interested  deny  the  need.  They  who  endeavour  to 
conceal  the  need  may  be  the  advocates,  but  they  are  not 
the  friends  of  the  church.  The  wound  of  the  daughter 
of  my  people  may  not  be  slightly  healed.  It  is  vain  to 
cry  Peace,  Peace,  when  there  is  no  peace.  What  then 
will  the  reader,  who  has  noticed  the  testimonies  which  have 
been  offered  in  this  chapter,  think  of  the  propriety  of  such 
statements  as  these  ?  The  "  establishment  is  the  firmest  sup- 
port and  noblest  ornament  of  Christianity."*  It  "presents 
the  best  security  under  heaven  for  the  preservation  of  the  true 
*  Dr  Howley,  Bishop  of  London :  Charge,  1814,  p  25. 


484  RELIGIOUS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [eSSAY  III. 

apostolical  faith  in  this  country."  *  "  Manifold  as  are  the 
blessings  for  which  Englishmen  are  beholden  to  the  in- 
stitutions of  their  country — there  is  no  part  of  those  institu- 
tions from  which  they  derive  more  important  advantages  than 
from  its  church  establishment."  f  Especially  what  will  the 
reader  think  of  the  language  of  Hannah  More  1 — Hannah 
More  says  of  the  established  church,  "  Here  Christianity 
presents  herself  neither  dishonoured,  degraded,  nor  disfig- 
ured ;"  Bishop  Watson  says  of  its  creed,  that  it  is  "  a  motley 
monster  of  bigotry  and  superstition."  Hannah  More  says, 
*'  Here  Christianity  is  set  before  us  in  all  her  original  purity  ;" 
Archdeacon  Blackburn  says,  that  "the  forms  of  the  church, 
having  been  weighed  in  the  balance  of  the  sanctuary,  are 
found  greatly  wanting."  Hannah  More  says,  "  She  has  been 
completely  rescued  from  that  encumbering  load  under  which 
she  had  so  long  groaned,  and  delivered  from  her  heavy  bond- 
age by  the  labours  of  our  blessed  reformers  ;"  \  Dr.  Lovvth 
says,  that  the  reformation  from  Popery  "  stopped  in  the  mid- 
way." Hannah  More  says,  "  We  here  see  Christianity  in 
her  whole  consistent  character — in  all  Her  fair  and  just  pro- 
portions— as  she  came  from  the  hands  of  her  divine  author ;" 
Dr.  Watson  calls  her  creed  "  a  scarecrow,  dressed  up  of  old 
by  philosophers  and  Popes."  To  say  that  the  language  of 
this  good  woman  is  imprudent  and  improper,  is  to  say  very 
little.  Yet  I  would  say  no  more.  Her  own  language  is  her 
severest  censurer.  When  will  it  be  sufficiently  remembered 
that  the  evils  of  a  system  can  neither  be  veiled  nor  defended 
by  praise  ?  When  will  it  be  remembered  that,  if  we  "  con- 
tend for  abuses,"  the  hour  will  arrive  when  "  correction  will 
be  applied  with  no  sparing  hand  ?" 


It  has  frequently  been  said,  that  the  "  church  is  in  danger." 
What  is  meant  by  the  church?  Or  what  is  it  that  is  en- 
dangered ?  Is  it  meant  that  the  Episcopal  form  of  church 
government  is  endangered — ^that  some  religious  revolution 
is  likely  to  take  place,  by  which  a  Christian  community  shall 
be  precluded  from  adopting  that  internal  constitution  which  it 
thinks  best?  This  surely  cannot  be  feared.  The  day  is 
gone  by,  in  England  at  least,  when  the  abolition  of  Prelacy 
could  become  a  measure  of  state.  One  community  has  its 
conference,  and  another  its  annual  assembly,  and  another  its 

*  On  the  Nature  of  Schism,  by  C.  Daubeny,  Archdeacon  of  Sarum, 
p.  153. 

t  First  words  of  Southey's  Book  of  the  Church. 
;  Moral  Sketches,  3d  edit.  p.  90. 


CRAP.  XV.]  ENGLAND    AND    IRELAND.    ,TH  485 

independency,  without  any  molestation.  Who,  then,  would  mo- 
lest the  English  Church  because  it  prefers  the  government  of 
bishops  and  deacons  to  any  other  ?  Is  it  meant  that  the  doctrines 
of  the  church  are  endangered,  or  that  its  liturgy  will  be  prohib- 
ited ?  Surely  no.  Whilst  every  other  church  is  allowed  to 
preach  what  doctrines  it  pleases,  and  to  use  what  formularies  it 
pleases,  the  liberty  will  not  surely  be  denied  to  the  Episcopal 
church.  If  the  doctrines  and  government  of  that  church  be 
Christian  and  true,  there  is  no  reason  to  fear  for  their  stability. 
Its  members  have  superabundant  ability  to  defend  the  truth. 
What  then  is  it  that  is  endangered.  Of  what  are  those  who 
complain  of  danger  afraid  ?  Is  it  meant  that  its  civil  immu- 
nities are  endangered — that  its  revenues  are  endangered  ?  Is 
it  meant  that  its  members  will  hereafter  have  to  support  their 
ministers  without  assistance  from  other  churches  ?  Is  it 
feared  that  there  will  cease  to  be  such  things  as  rich  dean- 
eries and  bishopricks  ?  Is  it  feared  that  the  members  of  other 
churches  will  become  eligible  to  the  legislature,  and  that  the 
heads  of  this  church  will  not  be  temporal  peers  1  In  brief,  is 
it  feared  that  this  church  will  become  merely  one  amongst 
the  many,  with  no  privileges  but  such  as  are  common  to  good 
citizens  and  good  Christians  ?  These  surely  are  the  things 
of  which  they  are  afraid.  It  is  not  for  religious  truth  but  for 
civil  immunities  :  It  is  not  for  forms  of  church  government, 
but  for  political  pre-eminence :  it  is  not  for  the  church,  but 
for  the  church  establishment.  Let  a  man,  then,  when  he 
joins  in  the  exclamation,  The  church  is  in  danger !  present 
to  his  mind  distinct  ideas  of  his  meaning  and  of  the  object  of 
his  fears.  If  his  alarm  and  his  sorrow  are  occasioned, 
not  for  religion,  but  for  politics — not  for  the  purity  and  useful- 
ness of  the  church,  but  for  its  immunities — not  for  the  offices 
of  its  ministers,  but  for  their  splendours — ^let  him  be  at  peace. 
There  is  nothing  in  all  this  for  which  the  Christian  needs  to 
be  in  sorrow  or  in  fear. 

And  why?  Because  all  that  constitutes  a  church,  as  a 
Christian  community,  may  remain  when  these  things  are 
swept  away.  There  may  be  prelates  without  nobility ;  there 
may  be  deans  and  archdeacons  without  benefices  and  patron- 
age ;  there  may  be  pastors  without  a  legal  provision ;  there 
may  be  a  liturgy  without  a  test. 

In  the  sense  in  which  it  is  manifest  that  the  phrase,  "  the 
church  is  in  danger,"  is  ordinarily  to  be  understood — that  is, 
"  the  establishment  is  in  danger" — the  fears  are  undoubtedly 
well  founded  :  the  danger  is  real  and  imminent.  It  may  not 
be  immediate  perhaps  :  perhaps  it  may  not  be  near  at  hand ; 

41* 


486  RfiLIGIOITS    ESTABLISHMENTS    OF  [eSSAT  III. 

but  it  is  real,  immiiient,  inevitable.  The  establishment  is  in- 
deed in  danger ;  and  I  believe  that  no  advocacy,  however 
zealous,  that  no  support,  however  determined,  that  no  power, 
however  great,  will  preserve  it  from  destruxjtion.  If  the  dec- 
larations which  have  been  cited  in  this  chapter  be  true — 
if  the  reasonings  which  have  been  offered  in  this  and  in  the 
last  be  just,  who  is  the  man  that,  as  a  Christian,  regrets 
its  danger,  or  would  delay  its  fall  1  He  may  wish  to  delay  it 
as  a  politician  ;  he  may  regret  it  as  an  expectant  of  temporal 
advantages  ;  but,  as  a  Christian,  he  will  rejoice. 

Supposing  the  doctrines  and  government  of  the  church  to 
be  sound,  it  is  probable  that  its  stability  would  be  increased 
by  what  is  called  its  destruction.  It  would  then  only  be 
detached  from  that  alliance  with  the  state  which  encumbers  it, 
and  weighs  it  down,  and  despoils  its  beauty,  and  obscures  its 
brightness.  Contention  for  this  alliance  will  eventually  be 
found  to  illustrate  the  proposition,  that  a  man's  greatest  ene- 
mies are  those  of  his  own  household.  He  is  the  practical 
enemy  of  the  church  who  endeavours  the  continuance  of  its 
connexion  with  the  state  :  except  indeed  that  the  more  zealous 
the  endeavour,  the  more  quickly,  it  is  probable,  the  connexion 
will  be  dissolved ;  and  therefore,  though  such  persons  "  mean 
not  so,  neither  do  their  hearts  think  so,"  yet  they  may  thus 
be  the  agents,  in  the  hand  of  God,  of  hastening  the  day  in 
which  she  shall  be  purified  from  every  evil  thing ;  in  which 
she  shall  arise  and  shine,  because  her  light  is  come,  and 
because  the  glory  of  the  Lord  is  risen  upon  her. 

Let  him,  then,  who  can  discriminate  between  the  church 
and  its  alliances,  consider  these  things.  Let  him  purify  and 
exalt  his  attachment.  If  his  love  to  the  church  be  the  love 
of  a  Christian,  let  him  avert  his  eye  from  every  thing  that 
is  political ;  let  his  hopes  and  fears  be  excited  only  by  reli- 
gion;  and  let  his  exertions  be  directed  to  that  which  alone 
ought  to  concern  a  Christian  church,  its  purity  and  its  useful- 
ness.   

In  concluding  a  discussion,  in  which  it  has  been  needful  to 
utter,  with  plainness,  unwelcome  truths,  and  to  adduce  testimo- 
nies which  some  readers  may  wish  to  be  concealed,  I  am  so- 
licitous to  add  the  conviction,  with  respect  to  the  ministers  of 
the  English  Church,  that  there  is  happily  a  diminished  ground 
of  complaint  and  reprehension — the  conviction  that,  whilst 
the  liturgy  is  unamended  and  unrevised,  the  number  of  minis- 
ters is  increased  to  whom  temporal  things  are  secondary  mo- 
tives, and  who  endeavour  to  be  faithful  ministers  of  one  cow- 


dBAP.  XV.]  EN^GLAND    AND    IRELAND.  487 

mon  Lord  :  the  conviction  too,  with  respect  to  other  members 
of  the  church,  that  they  are  collectively  advancing  in  the 
Christian  path,  and  that  there  is  an  "  evident  extension  of  re- 
ligion within  her  borders."  Many  of  these,  both  of  the  teach- 
ers and  of  the  taught  are  persons  with  whom  the  writer  of 
these  pages  makes  no  pretensions  of  Christian  equality — yet 
even  to  these  he  would  offer  one  monitory  suggestion — They 
are  critically  situated  with  reference  to  the  political  alliance 
of  the  church.  Let  them  beware  that  they  mingle  not,  with 
their  good  works  and  faith  unfeigned,  any  confederacy  with 
that  alliance,  which  will  assuredly  be  laid  in  the  dust.  That 
confederacy  has  ever  had  one  invariable  effect — to  dimin- 
ish the  Christian  brightness  of  those  who  are  its  partizans. 
It  will  have  the  same  eflect  upon  them.  If  they  are  desirous 
of  superadding  to  their  Christianity  the  privileges  and  emolu- 
ments of  a  state  religion — if  they  endeavour  to  retain  in  the. 
church  the  interests  of  both  worlds — if,  together  with  their 
desire  to  serve  God  with  a  pure  heart,  they  still  cling  to  the 
Efl  iiages  which  this  unholy  alliance  brings — and,  contend- 
ing i'or  the  faith,  contend  also  for  the  establishment — the  ef- 
fect- will  be  bad  as  the  endeavour  will  be  vain  ;  bad,  for  it  will 
obstruct  their  own  progress  and  the  progress  of  others  in  the 
Christian  path  ;  and  vain,  for  the  fate  of  that  establishment  is 
sealed. 

In  making  these  joyful  acknowledgments  of  the  increase  of 
Christianity  within  the  borders  of  the  church,  one  truth,  how- 
ever, must  be  added ;  and  it  is  a  solemn  truth — ^The  increase 
is  not  attributable  to  the  state  religion,  but  has  taken  place 
notwithstanding  it  is  a  state  religion.  I  appeal  to  the  experi- 
ence of  good  men  :  has  the  amendment  been  the  effect  of  the 
establishment  as  such  ?  Has  the  political  connexion  of  the 
church  occasioned  the  amendment  or  promoted  it?  Nay — 
Has  the  amendment  been  encouraged  by  those  on  whom  the 
political  connexion  had  the  greatest  influence  ?  No  :  the 
reader,  if  he  be  an  observer  of  religious  affairs,  knows  that 
the  state  alliance  is  so  far  from  having  effected  a  reformation, 
that  it  does  not  even  regard  the  instruments  of  that  reforma- 
tion with  complacency. 


488  LEGAL   PROVISION  f ESSAY  III 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

OF  LEGAL  PROVISION  FOR  CHRISTIAN  TEACHERS— OF 
VOLUNTARY  PAYMENT  AND  OF  UNPAID  MINISTRY. 

Compulsory  payment-— America — Legal  provision  for  one  church  unjust 
— Payment  of  Tithes  by  dissenters — Tithes  a  *'  property  of  the 
church  " — Voluntary  payment — The  system  of  remuneration — Qualifi- 
cations of  a  minister  of  the  gospel — Unpaid  ministry — Days  of  greater 
purity. 

If  some  of  the  observations  of  the  present  chapter  are  not 
accurately  classed  with  political  subjects,  I  have  to  offer  the 
apology  that  the  intimacy  of  their  connexion  with  the  precee- 
ding  discussions,  appears  to  afford  a  better  reason  for  placing 
them  here,  than  an  adherence  to  system  affords  for  placing 
them  elsewhere.  "  The  substance  of  method  is  often  sacri- 
ficed to  the  exterior  show  of  it."  * 


LEGAL  PROVISION. 

By  one  of  those  instances  which  happily  are  not  unfrequent 
in  the  progress  of  human  opinion  from  error  to  truth,  the  no- 
tion of  a  divine  right  on  the  part  of  any  Christian  teachers  to 
a  stated  portion  of  the  products  of  other  men's  labours,  is  now 
nearly  given  up.f  There  was  a  time  when  the  advocate 
of  the  claim  would  have  disdained  to  refer  for  its  foundation 
to  questions  of  expediency  or  the  law  of  the  land.  And 
he  probably  as  little  thought  that  the  divine  right  would  ever 
have  been  given  up  by  its  advocates,  as  his  successors  now 

*  Bishop  Warburton. 

t  Yet  let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  it  is  upon  this  exploded  notion  of  the 
divine  right  that  the  legal  right  is  founded.  The. law  did  not  give  Tithes 
to  the  clergy  because  the  provision  was  expedient,  but  because  it  was 
their  divine  right.  It  is  upon  this  assumption  that  the  law  is  founded. 
See  Statues  at  Large  ;  29  Hen.  VIII.  c.  20.     Mem.  in  the  MS. 

"  The  whole  weis  received  into  a  common  fund,  for  the  fourfold  pur- 
pose of  supporting  the  clergy,  repairing  the  church,  relieving  the  poor, 
and  entertaining  the  pilgrim  and  the  stranger." — "  The  payment  of 
Tithes  had  at  first  been  voluntary,  though  it  was  considered  as  a  reli- 
gious obligation.  King  Ethelwolf,  the  father  of  Alfred,  subjected  the 
whole  kingdom  to  it  by  a  legislative  act."  Southey's  book  of  the  Church  ; 
c.  6.     Mem.  in  the  MS. 

WicklifFe's  followers  asserted,  "  that  Tithes  were  purely  eleemosynary, 
and  might  be  withheld  by  the  people  upon  a  delinquency  in  the  pastor, 
and  transferred  to  another  at  pleasure."  Brodie's  history  of  the  British 
Empure.    Introduction.    Mem.  in  the  MS. 


CHAP.  XVI.]  FOR    CHRISTIAN    TEACHERS.  489 

think  that  they  have  fallacious  grounds  in  reasoning  upon  pub- 
lic utility.  Thus  it  is  that  the  labours  of  our  predecessors  in  the 
cause  of  Christian  purity  have  taken  a  large  portion  of  labour 
out  of  our  hands.  They  carried  the  outworks  of  the  citadel ; 
and  whilst  its  defenders  have  retired  to  some  inner  strong- 
hold, it  becomes  the  business  of  our  day  to  essay  the  firmness 
of  its  walls.  The  writer  of  these  pages  may  essay  them  in 
vain  ;  but  he  doubts  not  that  before  some  power  their  defend- 
ers, as  they  have  hitherto  retired,  will  continue  to  retire,  until 
the  whole  fortress  is  abandoned.  Abandoned  to  the  enemy  ? 
Oh  no. — He  is  the  friend  of  a  Christian  community,  who  in- 
duces Christian  principles  into  its  practice. 

In  considering  the  evidence  which  Christianity  affords  re- 
specting the  lawfulness  of  making  a  legal  provision  for  one 
Christian  church,  I  would  not  refer  to  those  passages  of 
Scripture  which  appear  to  bear  upon  the  question,  whether 
Christian  ministrations  should  be  absolutely  free  :  partly,  be- 
cause I  can  add  nothing  to  the  often  urged  tendency  of  those 
passages,  and  partly,  because  they  do  not  all  concern  the 
question  of  legal  provision.  The  man  who  thinks  Christian- 
ity requires  that  those  who  labour  in  the  gospel  should  live  of 
the  gospel,  does  not  therefore  think  that  a  legal  pravision 
should  be  made  for  the  ministers  of  one  exclusive  church. 

One  thing  seems  perfectly  clear — that  to  receive  from  their 
hearers  and  from  those  who  heard  them  not,  a  compulsory 
payment  for  their  preaching,  is  totally  alien  to  all  the  prac- 
tices of  the  apostles,  and  to  the  whole  tenor  of  the  principles 
by  which  they  were  actuated.  Their  one  single  and  simple 
motive  in  preaching  Christianity,  was  to  obey  God,  to  da 
good  to  man  ;  nor  do  I  believe  that  any  man  imagines  it  pos- 
sible that  they  would  have  accepted  of  a  compulsory  remune- 
ration from  their  own  hearers,  and  especially  from  those  who 
heard  them  not.  We  are  therefore  entitled  to  repeat  the  obser- 
vation, that  this  consideration  affords  evidence  against  the 
moral  lawfulness  of  instituting  such  compulsory  payment. 
Why  would  not,  and  could  not,  the  apostles  have  accepted 
such  payment,  except  for  the  reason  that  it  ought  not  to  be 
enforced  ?  No  account,  so  far  as  I  perceive,  can  be  given  of 
the  matter,  but  that  the  system  is  contrary  to  the  purity  of 
Christian  practice. 

An  English  prelate  writes  thus  :  "  It  is  a  question  which 
might  admit  of  serious  discussion,  whether  the  majority  of 
the  members  of  any  civil  community  have  a  right  to  compel 
all  the  members  of  it  to  pay  towards  the  maintenance  of  a 
set  of  teachers  appointed  by  the  majority  to  preach  a  particu-* 


4d0  .    tEGAL    PROVISION  [eSSAT  111. 

lar  system  of  doctrines."*  No  discussion  could  be  enter- 
tained respecting  this  right,  except  on  the  ground  of  its  Chris- 
tian unlawfulness.  A  legislature  has  a  right  to  impose  a 
general  tax  to  support  a  government,  whether  a  minority  ap- 
proves the  tax  or  not ;  and  the  bishop  here  rightly  assumes 
that  there  is  an  antecedent  question — whether  it  is  morally 
lawful  to  oblige  men  to  pay  teachers  whom  they  disapprove  ? 
It  is  from  the  want  of  taking  this  question  into  the  ac- 
count, that  inquirers  have  involved  themselves  in  fallacious 
reasonings.  It  is  not  a  question  of  the  right  of  taxation,  but 
of  the  right  of  the  magistrate  to  oblige  men  to  violate  their 
consciences.  Of  those  who  have  regarded  it  simply  as  a 
question  of  taxation,  and  who  therefore  have  proceeded  upon 
fallacious  grounds,  the  author  of  the  "  Duties  of  Men  in  So- 
ciety" is  one.  He  says,  "  If  a  state  thinks  that  national 
piety  and  virtue  will  be  best  promoted  by  consigning  the 
whole  sum  raised  by  law  to  teachers  of  a  particular  descrip- 
tion— ^it  has  the  same  right  to  adopt  this  measure,  as  it  would 
have  to  impose  a  general  tax  for  the  support  of  a  board  of 
physicians,  should  it  deem  that  step  conducive  to  national 
health."  Far  other — No  man's  Christian  liberty  is  invaded, 
no  man's  conscience  is  violated,  by  paying  a  tax  to  a  board  of 
physicians ;  but  many  a  man's  religious  liberty  may  be  in- 
vaded, and  many  a  man's  conscience  may  be  violated,  by  pay- 
ing for  the  promulgation  of  doctrines  which  he  thinks  Chris- 
tianity condemns.  Whither  will  the  argument  lead  us  ?  If 
a  Papal  state  thinks  it  will  promote  piety  to  demand  contri- 
butions for  the  splendid  celebration  of  an  auto-da-fe,  would 
Protestant  citizens  act  rightly  in  contributing  ?  Or  would  the 
state  act  rightly  in  demanding  the  contribution  ?  Or  has  a 
Bramin  state  a  right  to  impose  a  tax  upon  Christian  residents 
to  pay  for  the  fagots  of  Hindoo  immolations?  The  antece- 
dent question  in  all  these  cases  is — Whether  the  immolation, 
and  the  auto-da-fe,  and  the  system  of  doctrines,  are  consistent 
with  Christianity  ?  If  they  are  not,  the  citizen  ought  not  to 
contribute  to  their  practice  or  diffusion ;  and  by  consequence, 
the  state  ought  not  to  compel  him  to  contribute.     Now,  for 

*  See  Quarterly  Review,  No.  58. 

"  There  was  a  party  in  the  nation  who  conceived  that  every  man 
should  not  only  be  allowed  to  choose  his  own  religion,  but  contribute  as 
he  himself  thoujs^ht  proper  towards  the  support  of  the  pastor  whose  duties 
he  exacted.  The  party  however,  does  not  appear  to  have  been  great. 
Yet  let  us  not  despise  the  opinion,  but  remember  that  it  has  been  taken 
up  by  Dr.  Adam  Smith  himself  as  a  sound  one,  and  been  acted  upon 
successfully  in  a  vast  empire,  the  United  States  of  America." — Brodie's 
History  of  the  British  Empire,  v.  4,  p.  365.    Mem.  in  the  MS. 


CHAP.  XVI.]  FOR    CHRISTIAN    TEACHERS.  491 

the  purposes  of  the  present  argument,  the  consistency  of  any 
set  of  doctrines  with  Christianity  cannot  be  proved.  It  is  to 
no  purpose  for  the  Unitarian  to  say,  Afy  system  is  true ;  nor 
for  the  Calvinist  or  Arminian  or  Episcopalian  to  say,  My  sys- 
tem is  true.  The  Unitarian  has  no  Christian  right  to  compel 
me  to  pay  him  for  preaching  Unitarianism,  nor  has  any  reli- 
gious community  a  right  to  compel  the  members  of  another  to 
pay  him  for  promulgating  his  own  opinions. 

If  by  any  revolution  in  the  religious  affairs  of  this  country, 
another  sect  was  elevated  to  the  pre-eminence,  and  its  minis- 
ters supported  by  a  legal  provision,  I  believe  that  the  minis- 
ters of  the  present  church  would  think  it  an  unreasonable  and 
unchristian  act  to  compel  them  to  pay  the  preachers  of  the 
npw  state  religion.  Would  not  a  clergyman  think  himself 
aggrieved,  if  he  were  obliged  to  pay  a  Priestley,  and  to  aid 
in  disseminating  the  opinions  of  Priestley  ? — That  same  griev- 
ance is  now  inflicted  upon  other  men.  The  rule  is  disre- 
garded, to  do  as  we  would  be  done  by. 

Let  us  turn  to  the  example  of  America.  In  America  the 
government  does  not  oblige  its  citizens  to  pay  for  the  support 
of  preachers.  Those  who  join  themselves  to  any  particular 
religious  community  commonly  contribute  towards  the  support 
of  its  teachers,  but  there  is  no  law  of  the  state  which  com- 
pels it.  This  is  as  it  should  be.  The  government  which 
obliged  its  citizens  to  pay,  even  if  it  were  left  to  the  individual 
to  say  to  what  class  of  preachers  his  money  should  be  given, 
would  act  upon  unsound  principles.  It  may  be  that  the  citi- 
zen does  not  approve  of  paying  ministers  at  all ;  or  there 
may  be  no  sect  in  a  country  with  which  he  thinks  it  right  to 
hold  communion.  How  would  the  reader  himself  be  situated 
in  Spain  perhaps,  or  in  Turkey,  or  in  Hindostan  ?  Would  he 
think  it  right  to  be  obliged  to  encourage  Juggernaut,  or  Ma- 
homet, or  the  Pope  ? 

But  passing  from  this  consideration  :  it  is  after  all  said, 
that  in  our  own  country  the  individual  citizen  does  not  pay 
the  ministers  of  the  state  religion.  I  am  glad  that  this  seem- 
ing paradox  is  advanced,  because  it  indicates  that  those  who  ad- 
vance it  confess  that  to  make  them  pay  would  be  wrong.  Why 
else  should  they  deny  it  ?  It  is  said,  then,  that  persons  who 
pay  tithes  do  not  pay  the  established  clergy  ;  that  tithes  are 
property  held  as  a  person  holds  an  estate  ;  that  if  tithes  were 
taken  off,  rents  would  advance  to  the  same  amount ;  that  the 
buyer  of  an  estate  pays  so  much  the  less  for  it  because  it  is 
subject  to  tithes — and  therefore  that  neither  owner  nor  occu- 
pier pays  any  thing.     This  is  specious,  but  only  specious. 


492  LEGAL   PROVISION  [ESSAY  HI. 

The  landholder  "  pays"  the  clergyman  just  as  he  pays  the 
tax-gatherer.  If  taxes  were  taken  off,  rents  would  advance 
just  as  much  as  if  tithes  were  taken  off;  and  a  person 
may  as  well  say  that  he  does  not  pay  taxes  as  that  he  does 
not  pay  tithes. — The  simple  fact  is,  that  an  order  of  cler- 
gy are,  in  this  respect,  in  the  same  situation  as  the  body 
of  stockholders  who  live  upon  their  dividends.  They  are 
supported  by  the  country.  The  people  pay  the  stockholder 
in  the  form  of  taxes,  and  the  clergyman  in  the  form  of 
tithes.  Suppose  every  clergyman  in  England  were  to  leave 
the  country  to-morrow,  and  to  cease  to  derive  any  income 
from  it,  it  is  manifest  that  the  income  which  they  now  derive 
would  be  divided  amongst  those  who  remain — that  is,  that 
those  who  now  pay  would  cease  to  pay.  Rent,  and  Taxes, 
and  Tithes,  are  in  these  respects  upon  one  footing.  Without 
now  enquiring  whether  they  are  right,  they  are  all  payments 
— something  by  which  a  man  does  not  receive  the  whole  of 
the  product  of  his  labour. 

The  argument,  therefore,  which  affirms  that  dissenters  from 
the  state  religion  do  not  pay  to  that  religion,  appears  to  be 
wholly  fallacious  ;  and  being  such,  we  are  at  liberty  to  assume, 
that  to  make  them  pay  is  indefensible  and  unchristian.  For 
we  repeat  the  observation,  that  he  who  is  anxious  to  prove 
they  do  not  pay,  evinces  his  opinion  that  to  compel  them  to 
pay  would  be  wrong. 

There  is  some  injustice  in  the  legal  provision  for  one 
church.  The  episcopalian,  when  he  has  paid  his  teacher,  or 
rather  when  he  has  contributed  that  portion  towards  the 
maintenance  of  his  teacher  which  by  the  present  system  be- 
comes his  share,  has  no  more  to  pay.  The  adherent  to 
other  churches  has  to  pay  his  own  preacher  and  his  neigh- 
bour's. This  does  not  appear  to  be  just.  The  operation  of 
a  legal  provision  is,  in  effect,  to  impose  a  double  tax  upon  one 
portion  of  the  community  without  any  fault  on  their  part. 
Nor  is  it  to  any  purpose  to  say,  that  the  dissenter  from  the 
Episcopalian  church  imposes  the  tax  on  himself;  so  he  does  ; 
but  it  is  just  in  the  same  sense  as  a  man  imposes  a  penalty 
upon  himself  when  he  conforms  to  some  prohibited  point  of 
Christian  duty.  A  papist,  two  or  three  centuries  ago,  might 
almost  as  well  have  said  that  a  protestant  imposed  the  stake 
on  himself,  because  he  might  have  avoided  it  if  he  chose. 
It  is  a  voluntary  tax  in  no  other  way  than  as  all  other  taxes 
are  voluntary.  It  is  a  tax  imposed  by  the  state  as  truly  as 
.  he  window  tax  is  imposed,  because  a  man  may,  if  he  pleases, 


CHAP.  XVI. J  FOR    CHRISTIAN    TEACHERS.  493 

live  in  darkness ;  or  as  a  capitation  tax  is  imposed,  because 
a  man  may,  if  he  pleases,  lose  his  head. 

But  what  is  he  who  conscientiously  disapproves  of  a  state 
religion  to  do  ?  Is  he,  notwithstanding  his  judgment,  to  aid 
in  supporting  that  religion,  because  the  law  requires  it  ?  No  : 
ibr  then,  as  it  respects  him,  the  obligation  of  the  law  is  taken 
away.  He  is  not  to  do  what  he  believes  Christianity  forbids, 
because  the  state  commands  it.  If  public  practice  be  a  cri- 
I'ferion  for  the  public  judgment,  it  may  be  concluded  that  the 
number  of  those  who  do  thus  believe  respecting  our  state  re- 
ligion, is  very  small ;  for  very  few  decline  actively  to  support 
it.  Yet  when  it  is  considered  how  numerous  the  dissenters 
from  the  English  establishment  are,  and  how  emphatically 
some  of  them  disapprove  the  forms  or  doctrines  of  that  estab- 
lishment, it  might  be  imagined  that  the  number  who  decline 
thus  to  support  it  would,  in  consistency,  be  great.  How  are 
we  to  account  for  the  fact  as  it  is  1  Are  we  to  suppose  that 
the  objections  of  these  persons  to  the  establishment  are  such 
as  do  not  make  it  a  case  of  conscience  whether  they  shall  sup- 
port it  or  not  ?  Or  are  we  to  conclude  that  they  sacrifice 
their  consciences  to  the  terrors  of  a  distraint  ?  If  no  case  of 
conscience  is  involved,  the  dissenter,  though  he  may  think  the 
state  religion  inexpedient,  can  hardly  think  it  wrong.  And 
if  he  do  not  think  it  wrong,  why  should  he  be  so  zealous  in 
opposing  it,  or  why  should  he  expect  the  church  to  make  con- 
cessions in  his  favour  ?  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  sacrifices 
his  conscience  to  his  fears,  it  is  obvious  that,  before  he  repre- 
hends the  establishment,  he  should  rectify  himself.  He 
should  leave  the  mote,  till  he  has  taken  out  the  beam. 

Perhaps  there  are  some  who,  seriously  disapproving  of  the 
state  religion,  suspect  that  in  Christian  integrity  they  ought 
not  to  pay  to  its  support — and  yet  are  not  so  fully  convinced 
of  this,  or  do  not  so  fully  act  upon  the  conviction,  as  really  to 
decline  to  pay.  If  they  are  convinced  let  them  remember 
their  responsibility,  and  not  know  their  Master's  will  in 
vain.  If  these  are  not  faithful,  where  shall  fidelity  be  found  ? 
How  shall  the  Christian  churches  be  purified  from  their  de- 
filements, if  those  who  see  and  deplore  their  defilements, 
contribute  to  their  continuance  ?  Let  them  show  that  their 
principles  are  worthy  a  little  sacrifice.  Fidelity  on  their  part, 
and  a  Christian  submission  to  the  consequences,  might  open 
the  eyes  and  invigorate  the  religious  principle  of  many  more  ; 
and  at  length  the  objection  to  comply  with  these  unchristian 
demands  might  be  so  widely  extended,  that  the  legislature 
would  be  induced  to  withdraw  its  legal  provisitwi ;  and  thus 

43 


494  LEGAL   PROVISION  [essaY  III. 

one  main  constituent  of  an  ecclesiastical  system,  which  has 
grievously  obstructed,  and  still  grievously  obstructs,  the  Chris- 
tian cause,  might  be  taken  away. 

As  an  objection  to  this  fidelity  of  practice  it  has  been  said, 
that  since  a  man  rents  or  buys  an  estate  for  so  much  less  be- 
cause it  is  subject  to  tithes,  it  is  an  act  of  dishonesty  after- 
wards, to  refuse  to  pay  them.  The  answer  is  this — that  no 
dishonesty  can  be  committed  whilst  the  law  exacts  payment 
by  distraint ;  and  if  the  law  were  altered,  there  is  no  place 
for  dishonesty.  Besides,  the  desire  of  saving  money  does 
not  enter  into  the  refuser's  motives.  He  does  not  decline  to 
pay  from  motives  of  interest,  but  from  motives  of  duty. 

It  is,  however,  argued  that  the  legislature  has  no  right  to 
take  away  tithes  any  more  than  it  has  a  right  to  deprive  citi- 
zens of  their  lands  and  houses  ;  and  that  a  man's  property  in 
tithes  is  upon  a  footing  with  his  property  in  an  estate.  Now 
we  answer  that  this  is  not  true  in  fact ;  and  that,  if  it  were, 
it  would  not  serve  the  argument. 

It  is  not  true  in  fact, — If  tithes  were  a  property,  just  as  an  es- 
tate is  a  property,  why  do  men  complain  of  the  scandal  of  plural- 
ities ?  Who  ever  hears  of  the  scandal  of  possessing  three  or  four 
estates  1  Why,  again,  does  the  law  punish  simoniacal  con- 
tracts ?  Who  ever  hears  of  simoniacal  contracts  for  lands  and 
houses  ?  The  truth  is,  that  tithes  are  regarded  as  religious  pro- 
perty. The  property  is  legally  recognised,  not  for  the  sake  of 
the  individual  who  ma-y  possess  it,  but  for  the  sake  of  religion. 
The  law  cares  nothing  for  the  men,  except  so  far  as  they  are 
ministers.  Besides,  tithes  are  a  portion  of  the  produce  only  of 
the  land.  The  tithe-owner  cannot  walk  over  an  estate,  and  say 
of  every  tenth  acre  this  is  mine.  In  truth  he  has  not,  except 
by  consent  of  the  landholder,  any  property  in  it  at  all ;  for 
the  landholder  may,  if  he  pleases,  refuse  to  cultivate  it — oc- 
casion it  to  produce  nothing ;  and  then  the  tithe-owner  has 
no  interest  or  property  in  it  whatever.  And  in  what  sense 
can  that  be  said  to  be  property,  the  possession  of  which  is  at 
the  absolute  discretion  of  another  man  1 

But  grant,  for  a  moment,  that  tithes  are  property.  Is  it  af- 
firmed that  whatever  property  a  man  possesses,  cannot  be 
taken  from  him  by  the  legislature  ?  Suppose  I  go  to  Jamaica 
and  purchase  a  slave,  and  bring  him  to  England,  has  the  law 
no  right  to  take  this  property  away  1  Assuredly  it  has  the 
right,  and  it  exercises  it  too.  Now,  so  far  as  the  argument  is 
concerned,  the  cases  of  the  slave-holder  and  of  the  tithe- 
owner  are  parallel.  Compulsory  maintenance  of  Christian 
ministers,  and  compulsory  retention  of  men  in  bondage,  are 


CHAP.  XVI.]  FOR    CHRISTIAN    TEACHERS.  495 

hoth  inconsistent  with  Christianity ;  and  as  such,  the  property 
which  consists  in  slaves  and  in  tithes,  may  rightly  be  taken 
away — unless,  indeed,  any  man  will  affirm  that  any  property, 
however  acquired,  cannot  lawfully  be  taken  from  the  pos- 
sessor. But  when  we  speak  of  taking  away  the  property  in 
tithes,  we  do  not  refer  to  the  consideration  that  it  has  been 
under  the  sanction  of  the  law  itself  that  that  property  has 
been  purchased  or  obtained.  The  law  has,  in  reality,  been 
accessory  to  the  offence,  and  it  would  not  be  decent  or  right 
to  take  away  the  possession  which  has  resulted  from  that  of- 
fence without  offering  an  equivalent.  I  would  not  advise  a 
legislature  to  say  to  those  persons  who,  under  its  own  sanc- 
tion, have  purchased  slaves,  to  turn  upon  them  and  say,  I  am 
persuaded  that  slavery  is  immoral,  and  therefore  I  command 
you  to  set  your  slaves  at  liberty  ; — and  because  you  have  no 
moral  right  to  hold  them,  I  shall  not  grant  you  a  compensa- 
tion. Nor,  for  the  same  reasons,  would  I  advise  a  legislature 
to  say  so  to  the  possessor  of  tithes. 

But  what  sort  of  a  compensation  is  to  be  offered  1  Not 
surely  an  amount  equivalent  to  the  principal  money,  compu- 
ting tithes  as  interest.  The  compensation  is  for  life  interest 
only.  The  legislature  would  have  to  buy  off,  not  a  freehold 
but  an  annuity.  The  tithe-owner  is  not  like  the  slaveholder, 
who  can  bequeath  his  property  to  another.  When  the  pres- 
ent incumbent  dies,  the  tithes,  as  property,  cease  to  exist — 
until  it  is  again  appropriated  to  an  incumbent  by  the  patron 
of  the  living.  This  is  true  except  in  the  instances  of  those 
deplorable  practices,  the  purchase  of  advowsons,  or  of  any 
other  by  which  individuals  or  bodies  acquire  a  pecuniary  in- 
terest in  the  right  of  disposal. 

The  notion  that  tithes  are  a  "  property  of  the  church,"  is 
quite  a  fiction.  In  this  sense,  what  is  the  church  ?  If  no 
individual  man  has  his  property  taken  away  by  a  legislative 
abolition  of  tithes,  it  is  unmeaning  to  talk  of  "  the  church" 
having  lost  it. 

It  is,  perhaps,  a  vain  thing  to  talk  of  how  the  legislature 
might  do  a  thing  which  perhaps  it  may  not  resolve,  for  ages, 
to  do  at  all.  But  if  it  were  to  take  away  the  right  to  tithes 
as  the  present  incumbents  died,  or  as  the  interests  of  the  pres- 
ent owners  ceased,  there  would  be  no  reason  to  complain  of 
injustice,  whatever  there  might  be  of  procrastinating  the  ful- 
filment of  a  Christian  duty. 

Whether  a  good  man,  knowing  the  inconsistency  of  forced 
maintenance  with  the  Christian  law,  ought  to  accept  a  prof- 
fered equivalent  for  that  maintenance,  is  another  considera- 


496  VOLUNTARY    PAYMENT  [eSSAY  III. 

tion.  If  it  is  wrong  to  retain  it,  it  is  not  obvious  how  it  can 
be  right,  or  how  at  least  it  can  avoid  the  appearance  of  cv^il, 
to  accept  money  for  giving  it  up.  It  is  upon  these  principles 
that  the  religious  community  who  decline  to  pay  tithes,  de- 
cline also  to  receive  them.  By  legacy  or  otherwise,  the  legal 
right  is  sometimes  possessed  by  these  persons,  but  their  moral 
discipline  requires  alike  a  refusal  to  receive  or  to  pay. 

VOLUNTARY  PAYMENT.* 

That  this  system  possesses  many  advantages  over  a  legal 
provision  we  have  already  seen.  But  this  does  not  imply 
that  even  voluntary  payment  is  conformable  with  the  dignity 
of  the  Christian  ministry,  with  its  usefulness,  or  witn  the  re- 
quisitions of  the  Christian  law. 

And  here  I  am  disposed,  in  the  outset,  to  acknowledge  that 
the  question  of  payment  is  involved  in  an  antecedent  question 
— the  necessary  qualifications  of  a  Christian  minister.  If  one 
of  these  necessary  qualifications  be,  that  he  should  devote  his 
youth  and  early  manhood  to  theological  studies,  or  to  studies 
or  exercises  of  any  kind,  I  do  not  perceive  how  the  propriety 
of  voluntary  payment  can  be  disputed ;  for,  when  a  man  who 
might  otherwise  have  fitted  himself,  in  a  counting-house  or 
an  office,  for  procuring  his  after-support,  employs  his  time 
necessarily  in  qualifying  himself  for  a  Christian  instructor,  it 
is  indispensable  that  he  should  be  paid  for  his  instructions. 
Or  if,  after  he  has  assumed  the  ministerial  function,  it  be  hi& 
indispensable  business  to  devote  all  or  the  greater  portion  of 
his  time  to  studies  or  other  preparations  for  the  pulpit,  the 
same  necessity  remains.  He  must  be  paid  for  his  ministry, 
because,  in  order  to  be  a  minister,  he  is  prevented  from  main- 
taining himself. 

But  the  necessary  qualifications  of  a  minister  of  the  gospel 
cannot  here  be  discussed.  We  pass  on,  therefore,  with  the 
simple  expression  of  the  sentiment,  that  how  beneficial  soever 
a  theological  education  and  theological  enquiries  may  be  in 
the  exercise  of  the  office,  yet  that  they  form  no  necessary 
qualifications  ; — that  men  may  be,  and  that  some  are,  true  and 
sound  ministers  of  that  gospel,  without  them. 

Now,  in  enquiring  into  the  Christian  character  and  tenden- 
cy of  payment  for  preaching  Christianity,  one  position  will 
perhaps  be  recognized  as  universally  true — that  if  the  same 
ability  and  zeal  in  the  exercise  of  the  ministry  could  be  at- 

*  "  Thou  shall  take  no  gift :  for  the  gift  blindeth  the  wise,  and  pervert- 
eth  the  words  of  the  righteous." — Exod.  xxiii.  8.     Mem.  in  the  MS. 


CHAP.  XVlj  AND    UNPAID    MINISTRY*  497 

tained  without  payment  as  with  it,  the  payment  might  reason- 
ably and  rightly  be  forborne.  Nor  will  it  perhaps  be  disputed, 
that  if  Christian  teachers  of  the  present  day  were  possessed 
of  some  good  portion  of  the  qualifications,  and  were  actuated 
by  the  motives,  of  the  first  teachers  of  our  religion,  stated 
remuneration  would  not  be  needed.  If  love  for  mankind, 
and  the  "  ability  which  God  giveth,"  were  strong  enough  to 
induce  and  to  enable  men  to  preach  the  gospel  without  pay- 
ment, the  employment  of  money  as  a  motive  would  be  with- 
out use  or  propriety.  Remuneration  is  a  contrivance  adapted 
to  an  imperfect  state  of  the  Christian  church :— nothing  but 
imperfection  can  make  it  needful ;  and,  when  that  imperfec- 
tion shall  be  removed,  it  will  cease  to  be  needful  again. 

These  considerations  would  lead  us  to  expect,  even  ante- 
cedently to  enquiry,  that  some  ill  effects  are  attendant  upon 
the  system  of  remuneration.  Respecting  these  effects,  one 
of  the  advocates  of  a  legal  provision  holds  language  which, 
though  it  be  much  too  strong,  nevertheless  contains  much 
truth.  "  Upon  the  voluntary  plan,"  says  Dr.  Paley,  "  preach- 
ing, in  time,  would  become  a  mode  of  begging.  With  what 
sincerity  or  with  what  dignity  can  a  preacher  dispense  the 
truths  of  Christianity,  whose  thoughts  are  perpetually  soli- 
cited to  the  reflection  how  he  may  increase  his  subscription  ? 
His  eloquence,  if  he  possess  any,  resembles  rather  the  exhi- 
bition of  a  player  who  is  computing  the  profits  of  his  theatre, 
than  the  simplicity  of  a  man  who,  feeling  himself  the  awful 
expectations  of  religion,  is  seeking  to  bring  others  to  such  a 
sense  and  understanding  of  their  duty  as  may  save  their 
souls. — He,  not  only  whose  success  but  whose  subsistence 
depends  upon  collecting  and  pleasing  a  crowd,  must  resort  to 
other  arts  than  the  acquirement  and  communication  of  sober 
and  profitable  instruction.  For  a  preacher  to  be  thus  at  the 
mercy  of  his  audience,  to  be  obliged  to  adapt  his  doctrines  to 
the  pleasure  of  a  capricious  multitude,  to  be  continually  af- 
fecting a  style  and  maimer  neither  natural  to  him  nor  agree- 
able to  his  judgment,  to  live  in  constant  bondage  to  tyrannical 
and  insolent  directors,  are  circumstances  so  mortifying  not 
only  to  the  pride  of  the  human  heart  but  to  the  virtuous  love 
of  independency,  that  they  are  rarely  submitted  to  without  a 
sacrifice  of  principle  and  a  depravation  of  character ; — at 
least  it  may  be  pronounced,  that  a  ministry  so  degraded  would 
soon  fall  into  the  lowest  hands  ;  for  it  would  be  found  impos- 
sible to  engage  men  of  worth  and  ability  in  so  precarious  and 
humiliating  a  profession."* 

*  Mor.  and  Pol.  PhU.  b.  6,  c.  10. 
42* 


458  VdLFNfARY   PAYMfiNl^  [eSSAY  Itl. 

To  much  of  this  it  is  a  sufficient  answer,  that  the  predic- 
tions are  contradicted  by  the  fact.  Of  those  teachers  who 
are  supported  by  voluntary  subscriptions,  it  is  not  true  that 
their  eloquence  resembles  the  exhibition  of  a  player  who  is 
computing  the  profits  of  his  theatre  ;  for  the  fact  is,  that  a 
very  large  proportion  of  them  assiduously  devote  themselves 
from  better  motives  to  the  religious  benefit  of  their  flocks  : — 
it  is  not  true  that  the  office  is  rarely  undertaken  without  what 
can  be  called  a  depravation  of  character ;  for  the  character, 
both  religious  and  moral,  of  those  teachers  who  are  volunta- 
rily paid,  is  at  least  as  exemplary  as  that  of  those  who  are 
paid  by  provision  of  the  state  : — it  is  not  true  that  the  office 
falls  into  the  lowest  hands,  andthat  it  is  impossible  to*engage 
men  of  worth  and  ability  in  the  profession,  because  very  many 
of  such  men  are  actually  engaged  in  it.    . 

But  although  the  statements  of  the  Archdeacon  are  not 
wholly  true,  they  are  true  in  part.  Preaching  will  become  a 
mode  of  begging.  When  a  congregation  wants  a  preacher, 
and  we  see  a  man  get  into  the  pulpit  expressly  and  confess- 
edly to  show  how  he  can  preach,  in  order  that  the  hearers 
may  consider  how  they  like  him,  and  when  one  object  o'f  his 
thus  doing  is  confessedly  to  obtain  an  income,  there  is  reason 
— not  certainly  for  speaking  of  him  as  a  beggar — but  for  be- 
lieving that  the  dignity  and  freedom  of  the  gospel  are  sacri- 
ficed.— Thoughts  perpetually  solicited  to  the  reflection  how  he 
may  increase  his  subscription.  Supposing  this  to  be  the  lan- 
guage of  exaggeration,  supposing  the  increase  of  his  subscrip- 
tion to  be  his  subordinate  concern,  yet  still  it  is  his  concern, 
and  being  his  concern,  it  is  his  temptation.  It  is  to  be  feared, 
that  by  the  influence  of  this  temptation  his  sincerity  and  his 
independence  may  be  impaired,  that  the  consideration  of  what 
his  hearers  wish  rather  than  of  what  he  thinks  they  need, 
may  prompt  him  to  sacrifice  his  conscience  to  his  profit,  and 
to  add  or  to  deduct  something  from  the  counsel  of  God.  Such 
temptation  necessarily  exists ;  and  it  were  only  to  exhibit 
ignorance  of  the  motives  of  human  conduct  to  deny  that  it 
will  sometimes  prevail. — To  live  in  constant  bondage  to  inso- 
lent and  tyrannical  directors.  It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose 
that  directors  will  be  tyrannical  or  insolent,  nor  by  conse- 
quence to  suppose  that  the  preacher  is  in  a  state  of  constant 
bondage.  But  if  they  be  not  tyrants  and  he  a  slave,  they 
may  be  masters  and  he  a  servant ;  a  servant  in  a  sense  far 
different  from  that  in  which  the  Christian  minister  is  required 
to  be  a  servant  of  the  Church — in  a  sense  which  implies  an 
undue  subserviency  of  his  ministrations  to  the  will  of  men, 


CHAP.  XVI.]  ANt>   TJNPA  D    MINISTRY.  4^0 

and  which  is  inrompatihle  with  the  obligation  to  have  no  mas- 
ter but  Christ. 

Other  modes  of  vohmtary  payment  may  be  and  perhaps 
they  are  adopted,  but  the  effect  will  not  be  essentially  differ- 
ent. Subscriptions  may  be  collected  from  a  number  of  con- 
gregations and  thrown  into  a  common  fund,  which  fund  may 
be  appropriated  by  a  directory  or  conference  :  but  the  objec- 
tions still  apply ;  for  he  who  wishes  to  obtain  an  income  as  a 
preacher,  has  then  to  try  to  propitiate  the  directory  instead  of 
a  congregation,  and  the  temptation  to  sacrifice  his  independ- 
ence and  his  conscience  remains.  • 

There  is  no  way  of  obtaining  emancipation  from  this  sub- 
jection, no  way  of  avoiding  this  temptation,  but  by  a  system 
in  which  the  Christian  ministry' is  absolutely  free. 

But  the  ill  effects  of  thus  paying  preachers  are  not  confined 
to  those  who  preach.  The  habitual  consciousness  that  the 
preacher  is  paid,  and  the  notion  which  some  men  take  no 
pains  to  separate  from  this  consciousness,  that  he  preaches 
because  he  is  paid,  have  a  powerful  tendency  to  diminish  the 
influence  of  his  exhortations,  and  the  general  effect  of  his 
labours.  The  vulgarly  irreligious  think,  or  pretend  to  think, 
that  it  is  a  sufficient  excuse  for  disregarding  these  labours  to 
say.  They  are  a  matter  of  course — preachers  must  say  some- 
thing, because  it  is  their  trade.  And  it  is  more  than  to  be 
feared  that  notions,  the  same  in  kind  however  different  in 
extent,  operate  upon  a  large  proportion  of  the  community.  It 
is  not  probable  that  it  should  be  otherwise  ;  and  thus  it  is  that 
a  continual  deduction  is  made  by  the  hearer  from  the  preach- 
er's disinterestedness  or  sincerity,  and  a  continual  deduction 
therefore  from  the  effect  of  his  labours. 

How  seldom  can  such  a  pastor  say,  with  full  demonstration 
of  sincerity,  "  I  seek  not  yours,  but  you."  The  flock  may 
indeed  be,  and  happily  it  often  is,  his  first  and  greatest  motive 
to  exertion ;  but  the  demonstrative  evidence  that  it  is  so,  can 
only  be  afforded  by  those  whose  ministrations  are  absolutely 
free.  The  deduction  which  is  thus  made  from  the  practical 
influence  of  the  labours  of  stipended  preachers,  is  the  same 
in  kind  (though  differing  in  amount)  as  that  which  is  made 
from  a  pleader's  addresses  in  court.  He  pleads  because  he 
is  paid  for  pleading.  Who  does  not  perceive,  that  if  an  able 
man  came  forward  and  pleaded  in  a  cause  without  a  retainer, 
and  simply  from  the  desire  that  justice  should  be  awarded, 
he  would  be  listened  to  with  much  more  of  confidence,  and 
that  his  arguments  would  have  much  more  weight,  than  if  the 
same  words  were  uttered  by  a  barrister  who  was  fee'd?     A 


500  VOLUJrtARY    PAYMENT  [eSSAY  III. 

similar  deduction  is  made  from  the  writings  of  paid  ministers, 
especially  if  they  advocate  their  own  particular  faith.  "  He 
is  interested  evidence,"  says  the  reader — he  has  got  a  retain- 
er, and  of  course  argues  for  his  client ;  and  thus  arguments 
that  may  be  invincible,  and  facts  that  may  be  incontrovertibly 
true,  lose  some  portion  of  their  effect,  even  upon  virtuous 
men,  and  a  large  portion  upon  the  bad,  because  the  preacher  is 
paid.  If,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  "  the  amount  of  the  salary 
given  is  regulated  very  precisely  by  the  frequency  of  the 
ministry  required," — so  that  a  hearer  may  possibly  allow  the 
reflection„The  preacher  will  get  half  a  guinea  for  the  sermon 
he  is  going  to  preach — it  is  almost  impossible  that  the  dignity 
of  the  Christian  ministry  should  not  be  reduced,  as  well  as 
that  the  influence  of  his  exhortations  should  not  be  dimin- 
ished. "  It  is  however  more  desirable,"  says  Milton,  "  for 
example  to  be,  and  for  the  preventing  of  offence  or  suspicion, 
as  well  as  more  noble  and  honourable  in  itself,  and  conducive 
to  our  more  complete  glorying  in  God,  to  render  an  unpaid 
service  to  the  church,  in  this  as  well  as  in  all  other  instances  ; 
and,  after  the  example  of  our  Lord,  to  minister  and  serve  gra- 
tuitously."* 

Some  ministers  expend,  all  the  income  which  they  derive 
from  their  office  in  acts  of  beneficence.  To  these  we  may 
safely  appeal  for  confirmation  of  these  remarks.  Do  you  not 
find  that  the  consciousness,  in  the  minds  of  your  hearers,  that 
you  gain  nothing  by  your  labour,  greatly  increases  its  influ- 
ence jipon  them  ?  Do  you  not  find  that  they  listen  to  you 
with  more  confidence  and  regard,  and  more  wiUingly  admit 
the  truths  which  you  inculcate  and  conform  to  the  advices 
which  you  impart  ?  If  these  things  be  so — and  who  will  dis- 
pute it  1 — how  great  must  be  the  aggregate  obstruction  which 
pecuniary  remuneration  opposes  to  the  influence  of  religion 
in  the  world.  

But  indeed  it  is  not  practicable  to  the  writer  to  illustrate 
the  whole  of  what  he  conceives  to  be  the  truth  upon  this  sub- 
ject, without  a  brief  advertence  to  the  qualifications  of  the 
minister  of  the  gospel :  because,  if  his  view  of  these  qualifi- 
cations be  just,  the  stipulation  for  such  and  such  exercise  of 
the  ministry,  and  such  and  such  payment  is  impossible.  If  it 
is  "  admitted  that  the  ministry  of  the  gospel  is  the  work  of 
the  Lord,  that  it  can  be  rightly  exercised  only  in  virtue  of  his 
appointment,"  and  only  when  "  a  necessity  is  laid  upon  the 
minister  to  preach  the  gospel," — ^it  is  manifest,  that  he  cannot 
*  Chxistian  Doctrine :  p.  484. 


CHAP.  XVI.]  AND    UNPAID    MINISTRY.  501 

engage  beforehand  to  preach  when  others  desire  it.  It  is 
manifest,  that  "  the  compact  which  binds  the  minister  to  preach 
on  the  condition  that  his  hearers  shall  pay  him  for  his  preach- 
ing, assumes  the  character  of  absolute  inconsistency  with  the 
spirituality  of  the  Christian  religion."* 

"Freely  ye  have  received,  freely  give."  When  we  contem- 
plate a  Christian  minister  who  illustrates,  both  in  his  commis- 
sion and  in  his  practice,  this  language  of  his  Lord ;  who 
teaches,  advises,  reproves,  with  the  authority  and  affection  of 
a  commissioned  teacher ;  who  fears  not  to  displease  his  hear- 
ers, and  desires  not  to  receive  their  reward ;  who  is  under  no 
temptation  to  withhold,  and  does  not  withhold,  any  portion  of 
that  counsel  which  he  thinks  God  designs  for  his  church ; — 
when  we  contemplate  such  a  man,  we  may  feel  somewhat  of 
thankfulness  and  of  joy ; — of  thankfulness  and  joy  that  the 
Universal  Parent  thus  enables  his  creatures  to  labour  for  the 
good  of  one  another,  in  that  same  spirit  in  which  he  cares  for 
them  and  blesses  them  himself. 

I  censure  not,  either  in  word  or  in  thought,  him  who,  in 
sincerity  of  mind,  accepts  remuneration  for  his  labours  in  the 
church.  It  may  not  be  inconsistent  with  the  dispensations 
of  Providence,  that  in  the  present  imperfect  condition  of  the 
Christian  family,  imperfect  principles  respecting  the  ministry 
should  be  permitted  to  prevail :  nor  is  it  to  be  questioned  that 
some  of  those  who  do  receive  remuneration,  are  fulfilling  their 
proper  allotments  in  the  universal  church.  But  this  does  not 
evince  that  we  should  not  anticipate  the  arrival,  and  promote 
the  extension,  of  a  more  perfect  state.  It  does  not  evince 
that  a  higher  allotment  may  not  await  their  successors — that 
days  of  greater  purity  and  brightness  may  not  arrive  ; — of 
purity,  when  every  motive  of  the  Christian  minister  shall  be 
simply  Christian ;  and  of  brightness,  when  the  light  of  truth 

*  1  would  venture  to  suggest  to  some  of  those  to  whom  these  consider- 
ations are  offered,  whether  the  notion  that  a  preacher  is  a  sine  qua  non 
of  the  exercise  of  pubHc  worship,  is  not  taken  up  without  sufficient  con- 
sideration of  the  principles  which  it  involves.  If,  "  where  two  or  three 
are  gathered  together  in  the  name"  of  Christ,  there  He,  the  minister  of 
the  sanctuary,  is  "in  the  midst  of  them,"  it  suiely  cannot  be  necessary 
to  the  exercises  of  such  worship,  that  another  preacher  should  be  there 
Surely,  too,  it  derogates  something  from  the  excellence,  something  from 
the  glory  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  to  assume  that,  if  a' number  of 
Christians  should  be  so  situated  as  to  be  without  a  preacher,  there  the 
public  worship  of  God  cannot  be  performed.  This  may  often  happen  in 
remote  places,  in  voyages  or  the  like :  and  I  have  sometimes  been  im- 
pressed with  the  importance  of  these  considerations  when  I  have  heard 

a  person  say,  " is  absent,  and  therefore  there  will  be  no  divine 

service  this  morning." 


602  PATRIOTISM.  [essay  III. 

shall  be  displayed  with  greater  effulgence.  When  the  Great 
Parent  of  all  shall  thus  turn  his  favour  towards  his  people ; 
when  He  shall  supply  them  with  teachers  exclusively  of  his 
own  appointment,  it  will  be  perceived  that  the  ordinary  present 
state  of  the  Christian  ministry  is  adapted  only  to  the  twilight 
of  the  Christian  day;  and  some  of  those  who  now  faithfully 
labour  in  this  hour  of  twilight  will  be  amongst  the  first  to  re- 
joice in  the  greater  glory  of  the  noon. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

PATRIOTISM. 


Patriotism  as  it  is  viewed  by  Christianity — A  Patriotism  which  is  opposed 
to  general  benignity — Patriotism  not  the  soldier's  motive. 

We  are  presented  with  a  beautiful  subject  of  contemplation, 
when  we  discover  that  the  principles  which  Christianity  ad- 
vances upon  its  own  authority,  are  recommended  and  enforced 
by  their  practical  adaptation  to  the  condition  and  the  wants  of 
man.  With  such  a  subject  I  think  we  are  presented  in  the 
case  of  Patriotism. 

"  Christianity  does  not  encourage  particular  patriotism  in 
opposition  to  general  benignity."*  If  it  did,  it  would  not  be 
adapted  for  the  world.  The  duties  of  the  subject  of  one  state 
would  often  be  in  opposition  to  those  of  the  subject  of  another, 
and  men  might  inflict  evil  or  misery  upon  neighbour  nations 
in  conforming  to  the  Christian  law.  Christianity  is  designed 
to  benefit,  not  a  community,  but  the  world.  The  promotion 
of  the  interests  of  one  community  by  injuring  another — that 
is,  "  patriotism  in  opposition  to  general  benignity," — it  utterly 
rejects  as  wrong ;  and  in  doing  this,  it  does  that  which  in  a 
system  of  such  wisdom  and  benevolence  we  should  expect. 
— "  The  love  of  our  country,"  says  Adam  Smith,  "  seems  not 
to  be  derived  from  the  love  of  mankind."! 

I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  word  patriotism  is  to  be  found 
in  the  New  Testament,  or  that  it  contains  any  disquisitions 
respecting  the  proper  extent  of  the  love  of  our  country — but  I 
say  that  the  universality  of  benevolence  which  Christianity 

*  Bishop  Watson. 

t  Theo.  Mor.  Sent.  The  limitation  with  which  this  opinion  should 
be  regaiued,  we  shall  presently  propose. 


CHAP.  XVII.]  PATRIOTISM.  503 

inculcates,  both  in  its  essential  character  and  in  its  precepts, 
is  incompatible  with  that  patriotism  which  would  benefit  our 
own  community  at  the  expense  of  general  benevolence.  Pa- 
triotism, as  it  is  often  advocated,  is  a  low  and  selfish  principle, 
a  principle  wholly  unworthy  of  that  enlightened  and  expanded 
philanthropy  which  religion  proposes. 

Nevertheless  Christianity  appears  not  to  encourage  the  doc- 
trine of  being  a  "  citizen  of  the  world,"  and  of  paying  no  more 
regard  to  our  own  community  than  to  every  other.  And  why  ? 
Because  such  a  doctrine  is  not  rational ;  because  it  opposes 
the  exercise  of  natural  and  virtuous  feelings  ;  and  because,  if 
it  were  attempted  to  be  reduced  to  practice,  it  may  be  feared 
that  it  would  destroy  confined  benignity  without  effecting  a 
counterbalancing  amount  of  universal  philanthropy.  This 
preference  of  our  own  nation  is  indicated  in  that  strong  lan- 
guage of  Paul,  "  I  could  wish  that  myself  were  accursed  from 
Christ  for  my  brethren,  my  kinsmen  according  to  the  flesh, 
who  are  Israelites."*  And  a  similar  sentiment. is  inculcated 
by  the  admonition — "  As  we  have,  therefore,  opportunity,  let 
us  do  good  unto  all  men,  especially  unto  them  who  are  of  the 
household  of  faith. "f  In  another  place  the  same  sentiment 
is  applied  to  more  private  life  ; — "  If  any  provide  not  for  his 
own,  and  specially  for  those  of  his  own  house,  he  hath  denied 
the  faith."t 

All  this  is  perfectly  consonant  with  reason  and  with  nature. 
Since  the  helpless  and  those  who  need  assistance  must  obtain 
it  somewhere,  where  can  they  so  rationally  look  for  it,  where 
shall  they  look  for  it  at  all,  except  from  those  with  whom 
they  are  connected  in  society  ?  If  these  do  not  exercise  be- 
nignity towards  them,  who  will  ?  And  as  to  the  dictate  of 
nature,  it  is  a  law  of  nature  that  a  man  shall  provide  for  his 
own.  He  is  prompted  to  do  this  by  the  impulse  of  nature. 
Who,  indeed,  shall  support,  and  cherish,  and  protect  a  child 
if  his  parents  do  not  ?  That  speculative  philosophy  is  vain 
which  would  supplant  these  dictates  by  doctrines  of  general 
philanthropy.  It  cannot  be  applicable  to  human  affairs  until 
there  is  an  alteration  in  the  human  constitution.  Not  only 
religion  therefore,  but  reason  and  nature,  reject  that  philoso- 
phy which  teaches  that  no  man  should  prefer  or  aid  another 
because  he  is  his  countryman,  his  neighbour,  or  his  child  :— 
for  even  this,  the  philosophy  has  taught  us  ;  and  v/e  have 
been  seriously  iold  that,  in  pursuance  of  general  philanthropy, 
we  ought  not  to  cherish  or  support  our  own  offspring  in  pre- 
ference to  other  children.  The  effect  of  these  doctrines,  if 
*Rom.a.3,  t  Gal.  vi.  10.  II  Tim.  v.  8. 


504  PATRIOTISM.  -  [essay  III. 

they  were  reduced  to  practice,  would  be,  not  to  diffuse  univer- 
sal benevolence,  but  to  contract  or  destroy  the  charities  of 
men  for  their  families,  their  neighbours,  and  their  country. 
It  is  an  idle  system  of  philosophy  which  sets  out  with  extin- 
guishing those  principles  of  human  nature  which  the  Creator 
has  implanted  for  wise  and  good  ends.  He  that  shall  so  far 
succeed  in  practising  this  philosophy  as  to  look  with  indiffer- 
ence upon  his  parent,  his  wife,  and  his  son,  will  not  often  be 
found  with  much  zeal  to  exercise  kindness  and  benevolence 
to  the  world  at  large. 

Christianity  rejects  alike  the  extravagance  of  Patriotism  and 
the  extravagance  of  seeming  philanthropy.  Its  precepts  are 
addressed  to  us  as  men  with  human  constitutions,  and  as  men 
in  society.  But  to  cherish  and  support  my  own  child  rather 
than  others  ;  to  do  good  to  my  neighbours  rather  than  to  stran- 
gers ;  to  benefit  my  own  country  rather  than  another  nation, 
does  not  imply  that  we  may  injure  other  nations,  or  strangers, 
or  their  children,  in  order  to  do  good  to  our  own.  Here  is 
the  point  for  discrimination — a  point  which  vulgar  patriotism 
and  vulgar  philosophy  have  alike  overlooked. 

The  proper  mode  in  which  Patriotism  should  be  exercised, 
is  that  which  does  not  necessarily  respect  other  nations.  He 
is  the  truest  patriot  who  benefits  his  own  country  without 
diminishing  the  welfare  of  another.  For  which  reason,  those 
who  induce  improvements  in  the  administration  of  justice,  in 
the  maxims  of  governing,  in  the  political  constitution  of  the 
state — or  those  who  extend  and  rectify  the  education,  or  in 
any  other  manner  amend  the  moral  or  social  condition  of  a 
people,  possess  incomparably  higher  claims  to  the  praise  of 
patriotism  than  multitudes  of  those  who  receive  it  from  the 
popular  voice. 

That  patriotism  which  is  manifested  in  political  partizan- 
ship,  is  frequently  of  a  very  questionable  kind.  The  motives 
to  this  partizanship  are  often  far  other  than  the  love  of  our 
country,  even  when  the  measure  which  a  party  pursues  tends 
to  the  country's  good  ;  and  many  are  called  patriots,  of  whom 
both  the  motives  and  the  actions  are  pernicious  or  impure. 
The  most  vulgar  and  unfounded  talk  of  patriotism  is  that  which 
relates  to  the  agents  of  military  operations.  In  general,  the 
patriotism  is  of  a  kind  which  Christianity'^condemns  ;  because 
it  is  "  in  opposition  to  general  benignity."  It  does  more  harm 
to  another  country  than  good  to  our  own.  In  truth,  the  merit 
often  consists  in  the  harm  that  is  done  to  another  country,  with 
but  little  pretensions  to  benefiting  our  own.  These  agents 
therefore,  if  they  were  patriotic  at  all,  would  commonly  be  so 


CHAP.  XVII.]  PATRIOTISM.  505 

in  an  unchristian  sense.  And  as  to  their  being  influenced  by 
patriotism  as  a  motive,  the  notion  is  ordinarily  quite  a  fiction. 
When  a  Frenchman  is  sent  with  ten  thousand  others  into 
Spain,  or  a  Spaniard  with  an  army  into  France,  he  probably 
is  so  far  from  acting  the  patriot  that  he  does  not  know  whether 
his  country  would  not  be  more  benefited  by  throwing  down 
his  arms  ;  nor  probably  does  he  know  about  what  the  two  na- 
tions are  quarrelling.  Men  do  not  enter  armies  because  they 
love  their  countries,  but  because  they  want  a  living,  or  are 
pleased  with  a  military  life :  and  when  they  have  entered, 
they  do  not  fight  because  they  love  their  country,  but  because 
fighting  is  their  business.  At  the  very  moment  of  fighting, 
the  nation  at  home  is  perhaps  divided  in  opinion  as  to  the 
propriety  of  carrying  on  the  war.  One  party  maintains  that 
the  war  is  beneficial,  and  one  that  it  is  ruining  the  nation.  But 
the  soldier,  for  whatever  he  fights,  and  whether  really  in  pro- 
motion of  his  country's  good,  or  in  opposition  to  it,  is  secure 
of  his  praise. 

All  this  is  sufficiently  deceptive  and  absurd  :  the  delusion 
would  be  ridiculous  if  the  topic  were  not  too  grave  for  ridicule. 
It  forms  one  amongst  the  many  fictions  by  which  the  reputa- 
tion of  military  affairs  is  kept  up.  Why  such  fictions  are 
needful  to  the  purpose,  it  may  be  wise  for  the  reader  to  en- 
quire. I  suppose  the  cause  is,  that  truth  and  reality  would 
not  serve  the  purposes  of  military  reputation,  and  therefore 
that  recourse  is  had  to  pleasant  fictions.  This  may,  however, 
have  been  done  without  a  distinct  consciousness,  on  the  part 
of  the  inventors,  of  the  delusions  which  they  spread.  I  do 
not  wholly  coincide  with  the  writer  who  says, — "  The  love 
of  our  country  is  one  of  those  specious  illusions  which  have 
been  invented  by  impostors  in  order  to  render  the  multitude 
the  blind  instruments  of  their  crooked  designs."*  The  love 
of  our  country  is  a  virtuous  motive  of  action.  The  "  specious 
illusion"  consists  in  calling  that  "love  of  country"  which 
ought  to  be  called  by  a  far  other  name.  As  to  those  who 
have  thus  misnamed  human  motives  and  actions,  I  know  not 
whether  they  have  often  been  such  wily  impostors.  The 
probable  supposition  is,  that  they  have  frequently  been  duped 
themselves.  He  whom  ambition  urged  on  to  conquest,  tried 
to  persuade  himself,  and  perhaps  did  persuade  himself,  that 
he  was  actuated  by  the  love  of  his  country.  He  persuaded, 
also,  his  followers  in  arms ;  and  they,  no  doubt,  were  suffi- 
ciently willing  to  hope  that  they  were  influenced  by  such  a 
motive.  But,  in  whatever  manner  the  fiction  originated,  a 
*  Godwin :  Pol.  Justice,  v.  2,  p.  514. 
43 


"SOB  SLAVERY.  [essay  III. 

fiction  it  assuredly  is ;  and  the  circumstance  that  it  is  still 
industriously  imposed  upon  the  world,  is  no  inconsiderable 
evidence  that  the  system  which  it  is  employed  to  encourage, 
would  shrink  from  the  eye  of  virtue  and  the  light  of  truth. 

Upon  the  whole,  we  shall  act  both  safely  and  wisely  in 
lowering  the  relative  situation  of  patriotism  in  the  scale  of 
Christian  virtues.  It  is  a  virtue  ;  but  it  is  far  from  the  great- 
est or  the  highest.  The  world  has  given  to  it  an  unwarranted 
elevation — an  elevation  to  which  it  has  no  pretensions  in  the 
view  of  truth  ;  and  if  the  friends  of  truth  consign  it  to  its  pro- 
per station,  it  is  probable  that  there  will  be  fewer  spurious  pre- 
tensions to  its  praise. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

SLAVERY 


Requisitions  of  Christianity  professedly  disregarded — Persian  law — The 
slave  system  a  costly  iniquity. 

At  a  future  day  it  will  probably  become  a  subject  of  won- 
der how  it  could  have  happened  that  upon  such  a  subject  as 
Slavery  men  could  have  enquired,  and  examined,  and  debated, 
year  after  year ;  and  that  many  years  actually  passed  before 
the  minds  of  a  nation  were  so  fully  convinced  of  its  enormity, 
and  of  their  consequent  duty  to  abolish  it,  as  to  suppress  it  to 
the  utmost  of  their  power.  I  say  this  will  probably  be  a  sub- 
ject of  wonder ;  because  the  question  is  so  simple,  that  he 
who  simply  applies  the  requisitions  of  the  Moral  Law  finds 
no  time  for  reasoning  or  for  doubt.  The  question,  as  soon  as 
it  is  proposed,  is  decided.  How,  then,  it  will  be  asked,  in 
future  days,  could  a  Christian  Legislature  argue  and  contend, 
and  contend  and  argue  again,  and  allow  an  age  to  peiss  with- 
out deciding. 

The  cause  is,  that  men  do  not  agree  as  to  the  rule  of  deci- 
sion— as  to  the  test  by  which  the  question  should  be  examined. 
One  talks  of  the  rights  to  property — one  of  the  interests  of 
merchants — one  of  safety — one  of  policy — all  of  which  are 
valid  and  proper  considerations  ;  but  they  are  not  the  primary 
consideration.  The  first  question  is.  Is  Slavery  right  ?  Is  it 
consistent  with  the  Moral  Law  ?  This  question  is,  in  prac- 
tice, postponed  to  others,  even  by  some  who  theoretically  ac- 


CHAP.  XVIII.]  SLAVERY.  507 

knowledge  its  primary  claim ;  and  when  to  the  indistinct  prin- 
ciples of  these  is  added  the  want  of  principle  in  others,  it  is 
easy  to  account  for  the  delay  and  opposition  with  which  the 
advocate  of  simple  rectitude  is  met. 

I'o  him  who  examines  slavery  by  the  standard  to  which  all 
questions  of  human  duty  should  be  referred,  the  task  of  de- 
ciding, we  say,  is  short.  Whether  it  is  consistent  with  the 
Christian  Law  for  one  man  to  keep  another  in  bondage  with- 
out his  consent,  and  to  compel  him  to  labour  for  that  other's 
advantage,  admits  of  no  more  doubt  than  whether  two  and  l^wo 
make  four.  It  were  humiliating,  then,  to  set  about  the  proof 
that  the  Slave  System  is  incompatible  with  Christianity ;  be- 
cause no  man  questions  its  incompatibility  who  knows  what 
Christianity  is,  and  what  it  requires.  Unhappily,  some  who 
can  estimate,  with  tolerable  precision,  the  duties  of  morality 
upon  other  subjects,  contemplate  this  through  a  veil — a  veil 
which  habit  has  suspended  before  them,  and  which  is  dense 
enough  to  intercept  the  view  of  the  moral  features  of  slavery 
as  they  are  presented  to  others  who  examine  it  without  an  in- 
tervening medium,  and  with  no  other  light  than  the  light  of 
truth.  To  these  the  best  counsel  that  we  can  offer  is,  to  sim- 
plify their  reasonings — to  recur  to  first  principles ;  and  first 
principles  are  few.  Look,  then,  at  the  foundation  of  all  the 
relative  duties  of  man — Benevolence — Love — that  love  and 
benevolence  which  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  Moral  Law — that 
"  charity"  which  prompts  to  actions  of  kindness,  and  tender- 
ness, and  fellow-feeling  for  all  men.  Does  he  who  seizes  a 
person  in  Guinea,  and  drags  him  shrieking  to  a  vessel,  prac- 
tise this  benevolence  1  When  three  or  four  hundreds  have 
been  thus  seized,  does  he  who  chains  them  together  in  a  suf- 
focating hold  practise  this  benevolence  ?  When  they  have 
reached  another  shore,  does  he  who  gives  money  to  the  first 
for  his  victims — keeps  them  as  his  property — and  compels 
them  to  labour  for  his  profit,  practise  this  benevolence  1  Would 
either  of  these  persons  think,  if  their  relative  situations  were 
exchanged  with  the  Africans',  that  the  Africans  used  them 
kindly  and  justly?  No.  Then  the  question  is  decided.  Chris- 
tianity condemns  the  system  ;  and  no  further  enquiry  about 
rectitude  remains.  The  question  is  as  distinctly  settled  as 
when  a  man  commits  a  burglary  it  is  distinctly  certain  that 
he  has  violated  the  law. 

But  of  the  flagitiousness  of  the  system  in  the  view  of  Chris- 
tianity, its  defenders  are  themselves  aware — for  they  tell  us, 
if  not  with  decency  at  least  with  openness,  that  Christianity 
must  be  excluded  from  the  enquiry.     What  does  this  exclu- 


:50iS  SLAVERY.  [essay  III. 

sion  imply?  Obviously,  that  the  advocates  of  slavery  are 
conscious  that  Christianity  condemns  it.  They  take  her  away 
from  the  judgment  seat,  because  they  know  she  will  pro- 
nounce a  verdict  against  them, — Does  the  reader  desire  more 
than  this  1  Here  is  the  evidence,  both  of  enemies  and  of 
friends,  that  the  Moral  Law  of  God  condemns  the  slave  sys- 
tem. If,  therefore,  we  are  Christians,  the  question  is  not 
merely  decided,  hxni  confessedly  decided:  and  what  more  do 
we  ask? 

It  is,  to  be  sure,  a  curious  thing,  that  they  who  affirm  they 
are  Christians,  will  not  have  their  conduct  examined  by  the 
Christian  Law  ;  and  whilst  they  baptize  their  children  and 
kneel  at  the  communion  table,  tell  us  that  with  one  of  the 
greatest  questions  of  practical  morality  our  religion  has  no 
concern. 

Two  reasons  induce  the  writer  to  confine  himself,  upon 
this  subject,  to  little  more  than  the  exhibition  of  fundamental 
principles  ; — first  that  the  details  of  the  Slavery  question  are 
already  laid,  in  unnumbered  publications,  before  the  public  ; 
and,  secondly,  that  he  does  not  think  it  will  long  remain,  at 
least  in  this  country,  a  subject  for  discussion.  That  the  sys- 
tem will,  so  far  as  the  British  government  is  concerned,  at  no 
distant  period  be  abolished,  appears  nearly  certain ;  and  he  is 
unwilling  to  fill  the  pages  of  a  book  of  general  morality  with 
discussions  which,  ere  many  years  have  passed,  may  possess 
no  relevance  to  the  affairs  of  the  Christian  world. 

Yet  one  remark  is  offered  as  to  a  subordinate  means  of  es- 
timating the  goodness  or  badness  of  a  cause — that  which  con- 
sists in  referring  to  the  principles  upon  which  each  party 
reasons,  to  the  general  spirit,  to  the  tone  and  the  temper 
of  the  disputants.  Now,  I  am  free  to  confess,  that  if  I  had 
never  heard  an  argument  against  Slavery,  I  should  find,  in  the 
writings  of  its  defenders,  satisfactory  evidence  that  their 
cause  is  bad.  So  true  is  this,  that  if  at  any  time  I  needed 
peculiarly  to  impress  myself  with  the  flagitiousness  of  the 
system,  I  should  take  up  the  book  of  a  determined  advocate. 
There  I  find  the  most  unequivocal  of  all  testimony  against  it 
— that  which  is  unwittingly  furnished  by  its  advocates.  There 
I  find,  first,  that  the  fundamental  principles  of  morality  are 
given  to  the  winds ; — that  the  proper  foundation  of  the  reason- 
ing is  rejected  and  ridiculed.  There  I  find  that  the  temper 
and  dispositions  which  are  wont  to  influence  the  advocate  of 
a  good  cause,  are  scarcely  to  be  found  ;  and  that  those  which 
usually  characterize  a  bad  one,  continually  appear ;  and  there- 
fore, even  setting  aside  inaccurate  statements  and  fallacious 


6kAP.  xvitij  sLAVfiftif.  60^ 

reasonings,  I  am  assured,  from  the  general  character  of  thei 
defence  and  conduct  of  the  defenders,  that  the  system  is  radi- 
cally vicious  and  bad. 

The  distinctions  which  are  made  between  the  original  rob- 
bery in  Africa,  and  the  purchase,  the  inheritance,  or  the 
"  breeding"  of  slaves  in  the  colonies,  do  not  at  all  respect  the 
kind  of  immorality  that  attaches  to  the  whole  system.  They 
respect  nothing  but  the  degree.  The  man  who  wounds  and 
robs  another  on  the  highway,  is  a  more  atrocious  offender 
than  he  who  plunders  a  hen-roost ; — but  he  is  not  more  truly 
an  offender,  he  is  not  more  certainly  a  violater  of  the  law. — > 
And  so  with  the  slave  system.  He  who  drags  a  wretched 
man  from  his  family  in  Africa,  is  a  more  flagitious  transgres- 
sor than  he  who  merely  compels  the  African  to  labour  for  his 
own  advantage  ;  but  the  transgression,  the  immorality,  is 
as  real  and  certain  in  one  case  as  in  the  other.  He  who  had 
no  right  to  steal  the  African  can  have  none  to  sell  him.  From 
him  who  is  known  to  have  no  right  to  sell,  another  can  have 
no  right  to  buy  or  to  possess.  Sale,  or  gift,  or  legacy,  imparts 
no  right  to  me,  because  the  seller,  or  giver,  or  bequeath- 
er,  had  none  himself.  The  sufferer  has  just  as  valid  a  claim 
to  liberty  at  my  hands  as  at  the  hands  of  the  ruffian  who  first 
dragged  him  from  his  home. — Every  hour  of  every  day,  the 
present  possessor  is  guilty  of  injustice.  Nor  is  the  case  al- 
tered with  respect  to  those  who  are  born  on  a  man's  estate. 
The  parents  were  never  the  landholder's  property,  and  there- 
fore the  child  is  not.  Nay,  if  the  parents  had  been  rightfully 
slaves,  it  would  not  justify  me  in  making  slaves  of  their  chil- 
dren. No  man  has  a  right  to  make  a  child  a  slave,  but  him- 
self. What  are  our  sentiments  upon  kindred  subjects?  What 
do  we  think  of  the  justice  of  the  Persian  system,  by  which, 
when  a  state  offender  is  put  to  death,  his  brothers  and 
his  children  are  killed  and  mutilated  too  ?  Or,  to  come  nearer 
to  the  point,  as  well  as  nearer  home,  what  should  we  say 
of  a  law  which  enacted,  that  of  every  criminal  who  was  sen- 
tenced to  labour  for  life,  all  the  children  should  be  sentenced 
so  to  labour  also  ? — And  yet,  if  there  is  any  comparison  of  rea- 
sonableness, it  seems  to  be  in  one  respect  in  favour  of 
the  culprit.  He  is  condemned  to  slavery  for  his  crimes  :  the 
African,  for  another  man's  profit. 

That  any  human  being  who  has  not  forfeited  his  liberty  by 
his  crimes,  has  a  right  to  be  free — and  that  whosoever  forci- 
bly withholds  liberty  from  an  innocent  man,  robs  him  of  his 
right  and  violates  the  Moral  Law,  are  truths  which  no 
man  would  dispute  or  doubt,  if  custom  had  not  obscured  our 

43* 


^>^. 


510  sLAVfiRY.  [essat  nu 

perceptions,  or  if  wickedness  did  not  prompt  us  to  close  our 
eyes. 

The  whole  system  is  essentially  and  radically  bad  : — 
Injustice  and  oppression  are  its  fundamental  principles.  What- 
ever lenity  may  be  requisite  in  speaking  of  the  agent,  none 
should  be  shown,  none  should  be  expressed  for  the  act.  I  do 
not  affirm  or  imagine  that  every  slaveholder  is  therefore  a 
wicked  man ; — ^but  if  he  be  not,  it  is  only  upon  the  score 
of  ignorance.  If  he  is  exempt  from  the  guilt  of  violating  the 
Moral  Law,  it  is  only  because  he  does  not  perceive  what 
it  requires.  Let  us  leave  the  deserts  of  the  individual  to  Him 
who  knoweth  the  heart ;  of  his  actions,  we  may  speak;  and  we 
should  speak  in  the  language  of  reprobation,  disgust,  and  ab- 
horrence. 

Although  it  could  be  shown  that  the  slave  system  is  expe- 
dient, it  would  not  affect  the  question,  whether  it  ought  to  be 
maintained  ? — yet  it  is  remarkable  that  it  is  shown  to  be  im- 
politic as  well  as  bad.  We  are  not  violating  the  Moral  Law 
because  it  fills  our  pockets.  We  injure  ourselves  by  our  own 
transgressions.  The  slave  system  is  a  costly  iniquity  both  to 
the  nation  and  to  individual  men.  It  is  matter  of  great  satis- 
faction that  this  is  known  and  proved ;  and  yet  it  is  just  what, 
antecedently  to  enquiry,  we  should  have  reason  to  expect. — 
The  truth  furnishes  one  addition  to  the  many  evidences,  that, 
even  with  respect  to  temporal  affairs,  that  which  is  right 
is  commonly  politic  ;  and  it  ought,  therefore,  to  furnish  addi- 
tional inducements  to  a  fearless  conformity  of  conduct,  private 
and  public,  to  the  Moral  Law. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  our  slave  system  will  be  abolished, 
and  that  its  supporters  will  hereafter  be  regarded  with  the 
same  public  feelings,  as  he  who  was  an  advocate  of  the  slave 
trade,  is  now.  How  is  it  that  legislators  or  that  public 
men  are  so  indifferent  to  their  fame  ?  Who  would  now  be 
willing  that  biography  should  record  of  him — This  man  defend- 
ed the  slave  trade  ?  The  time  will  come  when  the  record — 
This  man  opposed  the  abolition  of  slavery — will  occasion  a 
great  deduction  from  the  public  estimate  of  worth  of  charac- 
ter. When  both  these  atrocities  are  abolished,  and  but  for 
the  page  of  history  forgotten,  that  page  will  make  a  wide  dif- 
ference between  those  who  aided  the  abolition,  and  those 
who  obstructed  it.  The  one  will  be  ranked  amongst  the 
Howards  that  are  departed,  and  the  other  amongst  those  who, 
in  ignorance  or  in  guilt,  have  employed  their  little  day  in  in- 
flicting misery  upon  mankind. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  WAH.  511 


CHAPTER  XIX 

WAR. 

Causes  of  War. — Want  of  enquiry:  Indifference  to  human  misery: 
National  irritability  :  Interest :  Secret  motives  of  Cabinets  :  Ideas  of 
glory — Foundation  of  military  glory. 

Consequences  of  War. — Destruction  of  human  life  :  Taxation :  Moral 
depravity  :  Familiarity  with  plunder :  Implicit  submission  to  superiors  : 
Resignaiion  of  moral  agency :  Bondage  and  degradation — Loan  of 
armies — Effects  on  the  community. 

Lawfulness  of  War. — Influence  of  habit — Of  appealing  to  antiquity — 
,  The   Christian    Scrii>ture8 — Subjects   of    Christ's    benediction — Matt. 

.  xxvii.  52. — The  Apostles  and  Evangelists — The  Centurion — Cornelius 
— Silence  not  a  proof  of  approbation — Luke  xxii.  36. — ^John  the  Baptist 
—Negative  evidence — Prophecies  of  the  Old  Testament — The  requi- 
sitions of  Christianity  of  present  obligation — Primitive  Christians — Ex- 
ample and  testimony  of  early  Christians — Christian  soldiers — Wars  of 
I'-""  Jews — Duties  of  individuals  and  nations — Offensive  and  defensive 
\     . — Wars  always  aggressive— Paley — War  wholly  forbidden. 

Of  the  probable  practical  Effects  of  adherlng  to  the 
Moral  Law  in  respect  to  War. — Quakers  in  America  and  Ireland 
— Colonization  of  Pennsylvania; — Unconditional  reliance  on  Providence 
— Recapitulation^ — General  Observations. 

It  is  one  amongst  the  numerous  moral  phenomena  of  the 
present  times,  that  the  enquiry  is  silently  yet  not  slowly  spread- 
ing in  the  world — Is  War  compatible  with  the  Christian  reli- 
gion ?  There  was  a  period  when  the  question  was  seldom 
asked,  and  when  war  was  regarded  almost  by  every  man  both 
as  inevitable  and  right.  That  period  has  certainly  passed 
away  ;  and  not  only  individuals  but  public  societies,  and  socie- 
ties in  distant  nations,  are  urging  the  question  upon  the  atten- 
tion of  mankind.  The  simple  circumstance  that  it  is  thus 
urged  contains  no  irrational  motive  to  investigation  :  for  why 
should  men  ask  the  question  if  tliey  did  not  doubt ;  and  how, 
after  these  long  ages  of  prescription,  could  they  begin  to  doubt, 
without  a  reason  1 

It  is  not  unwq^thy  of  remark,  that  whilst  disquisitions  are 
frequently  issuing  from  the  press,  of  which  the  tendency  is  to 
show  that  war  is  not  compatible  with  Christianity,  few  seri- 
ous attempts  are  made  to  show  that  it  is.  Whether  this 
results  from  the  circumstance  that  no  individual  peculiarly  is 
interested  in  the  proof — or  that  there  is  a  secret  conscious- 
ness that  proof  cannot  be  brought — or  that  those  who  may  be 
desirous  of  defending  the  custom,  rest  in  security  that  the  im- 
potence of  its  assailants  will  be  of  no  avail  against  a  custoin 


513  WAR.  [essay  III. 

so  established  and  so  supported — I  do  not  know ;  yet  the  fact 
is  remarkable,  that  scarcely  a  defender  is  to  be  found.  It 
cannot  be  doubted  that  the  question  is  one  of  the  utmost  inter- 
est and  importance  to  man.  Whether  the  custom  be  defensi- 
ble or  not,  every  man  should  enquire  into  its  consistency  with 
the  Moral  Law.  If  it  is  defensible  he  may,  by  enquiry,  dis- 
miss the  scruples  which  it  is  certain  subsist  in  the  minds  of 
multitudes,  and  thus  exempt  himself  from  the  offence  of  par- 
ticipating in  that  which,  though  pure,  he  "  esteemeih  to  be 
unclean."  If  it  is  not  defensible,  the  propriety  of  investigation 
is  increased  in  a  tenfold  degree. 

It  may  be  a  subject  therefore  of  reasonable  regret  to  the 
friends  and  the  lovers  of  truth,  that  the  question  of  the  Moral 
Lawfulness  of  War  is  not  brought yair/y  before  the  public.  I 
say  fairly:  because  though  many  of  the  publications  which 
impugn  its  lawfulness  advert  to  the  ordinary  arguments  in  its 
favour,  yet  it  is  not  to  be  assumed  that  they  give  to  those  argu- 
ments all  that  vigour  and  force  which  would  be  imparted  by  a 
stated  and  an  able  advocate.  Few  books,  it  is  probable, 
would  tend  more  powerfully  to  promote  the  discovery  and  dis- 
semination of  truth,  than  one  which  should  frankly  and  fully 
and  ably  advocate,  upon  sound  moral  principles,  the  practice 
of  war.  The  public  would  then  see  the  whole  of  what  can 
be  urged  in  its  favour  without  being  obliged  to  seek  for  argu- 
ments, as  they  now  must,  in  incidental  or  imperfect  or  scat- 
tered disquisitions  :  and  possessing  in  a  distinct  form  the 
evidence  of  both  parties,  they  would  be  enabled  to  judge  justly 
between  them.  Perhaps  if,  invited  as  the  public  are  to  the 
discussion,  no  man  is  hereafter  willing  to  adventure  in  the 
cause,  the  conclusion  will  not  be  unreasonable,  that  no  man  is 
destitute  of  a  consciousness  that  the  cause  is  not  a  good  one. 

Meantime  it  is  the  business  of  him  whose  enquiries  have 
conducted  him  to  the  conclusion  that  the  cause  is  not  good,  to 
exhibit  the  evidence  upon  which  the  conclusion  is  founded. 
It  happens  upon  the  subject  of  war,  more  than  upon  almost 
any  other  subject  of  human  enquiry,  that  the  individual  finds 
it  difficult  to  contemplate  its  merits  withjp,n  uninfluenced 
mind.  He  finds  it  difficult  to  examine  it  9s  it  would  be  ex- 
amined by  a  philosopher  to  whom  the  subject  was  new.  He 
is  familiar  wiih  its  details  ;  he  is  habitu^d^o  the  idea  of  its 
miseries  ,  he  has  perhaps  never  doubted,  because  he  has 
neve'*  questio  aed,  its  rectitude  ;  nay,  he  has  associated  with 
it  ideas  not  of  splendour  only  but  of  honour  and  of  merit. 
That  such  an  enquirer  will  not,  without  some  effort  of  abstrac- 
tion, examine  the  question  with  impartiality  and  justice,  is 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CAUSES    OF    WAlt.  513 

plain  ;  and  therefore  the  first  business  of  him  who  would 
satisfy  his  mind  respecting  the  lawfulness  of  war,  is  to  divest 
himself  of  all  those  habits  of  thought  and  feeling  which  have 
been  the  result  not  of  reflection  and  judgment,  but  of  the  ordi- 
nary associations  of  life.  And  perhaps  he  may  derive  some 
assistance  in  this  necessary  but  not  easy  dismissal  of  previous 
opinions,  by  referring  first  to  some  of  the  ordinary  Causes  and 
Consequences  of  War.  The  reference  will  enable  us  also 
more  satisfactorily  to  estimate  the  moral  character  of  the  prac- 
tice itself:  for  it  is  no  unimportant  auxiliary  in  forming  such 
an  estimate  of  human  actions  or  opinions,  to  know  how  they 
have  been  produced  and  what  are  their  effects. 

CAUSES  OF  WAR. 

Of  these  Causes  one  undoubtedly  consists  in  the  want  of 
enquiry.  We  have  been  accustomed  from  earliest  life  to  a 
familiarity  with  its  "  pomp  and  circumstance  ;"  soldiers  have 
passed  us  at  every  step,  and  battles  and  victories  have  been 
the  topic  of  every  one  around  us.  It  therefore  becomes  famil- 
iarized to  all  our  thoughts  and  interwoven  with  all  our  associ- 
ations. We  have  never  enquired  whether  these  things  should 
be  :  the  question  does  not  even  suggest  itself.  We  acquiesce 
in  it,  as  we  acquiesce  in  the  rising  of  the  sun,  without  any 
other  idea  than  that  it  is  a  part  of  the  ordinary  processes  of 
the  world.  And  how  are  we  to  feel  disapprobation  of  a  sys- 
tem that  we  do  not  examine,  and  of  the  nature  of  which  we 
do  not  think  1  Want  of  enquiry  has  been  the  means  by  which 
long-continued  practices,  whatever  has  been  their  enormity ,^^ 
have  obtained  the  general  concurrence  of  the  world,  and  by, 
which  they  have  continued  to  pollute  or  degrade  it,  long  after, 
the  few  who  enquire  into  their  nature  have  discovered  them- 
to  be  bad.  It  was  by  these  means  that  the  Slave  Trade  was' 
so  long  tolerated  by  this  land  of  humanity.  Men  did  not  think, 
of  its  iniquity.  We  were  induced  to  think,  and  we  soon  ab- 
horred, and  then  abolished  it.  Of  the  effects  of  this  want  of  ^ 
enquiry  we  have  indeed  frequent  examples  upon  the  subject* 
before  us.  Many  who  have  all  their  lives  concluded  that  war 
is  lawful  and  right,  have  found,  when  they  began  to  examine 
the  question,  that  their  conclusions  were  founded  upon  no  evi- 
dence ; — that  they  had  believed  in  its  rectitude  not  because 
they  had  possessed  themselves  of  proof,  but  because  they  had 
never  enquired  whether  it  was  capable  of  proof  or  not.  In 
the  present  jpaoral  state  of  the  wprld,  one  of  the  ifirst  concerns 


dl4  CAUSES    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III. 

of  him  wlio  would  discover  pure  morality  should  be,  to  ques- 
tion the  purity  of  that  which  now  obtains. 

Another  cause  of  our  complacency  with  war,  and  therefore 
another  cause  of  war  itself,  consists  in  that  callousness  to 
human  misery  which  the  custom  induces.  They  who  are 
shocked  at  a  single  murder  on  the  highway,  hear  with  indif- 
ference of  the  slaughter  of  a  thousand  on  the  field.  They 
whom  the  idea  of  a  single  corpse  would  thrill  with  terror,  con- 
template that  of  heaps  of  human  carcasses  mangled  by  human 
hands,  with  frigid  indifference.  If  a  murder  is  committed, 
the  narrative  is  given  in  the  public  newspaper,  with  many  ad- 
jectives of  horror — with  many  expressions  of  commiseration, 
and  many  hopes  that  the  perpetrator  will  be  detected.  In  the 
next  paragraph,  the  editor,  perhaps,  tells  us  that  he  has  hur- 
ried a  second  edition  to  the  press,  in  order  that  he  may  be  the 
first  to  glad  the  public  with  the  intelligence,  that  in  an  en- 
gagement which  has  just  taken  place,  eight  hundred  and  fifty 
of  the  enemy  were  killed.  Now,  is  not  this  latter  intelligence 
eight  hundred  and  fifty  times  as  deplorable  as  the  first  ?  Yet 
the  first  is  the  subject  of  our  sorrow,  and  this — of  our  joy ! 
The  inconsistency  and  disproportionateness  which  has  been 
occasioned  in  our  sentiments  of  benevolence,  offers  a  curious 
moral  phenomenon.* 

The  immolations  of  the  Hindoos  fill  us  with  compassion  or 

*  Part  of  the  Declaration  and  Oath  prescribed  to  be  taken  by  Cath- 
olics is  this :  "  I  do  solemnly  declare  before  God,  that  I  believe  that  no  act 
in  itself  unjust,  immoral,  or  wicked,  can  ever  be  justified  or  excused  by 
or  under  pretence  or  colour  that  it  was  done  either  for  the  good  of  the 
church  or  in  obedience  to  any  ecclesiastical  power  whatsoever."  This 
declaration  is  required  as  a  solemn  act,  and  is  supposed,  of  course,  to  in- 
volve a  great  and  sacred  principle  of  rectitude.  We  propose  the  same  declar- 
ation to  be  taken  by  military  men,  with  the  alteration  of  two  words.  "  I 
do  solemnly  declare  before  God,  that  I  believe  that  no  act  in  itself  unjust, 
immoral,  or  wicked,  can  ever  be  justified  or  excused  by  or  under  pre- 
tence cr  colour  that  it  was  done  either  for  the  good  of  the  state  or  in 
obedience  to  any  military  power  whatsoever."  How  would  this  declara- 
tion assort  with  the  customary  practice  of  the  soldier?  Put  state  for 
church,  and  ntilitary  for  ecclesiastical,  and  then  the  world  thinks  that 
acts  in  themselves  most  unjust,  immoral,  and  wicked,  are  not  only  justi- 
fied and  excused,  but  very  meritorious:  for  in  the  whole  system  of  war- 
fare, justice  and  morality  are  utterly  disregarded.  Are  those  who  approve 
of  this  Catholic  declaration  conscious  of  the  grossness  of  their  own 
inconsistency  ?  Or  will  they  tell  us  that  the  interests  of  the  state  are  so 
paramount  to  those  of  the  church,  that  what  would  be  wickedness  in  the 
service  of  one,  is  virtue  in  the  service  of  the  other  ?  The  truth  we  sup- 
pose to  be,  that  so  intense  is  the  power  of  public  opinion,  that  of  the 
thousands  who  approve  the  Catholic  declarations  and  the  practices  of 
war,  there  are  scarcely  tens  who  even  perceive  their  own  inconsistency.-— 
Mem.  in  the  MS. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CAUSES    OF    WAR.  5^5 

horror,  and  we  are  zealously  labouring  to  prevent  them.  The 
sacrifices  of  life  by  our  own  criminal  executions,  are  the  sub- 
ject of  our  anxious  commiseration,  and  we  are  strenuously 
endeavouring  to  diminish  their  number.  We  feel  that  the  life 
of  a  Hindoo  or  a  malefactor  is  a  serious  thing,  and  that  no- 
thing but  imperious  necessity  should  induce  us  to  destroy  the 
one,  or  to  permit  the  destruction  of  the  other.  Yet  what 
are  these  sacrifices  of  life  in  comparison  with  the  sacrifices 
of  war  ?  In  the  late  campaign  in  Russia,  there  fell,  during 
one  hundred  and  seventy-three  days  in  succession,  an  average 
of  two  thousand  nine  hundred  men  per  day :  more  than  five 
hundred  thousand  human  beings  in  less  than  six  months  !  And 
most  of  these  victims  expired  with  peculiar  intensity  of  suller- 
ing.  We  are  carrying  our  benevolence  to  the  Indies,  but 
what  becomes  of  it  in  Russia,  or  at  Leipsic  ?  We  are  labour- 
ing to  save  a  few  lives  from  the  gallows,  but  where  is  our  so- 
licitude to  save  them  on  the  field  ?  Life  is  life  wheresoever 
it  be  sacrificed,  and  has  every  where  equal  claims  to  our  re- 
gard. I  am  not  now  saying  that  war  is  wrong,  but  that  we 
regard  its  miseries  with  an  indiflference  with  which  we  regard 
no  others :  that  if  our  sympathy  were  reasonably  excited  re- 
specting them,  we  should  be  powerfully  prompted  to  avoid 
war ;  and  that  the  want  of  this  reasonable  and  virtuous  sym- 
pathy, is  one  cause  of  its  prevalence  in  the  world. 

And  another  consists  in  national  irritability.  It  is  assumed 
(not  indeed  upon  the  most  rational  grounds)  that  the  best  way 
of  supporting  the  dignity,  and  maintaining  the  security  of  a 
nation  is,  when  occasions  of  disagreement  arise,  to  assume  a 
high  attitude  and  a  fearless  tone.  We  keep  ourselves  in  a 
state  of  irritability  which  is  continually  alive  to  occasions  of 
offence  ;  and  he  that  is  prepared  to  be  offended  readily  finds 
offences.  A  jealous  sensibility  sees  insults  and  injuries  where 
sober  eyes  see  nothing  ;  and  nations  thus  surround  themselves 
with  a  sort  of  artificial  tentacula,  which  they  throw  wide  in 
quest  of  irritation,  and  by  which  they  are  stimulated  to  re- 
venge by  every  touch  of  accident  or  inadvertency.  They 
who  are  easily  offended  will  also  easily  offend.  What  is  the 
experience  of  private  life  ?  The  man  who  is  always  on  the 
alert  to  discover  trespasses  on  his  honour  or  his  rights,  never 
fails  to  quarrel  with  his  neighbours.  Such  a  person  may  be 
dreaded  as  a  torpedo.  We  may  fear,  but  we  shall  not  love 
him  ;  and  fear,  without  love,  easily  lapses  mto  enmity.  There 
are,  therefore,  many  feuds  and  litigaiions  in  the  life  of  such  a 
man,  that  would  never  have  disturbed  its  quiet  if  he  had  not 
captiously  snarled  at  the  trespasses  of  accident,  and  savagely 


5l6  CAUSES    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III. 

retaliated  insignificant  injuries.  The  viper  that  we  chance  to 
molest,  we  suffer  to  live  if  he  continue  to  be  quiet ;  but  if  he 
raise  himself  in  menaces  of  destruction  we  knock  him  on  the 
head. 

It  is  with  nations  as  with  men.  If  on  every  offence  we  fly 
to  arms,  we  shall  of  necessity  provoke  exasperation ;  and  if 
we  exasperate  a  people  as  petulent  as  ourselves  we  may  pro- 
bably continue  to  butcher  one  another,  until  we  cease  only 
from  emptiness  of  exchequers  or  weariness  of  slaughter.  To 
threaten  war,  is  therefore  often  equivalent  to  beginning  it.  In 
the  present  state  of  men's  principles,  it  is  not  probable  that 
one  nation  will  observe  another  levying  men,  and  building 
ships,  and  founding  cannon,  without  providing  men,  and  ships, 
and  cannon  themselves  ;  and  when  both  are  thus  threatening 
and  defying,  what  is  the  hope  that  there  will  not  be  a  war  ? 

If  nations  fought  only  when  they  could  not  be  at  peace, 
there  would  be  very  little  fighting  in  the  world.  The  wars 
that  are  waged  for  "  insults  to  flags,"  and  an  endless  train 
of  similar  motives,  are  perhaps  generally  attributable  to  the 
irritability  of  our  pride.  We  are  at  no  pains  to  appear 
pacific  towards  the  offender :  our  remonstrance  is  a  threat ; 
and  the  nation,  which  would  give  satisfaction  to  an  enquiry , 
will  give  no  other  answer  to  a  menace  than  a  menace  in  re- 
turn. At  length  we  begin  to  fight,  not  because  we  are 
aggrieved,  but  because  we  are  angry.  One  example  may  be 
offered:  "In  1789,  a  small  Spanish  vessel  committed  some 
violence  in  Nootka  Sound,  under  the  pretence  that  the  country 
belonged  to  Spain.  This  appears  to  have  been  the  principal 
ground  of  oifence  ;  and  with  this  both  the  government  and  the 
people  of  England  were  very  angry.  The  irritability  and 
haughtiness  which  they  manifested  were  unaccountable  to  the 
Spaniards,  and  the  peremptory  tone  was  imputed  by  Spain, 
not  to  the  feelings  of  oflfended  dignity  and  violated  justice,  but 
to  some  lurking  enmity,  and  some  secret  designs  which  we 
did  not  choose  to  avow."*  If  the  tone  had  been  less  peremp- 
tory and  more  rational,  no  such  suspicion  would  have  been 
excited,  and  the  hostility  which  was  consequent  upon  the  sus- 
picion would,  of  course,  have  been  avoided.  Happily  the 
ETiglish  were  not  so  passionate,  but  that  before  they  proceeded 
to  fight  they  negotiated,  and  settled  the  affair  amicably.  The 
preparations  for  this  foolish  war  cost,  however,  three  millions 
one  hundred  and  thirty-three  thousand  pounds  ! 

So  well  indeed  is  national  irritabihty  known  to  be  an  effi- 
cient cause  of  war,  that  they  who  from  any  motive  wish  to 
*  Smollett's  England. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CAUSES    OF   WAR.  6l7 

promote  it,  endeavour  to  rouse  the  temper  of  a  people  by 
stimulating  their  passions — just  as  the  boys  in  our  streets 
stimulate  two  dogs  to  fight.  These  persons  talk  of  the  insults, 
or  the  encroachments,  or  the  contempts  of  the  destined  enemy, 
with  every  artifice  of  aggravation  ;  they  tell  us  of  foreigners 
who  want  to  trample  upon  our  rights,  of  rivals  who  ridicule 
our  power  of  foes  who  will  crush,  and  of  tyrants  who  will  en- 
slave us.  They  pursue  their  object,  certainly,  by  efficacious 
means  :  they  desire  a  war,  and  therefore  irritate  our  passions ; 
and  when  men  are  angry  they  are  easily  persuaded  to  fight. 

That  this  cause  of  War  is  morally  bad — that  petulance  and 
irritability  are  wholly  incompatible  with  Christianity,  these 
pages  have  repeatedly  shown. 

Wars  are  often  promoted  from  considerations  of  interest,  as 
well  as  from  passion.  The  love  of  gain  adds  its  influence  to 
our  other  motives  to  support  them  ;  and  without  other  motives, 
we  know  that  this  love  is  sufficient  to  give  great  obliquity  to 
the  moral  judgment,  and  to  tempt  us  to  many  crimes.  During 
a  war  of  ten  years  there  will  always  be  many  whose  income 
depends  on  its  continuance ;  and  a  countless  host  of  commis- 
saries, and  purveyors,  and  agents,  and  mechanics,  commend  a 
war  because  it  fills  their  pockets.  And  unhappily,  if  money 
is  in  prospect,  the  desolation  of  a  kingdom  is  often  of  little 
concern :  destruction  and  slaughter  are  not  to  be  put  in  com- 
petition with  a  hundred  a-year.  In  truth,  it  seems  some- 
times to  be  the  system  of  the  conductors  of  a  war,  to  give 
to  the  sources  of  gain  endless  ramifications.  The  more  there 
are  who  profit  by  it  the  more  numerous  are  its  supporters ; 
and  thus  the  projects  of  a  cabinet  become  identified  with  the 
wishes  of  a  people,  and  both  are  gratified  in  the  prosecution 
of  war. 

A  support  more  systematic  and  powerful  is  however  given 
to  war,  because  it  offers  to  the  higher  ranks  of  society  a  pro- 
fession which  unites  gentility  with  profit,  and  which,  without 
the  vulgarity  of  trade  maintains  or  enriches  them.  It  is  of 
little  consequence  to  enquire  whether  the  distinction  of  vulgar- 
ity between  the  toils  of  war  and  the  toils  of  commerce  be  fic- 
titious. In  the  abstract,  it  is  fictitious  ;  but  of  this  species  of 
reputation  public  opinion  holds  the  arhitrium  et  jus  et  norma  ; 
and  public  opinion  is  in  favour  of  war. 

The  army  and  the  navy,  therefore,  afford  to  the  middle  and 
higher  classes  a  most  acceptable  profession.  The  profession 
of  arms  is  like  the  profession  of  law  or  physic — a  regular 
source  of  employment  and  profit.  Boys  are  educated  for  the 
urmy  as  they  are  educated  for  the  bar ;  and  parents  appear  to 

44 


"618  »  CAUSES    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III, 

have  no  other  idea  than  that  war  is  part  of  the  business  of  the 
world.  Of  younger  sons,  whose  fathers  in  pursuance  of  the 
unhappy  system  of  primogeniture,  do  not  choose  to  support 
them  at  the  expense  of  the  heir,  the  army  and  the  navy  are 
the  common  resource.  They  would  not  know  what  to  do 
without  them.  To  many  of  these  the  news  of  a  peace  is  a 
calamity;  and  though  they  may  not  lift  their  voices  in  fa- 
vour of  new  hostilities  for  the  sake  of  gain,  it  is  unhappily  cer- 
tain that  they  often  secretly  desire  it. 

It  is  in  this  manner  that  much  of  the  rank,  the  influence, 
and  the  wealth  of  a  country  become  interested  in  the  promo- 
tion of  wars  ;.  and  when  a  custom  is  promoted  by  wealth,  and 
influence,  and  rank,  what  is  the  wonder  that  it  should  be  con- 
tinued 1  It  is  said,  (if  my  memory  serves  me,  by  Sir  Walter 
Raleigh,)  "  he  that  taketh  up  his  rest  to  live  by  this  profession 
shall  hardly  be  an  honest  man." 

By  depending  upon  war  for  a  subsistence,  a  powerful  in- 
ducement is  given  to  desire  it ;  and  when  the  question  of  war 
is  to  be  decided,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  whispers  of  interest 
will  prevail,  and  that  humanity,  and  religion,  and  conscience 
will  be  sacrificed  to  promote  it. 

Of  those  causes  of  war  which  consist  in  the  ambition  of 
princes  or  statesmen  or  commanders,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
speak,  because  no  one  to  whom  the  world  will  listen  is  will- 
ing to  defend  them. 

Statesmen  however  have,  besides  ambition,  many  purposes 
of  nice  policy  which  make  wars  convenient :  and  when  they 
have  such  purposes,  they  are  sometimes  cool  speculators  in 
the  lives  of  men.  They  who  have  much  patronage  have 
many  dependents,  and  they  who  have  many  dependents  have 
much  power.  By  a  war,  thousands  become  dependent  on  a 
minister  ;  and  if  he  be  disposed,  he  can  often  pursue  schemes 
of  guilt,  and  intrench  himself  in  unpunished  wickedness,  be- 
cause the  war  enables  him  to  silence  the  clamour  of  opposi- 
tion by  an  office,  and  to  secure  the  suffrages  of  venality  by  a 
bribe.  He  has  therefore  many  motives  to  war — in  ambition, 
that  does  not  refer  to  conquest ;  or  in  fear,  that  extends  only 
to  his  office  or  his  pocket :  and  fear  or  ambition,  are  some- 
times  more  interesting  considerations  than  the  happiness  and 
the  lives  of  men.  Cabinets  have  in  truth,  many  secret  mo- 
tives to  wars  of  which  the  people  know  little.  They  talk  in 
public  of  invasions  of  right,  of  breaches  of  treaty,  of  the  sup- 
port of  honour,  of  the  necessity  of  retaliation,  when  these  mo- 
tives have  no  influence  on  their  determinations.  Some  un- 
told purpose  of  expediency,  or  the  private  quarrel  of  a  prince. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CAUSES    OF   WAR.  519 

or  the  pique  or  anger  of  a  minister,  are  often  the  real  motives 
to  a  contest,  whilst  its  promoters  are  loudly  talking  of  the 
honour  or  the  safety  of  the  country. 

But  perhaps  the  most  operative  cause  of  the  popularity  of 
war,  and  of  the  facility  with  which  we  engage  in  it,  consists 
in  this  ;  that  an  idea  of  glory  is  attached  to  military  exploits, 
and  of  honour  to  the  military  profession.  The  glories  of 
battle,  and  of  those  who  perish  in  it,  or  who  return  in  triumph 
to  their  country,  are  favourite  topics  of  declamation  Avith  the 
historian,  the  biographer,  and  the  poet.  They  have  told  us  a 
thousand  times  of  dying  heroes^  who  "  resign  their  lives  amidst 
the  joys  of  conquest,  and,  filled  with  their  country's  glory, 
smile  in  death;"  and  thus  every  excitement  that  eloquence 
and  genius  can  command,  is  employed  to  arouse  that  ambition 
of  fame  which  can  be  gratified  only  at  the  expense  of  blood. 

Into  the  nature  and  principles  of  this  fame  and  glory  We 
have  already  enquired ;  and  in  the  view  alike  of  virtue  and 
of  intellect,  they  are  low  and  bad.*  "  Glory  is  the  most 
selfish  of  all  passions  except  love."t — "  I  cannot,  tell  how  or 
why  the  love  of  glory  is  a  less  selfish  principle  than  the  love 
of  riches. "J  Philosophy  and  intellect  may  therefore  well 
despise  itj  and  Christianity  silently,  yet  emphatically,  con- 
demns it.  "  Christianity,"  says  Bishop  Watson,  "  quite  an- 
nihilates the  disposition  for  martial  glory."  Another  testi- 
mony, and  from  an  advocate  of  war,  goes  further — No  part  of 
the  heroic  character  is  the  subject  of  the  "  commendation,  or 
precepts,  or  example  of  Christ ;"  but  the  character  the  most 
opposite  to  the  heroic  is  the  subject  of  them  all.§ 

Such  is  the  foundation  of  the  glory  which  has  for  so  many 
ages  deceived  and  deluded  multitudes  of  mankind !  Upon  this 
foundation  a  structure  has  been  raised  so  vast,  so  brilliant,  so 
attractive,  that  the  greater  portion  of  mankind  are  content  to 
gaze  in  admiration,  without  any  inquiry  into  its  basis  or 
any  solicitude  for  its  durability.  If,  however,  it  should  be, 
that  the  gorgeous  temple  will  be  able  to  stand  only  till  Chris- 
tian truth  and  light  become  predominant,  it  surely  will  be 
wise  of  those  who  seek  a  niche  in  its  apartments  as  their  para- 
mount and  final  good,  to  pause  ere  they  proceed.  If  they  de- 
sire a  reputation  that  shall  outlive  guilt  and  fiction,  let  them 
look  to  the  basis  of  military  fame.  If  this  fame  should  one 
day  sink  into  oblivion  and  contempt,  it  will  not  be  the  first  in- 
stance in  which  wide-spread  glory  has  been  found  to  be  a 

*  See  Essay  II,  c.  10.  t  West.  Rev.  No.  1,  for  1827. 

t  Mem.  and  Rem.  of  the  late  Jane  Taylor. 
^  Paley :  Evidences  of  Christianity,  p.  2,  e.  2. 


520  CAUSES  OF  WAR.  [essay  at. 

glittering  bubble,  that  has  burst  and  been  forgotten.  Look  at 
the  days  of  chivalry.  Of  the  ten  thousand  Quixotes  of  the 
middle  ages,  where  is  now  the  honour  or  the  fame  ?  yet 
poets  once  sang  their  praises,  and  the  chronicler  of  their 
achievements  believed  he  was  recording  an  everlasting  fame. 
Where  are  now  the  glories  of  the  tournament  ?  glories 

"Of  which  all  Europe  rang  from  side  to  side." 

Where  is  the  champion  whom  princesses  caressed  and  no- 
bles envied  1  Where  are  now  the  triumphs  of  Duns  Scotus, 
and  where  are  the  folios  that  perpetuated  his  fame  ?  The 
glories  of  war  have  indeed  outlived  these  ;  human  passions 
are  less  mutable  than  human  follies  ;  but  I  am  willing  to  avow 
my  conviction,  that  these  glories  are  alike  destined  to  sink 
into  forgetfulness  ;  and  that  the  time  is  approaching  when  the 
applauses  of  heroism,  and  the  splendours  of  conquest,  will  be 
remembered  only  as  follies  and  iniquities  that  are  past.  Let 
him  who  seeks  for  fame,  other  than  that  which  an  era  of 
Christian  purity  will  allow,  make  haste  ;  for  every  hour  that 
he  delays  its  acquisition  will  shorten  its  duration.  This  is 
certain  if  there  be  certainty  in  the  promises  of  heaven. 

Of  this  factitious  glory  as  a  cause  of  War,  Gibbon  speaks 
in  the  Decline  and  Fall,  "  As  long  as  mankind,"  says  he, 
"  shall  continue  to  bestow  more  liberal  applause  on  their  des- 
troyers than  on  their  benefactors,  the  thirst  of  military  glory 
will  ever  be  the  vice  of  the  most  exalted  characters."  "  'Tis 
strange  to  imagine,"  says  the  Earl  of  Shaftesbury,  that  war, 
which  of  all  things  appears  the  most  savage,  should  be  the 
passion  of  the  most  heroic  spirits." — But  he  gives  us  the  rea- 
son.— "  By  a  small  misguidance  of  the  affection,  a  lover  of 
mankind  becomes  a  ravager ;  a  hero  and  deliverer  becomes 
an  oppressor  and  destroyer."  * 

These  are  amongst  the  great  perpetual  causes  of  war.  And 
what  are  they?  First,  that  we  do  not  enquire  whether  War 
is  right  or  wrong.  Secondly,  That  we  are  habitually  haughty 
and  irritable  in  our  intercourse  with  other  nations.  Thirdly, 
That  War  is  a  source  oi  profit  to  individuals,  and  establishes 
professions  which  are  very  convenient  to  the  middle  and  higher 
ranks  of  life.  Fourthly,  That  it  gratifies  the  ambition  of  pub- 
lic men,  and  serves  the  purposes  of  state  policy.  Fifthly,  that 
notions  of  glory  are  attached  to  Warlike  affairs  ;  which  glory 
is  factitious  and  impure. 

In  the  view  of  reason,  and  especially  in  the  view  of  religion, 
what  is  the  character  of  these   Causes  ?      Are  they   pure  ? 

*  Essay  on  the  Freedom  of  Wit  and  Humour. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CONSEQUENCES    OF    WAR.  62l 

Are  they  honourable  ?  Are  they,  when  connected  with  thai* 
effects,  compatible  with  the  Moral  Law? — Lastly,  and  es- 
pecially, is  it  probable  that  a  system  of  which  these  are  the 
great  ever-during  Causes,  can  itself  be  good  or  right  ? 

CONSEQUENCES   OF  WAR 

To  expatiate  upon  the  miseries  which  war  brings  upon 
mankind,  appears  a  trite  and  a  needless  employinent.  We 
all  know  that  its  evils  are  great  and  dreadful.  Yet  the  very 
circumstance  that  the  knowledge  is  familiar,  may  make  it  un- 
operative  upon  our  sentiments  and  our  conduct.  It  is  not  the 
intensity  of  misery,  it  is  not  the  extent  of  evil  alone,  which  is 
necessary  to  animate  us  to  that  exertion  which  evil  and  mis- 
ery should  excite  :  if  it  were,  surely  we  should  be  much  more 
averse  than  we  now  are  to  contribute,  in  word  or  in  action, 
to  the  promotion  of  War. 

But  there  are  mischiefs  attendant  upon  the  system  which 
are  not  to  every  man  thus  familiar,  and  on  which,  for  that  reason, 
it  is  expedient  to  remark.  In  referring  especially  to  some  of 
those  Moral  consequences  of  war  which  commonly  obtain  little 
of  our  attention,  it  may  be  observed,  that  social  and  political 
considerations  are  necessarily  involved  in  the  moral  tendency: 
for  the  happiness  of  society  is  always  diminished  by  the  dimi- 
nution of  morality ;  and  enlightened  policy  knows  that  the 
greatest  support  of  a  state  is  the  virtue  of  the  people. 

And  yet  the  reader  should  bear  in  mind — what  nothing  but 
the  frequency  of  the  calamity  can  make  him  forget — the  in- 
tense sufferings  and  irreparable  deprivations  which  one  battle 
inevitably  entails  upon  private  life.  These  are  calamities  of 
which  the  world  thinks  little,  and  which,  if  it  thought  of  them, 
it  could  not  remove.  A  father  or  a  husband  can  seldom  be 
replaced  ;  a  void  is  created  in  the  domestic  felicity  which 
there  is  little  hope  that  the  future  will  fill.  By  the  slaughter 
of  a  war,  there  are  thousands  who  weep  in  unpitied  and  un- 
noticed secrecy,  whom  the  world  does  not  see  ;  and  thousands 
who  retire,  in  silence,  to  hopeless  poverty,  for  whom  it  does 
not  care.  To  these,  the  conquest  of  a  kingdom  is  of  little  im- 
portance. The  loss  of  a  protector  or  a  friend  is  ill  repaid  by 
empty  glory.  An  addition  of  territory  may  add  titles  to  a  king, 
but  the  brilliancy  of  a  crown  throws  little  light  upon  domestic 
gloom.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  insist  upon  these  calamities, 
intense,  and  irreparable,  and  unnumbered  as  they  are ;  but 
those  who  begin  a  war  without  taking  them  into  their  esti- 
mates of  its  consequences,  must  be  regarded  as,  at  most,  half- 

44* 


$22  CONSEQUENCES    OP   WAR.  [^SSAY  llf 

seeing  politicians.  The  legitimate  object  of  political  meas- 
ures is  the  good  of  the  people ; — and  a  great  sum  of  good  a 
war  must  produce,  if  it  out-balances  even  this  portion  of  its 
mischiefs. 

Nor  should  we  be  forgetful  of  that  dreadful  part  of  all  war- 
fare, the  destruction  of  mankind.  The  frequency  with  which 
this  destruction  is  represented  to  our  minds,  has  almost  ex- 
tinguished our  perception  of  its  awfulness  and  horror.  Be- 
tween the  years  1141  and  1815,  an  interval  of  six  hundred 
and  seventy  years,  our  country  has  been  at  war,  with  France 
alone,  two  hundred  and  sixty-six  years.  If  to  this  we  add  our 
wars  with  other  countries,  probably  we  shall  find  that  one 
half  of  the  last  six  or  seven  centuries  has  been  spent  by  this 
country  in  war !  A  dreadful  picture  of  human  violence  ! 
How  many  of  our  fellow-men,  of  our  fellow-Christians,  have 
these  centuries  of  slaughter  cut  off!  What  is  the  sum  total 
of  the  misery  of  their  deaths  ?* 

When  political  writers  expatiate  upon  the  extent  and  the  evils 
of  taxation,  they  do  not  sufficiently  bear  in  mind  the  reflec- 
tion, that  almost  all  our  taxation  is  the  eflfect  of  war.  A  man 
declaims  upon  national  debts.  He  ought  to  declaim  upon  the 
parent  of  those  debts.  Do  we  reflect  that  if  heavy  taxation 
entails  evils  and  misery  upon  the  community,  that  misery  and 
those  evils  are  inflicted  upon  us  by  war  1  The  amount  of  sup- 
plies in  Queen  Anne's  reign  was  abouf  seventy  millions  ;t 
and  of  this  about  sixty-six  millions^  was  expended  in  war. 
Where  is  our  equivalent  good  ? 

Such  considerations  ought,  undoubtedly,  to  influence  the 
conduct  of  public  men  in  their  disagreements  with  other  states, 
even  if  higher  considerations  do  not  influence  it.  They  ought 
to  form  part  of  the  calculations  of  the  evil  of  hostility.  I  be- 
lieve that  a  greater  mass  of  human  suffering  and  loss  of  hu- 
man enjoyment  are  occasioned  by  the  pecuniary  distresses  of 
a  war,  than  any  ordinary  advantages  of  a  war  compensate. 
But  this  consideration  seems  too  remote  to  obtain  our  notice. 
Anger  at  offence  or  hope  of  triumph,  overpowers  the  sober  cal- 
culations of  reason,  and  outbalances  the  weight  of  after  and 
long-continued  calamities.  The  only  question  appears  to  be, 
whether  taxes  enough  for  a  war  can  be  raised,  and  whether 

*  "  Since  the  peace  of  Amiens  more  than  four  millions  of  human 
beings  have  been  sacrificed  io  the  personal  ambition  of  Napoleon  Buona- 
parte."—Quarterly  Review,  25  Art.  1,  1825. 

t  The  sum  was  i;69,8l5,457. 

t  The  sum  was  £65,853,799.     "The  nine  years'  war  of  1739,  cost 
this  nation  upwards  of  sixty-four  millions  without  gaining  any  object." 
Chaimer's  Estimate  of  the  Strength  of  Great  Britian. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CONSEQUENCfiS    Of    WAR.  523 

a  people  will  be  willing  to  pay  them.  But  the  great  question 
ought  to  be,  (setting  questions  of  Christianity  aside,)  whether 
the  nation  will  gain  as  much  by  the  war  as  they  will  lose  by 
taxation  and  its  other  calamities. 

If  the  happiness  of  the  people  were,  what  it  ought  to  be, 
the  primary  and  the  ultimate  object  of  national  measures,  I 
think  that  the  policy  which  pursued  this  object,  would  often 
find  that  even  the  pecuniary  distresses  resulting  from  a  war 
make  a  greater  deduction  from  the  quantum  of  felicity,  than 
those  evils  which  the  war  may  have  been  designed  to  avoid. 

"  But  war  does  more  harm  to  the  morals  of  men  than  even 
to  their  property  and  persons."*  If,  indeed,  it  depraves  our 
morals  more  than  it  injures  our  persons  and  deducts  from  our 
property,  how  enormous  must  its  mischiefs  be ! 

I  do  not  know  whether  the  greater  sum  of  moral  evil  result- 
ing from  war,  is  suffered  by  those  who  are  immediately  en- 
gaged in  it,  or  by  the  public.  The  mischief  is  most  exten- 
sive upon  the  community,  but  upon  the  profession  it  is  most 
intense. 

"  Rara  fides  pietasque  viris  qui  castra  sequuntur." — Lucan. 

No  one  pretends  to  applaud  the  morals  of  an  army,  and  for 
its  religion,  few  think  of  it  at  all.  The  fact  is  too  notorious 
to  be  insisted  upon,  that  thousands  who  had  filled  their  sta- 
tions in  life  with  propriety,  and  been  virtuous  from  principle, 
have  lost,  by  a  military  life,  both  the  practice  and  the  regard 
of  morality ;  and  when  they  have  become  habituated  to  the 
vices  of  war,  have  laughed  at  their  honest  and  plodding  breth- 
ren, who  are  still  spiritless  enough  for  virtue  or  stupid  enough 
for  piety. 

Does  any  man  ask.  What  occasions  depravity  in  military 
life  ?  I  answer  in  the  words  of  Robert  Hall,t  "  War  reverses, 
with  respect  to  its  objects,  all  the  rules  of  morality.  It  is 
nothing  less  than  a  temporary  repeal  of  all  the  principles  of 
virtue.  It  is  a  system  out  of  which  almost  all  the  virtues  are 
excluded,  and  in  which  nearly  all  the  vices  are  incorporated." 
And  it  requires  no  sagacity  to  discover,  that  those  who  are 
engaged  in  a  practice  which  reverses  all  the  rules  of  morality 
— which  repeals  all  the  principles  of  virtue,  and  in  which 
nearly  all  the  vices  are  incorporated,  cannot,  without  the 
intervention  of  a  miracle,  retain  their  minds  and  morals  un- 
depraved. 

Look  for  illustration  to  the  familiarity  with  the  plunder  of 
property  and  the  slaughter  of  mankind  which  war  induces. 
*  Erasmus.  t  Sermon,  1822. 


824  dOJfSEQtJENCES    OF    WAR.  JeSSAY  ill. 

He  who  plunders  the  citizen  of  another  nation  without  re- 
morse or  reflection,  and  bears  away  the  spoil  with  triumph, 
will  inevitably  lose  something  of  his  principles  of  probity.* 
He  who  is  familiar  with  slaughter,  who  has  himself  often  per- 
petrated it,  and  who  exults  in  the  perpetration,  will  not  retain 
undepraved  the  principles  of  virtue.  His  moral  feelings  are 
blunted ;  his  moral  vision  is  obscured ;  his  principles  are 
shaken  ;  an  inroad  is  made  upon  their  integrity,  and  it  is  an 
inroad  that  makes  after  inroads  the  more  easy.  Mankind  do 
not  generally  resist  the  influence  of  habit.  If  we  rob  and 
shoot  those  who  are  ''  enemies"  to-day,  we  are  in  some  degree 
prepared  to  shoot  and  rob  those  who  are  not  enemies  to-mor- 
row. Law  may  indeed  still  restrain  us  from  violence  ;  but 
the  power  and  efficiency  of  Principle  is  diminished  :  and  this 
alienation  of  the  mind  from  the  practice,  the  love,  and  the 
perception  of  Christian  purity,  therefore,  of  necessity  extends 
its  influence  to  the  other  circumstances  of  life.  The  whole 
evil  is  imputable  to  war ;  and  we  say  that  this  evil  forms  a 
powerful  evidence  against  it,  whether  we  direct  that  evidence 
to  the  abstract  question  of  its  lawfulness,  or  to  the  practical 
question  of  its  expediency.  That  can  scarcely  be  lawful 
which  necessarily  occasions  such  wide-spread  immorality. 
That  can  scarcely  be  expedient,  which  is  so  pernicious  to 
virtue,  and  therefore  to  the  state. 

The  economy  of  war  requires  of  every  soldier  an  implicit 
submission  to  his  superior ;  and  this  submission  is  required 
of  every  gradation  of  rank  to  that  above  it.  "  I  swear  to 
obey  the  orders  of  the  officers  who  are  set  over  me  :  so  help 
me,  God."  This  system  may  be  necessary  to  hostile  opera- 
tions, but  I  think  it  is  unquestionably  adverse  to  intellectual 
and  moral  excellence. 

The  very  nature  of  unconditional  obedience  implies  the 
relinquishment  of  the  use  of  the  reasoning  powers.  Little 
more  is  required  of  the  soldier  than  that  he  be  obedient  and 
brave.  ,  His  obedience  is  that  of  an  animal,  which  is  moved 
by  a  goad  or  a  bit,  without  judgment  of  his  own;  and  his 
bravery  is  that  of  a  mastiflf  that  fights  whatever  mastiff"  others 
put  before  him.f  It  is  obvious  that  in  such  agency  the  intel- 
lect and  the  understanding  have  little  part.    Now  I  think  that 

»  See  Smollett's  England,  vol.  4,  p.  376.  "  This  terrible  truth,  which 
I  cannot  help  repeating,  must  be  acknowledged : — indifference  and  selfish- 
ness are  the  predominant  feelings  in  an  army."  Miot's  Memoires  de 
I'Exp^dition  en  Egypte,  &lc.     Mem.  in  the  MSS. 

t  By  one  article  of  the  Constitutional  Code  even  of  republican  France, 
"  the  army  were  expressly  prohibited  from  deliberating  on  any  subject 
whatever." 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CONSEQUENCES    OF    WAR.  525 

this  is  important.  He  who,  with  whatever  motive,  resigns 
the  direction  of  his  conduct  implicitly  to  another,  surely  can- 
not retain  that  erectness  and  independence  of  mind,  that 
manly  consciousness  of  mental  freedom,  which  is  one  of  the 
highest  privileges  of  our  nature.  A  British  Captain  declares 
that  "  the  tendency  of  strict  discipline,  such  as  prevails  on 
board  ships  of  war,  where  almost  every  act  of  a  man's  life 
is  regulated  by  the  orders  of  his  superiors,  is  to  weaken  the 
faculty  of  independent  thought."*  Thus  the  Rational  Being 
becomes  reduced  in  the  intellectual  scale :  an  encroachment 
is  made  upon  the  integrity  of  its  independence.  God  has 
given  us,  individually,  capacities  for  the  regulation  of  our  in- 
dividual conduct.  To  resign  its  direction,  therefore,  to  the 
absolute  disposal  of  another,  appears  to  be  an  unmanly  and 
unjustifiable  relinquishment  of  the  privileges  which  he  has 
granted  to  us.  And  the  effect  is  obviously  bad  ;  for  although 
no  character  will  apply  universally  to  any  large  class  of  men, 
and  although  the  intellectual  character  of  the  military  profes- 
sion does  not  result  only  from  this  unhappy  subjection ;  yet 
it  will  not  be  disputed,  that  the  honourable  exercise  of  intel- 
lect amongst  that  profession  is  not  relatively  great.  It  is  not 
from  them  that  we  expect,  because  it  is  not  from  them 
that  we  generally  find,  those  vigorous  exertions  of  intellect 
which  dignify  our  nature  and  which  extend  the  boundaries 
of  human  knowledge. 

But  the  intellectual  effects  of  military  subjection  form  but 
a  small  portion  of  its  evils.  The  great  mischief  is,  that  it 
requires  the  relinquishment  of  our  moral  agency  ;  that  it  re- 
quires us  to  do  what  is  opposed  to  our  consciences,  and  what 
we  know  to  be  wrong.  A  soldier  must  obey,  how  criminal 
soever  the  command,  and  how  criminal  soever  he  knows  it  to 
be.  It  is  certain,  that  of  those  who  compose  armies,  many 
commit  actions  which  they  believe  to  be  wicked,  and  which 
they  would  not  commit  but  for  the  obligations  of  a  military 
life.  Although  a  soldier  determinately  believes  that  the  war 
is  unjust,  although  he  is  convinced  that  his  particular  part  of 
the  service  is  atrociously  criminal,  still  he  must  proceed — ^he 
must  prosecute  the  purposes  of  injustice  or  robbery,  he  must 
participate  in  the  guilt,  and  be  himself  a  robber. 

To  what  a  situation  is  a  rational  and  responsible  being  re- 
duced, who  commits  actions,  good  or  bad,  at  the  word  of  an- 
other?    I  can  conceive  no   greater  degradation.     It  is  the 

*  Captain  Basil  Hall :  Voyage  to  Loo  Choo,  c.  2.  We  make  no  dis- 
tinction between  the  military  and  naval  professions,  and  employ  one  word 
to  indicate  both. 


526  CONSEQUENCES    OP   WAR.  [eSSAY  III. 

lowest,  the  final  abjectness  of  the  moral  nature.  It  is  this 
if  we  abate  the  glitter  of  war,  and  if  we  add  this  glitter  it  is 
nothing  more. 

Such  a  resignation  of  our  moral  agency  is  not  contended 
for,  or  tolerated  in  any  one  other  circumstance  of  human  life. 
War  stands  upon  this  pinnacle  of  depravity  alone.  She,  only, 
in  the  supremacy  of  crime,  has  told  us  that  she  has  abolished 
even  the  obligation  to  be  virtuous. 

Some  writers  who  have  perceived  the  monstrousness  of 
this  system,  have  told  us  that  a  soldier  should  assure  himself, 
before  he  engages  in  a  war,  that  it  is  a  lawful  and  just  one ; 
and  they  acknowledge  that,  if  he  does  not  feel  this  assurance, 
he  is  a  "  murderer."  But  how  is  he  to  know  that  the  war  is 
just  ?  It  is  frequently  difficult  for  the  people  distinctly  to 
discover  what  the  objects  of  a  war  are.  And  if  the  soldier 
knew  that  it  was  just  in  its  commencement,  how  is  he  to 
know  that  it  will  continue  just  in  its  prosecution?  Every 
war  is,  in  some  parts  of  its  course,  wicked  and  unjust ;  and 
who  can  tell  what  that  course  will  be  ?  You  say — When  he 
discovers  any  injustice  or  wickedness,  let  him  withdraw  :  we 
answer,  He  cannot ;  and  the  truth  is,  that  there  is  no  way  of 
avoiding  the  evil,  but  by  avoiding  the  army. 

It  is  an  enquiry  of  much  interest,  under  what  circumstances 
of  responsibility  a  man  supposes  himself  to  be  placed,  who 
thus  abandons  and  violates  his  own  sense  of  rectitude  and  of 
his  duties.  Either  he  is  responsible  for  his  actions,  or  he  is 
not ;  and  the  question  is  a  serious  one  to  determine.*  Chris- 
tianity has  certainly  never  stated  any  cases  in  which  personal 
responsibility  ceases.  If  she  admits  such  cases,  she  has  at 
least  not  told  us  so  ;  but  she  has  told  us,  explicitly  and  repeat- 
edly, that  she  does  require  individual  obedience  and  impose 
individual  responsibility.  She  has  made  no  exceptions  to 
the  imperativeness  of  her  obligations,  whether  we  are  re- 
quired by  others  to  neglect  them  or  not ;  and  I  can  discover 
in  her  sanctions  no  reason  to  suppose,  that  in  her  final  adju- 
dications she  admits  the  plea,  tJiat  another  required  us  to  do 
that  which  she  required  us  to  forbear. — But  it  may  be  feared, 
it  may  be  believed,  that  how  little  soever  religion  will  abate 

*  Vattel  indeed  tells  us  that  soldiers  ought  to  "  submit  their  judgment." 
"  What,"  says  he,  "  would  be  the  consequence,  if  at  every  step  of  the 
Sovereign  the  subjects  were  at  liberty  to  weigh  the  justice  of  his  reasons, 
and  refuse  to  march  to  a  war  which,  to  them,  might  appear  unjust?" 
Law  of  Nat.  b.  3,  c.  11,  sec.  187.  Gisborne  holds  very  different  lan- 
guage. "  It  is,"  he  says,  "  at  all  times  the  duty  of  an  Englishman  stead- 
fjtstly  to  decline  obeying  any  orders  of  his  superiors,  which  his  conscience 
should  tell  him  were  in  any  degree  impious  or  unjust."     Duties  of  Men. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CONSEQUENCES    OF   WAR.  627 

of  the  responsibility  of  those  who  obey,  she  will  impose  pot 
a  little  upon  those  who  command.  They,  at  least,  are  an- 
swerable for  the  enormities  of  war :  unless,  indeed,  any  one 
shall  tell  me  that  responsibility  attaches  nowhere  ;  that  that 
which  would  be  wickedness  in  another  man,  is  innocence  in 
a  soldier  ;  and  that  heaven  has  granted  to  the  directors  of  war 
a  privileged  immunity,  by  virtue  of  which  crime  incurs  no 
guilt  and  receives  no  punishment. 

And  here  it  is  fitting  to  observe,  that  the  obedience  to  arbi- 
trary power  which  war  exacts,  possesses  more  of  the  charac- 
ter of  servility,  and  even  of  slavery,  than  we  are  accustomed 
to  suppose.  I  will  acknowledge  that  when  I  see  a  company 
of  men  in  a  stated  dress,  and  of  a  stated  colour,  ranged,  rank 
and  file,  in  the  attitude  of  obedience,  turning  or  walking  at 
the  word  of  another,  now  changing  the  position  of  a  limb  and 
now  altering  the  angle  of  a  foot,  I  feel  that  there  is  something 
in  the  system  that  is  wrong — something  incongruous  with  the 
proper  dignity,  with  the  intellectual  station  of  man.  I  do  not 
know  whether  I  shall  be  charged  with  indulging  in  idle  senti- 
ment or  idle  affectation.  If  I  hold  unusual  language  upon  the 
subject,  let  it  be  remembered  that  the  subject  is  itself  unusual. 
I  will  retract  my  affectation  and  sentiment,  if  the  reader  will 
show  me  any  case  in  life  parallel  to  that  to  which  I  have  ap- 
plied it. 

No  one  questions  whether  military  power  he  arbitrary. 
And  what  are  the  customary  feelings  of  mankind  with  respect 
to  a  subjection  to  arbitrary  power?  How  do  we  feel  and 
think,  when  we  hear  of  a  person  who  is  obliged  to  do  what- 
ever other  men  command,  and  who,  the  moment  he  refuses, 
is  punished  for  attempting  to  be  free  1  If  a  man  orders  his 
servant  to  do  a  given  action,  he  is  at  liberty,  if  he  think  the 
action  improper,  or  if,  from  any  other  cause,  he  choose  not  to 
do  it,  to  refuse  his  obedience.  Far  other  is  the  nature  of 
military  subjection.  The  soldier  is  compelled  to  obey,  what- 
ever be  his  inclination  or  his  will.  It  matters  not  whether 
he  have  entered  the  service  voluntarily  or  involuntarily.  Be- 
ing in  it,  he  has  but  one  alternative — submission  to  arbitrary 
power,  or  punishment — the  punishment  of  death  perhaps — 
for  refusing  to  submit.  Let  the  reader  imagine  to  himself 
any  other  cause  or  purpose  for  which  freemen  shall  be  sub- 
jected to  such  a  condition,  and  he  will  then  see  that  condi- 
tion in  its  proper  light.  The  influence  of  habit  and  the  gloss 
of  public  opinion  make  situations  that  would  otherwise  be 
loathsome  and  revolting,  not  only  tolerable  but  pleasurable 
Take  away  this  influence  and  this  gloss  from  the  situation  of 


,  528  CONSEQUENCES    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III. 

a  soldier,  and  what  should  we  call  it  ?  We  should  call  it  a 
state  of  degradation  and  of  bondage.  But  habit  and  public 
opinion,  although  they  may  influence  notions,  cannot  alter 
things.  It  is  a  state  intellectually,  morally,  and  politically, 
of  bondage  and  degradation. 

But  the  reader  will  say  that  this  submission  to  arbitrary 
power  is  necessary  to  the  prosecution  of  war.  I  know  it ; 
and  that  is  the  very  point  for  observation.  It  is  because  it  is 
necessary  to  war  that  it  is  noticed  here  :  for  a  brief  but  clear 
argument  results : — That  custom  to  which  such  a  state  of 
mankind  is  necessary,  must  inevitably  be  bad  ; — it  must  in- 
evitably be  adverse  to  rectitude  and  to  Christianity.  So  de- 
plorable is  the  bondage  which  war  produces,  that  we  often 
hear,  during  a  war,  of  subsidies  from  one  nation  to  another, 
for  the  loan,  or  rather  for  the  purchase  of  an  army. — To  bor- 
row ten  thousand  men  who  know  nothing  of  our  quarrel  and 
care  nothing  for  it,  to  help  us  to  slaughter  their  fellows !  To 
pay  for  their  help  in  guineas  to  their  sovereign !  Well  has  it 
been  exclaimed, 

"  War  is  a  game,  that,  were  their  subjects  wise, 
Kings  would  not  play  at." 

A  prince  sells  his  subjects  as  a  farmer  sells  his  cattle  ;  and 
sends  them  to  destroy  a  people,  whom,  if  they  had  been  higher 
bidders,  he  would  perhaps  have  sent  them  to  defend.  The 
historian  has  to  record  such  miserable  facts,  as  that  a  poten- 
tate's troops  were,  during  one  war,  "  hired  to  the  king  of  Great 
Britain  and  his  enemies  alternately,  as  the  scale  of  conveni- 
ence happened  to  preponderate  !"*  That  a  large  number  of 
persons  with  the  feelings  and  reason  of  men,  should  coolly 
listen  to  the  bargain  of  their  sale,  should  compute  the  guineas 
that  will  pay  for  their  blood,  and  should  then  quietly  be  led 
to  a  place  where  they  are  to  kill  people  towards  whom  they 
have  no  animosity,  is  simply  wonderful.  To  what  has  invet- 
eracy of  habit  reconciled  mankind !  I  have  no  capacity  of 
supposing  a  case  of  slavery,  if  slavery  be  denied  in  this. 
Men  have  been  sold  in  another  continent,  and  philanthropy 
has  been  shocked  and  aroused  to  interference  ;  yet  these  men 
were  sold  not  to  be  slaughtered  but  to  work :  but  of  the  pur- 
chases and  sales  of  the  world's  political  slave-dealers,  what 
does  philanthropy  think  or  care  ?  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
that,  upon  other  subjects  of  horror,  similar  familiarity  of  habit 
would  produce  similar  3ffects ;  or  that  he  who  heedlessly 
contemplates  the  purchase  of  an  army,  wants  nothing  but  this 

*  Smollett's  England,  v.  4,  p,  330. 


CRAP.  XIX.]  CONSEQUKNCBS    OF    WAR.  529 

familiarity  to  make  him  heedlessly  look  on  at  the  commission 
of  parricide. 

Yet  I  do  not  know  whether,  in  its  effects  on  the  military 
character,  the  greatest  moral  evil  of  war  is  to  be  sought. 
Upon  the  community  its  effects  are  indeed  less  apparent,  be- 
cause they  who  are  the  secondary  subjects  of  the  immoral 
influence,  are  less  intensely  affected  by  it  than  the  immediate 
agents  of  its  diffusion.  But  whatever  is  deficient  in  the  de- 
gree of  evil,  is  probably  more  than  compensated  by  its  extent. 
The  influence  is  like  that  of  a  ct>ntinuai  and  noxious  vapour : 
we  neither  regard  nor  perceive  it,  but  it  secretly  undermines 
the  moral  health. 

Every  one  knows  that  vice  is  contagious.  The  depravity 
of  one  man  has  always  a  tendency  to  deprave  his  neighbours , 
and  it  therefore  requires  no  unusual  acuteness  to  discover, 
that  the  prodigious  mass  of  immorality  and  crime  which  is 
accumulated  by  a  war,  must  have  a  powerful  effect  in  •'  de- 
moralizing" the  public-  But  there  is  one  circumstance  con- 
nected with  the  injurious  influence  of  war,  which  makes  it 
peculiarly  operative  and  malignant.  It  is,  that  we  do  not  hate 
or  fear  the  influence,  and  do  not  fortify  ourselves  against  it. 
Other  vicious  influences  insinuate  themselves  into  our  minds  by 
stealth ;  but  this  we  receive  with  open  embrace.  Glory,  and 
patriotism,  and  bravery,  and  conquest,  are  bright  and  glittering 
things.  Who,  when  he  is  looking,  delighted,  upon  these 
things,  is  armed  against  the  mischiefs  which  they  veil  ? 

The  evil  is,  in  its  own  nature,  of  almost  universal  opera- 
tion. During  a  war,  a  whole  people  become  familiarized 
with  the  utmost  excesses  of  enormity — with  the  utmost  in- 
tensity of  human  wickedness — and  they  rejoice  and  exult  in 
them;  so  that  there  is  probably  not  an  individual  in  a  hundred 
who  does  not  lose  something  of  his  Christian  principles  by  a 
ten  years'  war. 

"  It  is,  in  my  mind,"  said  Fox,  "  no  small  misfortune  to  live 
at  a  period  when  scenes  of  horror  and  blood  are  frequent." 
— "  One  of  the  most  evil  consequences  of  war  is,  that  it  tends 
to  render  the  hearts  of  mankind  callous  to  the  feelings  and 
sentiments  of  humanity,"* 

Those  who  know  what  the  moral  law  of  God  is,  and  who 
feel  an  interest  in  the  virtue  and  the  happiness  of  the  world, 
will  not  regard  the  animosity  of  Party  and  the  restlessness  of 
resentment  which  are  produced  by  a  war,  as  trifling  evils. 
If  any  thing  be  opposite  to  Christianity,  it  is  retaliation  and 
revenge.  In  the  obligation  to  restrain  these  dispositions, 
*  FcU's  Life  of  C.  J.  Fox. 
iO 


530  coNSEQUETJ-cirs  OF  WAX,  Iesbjiy  n«- 

much  of  the  characteristic  placability  of  Christianity  conf?ist». 
The  very  essence  and  spirit  of  our  religion  are  abhorrent  from 
resentment. — Th€  very  essence  and  spirit  of  war  a^re  promotive- 
of  resentment ;  and  what,  then,  must  be  their  mutual  adverse- 
xi-ess  ?  That  war  excites  tliese  passions,,  needs  not  to  be  proved-. 
When  a  war  is  in  contemplation,,  or  when  it  lias  been  begun^ 
what  are  the  endeavours  of  its  promoters?  They  animate  us 
by  every  artifice  of  excitement  to  hatred  and  animosity.  Pam- 
phlets, Placards,  Newspapers^  Caricatures — every  agent  is  in 
requisition  to  irritate  us  into  malignity.  Nay,  dreadful  as  it 
isy  the  pulpit  resounds  with  declamations  to  stimulate  our  too 
sluggish  resentment,  and  to  invite  us  to  slaughter. — And  thus 
the  most  unchristianiike  of  all  our  passions,  the  passion  which 
it  is  most  the  object  of  our  religion  to  repress,  is  excited  and 
fostered.  Christianity  cannot  be  flourishing  under  circum^ 
stances  like  these.  The  more  effectually  we  are  animated  to 
war,  the  more  nearly  we  extinguish  the  dispositions  of  our 
religion.  War  and  Christianity  are  like  the  opposite  ends  of 
a  balance^  of  which  one  is  depressed  by  the  elevation  of  the 
other. 

These  are  the  consequences  which  make  War  dreadful  to 
a  state.  Slaughter  and  devastation  are  sufficiently  terrible, 
but  their  collateral  evils  are  their  greatest.  It  is  the  immoral 
feeling  that  war  diffuses — it  is  tlie  depravation  of  Principle, 
which  forms  the  mass  of  its  mischief. 

To  attempt  to  pursue  the  consequences  of  war  through  all 
their  ramifications  of  evil,  w^ere,  however,  both  endless  and 
vain.  It  is  a  moral  gangrene,  which  diffuses  its  humours 
through  the  whole  political  and  social  system.  To  expose  its 
mischief,  is  to  exhibit  all  evil ;  for  there  is  no  evil  which  it 
does  not  occasion,  and  it  has  much  that  is  peculiar  to  itself. 

That,  together  with  its  multiplied  evils,  war  produces  some 
good,  I  have  no  wish  to  deny.  I  know  that  it  sometimes 
elicits  valuable  qualities  which  had  otherwise  been  concealed, 
and  that  it  often  produces  collateral  and  adventitious,  and  some- 
times immediate  advantages.  If  all  this  could  be  denied,  it 
would  be  needless  to  deny  it ;  for  it  is  of  no  consequence  to 
the  question  whether  it  be  proved.  That  any  v/ide-extended 
system  should  not  produce  some  benefits,  can  never  happen. 
In  such  a  system,  it  were  an  unheard-of-purity  of  evil,  which 
was  evil  without  any  mixture  of  good. — But,  to  compare  the 
ascertained  advantages  of  war  with  its  ascertained  mischiefs, 
and  to  maintain  a  question  as  to  the  preponderance  of  the 
balance,  implies,  not  ignorance,  but  disingenuousness,  not  ir  - 
capacity  to  decide,  but  a  voluntary  concealment  of  truth. 


OHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  531 

And  why  do  we  insist  upon  these  consequences  of  Warl 
— Because  the  review  prepares  the  reader  for  a  more  accu 
rate  judgment  respecting  its  lawfulness.  Because  it  reminda 
him  what  War  is,  and  because,  knowing  and  remembering 
what  it  is,  he  will  be  the  better  able  to  compare  it  with  the 
Standard  of  Rectitude. 


LAWFULNESS  OF  WAR. 

I  WOULD  recommend  to  him  who  would  estimate  the  moral 
character  of  war,  to  endeavour  to  forget  that  he  has  ever  pre- 
sented to  his  mind  the  idea  of  a  battle,  and  to  endeavour  to 
contemplate  it  with  those  emotions  which  it  would  excite  in 
the  mind  of  a  being  who  had  never  before  heard  of  human 
slaughter.  The  prevailing  emotions  of  such  a  being  would 
be  astonishment  and  horror.  If  he  were  shocked  by  the  hor- 
ribleness  of  the  scene,  he  would  be  amazed  at  its  absurdity. 
That  a  large  number  of  persons  should  assemble  by  agreement, 
and  deliberately  kill  one  another,  appears  to  the  understanding 
a  proceeding  so  preposterous,  so  monstrous,  that  I  think  a 
being  such  as  I  have  supposed  would  inevitably  conclude  that 
they  were  mad.  Nor  is  it  likely,  if  it  were  attempted  to  ex- 
plain to  him  some  motives  to  such  conduct,  that  he  would  be 
able  to  comprehend  how  any  possible  circumstances  could 
make  it  reasonable.  The  ferocity  and  prodigious  folly  of  the 
act  would,  in  his  estimation,  outbalance  the  weight  of  every 
conceivable  motive,  and  he  would  turn  unsatisfied  away, 

"  Astonished  at  the  madness  of  Mankind." 

There  is  an  advantage  in  making  suppositions  such  as 
these  ;  because  when  the  mind  has  been  familiarized  to  a 
practice,  however  monstrous  or  inhuman,  it  loses  some  of  its 
sagacity  of  moral  perception;  the  practice  is  perhaps  veiled 
in  glittering  fictions,  or  the  mind  is  become  callous  to  its 
enormities.  But  if  the  subject  is,  by  some  circumstance,  pre- 
sented to  the  mind  unconnected  with  any  of  its  previous  asso- 
ciations, we  see  it  with  a  new  judgment  and  new  feelings  ; 
and  wonder,  perhaps,  that  we  have  not  felt  so  or  thought  so 
before.  And  such  occasions  it  is  the  part  of  a  wise  man  to 
seek ;  smce,  if  they  never  happen  to  us,  it  will  often  be  diffi- 
cult for  us  accurately  to  estimate  the  qualities  of  human  ac- 
tions, or  to  determine  whether  we  approve  them  from  a  deci- 
sion of  our  judgment,  or  whether  we  yield  to  them  only  the 
acquiescence  of  habit. 

It  may  properly  be  a  subject  of  wonder  that  the  arguments 


532  LAWFULNESS  OF  WAR.  [esSAY  III. 

which  are  brought  to  justify  a  custom  such  as  war  receive  so 
little  investigation.  It  must  be  a  studious  ingenuity  of  mis- 
chief which  could  devise  a  practice  more  calamitous  or  horri- 
ble ;  and  yet  it  is  a  practice  of  which  it  rarely  occurs  to  us  to 
enquire  into  the  necessity,  or  to  ask  whether  it  cannot  be,  or 
ought  not  to  be  avoided.  In  one  truth,  however,  all  will  ac- 
quiesce— that  the  arguments  in  favour  of  such  a  practice 
should  be  unanswerably  strong. 

Let  it  not  be  said  that  the  experience  and  the  practice  of 
other  ages  have  superseded  the  necessity  of  enquiry  in  our 
own  ;  that  there  can  be  no  reason  to  question  the  lawfulness  of 
that  which  has  been  sanctioned  by  forty  centuries  ;  or  that  he 
who  presumes  to  question  it,  is  amusing  himself  with  schemes 
of  visionary  philanthropy.  "  There  is  not,  it  may  be,"  says 
Lord  Clarendon,  "  a  greater  obstruction  to  the  investigation 
of  truth  or  the  improvement  of  knowledge,  than  the  too  fre- 
quent appeal,  and  the  too  supine  resignation  of  our  under- 
standing to  antiquity."  *  Whosoever  proposes  an  alteration 
of  existing  institutions,  will  meet,  from  some  men,  with  a  sort 
of  instinctive  opposition,  which  appears  to  be  influenced  by 
no  process  of  reasoning,  by  no  considerations  of  propriety  or 
•:)rinciples  of  rectitude,  which  defends  the  existing  system  be- 
cause it  exists,  and  which  would  have  equally  defended  its 
opposite  if  that  had  been  the  oldest.  "  Nor  is  it  out  of  mod- 
esty that  we  have  this  resignation,  or  that  we  do,  in  truth, 
think  those  who  have  gone  before  us  to  be  wiser  than  our- 
selves ;  we  are  as  proud  and  as  peevish  as  any  of  our  pro- 
genitors ;  but  it  is  out  of  laziness ;  we  will  rather  take  theii 
words  than  take  the  pains  to  examine  the  reason  they  gov- 
erned themselves  by."  t  To  those  who  urge  objections  from 
the  authority  of  ages,  it  is,  indeed,  a  sufficient  answer  to  say, 
that  they  apply  to  every  long-continued  custom.  Slave-dealers 
urged  them  against  the  friends  of  the  abolition:  Papists  urged 
them  against  Wickliffe  and  Luther,  and  the  Athenians  proba- 
bly thought  it  a  good  objection  to  an  apostle,  "that  he  seemed 
to  be  a  setter  forth  of  strange  gods." 

It  is  some  satisfaction  to  be  able  to  give  on  a  question  of 
this  nature,  the  testimony  of  some  great  minds  against  the 
lawfulness  of  war,  opposed,  as  these  testimonies  are,  to  the 
general  prejudice  and  the  general  practice  of  the  world.  It 
has  been  observed  by  Beccaria,  that  "  it  is  the  fate  of  great 
truths  to  glow  only  like  a  flash  of  lightning  amidst  the  dark 
clouds  in  which  error  has  enveloped  the  universe ;"  and  if 
our  testimonies  are  few  or  transient,  it  matters  not,  so  that 
*  Lord  Clarendon's  Essays.  t  Id. 


CHAP.   XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  533 

their  light  be  the  light  of  truth.  There  are,  indeed,  many, 
who  in  describing  the  horrible  particulars  of  a  siege  or  a  bat- 
tle, indulge  in  some  declamation  on  the  horrors  of  war,  such 
as  has  been  often  repeated,  and  often  applauded,  and  as  often 
forgotten.  But  such  declamations  are  of  little  value  and  of 
little  effect ;  he  who  reads  the  next  paragraph  finds,  probably, 
that  he  is  invited  to  follow  the  path  to  glory  and  to  victory  ; — to 
share  the  hero's  danger  and  partake  the  herd's  praise ;  and  he 
soon  discovers  that  the  moralizing  parts  of  his  author  are  the 
impulse  of  feelings  rather  than  of  principles,  and  thinks  that 
though  it  may  be  very  well  to  write,  yet  it  is  better  to  forget 
them. 

There  are,  however,  testimonies,  delivered  in  the  calm  of 
reflection,  by  acute  and  enlightened  men,  which  may  reason- 
ably be  allowed  at  least  so  much  weight  as  to  free  the  present 
enquiry  from  the  charge  of  being  wild  or  visionary.  Chris- 
tianity indeed  needs  no  such  auxiliaries ;  but  if  they  induce 
an  examination  of  her  duties,  a  wise  man  will  not  wish  them 
to  be  disregarded. 

"  They  who  defend  war,"  says  Erasmus,  "  must  defend  the 
dispositions  which  lead  to  war :  and  these  dispositions  are  ab- 
solutely forbidden  by  the  gospel. — Since  the  time  that  Jesus 
Christ  said.  Put  up  thy  sword  into  its  scabbard.  Christians 
ought  not  to  go  to  war. — Christ  suffered  Peter  to  fall  into  an 
error  in  this  matter,  on  purpose  that,  when  he  had  put  up  Pe- 
ter's sword,  it  might  remain  no  longer  a  doubt  that  war  was 
prohibited,  which,  before  that  order  had  been  considered  as 
allowable." — "  Wickliffe  seems  to  have  thought  it  was  wrong 
to  take  away  the  life  of  man  on  any  account,  and  that  war 
was  utterly  unlawful."* — "I  am  persuaded,"  says  the  Bishop 
of  Landaff,  "  that  when  the  spirit  of  Christianity  shall  exert  its 
proper  influence  war  will  cease  throughout  the  whole  Christian 
world."  j  "  War,"  says  the  same  acute  prelate,  "  has  practices 
and  principles  peculiar  to  itself,  which  but  ill  quadrate  with  the 
rule  of  moral  rectitude,  and  are  quite  abhorrent  from  the  benig- 
nity of  Christianity."  ^  A  living  writer  of  eminence  bears 
this  remarkable  testimony: — "There  is  but  one  community 
of  Christians  in  the  world,  and  that  unhappily  of  all  commu- 
nities one  of  the  smallest,  enlightened  enough  to  understand 
the  prohibition  of  war  by  our  Divine  Master,  in  its  plain,  literal, 
and  undeniable  sense,  and  conscientious  enough  to  obey  it, 
subduing  the  very  instinct  of  nature  to  obedience," § 

Dr.  Vicessimus  Knox  speaks  in  language  equally  specific : 

*  PriePtley.  t  Life  of  Bishop  Watson.  t  Id. 

§  Southey's  History  of  Brazil. 

45* 


634  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III, 

• — "  Morality  and  religion  forbid  war,  in  its  motives,  conduct^ 
and  consequences y  * 

Those  who  have  attended  to  the  mode  in  which  the  Moral 
Law  is  instituted  in  the  expressions  of  the  Will  of  God,  will 
have  no  difficulty  in  supposing  that  it  contains  no  specific  pro- 
hibition of  war.  Accordingly,  if  we  be  asked  for  such  a  pro- 
hibition, in  the  manner  in  which  Thou  shalt  not  kill  is  directed 
to  murder,  we  willingly  answer  that  no  such  prohibition  exists  ; 
— and  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  argument.  Even  those  who 
would  require  such  a  prohibition,  are  themselves  satisfied 
respecting  the  obligation  of  many  negative  duties  on  which 
there  has  been  no  specific  decision  in  the  New  Testament. 
They  believe  that  suicide  is  not  lawful :  yet  Christianity 
never  forbade  it.  It  can  be  shown,  indeed,  by  implication 
and  inference,  that  suicide  could  not  have  been  allowed,  and 
with  this  they  are  satisfied.  Yet  there  is,  probably,  in  the 
Christian  Scriptures,  not  a  twentieth  part  of  as  much  indirect 
evidence  against  the  lawfulness  of  suicide  as  there  is  against 
the  lawfulness  of  war.  To  those  who  require  such  a  com- 
mand as  Thou  shalt  not  engage  in  war,  it  is  therefore  sufficient 
to  reply,  that  they  require  that,  which,  upon  this  and  upon 
many  other  subjects,  Christianity  has  not  seen  fit  to  give. 

We  have  had  many  occasions  to  illustrate,  in  the  course  of 
these  disquisitions,  the  characteristic  nature  of  the  Moral  Law 
as  a  Law  of  Benevolence.  This  benevolence,  this  good -will 
and  kind  affections  towards  one  another,  is  placed  at  the  basis 
of  practical  morality — it  is  "  the  fulfilling  of  the  law" — ^it  is 
the  test  of  the  validity  of  our  pretensions  to  the  Christian 
character.  We  have  had  occasion,  too,  to  observe,  that  this 
law  of  Benevolence  is  universally  applicable  to  public  affairs 
as  well  as  to  private,  to  the  intercourse  of  nations  as  well  as 
of  men.  Let  us  refer,  then,  to  some  of  those  requisitions  of 
this  law  which  appear  peculiarly  to  respect  the  question  of 
the  moral  character  of  war. 

Have  peace  one  with  another. — By  this  shall  all  men  know 
that  ye  are  my  disciples,  if  ye  have  love  one  to  another. 

Walk  with  all  lovdiness  and  meekness,  with  long-suffering, 
forhearing  one  another  in  love. 

Be  ye  all  of  one  mind,  having  compassion  one  of  another ; 
love  as  brethren,  be  pitiful,  be  courteous  :  not  rendering  evil  for 
evil,  or  railing  for  railing. 

*  Essays — The  Paterines  or  Gazari  of  Italy  in  the  11th,  12th,  and 
13th  centuries  "  held  that  it  wixs  not  lawful  to  bear  arms  or  to  kill  niaa- 
kind." 


CHXP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  535 

Be  at  peace  among  yourselms.  See  that  none  render  evil  for 
^vil  unto  any  mari. — G4»d  hath  called  us  to  peace. 

Follow  after  love^  patience,  meekness, — Be  gentle,  showing 
<zll  meekness  unto  all  men. — Live  in  peace.. 

Lay  aside  all  malice. — Put  off  anger^  wrath,  malice, — Let 
all  bittern^ess,  and  wrath,  and  anger^  and  clamour,  and  evil 
speaking,  be  put  away  from  you,  icith  all  malice. 

Avenge  not  yourselves. — If  thine  enemy  hunger,  feed  him  : 
if  he  thirst,  give  him  drinlt. — Recompense  to  no  man  evil  for 
evil. — Overcome  evil  with  good. 

Now  we  ask  of  any  man  who  looks  over  tli€se  passages. 
What  evidence  do  they  convey  respecting  the  lawfulness  of 
war  1  Could  any  approval  or  allowance  of  it  have  been  sub- 
joined to  these  instructions,  without  obvious  and  most  gross  in- 
consistency 1 — But  if  war  is  obviously  and  most  grossly  incon- 
sistent with  the  general  character  of  Christianity ;  if  war  could 
not  have  been  permitted  by  its  teachers,  without  an  egregious 
violation  of  their  own  preoepts,  we  think  that  the  evidence  of  its 
unlawfulness,  arising  from  this  general  character  alone,  is  as 
clear,  as  absolute,  and  as  exclusive,  as  could  have  been  con- 
tained in  any  form  of  prohibition  whatever. 

But  it  is  not  from  general  principles  alone  that  the  law  of 
Christianity  respecting  war  may  be  deduced. — Ye  have  heard 
that  it  hath  been  said,  "  An  eye  for  an  eye,  and  a  tooth  for  a 
tooth  :  but  /  say  unto  you,  that  ye  resist  not  evil :  but  whoso- 
ever shall  smite  thee  on  thy  right  cheek,  turn  to  him  the  other 
also. — Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath  been  said,  "Thou  shalt 
love  thy  neighbour,  and  hate  thine  enemy :  but  /  say  unto 
you.  Love  your  enemies,  bless  them  that  curse  you,  do  good 
to  them  that  hate  you,  and  pray  for  them  which  despitefuUy  use 
you,  and  persecute  you ;  for  if  ye  love  them  which  love  you, 
what  reward  have  ye  ?"  * 

Of  the  precepts  from  the  Mount  the  most  obvious  charac- 
teristic is  greater  moral  excellence  and  superior  purity.  They 
are  directed,  not  so  immediately  to  the  external  regulation  of 
the  conduct,  as  to  the  restraint  and  purification  of  the  affec- 
tions. In  another  precept  it  is  not  enough  that  an  unlawful 
passion  be  just  so  far  restrained  as  to  produce  no  open  immo- 
rality— the  passion  itself  is  forbidden.  The  tendency  of  the 
discourse  is  to  attach  guilt  not  to  action  only  but  also  to  thought. 
It  has  been  said,  "  Thou  shalt  not  kill ;  and  whosoever  shall 
kill  shall  be  in  danger  of  the  judgment ;  but  /  say  unto  you, 
*that  whosoever  is  angry  with  his  brother,  without  a  cause, 
shall  be  in  danger  of  the  judgment.'"!  Our  Lawgiver  at- 
*  Mat.  V.  38,  &C.  t  Mat.  v.  2i,  22. 


636  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  111. 

taches  guilt  to  some  of  the  violerrt  feelingly  such  as  resent- 
ment, hatred,  revenge ;  and  by  doing  this,  we  contend  that 
he  attaches  guilt  to  war.  War  cannot  be  carried  on  without 
those  passions  which  he  prohibits.  Our  argument,  therefore, 
is  syllogistical : — ^War  cannot  be  allowed,  if  that  which  is 
necessary  to  war  is  prohibited.  This,  indeed,  is  precisely 
the  argument  of  Erasmus  : — "  They  who  defend  war  must  de- 
fend the  dispositions  which  lead  to  war  ;  and  these  dispositions 
at^ absolutely  forbidden ^ 

Whatever  might  have  been  allowed  under  the  Mosaic  insti- 
tution as  to  retaliation  or  resentment,  Christianity  says,  "  If 
ye  lore  them  only  which  love  you,  what  reward  have  ye  ? — 
Love  your  enemies.^  Now  what  sort  of  love  does  that  man 
bear  towards  his  enemy,  who  runs  him  through  with  a  bayonet  ? 
We  repeat,  that  the  distinguishing  duties  of  Christianity  must 
be  sacrificed  when  war  is  carried  on.  The  question  is  be- 
tween the  abandonment  of  these  duties  and  the  abandonment 
of  war,  for  both  cannot  be  retained.* 

It  is  however  objected,  that  the  prohibitions,  "  Resist  not 
evil,"  &c.,  are  figurative  ;  and  that  they  do  not  mean  that  no 
injury  is  to  be  punished,  and  no  outrage  to  be  repelled.  It 
has  been  asked  with  complacent  exultation,  What  would  these 
advocates  of  peace  say  to  him  who  struck  them  on  the  right 
cheek  ?  Would  they  turn  to  him  the  other  ?  What  would 
these  patient  nwralists  say  to  him  who  robbed  them  of  a  coat  ? 
Would  they  give  a  cloak  also  ?  What  would  these  philan- 
thropists say  to  him  who  asked  them  to  lend  a  hundred 
pounds  ?  Would  they  not  turn  away  1  This  is  argumentum 
ad  hominem  ;  one  example  amongst  the  many,  of  that  low  and 
dishonest  mode  of  intellectual  warfare,  which  consists  in  ex- 
citing the  feelings  instead  of  convincing  the  understanding. 
It  is  however,  some  satisfaction,  that  the  motive  to  the  adop- 
tion of  this  mode  of  warfare  is  -  itself  an  indication  of  a  bad 
cause  ;  for  what  honest  reasoner  would  produce  only  a  laugh, 
il  he  were  able  to  produce  conviction  ? 

We  willingly  grant  that  not  all  the  precepts  from  the  Mount 
were  designed  to  be  literally  obeyed  in  the  intercourse  of  life. 
But  what  then  1     To  show  that  their  meaning  is  not  literal, 

*  Yet  the  retention  of  both  has  been,  unhappily  enough,  attempted. 
In  a  late  publication,  of  which  a  part  is  devoted  to  the  defence  of  war, 
the  author  gravely  recommends  soldiers,  whilst  shooting  and  stabbing 
their  enemies,  to  maintain  towards  them  a  feeling  of  good-will  !" — • 
Tracts  and  Essays  by  the  late  William  Hey,  Esq.,  F.  R.  S.  And  Gis- 
borne,  in  his  Duties  of  Men,  holds  similar  language.  He  advises  the 
soldier  "  never  to  forget  the  common  ties  of  human  nature  by  which  U^ 
is  inseparably  united  to  his  enemy  " 


CHA.P.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  537 

is  not  to  show  that  they  do  not  forbid  war.  We  ask  in  our  turn, 
What  is  the  meaning  of  the  precepts  ?  What  is  the  meaning  of 
"  Resist  not  evil  ?"  Does  it  mean  to  allow  bombardment — devas- 
tation—slaughter ?  If  it  does  not  mean  to  allow  all  this,  it  does 
not  mean  to  allow  war.  What,  again,  do  the  objectors  say  is  the 
meaning  of,  "  Love  your  enemies,"  or  of,  "  Do  good  to  them  that 
hate  you  ?"  Does  it  mean,  "  ruin  their  commerce" — "  sink  their 
fleets" — "  plunder  their  cities" — "  shoot  through  their  hearts  ?'* 
If  the  precept  does  not  mean  to  allow  all  this,  it  does  not  mean 
to  allow  war.  It  is,  therefore,  not  at  all  necessary  l/ere  to 
discuss  the  precise  signification  of  some  of  the  precepts  from 
the  Mount,  or  to  define  what  limits  Christianity  may  admit  in 
their  application,  since  whatever  exceptions  she  may  allow,  it 
is  manifest  what  she  does  not  allow  :*  for  if  we  give  to  our 
objectors  whatever  license  of  interpretation  they  may  desire, 
they  cannot,  without  virtually  rejecting  the  precepts,  so  inter- 
pret them  as  to  make  them  allow  war. 

Of  the  injunctions  that  are  contrasted  with,  "  eye  for  eye, 
and  tooth  for  tooth,"  the  entire  scope  and  purpose  is  the 
suppression  of  the  violent  passions,  and  the  inculcation  of 
forbearance  and  forgiveness,  and  benevolence  and  love.  They 
forbid  not  specifically,  the  act,  but  the  spirit  of  war  ;  and  this 
method  of  prohibition  Christ  ordinarily  employed.  He  did 
not  often  condemn  the  individual  doctrines  or  customs  of  the 
age,  however  false  or  however  vicious  ;  but  he  condemned 
the  passions  by  which  only  vice  could  exist,  and  inculcated 
the  truth  which  dismissed  every  error.  And  this  method  was 
undoubtedly  wise.  In  the  gradual  alterations  of  human  wicked- 
ness, many  new  species  of  profligacy  might  arise  which  the 
world  had  not  yet  practised :  in  the  gradual  vicissitudes  of  human 
error,  many  new  fallacies  might  obtain  which  the  world  had 
not  yet  held :  and  how  were  these  errors  and  these  crimes  to 
be  opposed,  but  by  the  inculcation  of  principles  that  were  ap- 
plicable to  every  crime  and  to  every  error  1 — principles  which 
define  not  always  what  is  wrong,  but  Avhich  tell  us  wha/ 
always  is  right. 

There  are  two  modes  of  censure  or  condemnation  ;  the  one 
is  to  reprobate  evil,  and  the  other  to  enforce  the  opposite 

*  It  is  manifest,  from  the  New  Testament,  that  we  are  not  required  t» 
give  a  "  cloak,"  in  every  case,  to  him  who  robs  us  of  "  a  coat ;"  but  1 
think  it  is  equally  manifest  that  we  are  required  to  give  it  vot  the  less^ 
because  he  has  robbed  us :  the  circumstance  of  his  having  robbed  us,  doea 
not  entail  an  obligation  to  give  ;  but  it  also  does  not  impart  a  permission 
to  withhold.  If  the  necessities  of  the  plunderer  require  relief,  it  is  the 
business  of  the  plundered  to  relieve  them. 


638  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [ESSAY  in. 

good  ;  and  both  these  modes  were  adopted  by  Christ. — He 
not  only  censured  the  passions  that  are  necessary  to  war,  but 
inculcated  the  affections  which  are  most  opposed  to  them. 
The  conduct  and  dispositions  upon  which  he  pronounced  his 
solemn  benediction  are  exceedingly  remarkable.  They  are 
these,  and  in  this  order  :  Poverty  of  Spirit ; — Mourning  ; — 
Meekness  ; — Desire  of  righteousness  ; — Mercy  ; — Purity  of 
heart ; — Peace-making ; — Sufferance  of  persecution.  Now, 
let  the  reader  try  whether  he  can  propose  eight  other  quali- 
ties, to  be  retained  as  the  general  habit  of  the  mind  which 
shall  be  more  incongruous  with  war. 

Of  these  benedictions,  I  think  the  most  eraphatical  is  that 
pronounced  upon  the  Peace-makers.  "  Blessed  are  the  peace- 
makers :  for  they  shall  be  called  the  children  of  God."* 
Higher  praise  or  a  higher  title,  no  man  can  receive.  Now,  I 
do  not  say  that  these  benedictions  contain  an  absolute  proof 
that  Christ  prohibited  war,  but  I  say  they  make  it  clear  that 
he  did  not  approve  it.  He  selected  a  number  of  subjects  for 
his  solemn  approbation ;  and  not  one  of  them  possesses  any 
congruity  with  war,  and  some  of  them  cannot  possibly  exist 
in  conjunction  with  it.  Can  any  one  believe  that  he  who 
made  this  selection,  and  who  distinguished  the  peace-makers 
with  peculiar  approbation,  could  have  sanctioned  his  follow- 
ers in  destroying  one  another  ?  Or  does  any  one  believe 
that  those  who  were  mourners,  and  meek  and  merciful  and 
peace  making,  could  at  the  same  time  perpetrate  such  destruc- 
tion ?  If  I  be  told  that  a  temporary  suspension  of  Christian 
dispositions,  although  necessary  to  the  prosecution  of  war,  does 
not  imply  the  extinction  of  Christian  principles  ;  or  that  these 
dispositions  may  be  the  general  habit  of  the  mind,  and  may 
both  precede  and  follow  the  acts  of  war,  I  ansvver  that  this  is 
to  grant  all  that  I  require,  since  it  grants  that,  when  we  en- 
gage in  war,  we  abandon  Christianity. 

When  the  betrayers  and  murderers  of  Jesus  Christ  ap 
proached  him,  his  followers  asked,  "  Shall  we  smite  with  tin 
sword?"  and  without  waiting  for  an  answer,  one  of  them  "  dre\^ 
his  sword,  and  smote  the  servant  of  the  high  priest,  and  cut 
off  his  right  ear." — "  Put  up  again  thy  sword  into  his  place," 
said  his  Divine  Master :  "  for  all  they  that  take  the  sword  shaU 
perish  with  the  sword. "f  There  is  the  greater  importance 
in  the  circumstances  of  this  command,  because  it  prohibited 
the  destruction  of  human  life  in  a  cause  in  which  there  were 
the  best  of  possible  reasons  for  destroying  it.  The  question, 
"  shall  we  smite  with  the  sword,"  obviously  refers  to  the  de- 
»  Matt.  V.  9  t  Matt.  xxvi.  52. 


CHAP.  XIXs]  LAWFULNKSS    OF    WAR.  539 

fence  ef  the  R-edeeraer  from  his  assailants,  by  force  of  arras, 
iiis  followers  were  ready  to  fight  for  liira ;  and  if  any  reason 
for  fighting  could  be  a  good  one,  they  certainly  had  it.  But 
if,  in  defence  of  Himself  from  the  hands  of  bloody  ruffians,  his 
religion  did  not  allow  the  sword  to  be  drawn,  for  what  reason 
can  it  be  lawful  to  draw  it  ?  The  advocates  of  war  are  at  least 
bound  to  show  a  better  reason  for  destroying  mankind,  than  is 
contained  in  this  instance  in  which  it  was  forbidden. 

It  will,  perhaps,  be  said,  that  the  reason  why  Christ  did 
not  suffer  himself  to  be  defended  by  arms,  was,  that  such  a 
defence  would  have  defeated  the  purpose  for  which  he  came 
into  the  world,  namely,  to  offer  up  his  life  ;  and  that  he  him- 
self assigns  this  reason  in  the  context. — He  does  indeed  as- 
sign it ;  but  the  primary  reason,  the  immediate  context  is. — 
*'for  all  they  that  take  the  sword  shall  perish  witli  the 
sword."  The  reference  to  the  destined  sacrifice  of  his  life  is 
an  after  reference.  This  destined  sacrifice  might,  perhaps, 
have  formed  a  reason  why  his  followers  should  not  fight  then^ 
but  the  first,  the  principal  reason  which  he  assigned,  was  the 
reason  why  they  should  not  fight  at  all.— Nov  is  it  necessary 
to  define  the  precise  import  of  the  words,  "  for  all  they  that 
take  the  sword  shall  perish  with  the  sword  ^"  since  it  is  suffi- 
cient for  us  all,  that  they  imply  reprobation. 

It  is  with  the  apostles  as  with  Christ  himself  The  inceiS- 
Bant  object  of  their  discourses  and  writings  is  the  inculcation 
of  peace,  of  mildness,  of  placability.  It  might  be  supposed 
that  they  continually  retained  in  prospect  the  reward  which 
would  attach  to  "  Peace-makers."  We  ask  the  advocate  of 
war,  whether  he  discovers  in  the  writings  of  the  apostles  or 
of  the  evangelists,  any  thing  that  indicates  they  approved  of 
war.  Do  the  tenor  and  spirit  of  their  writings  bear  any  con- 
gruity  with  it  1  Are  not  their  spirit  and  tenor  entirely  dis- 
cordant with  it  ?  We  are  entitled  to  renew  the  observation, 
that  the  pacific  nature  of  the  apostolic  writings,  proves,  pre- 
sumptively, that  the  writers  disallowed  war.  That  could  not 
be  allowed  by  them  as  sanctioned  by  Christianity,  which  out- 
raged all  the  principles  that  they  inculcated, 

"  Whence  come  vrars  and  fightings  among  you?"  is  the  in- 
terrogation of  one  of  the  apostles,  to  some  whom  he  was  re- 
proving for  their  unchristian  conduct :  and  he  answers  himself 
by  asking  them,  "  Come  they  not  hence,  even  of  your  lusts  that 
war  in  your  members  ?"*  This  accords  precisely  with  the 
argument  that  we  urge.  Christ  forbade  the  passions  which 
lead  to  war;  and  now,  when  these  passions  had  broken  out 
*  JamM  vh  1. 


54d  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [esSAT  111 

into  actual  fighting,  his  apostle,  in  condemning  war,  refers  it 
back  to  their  passions.  We  have  been  saying  that  the  passions 
are  condemned,  and  therefore  war  ;  and  now,  again,  the  apostle 
James  thinks,  like  his  master,  that  the  most  effectual  way  of 
eradicating  war,  is  to  eradicate  the  passions  which  produce  it. 

In  the  following  quotation  we  are  told,  not  only  what  the 
arms  of  the  apostles  were  not,  but  what  they  were.  "  The 
weapons  of  our  warfare  are  not  carnal  but  mighty  through 
God  to  the  pulling  down  of  strong  holds ;  and  bringing  into 
captivity  every  thought  to  the  obedience  of  Christ^*  I  quote 
this,  not  only  because  it  assures  us  that  the  ajwstles  bad  no- 
thing to  do  with  military  weapons,  but  because  it  tells  us  the 
object  of  their  warfare — ^the  bringing  every  thought  to  the  obe- 
dience of  Christ ;  and  this  object  I  would  beg  the  reader  to 
notice,  because  it  accords  with  the  object  of  Christ  himself  in 
his  precepts  from  the  Mount — the  reduction  of  the  thoughts  to 
obedience.  The  apostle  doubtless  knew  that,  if  he  could  ef- 
fect this,  there  was  little  reason  to  fear  that  his  converts 
would  slaughter  one  another.  He  followed  the  example  of  his 
master.  He  attacked  wickedness  in  its  root ;  and  inculcated 
those  general  principles  of  purity  and  forbearance,  which,  in 
their  prevalence,  would  abolish  war,  as  they  would  abolish  all 
other  crimes.  The  teachers  of  Christianity  addressed  them- 
selves not  to  communities  but  to  men.  They  enforced  the 
regulation  of  the  passions  and  the  rectification  of  the  heart ; 
and  it  was  probably  clear  to  the  perceptions  of  apostles, 
although  it  is  not  clear  to  some  species  of  philosphy,  that 
whatever  duties  were  binding  upon  one  man,  were  binding 
upon  ten,  upon  a  hundred,  and  upon  the  state. 

War  is  not  often  directly  noticed  in  the  writings  of  the 
apostles.  When  it  is  noticed,  it  is  condemned,  just  in  that 
way  in  which  we  should  suppose  any  thing  would  be  con- 
demned that  was  notoriously  opposed  to  the  whole  system — 
just  as  murder  is  condemned  at  the  present  day.  Who  can 
find,  in  modern  books,  that  murder  is  formally  censured  ?  We 
may  find  censures  of  its  motives,  of  its  circumstances,  of  its 
degrees  of  atrocity  ;  but  the  act  itself  no  one  thinks  of  censur- 
ing, because  every  one  knows  that  it  is  wicked.  Setting  stat- 
utes aside,  I  doubt  whether,  if  an  Otaheitan  should  choose  to 
argue  that  Christians  allow  murder  because  he  cannot  find  it 
formally  prohibited  in  their  writings,  we  should  not  be  at  a 
loss  to  find  direct  evidence  against  him.  And  it  arises,  per- 
haps, from  the  same  causes,  that  a  formal  prohibition  of  war 
is  not  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  the  apostles.  I  do  not 
*2Gor.  X.4. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  541 

believe  they  imagined  that  Christianity  would  ever  be  charged 
with  allowing  it.  They  write,  as  if  the  idea  of  such  a  charge 
never  occurred  to  them.  They  did,  nevertheless,  virtually 
forbid  it ;  unless  any  one  shall  say  that  they  disallowed  the 
passions  which  occasion  war,  but  did  not  disallow  war  itself ; 
that  Christianity  prohibits  the  cause  but  permits  the  effect ; 
which  is  much  the  same  as  to  say,  that  a  law  which  forbade 
the  administering  arsenic  did  not  forbid  poisoning. 

But  although  the  general  tenor  of  Christianity  and  some  of 
its  particular  precepts  appear  distinctly  to  condemn  and  dis- 
allow war,  it  is  certain  that  different  conclusions  have  been 
formed  ;  and  many,  who  are  undoubtedly  desirous  of  perform- 
ing the  duties  of  Christianity,  have  failed  to  perceive  that  war 
is  unlawful  to  them. 

In  examining  the  arguments  by  which  war  is  defended,  two 
important  considerations  should  be  borne  in  mind — first,  that 
those  who  urge  them  are  not  simply  defending  war,  they  are 
also  defending  themselves.  If  war  be  wrong,  their  conduct  is 
wrong  ;  and  the  desire  of  self-justification  prompts  them  to 
give  importance  to  whatever  arguments  they  can  advance  in 
its  favour.  Their  decisions  may,  therefore,  with  reason,  be 
regarded  as  in  some  degree  the  decisions  of  a  party  in  the 
cause.  The  other  consideration  is,  that  the  defenders  of  war 
come  to  the  discussion  prepossessed  in  its  favour.  They  are 
attached  to  it  by  their  earliest  habits.  They  do  not  examine 
the  question  as  a  philosopher  would  examine  it,  to  whom  the 
subject  was  new.  Their  opinions  had  been  already  formed. 
They  are  discussing  a  question  which  they  had  already  deter- 
mined :  and  every  man,  who  is  acquainted  with  the  effects  of 
evidence  on  the  mind,  knows  that  under  these  circumstances 
a  very  slender  argiunent  in  favour  of  the  previous  opinions, 
possesses  more  influence  than  many  great  ones  against  it. 
Now  all  this  cannot  be  predicated  of  the  advocates  of  peace  ; 
they  are  opposing  the  influence  of  habit ;  they  are  contending 
against  the  general  prejudice  ;  they  are,  perhaps,  dismissing 
their  own  previous  opinions :  and  I  would  submit  it  to  the 
candour  of  the  reader,  that  these  circumstances  ought  to 
attach,  in  his  mind,  suspicion  to  the  validity  of  the  arguments 
against  us. 

The  narrative  of  the  centurion  who  came  to  Jesus  at  Ca- 
pernaum to  solicit  him  to  heal  his  servant,  furnishes  one  of 
these  arguments.  It  is  said  that  Clirist  found  no  fault  with 
the  centurion's  profession  ;  that  if  he  had  disallowed  the  mili- 
tary character,  he  would  have  taken  this  opportunity  of  cen- 
suring it ;  and  that,  instead  of  such  censure,  he  highly  com- 

46 


642  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III. 

mended  the  officer,  and  said  of  him,  "  I  have  not  found  so 
great  faith,  no,  not  in  Israel."* 

An  obvious  weakness  in  this  argument  is  this ;  that  it  is 
founded  not  upon  an  approval,  but  upon  silence.  Approbation 
is  indeed  expressed,  but  it  is  directed,  not  to  his  arms,  but  to 
his  "  faith  ;"  and  those  who  will  read  the  narrative^  will  find 
that  no  occasion  was  given  for  noticing  his  profession.  He 
came  to  Christ,  not  as  a  military  officer,  but  simply  as  a  de- 
serving man.  A  censure  of  his  profession  might  undoubtedly 
have  been  pronounced,  but  it  would  have  been  a  gratuitous 
censure,  a  censure  that  did  not  naturally  arise  out  of  the  case. 
The  objection  is,  in  its  greatest  weight,  presumptive  only ; 
for  none  can  be  supposed  to  countenance  every  thing  that  he 
does  not  condemn.  To  observe  silence]  in  such  cases,  was 
indeed  the  ordinary  practice  of  Christ.  He  very  seldom  in- 
terfered with  the  civil  or  political  institutions  of  the  world. 
In  th^se  institutions  there  was  sufficient  wickedness  around 
him ;  but  some  of  them  flagitious  as  they  were,  he  never,  on 
any  occasion,  even  noticed.  His  mode  of  condemning  and 
extirpating  political  vices,  was,  by  the  inculcation  of  general 
rules  of  purity,  which,  in  their  eventual  and  universal  appli 
cation,  would  reform  them  all. 

But  how  happens  it  that  Christ  did  not  notice  the  centu- 
rion's religion  ?  He  surely  was  an  idolater.  And  is  there 
not  as  good  reason  for  maintaining  that  Christ  approved  idol- 
atry because  he  did  not  condemn  it,  as  that  he  approved  war 
because  he  did  not  condemn  it  1  Reasoning  from  analogy, 
we  should  conclude  that  idolatry  was  likely  to  have  been 
noticed  rather  than  war ;  and  it  is  therefore  peculiarly  and 
singularly  unapt  to  bring  forward  the  silence  respecting  war, 
as  an  evidence  of  its  lawfulness. 

A  similar  argument  is  advanced  from  the  case  of  Cornelius, 
to  whom  Peter  was  sent  from  Joppa,  of  which  it  is  said,  that 
although  the  gospel  was  imparted  to  Cornelius  by  the  especial 
direction  of  heaven,  yet  we  do  not  find  that  he  therefore  quit- 
ted his  profession,  or  that  it  was  considered  inconsistent  with 
his  new  character.  The  objection  applies  to  this  argument 
as  to  the  last — that  it  is  built  upon  silence,  that  it  is  simply 
negative.    We  do  not  find  that  he  quitted  the  service  :  I  might 

»  Matt.  viii.  10. 

t  "  Christianity,  soliciting  admission  into  all  nations  of  the  world,  ab- 
stained, as  behoved  it,  from  intermeddling  with  the  civil  institutions  of 
any.  But  does  it  follow,  from  the  silence  of  Scripture  concerning  them, 
that  all  the  civil  institutions  which  then  prevailed  were  right,  or  that  the 
bad  should  not  be  «xehang©d  for  better  ?"— Paley. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  I.AWriJLNESS    OF    WAR.  543 

answer,  neither  do  we  find  that  he  continued  in  it.  We  only 
know  nothing  of  the  matter ;  and  the  evidence  is  therefore 
so  much  less  than  proof,  as  silence  is  less  than  approbation. 
Yet  that  the  account  is  silent  respecting  any  disapprobation 
of  war,  might  have  been  a  reasonable  ground  of  argument 
under  different  circumstances.  It  might  have  been  a  reason- 
able ground  of  argument,  if  the  primary  object  of  Christianity 
had  been  the  reformation  of  political  institutions,  or,  perhaps, 
even  if  her  primary  object  had  been  the  regulation  of  the  ex- 
ternal conduct ;  but  her  primary  object  was  neither  of  these. 
She  directed  herself  to  the  reformation  of  the  heart,  knowing 
that  all  other  reformation  would  follow.  She  embraced,  in- 
deed, both  morality  and  policy,  and  has  reformed,  or  will  re- 
form, both — not  so  much  immediately  as  consequently — not 
so  much  by  filtering  the  current,  as  by  purifying  the  spring. 
The  silence  of  Peter,  therefore,  in  the  case  of  Cornelius,  will 
serve  the  cause  of  war  but  little :  that  little  is  diminished 
when  urged  against  the  positive  evidence  of  commands  and 
prohibitions,  and  it  is  reduced  to  nothingness  when  it  is  op- 
posed to  the  universal  tendency  and  object  of  the  revelation. 

It  has  sometimes  been  urged  that  Christ  paid  taxes  to  the 
Roman  government  at  a  time  when  it  was  engaged  in  war, 
and  when,  therefore,  the  money  that  he  paid  would  be  em- 
ployed in  its  prosecution.  This  we  shall  readily  grant ;  but 
it  appears  to  be  forgotten  by  our  opponents,  that  if  this  proves 
war  to  be  lawful,  they  are  proving  too  much.  These  taxes 
were  thrown  into  the  exchequer  of  the  state,  and  a  part  of 
the  money  was  applied  to  purposes  of  a  most  iniquitous  and 
shocking  nature — sometimes,  probably,  to  the  gratification  of 
the  emperor's  personal  vices,  and  to  his  gladiatorial  exhibi- 
tions, (fee,  and  certainly  to  the  support  of  a  miserable  idol- 
atry. If,  therefore,  the  payment  of  taxes  to  such  a  govern- 
ment proves  an  approbation  of  war,  it  proves  an  approbation 
of  many  other  enormities.  Moreover,  the  argument  goes  too 
far  in  relation  even  to  war;  for  it  must  necessarily  make 
Christ  approve  of  all  the  Roman  wars,  without  distinction 
of  their  justice  or  injustice — of  the  most  ambitious,  the  most 
atrocious,  and  the  most  aggressive — and  these,  even  our  objec- 
tors will  not  defend.  The  payment  of  tribute  by  our  Lord, 
was  accordant  with  his  usual  system  of  avoiding  to  interfere 
in  the  civil  or  political  institutions  of  the  world. 

"  He  that  hath  no  sword,  let  him  sell  his  garment  and  buy 
one."*     This  is  another  passage  that  is  brought  against  us 

*  Luke  xxii.  36.  Upon  the  interpretation  of  this  passage  of  Scripture, 
I  would  iubjoin  th*  sentiments  of  two  or  thr««  authors.     Bishop  P«arc» 


644  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [esSAY  III. 

*^  For  what  purpose,"  it  is  asked,  "  were  they  to  buy  swords, 
if  swords  might  not  be  used  ?"  It  may  be  doubted  Whether, 
with  some  of  those  who  advance  this  objection,  it  is  not  an 
objection  of  words  rather  than  of  opinion.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  they  themselves  think  there  is  any  weight  in  it.  To 
those,  however,  who  may  be  influenced  by  it,  I  would  observe 
that,  as  it  appears  to  me,  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  objection 
may  be  found  in  the  immediate  context :  "  Lord,  behold  here 
are  two  swords,"  said  they,  and  he  immediately  answered,  "  It 
is  enough."  How  could  two  be  enough  when  eleven  were  to 
be  supplied  with  them  ?  That  swords  in  the  sense,  and  for 
the  purpose,  of  military  weapons,  were  even  intended  in  this 
passage,  there  appears  much  reason  for  doubting.  This  rea- 
son will  be  discovered  by  examining  and  connecting  such 
expressions  as  these  :  "  The  Son  of  Man  is  not  come  to  de- 
stroy men's  lives,  but  to  save  them,"  said  our  Lord.  Yet,  on 
another  occasion,  he  says,  "  I  came  not  to  send  peace  on 
earth,  but  a  sword."  How  are  we  to  explain  the  meaning  of 
the  latter  declaration  ?  Obviously,  by  understanding  "  sword" 
to  mean  something  far  other  than  steel.  There  appears  little 
reason  for  supposing  that  physical  weapons  were  intended  in 
the  instruction  of  Christ.  I  believe  they  were  not  intended, 
partly  because  no  one  can  imagine  his  apostles  were  in  the 
habit  of  using  such  arms,  partly  because  they  declared  that 
the  weapons  of  their  warfare  were  not  carnal,  and  partly  be- 
cause the  word  "  sword"  is  often  used  to  imply  "  dissension," 
or  the  religious  warfare  of  the  Christian.  Such  an  use  of 
language  is  found  in  the  last  quotation ;  and  it  is  found  also 
in  such  expressions  as  these  :  shield  of  faith," — "  helmet  of 
salvation," — "  sword  of  the  spirit," — "  I  have  fought  the  good 
fight  of  faith." 

But  it  will  be  said  that  the  apostles  did  provide  themselves 
with  swords,  for  that  on  the  same  evening  they  asked,  "  Shall 
we  smite  with  the  sword  ?"  This  is  true,  and  it  may  proba- 
bly be  true  also,  that  some  of  them  provided  themselves  with 
swords  in  consequence  of  the  injunction  of  their  Master.     But 

says,  '•  It  is  plain  that  Jesus  never  intended  to  make  any  resistance,  or 
suffer  a  sword  to  be  used  on  this  occcasion."  And  Campbell  says,  "  We 
are  sure  that  he  did  not  intend  to  be  understood  literally,  but  as  speaking 
of  the  weapons  of  their  spiritual  warfare."  And  Beza :  "  This  whole 
speech  is  allegorical.  My  fellow  soldiers,  you  have  hitherto  lived  in 
peace,  but  now  a  dreadful  war  is  at  hand ;  so  that  omitting  all  other 
things,  you  must  think  only  of  arms.  But  when  he  prayed  in  the  gar- 
den, and  reproved  Peter  for  smiting  witli  the  sword,  he  himself  showed 
what  these  arms  were." — See  Peace  and  War,  an  Essay.  Hatchard, 
1834 


CHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  545 

what  then  ?  It  appears  to  me  that  the  apost.es  acted  on  this 
occasion  upon  the  principles  on  which  they  had  wished  to  act 
on  another,  when  they  asked,  "  Wilt  thou  that  we  command 
fire  to  come  down  from  heaven,  and  consume  them  ?"  And 
that  their  Master's  principles  of  action  were  also  the  same  in 
both — "  Ye  know  not  what  manner  of  spirit  ye  are  of ;  for 
the  Son  of  Man  is  not  come  to  destroy  raen's  lives,  but  to 
save  them."  This  is  the  language  of  Christianity ;  and  I 
would  seriously  invite  him  who  now  justifies  "  destroying 
men's  lives,"  to  consider  what  manner  of  spirit  he  is  of. 

I  think  then,  that  no  argument  arising  from  the  instruction 
to  buy  swords  can  be  maintained.  This,  at  least,  we  know, 
that  when  the  apostles  were  completely  commissioned,  they 
neither  used  nor  possessed  them.  An  extraordinary  imagina- 
tion he  must  have,  who  conceives  of  an  apostle,  preaching 
peace  and  reconciliation,  crying  "  forgive  injuries," — ■"  love 
your  enemies," — "  render  not  evil  for  evil ;"  and  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  discourse,  if  he  chanced  to  meet  violence  or 
insult,  promptly  drawing  his  sword  and  maiming  or  murdering 
the  offender.  We  insist  upon  this  consideration.  If  swords 
were  to  be  worn,  swords  were  to  be  used  ;  and  there  is  no 
rational  way  in  which  they  could  have  been  used,  but  some 
such  as  that  which  we  have  been  supposing.  If,  therefore, 
the  words,  "  He  that  hath  no  sword,  let  him  sell  his  garment 
and  buy  one,"  do  not  mean  to  authorize  such  an  use  of  the 
sword,  they  do  not  mean  to  authorize  its  use  at  all :  and  those 
who  adduce  the  passage,  must  allow  its  application  in  such 
a  sense,  or  they  must  exclude  it  from  any  application  to  their 
purpose. 

It  has  been  said,  again  that  when  soldiers  came  to  John 
the  Baptist  to  enquire  of  him  what  they  should  do,  he  did 
not  direct  them  to  leave  the  service,  but  to  be  content  with 
their  wages.  This,  also,  is  at  best  but  a  negative  evidence. 
It  does  not  prove  that  the  military  profession  was  wrong,  and 
it  certainly  does  not  prove  that  it  was  right.  But  in  truth,  if 
it  asserted  the  latter.  Christians  have,  as  I  conceive,  nothing 
to  do  with  it :  for  I  think  that  we  need  not  enquire  what  John 
allowed,  or  what  he  forbade.  He,  confessedly,  belonged  ta 
that  system  which  required  "  an  eye  for  an  eye,  and  a  tooth 
for  a  tooth ;"  and  the  observations  which  we  shall  by  and  by 
make  on  the  authority  of  the  law  of  Moses,  apply,  therefore, 
to  that  of  John  the  Baptist.  Although  it  could  be  proved 
(which  it  cannot  be)  that  he  allowed  wars,  he  acted  not  in- 
consistently with  his  own  dispensation ;  and  with  that  dis- 
pensation we  have  no  business.     Yet,  if  any  one  still  insists 

46* 


546  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III. 

upon  tlie  authority  of  John,  I  would  refer  him  for  an  answer 
to  Jesus  Clirist  himself.  What  authority  He  attached  to  John 
Oil  questions  relating  to  His  own  dispensation,  may  be  learnt 
from  this — "  The  least  in  the  kingdom  of  heaven  is  greater 
than  he." 

It  is  perhaps  no  trifling  indication  of  the  difficulty  which 
writers  have  Ibund  in  discovering  in  the  Christian  Scriptures 
arguments  in  support  of  war,  that  they  have  had  recourse  to 
such  equivocal  and  far-fetched  arguments.  Grotius  adduces 
a  passage  which  he  says  is  "  a  leading  point  of  evidence,  to 
show  that  the  right  of  war  is  not  taken  away  by  the  law 
of  the  gospel."  And  what  is  this  leading  evidence  1  That 
Paul,  in  writing  to  Timothy,  exhorts  that  prayer  should 
be  made  "  for  kings  !"  * — Another  evidence  which  this  great 
man  adduces  is,  that  Paul  suffered  himself  to  be  protected  on 
his  journey  by  a  guard  of  soldiers,  without  hinting  any  disap- 
probation of  repelling  force  by  force.  But  how  does  Grotius 
know  that  Paul  did  not  hint  this  ?  And  who  can  imagine  that 
to  suffer  himself  to  be  guarded  by  a  military  escort,  in 
the  appointment  of  which  he  had  no  control,  was  to  approve 
war? 

But  perhaps  the  real  absence  of  sound  Christian  arguments 
in  favour  of  war,  is  in  no  circumstance  so  remarkably  intima- 
ted as  in  the  citations  of  Milton  in  his  Christian  Doctrine. 
"  With  regard  to  the  duties  of  war,"  he  quotes  or  refers 
to  thirty-nine  passages  of  Scripture — thirty-eight  of  which  are 
from  the  Hebrew  Scriptures  :  and  what  is  the  individual  one 
from  the  Christian  ?— "  What  king  going  to  war  with  another 
king !"  &c.  t 

Such  are  the  arguments  which  are  adduced  from  the  Chris- 
tian Scriptures  by  the  advocates  of  war.  In  these  five  passa- 
ges, the  principal  of  the  New  Testament  evidences  in  its  fa- 
vour, unquestionably  consist :  they  are  the  passages  which 
men  of  acute  minds,  studiously  seeking  for  evidence,  have  se- 
lected. And  what  are  they  ?  Their  evidence  is  in  the  ma- 
jority of  instances  negative  at  best.  A  "  not"  intervenes. 
The  centurion  was  not  found  fault  with :  Cornelius  was  not 
told  to  leave  the  profession :  John  did  not  tell  the  soldiers  to 
abandon  the  army :  Paul  did  not  refuse  a  military  guard.  I 
cannot  forbear  to  solicit  the  reader  to  compare  these  ob- 
jections with  the  pacific  evidence  of  the  gospel  which  has 
been  laid  before  him ;  I  would  rather  say,  to  compare  it  with 
the  gospel  itself;  for  the  sum,  the  tendency,  of  the  whole  reve 
lation  is  in  our  favour. 

*  See  Rights  of  War  and  Peace.  t  Luke  xiv.  31. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  547 

In  an  enquiry  whether  Christianity  allows  of  war,  there  is 
a  subject  that  always  appears  to  me  to  be  of  peculiar  im- 
portance— the  prophecies  of  the  Old  Testament  respecting 
the  arrival  of  a  period  of  universal  peace.  The  belief  is  per- 
haps general  amongst  Christians,  that  a  time  will  come  when 
vice  shall  be  eradicated  from  the  world,  when  the  violent 
passions  of  mankind  shall  be  repressed,  and  when  the  pure 
benignity  of  Christianity  shall  be  universally  diffused.  That 
such  a  period  will  come  we  indeed  know  assuredly,  for  God 
has  promised  it. 

Of  the  many  prophecies  of  the  Old  Testament  respecting 
this  period,  we  refer  only  to  a  few  from  the  writings  of  Isaiah. 
In  his  predictions  respecting  the  "  last  times,"  by  which  it  is 
not  disput-ed  that  he  referred  to  the  prevalence  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion,  the  prophet  says — "  They  shall  beat  their 
swords  into  ploughshares,  and  their  spears  into  pruning  hooks  : 
nation  shall  not  lift  up  sword  against  nation,  neither  shall 
they  learn  war  any  more."  *  Again,  referring  lo  the  same  pe- 
riod, he  says — "They  shall  not  hurt  or  destroy  in  all  my  holy 
mountain :  for  the  earth  shall  be  full  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
Lord,  as  the  waters  cover  the  sea."  f  And  again,  respecting 
the  same  era — "  Violence  shall  no  more  be  heard  in  thy  land, 
wasting  nor  destruction  within  thy  borders."  | 

Two  things  are  to  be  observed  in  relation  to  these  prophe- 
cies ;  1st,  that  it  is  the  will  of  God  that  war  should  eventu- 
ally be  abolished.  This  consideration  is  of  importance  ;  for 
if  war  be  not  accordant  with  His  will,  war  cannot  be  accord- 
ant with  Christianity,  which  is  the  revelation  of  His  will. 
Our  business,  however,  is  principally  with  the  second  consid- 
eration— that  Christianity  will  he  the  means  of  introducing 
this  period  of  Peace.  From  those  who  say  that  our  religion 
sanctions  war,  an  answer  must  be  expected  to  questions  such 
as  these  : — By  what  instrumentality  and  by  the  diffusion  of 
v/hat  principles,  will  the  prophecies  of  Isaiah  be  fulfilled  ? 
Are  we  to  expect  some  new  system  of  religion,  by  which  the 
imperfections  of  Christianity  shall  be  removed  and  its  de- 
ficiencies supplied  ?  Are  we  to  believe  that  God  sent  his  only 
Son  into  the  world  to  institute  a  religion  such  as  this,  a  religion 
that,  in  a  few  centuries,  would  require  to  be  altered  and  amend- 
ed 1  If  Christianity  allows  of  war,  they  must  tell  us  what  it  is 
that  is  to  extirpate  war.  If  she  allows  "  violence,  and  wasting, 
and  destruction,"  they  must  tell  us  what  are  the  principles  that 
.^ro  to  produce  gentleness,  and  benevolence,  and  forbearance. 
—I  know  not  what  answer  such  enquiries  will  receive  from 
*  Isa.  ii.  4.  t  Id.  xi.  9.  X  Id.  Ix.  18. 


548  LAWFULNESS    OF    W^AR.  [eSSAY  III. 

the  advocate  of  war,  but  I  know  that  Isaiah  says  the  change 
will  be  effected  by  Christianity :  and  if  any  one  still  chooses 
to  expect  another  and  a  purer  system,  an  apostle  may, 
perhaps,  repress  his  hopes  ; — "  Though  we  or  an  angel  from 
heaven,"  says  Paul,  "  preach  any  other  gospel  unto  you,  than 
that  which  we  have  preached  unto  you,  let  him  be  accursed."* 

Whatever  the  principles  of  Christianity  will  require  here- 
after, they  require  now.  Christianity,  with  its  present  princi- 
ples and  obligations,  is  to  produce  universal  peace.  It  be- 
comes, therefore,  an  absurdity,  a  simple  contradiction,  to 
maintain  that  the  principles  of  Christianity  allow  of  war,  when 
they,  and  they  only,  are  to  eradicate  it.  If  we  have  no  other 
guarantee  of  Peace  than  the  existence  of  our  religion,  and  no 
other  hope  of  Peace  than  in  its  diffusion,  how  can  that  reli- 
gion sanction  war  ? 

The  case  is  clear.  A  more  perfect  obedience  to  that  same 
gospel,  which,  we  are  told,  sanctions  slaughter,  will  be 
the  means,  and  the  only  means,  of  exterminating  slaughter 
from  the  world.  It  is  not  from  an  alteration  of  Christianity, 
but  from  an  assimilation  of  Christians  to  its  nature  that 
we  are  to  hope.  It  is  because  we  violate  the  principles 
of  our  religion,  because  we  are  not  what  they  require  us  to  be, 
that  wars  are  continued.  If  we  will  not  be  peaceable,  let  us 
then,  at  least,  be  honest,  and  acknowledge  that  we  continue 
to  slaughter  one  another,  not  because  Christianity  permits  it, 
but  because  we  reject  her  laws. 

The  opinions  of  the  earliest  professors  of  Christianity  upon 
the  lawfulness  of  war  are  of  importance,  because  they  who 
lived  nearest  to  the  time  of  its  Founder  were  the  most  likely 
to  be  informed  of  his  intentions  and  his  will,  and  to  practise 
them  without  those  adulterations  which  we  know  have  been 
introduced  by  the  lapse  of  ages. 

During  a  considerable  period  after  the  death  of  Christ,  it  is 
certain,  then,  that  his  followers  believed  he  had  forbidden  war, 
and  that,  in  consequence  of  this  belief,  many  of  them  re- 
fused to  engage  in  it  whatever  were  the  consequence,  whether 
reproach,  or  imprisonment,  or  death.  These  facts  are  indis- 
putable. "  It  is  as  easy,"  says  a  learned  writer  of  the  sev- 
enteenth century,  "  to  obscure  the  sun  at  mid-day,  as  to  deny 
that  the  primitive  Christians  renounced  all  revenge  and  war." 
Christ  and  his  apostles  delivered  general  precepts  for  the  regu- 
lation of  our  conduct.  It  was  necessary  for  their  successors 
to  apply  them  to  their  practice  in  life.  And  to  what  did  they 
apply  the  pacific  precepts  wiiich  had  been  delivered  1  They 
*  Gal.  i.  8. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  549 

applied  them  to  war ;  they  were  assured  that  the  precep  s  ab- 
solutely forbade  it.  This  belief  they  derived  from  those  very 
precepts  on  which  we  have  insisted ;  they  referred  expressly, 
to  the  same  passages  in  the  New  Testament,  and  from  the  au- 
thority and  obligation  of  those  passages,  they  refuse  to  bear  arms. 
A  few  examples  from  their  history  will  show  with  what  un- 
doubting  confidence  they  believed  in  the  unlawfulness  of  war, 
and  how  much  they  were  willing  to  suffer  in  the  cause  of  Peace. 

Maximilian,  as  it  is  related  in  the  Acts  of  Ruinart,  was 
brought  before  the  tribunal  to  be  enrolled  as  a  soldier.  On  the 
proconsul's  asking  his  name,  Maximilian  replied,  "I  am  a 
Christian,  and  cannot  fight."  It  was,  however,  ordered  that 
he  should  be  enrolled,  but  he  refused  to  serve,  still  alleging 
that  he  was  a  Christian.  He  was  immediately  told  that 
there  was  no  alternative  between  bearing  arms  and  being  put 
to  death.  But  his  fidelity  was  not  to  be  shaken  : — "  I  cannot 
fight,"  said  he,  "  if  I  die."  He  continued  steadfast  to  his 
principles,  and  was  consigned  to  the  executioner. 

The  primitive  Christians  not  only  refused  to  be  enlisted  in 
the  army,  but  when  they  embraced  Christianity,  whilst  al- 
ready enlisted,  they  abandoned  the  profession  at  whatever 
cost.  Marcellus  was  a  centurion  in  the  legion  called  Tra- 
lana.  Whilst  holding  this  commission,  he  became  a  Chris- 
tian ;  and  believing  in  common  with  his  fellow-Christians, 
that  war  was  no  longer  permitted  to  him,  he  threw  down  his 
beJt  at  the  head  of  the  legion,  declaring,  that  he  had  become 
a  Christian,  and  that  he  would  serve  no  longer.  He  was 
committed  to  prison  ;  but  he  was  still  faithful  to  Christianity. 
"  It  is  not  lawful,"  said  he,  "  for  a  Christian  to  bear  arms  for 
any  earthly  consideration  ;"  and  he  was,  in  consequence,  put 
to  death.  Almost  immediately  afterwards,  Cassian,  who  was 
notary  to  the  same  legion,  gave  up  his  office.  He  steadfastly 
maintained  the  sentiments  of  Marcellus  ;  and,  like  him  was 
consigned  to  the  executioner.  Martin,  of  whom  so  much 
is  said  by  Sulpicius  Severus,  was  bred  to  the  profession 
of  arms,  which,  on  his  acceptance  of  Christianity,  he  aban- 
doned. To  Julian  the  Apostate,  the  only  reason  that  we  find 
he  gave  for  his  conduct  was  this  : — "  I  am  a  Christian,  and 
therefore  I  cannot  fight." 

These  were  not  the  sentiments,  and  this  was  not  the 
conduct,  of  insulated  individuals  who  might  be  actuated  by 
individual  opinion,  or  by  their  private  interpretations  of  the 
duties  of  Christianity.  Their  principles  were  the  principles 
of  the  body.  They  were  recognized  and  defended  by  the 
Christian  writers,  their  contemporaries.    Justin  Martyr  and 


550  LAWFULNESS    OP    WAR.  [essAY  III. 

Tatian  talk  of  soldiers  and  Christians  as  distinct  characters ; 
and  Tatian  says  that  the  Christians  declined  even  military 
commands.  Clemens  of  Alexandria  calls  his  Christian  con- 
temporaries the  "  Followers  of  Peace,"  and  expressly  tells  us 
"  that  the  followers  of  peace  used  none  of  the  implements  of 
war."  Lactantius,  another  early  Christian,  says  expressly, 
"  It  can  never  be  lawful  for  a  righteous  man  to  go  to 
war."  About  the  end  of  the  second  century,  Celsus,  one 
of  the  opponents  of  Christianity,  charged  the  Christians  with 
refusing  to  hear  arms  even  in  case  of  necessity.  Origen, 
the  defender  of  the  Christians,  does  not  think  of  denying  the 
fact;  he  admits  the  refusal,  and  justifies  it,  because  war  was 
unlawful.  Even  after  Christianity  had  spread  over  almost 
the  whole  of  the  known  world,  Tertullian,  in  speaking  of 
a  part  of  the  Roman  armies,  including  more  than  one-third  of 
the  standing  legions  of  Rome,  distinctly  informs  us  that  "  not 
a  Christian  could  be  found  amongst  them." 

All  this  is  explicit.  The  evidence  of  the  following  facts  is, 
however,  yet  more  determinate  and  satisfactory.  Some  of 
the  arguments  which,  at  the  present  day,  are  brought  against 
the  advocates  of  peace,  were  then  urged  against  these  early 
Christians  ;  and  these  arguments  they  examined  and  repelled. 
This  indicates  investigation  and  enquiry,  and  manifests  that 
their  belief  of  the  unlawfulness  of  war  was  not  a  vague  opin- 
ion, hastily  admitted  and  loosely  floating  amongst  them,  but 
that  it  was  the  result  of  deliberate  examination,  and  a  conse- 
quent firm  conviction  that  Christ  had  forbidden  it.  The  very 
same  arguments  which  are  brought  in  defence  of  war  at  the 
present  day,  were  brought  against  the  Christians  sixteen 
hundred  years  ago ;  and,  sixteen  hundred  years  ago,  they 
were  repelled  by  these  faithful  contenders  for  the  purity 
of  our  religion.  It  is  remarkable,  too,  that  Tertullian  appeals 
to  the  precepts  from  the  Mount,  in  proof  of  those  principles 
on  which  this  chapter  has  been  insisting  : — that  the  disposi- 
tions which  the  precepts  inculcate  are  not  compatible  with  war, 
and  that  war,  therefore,  is  irreconcilable  with  Christianity. 

If  it  be  possible,  a  still  stronger  evidence  of  the  primitive 
belief,  is  contained  in  the  circumstance,  that  some  of  the 
Christian  authors  declared  that  the  refusal  of  the  Christians  to 
bear  arms,  was  a  fulfilment  of  ancient  prophecy.  The  pe- 
culiar strength  of  this  evidence  consists  in  this — that  the  fact 
of  a  refusal  to  bear  arms  is  assumed  as  notorious  and  unques- 
tioned. Irenaeus,  who  lived  about  the  year  180,  affirms  that 
the  prophecy  of  Isaiah,  which  declared  that  men  should  turn 
their  swords  into  plough-shares  and  their  spears  into  pruning- 


CHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAK.  591 

hooks,  had  been  fuljilled  in  his  time ;  "  for  the  Christians," 
says  he,  "  have  changed  their  swords  and  their  lances  into  in- 
struments of  peace,  and  they  know  not  how  to  fights — Jus- 
tin Martyr,  his  contemporary,  writes — "  That  the  prophecy  is 
fulfilled  you  have  good  reason  to  believe,  for  we,  who  in  times 
past  killed  one  another,  do  not  now  fight  loith  our  enemies^ 
Tertullian,  who  lived  later,  says,  "  You  must  confess  that  the 
prophecy  has  been  accomplished,  as  far  as  the  "practice  of 
every  individual  is  concerned,  to  whom  it  is  applicable." 

It  has  been  sometimes  said,  that  the  motive  which  influenced 
the  early  Christians  to  refuse  to  engage  in  war,  consisted  in 
the  idolatry  which  was  connected  with  the  Roman  armies. — 
One  motive  this  idolatry  unquestionably  afforded ;  but  it  is  ob- 
fious,  from  the  quotations  which  we  have  given,  that  their 
belief  of  the  unlawfulness  of  fighting,  independent  of  any 
question  of  idolatry,  was  an  insuperable  objection  to  engaging 
in  war.  Their  words  are  explicit :  "  I  cannot  fight,  if  I 
die." — "I  am  a  Christian,  and  therefore  I  cannot /_§-^^." — ■ 
"  Christ,"  says  Tertullian,  "  by  disarming  Peter,  disarmed 
every  soldier  ;"  and  Peter  was  not  about  to  fight  in  the  armies 
of  idolatry.  So  entire  was  their  conviction  of  the  incompati- 
bility of  war  with  our  religion,  that  they  would  not  even  be 
present  at  the  gladiatorial  fights,  "lest,"  says  Theophilus,  "we 
should  become  partakers  of  the  murders  committed  there." 
Can  any  one  believe  that  they,  who  would  not  even  witness  a 
battle  between  two  men,  would  themselves  fight  in  a  battle 
between  armies  ?  And  the  destruction  of  a  gladiator,  it  should 
be  remembered,  was  authorized  by  the  state,  as  much  as  the 
destruction  of  enemies  in  war. 

It  is  therefore  indisputable,  that  the  Christians  who  lived 
nearest  to  the  time  of  our  Saviour,  believed,  with  undoubting 
confidence,  that  he  had  unequivocally  forbidden  war  ; — that 
they  openly  avowed  this  belief;  and  that,  in  support  of  it, 
they  were  willing  to  sacrifice,  and  did  sacrifice,  their  fortunes 
and  their  lives. 

Christians,  however,  afterwards  became  soldiers :  and 
when  ? — When  their  general  fidelity  to  Christianity  became 
relaxed  ; — when,  in  other  respects,  they  violated  its  principles ; 
— when  they  had  begun  "  to  dissemble"  and  "  to  falsify  their 
word,"  and  "  to  cheat ;" — when  "  Christian  casuists"  had  per- 
suaded them  that  they  might  "  sit  at  meat  in  the  idoVs  temple  •'* 
— when  Christians  accepted  even  the  priesthoods  of  idolatry. 
In  a  word,  they  became  soldiers  when  they  had  ceased  to  be 
Christians. 

The  departure  from  the  original  faithfulness,  was,  however, 


552  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III. 

not  suddenly  general.  Like  every  other  corruption,  war  ob- 
tained by  degrees.  During  the  first  two  hundred  years,  not 
a  Christian  soldier  is  upon  record.  In  the  third  century,  when 
Christianity  became  partially  corrupted.  Christian  soldiers 
were  common.  The  number  increased  with  the  increase  of 
ihe  general  profligacy ;  until  at  last,  in  the  fourth  century, 
Christians  became  soldiers  without  hesitation,  and  perhaps 
without  remorse.  Here  and  there,  however,  an  ancient  father 
still  lifted  up  his  voice  for  Peace  ;  but  these,  one  after  another, 
dropping  from  the  world,  the  tenet  that  War  is  unlav.fuly 
ceased  at  length  to  be  a  tenet  of  the  church. 

Let  it  always  be  borne  in  mind,  by  those  who  are  advoca- 
ting war,  that  they  are  contending  for  a  corruption  which  their 
forefathers  abhorred ;  and  that  they  are  making  Jesus  Christ 
the  sanctioner  of  crimes,  which  his  purest  followers  offered 
up  their  lives  because  they  would  not  commit. 

An  argument  has  sometimes  been  advanced  in  favour  of 
war,  from  the  divine  communications  to  the  Jews  under  the 
administration  of  Moses.  It  has  been  said,  that  as  wars  were 
allowed  and  enjoined  to  that  people,  they  cannot  be  inconsis- 
tent with  the  will  of  God. 

The  reader,  who  has  perused  the  First  Essay  of  this  work, 
will  be  aware  that  to  the  present  argument  our  answer  is 
short : — If  Christianity  prohibits  war,  there  is,  to  Christians, 
an  end  of  the  controversy.  War  cannot  then  be  justified 
by  the  referring  to  any  antecedent  dispensation.  One  brief 
observation  may,  however,  be  offered,  that  those  who  refer,  in 
justification  of  our  present  practice,  to  the  authority  by  which 
the  Jews  prosecuted  their  wars,  must  be  expected  to  produce 
the  same  authority  for  our  own.  Wars  were  commanded  to 
the  Jews,  but  are  they  commanded  to  us  ?  War,  in  the  ab- 
stract, was  never  commanded  :  and  surely  those  specific  wars 
which  were  enjoined  upon  the  Jews  for  an  express  purpose, 
are  neither  authority  nor  example  for  us,  who  have  received 
no  such  injunction,  and  can  plead  no  such  purpose. 

It  will,  perhaps,  be  said,  that  the  commands  to  prosecute 
wars,  even  to  extermination,  are  so  positive,  and  so  often  re- 
peated, that  it  is  not  probable,  if  they  were  inconsistent  with 
the  will  of  heaven,  that  they  would  have  been  thus  peremp- 
torily enjoined.  We  answer,  that  they  were  not  inconsistent 
with  the  will  of  heaven  then.  But  even  then,  the  prophets 
foresaw  that  they  were  not  accordant  with  the  xmiversal  will 
of  God,  since  they  predicted,  that  when  that  Will  should  be 
fulfilled,  war  should  be  eradicated  from  the  world.  And  by 
what  dispensation  was  this  Will  to  be  fulfilled  ?     By  that  of 


CHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  553 

the  "  Rod  out  of  the  stem  of  Jesse."  It  is  worthy  of  recollec- 
tion, too,  that  David  was  forbidden  to  build  the  temple  because 
he  had  shed  blood.  "  As  for  me  it  was  in  my  mind  to  build 
an  house  unto  the  name  of  the  Lord  my  God :  but  the  word 
of  the  Lord  came  to  me,  saying,  Thou  hast  shed  blood  abund- 
antly, and  hast  made  great  wars ;  thou  shalt  not  build  an  house 
unto  my  name,  because  thou  hast  shed  much  blood  upon  the 
earth  in  my  sight."*  So  little  accordancy  did  war  possess 
with  the  purer  offices  even   of  the  Jewish  Dispensation. 

Perhaps  the  argument  to  which  the  greatest  importance  is 
attached  by  the  advocates  of  war,  and  by  which  thinking  men 
are  chiefly  induced  to  acquiesce  in  its  lawfulness  is  this — 
That  a  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  rules  which  apply  to 
us  as  individuals,  and  rules  which  apply  to  us  as  subjects  of  the 
state  ;  and  that  the  pacijic  injunctions  of  Christ  from  the  Mounts 
and  all  the  other  kindred  commands  and  prohibitions  of  the  Chris- 
tian Scriptures,  have  no  reference  to  our  conduct  as  members 
cf  the  political  body. 

If  there  be  soundness  in  the  doctrines  which  have  been  de- 
livered at  the  commencement  of  the  Essay  upon  the  "  Ele- 
ments of  Political  Rectitude,"  this  argument  possesses  no 
force  or  application. 

When  persons  make  such  broad  distinctions  between  the 
obligations  of  Christianity  on  private  and  on  public  affairs, 
the  proof  of  the  rectitude  of  the  distinction  must  be  expected 
of  those  who  make  it.  General  rules  are  laid  down  by  Chris- 
tianity, of  which,  in  some  cases,  the  advocate  of  war  denies 
the  applicability.  He,  therefore,  is  to  produce  the  reason  and 
the  authority  for  the  exception.  And  that  authority  must  be 
a  competent  authority — the  authority  mediately  or  immediately 
of  God.  It  is  to  no  purpose  for  such  a  person  to  tell  us  of 
the  magnitude  of  political  affairs — of  the  greatness  of  the  in- 
terests which  they  involve — of  "  necessity,"  or  of  expediency. 
All  these  are  very  proper  considerations  in  subordination  to 
the  Moral  Law ; — otherwise  they  are  wholly  nugatory  and 
irrelevant.  Let  the  reader  observe  the  manner  in  which  the 
argument  is  supported. — If  an  individual  suffers  aggression, 
there  is  a  power  to  which  he  can  apply  that  is  above  himself 
and  above  the  aggressor ;  a  power  by  which  the  bad  passions 
of  those  around  him  are  restrained,  or  by  which  their  aggres- 
sions are  punished.  But  amongst  nations  there  is  no  acknow- 
ledged superior  or  common  arbitrator.  Even  if  there  were, 
there  is  no  way  in  which  its  decisions  could  be  enforced,  but 
by  the  sword.  War,  therefore,  is  the  only  means  which  on© 
*  1  Chron.  xxii.  7,  8. 
il 


554  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  HI 

nation  possesses  of  protecting  itself  from  tlie  aggression  of 
another.  The  reader  will  observe  the  fundamental  fallacy 
upon  which  the  argument  proceeds. — It  assumes,  ttiat  the  rea- 
son why  an  individual  is  not  permitted  to  use  violence  is,  that 
the  laws  will  use  it  for  him.  Here  is  the  error  ;  for  the  fouiv- 
dation  of  the  duty  of  forbearance  in  private  life,  is  not  that  the 
laws  will  punish  aggression,  but  that  Christianity  requires  for- 
bearance. 

Undoubtedly,  if  "the  existence  of  a  common  arbitrator  were 
the  foundation  of  the  duty,  the  duty  would  not  be  binding  upon 
nations.  But  that  which  we  require  to  be  proved  is  this — 
that  Christianity  exonerates  nations  from  those  duties  which 
she  has  imposed  upon  individuals.  This,  the  present  argu- 
ment does  not  prove :  and,  in  truth,  with  a  singular  unhappi- 
ness  in  its  application,  it  assumes,  in  effect,  that  she  has  im- 
posed these  duties  upon  neither  the  one  nor  the  other. 

If  it  be  said,  that  Christianity  allows  to  individuals  some 
degree  and  kind  of  resistance,  and  that  some  resistance  is 
therefore  lawful  to  states,  we  do  not  deny  it.  But  if  it  be  said, 
that  the  degree  of  lawful  resistance  extends  to  the  slaughter 
of  our  fellow  Christians — that  it  extends  to  war — ^we  do  deny 
it :  we  say  that  the  rules  of  Christianity  cannot,  by  any  possible 
latitude  of  interpretation,  be  made  to  extend  to  it.  The  duty 
of  forbearance,  then,  is  antecedent  to  all  considerations  respect- 
ing the  condition  of  man  ;  and  whether  he  be  under  the  pro- 
tection of  laws  or  not,  the  duty  of  forbearance  is  imposed. 

The  only  truth  which  appears  to  be  elicited  by  the  present 
argument  is,  that  the  difficulty  of  obeying  the  forbearing  rules 
of  Christianity  is  greater  in  the  case  of  nations  than  in  the 
case  of  individuals  :  The  obligation  to  obey  them  is  the  same 
in  both.  Nor  let  any  one  urge  the  difficulty  of  obedience  in 
opposition  to  the  duty;  for  he  who  does  this,  has  yet  to  learn 
one  of  the  most  awful  rules  of  his  religion — a  rule  that  was 
enforced  by  the  precepts,  and  more  especially  by  the  final  ex- 
ample, of  Christ,  of  apostles  and  of  martyrs — the  rule  which 
requires  that  we  should  be  "  obedient  even  unto  death." 

Let  it  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  we  believe  the  diffi- 
culty of  forbearance  would  be  great  in  practice  as  it  is  great 
in  theory.  Our  interests  are  commonly  promoted  by  the  ful- 
filment of  our  duties  ;  and  we  hope  hereafter  to  show,  that  the 
fulfilment  of  the  duty  of  forbearance  forms  no  exception  to  the 
applicability  of  the  rule. 

The  intelligent  reader  will  have  perceived  that  the  "  War" 
of  which  we  speak  is  all  war,  without  reference  to  its  objects, 
whether  offensive  or  defensive.     In  truth,  respecting  any  other 


CHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  555 

than  defensive  war,  it  is  scarcely  worth  while  to  entertain  a 
question,  since  no  one  with  whom  we  are  concerned  to  reason 
will  advocate  its  opposite.  Some  persons  indeed  talk  with 
much  complacency  of  their  reprobation  of  offensive  war.  Yet 
to  reprobate  no  more  than  this,  is  only  to  condemn  that  which 
wickedness  itself  is  not  wont  to  justify.  Even  those  who 
practise  offensive  war,  affect  to  veil  its  nature  by  calling  it  by 
another  name. 

In  conformity  with  this,  we  find  that  it  is  to  defence  that  the 
peaceable  precepts  of  Christianity  are  directed.  Offence  ap- 
pears not  to  have  even  suggested  itself.  It  is,  "  Resist  not 
evil:^'  it  is,  "  Overcome  evil  with  good :"  it  is,  "  Do  good  to 
them  that  hate  you  :"  it  is,  "  Love  your  enemies ;"  it  is,  "  Ren- 
der not  evil  for  evil :"  it  is,  "  Unto  him  that  smiteth  thee  on  the 
one  cheek.''^  All  this  supposes  previous  offence,  or  injury,  or 
violence  ;  and  it  is  then  that  forbearance  is  enjoined. 

It  is  common  with  those  who  justify  defensive  war,  to  iden- 
tify the  question  with  that  of  individual  self-defence ;  and  al- 
though the  questions  are  in  practice  sufficiently  dissimilar,  it 
has  been  seen  that  we  object  not  to  their  being  regarded  as 
identical.  The  Rights  of  Self-Defence  have  already  been 
discussed,  and  the  conclusions  to  which  the  Moral  Law  ap- 
pears to  lead,  afford  no  support  to  the  advocate  of  war. 

We  say  the  questions  are  practically  dissimilar ;  so  that 
if  we  had  a  right  to  kill  a  man  in  self-defence,  very  few  wars 
would  be  shown  to  be  lawful.  Of  the  wars  which  are  prose- 
cuted, some  are  simply  wars  of  aggression ;  some  are  for  the 
maintenance  of  a  balance  of  power ;  some  are  in  assertion  of 
technical  rights ;  and  some,  undoubtedly,  to  repel  invasion 
The  last  are  perhaps  the  fewest ;  and  of  these  only  it  can  be 
said  that  they  bear  any  analogy  whatever  to  the  case  which 
is  supposed ;  and  even  in  these,  the  analogy  is  seldom  com- 
plete. It  has  rarely  indeed  happened  that  wars  have  been 
undertaken  simply  for  the  preservation  of  life,  and  that  no  other 
alternative  has  remained  to  a  people  than  to  kill,  or  to  be  killed. 
And  let  it  be  remembered,  that  unless  this  alternative  alone  re- 
mains,  the  case  of  individual  self-defence  is  irrelevant :  it  ap- 
plies not,  practically,  to  the  subject. 

But  indeed  you  cannot  in  practice  make  distinctions,  even 
moderately  accurate,  between  defensive  war  and  war  for  other 
purposes. 

Supposing,  the  Christian  Scriptures  had  said.  An  army  may 
fight  in  its  own  defence ^  hut  not  for  any  other  purpose. — Who- 
ever will  attempt  to  apply  this  rule  in  practice,  will  find  that 
he  has  a  very  wide  range  of  justifiable  warfare :  a  range  that 


656  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  [eSSAY  III 

will  embrace  many  more  wars,  than  moralists,  laxer  than  we 
shall  suppose  him  to  be,  are  willing  to  defend.  If  an  army- 
may  fight  in  defence  of  their  own  lives,  they  may,  and  they 
must  fight  in  defence  of  the  lives  of  others  :  if  they  may  fight 
in  the  defence  of  the  lives  of  others,  they  will  fight  in  defence 
of  their  property :  if  in  defence  of  property,  they  will  fight  in 
defence  of  political  rights  :  if  in  defence  of  rights,  they  will  fight 
in  promotion  of  interests  :  if  in  promotion  of  interests,  they 
will  fight  in  promotion  of  their  glory  and  their  crimes.  Now 
let  any  man  of  honesty  look  over  the  gradations  by  which  we 
arrive  at  this  climax,  and  I  believe  he  will  find  that,  in  practice, 
no  curb  can  be  placed  upon  the  conduct  of  an  army  until  they 
reach  that  climax.  There  is,  indeed,  a  wide  distance  between 
fighting  in  defence  of  life,  and  fighting  in  furtherance  of  our 
crimes ;  but  the  steps  which  lead  from  one  to  the  other  will 
follow  in  inevitable  succession.  I  know  that  the  letter  of 
our  rule  excludes  it,  but  I  know  that  the  rule  will  be  a  letter 
only.  It  is  very  easy  for  us  to  sit  in  our  studies,  and  to  point 
the  commas,  and  semicolons,  and  periods  of  the  soldier's  ca- 
reer :  it  is  very  easy  for  us  to  say,  he  shall  stop  at  defence 
of  life,  or  at  protection  of  property,  or  at  the  support  of  rights  ; 
but  armies  will  never  listen  to  us :  we  shall  be  only  the  Xerxes 
of  morality,  throwing  out  idle  chains  into  the  tempestuous 
ocean  of  slaughter. 

What  is  the  testimony  of  experience  ?  When  nations  are 
mutually  exasperated,  and  armies  are  levied,  and  battles  are 
fought,  does  not  every  one  know  that  with  whatever  motives 
of  defence  one  party  may  have  begun  the  contest,  both,  in 
turn,  become  aggressors  ?  In  the  fury  of  slaughter,  soldiers 
do  not  attend,  they  cannot  attend,  to  questions  of  aggression. 
Their  business  is  destruction,  and  their  business  they  will 
perform.  If  the  army  of  defence  obtains  success,  it  soon  be- 
comes an  army  of  aggression.  Having  repelled  the  invader, 
it  begins  to  punish  him.  If  a  war  has  once  begun,  it  is  vain 
to  think  of  distinctions  of  aggression  and  defence.  Moralists 
may  talk  of  distinctions,  but  soldiers  will  make  none ;  and  none 
can  be  made ;  it  is  without  the  limits  of  possibility. 

Indeed,  some  of  the  definitions  of  defensive  or  of  just  war 
which  are  proposed  by  moralists,  indicate  how  impossible  it 
is  to  confine  warfare  within  any  assignable  limits.  "  The 
objects  oijust  war,"  says  Paley,  "  are  precaution,  defence,  or 
reparation." — "  ^YQxy  just  war  supposes  an  injury  perpetrated, 
attempted,  or  feared." 

I  shall  acknowledge,  that  if  these  be  justifying  motives  to 


4 

CHAP.  XIX.]  LAWFULNESS    OF    WAR.  557 

war,  I  see  very  little  purpose  in  talking  of  morality  upon  the 
subject. 

It  is  in  vain  to  expatiate  on  moral  obligations,  if  we  are  at 
liberty  to  declare  war  whenever  an  "  injury  is  feared :" — an 
injury,  without  limit  to  its  insignificance  !  a  fear,  without  stipu- 
lation for  its  reasonableness !  The  judges,  also,  of  the  rea- 
sonableness of  fear,  are  to  be  they  who  are  under  its  influence ; 
and  who  so  likely  to  judge  amiss  as  those  who  are  afraid  ? 
Sounder  philosophy  than  this  has  told  us,  that  "  he  who  has 
to  reason  upon  his  duty  when  the  temptation  to  transgress  it 
is  before  him,  is  almost  sure  to  reason  himself  into  an  error." 

Violence,  and  Rapine,  and  Ambition,  are  not  to  be  restrained 
by  morality  like  this.  It  may  serve  for  the  speculations  of  a 
study ;  but  we  will  venture  to  affirm  that  mankind  will  never 
be  controlled  by  it.  Moral  rules  are  useless,  if,  from  their 
own  nature  they  cannot  be,  or  will  not  be  applied.  Who  be- 
lieves that  if  kings  and  conquerors  may  fight  when  they  have 
fears,  they  will  not  fight  when  they  have  them  not  ?  The 
morality  allows  too  much  latitude  to  the  passions,  to  retain 
any  practical  restraint  upon  them.  And  a  morality  that  will 
not  be  practised,  I  had  almost  said,  that  cannot  be  practised, 
is  an  useless  morality.  It  is  a  theory  of  morals.  We  want 
clearer  and  more  exclusive  rules ;  we  want  more  obvious  and 
immediate  sanctions.  It  were  in  vain  for  a  philosopher  to  say 
to  a  general  who  was  burning  for  glory,  "  You  are  at  liberty 
to  engage  in  the  war  provided  you  have  suffered,  or  fear  you 
will  suff*er  an  ^njury — otherwise  Christianity  prohibits  it."  He 
will  tell  him  of  twenty  injuries  that  have  been  suffered,  of  a 
hundred  that  have  been  attempted,  and  of  a  thousand  that  he 
fears.     And  what  answer  can  the  philosopher  make  to  him  ? 

If  these  are  the  proper  standards  of  just  war,  there  will  be 
little  difficulty  in  proving  any  war  to  be  just,  except,  indeed, 
that  of  simple  aggression ;  and  by  the  rules  of  this  morality, 
the  aggressor  is  difficult  of  discovery,  for  he  whom  we  choose 
to  "  fear,"  may  say  that  he  had  previous  "  fear "  of  us,  and 
that  his  "  fear,"  prompted  the  hostile  symptoms  which  made 
us  "  fear  "  again.  The  truth  is,  that  to  attempt  to  make  any 
distinctions  upon  the  subject  is  vain.  War  must  be  wholly 
forbidden,  or  allowed  without  restriction  to  defence ;  for  no 
definitions  of  lawful  and  unlawful  war,  will  be,  or  can  be,  at- 
tended to.  If  the  principles  of  Christianity,  in  any  case,  or 
for  any  purpose,  allow  armies  to  meet  and  to  slaughter  one 
another,  her  principles  will  never  conduct  us  to  the  period 
wh'ch  prophecy  has  assured  us  they  shall  produce.     Ther* 

47* 


558  PROBABLE  PRACTICAL  EFFECTS  OF         [eSSAY  III. 

is  no  hope  of  an  eradication  of  war,  but  by  an  absolute  and  to- 
tal abandonment  of  it. 


OF  THE   PROBABLE    PRACTICAL    EFFECTS   OF  ADHE- 
RING TO  THE  MORAL  LAW  IN  RESPECT  TO  WAR. 

We  have  seen  that  the  duties  of  the  religion  which  God 
has  imparted  to  mankind  require  irresistance  ;  and  surely  it 
is  reasonable  to  hope,  even  without  a  reference  to  experience, 
that  he  will  make  our  irresistance  subservient  to  our  interests : 
that  if,  for  the  purpose  of  conforming  to  his  will,  we  subject 
ourselves  to  difficulty  or  danger,  he  will  protect  us  in  our  obe- 
dience, and  direct  it  to  our  benefit :  that  if  he  requires  us  not 
to  be  concerned  in  war,  he  will  preserve  us  in  peace  :  that  he 
will  not  desert  those  who  have  no  other  protection,  and  who 
have  abandoned  all  other  protection  because  they  confide  in 
His  alone. 

This  we  may  reverently  hope ;  yet  it  is  never  to  be  forgot- 
ten that  our  apparent  interests  in  the  present  life  are  some- 
times, in  the  economy  of  God,  made  subordinate  to  our  inter- 
ests in  futurity. 

Yet,  even  in  reference  only  to  the  present  state  of  existence, 
I  believe  that  we  shall  find  that  the  testimony  of  experience  is, 
that  forbearance  is  most  conducive  to  our  interests.  There  is 
practical  truth  in  the  position,  that  "  When  a  man's  ways  please 
the  Lord,"  he  "  maketh  even  his  enemies  to  be  at  peace  with  himP 

The  reader  of  American  history  will  recollect,  that  in  the 
beginning  of  the  last  century  a  desultory  and  most  dreadful 
warfare  was  carried  on  by  the  natives  against  the  European 
settlers  ;  a  warfare  that  was  provoked — as  such  warfare  has 
almost  always  originally  been — by  the  injuries  and  violence 
of  the  Christians.  The  mode  of  destruction  was  secret  and 
sudden.  The  barbarians  sometimes  lay  in  wait  for  those  who 
might  come  within  their  reach,  on  the  highway  or  in  the 
fields,  and  shot  them  without  warning :  and  sometimes  they 
attacked  the  Europeans  in  their  houses,  "  scalping  some,  and 
knocking  out  the  brains  of  others."  From  this  horrible  war- 
fare the  inhabitants  sought  safety  by  abandoning  their  homes, 
and  retiring  to  fortified  places,  or  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
garrisons  ;  and  those  whom  necessity  still  compelled  to  pass 
beyond  the  limits  of  such  protection,  provided  themselves 
with  arms  for  their  defence.  But  amidst  this  dreadful  deso- 
lation and  universal  terror,  the  Society  of  Friends,  who  were- 
a  considerable  portion  of  the  whole  population,  were  steadfast 


GHAP.  XIX,]    ADHERING  TO  THE  MORAL  LAW,  ETC.  559 

to  their  principles.  They  would  neither  retire  to  garrisons 
nor  provide  themselves  with  arms.  They  remained  openly 
in  the  country,  whilst  the  rest  were  flying  to  the  forts.  They 
still  pursued  their  occupations  in  the  fields  or  at  their  homes, 
without  a  weapon  either  for  annoyance  or  defence.  And 
what  was  their  fate  ?  They  lived  in  security  and  quiet.  The 
habitation  which,  to  his  armed  neighbour,  was  the  scene  of 
murder  and  of  the  scalping-knife,  was  to  the  unarmed  Quaker 
a  place  of  safety  and  of  peace. 

Three  of  the  Society  were  however  killed.  And  who  were 
they  ?  They  were  three  who  abandoned  their  principles. 
Two  of  these  victims  were  men  who,  in  the  simple  language 
of  the  narrator,  "  used  to  go  to  their  labour  without  any  wea- 
pons, and  trusted  to  the  Almighty,  and  depended  on  his  pro- 
vidence to  protect  them,  (it  being  their  principle  not  to  use 
weapons  of  war  to  oflfend  others,  or  to  defend  themselves ;) 
but  a  spirit  of  distrust  taking  place  in  their  minds,  they  took 
weapons  of  war  to  defend  themselves,  and  the  Indians  who 
had  seen  them  several  times  without  them  and  let  them  alone, 
saying  they  were  peaceable  men  and  hurt  nobody,  therefore 
they  would  not  hurt  them — now  seeing  them  have  guns,  and 
supposing  they  designed  to  kill  the  Indians,  they  therefore 
shot  the  men  dead."  The  third  whose  life  was  sacrificed  was 
a  woman,  "  who  had  remained  in  her  habitation,"  not  think- 
ing herself  warranted  in  going  "  to  a  fortified  place  for  preser- 
vation, neither  she,  her  son,  nor  daughter,  nor  to  take  thither 
the  little  ones  ;  but  the  poor  woman  after  some  time  began  to 
let  in  a  slavish  fear,  and  advised  her  children  to  go  with  her 
to  a  fort  not  far  from  their  dwelling."  She  went; — and 
shortly  afterwards  "  the  bloody,  cruel  Indians,  lay  by  the  way, 
and  killed  her."* 

The  fate  of  the  Quakers  during  the  Rebellion  in  Ireland 
was  nearly  similar.  It  is  well  known  that  the  Rebellion  was 
a  time  not  only  of  open  war  but  of  cold-blooded  murder  ;  of 
the  utmost  fury  of  bigotry,  and  the  utmost  exasperation  of  re- 
venge. Yet  the  Quakers  were  preserved  even  to  a  proverb  ; 
and  when  strangers  passed  through  streets  of  ruin  and  ob- 
served a  house  standing  uninjured  and  alone,  they  would 
sometimes  point,  and  say, — "  That,  doubtless,  is  the  house  of 
a  Quaker."t  So  complete  indeed  was  the  preservation  which 
these  people  experienced,  that  in  an  official  document  of  the 
Society  they  say, — "  no  member  of  our  society  fell  a  sacrifice 

*  See  Select  anecdotes,  «fec.  by  John  Barclay,  pages  71,  79. 
t  The  Moravians,  whose  principles  upon  the  subject  of  war  are  similar 
to  those  of  the  Quakers,  experienced  also  similar  preservation. 


i560  PROBABLE  PRACTICAL  EFFECTS  OF         [eSSAY  III. 

but  one  young  man ;" — and  that  young  man  had  assumed  regi- 
mentals and  arms."* 

It  were  to  no  purpose  to  say,  in  opposition  to  the  evidence 
of  these  facts,  that  they  form  an  exception  to  a  general  rule. — 
The  exception  to  the  rule  consists  in  the  trial  of  the  experiment 
of  non-resistance,  not  in  its  success.  Neither  were  it  to  any  pur- 
pose to  say,  that  the  savages  of  America  or  the  desperadoes  of 
Ireland,  spared  the  Quakers  because  they  were  previously 
known  to  be  an  unoffending  people,  or  because  the  Quakers 
had  previously  gained  the  love  of  these  by  forbearance  or  good 
offices  : — we  concede  all  this ;  it  is  the  very  argument  which 
we  maintain.  We  say,  that  an  uniform  undeviating  regard 
to  the  peaceable  obligations  of  Christianity,  becomes  the  safe- 
guard  of  those  who  practise  it.  We  venture  to  maintain,  that 
no  reason  whatever  can  be  assigned,  why  the  fate  of  the 
Quakers  would  not  be  the  fate  of  all  who  should  adopt  their 
conduct.  No  reason  can  be  assigned  why,  if  their  number 
had  been  multiplied  tenfold  or  a  hundred-fold,  they  would  not 
have  been  preserved.  If  there  be  such  a  reason,  let  us  hear 
it.  The  American  and  Irish  Quakers  were,  to  the  rest  of  the 
conununity,  what  one  nation  is  to  a  continent.  And  we  must 
require  the  advocate  of  war  to  produce  (that  which  has  never 
yet  been  produced)  a  reason  for  believing,  that  although  indi- 
viduals exposed  to  destruction  were  preserved,  a  nation  ex- 
posed to  destruction  would  be  destroyed.  We  do  not  how- 
ever say,  that  if  a  people,  in  the  customary  state  of  men's  pas- 
sions, should  be  assailed  by  an  invader,  and  should,  on  a  sud- 
den, choose  to  declare  that  they  would  try  whether  Providence 
■would  protect  them — of  such  a  people,  we  do  not  say,  that 
they  would  experience  protection,  and  that  none  of  them  would 
be  killed :  but  we  say,  that  the  evidence  of  experience  is,  that 
a  people  who  habitually  regard  the  obligations  of  Christianity 
in  their  conduct  towards  other  men,  and  who  steadfastly  re- 
fuse, through  whatever  consequences,  to  engage  in  acts  of 
hostility  will  experience  protection  in  their  peacefulness : — And 
it  matters  nothing  to  the  argument,  whether  we  refer  that  pro- 
tection to  the  immediate  agency  of  Providence,  or  to  the  in- 
fluence of  such  conduct  upon  the  minds  of  men.f 

*  See  Hancock's  Principles  of  Peace  Exemplified. 

t  Ramond,  in  his  "  Travels  in  the  Pyrenees j"  fell  in  from  time  to  time 
with  those  desperate  marauders  who  infest  the  boundaries  of  Spain  and 
Italy — men  who  are  familiar  with  danger  and  robbery  and  blood.  What 
did  experience  teach  him  was  the  most  efficient  means  of  preserving  him- 
self from  injury?  To  go  "  unarmed."  He  found  that  he  had  "little  to 
apprehend  from  men  whom  we  inspire  with  no  distrust  or  envy,  and  every 
thing  to  expect  in  those  from  whom  we  claim  only  what  is  due  from  man 


CHAP.  XIX.]    ADHERING  TO  THE  MORAL  LAW,  ETC.  561 

Such  has  been  the  experience  of  the  unoffending  and  un- 
resisting, in  individual  life.  A  National  example  of  a  refusal 
%o  bear  arms,  has  only  once  been  exhibited  to  the  world :  but 
that  one  example  has  proved,  so  far  as  its  political  circumstances 
enabled  it  to  prove,  all  that  humanity  could  desire  and  all  that 
scepticism  could  demand,  in  favour  of  our  argument. 

It  has  been  the  ordinary  practice  of  those  who  have  colon- 
ized distant  countries,  to  force  a  footing,  or  to  maintain  it,  with 
the  sword.  One  of  the  first  objects  has  been  to  build  a  fort 
and  to  provide  a  military.  The  adventurers  became  soldiers, 
and  the  colony  was  a  garrison.  Pennsylvania  was  however 
colonized  by  men  who  believed  that  war  was  absolutely  in- 
compatible with  Christianity,  and  who  therefore  resolved  not 
to  practise  it.  Having  determined  not  to  fight,  they  maintained 
no  soldiers  and  possessed  no  arms.  They  planted  them- 
selves in  a  country  that  was  surrounded  by  savages,  and  by 
savages  who  knew  they  were  unarmed.  If  easiness  of  con- 
quest, or  incapability  of  defence,  could  subject  them  to  out- 
rage, the  Pennsylvanians  might  have  been  the  very  sport  of 
violence.  Plunderers  might  have  robbed  them  without  retal- 
iation, and  armies  might  have  slaughtered  them  without  re- 
sistance. If  they  did  not  give  a  temptation  to  outrage,  no 
temptation  could  be  given.  But  these  were  the  people  who 
possessed  their  country  in  security,  whilst  those  around  them 
were  trembling  for  their  existence.  This  was  a  land  of  peace, 
whilst  every  other  was  a  land  of  war.  The  conclusion  is  in- 
evitable, although  it  is  extraordinary  : — they  were  in  no  need 
of  arras,  because  they  would  not  use  them. 

These  Indians  were  sufiiciently  ready  to  commit  outrages 
upon  other  States,  and  often  visited  them  with  desolation  and 
slaughter :  with  that  sort  of  desolation,  and  that  sort  of 
slaughter,  which  might  be  expected  from  men  whom  civilization 
had  not  reclaimed  from  cruelty,  and  whom  religion  had  not 
awed  into  forbearance.  "  But  whatever  the  quarrels  of  the 
Pennsylvanian  Indians  were  with  others,  they  uniformly  re- 
spected and  held  as  it  were  sacred,  the  territories  of  William 

to  man.  The  laws  of  nature  still  exist  for  those  who  have  long  shaken 
off  the  law  of  civil  government." — "The  asseissin  has  been  my  guide  in  the 
defiles  of  the  boundaries  of  Italy :  the  smuggler  of  the  Pyrenees  has  re- 
ceived me  with  a  welcome  in  his  secret  paths.  Armed,  I  should  have 
been  the  enemy  of  both :  unarmed,  they  have  alike  respected  me.  In 
such  expectation  I  have  long  since  laid  aside  all  menacing  apparatus 
w^hatever.  Arms  irritate  the  wicked  and  intimidate  the  simple  ;  the  man 
of  peace  amongst  mankind  has  a  much  more  sacred  defence — his  chai 
acter." 


562  PROBABLE  PRACTICAL  EFFfiCTS  OF        [eSSAY  III. 

Penn.*  The  Pennsylvanians  never  lost  man,  woman  or  child 
by  them  ;  which  neither  the  colony  of  Maryland,  nor  that  of 
Virginia  could  say,  no  more  than  the  great  colony  of  New- 
England."t 

The  security  and  quiet  of  Pennsylvania  was  not  a  transient 
freedom  from  war,  such  as  might  accidentally  happen  to  any 
nation.  She  continued  to  enjoy  it  "  for  more  than  seventy 
years,"  ^  and  "  subsisted  in  the  midst  of  six  Indian  nations, 
without  so  much  as  a  militia  for  her  defence. "§  "  The 
Pennsylvanians  became  armed,  though  without  arms;  they 
became  strong,  though  without  strength;  they  became  safe, 
without  the  ordinary  means  of  safety.  The  constable's  staff 
was  the  only  instrument  of  authority  amongst  them  for  the 
greater  part  of  a  century,  and  never  during  the  administration 
of  Penn,  or  that  of  his  proper  successors,  was  there  a  quarrel 
or  a  war. "II  , 

I  cannot  wonder  that  these  people  were  not  molested — ex- 
traordinary and  unexampled  as  their  security  was.  There  is 
something  so  noble  in  this  perfect  confidence  in  the  Supreme 
Protector,  in  this  utter  exclusion  of  "  slavish  fear,"  in  this 
voluntary  relinquishment  of  the  means  of  injury  or  of  defence, 
that  I  do  not  wonder  that  even  ferocity  could  be  disarmed  by 
such  virtue.  A  people  generously  living  without  arms  amidst 
nations  of  warriors  !  Who  would  attack  a  people  such  as 
this  ?  There  are  few  men  so  abandoned  as  not  to  respect 
such  confidence.  It  were  a  peculiar  and  an  unusual  inten- 
sity of  wickedness  that  would  not  even  revere  it. 

And  when  was  the  security  of  Pennsylvania  molested,  and 
its  peace  destroyed  ? — -When  the  men  who  had  directed  its  coun- 
sels, and  who  would  not  engage  in  war,  were  outvoted  in  its 
legislature  :  when  the?/  who  supposed  that  there  was  a  greater 
security  in  the  sword  than  in  Christianity,  became  the  predomi- 
nating body.  From  that  hour  the  Pennsylvanians  transferred 
their  confidence  in  Christian  Principles,  to  a  confidence  in 
their  arms  ; — and  from  that  hour  to  the  present  they  have  been 
subject  to  war. 

Such  is  the  evidence,  derived  from  a  national  example,  of  the 
consequences  of  a  pursuit  of  the  Christian  policy  in  relation 
£0  war.  Here  are  a  people  who  absolutely  refused  to  fight, 
and  who  incapacitated  themselves  for  resistance  by  refusing  to 
possess  arms  ;  and  these  were  the  people  whose  land,  amidst 
surrounding  broils  and  slaughter,  was  selected  as  a  land  of 
security  and  peace.     The  only  national  opportunity  which  the 

*  Clarkson.  t  Oldmixon,  Anno  1708.  X  Proud. 

§  Oldmixon.  II  Clarkson :  Life  of  Penn. 


CHAP.  XIX.]    ADHERING  TO  THE  MORAL  LAW,  ETC.  563 

virtue  of  the  Christian  world  has  afforded  us,  of  ascertaining 
the  safety  of  relying  upon  God  for  defence,  has  determined 
that  it  is  safe. 

If  the  evidence  which  we  possess  do  not  satisfy  us  of  the 
expediency  of  confiding  in  God,  what  evidence  do  we  ask, 
or  what  can  we  receive  ?  We  have  his  promise  that  he  will 
protect  those  who  abandon  their  seeming  interests  in  the  per- 
formance of  his  will ;  and  we  have  the  testimony  of  those 
who  have  confided  in  him,  that  he  has  protected  them.  Can 
the  advocate  of  war  produce  one  single  instance  in  the  his- 
tory of  man,  of  a  person  who  had  given  an  unconditional 
obedience  to  the  will  of  Heaven,  and  who  did  not  find  that 
his  conduct  was  wise  as  well  as  virtuous,  that  it  accorded  with 
his  interests  as  well  as  with  his  duty.  We  ask  the  same 
question  in  relation  to  the  peculiar  obligations  to  irresistance. 
Where  is  the  man  who  regrets,  that,  in  observance  of  the 
forbearing  duties  of  Christianity,  he  consigned  his  preserva- 
tion to  the  superintendence  of  God  ? — And  the  solitary  na- 
tional example  that  is  before  us,  confirms  the  testimony  of 
private  life ;  for  there  is  sufficient  reason  for  believing,  that 
no  nation,  in  modern  ages,  has  possessed  so  large  a  portion 
of  virtue  or  of  happiness,  as  Pennsylvania  before  it  had 
seen  human  blood.  1  would  therefore  repeat  the  question — 
What  evidence  do  we  ask  or  can  we  receive  ? 

This  is  the  point  from  which  we  wander :  we  do  not  be- 
lieve IN  THE  PROVIDENCE  OF  GoD.  When  this  statement 
is  formally  made  to  us,  we  think,  perhaps  that  it  is  not  true  ; 
but  our  practice  is  an  evidence  of  its  truth ;  for  if  we  did  be- 
lieve, we  should  also  confide  in  it,  and  should  be  willing  to 
stake  upon  it  the  consequences  of  our  obedience.*  We  can 
talk  with  sufficient  fluency  of  "  trusting  in  Providence  ;"  but 
in  the  application  of  it  to  our  conduct  in  life,  we  know  won- 
derfully little.  Who  is  it  that  confides  in  Providence,  and 
for  what  does  he  trust  him?  Does  his  confidence  induce 
him  to  set  aside  his  own  views  of  interest  and  safety,  and 
simply  to  obey  precepts  which  appear  inexpedient  and  unsafe  ? 
This  is  the  confidence  that  is  of  value,  and  of  which  we 
know  so  little.  There  are  many  who  believe  that  war  is  dis- 
allowed by  Christianity,  and  who  would  rejoice  that  it  were 
for  ever  abolished;  but  there  are  few  who  are  willing  to 
maintain  an  undaunted  and  unyielding  stand  against  it.     They 

*  "  The  dread  of  being  destroyed  by  our  enemies  if  we  do  not  go  to 
war  with  them,  is  a  plain  and  unequivocal  proof  of  our  disbelief  in  the 
superintendence  of  Divine  Providence." — The  Lawfulness  of  Defensive 
War  impartially  considered.    By  a  Member  of  the  Church  of  England. 


564  PROBABLE  PRACTICAL  EFFECTS  Of  [eSSAY  III. 

can  talk  of  the  loveliness  of  peace,  ay,  and  argue  against  the 
lawfulness  of  war ;  but  when  difficulty  or  suffering  would  be 
the  consequence,  they  will  not  refuse  to  do  what  they  know  to 
be  unlawful,  they  will  not  practise  the  peacefulness  which 
they  say  they  admire.  Those  who  are  ready  to  sustain  the 
consequences  of  undeviating  obedience,  are  the  supporters  of 
whom  Christianity  stands  in  need.,  She  wants  men  who  are 
willing  to  suffer  for  her  principles. 

The  positions,  then,  which  we  have  endeavoured  to  estab- 
lish are  these — 

I.  That  those  considerations  which  operate  as  general 
Causes  of  War,  are  commonly  such  as  Christianity  con- 
demns : 

II.  that  the  Effects  of  War,  are  to  a  very  great  extent, 
prejudicial  to  the  moral  character  of  a  people,  and  to 
their  social  and  political  welfare  : 

III.  That  the  General  Character  of  Christianity  is  wholly 
incongruous  with  war,  and  that  its  General  Duties  are 
incompatible  with  it : 

IV.  That  some  of  the  express  Precepts  and  Declarations 
of  the  Christian  Scriptures  virtually  forbid  it : 

V.  That  the  Primitive  Christians  believed  that  Christ  had 
forbidden  War :  and  that  some  of  them  suffered  death  in 
affirmance  of  this  belief : 

VI.  That  God  has  declared,  in  Prophecy,  that  it  is  His 
will  that  war  should  eventually  be  eradicated  from  the 
earth;  and  that  this  eradication  will  be  effected  by 
Christianity,  by  the  influence  of  its  present  Principles  : 

VII.  That  those  who  have  refused  to  engage  in  War,  in 
consequence  of  their  belief  of  its  inconsistency  with 
Christianity,  have  found  that  Providence  has  protected 
them. 

Now,  we  think  that  the  establishment  of  any  considerable 
number  of  these  positions  is  sufficient  for  our  argument. 
The  establishment  of  the  whole  forms  a  body  of  Evidence, 
to  which  I  am  not  able  to  believe  that  an  enquirer,  to  whom 
the  subject  was  new,  would  be  able  to  withhold  his  assent. 
But  since  such  an  enquirer  cannot  be  found,  I  would  invite 
the  reader  to  lay  prepossession  aside,  to  suppose  himself  to 
have  now  first  heard  of  battles  and  slaughter,  and  dispassion- 
ately to  examine  whether  the  evidence  in  favour  of  Peace  be 
not  very  great,  and  whether  the  objections  to  it  bear  any  pro- 
portion to  the  evidence  itself.  But  whatever  may  be  the  dc 
termination  upon  this  quealion,  surely  it  is  reasonable  to  try 


CHAP.  XIX.]    ADHERING  TO  THE  MORAL  LAW,  ETC.  665 

the  experiment,  whether  security  cannot  be  maintained  with- 
out slaughter.  Whatever  be  the  reasons  for  war,  it  is  certain 
that  it  produces  enormous  mischief.  Even  waiving  the  obH- 
gations  of  Christianity,  we  have  to  choose  between  evils  that 
are  certain  and  evils  that  are  doubtful ;  between  the  actual 
endurance  of  a  great  calamity,  and  the  possibility  of  a  less. 
It  certainly  cannot  be  proved,  that  Peace  would  not  be  the 
best  policy :  and  since  we  know  that  the  present  system  is 
bad,  it  were  reasonable  and  wise  to  try  whether  the  other  is 
not  better.  In  reality  I  can  scarcely  conceive  the  possibility 
of  a  greater  evil  than  that  which  mankind  now  endure ;  an 
evil,  moral  and  physical,  of  far  wider  extent,  and  far  greater 
intensity,  than  our  familiarity  with  it  allows  us  to  suppose. 
If  a  system  of  Peace  be  not  productive  of  less  evil  than  the 
system  of  war,  its  consequences  must  indeed  be  enormously 
bad ;  and  that  it  would  produce  such  consequences,  we  have 
no  warrant  for  believing,  either  from  reason  or  from  pracT;ice 
— either  from  the  principles  of  the  moral  government  of  God, 
or  from  the  experience  of  mankind.  Whenever  a  people 
shall  pursue,  steadily  and  uniformly,  the  pacific  morality  of 
the  gospel,  and  shall  do  this  from  the  pure  motive  of  obedi- 
ence, there  is  no  reason  to  fear  for  the  consequences :  there 
is  no  reason  to  fear  that  they  would  experience  any  evils 
such  as  we  now  endure,  or  that  they  would  not  find  that 
Christianity  understands  their  interests  better  than  themselves ; 
and  that  the  surest,  and  the  only  rule  of  wisdom,  of  safety, 
and  of  expediency,  is  to  maintain  her  spirit  in  every  circum- 
stance of  life. 

"  There  is  reason  to  expect,"  says  Dr.  Johnson,  "  that  as 
the  world  is  more  enlightened,  policy  and  morality  will  at  last 
be  reconciled."*  When  this  enlightened  period  shall  arrive, 
we  shall  be  approaching,  and  we  shall  not  till  then  approach, 
that  era  of  purity  and  of  peace,  when  "violence  shall  no 
more  be  heard  in  our  land — wasting  nor  destruction  within 
our  borders ;" — ^that  era  in  which  God  has  promised  that 
"  they  shall  not  hurt  nor  destroy  in  all  his  holy  mountain." 
That  a  period  like  this  will  come,  I  am  not  able  to  doubt ;  I 
believe  it,  because  it  is  not  credible  that  he  will  always  en- 
dure the  butchery  of  man  by  man ;  because  he  has  declared 
that  he  will  not  endure  it ;  and  because  I  think  there  is  a  per- 
ceptible approach  of  that  period  in  which  he  will  say — "  it  is 
enough. "t  In  this  belief  the  Christian  may  rejoice  ;  he  may 
rejoice  that  the  number  is  increasing  of  those  who  are  at>king 
— "  Shall  the  sword  devour  for  ever  ?"  and  of  those  who, 
*  Falkland's  Islauds.  t  2  Sam.  xxiv.  16 

4» 


566  coNCLUsiojf.  [essay  m. 

whatever  be  the  opinions  or  the  practice  of  others,  are  openly- 
saying,  "  I  am  for  Peace."* 

It  will  perhaps  be  asked,  what  then  are  the  duties  of  a 
subject  who  believes  that  all  war  is  incompatible  with  his 
religion,  but  whose  governors  engage  in  a  war  and  demand 
his  service  1  We  answer  explicitly.  It  is  his  duty,  mildly  and 
temperately,  yet  firmly  to  refuse  to  serve. — Let  such  as  these 
remember,  that  an  honourable  and  an  awful  duty  is  laid  upon 
them.  It  is  upon  their  fidelity,  so  far  as  human  agency  is 
concerned,  that  the  Cause  of  Peace  is  suspended.  Let  them 
then  be  willing  to  avow  their  opinions  and  to  defend  them. 
Neither  let  them  be  contented  with  words  if  more  than  words, 
if  suffering  also,  is  required.  It  is  only  by  the  unyielding 
fidelity  of  virtue  that  corruption  can  be  extirpated.  If  you  be- 
lieve that  Jesus  Christ  has  prohibited  slaughter,  let  not  the 
opinions  or  the  commands  of  a  world  induce  you  to  join  in  it. 
By  this  "  steady  and  determinate  pursuit  of  virtue,"  the  bene- 
diction which  attaches  to  those  who  hear  the  sayings  of  God 
and  do  them,  will  rest  upon  you  ;  and  the  time  will  come  when 
even  the  world  will  honour  you,  as  contributors  to  the  work 
of  Human  Reformation. 


CONCLUSION. 

That  hope  which  was  intimated  at  the  commencement  of 
this  volume — that  a  period  of  greater  moral  purity  would 
eventually  arrive — ^has  sometimes  operated  as  an  encourage- 
ment to  the  writer,  in  enforcing  the  obligations  of  morality  to 
an  extent  which  few  who  have  written  such  books  have  ven- 
tured to  advocate.  In  exhibiting  a  standard  of  rectitude 
such  as  that  which  it  has  been  attempted  to  exhibit  here — a 
standard  to  which  not  many  in  the  present  day  are  willing  to 
conform,  and  of  which  many  would  willingly  dispute  the 
authority,  some  encouragement  was  needed ;  and  no  human 
encouragement  could  be  so  efficient  as  that  which  consisted  in 
the  belief,  that  the  principles  would  progressively  obtain  more 
and  more  of  the  concurrence  and  adoption  of  mankind. 

That  there  are  indications  of  an  advancement  of  the  hu- 
man species  towards  greater  purity  in  principle  and  in  prac- 
tice, cannot,  I  think,  be  disputed.  There  is  a  manifest  ad- 
*  Ps.  exx.  7. 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CONCLUSION.  567 

vancement  in  intellectual  concerns  : — Science  of  almost  every 
kind  is  extending  her  empire ; — Political  Institutions  are 
becoming  rapidly  ameliorated  ;* — and  Morality  and  Religion, 
if  their  progress  be  less  perceptible,  are  yet  advancing  with 
an  onward  pace.f 

Lamentations  over  the  happiness  or  excellence  of  other 
times,  have  generally  very  little  foundation  in  justice  or  rea- 
son.J  In  truth  they  cannot  be  just,  because  they  are  per- 
petual. There  has  probably  never  been  an  age  in  which 
mankind  have  not  bewailed  the  good  times  that  were  departed, 
and  made  mournful  comparisons  of  them  with  their  own.  If 
these  regrets  had  not  been  ill-founded,  the  world  must  have 
perpetually  sunk  deeper  and  deeper  in  wickedness,  and 
retired  further  and  further  towards  intellectual  night.  But 
the  intellectual  sun  has  been  visibly  advancing  towards  its 
noon ;  and  I  believe  there  never  was  a  period  in  which, 
speaking  collectively  of  the  species,  the  power  of  religion 
was  greater  than  it  is  now  :  at  least  there  never  was  a  period 
in  which  greater  efforts  were  made  to  diffuse  the  influence  of 
religion  amongst  mankind.  Men  are  to  be  judged  of  by  their 
fruits ;  and  why  should  men  thus  more  vigorously  exert 
themselves  to  make  others  religious,  if  the  power  of  religion 
did  not  possess  increased  influence  upon  their  own  minds  ? 
The  increase  of  crime — even  if  it  increased  in  a  progression 
more  rapid  than  that  of  population,  and  the   state  of  society 

*  "  The  degree  of  scientific  knowledge  which  would  once  have  con- 
ferred celebrity  and  immortality,  is  now,  in  this  country,  attained  by 
thousands  of  obscure  individuals." — Fox's  Lectures.  "  To  one  who  con- 
siders coolly  of  the  subject,  it  will  appear  that  human  nature  in  general, 
really  enjoys  more  liberty  at  present,  in  the  most  arbitrary  governments 
of  Europe,  than  it  ever  did  during  the  most  flourishing  period  of  ancient 
times." — Hume. 

t  Not  that  the  present  state,  or  the  prospects  of  the  world,  afford  any 
countenance  to  the  speculations — favourite  speculations  with  some  men — ■ 
respecting  "  human  perfectibility."  In  the  sense  in  which  this  phrase  is 
usually  employed,  I  fear  there  is  little  hope  of  the  perfection  of  man  ;  at 
least  there  is  little  hope,  if  Christianity  be  true.  Christianity  declares 
that  man  is  not  perfectible  except  by  the  immediate  assistance  of  God ; 
and  this  immediate  assistance  the  advocates  of  "  human  perfectibility  " 
are  not  wont  to  expect.  The  question  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  ordina- 
rily exhibited,  is  in  reality  a  question  of  the  truth  of  Christianity. 

X  "  This  humour  of  complaining  proceeds  from  the  frailty  of  our  na- 
tures ;  it  being  natural  for  man  to  complain  of  the  present,  and  to  com- 
mend the  times  past." — Sir  Josiah  Child,  1665.  This  was  one  hundred 
and  fifty  years  ago.  The  same  frailty  appears  to  have  subsisted  two  or 
three  thousands  of  years  before :  "  Say  not  thou  what  is  the  cause  that 
the  former  days  were  better  than  these?  for  thou  dost  not  enquire  wisely 
cone«rnlng  this." — £ccl«6.  vii.  10. 


56S  CONCLUSION.  |es9ay  m 

which  gives  rise  to  crime— is  a  very  imperfect  standard  of 
judgment.  Those  offences  of  which  civil  laws  take  cogni- 
zance, form  not  an  hundredth  part  of  the  wickedness  of  the 
world.  What  multitudes  are  there  of  bad  men  who  never 
yet  were  amenable  to  the  laws  !  How  extensive  may  be  the 
additional  purity  without  any  diminution  of  legal  crimes ! 

And  assuredly  there  is  a  perceptible  advance  in  the  senti- 
ments of  good  men  towards  a  higher  standard  of  morality. 
The  lawfulness  is  frequently  questioned  now  of  actions  of 
which,  a  few  ages  ago,  few  or  none  doubted  the  rectitude. 
Nor  is  it  to  be  disputed,  that  these  questions  are  resulting 
more  and  more  in  the  conviction,  that  this  higher  standard  is 
proposed  and  enforced  by  the  Moral  Law  of  God.  Who 
that  considers  these  things  will  hastily  affirm,  that  doctrines 
in  morality  which  refer  to  a  standard  that  to  him  is  new,  are 
unfounded  in  this  Moral  Law  ?  Who  will  think  it  sufficient, 
to  say  that  strange  things  are  brought  to  his  ears  ?  Who  will 
satisfy  himself  with  the  exclamation,  these  are  hard  sayings, 
who  can  hear  them  ?  Strange  things  must  be  brought  to  the 
ears  of  those  who  have  not  been  accustomed  to  hear  the 
truth.  Hard  sayings  must  be  heard  by  those  who  have  not 
hitherto  practised  the  purity  of  morality. 

Such  considerations,  I  say,  have  affijrded  encouragement  in 
the  attempt  to  uphold  a  standard  which  the  majority  of  man- 
kind have  been  little  accustomed  to  contemplate  ; — and  now 
and  in  time  to  come,  they  will  still  suffice  to  encourage, 
although  that  standard  should  be,  as  by  many  it  undoubtedly 
will  be,  rejected  and  contemned. 

I  am  conscious  of  inadequacy — what  if  I  speak  the  truth 
and  say,  I  am  conscious  of  unworthiness — thus  to  attempt  to 
advocate  the  Law  of  God.  Let  no  man  identify  the  advocate 
with  the  Cause,  nor  imagine,  when  he  detects  the  errors  and 
the  weaknesses  of  the  one,  that  the  other  is  therefore  errone- 
ous or  weak.  I  apologize  for  myself:  especially  I  apologize 
for  those  instances  in  which  the  character  of  the  Christian 
may  have  been  merged  in  that  of  the  exposer  of  the  evils 
'"of  the  world.  There  is  a  Christian  love  which  is  paramount 
to  all ; — a  love  which  he  only  is  likely  sufficiently  to  main- 
tain, who  remembers  that  he  who  exposes  an  evil  and  he 
who  partakes  in  it,  will  soon  stand  together  as  suppliants  for 
the  mercy  of  God. 

And  finally,  having  written  a  book  which  is  devoted  almost 
exclusively  to  disquisitions  on  Morality,  I  am  solicitous  lest 
the  reader  should  imagine  that  I  regard  the  practice  of  mo- 
rality as  all  that  God  requires  of  Man.     I  believe  fai  other ; 


CHAP.  XIX.]  CONCLUSION.  569 

and  am  desirous  of  here  expressing  the  conviction,  that 
although  it  becomes  not  us  to  limit  the  mercy  of  God,  or  cu- 
riously to  define  the  conditions  on  which  he  will  extend  that 
mercy — ^yet  that  the  true  and  safe  foundation  of  our  hope  is 
in  "the  redemption  that  is  in  Christ  Jesus." 

48*' 


I 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Advowsons, 473 

Agency,  immoral, 206 

Amusements,  public, 111,269 

Antiquity,  of  appealing  to, 532 

Arbitration, 150 

,  courts  of, 395 

Armies,  loan  of, 528 

Articles  of  religion,  subscription  to, 195 

Attributes,  the  divine, 33 

Ballot, 367 

Bankrupts, 413 

Bequests,  charitable, 126 

Bible  Society,... 378 

Bills  of  exchange, 129 

Bishops,  bench  of, 358 

Books,  publication  of, 207 

Boxing  and  wrestling, 273 

Bravery, 213,  223 

British  constitution, 353 

Canvassing  for  votes, 369 

"Catholic  Question,  The," ^ 320 

Ceremonial  institutions, 112 

Ceremonials  and  rituals, 116 

Children,  provision  for, 145 

Christianity,  benevolence  of, 51 

Church. — See  Religious  Establishments,  &c 438,  50C' 

the  primitive, 440 

an  established, 441 

alliance  of,  with  the  state, 446,  464,  481 

Civil  obedience 322 

Classics,  the  ancient, 239,  257 

Clergy. — See  Religious  Establishments,  Priesthood,  the  Church,  &c. 

Commons,  House  of, 361 

Confiscations, 135 

Conscience,  the  nature,  dictates,  and  authority  of, 55,  58,  75,  260 

Conversation,  religious, 106 

Courage, 213,224 

Courts  of  Equity, 391,  398 

Martial,  evidence  in, 193 


572  INDEX. 

PAOR 

Creeds  and  confessions 451 

Creed,  the  Athanasian, 478 

Crime,  as  regarded  by  the  Civil  and  by  the  Moral  Law, 403 

Crimes,  (and  vices,)  eis  they  are  regarded  by  the  Moral  Law,  and  by 

Public  Opinion, 212 

Curse,  a, 180 

Days,  Non-Sanctity  of, 107 

Death,  Punishment  of, 428 

Debts,  Perpetual  Obligation  to  Pay, 121 

Minors,  a  wife's, 128,  129 

Debtor's,  Criminal, 410 

Defendants,  Unjust, 132 

Devotion,  Factitious  Semblances  of, 105 

Distraints, 131 

Drama,  The, 269 

Duelling, 77,  216,  275,  409 

Duty,  mode  of  applying  the  precepts  of  Scripture  to  questions  of, 42 

Ecclesiastics,  Noble, 478 

Education,  Intellectual  and  Moral, 239,  250,  254 

of  the  People, 265,377 

Elective  Franchise,  The, 363 

Executions,  Public, 430 

Expediency, 24,  93,  307 

Extortion, 132 

Falsehoods,  (see  also  Lies,) 173 

in  Legal  Documents, 178 

Fame, 233,  309,  374 

Military,  not  durable, 226 

Farnily — "  Keeping  up  the  Family," 149 

Splendour  of, 382 

Fualis  of  Great  Men, 233 

Fdo  de  Se,  Verdict  of, 280,  284 

Field  Sports, 272 

Forbearance, 214,292 

Fornuilaries,  Devotional, 112 

Fortitude, 214 

Fraud,  and  other  modes  of  Dishonesty, 214 

Glory,"  Military  Virtues,  &c 218,  519 

Government,  Civil,  different  forms  of, 333  to  341 

Grammar,  English, 245 

Heirs, 124 

Historical  Works, 239 

"  Holy  Alliance,  The," 309 

Holydays, Ill 

Houses  of  Infamy, , 142 

Hyperbole, 177 

Improvements  on  Estates, 140 

Infanticide, 75 

Inns, 210 


INDEX.  573 

PAGE. 

Insolvency, 120,  410 

Institutions,  Ceremonial, 112 

Intestates, 125,  384 

Insurance, 139 

Irony, 176 

Justice,  Administration  of, 334 

Law  of  the  Land, 80 

of  Nature, 85 

of  Nations, 95 

of  Honour, 99 

Laws,  Fixed, 387,  394 

,  Useless— Bad, 310,  380,  402 

Legal  Injustice, 153 

Practice, 154 

-,  Effects  of, 159 

,  Morality,  applicable  to, 156 

Legatees  and  Heirs, 124 

Libels, 414 

Liberty,  Civil 310 

,  Political, 312 

,  Religious, 314,  453 

• ,  Incompatible  with  Religious  Establishments 319 

Libraries,  Circulating, 210 

Lies,  (see  also  Falsehoods,) 173 

Lying  for  Particular  purposes, 214 

Litigation, 150 

Lords,  House  of, 356 

Lotteries, 379 

Masquerades, 271 

Ministerial  Union, 350 

Ministers,  Christian,  legal  provisions  for, 457,488 

,  voluntary  pajonent  of, 462,  496 

Monarchy,  Hereditary  and  Elective, 335 

Moral  Law,  The,  Variations  in, 41 

■ Every  human  being  possesses, 30,  70,  77 

Spirit  of, 47 

Benevolence  of, 51,  534 

Nations  not  exempted  from  the  obligations  of,  307,  553 

Effects  of  adhering  to,  in  respect  of  War, 558 

Moral  Legislation, 375 

Moral  Obligation,  Foundation  of, 15 

Moral  Sense,  Opinions  respecting  a, 61 

Morality  of  the  Patriarchal,  Mosaic,  and  Christizm  Dispensations,...     37 

Supremacy  of  Christian, 39 

No  formal  system  of,  in  Scripture, 43 

Influence  of  individuals  upon  public  notions  of, 213 

War  reverses  the  rules  of, 523 

Motives  of  action, 36 

Murder, 435 

and  human  destruction  under  other  names, 214 


574  INDEX. 

PA08 

Nature,  definition  of  the  word,  &c., 89 

Newspapers, 237 

Not  at  Home, 178 

Oaths,  their  moral  character, 179 

their  efficacy  as  securities  for  veracity, 186 

effects  of, 193 

moral  character,  &c.,  of  particular  oaths, 195,  202,  331 

of  allegiance, 196,  3U 

Obligation,  moral,  foundation  of, 15 

Obligations,  religious, 103 

identical  authority  of,  moral  and  religious, 32 

Offences — created  offences, 406 

Oratorios, 271 

Pagans,  the  Will  of  God  communicated  to, 30,  70 

Pardons, 394 

Parliaments,  annual  and  septennial, 367 

Patriotism, 214,225,502 

■ not  the  soldier's  motive, 225,  505 

Patronage  and  Party, 348,  350 

Peculation, 162 

Penal  Animadversion,  proper  subjects  of, 403,  424 

Pennsylvania,  colonization  of, 561 

Placability, 214,534 

Placemen  and  Pensioners 373 

Pleading  in  Courts  of  Justice, 162 

Pluralities, 474 

Political  Influence, 342 

• rights  and  obligations 294 

Power,  the  possession  of, ib 

the  exercise  of, 301,  304 

Prayer,  Forms  of, 116 

Press,  the, 236,  423 

Priesthood. — See  Religious  Establishments,  the  Church,  &c. 

averse  from  reformation, 467 

recoil  from  works  of  philanthropy, 481 

Primogeniture, 380 

Privateers, 134 

Profaneness, 214 

Promises, — Lies — Parole, 169,  170 

extorted, 171 

Property,  Origin  of.  Right  of, 119 

Accumulation  of, 383 

Inequality  of, 144 

Literary, 143 

Prosecutions, 211 

Providence  of  God,  Unconditional  reliance  on, 563 

PubHc  Money,  Receivers  of, 136 

Public  Opinion,  its  influence  on  the  practice  of  virtue, 188 

errors  of,  in  regard  to  some  questions  of  morality,...  213 

Punishment,  proper  ends  of, 423 

of  Death, 428 


INDEX.  675 

PAGE. 

Religious  Establishments, 319,438,462 

of  England  and  Ireland 463 

incompatible  with  Religious  Liberty, 319 

Rewards, 143 

Resentment, 214,  536 

Right  and  Wrong,  Standard  of, 16 

Subordinate  standards  of, 31 

Rights  and  Obligations,  Private, 103 

Political, 294 

Rights  of  Self-Defence, 285 

Rituals, 116 

Sabbath,  temporal,  employments  on  the, 108 

Sabbatical  Institutions, 107 

Scepticism, 117 

Schools,  Public, 242,253 

Infant, 268 

Science  and  Literature, 246 

Scripture, 37 

Self-Defence,  Rights  of, 285 

Seduction, 161,  403,  408 

Sermon  on  the  Mount, 534 

Settlements, 141 

Shipments, 130 

Slavery, 506 

Slaves, 133 

Subscription  to  Articles  of  Religion, 195,203 

Suflrage,  Universal, 365 

Suicide, 280 

"  Sunday  Papers," Ill 

Sympathy, 18 

Taxes,  the  payment  of, 543 

Tests,  Religious, 319,  448 

Tithes, 482 

Toleration, 317 

Turf,  the, 273 

Verdicts, 394 

Vices,  National, 75 

Virtue, 35 

Virtues  as  they  are  regarded  by  the  Moral  Law,  and  by  Public 

Opinion, 214 

Military, 218 

Unchastity, 214,  227 

Untruths,  (see  also  Lies,) 158,  177 

UtUity, 18,  26,  91 

War,  Causes  of— Consequences  of, 511,  513,  521 

■ Lawfulness  of, 531 

Opinions  and  example  of  the  early  Christians, 548 

Christians  first  engage  in, 551 


fi76  INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Wars,  always  aggressive, 556 

of  the  Jews, 552 

Wealth,  accumulation  of, 144 

Will  of  God, 16 

communication  of, 19 

■ immediate, 54,  70 

Supreme  authority  of, 20 

\ subordinate  means  of  discovering, 80 

Wills,  Legatees,  and  Heirs, 124 

Worship,  Religious,  (see  Religious  obligations) 103 


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